Counter-IED Report Spring-Summer 2024

ISSN2050-6732(Print)

ISSN2050-6740(Online)

SYNCHRONIZEDC-IEDSTRATEGYINEUROPETOCOUNTER THEEVOLVINGIEDTHREAT

NECESSITYOFADESIGNATEDLEADENTITYWITHINNATIONAL C-IEDENTERPRISES

NESTINGC-IEDAPPROPRIATELYWITHINASTATE’SNATIONAL SECURITYARCHITECTURE

ATOONARROWSTRAIT:EXPLOSIVETHREATDYNAMICS INTHEREDSEA

IEDATTACKSAIMEDTOIMPEDEINDIA’SECONOMICGROWTH

ISLAMICSTATETWINSUICIDEBOMBINGS,KERMAN,IRAN

VIPSECURITY–AMATTEROFLIFEANDDEATH

EDITORIALANDTECHNOLOGYPARTNERS

Counter-IEDReport PublishedbyDeltaBusinessMediaLimited 167-169GreatPortlandStreet,5th Floor London,W1W5PF UnitedKingdom

Tel:+44(0)2071932303 info@deltabusinessmedia.com www.counteriedreport.com

ISSN2050-6732(Print) ISSN2050-6740(Online)

Theopinionsandviewsexpressedintheeditorialcontentinthisreportare thoseoftheauthorsaloneanddonotnecessarilyrepresenttheviewsofany organisationwithwhichtheymaybeassociated.Materialinadvertisements andpromotionalfeaturesmaybeconsideredtorepresenttheviewsofthe advertisersandpromoters.Theviewsandopinionsexpressedinthisreport donotnecessarilyexpresstheviewsofthepublisher.Whileeverycarehas beentakeninthepreparationofthereport,thepublisherisnotresponsible forsuchopinionsandviewsorforanyinaccuraciesinthearticles.

©2024.Theentirecontentsofthispublicationareprotectedbycopyright. Fulldetailsareavailablefromthepublisher.Allrightsreserved.Nopartofthis publicationmaybereproduced,storedinaretrievalsystemortransmittedin anyformorbyanymeans,electronic,mechanicalphotocopying,recording orotherwise,withoutthepriorpermissionofthecopyrightowner.

SMART, STRONG, AFFORDABLE

CONTENTS

16SYNCHRONIZEDC-IEDSTRATEGYINEUROPE TOCOUNTERTHEEVOLVINGIEDTHREAT

ByJohannFischer,HeadofUnitLand&Logisticsand DannyHeerlein,ProjectOffcerC-IED EuropeanDefenceAgency

26EUROSATORY2024

27NECESSITYOFADESIGNATEDLEADENTITYWITHIN NATIONALC-IEDENTERPRISES

ByPaulAmoroso,anexplosivehazardsspecialist atAssessedMitigationOptions(AMO)consultancy

34COUNTERTERROREXPO – CTX2024

35NESTINGC-IEDAPPROPRIATELYWITHINASTATE’S NATIONALSECURITYARCHITECTURE

ByPaulAmoroso,anexplosivehazardsspecialist atAssessedMitigationOptions(AMO)consultancy 42SAHAEXPO2024–TÜRKİYE’s LEADING INTERNATIONALDEFENCE&AEROSPACEEXHIBITION

Countermine Detectors

Find IEDs, UXO, and Mines with Garrett Detectors

Trusted worldwide. Garrett AML Pulse Induction countermine detectors save lives by finding mines, UXO, and IED threats in all-terrain conditions.

43ATOONARROWSTRAIT:EXPLOSIVETHREATDYNAMICS INTHEREDSEA

ByLieutenantColonelJoseMRufas,ChiefofAttackthe NetworksBranch,C-IEDCentreofExcellence

51IEDATTACKSAIMEDTOIMPEDEINDIA’S ECONOMICGROWTH

ByColonelHRNaiduGade–IndianArmyVeteran

60FUTUREFORCESFORUM2024

61ISLAMICSTATETWINSUICIDEBOMBINGS,KERMAN,IRAN

ByChiefSuperintendent(ret.)MichaelCardash,Terrogence-Global

75KADEX2024 – KOREAARMYINTERNATIONAL DEFENSEINDUSTRYEXHIBITION

76VIPSECURITY–AMATTEROFLIFEANDDEATH

ByVincentDeery,CEO,3DX-RayLtd

FOREWORD

ByRobHyde-Bales,ConsultingEditor,Counter-IEDReport

Itismorethan50yearsagosincetheImprovised ExplosiveDevice(IED)madeitsfrstsignifcant globalappearance,andthiswasintheconfictin NorthernIreland.Inthosedaysitwasknownasa RoadsideBomb.Itrapidlyfoundfavourwithallthe terroristfactionsintheProvinceandtheIrish RepublicanArmy,inparticular,becameveryadept bombmakers.TheindiscriminateuseoftheIED exactedahightollindeathsandinjuriesamongthe securityforcesandcivilianpopulationinboth NorthernIrelandandmainlandUK.Suchwasits effectivenessthatthemilitaryhadtousehelicopters toensuresafemovementratherthanroadtravelin partsoftheProvince.

Violentextremistorganisations,splintergroupsand terroristsaffliatedwiththemcontinuetoposea signifcantdangertohumanlifeandtocausemass casualtiestargetingpubliceventsandgatheringsas wasdemonstratedintheManchesterArenaattackin May2017,theHamasattackonIsraelinOctober 2023andveryrecentlyintheattackonamusicvenue inRussia.On22March2024,aterroristattack occurredattheCrocusCityHallinKrasnogorsk, Moscowregion.Theattackclaimedover140lives andmorethan550peoplewereinjuredbygunshot woundsandfre-relatedinjuries.Fourattackers armedwithgunsandincendiarydevicesstormedthe

packedconcertarenabeforesettingitonfre.The allegedattackersweredetainedintheBryanskregion ofRussia,400kilometressouth-westofMoscow hoursafterthemassacre.ISIS-K,theAfghanistanbasedsplintergroupoftheIslamicState(IS,formerly ISIS),claimedresponsibilityshortlyaftertheattack. Theinvestigationisongoing,andaccordingto thelatestreports12suspectswerearrestedin connectionwiththisattack.

Theconfictandtensionscontinuethroughout numerousregionsoftheworldasweapproachthe mid-pointof2024,andtwowarsinparticularshowno signsofresolution.InmainlandEurope,thewarin Ukrainehasrecentlywitnesseditsunwelcome secondanniversary.Afterarecentlullinground operationsduringthelocallynamed Rasputitsa,or theseasonofbadroads,duringwhichtimethe Russianarmedforcesregroupedandreplenished.It nowseemslikelythattheywillagainattempttobreak throughtheUkrainiandefenceswithlikelyemphasis onthestrategicallyimportantregionaroundthe cityofKharkivinnorth-easternUkraine.Asthewar continuestoexactaterriblelossoflifeonbothsides, oneofthenotablethreatswhichtranspiredfromthe Russia-Ukraineconfictistheextensiveuseof explosive-ladenaerialdrones,orone-wayattack (OWA)unmannedaircraftsystems(UAS).The

extensiveuseofOWAdronesaddstotheEO/UXO contaminationrisksoftheterritoriesfarbeyondthe immediatebattlefeldduetotheshootdowns, electroniccounter-measuresandmalfunctions. Emergencyservices,repairworkers,farmersand civilians,especiallychildren,maybeparticularlyatrisk duetocuriosityandbeingunfamiliarwithexplosive hazards.Also,tacticaluseoftheweaponisedfrstpersonview(FPV)dronesnowposesarealproblem tomilitarypersonnel,armouredvehiclesandother militaryassetsalongthecontactlineinUkraine.This wasdiscussedindetailbyLtColJoseRufasinhis article1 earlierthisyear ‘ProtectingSteelfromHornets: RussianreactionstothetacticalthreatbyexplosiveladendronesintheUkrainiantheatreofoperations’. TheuseoftheFPVdroneshasincreasedinthepast fewmonthsandthedevelopmentofcounter-measures isurgentlyrequired.

Throughouttheconfict,therehasbeen widespreaduseoflandminesbybothsidestobolster theirdefensivepositions.Inthethirdyearofthewar, UkrainehasovertakenAfghanistanandSyriato becomethemostheavilyminedcountryintheworld. LandmineMonitorReportof2023statesthatUkraine isheavilycontaminatedbylandmines–bothAVand AP–aswellasotherERWincludingIEDsand unexplodedclustermunitions.Itisestimatedthat some8%ofUkrainianland–some7000sqkmare affected.TheseminesdatefromtheFirstand SecondWorldWarsandalsothecurrentwarsince 2014.TheUnitedStatesisthelargesthumanitarian deminingdonortoUkraineandremainscommittedto supportingUkraine'seffortstoaddresstheimpactsof explosivehazards2.TheDepartmentofStateis leadingtheU.S.government'sresponse,having committed$182milliontotheeffortsinceFebruary 2022.Therecentinfuxofmineclearanceequipment, alongwithintensivetraining,internationalfunding andnewtechnologies,suchastheintegrationof artifcialintelligence(AI)andaerialdronesintomine

clearanceprocedures3,canspeeduptheinitial surveyprocess,aiddeminingeffortsandprovidesafe accesstoclearedland.

Theothermainareaofconficthasbeenthe MiddleEast–specifcallythewarbetweenIsraeland HamasandtheattacksbyHouthirebelsonshipping intheRedSea.Sincetheoutbreakofthiswarin October2023whenHamasbrutallyattackedIsrael, fghtinghascontinuedunabatedinGazawith increasinglossoflivesonbothsides.Thetwo primarystatedaimsofIsraelarethedestruction ofHamasandthefreedomforIsraelihostages kidnappedbyHamasmorethansixmonthsago.The conficthasresultedindestructionofinfrastructurein Gazaincludinghospitalsandlivingaccommodation. Gazahasnotbeenaffectedbylandminesperse,but veryheavilycontaminatedbyERWastheresultof artilleryandmissilestrikesduringthelatestperiodof violencesinceOctober2023.UNMASreportthat ERWposeasignifcantthreattociviliansinGazaand thelackofmedicalfacilitieswhichhavebeeneither damagedordestroyedmakesthetreatmentofthe woundedverydiffcultindeed.Additionally,Hamas hasbooby-trappeditstunnelsandotherfacilities withIEDstoimpedeIDFadvancesandhostage rescueoperations.

TheconfictintheMiddleEasthasnowwidenedto includetheactiveparticipationofIran.On1AprilIsrael launchedanattackontheIranianconsulatein Damascuskillingsevenpeopleincludingtwo membersoftheIslamicRevolutionaryGuardCorps. On14AprilIranrespondedtothisattackbylaunching morethan300missilesanddronesintoIsraeliterritory targetingmilitaryinstallations.Thisisthefrsttimethat IranhasdirectlyattackedIsraeliterritoryfromits homeland.Inresponseon19AprilIsraellauncheda limitedandtargetedstrikeonanairdefenceradarsite nearIsfahaninIran.

Elsewherearoundtheglobelandmines,IEDsand otherERWcontinuetoposesevereproblemstoboth

1 https://issuu.com/deltabusinessmedialimited/docs/counter-ied_report_winter_2023-24/69?fr=sMDQ3NTY2MjUwODM

2 https://www.state.gov/improving-food-security-in-ukraine-through-demining/

3 https://counteriedreport.com/safe-pro-ai-to-present-its-spotlightai-ai-powered-next-generation-demining-solution-at-thegeneva-international-centre-for-humanitarian-demining-innovation-conference/

thesecurityforcesandthecivilpopulations.Thisis particularly,butnotexclusively,thecaseinAfghanistan, Syria,Iraq,India,Nigeria,PakistanandSomaliawhere theycontinuetocausewidespreadlossoflifeand impedeeconomicdevelopment.LandmineMonitor Report2023statesthatCambodiaremainsoneofthe world’smostaffectedstatesduetocontamination bymines,clustermunitionremnants,andexplosive remnantsofwar(ERW),asaresultofconfictfrom the1960suntilthe1990s.Asof theendof 2022,Cambodiahad identifed681sqkmofland contaminatedwithAPlandminesand 741sqkmcontaminatedwithcluster munitionremnants.Asastark reminderoftheinheriteddanger posedbyexplosiveordnance andintherecentunfortunate episode,anexplosionoccurredata militarybaseinKampongSpeu provinceinsouthwesternCambodia whichclaimedthelivesof20soldiers. Accordingtoanarmyspokesman theexplosionwascausedby mishandlingofammunitionbytroops.

IntheirarticleonaSynchronised C-IEDStrategyinEuropetoCounter theEvolvingIEDThreatJohann FischerandDannyHeerleinofthe EuropeanDefenceAgencyprovidea highlyinformativeinsightintothe EDA’seffortstosupportMember StateswithmultipleC-IEDprojects. Athree-dimensionalmodelfor categorisingexplosivedevice(ED) incidentsandtwonewtechnologies arediscussedalongwithfurther considerationoftheoverallIED problem.Theyhighlightthe challengeinreachingastandardised defnitionofanIED.Theyemphasise thatalltheirworkiscoherentwiththe NATOC-IEDapproachbasedonthe

principlesofPreparetheForce,AttacktheNetworks andDefeattheDevice,allsupportedbyunderstanding andintelligence.TheyoutlinetheEDAC-IED approachanddescribethedifferentprogrammesand theirobjectives.Asoftoday,19MemberStates participateintheirprogrammes.Thereisaregular validationoftheircapabilitiesandtheirinteractionby meansofliveexercises,themostrecentbeinghosted bytheSpanishArmedForces.Basedonthecurrent

→ Lightweight (2.5 Kg & 2.9/4.3 Kg) → Battery-operated generator → Large active area (up to 43x35 cm) → High-quality imaging → Reach the most inaccessible areas → User-friendly and fast set-up

Sherlock Security software

FAST

defnitionofImprovisedWeaponsathree-dimensional modelhasbeendevelopedtocategorisetheincident ratherthanthedevice.Theauthorsconcludetheir articlewithexcellentadvice;Alwaysbeonestep aheadofyouropponent;Addressingyesterday’s threatwillnotanswertomorrow’squestions;Turnour technologicaladvantageintooperationalvalue.

PaulAmorosoofAssessedMitigationOptions continueshisseriesofarticlesonnationaland regionalCounter-IEDefforts.Inapreviousarticle4 theauthoridentifedtherequirementtonamea legallyempowerednationalC-IEDleadentitywithin anationalC-IEDenterprise.Inthefrstoftwoarticles theauthorexaminestheneedforandpotential optionsforsuchaleadentity.Thememberswhowill constitutetheenterprisewillrepresentaWholeof SocietyApproachandwillvaryaccordingtofactors suchastheIEDthreatbeingcountered,theextant legalframework,resourcesavailable,statesecurity andgovernmentstructures,theneedtocoordinate withregionalandinternationalC-IEDinitiatives andthepresenceofcivilsocietyandindustry representatives.Thelegalframeworkunderwhich theentitycouldoperatemaybecriminaljustice,CT, counter-insurgencyorawarsituationdependingon theIEDthreat,andthiswillhelptodeterminethe leadentity–anewoffce,policeorjusticesystem led,militaryenterpriseled,existingnationalmine actionauthorityled,orasmallarms/lightweapons commissionlead.Theauthorexamineseachof thesepotentialleadentitiesandconcludesthatthe choiceofentitywilldependonthedesignatedlegal frameworktogetherwithotherconsiderations.The leadentitywillinevitablybefacedwithdaily challengesandwillneedtodemonstrateleadership, tact,diplomacyandnotleast,patiencetoundertake therole.Inhissecondarticletheauthorexamines howanynationalC-IEDenterpriseneedstobe appropriatelynestedwithinastate’snational securityarchitecture.AsC-IEDevolvesitshouldbe integratedaspartofwidernationalsecurity strategies.Thesestrategiesrefertoallentities

4 Counter-IEDReport,Autumn2023,pp15-21

involvedintheprovisionofpublicsafetyandnational securitywhooperateunderstategovernance.The authoridentifes15elementswithadescriptionof potentialsecurityordefenceentitieswhichcould undertaketheactivitiesassociatedwitheach, togetherwithconsiderationsforroles,duties,and responsibilities.Theelementswillformthebasisof anationalC-IEDenterpriseunderthecategories ofcross-cuttingC-IED,preventativeC-IEDand responsiveC-IEDelements.Onceastatehasan informedunderstandingoftheIEDthreatitfacesand determinedthepriorityofC-IEDelementsinwhichit willinvestalongwiththelegalframeworkunder whichitwilloperate,genericstakeholdermapping willallowallmemberswithintheC-IEDstakeholder communitytobeidentifed.Itisimportantthatthe establishedC-IEDenterpriseisadaptedtoftwithin theexistingstatesecurityarchitecture.■

DuringhiscareerintheUKRoyal Engineers, RobHyde-Bales was responsibleforlandmineclearancein Libyaand,morelatterly,Afghanistan intherunningofthefrstUnited Nationshumanitarianlandmine clearancetrainingprogramme–OperationSalam.Theprogramme trainedAfghanmalerefugeesinlandmineclearance techniques,andAfghanwomenandchildreninmine awarenessandavoidancetraining.Morerecentlyheset uptheCaribbeanSearchCentreinKingston,Jamaica. TheCentreisdesignedtotrainsecurityforcesacross theCaribbeaninmodernsearchtechniques.After retiringfromthearmyhejoinedCranfeldUniversityat Shrivenham,nearOxford,andundertookaresearch projectonbehalfoftheUKMinistryofDefencethat examinedwaystoimprovethesharingofIEDthreat informationbetweenthemilitaryandcivilian organisationsinhazardousareas.

RobHyde-Balesbiography

SYNCHRONIZEDC-IEDSTRATEGYINEUROPE TOCOUNTERTHEEVOLVINGIEDTHREAT

ByJohannFischer,HeadofUnitLand&LogisticsandDannyHeerlein,ProjectOffcerC-IEDEuropeanDefenceAgency

ThisarticleprovidesanoverviewofhowtheEuropeanDefenceAgency(EDA)supportsthecontinuouseffortofour MemberStateswithmultipleC-IEDprojects,namely:theJointDeployableExploitationandAnalysisLaboratory(JDEAL); the EuropeanCentreofManualNeutralizationCapabilities(ECMAN); theMilitarySearchCapabilityBuilding(MSCB); SmartFutureCounterImprovisedExplosiveDevicesFieldLaboratory(SFC-IEDFL);andBisonCounterC-IEDExercises CapabilityBuilding(BC-EX).Inadditiontotheseprojects,athree-dimensionalmodelforcategorisingincidentsinvolving EDsandtwonewtechnologies,whoseaddedvaluefortheC-IEDsectorwillbetested,arepresented.Finally,further considerationsonthetopicofC-IEDareraised.

INTRODUCTION

TheIEDthreatisconstantlyevolvingdueto technologicalprogress,changingconfictpartiesand theircorrespondingintentions.Mitigatingthisthreat andadequatelypreparingthetroopsforthescenarios oftomorrowrequiresaconstanteffortbytheEU MemberStates(MS).

ButwhatisanIED?Howdoyoucounterthisthreat, andwhenareyourowncapabilitiessuffcientto adequatelycounterthethreatoftomorrow?Perhaps thefrstaspectofthequestionseemstooobvious.

Ofcourse,eachoneofusknowswhatanIEDis,but havingdiscussionswithotherexpertsshowsthat reachingastandardiseddefnitionisarealchallenge. However,ifthisdefnitionisreplacedbyamodelthat providesagenerallyvalidrepresentationofthe underlyingaspectsofthethreat,incidentscanbe clearlycategorised.

Thisarticleprovidesanoverviewofhowthe EuropeanDefenceAgency(EDA)supportsthe

continuouseffortofourMemberStateswithmultiple C-IEDprojects-allcoherentwiththeNATOC-IED approach.Thefocusisfxedonthelanddomain projectssincethemajorityofIEDshavebeenfound onland.Aswellastheintroductionofathreedimensionalmodelforthecategorisationofincidents withexplosivedevices,thisarticlepresentsan overviewoftwonewtechnologieswhoseadded valuewillbetestedinthefeldofC-IEDs.

NATOC-IEDAPPROACH

Accordingto(NATO,2018)Figure1NATO,the processofmitigatingtheriskscausedbyIED activitiestominimisetheimpactonownoperations islikeabuilding.Itsroofissupportedbythree mutuallysupportingandcomplementarypillars standingonastrongfoundation.Understandingand intelligencearethefoundationforanyoperation,and itfacilitates:

Figure1:TheC-IEDapproachwithsupportingpillarsas describedinNATOStandardAJP3.15(NATO,2018)

•attackingthenetworks(AttacktheNetwork,AtN), •enabledefeatingthedevice(DefeattheDevice, DtD)and •supportproperpreparationoftheforce(Prepare theForces,PtF).

“DtD isajointactivityaimingatdetecting, neutralizingandmitigatingIEDsandIEDevents’ effects.”(NATO,2018)todeliverfreedomto manoeuvre,protectingthepopulationandproviding physicalsecurity.

“AtN istheproactivepillaroftheC-IEDapproach andthe prevent and pursue activitiesoftheC-IED conceptofoperations.”(NATO,2018)todefeatan improvisedexplosivedevicesystem.

“PtF isajointtaskandcomprisesallmeasures requiredtopreparefriendlyforces”(NATO,2018)to accomplishtheirmissionunderapermanentIED threat.

“Understandingandintelligence supportallthree pillarsoftheC-IEDapproach.“(NATO,2018)

AsuccessfulC-IEDapproachis,amongothers, tailoredtothesuperioroperations.

EDAC-IEDAPPROACH-PROJECTTEAMFOR C-IEDANDSELECTEDPROJECTS

Ingeneral,EDAsupportstheMemberStatesin creatingcomprehensiveandcommonconceptual approachestoreducethecapabilityshortfallof thoseMemberStates.InthecontextofC-IED,the differentC-IEDeffortscanbeunderstoodas capabilitiesthatcanbecombinedbasedonthe operationalneeds.TheProjectTeamforC-IED(PT C-IED)supportsMemberStatestofurther implementaneffectiveC-IEDstrategy(EDA,2023).

ThePTC-IED’smissionisestablishinganetworkof EuropeanexpertsfromtheMemberStates dedicatedtoidentifying,assessinganddeveloping potentialcollaborativeactivities,projectspursuantto effective,coherentandtechnologicallyadvanced C-IEDandCBRNecapabilitieswithinEuropean ArmedForces.

Followingisabriefintroductionofthedifferent programsandtheirobjectives:

•The JointDeployableExploitationAndAnalysis Laboratory(JDEAL) contributestoUnderstanding andIntelligencebyexploitationofexplosive devices,providesimmediateinformationto preparetheforcesonthecurrentthreatand deliversimportantinformationasbaselinefor attackingtheenemy(IED)network(accordingto (JDEAL,2024)).

•TheEuropeanCentreofManualNeutralization Capabilities(ECMAN) empowersExplosive OrdnanceDisposal(EOD)personneluptothe highestlevelofexpertise.These“HighThreat Operators”areapremium-qualitycapabilityinthe lineof“DefeattheDevice”(accordingto(ECMAN, 2024)).

•The MilitarySearchCapabilityBuilding(MSCB) developscoursestofurtherimproveMember States’capabilitiesinthefeldofsearchanddetect IEDs.Thiscontributestothe“PreparetheForce” pillarandthereforecreatesthebaselineforlater effortsinthecontextof“DefeattheDevice”.

•Withinthe SmartFutureCounterImprovised ExplosiveDevicesFieldLaboratory(SFC-IEDFL), newtechnologiesandtheirmilitaryusageincontext ofC-IEDareexploredtoensurethattheused techniquesarekeepingpacewiththedevelopment.

ThecenterofgravityforthePTC-IEDarethese capabilitydevelopmentprojects.Asoftoday,19MS areparticipatinginLand&Logistics’C-IEDprogram, (asinFigure2).

FREQUENTVALIDATIONOFTHE

CAPABILITIESANDTHEIRINTERACTION

Everytwoyears,theEDAProjectBisonCounter C-IEDExercisesCapabilityBuilding(BC-EX, 2024)offerstheopportunitytovalidatenewly developedorimprovedcapabilities,tactics, techniquesandproceduresintwoways.Firstly, thecapabilitiesthemselvescanbetestedlargelyinisolation-inarealisticscenario. Secondly,itisalsopossibletoverifyhowthis furtherdevelopedcapabilityftsintothe structureoftheotherC-IEDenablersinorderto counteranIEDthreatinacomplexenvironment.

BC2023,thelatestexecuted,multinational, liveexerciseunderBC-EXwashostedbythe SpanishArmedForcesandmobilizedmorethan 1,000personnelfrom16MemberStatesand

thirdcountries,eitheractivelyindifferenttrainingsor asobservers.Morethan270scenarioswere conductedbetweentwoexercisesites–landbased andmaritimeenvironment.

BC23C-IEDconceptwasbasedonafull-spectrum, multilevelandmultidomainapproach,integratingthe intelligencecyclewhichallowsinterconnectionamong alllevels.Figure3,andtheassignedC-IEDenabler illustratestheunderstandingofthis.

Figure2:ParticipatingMemberStatesandthirdcountriesgroupedbyLand&Logistics'C-IEDprojects.

Itisassumed,thatduringanoperationanIEDwas suspectedbytheinvolvedforces.ThissuspectedIED canbeconfrmedinvariousways,includingRoute Clearance(RC),usageofMilitaryWorkingDogs(K9) andUnderwaterWork(UW),capabilitiesthatare amongstothersalsodevelopedandimprovedwithin MSCB.

OncetheIEDisconfrmed,the(C-IED)TaskForce decideshowtoeliminatethisthreat.Thecommon approachistaskingExplosiveOrdnanceDisposal (EOD).

Insomecases,theuseofEODmaybe inappropriateortheriskofexplodingadeviceis unacceptable(i.e.directthreattohumanlife,recovery ofanintactdeviceisofinterestforexploitationetc.). Therefore,manualneutralizationisrequired.This highestlevelofskillandtrainingcanbeachievedby coursesdeliveredundertheECMAN.

Aftereliminatingthethreat,collectionofevidencefor furtherinvestigationisattempted.Thisisusuallydone byaWeaponIntelligenceTeam(WIT)orsimilar capabilities(Level1exploitation).Thecollectedpieces ofevidenceareforwardedtoLevel2Exploitation,a capabilityprovidedbyJDEAL.Theresultsprovide informationonenemyTechniques,Tactics,and Procedures(TTP),whichcanbeusedinfurther operationalplanningandthuscontributedirectlytothe preparationoftheforces(PtF).

ThedifferentiterationsofBC-EXprovedthatthe capabilityshortfallincontextofC-IEDhasbeen

reducedbycontinuousEDAprojects.This assessmentisalsosupportedbythelatestversionof theCapabilityDevelopmentPlan(CDP)in2023. Nevertheless,thefollowingchapterillustratesthat thereisstillagreatneedfortheafore-mentioned projectstosupportMemberStatesinimprovingthis operationalcapability,tomaintainthisadvantageand furtherexpandit.Inaddition,twocurrentlyplanned effortsundertheSFC-IEDFLandtheirexpected beneftinthefeldofC-IEDareintroduced.

REFLECTIONOFTHEIEDDEFINITION

InthecontextofC-IED,thetechnicalandtactical categorisationofIEDrelatedincidentsaredescribed bytheJointImprovised-ThreatDefeatOrganization (JIDO).ManyMemberStatesrefertothiscategorisationandhavemadeitasquasi-standard.

JIDO(JIDO,2017)defnesImprovisedWeaponsas following: “ImprovisedWeaponsincludemodifed weaponsandmunitions,IEDsandimprovisedCBRN, aretypicallyemployedbynon-stateactors,and canincludechemical,biological,orradiological enhancements.Theseweaponsincorporate destructivepayloadsandfllersdesignedtokill, destroy,incapacitate,harass,ordistract.Improvised weaponscanincorporatemilitaryordnancebutare normallymadefromacombinationofmilitaryordnance andnon-militarycomponents.”Phraseslike“typically”, “caninclude”and“normallymadefrom”havenotbeen suffcienteveninthepasttodefneallformsof

Figure4:CategoriesofImprovisedWeapons(JIDO,2017).

Figure5:ExampleofAnti-TankMissiles(ATM),thathavebeendocumentedintheUKRAINE(CentreC-IEDBWJFOCOM).

incidentsorclearlydistinguishbetweenIEDsandCM (ConventionalMunitions)1.

Figure5providestwoexamplesofAnti-Tank MissilesdocumentedinUkraine.Whereastheswitch/ trigger/launchingmechanismoftherightATMwas modifed,theATMontheleftsidewasnotmodifedat all,butthemannerofdeliverywasimprovised.

Thisexamplesupportstheassessmentthatthe currentcrisishasincreasedtheissuesofaninsuffcient IEDdefnition.Finetuningintheexistingdefnitionsis nolongertherightapproach.Instead,arethink fromscratchseemstoberequiredtowardsa comprehensivedefnition.Therefore,MemberStates agreedtoaddressthisissueunderthePTC-IED.The followingproposalmustbeunderstoodasabaselinefor thisdiscussion.Basedonthecurrentdefnitionof ImprovisedWeapons(JIDO,2017),athree-dimensional modeltocategorisetheincidentinsteadoftheexplosive devicewasdeveloped,wherethedimensions correspondtofollowingcriteriaandsubcategories:

•TypeofActor: RegularForces,PrivateMilitary Contractors(PMC),IrregularForces.

•TypeofMainCharge: Military,Commercial, Improvised.

•TypeofDelivery: Accordingtothedoctrine, improvisedmanner.

Figure6givesanexampleofthismodel,together withthefollowingvisualinterpretations:

•EachincidentcanbedescribedastripleofForce, MainCharge,andMeansofDelivery.

•Theoriginofthemodel,interpretedas“Regular Forces,useMilitaryMainChargeaccordingtotheir doctrines”,describesconventionalwarfare.

•Themostexpandedcombination,describedas “IrregularForces,useimprovisedMainChargein animprovisedmanner”,describesirregular warfareandwhatwehadinmindwhensayingIED inAFGHANISTAN.

•Allcombinationsinbetweencanbeunderstoodas hybridwarfareandthe“distance”totheoriginof themodelisameasurementfor“howimprovised” theenemies’TTPsare.

Basedonthefollowingexamplestheopportunityto intuitivelycategorizeincidentswithexplosivedevices withthismodelareshown:

1.RegularforcesdeployseveralAnti-TankMinesas minefeld.

2.Regularforces,deployoneAnti-TankMissilebya UAV.

3.PrivateMilitaryContractors(PMC)attack infrastructurewithmortars.

1TheIEDLexicon,5thedition,2017isamendedandreplacedbytheIEDIncidentReportingGuide,6thedition2024,that defnesIEDasfollowing“Unconventionalexplosiveweaponthatcantakeanyformandbeactivatedinavarietyofways.It mayincorporatemilitaryand/ornon-militarycomponents.”“Thesedevicescanbeplacedorfabricatedinanimprovised mannerincorporatingdestructive,lethal,noxious,pyrotechnicorincendiarychemicalsdesignedtodestroy,incapacitate, harass,ordistract.”Themodelforcharacterizingincidentswithexplosivedevicespresentedinthisdocumentdoesnot contradictthisdefnition,butratherattemptstosupplementit.

Figure6:Three-dimensionalmodeltocategorizeincidentswithexplosivedevices.Leftimageshouldbeunderstoodas intermediatesteptodevelopthemodelontheright(Heerlein,2024).

4.ATerroristArmedGroup (TAG)usecommercial/civilian explosivesagainstaradio mast.

5.ATAGusesHomeMade Explosives(HME)toattacka militaryconvoy.

Thismodelpromisesthe followingadvantages,whichhave tobeverifedorextendedin furtherdiscussionwithintheEDA framework:

•Providingameasurementfor “Howfarawayfromregular warfare”/“howimprovisedare theenemy’sTTPs”,

•Providingcriteriatodecide whichlevelofEODtoget deployed,

Figure7:AssignmentoftheprovidedexamplesofincidentswithEDtothe combinationoptionsinthethree-dimensionalmodel(Heerlein,2024).

•Prioritisationofpostblastinvestigation(WIT),

•Prioritisationofevidencecollection&exploitation,

•Documentandassessthegenerationofenemy’s TTPs,

•Compareenemy’sTTPsofdifferentareas,

•DevelopproflesofTTPsandestimatefuture threat.

ENHANCEDPOSTBLASTINVESTIGATION

AsreviewedundertheChapterFrequentvalidationof thecapabilitiesandtheirInteraction,andin accordancetotheNATOdoctrine,AnnexA-5(NATO, 2018),postblastexploitationisdescribedas“Tactical on-siteexploitationthatrecordsthedetailsofanIED eventandpreserves,describesandrecoversphysical, technicalandforensicmaterials”.Thistaskisusually conductedbyaweaponsintelligenceteam(WIT)after thesitehasbeenrenderedsafebyExplosive OrdnanceDisposal(EOD)andsecuredbyForce Protection(FP).Tothebestofourknowledge,most MemberStateslimitthetimeforthisexploitationtoa maximumofonehour.Asaresult,thetimeauthorised forthispost-blastinvestigationandthequalityofthe resultsarealwaysincompetitionwitheachother.Ina

warsuchastheonetakingplaceinUkraine,this competitionisfurtherexacerbatedbytheincreased timepressureresultingfromthedynamicbattles.

BasedonthearchivedresultsofsomeMember States,EDAundertheumbrellaoftheSFC-IEDFLis investigatinganopportunitytoenhanceWITwithmore effectivetechnology.Figure8showsascreenshotof anarea,whichwasdocumentedbyacameracarried byasmallUnmannedAerialVehicle(sUAV).The documentedareawasthesurroundingofapointof impact(POI),thedocumentationwasconductedunder followingcircumstances:

•Theareatodocumentwas76x90meters.

•Thedistancebetweenoperatorandspotwas 200meters.

•Thedronewasfyingatanelevationof38meters.

•Andthetimeforthedocumentationwas9minutes.

Duringthepostprocessingtheproducedimages (236images)weretransferredintoavirtual environmentthatallowsalltypesofmeasurement andvisualisation.Figure8forexamplerepresents thearea color-codedaccordingtotheelevationofthe groundtoassesschannelizingterrain.

Figure8:Screenshotofavirtualenvironmentbasedonadocumentationundertheaforementionedparameters.

Thevirtualrepresentationoftheenvironment,the so-calledvirtualtwin,allowsalsotopreciselymeasure orexploitthedimensionandshapeofspecifcpointof interest.Figure9,forexample,showsfourdifferent crosssectionsofthecratercausedbytheexplosionof asimulatedIED.Thisnewapproachallowstomeasure allcrossconnectionsandenablestheanalyststodraw morepreciseconclusionsoftheshapeandsizeofthe explosivematerial.

COLLECTIONOFENVIRONMENTALDATA

Whilethedocumentationviasmalldronesisverywell suitedtocapturealimitedspace,thismethodseems lesssuitableforthedocumentationoflargerspaces, e.g.,alongamarshroad.RedTeamingisacommon waytoidentifyvulnerablepoints.Inthecontextof C-IED,thesepointsoftenfulflseveralofthefollowing criteria:

•Channelizingterrain, •Reducingmarchingspeed, •OpportunitytoemplaceanIED(underneaththe road),

•Frequentlyused, •Reducestheeffectivenessofyourownprotective equipment.

Collectingandsynchronisingthesedatamanuallyis time-consumingandexposesthepersonnelfulflling thattasktoanincreasedrisk.Kinematicdata acquisitiondescribestheautomateddocumentationof theenvironmentvialasertechnologywhiledrivingand isthereforesometimesparaphrasedwiththeterm “MobileMapping”.Thistechnologyisalreadywidely usedinnon-militaryapplications.Basedonthe archivedresultsofsomeMemberStates,EDAunder theumbrellaoftheSFC-IEDFLisinvestigatinghowto

Figure9:Fourdifferentcrosssectionsofthesamedocumentedcrater.

makeuseofthistechniqueinamilitarycontextcollectingenvironmentaldatawithhigherqualityinless timeandwithlessriskforthedeployedtroopsisthe desiredresultofthistesting.

Figure10providesoneexampleofadocumentationdonebyGermanyinMALI.Duringthis campaign,about90kmofamainsupplyroutewere documentedinbothdirections,inlessthanfourhours. Thecollectedrawdataneedstogetpostprocessedto createavirtualenvironment(“virtualtwin”)thatallows -similartotheintroducedresultsundertheheading EnhancedPostBlastInvestigationofalltypesof measurementsandvisualization.Followingisalistof resultsandpossibleapplicationsinamilitarycontext:

•Panoramaimagewithmetadata(drivingdirection, GPScoordinates/-time),

•Virtualenvironmentofthedocumentedarea,colorcodedaccordingto:

◦theelevationofthegroundtoidentify channelizingterrain,

◦intensityvaluestodetectdifferencesinmaterial,

◦realcolourtovisuallyidentifypointsofinterestin thevirtualenvironment.

•Precisemeasurementofdistances,areas,and dimensions,

•LineofSightanalysis,

•Bird–and1stPersonview.

CONCLUSION

ThisarticleprovidesyouanoverviewaboutEDA supportingourMemberStatesthroughcapability developmentinthewiderangeofC-IEDs,andhow theseindividualeffortsarefrequentlyverifedto ensureacommonsynchronalC-IEDstrategyin Europetocountertheconstantlyevolvingthreat ofIEDs.

•Alwaysbeonestepaheadofyouropponent. Theresponsetothisconstantlyevolvingthreatcan neverbeconsideredascompleteandweshould notdiminishoureffortsandrisklosingthe advantagegainedoverthepastfewyears.

•Addressingyesterday’sthreat,willnotanswer tomorrow’squestions.

Thisincludesacriticalrefectionofdefnitions. Amore-dimensionalmodelasasupportingtoolfor adefnitionhasbeenprovided,whichisaddressing thecomplexthreatmoreintuitively.Butthiscan onlybethestartingpointforamultinational& multiorganizationalefforttosharpenthismodel together.

•Turnourtechnologicaladvantageintooperationalvalue.

Theprovidedexampleshaveproventheexistence ofavailabletechnologiesthatcouldbeeasily adoptedandappliedtoamilitarycontext.■

Figure10:Pointofinterestalongamainsupplyroute.Panoramaimagevscolouredlaserpointcloud.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

BC-EX,E.(2024,January08). https://eda.europa.eu/ RetrievedfromBISONCOUNTEREXERCISES: https://eda.europa.eu/ what-we-do/all-activities/activities-search/bison-counter-exercises ECMAN,E.(2024,January08). https://eda.europa.eu/. RetrievedfromEUROPEANCENTERFORMANUALNEUTRALIZATION CAPABILITIES(ECMAN): https://eda.europa.eu/what-we-do/all-activities/activities-search/manual-neutralisation-techniquescourses-and-exercises-(mntce)

EDA.(2023). ProjectTeamCounter-ImprovisedExplosiveDevices,TermsofReference(EDAPTC-IEDToR),Revision2023. Brussels:EuropeanDefenceAgency. Heerlein,D.(2024).3-DimensionalCategorizationofIncidentswithExplosiveDevices. Brussels. JDEAL,E.(2024,January08). https://eda.europa.eu/ RetrievedfromJOINTDEPLOYABLEEXPLOITATIONANDANALYSIS LABORATORY(JDEAL): https://eda.europa.eu/what-we-do/all-activities/activities-search/joint-deployable-exploitation-andanalysis-laboratory-(jdeal)

JIDO.(2017). ImprovisedExplosiveDevice(IED)TechnicalExploitationLexicon. Washington:JointImprovised-ThreatDefeat Organization.

NATO.(2018,March8). https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/. RetrievedfromAlliedJointDoctrineforCounteringImprovised ExplosiveDevices(AJP-3.15),EditionCVersion1: https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/5aa10fe1e5274a7bd3417176/ doctrine_nato_countering_ied_ajp_3_15.pdf

ABOUTTHEAUTHORS

JohannFischer wasappointedasHeadofUnit Land&LogisticsattheEuropeanDefenceAgencyon 1September2016.AftergraduationfromtheAustrian MilitaryAcademy,heservedasaMainBattleTank platoonleaderandcompanycommander.Upon completionoftheAustrianCommandandGeneral StaffCourse,hewasnominatedasaHeadofTactics andLogisticsforadvancedoffcertraining,Branch HeadofMissionPlanningintheAustrianMinistryof DefencefollowedbyanappointmentintheAustrian PermanentRepresentationtotheEuropeanUnion andasubsequentassignmentintheForceCapability BranchoftheEuropeanMilitaryStaff.Afterworkingfor fouryearsinBrussels,hetookovertheBranchof InternationalForcePlanningintheAustrianMinistryof Defence.

HisportfolioattheEDAstretchesfromconceptual thinkingtoimplementationintheplanningand developmentprocessesofarmamentprogrammes withinthelandandjointenablingdomains.This includescontributionstotheCapabilityDevelopment Plan,CoordinatedAnnualReviewofDefence, PESCOandEuropeanDefenceFund.Themost

prominentprogrammesareMilitaryMobility,Additive Manufacturing,C-IEDaswellasthecollaborative procurementofammunitionwithafocuson155mm forthereplenishmentofnationalstocksandinsupport ofUkraine.

DannyHeerlein hasbeenworkingasProjectOffcer forC-IED(POC-IED)intheLand&LogisticsUnitofthe EuropeanDefenceAgencysince1September2023.

PriortohisappointmentasPOC-IED,hehadbeen workedasHeadofSectionintheCentreforC-IEDat theBundeswehrJointForcesCommandfrom2015to 2023.Aspartofhisassignments,hewasdeployed severaltimesinISAFmissionsasChiefAnalystandas C-IEDexpertforEUTMandMINIUSMAinMali.

DannyHeerleinholdsamaster’sdegreeincomputer sciencefromtheUniversityoftheGermanArmed ForcesinMunichandaMaster'sdegreeinOperations ResearchfromtheNavalPostgraduateSchoolin Monterey,USA.Duringhisstudieshewasinvolvedin severalC-IEDprojectsofTRACMontereyandformerly JIEDDOandwasabletodeepenhisexperienceduring theISAFmissionsasChiefAnalyst.

NECESSITYOFADESIGNATEDLEADENTITY WITHINNATIONALC-IEDENTERPRISES

ByPaulAmoroso,anexplosivehazardsspecialistatAssessedMitigationOptions(AMO)consultancy

INTRODUCTION

Fragile,fragmented,orfailedregions,statesor localitiesarevulnerabletoIEDuse,withtheirimpact mostacuteintermsoftheirpolitical,economicand socialdestabilisingimpacts.Assuch,theIEDislikelyto beaprevalentandenduringthreatwithinsuchsecurity landscapesfortheforeseeablefuture.Theauthorhasin theSpring-Summer,AutumnandWinter2023editions ofTheCounterIEDReportpublishedaseriesofarticles relatedtonationalandregionalCounterIED(C-IED) efforts.¹ Aspartofthisseriesofarticlestheauthorhas discussedamongstotherissues,theneedtobuilda C-IEDenterprise² andempoweritlegallytocounterthe IEDsystem.³ Inonearticle,4 entitled‘C-IEDStrategic

Principles 5 forEastAfrica’ 6 oneoftenprinciples identifed,wastheneedtonamealegallyempowered nationalC-IEDleadentity.Thisarticleintendsto examinetheneedandpotentialoptionsforsucha legallyempowerednationalC-IEDleadentity.

MembersofaNationalC-IEDEnterprise AspartofawholeofsocietyapproachtoC-IED,a comprehensiveC-IEDstakeholdercommunity, appropriatelyresourcedandeffectivelymanaged, needstobeestablishedandsustained.Theexact memberswhowillmakeupanationalC-IED enterprise,willvaryaccordingtofactorssuchas:

1C-IEDeffortsrefertoallinitiatives,activities,assistance,capabilitiesandcapacitiesthatcollectivelymakeupaC-IED enterprise.C-IEDeffortscaninclude,interalia,training,mentoring,advising,accompanying,assisting,technologyand equipmentprovisionandintelligencesupport.

2AC-IEDenterpriseisthecollectivetermtodescribeallinitiatives,activities,assistance,capabilitiesandcapacitiesthat contributetotheC-IEDeffortsintendedtoatleastmatchbutideallyovermatchthethreatposedbytheuseorthreateneduse ofIEDs.Itcaninvolveanythingwhichisintendedtopredictdiscoverordetect,prevent,protectagainst,respondtoor neutralise,recoverfromorexploit,mitigateagainst,ordeterIEDattacks.

3AnIEDsystemisthecombinationofpeople,processesandmaterialthatgointosupporting,funding,procuring, manufacturing,transporting,targeting,preparing,emplacing,executingandpublicisinganyelementofanIEDattack, includingtheindoctrination,trainingandlifesupportofthepersonsinvolved.

4TheCounterIEDReport,Autumn2023,pp.15–21,ISSN2050-6732(Print)ISSN2050-6740(Online)

5C-IEDstrategicprinciplesrefertofundamentalrulesandguidelinesthatserveasafoundationforreasoninganddecision makingaboutthelonger-termdirectioninaC-IEDenterprise.Theycanhelpstatesandregionalorganisationstoatleast matchbutideallyovermatchthethreatposedbyIEDswithinagivenregion.

6ThisresearchfocusedondefningstrategicC-IEDprinciplesforEastAfricafortworeasons.Firstly,theenduringIEDthreat inEastAfricawiththelikelihoodofanincreaseintheiruseandsecondlythepotentialforover-extensionbylookingattoo broadormanyregions.

•IEDthreatbeingcounteredandideallywhenever possible,potentialemergingIEDthreats;

•Legalframeworkunderwhichtheenterpriseisto operate;

•ElementsthatwillmakeupthenationalC-IED enterprisei.e.whichC-IEDeffortstobeinvestedin;

•Resourcesmadeavailabletooperatethe enterprise;

•Statesecurityandgovernmentstructuresneeded tobepartoftheenterprise;

•RegionalandinternationalC-IEDinitiativesthe enterpriseistobecoordinatedwith;

•Civilsocietyorganisationsandindustryrepresentativeorganisationswhocancontributetovarious elementsoftheenterprise.

InapreviousarticlewithinTheCounterIED Report,7 potentialmemberswithinanationalC-IED stakeholdercommunitywereexamined,which identifedthefollowinggroupswhomaybemembers ofanationalC-IEDenterprise:

•Internalstakeholderswithinthestate;

•Externalstakeholderssupportingthestate;

•Securityanddefenceentities;

•Membersfromacrossgovernmentdepartments, ministries,offces,andagencies;

•Civilsocietyorganisations;

•Commercialandindustryentities,includingrepresentativeassociations;

•Regionalorganisationsandinternationalcommunityorganisations.

WhyaLeadEntityWithinaNationalC-IED EnterpriseisNeeded

Severalfactorsinfuencethe desiredendstate ofanationalC-IEDenterprise.Firstly,thelegal frameworkunderwhichitistofunctionwillinfuence the ways theenterprisewilloperate.Secondly,the resourcesavailabletoinvestintheC-IEDenterprise willdeterminethemeansoftheenterprise.Therewill oftenbemultiple ways oroptionsavailableintermsof howthedesiredendstatemaybeachieved.Addedto

this,willbedifferentrecommendationsfromthe membersoftheC-IEDenterpriseonwhichoptionsto choose.Incertaincases,someC-IEDstakeholders maystronglyadvocatecertainoptionsoverothers basedontheirparadigmofwhatanationalapproach toC-IEDshouldbe.Regardlessofthemyriadof potentialwaysthatmaybeavailabletoachievethe desiredendstateofanationalC-IEDenterprise, thereisinevitablyalwayslimitedresourcesavailable intermsoffnances,time,andexpertisetoinvest.The prioritizationofinvestmentoftheselimitedresources willalsobeinfuencedbythelegalframeworkunder whichthenationalC-IEDenterpriseisbeing undertaken.Resourceinvestmentwillalsoneedtobe consideredoverthemediumtolongtermasthe variouseffortsinvestedinwillneedtobenotonly maintainedbutmodifedastheIEDthreatevolves andtheC-IEDenterpriseneedstobeadapted,so thatitsstaysthreatalignedandcontinuestoinvestin themostappropriatewaysunderthelegalframework itisrequiredtooperate.Fortheseandotherreasons, signifcanttension,andsometimesunhealthy competitionbetweenthemembersofanational C-IEDenterprisecanarisewhendecidingthewaysa C-IEDenterpriseshouldinvestin,alongwiththe allocationoflimitedresources.Duetotheseissuesof lackofcoordinationandpossiblecooperationwithina nationalC-IEDenterprise,whichinsomecases canleadtodetrimentalcompetitionbetween stakeholders,allenterprisemembersinvolvedneed tobecoordinatedbyacentralentity.

Thepoliticalleadership,whoarebackingthe establishmentofanationalC-IEDenterpriseneedto demonstrateacknowledgementoftheproblemposed bytheuseandthreateneduseofIEDsalongwitha commitmenttoaddressingtheirusebydesignatinga focalpointauthoritywithoverallresponsibilityfora nationalC-IEDenterprise.Suchaleadentitywill requiregovernmentlevelagreementontheirrole, responsibilities,resourcesandlimitations,toempower themsuffcientlytoensurecoordinationand cooperationbetweentheothermembersofthe

7 TheCounterIEDReport,Winter2023/24,pp.15–22,ISSN2050-6732(Print)ISSN2050-6740(Online)

NECESSITYOFADESIGNATEDLEADENTITYWITHINNATIONALC-IEDENTERPRISES

enterprisesothatacoherentnationalapproachto C-IEDisachieved.Thechoiceofadesignatednational leadentityneedstobecommunicatedtoallinternal nationalC-IEDenterprisemembersaswellasto internationalstakeholdersandpartners.

WhatisaNationalC-IEDEnterpriseLeadentity?

ThetermnationalC-IEDenterpriseleadentityisused asagenericonetodesignateanyoffce,institution, ministry,department,board,body,orother establishmentwhichhasresponsibilitiestothe nationalC-IEDenterpriseitischargedtolead.In particularitshouldhaveresponsibilityfor:

•EnsuringthesuccessofthenationalC-IED enterpriseinlinewithanationalstrategysothata coherentnationalapproachtoC-IEDisachieved toultimatelymatchbutideallyovermatchtheuse orthreateneduseofIEDs.

•Exercisegovernanceovertheenterprisetoensure allitsmembersareoperatingunderthelegal frameworkthatempowersthemintheirrole,duties andresponsibilities.

•Providecoordination,advocacy,strategiclevel awarenessandintegrationnecessarytoensure coherence,collaboration,andcomplementarity betweenthevariousC-IEDenterprisemembers.8

•Allocateandprioritizeresourceinvestmentinthe variousC-IEDeffortswhichmakeupallinitiatives, activities,assistance,capabilities,andcapacities oftheC-IEDenterprise.Forexample,theUSArmy C-IEDstrategystatesthe“entitydesignatedasthe leadtocoordinatenationalC-IEDeffortswillbe responsibletoensuretheC-IEDeffortsinvestedin areappropriatelyintegratedinacoordinated

mannerbetweenthenationalC-IEDlinesofeffort thatareengagedin.” 9

•Foster,encourageandfacilitateacollaborative timelyinformationsharingculture10 amongstallthe C-IEDenterprisemembers.

•Monitortheindividualandoveralleffectiveness ofthevariousC-IEDeffortsinvestedin,to appropriatelyadapttheC-IEDenterpriseasthe inevitablechangeintheIEDthreat,itis countering,occurs,astheIEDsystemresponds totheC-IEDeffortsintroducedagainstit. AdaptationoftheC-IEDenterprisemayalsobe necessaryduetochangesinthelegalframework underwhichitisrequiredtooperate.

Ideallysuchaleadentitywouldalsocoordinate allnationalC-IEDeffortswithanyC-IEDdonor assistance11 beingprovidedanddeterminewhereitis bestinvestedtohaveoptimalimpact.Inanarticlein theWinter2023/2024editionofthispublicationby ColonelHRNaiduGade,anotherperspectiveonwhat anationalC-IEDenterpriseleadentitymaybe responsibleforispresented.Inthisarticleonnational counterIEDstrategyforIndia,theneedtodesignate whatiscalledanodalagencyisoutlined.Theroleof suchanodalagencyis“tocoordinateandtrack progressacrossalltheagenciesatnational,state,and locallevelstowardbuildingtheC-IEDcapabilities.It shouldfacilitateharnessingtheinnovativepotentialof theresearchanddevelopmentorganizationstomeeta dynamic,complex,andadaptivethreatandtopromote aninformedandagileresearchandacquisitions processthatstaysaheadofthethreatanddevelops timelyandeffectiveC-IEDsystemsandsolutions.”

8Adaptedfrom,USDoD.2022.“ArmyC-IEDStrategy.”WashingtonDC:USDoD,February,pp.11. 9USDoD.2022.“ArmyC-IEDStrategy.”WashingtonDC:USDoD,February,pp.18.

10ThisissueofthecriticalityoftimelyinformationbetweenthemembersofnationalC-IEDenterpriseandtheassociated challengesinmakingthishappenhavepreviouslybeendiscussedinanarticleinTheCounterIEDReport,Autumn2023, entitled ‘UnderstandingandMaximizingC-IEDInformationSharing’.

11C-IEDdonorassistancereferstoC-IEDsupportprovidedonabilateralbasis,onajointinitiativefromtwoormoreStatesor byaninternationalorganisation,e.g.,EU,LeagueofArabStates,ECOWASetcoranalliancee.g.NATO,toanIEDaffected stateorregion.

12 India–TheNationalCounter-IEDStrategy,TheCounterIEDReport,Winter2023/2024,byColonelHRNaiduGade(Retd), pp.40.

Overall,anationalC-IEDenterpriseleadentity shouldactasthenationalcoordinatingmechanism thatisresponsibleforthedirectionandcoordination ofallmembersofthenationalC-IEDenterprisethat itleads.

NationalCompetentAuthority

Atermthatisoftenusedinternationally,whenit comestoarmscontrolandrelatedactivitiesisnational authority,withtheModularSmallArmsControl ImplementationCompendium(MOSAIC),13 the InternationalAmmunitionTechnicalGuidelines (IATG)14 andtheInternationalMineActionStandards (IMAS),15 allreferringtotheneedforandrolesofa ‘nationalauthority.’Whilethereareslightdifferences betweenthethreepublicationsandwhatthey consideranationalauthoritytobe,torefectthe nuancesoftherespectiverequirements,anational authoritycanbroadlybetakenasthelead governmentagency,department(s),organisation(s) orinstitution(s)whichcanprovidepolitical coordinationandpolicydirectionandischargedwith theregulation,management,co-ordinationand operationofthenationalefforttheyareresponsible for.Anothertermthatisoftenusedtoleadand coordinatetheregulationofaspecifcnational endeavourorareaofpublicinterest,isanational competentauthority.Theyareanoffcialbodyor organisationwithregulatoryoversightand governanceoftheinitiatives,activities,assistance, capabilities,andcapacitiestheyhaveresponsibility for,workingcloselywithrelevantstakeholders,to supporttheeffectivenessoftheirareaof responsibility.Theyoftenplayaleadroleinpolicy development,licensing,inspection,enforcement,and publiceducationandcanactasthenationalfocal pointforinternationalcooperationandcollaboration withnationalandinternationalentitiestoensure

harmonisationofpolicies,practiceandstandards. Assuchwhenconsideringwhomayactasanational C-IEDenterpriselead,theconceptsassociatedwith anationalcompetentauthorityareworthyof consideration.

PotentialNationalC-IEDEnterpriseLeadEntities

Itisimportanttoremembernoone-size-fts-alland thebestfttoleadanynationalC-IEDenterprisewill involveconsiderationofthecontext,threatandany limitationsimposed.Apreviousarticlehasoutlined fourpotentiallegalframeworksunderwhicha nationalC-IEDenterprisemaybeundertaken.These include,acriminaljusticemodel,acounterterrorism, acounterinsurgencyandawarmodelapproach. EachoftheseapproachestoC-IEDislikelytohave adifferentleadentity.Forexample,acriminaljustice modelapproachmayhaveapoliceorjusticesystem lead.Acounterterrorismapproachmayhavea police,justice,internalsecurityorsecurityservices leaddependingonthestate’sinternalsecurity architecture.AcounterinsurgencyapproachtoC-IED mayhaveaparamilitaryormilitaryleadaswoulda warmodelapproach.Severaloptionsexistwhen decidingtheentitytoleadanationalC-IED enterprise.Optionsincludeestablishinganewoffce, organization,ordepartment;apoliceorjustice systemlead;amilitaryledenterprise;oranarms controloffcewhichcouldengageanexistingmine actionauthorityoralternativelyengageasmallarms andlightweaponsnationalcommission.Wewill examinefvepotentialnationalC-IEDenterpriselead entities.

NewOffce,Organization,orDepartment

Establishinganewentitycaninvolvechallengessuch asstrainingalreadylimitedbudgetsandtheriskof duplicationofpositionsbetweenitandpre-existing

13Source:ModularSmallArmsControlImplementationCompendiumMOSAIC01.20Glossaryofterms,defnitionsand abbreviationsVersion1.52018-04-30.

14Source:IATG01.40ThirdeditionMarch2021Glossaryofterms,defnitionsandabbreviations.

15Source:IMAS04.10SecondEdition(Amendment11,January2023)GlossaryofMineActionTerms,defnitionsand Abbreviations.

entitieswhichmayhavecertaincrossovercapabilities orareasofresponsibility.Itisalsolikelythatitwilltake acertainamountoftimetosetup,recruitorsecond personnelintoandestablishprocessesand procedurestosupportasystemofworkpractices betweenthevariousmembersoftheC-IED enterprise.

PoliceorJusticeSystemLead

ApoliceledC-IEDenterprise,mayhavethelead entitybasedwithintheministryofjustice,interioror similarwiththisvaryingbetweencountries.Incertain waysajusticeledC-IEDentityhasadvantagesover amilitaryledoneaslawenforcementarelikelytobe moreappropriatelyskilledandexperiencedto undertakethevariouseffortsneededtoexploitIED incidents,prosecuteIEDsystemsandworktoward thejudicialprosecutionofIEDnetworkmembers. Anotheradvantageofajusticeleadentityisthat policetypicallyhavelessclassifcationandhandling restrictionissuesforIEDintelligencecomparedtothe militarywhichwillsupportinformationsharing.

MilitaryLedEnterprise

Duringresearchconductedbytheauthoronthis topic,16 onekeyinformant,explainedhowintheWest Africaregion,experiencehasshownthatthereare thosewhoconsidernationalC-IEDinitiativesasa nationalsecurityorstabilitymatter,makingita defenceorcounterterrorismissue.Thisshowshow theremaybecircumstanceswhenamilitaryled enterpriseisthebestoption,suchaswhennational C-IEDisundertakenunderacounterterrorism, counterinsurgency,orwarmodellegalframework. AmilitaryledC-IEDenterprisecouldinvolvea

nationalmilitaryoraparamilitaryentitywithinthe statesecurityapparatus.Amilitaryledenterprise wouldbeasecuritycentriconeandwasthetypical approachtakenwiththeemergenceofcontemporary C-IEDemanatingfromIraqandAfghanistan,which involvedthreemainpillarsorlinesofeffortofdefeat thedevice,attackthenetwork,traintheforce,with understandingandintelligenceunderpinningand providingcrossoverbetweenthem.However,witha militaryledenterprisecoordinatingvarious preventativeC-IEDefforts,beyondintelligenceled operations,maybeachallenge.Forexample,the development,sustainmentandadaptationofnational policy,regulations,andlegislation,thecontroland securityofexplosives,IEDprecursorcontrolsand bordercontrols,couldbeachallengeforamilitaryor paramilitarylead.

EngaginganExistingNationalMineActionAuthority

Theinclusionofcertaintypesofvictimoperated IEDs,whichmaybeconsideredimprovised landmines,underthe1996Anti-PersonnelMineBan Convention(APMBC),allowsthisinternational conventiontobeleveragedtoassistinaspectsof C-IED.Similarly,UNCCWAPII17 alsoconsiders sometypesofIEDstofallwithinthedefnitionsof ‘boobytraps’and‘mines’undertheconvention.18 TheseallowC-IEDapointofentry,forittobebuilt intoexistinginternationalefforts,foraandarms controlarchitectures.Withsuchanapproachto C-IED,existingnationalmineactionauthoritiesmay beengagedtoactastheleadentityforanational C-IEDenterprise.Nationalmineactionauthorities canhavecertaintransferrableskillsandcapabilities whichcanberetrainedforC-IEDpurposesalongwith

16Thecontentofthisarticleisinformedfromon-goingworkinthisareaandresearchconductedbytheauthoraspartofaMA instrategicstudieswhichexaminedandidentifedC-IEDstrategicprinciplesforEastAfrica-IdentifyingCounterImprovised ExplosiveDeviceStrategicPrinciplesforEastAfrica,PaulAmoroso,MAStrategicStudiesThesis,NationalUniversityof Ireland,Cork,SchoolofHistory,September2022.

17ProtocolonProhibitionsorRestrictionsontheUseofMines,Boobytraps,andOtherDevicesasAmendedon3May1996 (ProtocolII,asAmendedon3May1996).AnnexedtotheConventiononProhibitionsorRestrictionsontheUseofCertain ConventionalWeapons,whichMayBeDeemedToBeExcessivelyInjuriousorToHaveIndiscriminateEffects.

18OutofControl–TheTraffckingofImprovisedExplosiveDeviceComponentsandCommercialExplosivesinWestAfrica, SmallArmsSurvey(GraduateInstituteofInternationalandDevelopmentStudies),Geneva,2023Firstpublishedin November2023,ISBN978-2-940747-06-1.Pp.90.

existingaccesstokeygovernmententitiesand certaininternationalorganisationsaswellas internationalNGOswhomaybeabletosupportwith C-IEDdonorassistance.Forexample,theUN, humanitarianmineactionorganisationsaswellas certainNGOsmayassistinthetransformationof nationalmineactionauthoritiestobecomingC-IED capable.Suchaspectsareadvantageousintermsof thepotentialforhavingpre-existingcompetencies, expertiseandcapacitiesthatcanbeadaptedwith relativeeasetoallowthedevelopmentofa competentnationalC-IEDenterpriseleadwith relativeease.However,despitecertainoverlaps, C-IEDandmineactionaredifferent,andnew expertise,skillsetsandcompetenciesmayneedto bebroughtintoanexistingnationalmineaction authority,whileatthesametimeensuringspecific mineactioncompetenciesandexpertiseare maintained.Anotherconsiderationisthatexisting mineactionauthoritiesmaybetoohumanitarian focusedforthemtobeeffectiveinleadingthe development,sustainmentandinevitableadaptation ofanationalC-IEDenterprise.Thesuitabilityofan existingmineactionauthoritytobeadaptedtolead anationalC-IEDenterprisemaybeinfluencedbythe legalframeworkunderwhichthenationalC-IED enterpriseisbeingundertaken.NGOsinvolvedin mineactionwithinanIEDaffectedStatemaybe relativelycooperativeinengaginginsomeaspects ofC-IEDprovideditisinapostconflictoratleastnot activeconflictsetting;however,theremaybeNGOs workinginhumanitarianmineactionwhomaynotbe cooperativewithsecurityormilitaryforcemembers ofanationalC-IEDenterpriseastheyconsidersuch cooperationmaycompromisetheirimpartiality.Such

alackofcooperationcanbeparticularlyproblematic whenitcomestoIEDexploitationandtheassociated informationsharingwhicharecriticalforeffective C-IED.Suchanapproachrunscountertotheneed forawholeofsocietyapproachtoC-IED.These challengesanddifferencesinapproachtoC-IEDas wellasculturalnuancesbetweenNGOor humanitarianmineactorsandsecurityforceentities involvedinC-IEDneedtobeconsideredifan existingmineactionauthorityistobegiventherole ofleadwithinanationalC-IEDenterprise.

EngagingaNationalSmallArmsLightWeapons/Arms CommissionorSimilar

TherearethosewhoconsiderC-IEDasanarms controlissue,withtheUNCCWAPIIexaminingthe issueofIEDsonanannualbasisthroughtheAnnual ConferencesoftheHighContractingPartiesand meetingoftheGroupofExperts 19 Forthisreason,CIEDmaybeconsideredtobedealtwith,bynational armscontrolinstitutions,suchassmallarmslight weaponcommissionsorequivalententities.20 For example,intheWestAfricaregion,thisissueofCIEDhasemergedasanissuerelatedtosmallarms andlightweapons(SALW)control.WestAfrican regionalarmscontrolapproacheshavebeenthrough theBamakoDeclaration21 andthe2006Economic CommunityofWestAfricanStates(ECOWAS) ConventiononSmallArmsandLightWeapons,Their Ammunition,andOtherRelatedMaterial.This conventionstatesthat‘otherrelatedmaterials’ include‘...anychemicalsubstanceservingasactive materialusedasapropellingorexplosiveagent.’ 2 2

TheECOWASCommissionhastakentheposition thatIEDsfallundertheremitoftheECOWAS

19OutofControl–TheTraffckingofImprovisedExplosiveDeviceComponentsandCommercialExplosivesinWestAfrica, SmallArmsSurvey(GraduateInstituteofInternationalandDevelopmentStudies),Geneva,2023Firstpublishedin November2023,ISBN978-2-940747-06-1.Pp.90.

20Somestateshavearmscommissions,whileothershavesmallarmscommissionswithvaryingtermsofreferenceandnotall considerC-IEDasanarmscontrolissuethatfallsundertheirremit.Wewillusethetermsmallandlightweapon(SALW) commissionsinthisarticleasthecollectivetermtorefertoallsuchentities.

21BamakoDeclarationonanAfricanCommonPositionontheIllicitProliferation,CirculationandTraffckingofSmallArmsand LightWeapons,01December2000.

22 ECOWASConventiononSmallArmsandLightWeapons,TheirAmmunition,andOtherRelatedMaterial(2006),Article1,para.4.

Conventionunder‘otherrelatedmaterials’and encouragedmemberstatestoworkthroughthis conventiontomitigatetherisksofIEDs.Inpractice, thenationalsmallarmscommissionsofseveral ECOWASmemberstatesapproachC-IEDbyacting asafocalpointforsmallarms,mineaction,andIEDs, intheabsenceofadedicatedbodydesignatedto coordinateonthismultifacetedissue.23

CONCLUSION

Ashasbeenoutlinedinthisarticle,noone-size-ftsallwhenassessingwhoisbesttoactasthelead entityforanationalC-IEDenterprise.Inreality,the choicewillrequireconsiderationofmanyfactors withthemembershipofthenationalenterprise itselfakeyinfuencealongwiththelegalframework underwhichtheenterprisewilloperate.Oneofthe keyrolesofanationalC-IEDleadentityistoensure coherence,coordinationandcomplementarity betweenitsmembersandminimizeunnecessaryand unproductiveinteragencycompetitionforlimited resourceswhileatthesametimeensuringa collaborativecultureoftimelyinformationsharingto maintainoptimizedunderstanding.Thiscanbe challengingtoachieveamongstwhatcanbea diversecommunityofstakeholderswhomake uptheenterpriseandmayhavetooperateina challengingandpressurizedenvironmentinwhich IEDusecanbeanongoingdestabilizingsecurity issue.Assuch,tousethedescriptionbyColonelHR NaiduGadeofthechallengesofnationalC-IED strategy,anationalC-IEDenterpriseleadentity needsgreatpatience,persuasionandpolitical statesmanship.24 ■

ABOUTTHEAUTHOR

23Source:OutofControl–TheTraffckingofImprovised ExplosiveDeviceComponentsandCommercial ExplosivesinWestAfrica,SmallArmsSurvey(Graduate InstituteofInternationalandDevelopmentStudies), Geneva,2023FirstpublishedinNovember2023,ISBN 978-2-940747-06-1.Endnote20.

24India–TheNationalCounter-IEDStrategy,TheCounter IEDReport,Winter2023/2024,byColonelHRNaidu Gade(Retd),pp.40.

PaulAmoroso isanexplosive hazardsspecialistandhas extensiveexperienceasanIED ThreatMitigationPolicyAdvisor workinginEastandWestAfrica.He servedintheIrishArmyasanIED DisposalandCBRNeoffcer,upto MNTlevel,andhasextensivetactical,operational,and strategicexperienceinPeacekeepingOperationsin AfricaandtheMiddleEast.Hehasexperienceinthe developmentofdoctrineandpolicyandwasoneofthe keycontributorstotheUnitedNationsImprovised ExplosiveDeviceDisposalStandardsandtheUnited NationsExplosiveOrdnanceDisposalMilitaryUnit Manual.HeworksatpresentintheMENAregionon SALWcontrolaswellasinwiderAfricaadvisingon nationalandregionalC-IEDstrategies.HehasaMSc inExplosiveOrdnanceEngineeringandanMAin StrategicStudies.Herunsaconsultancy,Assessed MitigationOptions(AMO),whichprovidesadvice, support,andtrainingdeliveryinEOD,C-IED,WAMas wellasPersonalSecurityAwarenessTraining(PSAT) andHostileEnvironmentAwarenessTraining(HEAT). Thisarticlerefectshisownviewsandnotnecessarily thoseofanyorganisationhehasworkedfororwithin developingtheseideas.

Linkedinprofle: https://www.linkedin.com/in/paulamoroso-msc-ma-miexpe-60a63a42/

Counter Terror Expo 2024 will provide professionals from industry, infrastructure, government and policing an opportunity to discover the latest counter-terrorism solutions.

CTX 2024 will feature exhibits, seminar and workshop content delivered by leaders in CT and Security.

To find out more and to register for a free ticket, visit our website today at ctexpo.co.uk.

NESTINGC-IEDAPPROPRIATELYWITHINASTATE’S

NATIONALSECURITYARCHITECTURE

ByPaulAmoroso,anexplosivehazardsspecialistatAssessedMitigationOptions(AMO)consultancy

INTRODUCTION

TheauthorhaspreviouslyadvocatedforaWholeof SocietyapproachtoC-IEDwheninvestingin, sustainingandwhennecessary,overtimeadapting anationalC-IEDenterprise1.Awholeofsociety approachtonationalC-IEDisacomprehensiveone andmayincludemultipleelementsofstatesecurity, defence,governmentdepartments,ministries, offces,andagenciesalongwithcivilsociety organisations,commercialandindustryentitiesas wellasinternationalandregionalorganizations. Suchawholeofsocietyapproachisintendedto ensureallstakeholderswhohavearoletoplayin respondingtoandultimatelypreventingtheuseof IEDs,haveinputintothenationalC-IEDenterprise whichisultimatelyrequiredtoatleastmatchbut ideallyovermatchtheuseofIEDsandremovethem asathreattosecurity,developmentandprosperityof theState.Ithaspreviouslybeenadvocatedforthe needtoguardagainstoverlysecuritycentric approachestoC-IED;however,nationaldefenceand

securityelementswillalwayshaveakeyroletoplay inanynationalC-IEDenterprise.

TheemergenceofC-IEDfromIraqandAfghanistan, resultedinitbeingviewedthroughabattlefeldlens, makingC-IEDamilitarizedmissionandinspiringmilitary solutions,notparticularlysuitedtosupportC-IED enterprisesbasedontheruleoflawandacriminal justiceapproach.Onekeyinformantwhenresearching thistopicstated,“militariesgotowarandwarisdevoid ofcriminaljusticethinking.” 2 Thedominanceofmilitary centricapproachesbynationalC-IEDenterprises,was highlightedbythesamekeyinformant,havingworked tocoordinateinternationalC-IEDassistance 3 inEast Africa,observingthatinmanycasesitinvolvedbilateral ormilitarytomilitaryengagementsratherthan involvementoflawenforcementagenciessuchastheir police,hampering acriminaljusticeapproachtoC-IED. Theauthorwouldadvocateforacriminaljustice approachtocounteringtheuseofIEDswhichoperates withintheruleoflawandendeavours,whenever

1AC-IEDenterpriseisthecollectivetermtodescribeallinitiatives,activities,assistance,capabilitiesandcapacitiesthat contributetotheC-IEDeffortsintendedtoatleastmatchbutideallyovermatchthethreatposedbytheuseorthreateneduse ofIEDs.Itcaninvolveanythingwhichisintendedtopredictdiscoverordetect,prevent,protectagainst,respondtoor neutralise,recoverfromorexploit,mitigateagainst,ordeterIEDattacks.

2KeyinformantinterviewconductedbyauthoraspartofresearchintoC-IEDstrategicprinciplesforEastAfrica-Identifying CounterImprovisedExplosiveDeviceStrategicPrinciplesforEastAfrica,PaulAmoroso,MAStrategicStudiesThesis, NationalUniversityofIreland,Cork,SchoolofHistory,September2022.

3VariousformsofC-IEDsupportthatanIEDaffectedstatecanreceivefromadonorwhichcanincludeinteralia,training, mentoring,advising,accompanying,assisting,technologyandequipmentprovisionandintelligencesupport.

possible,toprosecutetheIEDsystem 4 throughjudicial processesandsupportingintelligenceledoperations; however,itisalsoacknowledgedthatthismaynot alwaysbeachievable.Whilesomemayclaim “acriminaljusticeapproachtostrategicnationalC-IED, isessential,” 5 manyIEDaffectedstateswillhavean underdevelopedsecurityandjudicialsystem,which cannotmoveimmediatelytotakesuchanapproach. Instead,aprogressivetransitiontoallowtherequired structures,skillsetsandcapabilitiestobedevelopedis needed.IEDaffectedstatesmayalsolacktherequired legislativeinstruments,governmentpoliciesorlegal powersneededtoempoweraruleoflawapproachto prosecutetheIEDsystem.

Dependingonitssecuritycontext,nationalsecurity architecture,maturityofitslegalsystemandtheIED threatfacedbyastate,itisacknowledgedthatitmay benecessarytohaveaninitialfocusonresponsive C-IEDeffortsandlaterevolvetoanappropriate balancedmixtureofresponsiveandpreventative C-IEDefforts.TheC-IEDwhichemergedfromIraqand Afghanistanwasasmuchamilitaryindustrial enterpriseasitwasasecurity,stabilization,or developmentendeavor.InitialUSeffortsindeveloping C-IEDwerefocussedonrightofboombutintimethey movedmoretolookingleftofboom.Togoleftofboom, C-IEDeffortsneedagreaterlawenforcementor paramilitaryapproachthanamilitarycentricapproach.6 Libya’sdevelopmentofnationalC-IEDcapabilities providesagoodexampleofthetransitionfroma militarydominatedapproachtoacriminaljustice approachtoC-IEDledbylawenforcement.” 7

UsingthisparadigmofhowanationalC-IED enterprisemayevolve,itisclearthatmanyelementsof astate’ssecurityarchitecturewillplayacentraland keyroleintheC-IEDefforts 8 investedin,sustained, andadaptedovertime.AsIEDsarebutoneofmany weaponsystemsthatpresentasecurityissuewithina state,theauthorproposesthatitisnecessarytoadapt theC-IEDenterprisethatisdeveloped,sustained,and adaptedovertimetoftwithinastate’sestablished nationalsecurityinfrastructureandnottheotherway around.Suchanapproachwillallowthesecurityand defenceaspectsofanationalC-IEDenterpriseto ideallyftwithinexistingcapabilitiesandstructuresto complementandimprovewiderstatedefenceand securitycapabilitiesandavoidunnecessaryduplication andpotentialcompetitionforresourcesandissues relatedtothesharingofinformation.Thispaperwill seektoexaminehowanynationalC-IEDenterprise needstobeappropriatelynestedwithinaState’s nationalsecurityarchitecture.

C-IEDASAWIDERNATIONALSECURITYISSUE

ThetransitionofC-IEDfromasecuritycentric responsiveapproachtolaterevolveintoanappropriate balancedmixtureofresponsiveandpreventativeC-IED effortshasbeenoutlined.AsC-IEDevolves,itneedsto becomeintegratedaspartofwidersecuritystrategies, anelementofwhichmaybeasizeablecomponent thereofdependingontheprevailingIEDthreat.IED affectedstatesarelikelytofacemultiplesecurity challengessimultaneouslywhichoftenleadsthemto requireexternalC-IEDassistance.Previousresearchby

4 AnIEDsystemisthecombinationofpeople,processesandmaterialthatgointosupporting,funding,procuring,manufacturing, transporting,targeting,preparing,emplacing,executingandpublicisinganyelementofanIEDattack,includingthe indoctrination,trainingandlifesupportofthepersonsinvolved.

5KeyinformantinterviewconductedbyauthoraspartofresearchintoC-IEDstrategicprinciplesforEastAfrica-Identifying CounterImprovisedExplosiveDeviceStrategicPrinciplesforEastAfrica,PaulAmoroso,MAStrategicStudiesThesis, NationalUniversityofIreland,Cork,SchoolofHistory,September2022.

6Source:IdentifyingCounterImprovisedExplosiveDeviceStrategicPrinciplesforEastAfrica,PaulAmoroso,MAStrategic StudiesThesis,NationalUniversityofIreland,Cork,SchoolofHistory,September2022.

7KeyinformantinterviewconductedbyauthoraspartofresearchintoC-IEDstrategicprinciplesforEastAfrica-Identifying CounterImprovisedExplosiveDeviceStrategicPrinciplesforEastAfrica,PaulAmoroso,MAStrategicStudiesThesis, NationalUniversityofIreland,Cork,SchoolofHistory,September2022.

8 C-IEDeffortsrefertoallinitiatives,activities,assistance,capabilitiesandcapacitiesthatcollectivelymakeupaC-IEDenterprise. C-IEDeffortscaninclude,interalia,training,mentoring,advising,accompanying,assisting,technologyandequipmentprovision andintelligencesupport.

theauthor,9 identifedthatinmanycases,donornations preferinvestmentinsecurityinitiativeswhichare associatedwithasuitablenationalstrategy.Thiscan resultinanIEDaffectedstatehavingseveralsecurity relatedstrategiesatthesametime.Thiscanthenleadto theneedforconsolidationofsecurityrelatedstrategies, inwhichC-IEDmaynotgetitsownstandalonestrategy butmayneedtocomeunderawiderstrategy.Evenin thecasethatanIEDaffectedstateisnotreceiving notableexternalC-IEDassistance,itisgoodpracticeto considerhowaC-IEDenterprisemaycomeunderwider securitystrategies.Assuch,nationalC-IEDenterprises mayfallunderbroadernationalsecuritystrategies10 suchascounterinsurgency,counterterrorism11 oran overallnationalsecuritystrategy.NestingC-IEDwithina broadernationalsecurity,defenceordevelopment strategythatbestftstheaspirationsofanIEDaffected statemaximisessynergiesallowingthereinforcingof commoncomplementarygoodpracticesrelatedto varioussecuritythreatsthusavoidingunnecessary replicationorsiloing.Sucheffcienciesareevenmore criticalinresourcelimiteddevelopingnations.However, shouldC-IEDcomeunderabroadernationalsecurity, defenceordevelopmentstrategy,itisnecessaryto ensuretherequisiteexpertisetoaddressIEDuse,ispart ofsuchstrategydevelopmentanditssubsequent implementation.

DEFININGASTATE'SNATIONALSECURITY ARCHITECTURE

Inthecontextofthispaper,nationalsecurity architecturereferstoallentitiesinvolvedinthe

provisionofpublicsafetyandnationalsecurity belongingtotheoffcial,legitimatedomainofthe securityforcesofthestate,whooperateunderstate governance,alongwiththeirrespectiveroles,duties, responsibilitiesandcapabilitiesandtheirassociated interrelationships.Theexactmake-upofthenational securityarchitectureforagivenstatewillbeunique ineachcase.Forthisreason,theexpression‘context isking’isaptwhenconsideringhowbesttonest C-IEDappropriatelywithinastate’ssecurity architecture.Whileacknowledgingcontextisking, entitieswhichmayformpartofastatesecurity architectureincludeinteralia,defenceforcesand alltheirbrancheswithintheland,air,maritime, andcyberdomains,alongwithcivilianpolice; presidentialguards;intelligenceservices;border guards;reserveorlocalsecurityunits;civildefence units;nationalguardsandgovernmentmilitias.12 Addedconsiderations,includetheprevailingIED threatandthelegalframeworkunderwhichthestate choosestoaddresstheiruseaswellasthe relationshipbetweenthevarioussecurityelements involvedinC-IEDandhowtheyworktogether. VariouslegalframeworksunderwhichC-IEDis undertakencanincludeacombatengineering approach,acounterinsurgencyapproach,a counterterrorismapproachoracriminaljustice approach.Eachofthesehasitsownnuanceswhich needtobeunderstood.Whicheverlegalframework C-IEDisundertaken,willinfuencewhatsecurityand defenceentitieswithinastatemaybeinvolvedina nationalC-IEDenterprise

9Author’sMAinstrategicstudieswhichexaminedandidentifedC-IEDstrategicprinciplesforEastAfrica-IdentifyingCounter ImprovisedExplosiveDeviceStrategicPrinciplesforEastAfrica,PaulAmoroso,MAStrategicStudiesThesis,National UniversityofIreland,Cork,SchoolofHistory,September2022.

10 Anationalsecuritystrategyorpolicyreferstoaformalstrategythatinvolvesalldecisionandactivitiesaboutthesecuritysector whichaffectthestatesandsocietiesexternalandinternalsecurity.Itincludesbothpolicyandstatementsandthemeasuresto implementthosepolicystatements.Source:SSRinaNutshell,ManualforIntroductoryTrainingonSSR,DCAF/ISSAT2012

11Duringpreviousresearchonthissubject,onekeyinformantstatedthat“whenC-IEDisplacedunderCTsecurityinitiativesit canoftenservetoscaresomekeystakeholdersofffromengagingwithit.”“Polarizedpositionscanbetakenbykey stakeholdersinvolvedonissuessuchasthedifferencebetweenC-IEDandCTaswellastheirnuanceswithinwidersecurity initiatives.”“Forthisreason,itisoftenprudenttoavoidhavingC-IEDunderbroaderCTsecurityinitiatives.Oneofthemain reasonsforthisisthatitisoftenverychallengingtoseparatethehumanelementsofCTfromthetechnicalelementsrequired tosupportC-IED.”Source:IdentifyingCounterImprovisedExplosiveDeviceStrategicPrinciplesforEastAfrica,Paul Amoroso,MAStrategicStudiesThesis,NationalUniversityofIreland,Cork,SchoolofHistory,September2022.

12Source:SSRinaNutshell,ManualforIntroductoryTrainingonSSR,DCAF/ISSAT2012.

STATE’SNATIONALSECURITYARCHITECTURE

ENTITIESINVOLVEDINC-IED

VariouseffortsarerequiredaspartofanationalC-IED enterprise,whichcaningeneralbeconsideredas preventative,responsive,orcross-cuttinginhowthey addresstheuseorthreateneduseofIEDs.Theauthor proposedinapreviouspaper,publishedinThe

CounterIEDReport,ffteenelementsasthebasisfora nationalC-IEDenterprise.13 Giveninthetablebelow aretheseffteenelementswithadescriptionof potentialsecurityordefenceentitieswhichcouldbe requiredtoundertaketheactivitiesassociatedwith eachalongwithconsiderationsforroles,duties, responsibilitiesandinter-relationships.

Cross-cuttingC-IEDelements

Understanding Variousintelligenceagenciesandentities,includinginternaldomesticaswellasforeign, inparticularallthosewhomaycontributetodevelopingandmaintaininganaccurateIED threatpicture.

Preparation

ThepreventativeC-IEDelementof‘preparation,’referstoalleffortswithinastatetobest makeready,thepopulation,securityanddefencepersonnel,aswellasC-IEDspecialists, sothattheyarebestpositionedtoeffectivelypreventandifnecessary,respondtoIED events.Alltrainingproviderswithinthestate’ssecurityinfrastructureinvolvedinany aspectsoftheseC-IEDactivitieswillhavearoleinpreparation.Dependingonthelegal frameworkunderwhichtheC-IEDenterpriseisbeingundertaken,preparationofthe populationmayinvolvethesecurityordefenceforcesundertakinginformationoperations toengagethepopulationwithappropriateIEDawarenessandC-IEDknowledge.Theaim ofpreparationofsecurityanddefencepersonnelistoprovideappropriateC-IEDeducation andtrainingtosecurityforce,defence,frontlineandfrstresponderpersonnelwhomay encounterorbecalledtothesceneofanIEDevent.Theintentisforthemtobe appropriatelyknowledgeableofwhattobeawareofandbeonthelookoutfor,bybeing abletoidentifypotentialIEDs,componentsthereoforexplosiveprecursorchemicals.They shouldalsobetrainedinhowtosafelyreact,whichmayinvolveclearingtheimmediate dangerareaofallpersonnel,notingdetailsofthesuspiciousitem(s)andreportingthemto specialiststorespondto.Itmayalsoextendtotheprovisionof,andtrainingon,certain equipmentsuchasmetaldetectorsorothertypesofC-IEDdetectionequipment.

Securityforceanddefenceforcepersonnelwhoarerequiredtooperateinahighthreat IEDenvironmentwillneedtobeprovidedwithsuitablethreatalignedIEDawarenessand trainingwhichmayincludetheprovisionofcertainC-IEDequipmentandmaybe consideredasspecialistpreparation.Examplesofthisincludeintermediatesearch capabilitiessuchasroutesearch,theuseofelectroniccountermeasures(ECM) equipmentorwhatmaybeconsideredlevel1exploitation.

TheaimofC-IEDspecialistpreparationistoappropriatelytrainandequipallthose requiredtoundertakekeyactivitieswithinanynationalC-IEDenterprise.SuchkeyC-IED activitiesinclude,interalia,informationmanagementandthreatpicturedevelopmentaspart ofunderstandingeffortsaswellasdefeatthedeviceactivities,andexploitationactivities.

Withinmilitaries,‘preparation’comesunderthe‘preparetheforce’lineofoperations thatmanyuseastheirC-IEDmodel.Inthiscontext,itisexpandedtoincludeallelements ofthestateinvolvedinaC-IEDenterprisenotjustthemilitaryandisexplicitlybeyond specialistC-IEDrolestoincludenon-specialistsandthewiderpopulation.

13 TheCounterIEDReport,Autumn2023,pp.15–21,ISSN2050-6732(Print)ISSN2050-6740(Online)

Interagencyand international cooperation

Information management

Allentitieswithinanation’ssecurityarchitecturewhoareinvolvedinanationalC-IED enterprise,willneedtohaveappropriateliaisonandinteractionmechanismsestablished withtheotherentitiesinvolvedinC-IEDensuringsuchactivitiesareoptimisedandwastage ofresourcesisminimised.

Asecureinformationsharingcultureneedstobefosteredthatsupportsthetimelyexchange ofinformationbetweenallentitieswhoneedittoempowerinformeddecisionmaking.

Similarly,someofthestatesecurityentitiesinvolvedinC-IEDwillneedtoengageinvarious agreedforawithinternationalpartners,neighbouringstatesorregionalorganisations.This engagementmaybedirectlyorthroughsupportforadesignatedleadentitywiththis responsibility,suchasaforeignintelligenceagencyoradepartment/ministryforforeignaffairs.

AllsecurityanddefenceentitieswithinanationalC-IEDenterprise,willneedtohave appropriateinformationexchangeandstorageinfrastructureinplacetosupportthesecure andtimelyexchangeofC-IEDinformationwithallotherC-IEDstakeholderswhoneed accesstotheinformationtoempowerinformeddecisionmaking.Thismayalsoinvolve variousforaestablishedtodevelop,maintainandmonitortheIEDthreatpicturesuchasan IEDinformationfusioncentre.

AdaptingC-IED efforts

Strategy,policy, regulations,and legislation

Controland securityof explosives

IEDcomponent controls

AllsecurityanddefenceentitiesinvolvedinC-IED,willneedtohaveinternalmechanisms tomonitor,evaluateandfeedbacklessonsidentifedintothenationalC-IEDenterprisein relationto:

1.IEDthreat

2.C-IEDeffortsitisinvolvedindelivering

PreventativeC-IEDelements

AllstatesecurityentitiesinvolvedinC-IED,ideallyneedtobeconsultedwith,duringthe developmentofanystrategy,policies,regulationsorlegislationtheywillberequiredto operateunder.Ideally,wheneverpossible,existingstrategies,policies,regulationsand legislationshouldbeengagedandadapted,ifnecessary,forC-IEDpurposes,toharness thebeneftprovidedbyusingexistingpractices,processesandprocedures.

Allstatesecurityanddefenceentitieswithanytypeofexplosiveordnanceneedto ensuretheyengagewiththestate’slaiddownproceduresdesignedtocontrolandsecure them.

Anystatesecurityentitieswitharoletoplayindevelopingorimplementingthemeasures establishedtocontrolaccesstoIEDcomponentswillneedtobeinvolved.Suchcontrol measuresmayberelatedtoexplosiveprecursorchemicalsidentifedasathreatowingtothe assessedriskoftheiruseinthemanufactureofimprovisedexplosivesormayberelatedto switchesidentifedasbeingusedinIEDs.Thismayinvolve,bordermanagementauthorities withresponsibilityformonitoringandenforcingregulationsrelatedtotheinternational movementofsuchcontrolleditemsintoorfromthestate.Similarly,policeorotherlaw enforcementagenciesmayhaveprimaryresponsibilityforinvestigatingandenforcingsuch controlsdomestically.

Bordercontrols

Bordermanagementauthorities,particularlythosewithcustomsresponsibilitiesmaybe requiredtomonitorandenforceregulationsrelatedtotheinternationalmovementofcertain controlledIEDcomponentsintoorfromthestate.Thismayrelatetothreatexplosiveprecursor chemicalswhichmaybesubjecttocontrolledaccessandassociatedimportationandexport controls.Widerbordersecurityentitiesmayalsoberequiredtobeonthelookoutforand trainedtoidentifytheillicitmovementofIEDs,componentsthereofaswellasIEDnetwork personnel.Theymayalsobetrainedandequippedtotakeappropriatesafeactionupon discoveryofanysuspecteditemsorpersonnel.

Intelligenceled operations

Defeatthe device14

Exploitation

C-IEDintelligenceledoperationscanbeexecutedagainstthenetworkpersonnel,the processesinvolvedandthesupplyofmaterielthatanIEDsystemrequirestofunction. Variousintelligence,securityserviceandinvestigationentitieswithinastate’ssecurity architecturewillbeinvolvedintheplanningofsuchoperations.

Police,paramilitary,securityserviceordefencepersonnelaretypicallyinvolvedin operationsagainstIEDnetworkpersonnel.

ExamplesofhowtheprocessesthatsupportanIEDsystemmayhaveintelligenceled operationsmountedagainstthemcouldincludeoperationstotargetthoseinvolvedinthe fnancing,radicalisation/indoctrination,orprovisionoftechnicalknowledgetoIEDnetwork personneleitherinpersonorthroughtheinternet.IntelligenceledoperationsagainstIED systemprocessesdonethroughtheinternet,willinvolvecybersecurityagencies.Similarly varioussecurityentitiescanbeinvolvedinoperationsagainstthesupplyofmaterielofIED components,withbordersecurityagenciesoftenoneofthose.

InsomeStates,theuseofintelligencetoproactivelydegradetheeffectivenessofIED networksisaC-IEDlineofoperationknownas“attackthenetwork”.Attackthenetwork seekstoproactivelydegradeanIEDnetworkthroughoffensiveactionsandactivities designedtoreducetheeffectsandinterruptanIEDsystems’activities.OtherC-IEDterms whicharesometimesused,areengagethenetworkanddegradethenetwork.

ResponsiveC-IEDelements

Inmanystates,itwillbethemilitaryandorthepolicewhoprovidemostofthedefeatthe devicecapabilitiessuchasconventionalmunitionsdisposal(CMD),IEDdisposal(IEDD), searchandelectroniccountermeasures(ECM)whenneeded.InthecaseofECM; howeverthiscanofteninvolveanexusbetweenstatesecurity,intelligence,exploitation andenduserentitiesandassuchcaninvolvemanysecurityentities.

Inmostcases,astatewillhaveeithertheirtechnicalmilitarybranchesortheirpolice investigationandassociatedforensicbranchesleadtheirexploitationefforts.Ifastatehas itsmilitaryinvolvedinexploitation,itispossibletheywilldosoundertheumbrellaof weaponstechnicalintelligence(WTI).

Investigation

Judicial processes

Victim assistance

Statesecurityelementsinvolvedindefeatthedeviceandexploitationactivitieswillhavea roleineitherleadingorsupportingtheinvestigationofIEDincidentsandtheIEDsystem responsible.Suchactivitieswillbeundertakentosupportunderstandingaswellasintelligence ledoperationsandorjudicialprocesses.

Whenever,judicialprocessesarepursuedwithinanationalC-IEDenterprise,allsecurity ordefenceentitiesinvolvedinhandlingorprocessingIEDincidentevidenceorinformation andrelatedinvestigationneedtodosoinlinewiththelegalrequirementswithinthestate forsuchitemstobesubmissibletothestate’scourtsystem.

StatesecurityentitiesinvolvedinmonitoringtheIEDthreatmayneedtoestablish relationswiththosewhotreatandcareforIEDvictimstoensureanaccurateIEDthreat pictureismaintained.BymonitoringtheinjuriessustainedbyIEDvictims,understanding oftheIEDthreatcanbeenhancedwhichinturnsupportsallotherelementswithintheCIEDenterprise.Similarly,thoseinvolvedintheexploitationofIEDincidentscanprovide informationtothoseinvolvedinIEDvictimassistanceintermsofthethreatwhichisfaced.

14DefeatthedevicereferstoadefensivelineofoperationinvolvingasuiteofresponsiveC-IEDeffortswhichincludeallactions andactivitiesdesignedtoreducethenumberofortheeffectofIEDinitiations.ManyC-IEDeffortscanbeconsidereddefeat thedeviceactivities,including,mobilityplanningadvice;andForceProtection(FP)advice;searchactivities;routeclearance packagecapabilities;ConventionalMunitionsDisposal(CMD)activities;ElectronicCountermeasure(ECM)assets;and ImprovisedExplosiveDeviceDisposal(IEDD)activities.

DETERMININGWHICHSTATESECURITYAND DEFENCEENTITIESWILLBEMEMBERSOF ANATIONALC-IEDENTERPRISE

Ideally,afterastatehasaninformedunderstandingof theIEDthreatitfacesanddeterminedthepriorityof C-IEDelementsitisgoingtoinvestinaspartofits nationalenterprisealongwiththelegalframeworkunder itwilloperate,genericstakeholdermappingallowsall potentialmemberswithinitsnationalC-IEDstakeholder communitytobeidentifed.Suchgenericstakeholder mappingwillidentifybothsecurityanddefenceentities alongwithotherentitieswhomaybeinvolved.The varioussecurityanddefenceentitieswhoareidentifed mayhaveoverlapintheroles,dutiesandresponsibilities theyarealignedwith,i.e.morethanonestateentitymay beabletofulflcertainC-IEDroles.Assuchassignment ofroles,dutiesandresponsibilitiesforeachofthe requiredsecurityordefencerelatedC-IEDactivities needtoconsiderwhichentityhasthemostmature capabilitytodirectlytakeonsuchroles.Alternatively,it maybenecessarytoidentifywhichentitiesarebest positionedtoundergoinvestmenttoadapttotakeon suchrolesintheshortesttime.Thisisintendedto minimiseduplicationandmaximiseutilityofexisting practices,processesandproceduresaswellas harnessingexistingcapabilities.Inthecaseof harnessingexistingcapabilities,dueconsiderationis neededtoidentifyanyexpansionincapacityintermsof increasingfnancialorotherresourcesifanentityis beinggivenadditionalC-IEDtaskingsontopofexisting securityanddefencetasks.

CONCLUSION

IthasbeenoutlinedhownationalC-IEDenterpriseshave oftenbeenmilitarycentricendeavours,butthatideally, criminaljusticeapproachestoC-IEDarepreferablein ultimatelyattemptingtopreventIEDuse.However,these areoftennotinitiallypossiblerequiringagradualtransition overtimefrommilitarytocriminaljusticeapproachesto C-IED.Overall,awholeofsocietyapproachtoC-IEDis advocated,withmanyelementsofthestatesecurity architectureplayingacentralroleintheC-IEDefforts investedin,sustained,andadaptedovertime.AsIEDs arebutonesecurityissuethatastate'sdefenseand

securityelementsmustcontendwith,itisimportantthat theC-IEDenterpriseestablishedisadaptedtoftwithin theexistingstatesecurityarchitecture.Whilesome adaptation,suchasspecifcC-IEDskillsetandexpertise development,maybenecessarywithinanexistingstate securityarchitecture,theintentshouldbetocomplement andimprovewiderstatedefenceandsecuritycapabilities andavoidunnecessaryduplicationandpotentially competitionforresourcesalongwithissuesrelatedto informationsharing.WhereverC-IEDwithinaState’s securityarchitectureisnestedwillbenuancedonhow IEDsarebeingusedineachcontextandthematurityof thenationalsecurityandjusticesystemwithintheIED affectedstatei.e.thereisno,onesizethatftsall.■

ABOUTTHEAUTHOR

PaulAmoroso isanexplosive hazardsspecialistandhasextensive experienceasanIEDThreat MitigationPolicyAdvisorworkingin EastandWestAfrica.Heservedin theIrishArmyasanIEDDisposaland CBRNeoffcer,uptoMNTlevel,and hasextensivetactical,operational, andstrategicexperienceinPeacekeepingOperationsin AfricaandtheMiddleEast.Hehasexperienceinthe developmentofdoctrineandpolicyandwasoneofthe keycontributorstotheUnitedNationsImprovised ExplosiveDeviceDisposalStandardsandtheUnited NationsExplosiveOrdnanceDisposalMilitaryUnit Manual.HeworksatpresentintheMENAregionon SALWcontrolaswellasinwiderAfricaadvisingon nationalandregionalC-IEDstrategies.HehasaMScin ExplosiveOrdnanceEngineeringandanMAinStrategic Studies.Herunsaconsultancy,AssessedMitigation Options(AMO),whichprovidesadvice,support,and trainingdeliveryinEOD,C-IED,WAMaswellas PersonalSecurityAwarenessTraining(PSAT)and HostileEnvironmentAwarenessTraining(HEAT).This articlerefectshisownviewsandnotnecessarilythoseof anyorganisationhehasworkedfororwithindeveloping theseideas.Linkedinprofle: https://www.linkedin.com/ in/paul-amoroso-msc-ma-miexpe-60a63a42/

ATOONARROWSTRAIT:EXPLOSIVETHREAT DYNAMICSINTHEREDSEA

ByLieutenantColonelJoseMRufas,ChiefofAttacktheNetworksBranch,C-IEDCentreofExcellence

“Ilookeduponthesea,itwastobemygrave.” (MaryShelley,inherbook"Frankenstein",frstpublishedin1818)

DuringtheCivilWarthatishappeninginYemen,the HouthiMovement(self-namedas “Ansar Allah”)triedtoalsofghtagainsttheopponentnaval forces,buttheircapabilitiesweremerelylimitedto attackswithfrearmsandrocketpropelledgrenades fromsmallboatsclosetotheshore.

Ontheotherhand,theYemeninavalmeanswere severelydamagedinharborduringthebattleforthe controlofAdenportin2015:theHouthifghterswere alsoabletocaptureseveralhelicoptersalongwith patrolandlandingvessels…butmostofthemwere destroyedbythesubsequentaerialbombingactions bytheSaudi-ledmultinationalcoalition.

FromOctober2015andonceachievingaccessto theseacoast,theHouthiforcesstartedattacking maritimenavigationagainstbothcoalition1 militaryor commercialvessels.Initially,theHouthisthemselves didnotreportthoseattacksinanareaalreadysuffering fromsomerateofpiracy.

ApartfromtheattacksagainstAmerican,Saudi,and Emiratiwarshipsfrom2015on,theHouthiMovement

hasbeenconductingotheractionsagainstcivilian means,amongothersasfollows:

•Releaseofdriftingseaminessince2015intothe Babal-Mandabstrait,fromwhichtheyhavefoated asfarasninetykilometerssouthwestofAdenafter passingthroughthestrait.

•Explosive-ladenboat(UnmannedSurfaceVehicle USV“Shark-33”model)attackonaSaudioffshore loadingfacilityofanoilterminalinJizan,June16,2017.

•Rocketormissileattackagainstacivilianoiltanker (“Arsan”,aSaudi-fagged,double-hulledverylarge crudecarrierVLCC)intheRedSeawestof Yemen’sHodeidahportonJuly25th,2017.

•PropagandathreatstoshippingthroughHouthi “Al Masirah” channelonNovember12th,2017.

•RocketattackagainstSaudi “Abqaia” double hulledVLCCtankeronApril3rd,2018.

•Afterdestructionofcoastalradarsystemsin October2016,anillegalmilitaryuseofradarfor targetingpurposesondockedcivilianvesselsin theHodeidahandSalifanchorageareas.

1“OperationDecisiveStorm”&“OperationRestoringHope”:composedbySaudiArabia,Egypt,Morocco,Jordan,Sudan, UnitedArabEmirates,Kuwait,Qatar,andBahrain;itwasalsosupportedbyDjibouti,Eritrea,andSomaliawhilebackedby theUnitedStates,UnitedKingdom,France,Germany,andCanada.

•TheSaudi-ledcoalitionfoiledanattackwith explosive-ladenUSVonaSaudioiltankernearthe HodeidahportonJanuary10th,2018.

•ASaudioiltankerattackedwithamissilewestof HodeidahininternationalwatersonApril3rd,2018.

•Land-basedmissileorrocketattackontheTurkishfagged “InceInebolu” vessel,abulkfoodcarrier, onMay10th,2018.

•AnotherSaudioiltankerwasattackedonJuly 25th,2018.

•AnattackwithexplosiveladenUSVsagainstthe JizanportwasfoiledonSeptember30th,2018.

Weknowaboutthe“where”andthe“who (against)”…Whataboutthe“(with)what”?

Facedwithsuperiorforces,theHouthishavebeen forcedtorelyincreasinglyonasymmetricalinsurgency tacticstopressurethecoalition.TheHouthi’s asymmetricstrategyincreasinglyreliesonattacks againstmaritimetargetsintheRedSeafromareasof theYemenicoasttheycontrol.

Aspreviouslyhighlighted,theHouthiforceswere onlycountingonfewpatrolboatsandanaverage amountofstoredanti-shipmissiles(ballistic,cruise andothers)withoutlaunchingplatforms:thosemissiles werethetoolforfrstattacksagainstvesselsnavigating aroundYemenicoast(e.g.U.S.NavydestroyerUSS “Mason”,amphibioustransportdockshipUSS “Ponce”,commercialships…).

Withlimitedeffciency,theywereusingsmallboats carryinglightweaponssuchassmallarmsandrocketpropelledgrenades(RPGs)forswarmtacticsagainst commercialoiltankers.

Thefrstuseofanexplosive-ladenunmanned surfacevehicle(USV)againstmilitaryvesselstook placein2017,whenoneoftheseremotelycontrolled boatsdetonatedatthesternoftheSaudiNavalForces frigate “Al-Madinah”,damagingthewarship,andkilling atleasttwoSaudisailors;itwas2018whenagroupof thosemeansattackedcivilianvesselssuchasaSaudifaggedtanker.

AnsarAllah’snavalinsurgenttacticsnotonlyaffect adversarywarships,butmorerelevantlyhavean economicimpactthroughtheirthreatstoattacktrade,

cargoandoilshipmentspassingthroughtheBab al-MandebStraitandfurthernorthintheRedSea.The Houthigrouphasstrategicallyusedtheseattacksto coercetheSaudi-ledCoalitionfrombothmilitaryand economicperspectives.

TheBabal-Mandabstrait,whichisabout 25kilometerswide,isastrategicallyvitalmaritime waterway,throughwhichmerchantshipsintheGulf ofAdensailtotheRedSea,andthentotheSuez CanalandtheMediterraneanSea.Itisoneofthe mostcrowdedwaterwaysforoiltransportationinthe MiddleEastandotherregionswithmorethan 3.3millionoilbarrelsperday.Thisstraitisvitally sensitive,notonlytoallcountriesborderingtheRed Sea,buttoallworldtrade.

Infact,themaritimethreatbyAnsarAllahisalso strategicallybeneftingIran,whoisbehindthe Figure1:Houthipropagandaonattackedvessels (Source–Telegram)

supportwithtraining,technicalknowledge,and provisionofcomponentstotheHouthis’relatively innovativetactics,techniques,andproceduresinthe RedSea.IranunderstandstheHouthisassupportive meanstoleveragepressureontheRedSea chokepointasIranhasdoneinStraitofHormuzatthe entranceofthePersianGulf.

AclearexampleofIraniansupportcouldbethe transferofcopiesoftheChineseC-802anti-ship missile,asitwasmadewithotherIranian-backed militiassuchasHezbollah(e.g.C-802missileswere alsousedintwoHezbollahnavalattacksduringthe 2006LebanonWar).

Additionally,theHouthisarealsotaking commercialvesselshostagefrom2018on, includingtheseizureofSaudioffshoretugboat “Rabigh-3” andaSouthKorean-owneddrillingrigon November17th,2019.

MaybeGazaisclosertoHodeidahthanitcould looklike

Afterthatindicatedpersistentindirectthreatto maritimetraffcalongRedSeaandArabianSea

throughtheBabal-MandabStraitbytheHouthi groupfrom2015on,theHouthiMovementgroup reactedtotheIsraelioperationsinGazawithdirect attackstovesselsandmaritimetraffcthroughthe referredarea.

AsanarmedanswerinsupporttoPalestineafter theIsraelientryinsideGazaStripbecauseofthe coordinatedattacksovertheirterritorybyPalestinian militiasonOctober7th,2023,AnsarAllahinitiated activitiesagainstIsraeliterritoryandtheirexternal interests(includingattacksagainstIsraelivesselsor thoseconnectedwithIsraelicompanies/actors)from October19th,2023,on.

Thethreattocargovesselstravellingthroughone ofthemaincommercialmaritimeroutesresultedin numeroustransportationcompaniestochangetheir maritimeroutetoasafer-but-morecostlyandlonger route.

TheUnitedStatesandUnitedKingdomreacted againsttheHouthithreatsagainstcommercial navigationwithsurgicalattacksinYemeniterritory:that movedtheHouthiMovementtoalsoattackAmerican andBritishvesselsfromJanuary11th,2024,on.

Figure2:HouthipropagandathreateningIsraelimilitaryandcommercialvessels (Source–Telegram)

Figure3:IncidentsaroundRedSeaandArabianSeafrom15November2023to13April2024 (Source–X/@detresfa_)

Signalsfromabove:Houthinavalcapabilitieson explosive-ladenunmannedaircraftsystems(UAS) WiththeessentialtechnicalsupportfromIran,theHouthi Movementcountsonseveralmodelsofexplosiveladen drones(e.g. “Rasid”,“Qasif1”,“Qasif2K”,“Samad2”, “Samad3”,“Shihab”,“Rajum”,“Waeed1”,“Waeed2” …).

Consideringtheattackreports, “Waeed1” & “Waeed2”,locallyproducedexplosiveladendrones basedontheIranianSahed-131/136design,arethe mainmodelsusedbytheHouthiMovementagainst vessels(alongwithotherground-basedtargets).

Withanestimatedrangeof250to500Km(upto 2500Km,asitwasself-declaredbyHouthipropaganda butnotconfrmed)dependingonversionsandpayload, theattacktypicallytakesplacefromabove,andthe explosivewarheadsof “Waeed” andsimilarversions (from15Kgto40Kg)areabletocauseaholeinthe

deckspreadingfragmentation,causingminordamage andevenlimitedcasualtiesamongthecrew.

UASareestimatedtobeeffectiveagainstcivilian vessels,whileapotentialdaylightattackagainsta militaryvesselwouldmostprobablyberepelledbythe vessel’santi-aircraftdefensivesystems. “Waeed” versionsarealsoquiteresistanttoelectromagnetic warfare.

Themostdangerousadversarycourseofaction wouldbetargetingthecommunicationsandnavigation systemsantennasfromabove,whichcouldleavethe vesselwithoutcommunicationsornavigationsupport elements:thevesselwouldsuffermobilityproblems.

Additionally,oneofthepotentialusesofexplosiveladendronescouldbetheirusetoattractattentionor distractweaponsystemsintheaimofcoveringor maskingamoreeffectiveattackwithmissiles.

AnalternatebeneftfromtheuseofthoseUASisthe saturationofairdefensesofAlliedmilitaryvessels taskedtoprotectagainstattacksoncivilianships: asingleUSNavyStandardMissile(SM)couldcost between$2and$4million,whilethedronesarea muchlowercostalternative.

Therearenoreportsaboutthepotentialuseofother modelsofexplosive-ladendronesthanthe “Waeed” versionsagainstnavalvehicles:nonetheless,the HouthiMovementhasused “Qasif” and “Samad” seriesagainstoilplatformsandharborfacilitiesin thepast.

Additionally,thestationorentrymaneuverinsidea harbor,alongwiththerefuelingofavesselnearthe coast,couldalsoexposeahighvulnerabilityregarding potentialattackswithexplosive-ladendroneswitha shorterrange(e.g. “Rajum”,“Rasid” …).

TheIraniandevelopmentandpotentialdistributionof radar/infraredseekingguidancesystemsforAbabilbasedUASisposinganemergingthreatagainstthe vesselscrossingwatersclosetoYemen.Thoseactive guidancesystemsaresimultaneouslyavoidingtheneed ofradiofrequencypiloting(somakingjammingmuch morediffcult)duringattack,whileprovidingexplosive-

ladendroneswithautonomoustargetselectionthrough targetinghotareas(e.g.engines)anddetection/ communicationssystemsofthetargetedvessels(e.g. radar)orevenagainstotheraerialvehicles.

Phantomvessels:Houthinavalcapabilitieson explosive-ladenunmannedsurfacevehicles(USV) Althoughtherearepreviouslyreportedattackswith unmannedexplosive-ladenboatsagainstSaudi vessels,itwaslastJanuarywhenthefrstattackofthis typeagainstaciviliancommercialshipintheRedSea wasreportedbytheU.S.Navy.

Thealreadyknownmodels(called “Shark-33”, “Blowfsh”,“Tufan-1”,“Tufan-2” & “Tufan-3”)of unmannedsurfacevehicleborneimprovisedexplosive devices(USVVBIED)arebasedoncivilianboats whichhavebeentransformedintounmanned explosive-ladensurfacevehiclesthroughinstalling radiocontrol,servodriving,globalnavigationsatellite systems(GNSS)andbulkexplosiveormunition warheadsasamaincharge.Allthosevehiclesare fttedwithcommercial-off-the-shelf(COTS)outboard engines(e.g.YAMAHA200A)insingleortwin confguration.

Figure4:Houthipropagandaontheirunmannedaircraftsystems,including “Waeed” model (Source–Telegram)

ThereferredUSVVBIEDmodelsarecurrently showingsomepotentialvulnerabilitieswhichcould facilitatetheirdetectionandengagement,solimiting theireffectiveness,asfollows:

•Daylightonlyoperations.

•COTSOutboardengines.

•Stillrelativelyhighprofleabovesealevel.

•Notverygoodmaneuverability.

•Radiocontrolbyradiofrequency.

Themainpotentialadvantagesfromtheuseofthose unmannedvehiclesare:

•Hugeexplosivemaincharges(e.g.454Kgfor “Shark-33”,150Kgfor “Tufan-1”,400Kgfor “Tufan-2”,500Kgfor “Tufan-3”).

•Highspeed(upto52nauticalmilesperhourfor “Tufan-3”).

•Longrange(e.g. “Tufan-3”).

•Groupattacksincludingmannedintelligencesurveillance-reconnaissance(ISR)andattack USVsinsupporttothetargetingbyseveral explosive-ladenones.

•EstimatedsupportbyIranianmeansregarding Intelligence,SupporttoTargeting,andTargeting selection/prioritization.

Themostdangerousadversarycourseofaction couldbetheapplicationoftechnicalandtactical lessonsidentifedfromtheUkrainianareaof operationswiththetechnologicalsupportfromIran,as basedondeveloping:

•Satellite-basedcommunications/control(extremely higherbandsthanforothermeans).

•Jetfoilengines.

•Lowersignatureandlowerprofleabovesealevel.

•Thermalcameras.

•Night-timeoperationscapability.

•Reiterationofattacks:frstblocking,second exploitingsuccesswithaccumulativeeffectsover aspecifctargetedpointatvesselhub.

•Electricalpower.

•Electromagneticprotectionmeasures.

Figure5:Houthipropagandaontheirexplosive-laden unmannedunderwatervehicles (Source–Telegram)

ThereisevidenceonthepreviousHouthiuseofantihandlingswitches/devices(withestimatedIranian support)insideseizedfshingboatsastransformed intoISRUSVsplusvictimoperatedIEDs.

Thevictim-operatedswitchesshouldalsobe expectedinsideexplosive-ladenUSVs,withthe estimatedaimoflimitingtechnicalexploitationafter theirpotentialfailureand/orcapture.

Livingtorpedoes:Houthinavalcapabilitieson explosive-ladenunmannedunderwatervehicles (UUVs)

Thefrstreporteduseofexplosive-laden(alsonamed as “OneWayAttack OWA”)UUVsbyAnsarAllahwas announcedonFebruary18th2024.

Inthatline,afast-responsecutter(asassignedto U.S.NavalForcesCentralCommandtosupportU.N. SecurityCouncilresolutions2216/2675/2707inthe Arabian/RedSea)boardedavesseltransporting unmannedunderwater/surfacevehicle(UUV/USV) componentsofIranianorigintoYemenonJanuary 28th,2024.

TheIraniandesignforUUV(fromwhichtheHouthi modelisestimatedtobederivedfrom)istechnically assessedaswire-guided,soopentobemanaged frommilitaryspeedboatsorevenfshingones: accordingly,theadditionofthatkindofguidanceto anexplosive-ladenUUVwouldmostprobablypose achallengetopotentialcountermeasures(e.g. electromagneticwarfare,directfre…)includingtactics, techniquesandprocedures(e.g.evasionmaneuver).

Inadditiontothat,theharborentryofamilitary vesseloralargecargoonemeansahighlyvulnerable momentforanattack,especiallyifconsideringthe limitationofuseofelectromagneticsystemswhenthe portissharedwithcivilianuse.

Nonetheless,theestimatedmostdangerous adversarycourseofactionusingexplosive-laden UUVswouldconsistoftheirconcealeduseasapartof acombinedattackwithotheroffensivemeans.

Otherkindofthreats,othermeansofdamage… Althoughtheuseofrocketormissilelauncherboatsby theHouthiMovementhasnotbeenreportedyet,the

developmentofthatkindofweaponizedmeansbythe IslamicRevolutionaryGuardCorpscouldevolveintoa transferofdesigns,technologies,componentsor meanstoAnsarAllahorganization’sforces.

AnsarAllahcountsonseveraldesignsforseamines andtheycouldbeeasilydeployedtothreatenand deternavigationthroughtheBabal-MandabStrait, alongwiththerestofmaritimetraffcroutesalongthe ArabianandRedSeas.

Analternatelyimprovisedversionofaseamine consistsoffoatingdevicesorfshingboatsloadedwith explosivechargeswithvictim-operatedswitchesand abandonedalongnavigationroutesorintheproximity ofharbors/refuelingpoints.

Themostdangerousoptionwouldbebasedon intentionallydriftingseaminesalongseacurrentsor closetocriticallocations(e.g.straits,portaccess…).

Asithappenswithseamines,theHouthiMovement alsocountsondifferentversionsofmaritimesabotage devices,whichcouldbediscreetlyemplacedbytheir navalcommandounitsinthehullofcivilianormilitary vesselsonceplacedinsideestimatedassafeareas.

Severallocallyproducedmodelsforanti-ship missileshavebeendevelopedandshownduring militaryparades/exercisesbyAnsarAllah(e.g. “AlMandab1”,“Al-Mandab2”,“Faliq-1”,“Zubig”…):they arebasedonrefurbishingofoldSovietweaponsor copiesfromIranianandChinesedesigns.

Themostdangerouscourseofactionabouttheiruse wouldbefocusedonacombinedusealongwithother improvisedexplosivedevicesaspartofacomplex attack.

Thepotentialdevelopmentofmissilelaunchingboats bytheHouthiMovementwouldseriouslyincreasetheir capabilitiesregardingfastandmobileplatforms threateningbothcivilianandmilitarytargets.

Assomesortofconclusions

TheHouthiattacksareexpectedtodecreaseasmuch ofthetraffcthroughtheareawillbereducedduetothe threatfrompotentialattacks:lesseradversarytargets meanslessernumberofaggressiveactions!

Althoughtheirtechnologiesareeffectivelynotthe mostadvancedones,theHouthithreattomaritime

movementthroughtheRedSeaishardtodefeatas theyhavebeendevelopingtoomanydifferentmeans tobelaunchedfromdifferentplatformsandcombined withsomeinnovativetactics,techniquesand procedures…anyHouthicombinedattackusing differentmeansfromdifferentangleswouldrequiretoo manycountermeasurestobesmartlyand simultaneouslyused.

Additionally,potentialIranianlessonslearnedfrom Ukrainiantheatreofoperationscouldmakethe Houthithreatsevenmoredangerousthanthey currentlyare…■

“Ifyourenemyoffersyoutwotargets,strikeatathird.” (RobertJordan,inhisbook"CrossroadsofTwilight" frstpublishedin2003)

REFERENCES

•C-IEDCoE“ThreatanalysisbyAnsarAllah/Houthi rebelsovernavigationthroughtheRedSeaand ArabianSea”,April2024.

•C-IEDCoE“Non-StateActors´TacticsTechniques &ProceduresUpdates”products(from2020on)

•USDoDDefenseIntelligenceAgency–Iran enablingHouthiattacksacrosstheMiddleEast, February2024.

•RiskIntelligence-SecurityThreatUpdatesonRed Sea/GulfofAden.

• www.shebaintelligence.uk

• www.confictarm.com

• www.longwarjournal.org

• www.runi.ac.il

• www.washingtoninstitute.org

• www.georgetownsecuritystudiesreview.org

•Socialmedia:X(formerTwitter)/Telegram/VKontakte VK(ВКонтакте)

Disclaimer

Thisarticledoesnotrepresenttheopinionofany nationalormultinationalorganisation;itswholecontent shouldonlybeconsideredastheopinionoftheauthor. Asalltheinformationhasbeenobtainedfromopen sources,potentialmistakescouldhavebeenmade duringtheresearchprocess.Pleasefeelfreetosend yourcomments,correctionsandinputstotheauthor; theywillbehighlyappreciated.

ABOUTTHEAUTHOR

LieutenantColonelJoseMRufas graduatedfrom theSpanishArmyMilitaryAcademyin1993.Hewas commissionedintotheC-IEDCentreofExcellenceas HeadoftheDefeattheDeviceBranchinAugust2016 andcurrentlyholdsthepostofChiefofAttackthe NetworksBranch.AsaMilitaryEngineerOffcer,his backgroundhasbeenmainlybasedonExplosive OrdnanceDisposalactivitiesintheSpanishArmyand C-IEDstaffissuesatthemultinationalheadquarters.In additiontohisEODOperator/EODOffcereducation, heattendedsomeothermilitarycoursesregarding Parachuting,ArmyStaff,InformationOperations,War CollegeGeneral/JointStaff,MilitarySearch,Technical ExploitationOperations,WeaponsIntelligenceTeam, ExploitationLaboratories,HomemadeExplosivesand otherC-IEDcourses.Hisoperationalassignments includeBosniaandHerzegovina(3),Afghanistan(3), theRepublicofEcuador,IraqandUganda. E-mail:jrufas@ciedcoe.org

IEDATTACKSAIMEDTOIMPEDE INDIA’SECONOMICGROWTH

ByColonelHRNaiduGade–IndianArmyVeteran

INTRODUCTION

OverthelastthirtyyearsIndia’seconomy hasbeengrowingatahigherratethanmost nationsintheworld.Infact,Indiaisone ofthefastestgrowingeconomiesinthe worldtoday.Thisrapidgrowthisbeing drivenbyIndia’sleadershippositionin theever-growingInformationTechnology (IT),Services,Manufacturing,Agriculture, EnergyandHumanCapitalsectors.Foreign DirectinvestmentinIndiahasgrown manifoldduetoconfdenceinIndia’s economicreformagenda.Millionsof Indiansworkingabroadhavebeenmaking hugeremittanceshome.India,soonis poisedtobethethirdlargesteconomyin theworldaftertheUSAandChina.While theeconomyandqualityoflifearegrowing, IndiafacesmanyInternalsecurity challengesemanatingfrom,militancyinthe UnionTerritoryofJammuandKashmir, insurgenciesintheNorthEasternStates andtheMaoistdominated‘RedCorridor’ coveringabout80of100districtsofIndia, terrorismsponsoredfromacrosstheborder andcivildisorderonvarioussocialissues. Alargenumberofsecurityforcesare deployedtomeetthesechallenges.

BoomingIndianEconomy. (Source:IMF)

India’sInternalSecurityChallenges. (Source:www.governancetoday.co.in)

ImprovisedExplosiveDevices(IEDs)haveoverthe timebecometheweaponofchoiceforthesehostile elementsandconstituteagreatpartoftheoverall securitythreatsincludingeconomicsecurity.These inimicalforceshavebeentargetingmanyeconomic hubslocatedinthemetropolitanandurbanareas acrossthenationwithanobjectivetoimpedeIndia’s rapideconomicgrowth.

ECONOMICTARGETSOFATTACKS

Inthelastthreedecades,Indiawitnessedalarge numberofviciousIEDattacksonmanyderivativesof itseconomicgrowthacrossthecountrywhichinclude urbanpublictransportationsystems,touristcentres, revenuegeneratingentities,rapidlydeveloping infrastructure,fnancialhubs,ITparks,centresoftrade, commerceandenergyindustries.SuchmajorIED attacksaredescribedbelow:

A.MumbaiSerialBombings1993 —Thebombings wereaseriesof13explosionsatvariouslocations spreadovertheMumbaiMetropolisonFriday, 12March1993.Mostofthebombswerecar bombs,butsomewereinscootersandsuitcases. Handgrenadeswerealsousedintheattacks. Bombsandhandgrenadesexplodedatverybusy marketsincludingZaveriBazaar,CenturyBazaar, KathaBazaar,ShivSenaBhavan,PlazaTheatre, SaharInternationalAirportandatFishermen's Colony.Severaldayslater,unexplodedcarbombs werediscoveredatasuburbanrailwaystation.The offcialnumberofdeadwasputat257withabout 1,500othersinjured.Propertiesworthmillionsof Dollarsweredestroyedduringtheseblasts.The entireMumbaiMetropoliswasparalysedforafew days.However,Mumbaianditspeoplehadshown greatresilience,gritanddeterminationtodefeat

DevastationMumbaiBlasts1993. (Source:TimesofIndia)

CoimbatoreBombings1998. (Source:MHA,India)

terrorismandspeedilysprungbackintoroutine life.Aclearmessagewassentthatterrorism willneverdefeattheirwillandlongcherished cultureofharmonyandbrotherhood.Mumbai, thethrivingmetropolisandcommercialcapitalof India,ishomefornearly22millionpeople.Mumbai accountsfornearly20%ofTotalGrossDomestic ProductofIndia.

B.MumbaiSeriesofTrainBombings2006 —On 11July2006,aseriesofsevenbombblaststook placeoveraperiodof11minutesonthesuburban railwaynetworkduringtheafter-workrushhour whichkilled209andinjuredover700people. PressureCookerbombswereplacedontrainson thenetwork,whichformsthebackboneofthecity's transportnetwork.Pressurecookerswereusedin thisbombingtoincreasetheafterburnina

thermobaricreaction,morepowerfulthan conventionalhighexplosives.Thetimingofthe bombingsandthetrainssoselectedwastoinfict largenumberofcasualties,causegreaterimpact onpublicpsycheanddisrupteconomicactivities.

C.DelhiSerialBombBlasts2005and2008 —On 29Oct2005twodaysbeforeDiwaliaseriesofthree bombblaststookplaceinthecapitalofIndia.These blastswerecarriedoutbythePakistanbased terroristorganizationIslamicRevolutionaryFront. Twobombswereexplodedinmainmarketsofthe cityandthethirdblasttookplaceinabus.The attackineachmarketwasdeadlierasitwastheday ofDhanterasashoppingtimeforfestivals.The attackresultedin63deadand210injured.Again, on13Sept2008aseriesoffvesynchronised blaststookplacewithinaspanoffveminutesat

TrainofTerrorMumbai2006. (Source:IndiaToday)

(Source:IndiaTV)

variouslocationsofDelhikilling30andinjuring150 people.DelhiisnotonlythecapitalofIndia,buta largeeconomichub.

D.JaipurBlast2008 —On13May2008,aseries ofninesynchronisedbombblaststookplaceina spanof15minutes.Atenthbombwasalsofound andwasdefusedbythepolice.Thiswasa shockingincidentforIndiaasJaipurwasnever targetedbyterroristsbeforeanditisoneof India’smostpopulartouristdestinations.Oneof thebombswasexplodednearHawaMahal–an iconicmonumentofIndia.Initialpolice investigationssuggestedtheinvolvementof severalIslamicmilitantorganizations.These blastsweresynchronizedinsuchawaythat attackersknewwherepeoplewillrunnextafter ablastatoneplaceandwhentheterrifedpublic rantowardsasaferplace,anexplosiontook placethere.Thetotalcasualtiesinthisattack amountedto63peopledeadand216injured.

E.GuwahatiBombings2008 —Aserialbombblast, oneoftheworstterroristattacksinIndiawas inGuwahati,capitaloftheStateofAssam occurredon30Oct2008.Asmanyaseighteen bombblastsatdifferentlocationsshookthecity andotherareas.Mostofthebombsexploded nearamainmarketandatatimewhenthemarket wascrowded.Noneofthegroupsclaimed responsibilityfortheseattacksbutsomeevidence suggesteditwastheNationalDemocraticFrontof Bodoland(NDFB)thatexecutedthebombingsin Assam.Thetotalcasualtiesinthisattack amountedto81deadand470injured.Guwahatiis thelargestcityoftheNorthEastandathriving economicmetropolis.

F.CoimbatoreBombings1998 -—AnIslamist Fundamentalistgroup,AlUmmah,conducteda seriesoftwelveBombblastsatelevendifferent locationson14Feb1998.Mostoftheblastswere plantedatHinduinhabitedareasduetowhichthe

DelhiBlasts2005.

GuwahatiBlasts2008. (Source:DainikBhaskar)

JaipurBlasts2008. (Source:HindustanTimes)

AhmedabadBombings2008. (Source:TheTathva)

majorityofthevictimswereHindus.Mainaimof theblastswastodisruptthecommunalharmony andcommercialandindustrialactivitiesofthe SouthernCity.Theseblastsresultedin60people deadand200injured.

G.SrinagarAttack2001 —On01Oct2001,the militantsbelongingtoJaish-e-Mohammedcarried outanattackontheJammuandKashmirState LegislativeAssemblycomplexinSrinagarusinga carbombandthreeFedayeensuicidebombers. 38peopleincludingthreeFedayeendiedinthis attack.SrinagarisIndia’smostpopulartourist centreandthestate’smainhubforeconomic activities.

H.AhmedabadBombings2008 —TheCapitalcity oftheStateofGujaratsurvivedaseriesoftwentyonebombblastson26July2008.Thesebomb blastsleft56peopledeadandmorethan200 peopleseverelyinjured.AhmedabadisIndia’s biggesttextilehub.

I.HyderabadBlasts2007 —On25August2007, twobombsexplodedalmostsimultaneouslyinthe capitaloftheStateofTelangana.Thefrstbomb explodedinLumbiniAmusementParkandthe secondbombexplodedfveminuteslaterinGokul ChatBhandari,apopularrestaurantabout5 kilometresaway.Atleast42peoplewerereported tohavediedinthetwobombings.Twomore bombsweredefusedinotherpartsofthecity. HyderabadistheffthbiggestmetropolisofIndia andabigcentreforITandPharmacompanies.It isalsoabigtouristcentre.

J.MumbaiBombings2011 —Aseriesofthree coordinatedbombexplosionsatdifferentlocations allwithin12minutesoccurredon13July2011.The frstdevicewasplantedonamotorcycle,the seconddeviceplantedinatiffnboxandthethird deviceplacedonanelectricpoleatabusstand exploded.Theblastsclaimed26livesandinjured anadditional130others.

HyderabadBlasts2007. (Source:LiveLaw.in)

PulwamaSVBIEDAttack2019. (Source:MHAIndia)

K.PuneBombing2010 —Abombexplodedatthe GermanBakeryinthecityofPune,on13Feb 2010.Theblastkilled17people,andinjuredat least60more.TheGermanBakeryislocated neartheJewishChabadHouseandtheOsho internationalmeditationresort.Theresortand thebakeryarefrequentedbyforeignersandthe bakery,whichispopularwithtouristsandlocals alike,wasbusyatthetimeoftheblast.Twolittle knowngroups,theLaskhar-e-TaibaAlAlamiand theMujahedeenIslamiMuslimFront,claimed theywerebehindthebombattack.Punehas hugeautomobile,IT,pharmaceuticalIndustries andoneofthebiggesteducationalcentres.

L.ThePulwamaAttack2019 —On14February 2019,aconvoyofvehiclestransportingmore than2,500centralpoliceforcepersonnelfrom JammutoSrinagarwasattackedatLethpora, PulwamaDistrict.Theffthbusintheconvoy carryingsecuritypersonnelwasrammed byvancarryingalargequantityofexplosives.It causedahugeblastwhichkilled44police personnelandinjuredmanyothers.PakistanbasedterroristgroupJaisheMohammed(JeM) claimedresponsibilityfortheattack.The Pulwamaattackisthebiggestinthehistoryof Kashmirmilitancyintermsofthecasualtiesit infictedonsecurityforces.JammuandKashmir isIndia’smaintouristterritoryattractingmillions oftouristseveryyear.Tourismisthemainsource ofrevenueforthatterritory.

CONCLUSION

TheIEDattacksoverthelastthreedecades,a fewofwhichhavebeendescribedabove,onIndia’s economic,fnancialandtouristcentresundoubtedly provethemainobjectivetoimpedeeconomicgrowth ofavibrantdemocraticandprogressivenation,and frmlyinthecross-hairsofterrorgroups.Despite thesedisruptions,resilientandrobustIndiaisfrmly andconfdentlyonthepathofprogressand development.■

ABOUTTHEAUTHOR

ColonelHRNaiduGade-IndianArmyVeteran, [BE(Civil),MSc(DefenceStudies),MBA(HR)] CommissionedintotheCorpsofCombatEngineers. ACivilEngineer,andSecurityProfessional,with 47yearsofrichexperienceinthefeldofCombat Engineering,Chemical,Biological,Radiological, NuclearandExplosives(CBRNe)Defence,Security andDisasterManagementandCounterIED Operations.IsaqualifedCBRNandCounter-IED Professional.

IsaformerMemberInternationalCivilServicewhile workingasChiefCWInspector1997-2004withthe ‘OrganisationforProhibitionofChemicalWeapons (OPCW)’,TheNetherlands,winneroftheNobelPeace Prize2013.Ledteamsofinternationalprofessionalson manyverifcationmissionstovariousmember countries,toverifytheinventoryofChemicalWeapons andmonitortheirdestruction.

Presently,ChiefConsultantwith‘CBRNeSecure India’a‘forumandaknowledgecentre’forbringing awarenessinthegeneralpublic,governmentand securityentitiesonthethreatsarisingfromtheuseof CBRNematerialandtheirdisastrousconsequencesA prolifcwriterandspeaker,participatedinvarious internationalanddomesticconferencesonCBRN Security,DisasterManagementandCounterExplosive Issuesandwritesarticlesforprofessionaljournals worldwideonthesesubjects.

ISLAMICSTATETWINSUICIDEBOMBINGS, KERMAN,IRAN

ByChiefSuperintendent(ret.)MichaelCardash,Terrogence-Global

ANALYSIS

OnJanuary3,2024,ataround2:55PM,duringa commemorativeceremonymarkingthedeathof MajorGeneralQasemSoleimani,ablastoccurred approximately700metersfromSahebal-Zaman MosqueandKerman’sMartyrsCemetery,where Soleimani’stombislocated.Theexplosionoccurredin

anareawheredozensofpeoplehadgathered, marchingtowardthecemetery.Visualevidence fromtheblastarearevealssubstantialmetalball fragmentationdamagetotheroad,nearby infrastructure,property,andvictims.Severalindividuals sustainedfragmentationimpactstothehead.

MapindicatingtheapproximatelocationsofthefrstandsecondblastsnearKerman’sMartyrsCemeteryinthecityofKerman

Themomentofthefrstexplosion

Thesceneoftheattack

Fragmentationdamageontheroad

Metalballfragmentationdamagetoanearbytraffcbarrier

Ballbearingfragmentationdamageontheroad,andabenttraffcsign

Thetraffcsignthatbentfromtheexplosionwave,withvisiblefragmentationimpact

Aftertheexplosion,footagerevealsmultiplevictims,withtheabove-mentionedbenttraffcsignvisibleintheleftpartofthe image(markedwitharedarrow)

Twentyminutesafterthefrstblast,at3:15PM,a secondexplosionoccurredapproximately1,000 metersfromthetomb,nearamajorroadcurve.Videos andCCTVfootagerevealtheblastsite,capturingthe momentoftheexplosionnearparkedcars,witha signifcantcrowdpresent.Sirenscanbeheardinthe

background.CCTVfootagesuggeststhattheblast originatedfromanindividualwhowasneartheparked carsatthetime.Similartothefrstblast,thereis evidencepointingtofragmentationdamageaffecting nearbyvictimsandvehicles.

Thesceneandthemomentoftheblast

Theexplosiontookplacenearavehiclewithitsrearcompartmentlifted.Theblastoriginatedontherightsideofthevehicle

Damagetothevehicleparkedinfrontoftheonewiththeraisedrearcompartment

Oneofthebodiesexhibitssignifcantabdominaldamage,possiblyindicatingtheuseofaPBIEDwornbytheindividual

ASSESSMENT

Accordingtovariousreports,theattacksresultedinan estimated80-90fatalitiesandleftaround280others injured.ThismarksthedeadliestterroristattackinIran sincetheCinemaRexattack of1978.Thetwinbombings tookplaceduringahighly sensitiveoccasion-the commemorativeceremony forQasemSoleimani.

Soleimani,areveredfgurein theIranianregime,servedas thecommanderoftheIslamic RevolutionaryGuardCorps (IRGC)QudsForce,specializinginunconventional warfareandspecialmilitary intelligenceoperations.

Shortlyafterthebombings, ISclaimedresponsibilityfor

theattackthroughitsAmaqNewsAgency,asserting thattwoofitsmembershadcarriedouttheattackusing PBIEDs.

ISclaimofresponsibilityinEnglishfeaturingthetwosuicidebombers

Aftertheattacks,theIranianMinistryofIntelligence announcedthearrestof35suspectswhoallegedly supportedandfacilitatedthepreparationsforthe bombingsinKerman.TheMinistryreleasedfootageofthe suspectedsuicidebombersbeforetheattackand publishedincriminatingevidenceandmaterialsfoundin theirsafehouse.Thestatementprovideddetailsonthe identityofoneofthebombersandoneoftheorganizers oftheattack,aswellastheirmethodofinfltrationintoIran.

Accordingtotheinvestigation,Abdullahal-Tajiki,a Tajiknational,servedasthemastermindandprimary facilitatorofthebombings.Operatingalongsidea womanandachildwhoprovidedhiscover,heillegally enteredIranwiththeassistanceoflocalsmugglersfrom thesoutheasternborders.Al-TajikisettledinKerman Province,takingresidenceinarentedhouseonthe outskirtsofKermanCity.Inadditiontoorchestratingthe bombings,hewasinvolvedinthemanufacturingofthe PBIEDs,includingthemakingoftheexplosivesandthe assemblyofelectricalcomponents.Al-Tajikileftthe countrytwodaysbeforethebombings.

Additionally,theMinistryofIntelligenceidentifed oneofthesuicidebombersasa24-year-old Tajikistancitizen.HebecameacquaintedwithIS throughtheTelegrammessagingapp.Several monthsbeforethebombings,hetraveledtothecity ofVan,Turkey,andthenenteredIranwiththe assistanceofsmugglersoperatinginthewesternand easternborders.HeproceededtoAfghanistan, attendingatrainingcampinBadakhshanProvince managedbytheIslamicStateKhorasanProvince (ISKP).There,hestudiedISreligiousteachingsand underwentoperationalandmilitarytraining.Aftera fewmonths,hewasdispatchedtoIran.Themilitant crossedtheborderintoJaleqKalleganinSaravan Citywiththeaidoflocalsmugglers.Passingthrough thecitiesofKhash,Iranshahr,andJiroft,hereached Abdullahal-Tajiki'ssafehouseinKerman,wherehe joinedhim.Onthedayoftheincident,at1:03PMand 1:14PM,thetwosuicidebomberslefttheir safehouseandheadedtowardsKermanMartyrs Cemetery.

Thesafehouse

Themaintargetfortheattackwaslikelytheinner complexofthecemetery,possiblyaimingatthegrave ofQasemSoleimaniorthemosque.However, stringentsecurityarrangementsduringthissensitive memorialeventmayhavecompelledthebombersto initiatetheattackhundredsofmetersawayfromthe innercomplex.

Thelocationofthesecondblastwasontheroad exitingthecemetery,featuringamajorroadcurvethat causesvehiclestoslowdown,makingthemmore vulnerable.Thisroadservesasthemostplausible evacuationroute,andinourestimation,thesecond bomberintendedtotargetfrstrespondersevacuating thewoundedfromthearea.Thiscouldalsoaccount forthetwenty-minuteinterludebetweenthetwo bombings.

Thesubstantialattendanceatthememorial ceremonysignifcantlyheightenedthepotentialfor masscasualties.Theattackservesasasymbolic glorifcationofIScapabilitiesandfanaticismagainst ShiaIslamandtheIranianregime,bothdeemedbyIS asinfdelsworthyofpersecutionanddeath.

TheIraniansecurityforcesconductedaraidon Abdullahal-Tajiki'ssafehouseinKerman,uncovering

equipmentandcomponentsusedinthemanufacturing ofIEDs.Furthermore,theydiscoveredacamoufagestylefabricresemblingthevestswornbyISmilitants inthevideowheretheypledgedallegiancetothe ISleader.

Theevidenceobtainedfromtheraidstrongly substantiatestheclaimsmadebyboththeIranian regimeandISregardingtheuseofPBIEDsin theattacks.

Thediscovereditemsincludemetalball fragmentationplates,adigitalscale,voltmeter,various electricalcomponents,anON/OFFswitch,abattery connector,andapullswitch.

Inrecentyears,particularlyin2023,ISKPhas intensifeditsfocusoncarryingoutPBIEDattacksin AfghanistanandPakistan.Pullswitches,common componentsininitiationsystems,havebeen frequentlyidentifedinISKPPBIEDs.Notably,the TalibanthwartedanattackplotinvolvingaTajikISKP militantwhowasdiscoveredwithanIEDconcealedin sandals,featuringapullswitchcomponent, suggestingapotentialuseasaPBIED.Pullswitches andPBIEDswerealsodiscoveredinvariousTaliban raidsonISKPsafehouses.

Metalballfragmentationplatesfoundinthesafehouse

Componentsfoundinthesafehouse

Explosivespacket(left)andpullswitch(right)foundconcealedinsandals, KabulProvince,Afghanistan,August28,2023

ItshouldbenotedthatISattacksare rareinIran.Thelastrecordedincident claimedbyISinthecountryoccurredon theeveningofOctober26,2022,whenan assailantenteredtheShahCheraghHoly ShrineinthecityofShiraz.

Footagefromwithintheholysite, disseminatedthroughIranianstatemedia andsocialmedia,revealedtheperpetrator enteringfreelyandindiscriminately shootingatworshippersandvisitors presentatthetime.Accordingtoreports fromstate-runandinternationalmedia,the attackresultedinthedeathsof13to15 individuals,withanadditional40 sustaininginjuries.

Anothershootingattacktookplaceat thesameshrineonAugust13,2023. At7PMonaSunday,alone-wolf shootergainedaccesstotheShah Cheraghshrinethroughitssouthern

PBIED(left)andassortedpullswitches(right)foundinanISKPworkshop,JowzjanProvince,Afghanistan,March24,2023

gate,initiatinggunfre.Reportssuggestthatatleast oneanduptofourindividualswerekilledbeforethe assailantwasapprehendedbysecurityforces.Notably, thissecondattackwasnotattributedtoIS.

Furthermore,theJanuary2024Kermanattackisthe frstsuccessfulsuicidebombinginIraninseveralyears.

InSeptember2023,theIranianMinistryofIntelligence announceditapprehendedanISnetworkthatwas planningsimultaneousattacksindenselypopulated locationsinTehran.Duringraids,securityforces recoveredIEDsandcomponents,includingthosefora vestPBIEDwithimproviseddetonatorsandanelectric initiationsystem,incorporatingatleasttwo9Vbatteries andON/OFFrockerswitches.

ThelastsuicidebombinginIranwasexecutedbythe BalochiSalafgroupJayshal-AdelonFebruary13,2019. ThesuicidebomberdetonatedanSVBIEDnearabus transportingIRGCpersonnelontheroadbetweenKhash andZahedaninSistanandBaluchestanProvince, resultingin27casualties.

Overtheyears,Iraniansecurityforceshaveconducted operationsinthecountry'sborderregions,notablyin SistanandBaluchestanProvince,leadingtothe discoveryandconfscationofseveralPBIEDsduring raids.Forexample,onJune15,2017,Iraniansecurity forceslaunchedanoperationagainstamilitantcell affliatedwiththeAnsaral-Furqangroup,aSunni organizationoperatinginsoutheasternIranandknown

CCTVfootageshowinggunmeninShahCheraghHolyShrineattacks:October2022(top)andAugust2023(bottom)

forcarryingoutterroristattacks.Theraidonahideoutin thecityofChabaharintheprovinceuncoveredIEDs, explosives,PBIEDs,grenades,rifes,andammunition.

TheparticipationofISKPinorchestratingandproviding trainingforthepreparationsleadinguptothesuicide bombingsindicatetheescalatingregionalterrorismthreat posedbythegroup,surpassingitsusualoperations confnedwithinAfghanistan’sborders.ISKPsuccessfully coordinatedacomplexdoublesuicidebombingattack, suggestingextensivemonths-longpreparationsand meticulousplanning.Thisattackwasexecutedona signifcantmass-gatheringoccasionandatalocationof profoundsymbolicimportancetotheIranianregime.

Thisattackadditionallysignifesasubstantial escalationinthegroup’sattackTTPsinIran,andmarks ashiftfromconventionalshootingattacks,typically carriedoutbyaloneassailant,toasophisticated

operationinvolvingfacilitators,smugglers,extended trainingperiods,andthecoordinationandexpertiseofan IEDspecialist.■

ABOUTTHEAUTHOR

ChiefSuperintendent(ret.)Michael Cardash, Seniorbombtechnician andformerdeputyheadoftheIsraeli policebombdisposaldivision, commandedbombdisposalunits withintheborderguardsandpolice duringintenseterroristconfictsin Israel.Michaelcurrentlyisthesenior CIEDanalystatTerrogence-Global,IED’sandauthors theTerogenceMöbiusC-IEDreportsanalyzingand assessingglobalIED-relatedtechnicalandtactical intelligence.

ComponentsofthePBIEDfoundbyIraniansecurityforces,September2023

October 2 - 6 2024

VIPSECURITY–AMATTEROFLIFEANDDEATH

ByVincentDeery,CEO,3DX-RayLtd

Flatpanelportablex-rayscannersarealreadyfrmly establishedasanessentialtoolforbombdisposal teamsthroughouttheworld.

Theirmobility,accuracy,andspeedofusegaveEOD operatorstheabilitytoviewwhatwasinsideabagor packageinsitu,whilstmaintainingasafedistance.

Flatpanelportablex-rayscannersallowoperators toseedetailedhigh-defnitionimagesofthecontents ofasuspectpackageorbag.Theycandetermine,not onlyifitisathreat,butwhattypeofthreat,withoutthe potentiallydangerousbusinessofopeningormoving theobjectordisruptingordestroyingitonsite.

Theyenableagenciestomakequickdecisions aboutwhetherabagposesagenuinethreatoris exactlywhatitseemstobe,aninnocentpieceof baggage.Meaning,thatpeoplecangoabouttheir businessasquicklyaspossibleandavoidmass disruptiontopublicspacesandtransportthrough unnecessaryevacuations.

Overtheyears,technologyhascontinually developedandnowcolourdifferentiatedscanshave beenintroduced.Thishasmadeitpossibletodetermine ifmaterialsareorganic,suchasexplosives,chemicals, anddrugs,aswellasmoreinnocentitemssuchas foodstuffs.Whataremetals,suchasguns,knives,hand grenades,metalpipebombs,andIEDcomponents (switches,circuitcomponents,etc.)andmetallic

fragmentation.Andlastly,inorganicmaterialslikeblack powdersandaluminizedhomemadeexplosives.

Theseattributeshavenotbeenlostonother membersofthelawenforcementandsecurity community.

Thecombinationof,alargeimagingarea,withhighqualityimages,atanaffordablepricehasmadethe 3DX-RayThreatScan®-LS1apopularsolutionfor secretserviceoffcersandprivatesecuritycompanies, whorequireamobilesystem,thatcanberapidly deployedtosecurehigh-profleVIPdelegationsat eventsworldwide.

3DX-RayaskedoneoftheirThreatScan®-LS1 users,aglobalsecuritycompanyCEO,whousesthe systemfortheiroperationsinEurope,andSouthand NorthAmerica,todescribeforusthebeneftsof workingwiththesystem:

“Wesupplysecuritysolutionsatconferences worldwide,soitisimportanttohaveamobilesystem thatcanbeeasilyandsafelyshipped.Whenthesecurity teamarrivesataconferencelocation,theywillcreatea sterilezonewhereallthemediareportersanddelegates willbecheckedbeforepassingtotheconvention.

“Withtheportablex-raysystem,wearechecking everydevicethatwillproceedtotheconvention arealikecameras,microphones,phones,suitcases, laptops,pens,andmore.

“Therewereseveraloccasionswhenthesystem wasabletodetectammunition,andthiswasthe differencebetweenasuccessfuloperationora failurewhichcouldresultinlossofhumanlife.

“Itisimportanttohaveasystemwithalargeimaging areathatcanscananentirecaseorseveralobjects together;wecannotcompromiseonthesecuritybut mustdoafastandeffectivejobsoastonotdelayVIP delegations”.

Themainadvantageofx-rayfatpaneltechnology isthatyoucanhaveaveryquickscanofonly 6secondstocoverthe 60x46 cmimagingarea, whichcanbeacartrunkoralargesuitcase,a simplego-no-gosituation.Thisshouldbeenoughto decidewhetheryouhaveathreatorasuspicious object,butifneededyoucantakeasecondscanof aspecifcregionofinterestandthenseeitmuch betterandlarger,seeexampleinFigures1and 2below.

Anotheradvantageisthatyoudonotneedto compromiseonthepenetrationandimagingarea. Youcanstillgetadecentpenetrationevenonthick objects,usually,itwillbescanningfordeviceshidden inawall,seeexampleinFigures3and4.

Forobviousreasons,itisnotpossibletoshare muchinformationaboutthegovernmentandsecret serviceswhousethesystem,butseveralagencies areworkingwiththesystemandbeneftfromits advantages:portability,superiorimagequality,ease ofuse,andaverylargeimagingareawhichallows themtoscananentireroom,fromthephonetothe wallsinaveryshorttimeenablingthemeetingor conferencetotakeplaceonschedule.

ManyagenciesliketopairtheThreatScan®-LS1 withthesmallerLS3detector,whichcanbe backpackedorcarriedinasmallPelicaseonaplane, orinthebootofa4x4whentravellingcrosscountry. Thissystemisknownasthe"Combi".

Figure1:Aquickscanofalargesuitcase

Figure2:Sub-regionscanofaspecifcROI

Morerecently3DX-Rayaddedanewsmallerfat paneltotheirfamilyofproducts,calledtheAS2.Only 43x35cmwithimprovedresolutionandthesame materialsdiscriminationcapability,thisnewpanelis smallenoughtoftintoconfnedareassuchasunder theseatsofcars,intoshelves,drawsandrecesses, wherethelargerpanelswillnotft.

3DX-RAYLTD,CEO,VincentDeerysaid: “VIPsare someofthemostwidelytravelledpeopleonthe planet.Constantlymovingtonewvenuesandnew accommodation,onbusinessandpleasure,creating massivechallengesfortheircloseprotectionteams. Wearealwayslisteningtoourcustomers,andthey

toldusthattheyneededthesearchcapabilityand portabilityprovidedbyourlargerx-rayfatpanelsbut neededsmallerpanelswithallthecapabilitiesoftheir largercounterparts,butsmallenoughtobeslippedinto spaceswherelargerpanelsjustwon’tft.So,thenew detectorpanelhasbeenspecifcallydesignedfor operatorsworkinginareaswhereaccessisvery restricted.WenowfeelthatourThreatScanfamilyof productscaterstothewidestrangeofoperational scenarios,whetherthat’sanEODtechnicianinspecting asuspiciouspackageoracloseprotectionteam clearingahotelroominadvanceofthearrivalof their‘Principal’” ■

Figure3:Regularimage

Figure4:Samedevicehiddenbehind25cmofconcrete

CR + DR

DUAL SYSTEMS Scanna dual radiography systems

One operating platform

Double the capability

CR + DR combined systems enable your team to respond quickly, with an optimised solution, for Counter-EO and CBRNE missions

X-ray Systems designed and built for bomb techs