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FCMUN 2011

European External Action Service

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Five College Model United Nations 2011 April 1st -3rd, Mount Holyoke College

European External Action Service www.fcmun.org


FCMUN 2011

European External Action Service

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European External Action Service: What is the European Union? The European Union (EU) in terms of its character is regarded as a very unique formation in modern political history. It is the historical background, demographic and geographic composition of the European continent that allowed for this formation to come into being and it might sometimes be hard to grapple practically and theoretically what exactly the EU is/does. The institutions of the European Union resemble those of a modern nation-state and a conventional international regime both at the same time. It is therefore imperative to visualize European Union as a unique, multileveled and transnational political system rather than comparing it to a state or an UN-like international organization1. Over the years, the European Union has strived to position itself in the international system as a global actor initially in the form of a significant economic power. The ambitions for cooperation in security and defense followed; however, this path was long and steep one. In the wake of German unification and the end of Cold War, the member states committed themselves to a common foreign and security policy at a European level. 2 Yet the task of further integration in this policy area was challenging both in terms of structure and representation. The unique formation of the EU has caused confusion and misconceptions about what the EU is, wants to do, and can achieve in the realm of foreign policy. Especially in terms of representation, it became an obstacle for the EU that it wasn‟t clear to neither the European public nor the international community how the chain of responsibility functioned. The historic question of Henry Kissinger marked this confusion with words as he said “Who do I call if I want to call Europe?”

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Andrew Moravcsik, The Choice for Europe: Social Purpose and State Power from Messina to Maastrict (Cornell University Press, 1998), 1. 2 Anthony Forster and William Wallace, “Common Foreign and Security Policy”, in Policy Making in the European Union, edited by Hellen Wallace and William Wallace (Oxford University Press 2000), 461 – 91.


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This remark was the vocalization of the international community‟s perception of a powerful international actor built upon the traditional understanding of the concept which has been the nation state. To that question European officials responded pointing out the difference of the case. The President of the European Commission Jose Manuel Barroso said “We are not the United States, we are not China, we are not Russia and we do not want to be. We are a union of states, so by definition our system is more complex.”3 Yet it was recognized by the European Union that the problem of representation and coherence had to be addressed in a way that is fitting to the “complex” system of the European Union and satisfying to the Europeans and the international community. Pre-Common Foreign and Security Policy Kissinger‟s question became one of the most quoted remarks in Brussels as the strengthening of European common foreign, security and defense policy became more and more salient. Yet the idea of cooperation in this policy realm was nothing novel. A federal solution as an alternative to the balance of power was first mentioned in the mid-nineteenth century. Even though challenged from time to time, the idea continuously resurfaced in the aftermath of the World War II and the rise of fascism. The “abolition of the division of Europe into national sovereign states” based on the impossibility of maintaining balance between the independent European states was manifested by two political prisoners at the time – Ernesto Rossi and Altiero Spinelli. 4 Later on absolute federalist movements advocated for action which led to the establishment of the Union of European Federalists (UEF) in 1946. 5 These movements suggest that European integration, contrary to the conventional understanding, didn‟t exclude the possibility of integration in terms of security and defense until a certain time but was always in the minds of Europeans. The security concerns of the European people and outside actors about the continent were very much vocalized after the experiences of the two World Wars. In 1948, through the efforts of the UEF, other pan-European organizations, political movements and powerful political actors such as Winston Churchill and Duncan Sandys, the Hague Congress was held that united 800 delegates from around Europe as well as from the United States and Canada. The Congress was pivotal and ensued the Brussels Pact of 1948 and had important outcomes such as the creation of the Western European Union and the European Movement (the first European Party) and laid the groundwork for Council of Europe.6 The Western European Union that was the descendant of the Western Union Defense Organization was an integral part of the development of the European Union.7 At the same time, with the help of historic lessons, it was recognized that the United States‟ support in guaranteeing European security was vital and indispensible. With the furthering of the talks 3

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David Brunnstrom, “EU says it has solved the Kissinger question”, Reuters, November 20 , 2009, th http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE5AJ00B20091120 (Accessed November 29 , 2010) 4 Simon Duke, The Elusive Quest for European Security (MacMillan Press Ltd. 2000), 12. 5 “UEF (Union of European Federalists) Beginnings”, federaleurope.org, http://www.federaleurope.org/aboutth uef/history/ (Accessed November 29 , 2010). 6 Alice-Catherine Carls and Megan Naughton, “Functionalism and Federalism in the European Union”, The Center for Public Justice (cpjustice.org), http://www.cpjustice.org/content/functionalism-and-federalism-european-union th (Accessed November 29 , 2010). 7 Forster & Wallace , “Common Foreign and Security Policy”, 473.

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initiated at the Hague Congress, the spirit of cooperation was maintained and resulted in the signature of the North Atlantic Treaty in Washington on 4 April 1949.8 At this point, it is important to recognize that European security and defense concerns were entertained both by the Western European Union, NATO and soon at the European Coal and Steel community. Both American and European concerns about the security and rearmament of Germany have paved the way for European leadership in European security. The European Defense Community (EDC) was thus proposed on 24 October 1950 by René Pléven for six countries: France, Italy, West Germany, Belgium, Netherlands and Luxembourg. 9 EDC was the first proposal for the establishment of a pan-European army; however, it failed when French parliament voted down the ratification. However, this failure did not stop the efforts for foreign policy cooperation and success was attained with the establishment of the European Political Cooperation. The European Political Cooperation (EPC) was the first step of incorporation of foreign policy into the European Communities (EC), mainly the European Coal and Steel Community. The political cooperation was based on the recognition that the implementation of common policies required corresponding developments in the political sphere to keep up with the increasing role and cohesion of Europe. 10 The EPC consisted of regular meetings of the Foreign Ministers to co-ordinate national stances towards particular areas of the world, or particular issues and was set up in a manner to function in a parallel way to the economic integration of the European community. In the 1970s, it became intertwined with the institutions and procedures of the EC. In 1987, with the Single European Act, it became officially incorporated into the European Community structure.11 However, the EPC was highly criticized for being weak and lacking substance. For many, “the light-touch approach and its loose framing made it ill equipped to project a common European vision at the end of the Cold War and this led to criticism that it was reactive.”12 The Gulf War and Yugoslavia Crisis “We have to wonder why Europe does not seem capable of taking decisive action in its own theater.” – Richard Holbrooke13 The historic events of the time had been imperative in the development of a common European foreign policy. The Gulf and Yugoslavia crises stand out as the two most important events that defined the demands of the international community. And the disagreement about what kind of action needs to be taken among member states became the divisive topic. 8

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“History of WEU”, Western European Union, http://www.weu.int/History.htm (Accessed November 29 , 2010). Duke, The Elusive Quest for European Security, 19-20. 10 th th Davignon Report (Luxembourg October 27 , 1970), Ena.lu, http://www.ena.lu/ (Accessed at November 30 , 2010). 11 Robert Dover, “The EU’s Foreign, Security, and Defense Policies”, European Union Politics, edited by Michele Cini nd (Oxford University Press 2007-2 Edition), 239. 12 Dover, “The EU’s Foreign, Security, and Defense Policies”. 13 Tony Judt, Postwar: A History of Europe since 1945, (The Penguin Press 2005), 701. 9

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In the Gulf Crisis the attack on the French embassy by Iraqi forces and the taking of hostages was the breaking point for the united European response. According to Dover, “The subsequent release of the French hostages by Iraq raised suspicions that the French government had engaged in some sort of unilateral negotiation, perhaps making commitments to Saddam Hussein.”14 These suspicions decreased the possibility of forming a proposal about actions that were commonly agreed upon especially about the peaceful Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait. Throughout the crisis, while agreeing on economic sanctions was a smooth process, military action plans had been continuously very controversial. The Yugoslavian Crisis carried even more importance as it occurred on the European soil. The initial agreement among the EC countries was that the support was going to be behind a united Yugoslavia, yet this decision proved unfeasible as different countries‟ public opinion changed towards favoring the recognition of some countries such as Croatia and Slovenia. The conclusion from these two experiences was that “the EC‟s response to these crises lent some support to the view that the differences between the perceptions and national interests of the member states remained too diverse to accommodate within a single foreign policy. However, it also supported the view that some of the problems at least lay in the existence of inadequate machinery for dealing with crisis.” 15 The Intergovernmental Conference that was taking place at the time was thus highly influenced by these crises. The Intergovernmental Conferences (IGCs) by nature are perceived as the negotiation phase of the European treaties which set out the EU‟s (at the time still EC) constitutional basis. The Belgian position on the matter stating the urgent need for a “truly common foreign policy” and participation of the Community as a “political entity” found a lot of support and placed the issue on the IGC of 1991.16 And the IGC planned for 1990-1 that was intended to focus on monetary union and the institutional consequences thus included the foreign and defense policy of the union.17 Common Foreign and Security Policy “A common foreign and security policy is hereby established” – The Maastricht Treaty – Treaty on European Union, Maastricht 7 February 199218 Title V of the Treaty on the European Union created the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and constructed the institutional mechanisms of it. While establishing the European Union, the Maastricht Treaty secured both the structure of the CFSP and the European Communities through incorporating the EPC to the EU. Article C of the Treaty suggests that “The Union shall be served by a single institutional framework which shall ensure the consistency and the continuity of the activities carried out in order to attain its objectives while respecting and building upon the acquis communautaire”.19 14

Dover, “The EU’s Foreign, Security, and Defense Policies”. Ibid, 521. 16 Duke, The Elusive Quest for European Security, 79. 17 Forster & Wallace, “Common Foreign and Security Policy”, 467. 18 Maastricht Treaty – Treaty on European Union (1992), http://www.eurotreaties.com/maastrichteu.pdf (Accessed on December 1st, 2010), 7. 19 Ibid, 5. 15

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Through the treaty, the pillar system that was to survive till the Lisbon Treaty was instituted. The pillar system was a crucial element of the EU structure as it secured the different decision making procedures for the different topics. Its importance rests on the fact that for many member states a community approach which included supranational institutions of the EU to be included in the foreign and security policy of the EU was very unattractive. The suggestion of the pillar system thus eliminated the idea that there needed to be a singular decision making mechanism for all policy areas across the board. So it was decided that the CFPS and Justice and Home Affairs pillars (2nd and 3rd) were going to be intergovernmental pillars. And Qualified majority voting (QMV) in the second pillar was only restricted for the implementation of the measures that were agreed to be taken by consensus.20

Common Foreign and Security Policy (2nd Pillar) Foreign Policy Security Policy

European Union European Communities (1st Pillar) European Economic Community + Euratom + European Coal and Steel Community Inc. European Monetary Union

Home & Justice Affairs (3rd Pillar) Inc. Schengen Accords

Source: Duke, The Elusive Quest for European Security, 101.

The question of defense was also a matter to be included in the new treaty; however, this could not have been done without addressing the WEU. This was due to the fact that all members of the Community were also members of the WEU and duplication of responsibilities was not favored. Eventually, “agreement on the objective of the WEU of building up the organization in stages, as the defense component of the European Union, … agreement on the objective of strengthening the European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance and role, … affirmation of the intention of the WEU to act in conformity with positions adopted in the Alliance,”21 The Maastricht Treaty was in a way an improvement when assessed according to Christopher Hill‟s “capabilities – expectations gap” theory. This now widely used term was introduced as an assessment scheme of the union and its perception as an international actor. According to Hill, “the Community has been talked up – as a result of the Single Market and the Intergovernmental

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Ian Bache Stephen George, Politics in the European Union, (Oxford University Press, 2006), 522. “Chapter 15: Wider Institutional Framework for Security – The Western European Union”, NATO Handbook, th st (November 4 , 2002), http://www.nato.int/docu/handbook/2001/hb1504.htm, (Accessed at December 1 , 2010). 21

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Conferences of 1991 – to a point where it is not capable of fulfilling the new expectations already (and often irrationally) held of it.” 22 The Treaty of Amsterdam adopted the goal of making the CFSP more effective and equipping the Union with better instruments that fits to its role in international politics. The decision making has been re-evaluated and “constructive abstention” was introduced. One of the biggest contributions the Amsterdam Treaty made was the introduction of a new post intended to give a higher profile and more coherency to the CFSP - The High Representative. Additionally, the High Representative position was supported by a policy planning and early warning unit which is perceived as the earliest form of European External Actions Service. 23 The Birth of the High Representative Position “Treaty commitment (in Articles 18 and 26) to a High Representative marked potentially a larger step forward: empowered to assist the Council … in particular through contributing to the formulation, preparation and implementation of policy s.” – Anthony Forster and William Wallace Structurally, the High Representative position was combined with that of Secretary-General of the Council, and a new Deputy Secretary-General post was created to be in charge of managing the Council Secretariat. Thus, the first ever High Representative was Jürgen Trumpf, the Secretary General of the time. 24 This new position was meant to be the Mr/Mrs. CFPS with the idea of putting a face to the foreign policy of the EU. Its purpose was to clearly “allow the Union to express itself with greater visibility and coherence on the international stage by giving it a more recognizable face and voice,” through conducting political dialogue with third parties.25 With this new position, the idea that there needed to be a new policy planning unit, in addition to the CFSP Secretariat, was also introduced. This unit originally perceived to be around half-dozen in size by the French and British was enlarged in size to be able to address the concern of the small member states. The structure thus was created through, “the insistence from the smaller member states that they should be represented in this unit, together with staff seconded from the Commission and from the WEU Secretariat.”26

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Christopher Hill, “The Capabilities Expectations Gap, or Conceptualizing Europe’s International Role”, Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol.31 no.3, (September 1993). 23 “Common Foreign and Security Policy”, Amsterdam Treaty: A Comprehensive Guide, Europa – Summaries of EU Legislation, http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/institutional_affairs/treaties/amsterdam_treaty/a19000_en.htm, st (Accessed at December 1 , 2010). 24 th “Jürgen Trumpf”, European Navigator, Accessed at January 14 , 2011 at http://www.ena.lu/jurgen-trumpf020706075.html. 25 th “High Representative for the CFSP”, Europa Glossary, Accessed at January 14 , 2011, http://europa.eu/scadplus/glossary/high_representative_en.htm. 26 Forster and Wallace, 485.

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As the position was legally defined, the question now was: Who was to replace SecretaryGeneral Jürgen Trumpf? The answer was former Spanish Foreign minister and the current NATO Secretary-General Javier Solana. There was a symbolic purpose in the appointment of Solana in addition to its appropriateness. “The Secretary-General of NATO had always been a European, accepted by Americans as an interlocuteur on behalf of its allies; Solana was already well known, and well trusted in Washington.” 27 The appointment of Solana was in a way symbolic of European‟s continuous commitment to American alliance and the NATO structure.

Javier Solana:

"He is an extraordinary consensus-builder who works behind the scenes with leaders on both sides of the Atlantic to ensure that NATO is united when it counts," US ambassador to NATO Alexander Vershbow 28 Appointment of Solana was perceived as the found phone number for the Kissinger‟s question as he was seen as the face of the Common Foreign and Security Policy. There was of course a lot pressure about what he was to make out of the position. As Vershbow suggests, his behind the scenes but consensus-builder style of work led to a positive impression; however, challenges still existed. Even though the decision about the creation of the position was built upon consensus, the member states were challenged by the idea that the international dialogues were under the responsibility of the High Representative. Sir Brian Crowe states “complete achievement of an empowered HR (High Representative) has not been at all easy, either for Solana himself or for the Council, and especially not for the successive holders of the rotating presidency.” 29 It was the reality that the HR position was charged with assisting the Presidency and therefore was conceived by the member states as not having any authority. This has begun to be altered with his involvement in Yugoslavia. As the Council increasingly relied on Solana with his work in Serbia in building the civil society against Milosevic, Solana has begun to assert his leadership and the place of the position.

Through this success, the international community also started to perceive him as the representative of Europe as a collective, free from the influence of the powerful players. The Egyptian President‟s invite of Solana to the Sharm el-Sheikh and Kofi Annan‟s (UN SecretaryGeneral of the time) invitation to the Quartet on the Middle East proved that the international actors were warming up to the idea of a united Europe in foreign policy. However, these 27

Forster and Wallace, 487. th “Javier Solana”, SETimes.com, Accessed at January 18 , 2011, http://www.setimes.com/cocoon/setimes/xhtml/en_GB/infoCountryPage/setimes/resource_centre/bios/solana_j avier?country=EU 29 Sir Brian Crowe, “A Common Foreign European Foreign Policy After Iraq?” in Martin Holland, ed., Common Foreign and Security Policy: the First Ten Years, (London, UK, 2005), 37. 28

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processes were dismantled by the rotating presidency foreign ministers and caused confusion. Crowe notes, “Solana‟s role, while increasing, has been somewhat chequered, expanding incrementally and against rather than with Brussels; nevertheless, this needs to be the shape of things to come.” 30 This was the sign that the legitimacy of the position in the eyes of the member states was not as easy as signing the treaty that created the position. It required time and effort from both the states and the Representative. Solana did gain the respect of the member states and the international community over time. However, he was criticized for not institutionalizing the process. Solana‟s style of working was characterized as “highly effective as it is, is very personal and relies little on structural or institutional underpinning.” 31 Therefore what was to come after his term was unclear and the continuation of the position was doubted. The Lisbon Treaty – Taking Europe into the 21st Century With the passage of time, it became clear that the scope and content of the Common Foreign and Security Policy was adequate but it was the decision making process which loomed problematic.32 It was because of this that the 2002-2003 Convention on the Future of Europe was focused on how to improve the decision making process. This forum was the first time that the idea of combining the High Representative (previously combined with Secretary General) and the Commissioner for External Affairs came to be. This would mean that the tasks of initiative, chairmanship, representation and implementation were to be assigned to the High Representative position that was previously under the responsibility of the rotating presidency. This would create the new office for the “Union Minister for Foreign Affairs”, a title that would address the Kissinger question directly. However, the failed Constitution treaty also called for the collection all external action provisions under one structure. The CFSP (including the Common Foreign and Defense Policy), trade policy, development co-operation and humanitarian aid was to be titled as the Union‟s External Action. 33 Although, this structure was eliminated with the failure of the constitution treaty, its purposes that called for the enhancement of coherence of the EU external policies was not disposed. The issue was addressed through the unification of the framework of the external action. The Reform of the High Representative Position in the Lisbon Treaty: The Constitutional Treaty although signed by all the member states, failed in ratification with the negative result of the French and Dutch referenda. With the failure of the Constitutional Treaty and later through the 2007 Intergovernmental Conferences (IGC) mandate, the “Union Minister for Foreign Affairs” title was abandoned. However, the Lisbon Treaty produced through the IGC 30

Sir Brian Crowe, 38. Sir Brian Crowe, 38. 32 Jean-Claude Piris, The Lisbon Treaty: A Legal and Political Analysis, 33 Jean-Claude Piris, 242. 31

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did create the position with its enriched responsibilities. The title of “minister” was abandoned but the structure perceived in the in the Convention and the IGC about the position was preserved. Piris states, “The substance of the envisaged functions has nevertheless been kept and, to exercise them, the Lisbon Treaty has created the new office of „High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy” 34 The new High Representation position has combined three pre-existing positions into one. These positions were: 

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The High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy/ Secretary General of the Council: This was the earliest form of the position established through the Amsterdam Treaty. It is very much concerned with maintaining dialogue with third party countries throughout the policy making. The Commissioner for External Affairs: The Commission‟s right of initiative for policy making was exercised through this position and Commissioner also assisted the Council Presidency in negotiations. The President of the External Relations Council: Usually was the foreign minister of the rotating presidency countries‟ position. It also expressed the position of the Union in international organizations and conferences. 35

This structure aimed at providing “the means to develop coherence and unity for its foreign policy” and fostering of “the development of a common external policy as well as the coherence and unity of the European Union‟s external action. 36 These structural developments were indeed only one of the pillars of the change in foreign and security policy in the Lisbon Treaty. Under this new structure the High Representative is appointed by the European Council that acts by Qualified Majority Voting and the agreement of the President of the Commission. Both the President of the Commission, the High Representative and all the Commission members are subject to vote of consent by the European Parliament. And now the responsibilities of the High Representative include:

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Presiding the Foreign Affairs Council Being involved with the work of the European Council Ensuring consistency of the Union‟s external action (CFSP and other aspects) Sitting as the Vice President of the Commission Conducting the CFSP through exercising the right of initiative and making proposals

Jean-Claude Piris, 243. Jean-Claude Piris, 244. 36 Robert Schuman, The Lisbon Treaty: 10 Easy-to-read Fact Sheets, (Robert Schuman Foundation, 2007), 22. 35

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Negotiating international agreements related to the CFSP Representing the Union in conducting dialogue with the third parties, in international organizations and conferences (including the Security Council) Implementing the CFSP and coordinating the member states to do so Consulting the European Parliament on the main choices of the CFSP and ESDP Exercising authority over the EU special representatives and the European External Action Service. 37

Increasing the International Influence of the EU and Moving Towards a European Defense Policy It was clear to both the member states of the EU and the international community that a more assertive EU in the international system could only be achieved through placing the structures of the Common Foreign and Security Policy on solid grounds. Giving “legal status” to the EU that “will enable it to increase the role it plays in the international arena … both with regard to foreign trade, development policy and humanitarian aid as well as the creation of the international standards that regulate globalization”38 was therefore a necessary step to be taken. Through this regulation, EU as an entity was going to be able to sign contracts, participate in international conventions or organizations (like G20). In the realm of increasing defense a “mutual defense clause” and “solidarity clause,” similar to that of NATO, was introduced. This called for the other member states‟ support at the time of an attack or natural disaster in one of the member states. European Defense Agency‟s mandates were also reinforced with the goal of developing an arms policy and coordination of the national armed forces. In short, the Lisbon treaty approached the issue of Common Foreign and Security policy according to its multifaceted nature. The goal was clear and concise: asserting the European power in foreign and security policy in the international arena and bringing greater coherence to the policy area. The appointment of the chief operator of the Common Foreign and Security policy was thus an important leap forward, and a sign of more commitment. Although it is still quite unclear to the public what this position entails, there is a lot of room for solidifying the authority. As Nicolas Gros-Verheyde rightly points out, “a not yet identified object: „a bit Commissioner, a bit minister (as he presides over the Foreign Affairs), and always the EU‟s

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Jean-Claude Piris, 245-6. Robert Schuman, 22.

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chief diplomat. … It is obvious that the personality of the first office-holder will play a key role in defining the job of the HR.” 39

The European External Action Service: With the increased responsibilities of the High Representative, it was structurally imperative that the HR was assisted with a coherent and consistent diplomatic unit. This idea formed the European External Action Service, and as the Director of the Centre for European Reform Charles Grant stated, not having such structure would “… be like having a conductor without an orchestra – or rather, a conductor trying to conduct two separate orchestras at the same time.” 40 The two orchestras Grant was alluding to were the Commission and the Council as the HR was expected to ensure consistency in working with the two bodies. The External Action Service Structure draws upon the external relations departments of both and is an independent structure having its own budget. This formation allows for greater consistency and coherence among the two bodies and is also the reason why the High Representative position is considered doublehatted as it is connected to both bodies at the highest level possible. The structure of EEAS is quite complicated and chain of command is under no condition a linear one. In the Lisbon Treaty chapters 1 and 2 outline the External Action of the European Union that the EEAS is charged to assist the High Representative in carrying out the external action of the EU. The first chapter (Article 21 and 22) outline the General Provisions on the Union‟s External Action while Chapter 2 specifies the provisions of the CFSP. The Lisbon Treaty also made alterations in how the European Council, Council of Ministers and European Parliament exercise power over the external action. Under these regulations, the European Council can make strategic decisions concerning all the EU‟s external action as opposed to only the CFSP. These decisions now can concern issues like enlargement, development, common commercial and the neighborhood policy. 41 Because of this separation there are different procedures for decision making in different policy areas of the External Action. Under the Lisbon Treaty, the European Council can make “determinations of strategic interests and objectives” for all aspects of Union‟s external action by the unanimity rule through the proposals of the Council of Ministers. However because of the separation of the CFSP and nonCFSP provisions of the External Action in the treaties, there are different decision making procedures that apply to different policy areas of the Union‟s external action. This separation can be clarified by titling the two classes of policy areas as Community areas and the CFSP areas. 39

Nicolas Gros-Verheyde, in “EU High Representative according to Lisbon: A job description”, Global Europe.com, th Accessed at January 18 , 2011, at http://www.globeurope.com/blog/2009/10/20/eu-high-representative-a-jobdescription/. 40 Charles Grant, “Constitutional Fudge – The EU’s foreign policy arrangements are dysfunctional, so why is Britain trying to block plans to make them more effective?”, Centre for European Reform Comment & Analysis, Accessed th at January 26 , 2011, at http://www.cer.org.uk/articles/grant_guardian_blog_19june07.html. 41 “Foreign Policy Aspects of the Lisbon Treaty – Third Report of Session 2007-2008”, House of Commons Foreign th Affairs Committee, Accessed at January 10 , 2011, http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200708/cmselect/cmfaff/120/120.pdf.

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The Community areas comprise the trade, development assistance and other types of cooperation with third countries. With respect to this separation, measures on humanitarian aid and urgent micro financial assistance became subject to Qualified Majority Voting as opposed to unanimity. Yet unanimity rule still stands for the CFSP and all military related decisions. This is an important development as it brings a great deal of efficiency in dealing with crisis situations. There are in total four exceptions to the unanimity rule under the CFPS while being decided in the Council of Ministers:    

define an action or position on the basis of a European Council decision regarding the Union‟s strategic interests or objectives; define an action or position on the basis of a proposal made by the High Representative following a specific request from the European Council, made on its own initiative or that of the High Representative; implement a decision defining an action or position appoint an EU special representative 42

These decision making processes need to be kept in mind while making proposals, and how the decision making will function is an important matter. If the unanimity rule will apply to the decision the EEAS delegates are making, the delegates need to ensure that the position proposed will be favorable to all nations so that their proposal will not fail. However, if the proposal that is discussed is subject to QMV, then all the votes of the member states will be less concerning. The High Representative is expected to participate in shuttle diplomacy while dealing with crisis situations. Shuttle diplomacy, or mediated communication, is useful in early stages of conflict or when direct communication between the parties is unlikely to reduce tension or likely to make the situation worse. The HR will convey information between the parties and make suggestions for resolution of the problems. 43The EEAS will assist her in her duties in conflict resolution while also focusing on development aid, natural disasters, pandemics, energy security and migration. So what exactly the EEAS is suppose to do and how? This committee and EEAS in reality are challenged with two basic problems: the bureaucracy of the EU, especially regarding foreign policy, and the real world problems that the EU has to face. For example, in the case of a national disaster, the members of the committee will have to figure out both what the best policy tools that can be produced are and how they can be implemented through the decision making mechanisms of the EU. The main policy tool of the CFPS are the “decisions” that determine the “actions” and “positions” of the Union.

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“Foreign Policy Aspects of the Lisbon Treaty – Third Report of Session 2007-2008”, 39-40. th Eric Brahm and Heidi Burgess, “Shutle Diplomacy”, Beyond Interactability.org, Accessed at January 12 , 2011 in http://www.beyondintractability.org/essay/shuttle_diplomacy/ 43

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     

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Decisions: The decisions are adopted by the Council upon the defined proposals of the Political and Security Committee under the EEAS. Positions: Positions are binding on the Member States and must be defended by them under all circumstances, including vis-à-vis international organizations and at international conferences. The High Representative plays especially an important role in the implementation of these positions. Actions: Actions enable material and financial resources to be freed up for a joint action upon the consent of the Council. Declarations of the High Representative: This instrument is utilized as presenting the public opinion and expressing the assessment of the Union in given situations. The approval of all member states is needed. Approaches to third countries: Approaches are intended to convince the foreign government to review their opinion and abstain from a certain action. Dialogue with third countries or regional organizations: These dialogues are conducted by the High Representative with around 50 countries and around 10 regional organizations. EU Presence on the ground: The presence of the Union is assured by the Special Envoys and representatives so that a dialogue can be maintained. Sanctions: Sanctions are applied in the condition that there has been a breach of international law, the human rights and incompatibilities with the democratic principles. The sanctions include embargoes, trade restrictions, limited access to the Union and the freezing of assets.

In utilizing the policy tools listed above, the High Representative plays a great role either directly (declarations, approaches etc.) or indirectly (decisions, sanctions). And the EEAS‟ duty is to assist the High Representative in all these duties. In this Committee, the HR will be represented by the Director that chairs the committee and will only serve as a figurehead for the works of the EEAS. The members of the committee listed below may either serve as deputies of HR or as a collective assistant. The HR will in other words be the embodiment of the committee as a whole and not an individual personality. 44 The committee members: According to the Lisbon Treaty, the staffing of the Service would be established according to the “appropriate and meaningful presence of nationals from all member states and equal opportunities for women and men” 45and the officials are expected to serve all member states interests and instead of their own. However, the idea that the nationalities of the staff members will affect the functioning of the Services is quite highly considered among member states. Indeed with the leak of a confidential document belonging to the German ministry of Foreign 44

“The Common Foreign and Security Policy”, Kingdom of Belgium Foreign Affairs, Foreign Trade and Development th Cooperation, Accessed in January 14 , 2011 at http://diplomatie.belgium.be/en/policy/policy_areas/peace_and_security/in_international_organisations/europea n_union/cfsp/. 45 “EEAS: staff rules to ensure geographical and gender balance”, European Parliament Press Release, Accessed in th January 14 , 2011 at http://www.europarl.europa.eu/en/pressroom/content/20101018IPR87689/html/EEASstaff-rules-to-ensure-geographical-and-gender-balance.

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Affairs, the staffing of the EEAS was criticized for having too much British influence. 46The members of this committee therefore should be mindful of their nationality and the duties of their positions.

1) Secretary General – Pierre Vimont (France) 2) Deputy Secretary General for Political Affairs – Helga Schmid (Germany) 3) Deputy Secretary General for Inter-institutional Affairs – Maciej Popowski (Poland) 4) Chief Operating Officer – David O‟Sullivan (Ireland) 5) Counselor – Robert Cooper (United Kingdom) 6) Chairman of Political and Security Committee – Olof Skoog (Sweden) 7) Managing Director for Crisis Response – Agostino Miozzo (Italy) 8) Director of Situation Center – Ilkka Salmi (Finland) 9) Chairman of European Union Military Committee (EUMC) – General Hakan Syren (Sweden) 10) Director General of the European Union Military Staff - General Ton Van Osch (Netherlands) 11) Managing Director for Africa – Nicholas Westcott (United Kingdom) 12) Managing Director for the Middle East and Southern Neighborhood – Hugues Mingarelli (France) 13) Managing Director for the Americas – Christian Leffler (Sweden) 14) Deputy Director General of the Crisis Management and Planning Directorate (CMPD) – Claude-France Arnould (France) 15) Director of Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability (CPCC) – Kees Klompenhouwer (Netherlands) 16) Special Representative (EUSR) for Afghanistan – Vygaudas Usackas (Lithuania)

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Krzysztof Rutkowski, “Germany fights to secure positions in the EU”, OSW Centre for Eastern Studies, Accessed in th January 14 , 2011 at http://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/ceweekly/2010-03-10/germany-fights-to-securepositions-eu.

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17) Special Representative to the African Union – Koen Vervaeke (Belgium) The Focus of this Committee The European External Action is very much multifaceted and for the sake of this conference, our scope will be narrowed. Some of the issues that are listed below will be the focus of this committee and will prepare the delegates for the crises that the crisis management will prepare for the delegates. Delegates are encouraged to do further research on these issues keeping in mind their own portfolio and the portfolio of the EEAS. - Battle against Terrorism: Terrorism is a threat to all nations around the world especially in the last couple of decades. However, the EU has to take even greater caution in the battle against terrorism due to its increasing openness provided through free movement of persons, goods and capital. Within the Union the co-operation and measures against terrorism intensified after 9/11 and more importantly the attacks in Madrid in 2004 and London in 2005. 47 The attacks in Madrid killed 191 and injured 1800. The responsibility was claimed by Al-Qaeda later through a video found near a Mosque in Madrid. The video has revealed that the bombs were protesting the presence of Spain in Iraq and Afghanistan. 48 Attacks in London in July 7th, 2005 had similar motives. The four bombs that exploded in the transportation system, three in the Tube and one in a double –decker bus, had connections to Al-Qaeda. 49 In a video by the terrorist group released on Al-Jazeera, the statement was clear that the English forces in Afghanistan and Iraq was the reason for the attacks. 50 Terrorism in the European context was even a harder task to deal with than in any state structure. While Schengen visa procedures allowed free movement of persons, the law enforcement mechanism of single member states were not unified causing extradition and bureaucratic problems. The European Arrest warrant was thus introduced in June 2002. 51 The attacks had caused great concern over European security and as a response; the EU has determined four objectives in the fight against terrorism: prevent, protect, pursue and respond. 52 In the 2004 EU Plan of Action Plan to Combat Terrorism, the main objectives of the Union in tackling this problem were laid out: 47

th

“EU Fight Against Terrorism”, Council of the European Union, Accessed in January 14 , 2011 at http://www.consilium.europa.eu/showpage.aspx?id=406&lang=en 48

th

“The 2004 Madrid Bombings”, Guardian.co.uk, Accessed at January 14 ,2011 at http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2007/oct/31/spain.menezes. 49 th “7 July Bombings – Overview”, bbc.co.uk, Accessed in January 14 , 2011 in http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/shared/spl/hi/uk/05/london_blasts/what_happened/html/. 50 Adam Fresco, Daniel McGrory and Andrew Norfolk, “Video of London suicide bomber released”, The th Timesonline.co.uk, accessed in January 20 , 2011 in http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/uk/article683824.ece. 51 th “EU Law: What is the European Arrest Warrant?”, Europeanmonitor.org, Accessed in January 18 , 2011 at http://www.europeanlawmonitor.org/EU-Information/What-Is-Guide-to-Key-EU-Terms/EU-Law-What-is-theEuropean-Arrest-Warrant.html. 52 “EU Fight Against Terrorism”.

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to deepen the international consensus and enhance international efforts to combat terrorism to reduce the access of terrorists to financial and other economic resources to maximize capacity within EU bodies and Member states to detect, investigate and prosecute terrorists and prevent terrorist attacks to protect the security of international transport and ensure effective systems of border control to enhance the capability of the European Union and of member states to deal with the consequences of a terrorist attacks to address factors which contribute to support for, and recruitment into, terrorism to target actions under EU external relations towards priority Third Countries where counter-terrorist capacity or commitment to combating terrorism needs to be enhanced. 53

According to the EU Terrorism Situation and Trend Report 2010, published by Europol (The European Police Office), the biggest threat of terrorism in Europe continues to root from Islamist and separatist movements. The report states that, “weak states with ungoverned spaces, large Muslim populations, economic problems and social grievances can be breeding grounds for Islamist terrorism… The security situation outside the EU continues to have an impact on terrorist activities in Member states.” 54 As an example of this situation, the cases of Somalia and Yemen are emphasized. The case of Somalia is particularly important for Europe‟s future and this committee, as it has been recently ranked first in the Terrorism Risk Index of British risks advisory firm Maplecroft. According to the report, “the principal threat in Somalia comes from the Islamist al Shabaab, which has claimed responsibility for several deadly suicide bombings, including one in February 2009, which killed eleven Burundian soldiers on an AU peacekeeping mission. In a recent and worrying change of tactics, the group carried out its first major international attack in July 2010, when it bombed the Ugandan capital, Kampala, killing at least 74 people.” 55 It was originally disputed that Al-Shabaab had any connections to Al-Qaeda and was claimed that the only commonality between them was the ideology. However, recently this has changed. The group declared recently declared that they officially aligned themselves with Al-Qaeda. 56 With this important shift, the international expansion of al-Shabaab is a grave concern. - Strengthening the European – Atlantic Alliance: “The collaboration between the European Union and the United States is critical, essential to our shared objectives, values, and goals, but also to our commitment to tackling …the bigger

53

th

“EU Plan of Action on Combating Terrorism”, Consolium.europa.org, Accessed in January 18 , 2011 at http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/EU_PlanOfAction10586.pdf. 54 th “TE-SAT 2010 – EU terrorism situation and trend report”, Europol, Accessed in January 18 , 2011 at http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/TE-SAT%202010.pdf. 55 “Somalia overtakes Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan and Columbia to become world’s terror capital”, Maplecroft.com, th Accessed in January 19 , 2011 at http://www.maplecroft.com/about/news/terrorism.html. 56 st “Somali Islamists al-Shabab ‘join al-Qaeda fight”, BBC.co.uk, Accessed at February 1 , 2011 at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/8491329.stm.

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issues we face” – EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Catherine Ashton The US has shown great support for European integration since the inception of the Union. The EU – US alliance has a great weight in the international community as together the two countries account for half the global economy, 40 % of the world trade and 80 % of the official development assistance to the world. In foreign and security policy realm, the US and EU‟s focus on the rule of law missions, multilateral response to nuclear weapons and terrorism. 57 The recent accomplishments of the alliance include the EU Integrated Rule of Law Mission for Iraq (EU JUST LEX) and EU Police Mission in Afghanistan (EUROPOL) involvement in Afghanistan, multilateral response to Iran‟s Nuclear Program and the Terrorist Finance Tracking Program. However, the success has not always been the outcome in EU-US relationships and there had definitely been stark disagreements about various conflicts, including the Bosnian War and the US-led invasion of Iraq in 2003. 58 Although the US-EU alliance has grown and been strengthened, there is still a lot of room for improvement. With the increased determination of the EU in defense matters, the extraction of the alliance from NATO network and its integration into the EU structures should be taken into consideration. Also member states‟ greater commitment to unified foreign policy towards the US that is not endangered by the personal interests of the individual states is immensely important. This committee will be responsible for maintaining good relations with the US while at the same time proving the individual power of the EU that is not dependent on the US for its own security. This will be significant especially while handling crisis situations. - EU Involvement in the World The EU is involved in many regions of the world in civilian missions and military operations. These operations fall under many aspects of European CFPS, including the European Neighborhood policy, alliance with International Organizations, objective of bringing security, stability, and peace (including the Instrument for Stability). The European security strategy adapted in December 12, 2003 identifies the 5 major threats and three priorities of the Union as; Threats: Terrorism, Weapons of Mass Destruction, regional conflicts, state failures, and organized crime. Priorities: Conflict prevention, rapid response and assistance on all stages of crisis. While approaching crisis situations, the delegates should keep in mind the priorities of the Union and the methods utilized for both missions in the past both successfully and unsuccessfully. The involvement of the Union in different parts of the world is pictured below (see Annex) and this 57

“The European Union and the United States: A Long-Standing Partnership”, EU Focus December 2010¸ Accessed th in January 20 , 2011 at http://www.eurunion.org/eu/images/stories/eufocus-eu-usrels-dec-2010.pdf. 58 Daniel Korski, Daniel Serwer and Megan Chabalowski, “A New Agenda for US-EU Security Cooperation November th 2009”, Fride, Accessed in January 19 , 2011at http://ecfr.eu/page/-/documents/New-agenda-for-US-EU-securitycooperation-FRIDE.pdf.

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would provide the delegates with a general idea about how different interests are satisfied. However, for the purposes of this conference, delegates should pay closer attention to missions that has direct relevance to the top priorities of the Union and the scope of the committee outlined above. Further Research: In the preparation of this background guide, I have tried to use web resources as much as possible for mainly two reasons: a) since the topic is very new, the most up to date information can only be found online, b) through following the links delegates can reach use the same sources of the information. I highly recommend delegates to look into the corresponding footnotes for parts that they feel are unclear about. Especially documents that are taken from the official sources of the EU (Europa glossary, Who is who, EU law etc.) For the positions, since the appointments have only recently been made, the best method to find information about them might not be to look for what these people have done under this position. Instead, I advise you to look at the position itself, its duties, responsibilities and authorities and also pay attention to the personal background of the person and their ties with their nation state. If you have any questions about the material or the committee in general, please donâ€&#x;t hesitate to contact me. If you canâ€&#x;t find resources, I will do my best to direct you to the resources you need. I am writing my honors thesis on the High Representative position so my research goes beyond this background guide and I would be happy to share it with you at any time.

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Annexes

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Foreign policy-making structures and processes under the Lisbon Treaties

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EEAS Background Guide