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Nationalism: Is it really all that bad? Davorka Matić The last three decades have witnessed a growing interest in the phenomena of nationalism and national conflicts. Countless scholars from throughout the world have devoted significant time and energy in an effort to grasp the origin, nature and consequences of nationalism and its relations to modern-day politics. It is hardly an exaggeration to say that in the last quarter century the study of nationalism has occupied a central position within the social sciences, producing an immense body of literature and provoking fierce debate among scholars. What can we learn from this literature and concomitant debates? Two things immediately come to mind. First, the study of nationalism betrays what were (and still are) the major problems hampering the social sciences – the inability to reach a basic consensus about the nature, meaning, and functions of studied phenomenon and, most importantly, that values, ideology, and taken-for-granted assumptions of individual social scientists play a prominent role in their analyses and profoundly shape the outcome of their study. Second, people of a liberal disposition are often inclined to view nationalism as an irrational, potentially harmful, and irredeemably illiberal doctrine, a brutal, uncivilized and destructive force. Nationalism, they tell us, may foster intolerance and may lead to violence, bloodshed and wars.1 It was Kedouri’s influential work “Nationalism” that gave the most consistent shape to this negative view of nationalism. According to him, nationalism is not just an incoherent and logically contradictory doctrine but, above all, it is morally reproachable. In the name of national identity people are willing to give up their own rights and liberties and strip others of them. And on the international arena, the nationalist doctrine of self-determination did not bring peace and stability but rather, “has created new conflicts, exacerbated tensions, and brought catastrophe to numberless people innocent of all politics. The history of Europe since 1919, in particular, has shown the disastrous possibilities inherent in nationalism”. 2

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Although it is quite easy to depict nationalism in such a way, this view is beset with serious flaws and shortcomings. Telling us just part of the story, it offers an incomplete and inaccurate picture of nationalism as a phenomenon. No doubt, nationalism has been correctly associated with many ugly practices and some of its manifestations are indeed morally repulsive. But the 20th century witnessed many murderous and oppressive regimes and movements that were not inspired by nationalism. The traditional left is inclined to forget or downplay the crimes and killings committed in the name of “communist” utopia by revolutionary communist regimes throughout the world as well as those committed by some Latin-American guerrillas. Michael Mann coined the term classicide to describe intended, and I would say in the case of Khmer Rouge widely achieved, mass killings of entire social classes by the extreme leftist. What is distinctive in this type of mass murder is that “the victim classes were considered to be irredeemable political rather than ethnic enemies”.3 Yael Tamir warns us that almost any political theory, if pushed to a logical extreme, can have malignant results that ultimately lead to the suffering of large segments of the population. So, not only nationalist and communist theory can be perverted, but so can liberalism. Rigid adherence to free-market libertarianism ignores the plight of the masses of poor in developing countries and ignores their legitimate pleas for more just economic and social policies. 4 For Kedourie and others sharing his negative view, nationalism presents a serious problem that has to be opposed. But what is striking in this vocabulary of condemnation – it is dangerously emotional, irrational and illiberal force – is that nationalism is regularly presented as a problem, to use Billig’s words, that is projected onto “others”5, that is the property of “them”, never of “us”. Hence, Kedourie concluded his 1984 Afterword to his Nationalism with the claim that “Great Britain and the United States of America are precisely those areas where nationalism is unknown”.6 Others would talk about intrinsic differences between so-called Western, civic, and Eastern, ethnic nationalism.7 Civic or Western nationalism, the story goes, has its social base in civic institutions, is exercised by a group of people who feel they belong to the same community, are governed by law and enjoy legal equality. This type of nationalism was a political

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phenomenon and it was preceded by or coincided with the nation-building process. National dignity is derived from the individual/citizen and is linked to individual liberty and rational cosmopolitanism. As such, civic/western nationalism is democratic and liberal in its nature. In contrast, Eastern nationalism emerged in opposition to existing states, in places where both civic institutions and developed bourgeoisie were lacking. It was intellectuals who, through the manipulation of history, myths and symbols, fashioned national consciousness and who defined the nation in terms of ethnic origin and common blood. The newly emerging political culture was collectivistic, organic, and undemocratic. For Ignatieff, the main differences between these two types of nationalism are found in the fact that civic nationalism belongs to “a community of equal, right-bearing citizens, united in patriotic attachment to a shared set of political practices and values”, while ethnic nationalism belongs to the community where “an individual’s deepest attachments are inherited not chosen” because “it is the national community that defines the individual, not the individual who defines the national community”. 8 Indeed, it is not difficult to expose the Euro-centric prejudice that lies behind this distinction. It says that “Our”, Western nationalism is civic in nature and free of the taint of ethnicity. It is inclusive and conducive with the liberal state and it helped to shape the democratic nation in a way in which all of its citizens are treated as equals, regardless of their ethnicity, religion, culture, race or ways of life. In contrast, “their”, Eastern nationalism is ethnic in nature, breeding intolerance and ethnic hatred. It is oppressive, exclusive and intrinsically illiberal, inexorably leading to authoritarianism and political repression. It does not require much intellectual effort to conclude that there must also be a profound difference between “Western”, democratic nations and “Eastern”, intolerant, non-democratic nations that are obsessed with ethnic/racial purity. This is the view openly expressed by Liah Greenfeld. In the Indroduction to her otherwise excellent book Nationalism: Five Roads to Modernity, she claims not only that there exist two radically different forms of nationalism, but in addition, two radically different types of national collectivities – nations. In England, France and the United States of America nationalism developed as democracy and, due to the conditions of its development, the identity of the two

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was maintained. But that was not the case in countries such as Germany and Russia; there the original link between democracy and nationalism was lost. It was in the reaction to this kind of analysis that Bernard Yack criticized the very concept of the “civic” nations. As he nicely put it, this “civic/ethnic distinction itself reflects a considerable dose of ethnocentrism” and discloses a “mixture of self-congratulation and wishful thinking”.9 Unfortunately, this simplistic distinction between good, Western and bad, Eastern nationalism with its complementary distinction between civic and ethnic nations heavily influenced the world of politics and media. It found resonance in the theory of ethnic hatreds that was deployed by Western political leaders, policy-makers, intellectuals, and journalists trying to make sense of the inconvenient events resulting from the disintegration of communist Yugoslavia (and Soviet Union). This theory inevitably offered a distorted account of the wars in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina. But more importantly, it served as justification for political inaction in the face of mass, state-sponsored violence against civilian populations, absolving Western diplomats of any responsibility to prevent the slaughter in its “own backyard”.10 It provided an image of the Balkans as the lost territory of Europe, inhabited by primitive and barbaric tribes that have being killing each other for centuries. It prompted then US Secretary of State Warren Christopher to characterize the war in Bosnia as a product of “ancient ethnic hatreds”.11 Therefore, there was nothing that we, the West, could do to stop the slaughter until they exhaust themselves and eventually decide to work out their grievances in a rational, civilized way as we would do. What is most striking about the theory of ethnic hatreds is not that it is simply not predicated on facts but that despite of its obvious falsehood it quickly gained broad currency throughout the Western world. Even a superficial knowledge of Yugoslavia, its history and of its people reveals this theory’s bankruptcy. Serbs, Croats and Bosnian Muslims for several centuries co-existed peacefully next to each other. Though beset with national tensions from its very beginning, Yugoslavia did not have a history of spontaneous clashes between members of its different national communities (the only other occasion being the Second World War and, in this

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regard, joining the Western countries in “killing each other”). Its citizens did not experience the communal violence that we have witnessed in some Western democracies. We do not have to discuss in length the conflicts in Northern Ireland, the racial riots in the United States or the clashes between immigrants and ethnic French, English or Germans in their respective states to make the point. Recent events in The Netherlands where murder of movie director Theo van Gogh by an Islamic radical caused clashes between Dutch and Muslim immigrant communities and destructions of churches and mosques, illustrates the fact that even a country that is considered to be one of the most civic, tolerant, and inclusive is not immune to the outburst of “ethnic” passions, hatreds, and violence. Also, Yugoslavia had significantly high rates of interethnic marriages. The results of the survey conducted in the winter 1989/90, less than two years prior to the outbreak of wars in Slovenia and Croatia, showed that the level of national tolerance was generally quite high, and specifically, that in the most nationally heterogeneous areas (Bosnia-Herzegovina, Voivodina, and Croatia) inter-ethnic tolerance was highest.12 All of this demonstrates the shallowness of the theory of ethnic hatreds. Concepts of intolerance and ethnic hatreds tell us nothing about the causes of the disintegration of the Yugoslav federation and proved to be utterly useless for explaining the wars that finally brought it to its end. Obviously, a different theory and explanation is needed, one that relies on the concepts of social structure, identity, political values, state legitimacy and geo-political environment.13

STATE, NATIONS AND NATIONALISM At this point, some could argue that even if it is true that deeply seated ethnic hatreds and ethnic intolerance were not the main causes of the collapse of Yugoslav state it was, nevertheless, resurfaced ethnic nationalism of Yugoslav constituent nations that was a single culprit for the bloodshed that accompanied its disintegration.14 That must be the case, they would argue, since ethnic nationalism is an ideology that exalts the nation that is understood in exclusive, organic, almost biological terms and that has no respect for individual autonomy,

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rights, and liberties. Therefore, when such a nation enters into the realm of politics it destroys every basis for rational politics and easily delivers society into the hands of demagogues and political tugs Besides being condescending, such an argument tends to ignore several important factors. First, it ignores the fact that, in a situation where the existing order is eroding and where the old bonds that held society together have been severed, it becomes vital for a society in question to formulate a new basis of identification and political solidarity. Since communism destroyed civil society and since there were no alternative political parties, independent trade unions, or mass media that could have shaped a new moral and political order, the only entity capable of filling the vacuum caused by social atomization and of providing meaning to individual and social existence was the symbolically articulated national community. In a disintegrating society, the nation seems to be the substitute for the failing factors of integration, the last resort for a people searching for security and stability. The nation provides individuals with feelings of belonging and shared identity, it informs them about their mutual obligations and duties and explains the network of cordial bonds and solidarity.15 Since it functions as a powerful factor of identification and cohesion, it is not hard to imagine how the moral basis of social life that was once lost can be recaptured through the affirmation of the nation. In David Miller’s words, “Where sources of authority can no longer be taken for granted, the sources of authority has to be found in something more fundamental, and the nation provides such a source.”16 Second, such an argument tends to downplay the importance of the intimate relationship of nationalism to both the modern state and democracy. According to J. Breuilly, nationalism (and here he means every nationalism) is “a peculiarly modern form of politics which can only be understood in the relation to the way in which modern state has developed”.17 The modern state entered on the world scene during and after the era of European absolutism. It was a product of the conscious efforts of absolutist monarchs to strengthen their control over society in the name of greater efficiency. Engaged in prolonged and costly interstate wars, monarchies had to extract unprecedented levels of resources from their societies. In order to achieve this, the monarchs

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undertook the project of state modernization. The modern state was born out of the processes of administrative centralization, territorial integration, the establishment of borders rather than frontiers and a monopolization of taxation and coercion.18 This transformation of the state was accompanied by changes in the relationship between the state and society. The changes in the modes of exercising power brought about changes in the modes of legitimation. As the state increased its demands on society and as it placed more burdens and obligations on the individuals, so the problem of securing consent to be ruled, taxed and conscripted became more urgent.19 The idea of popular sovereignty according to which political power could only be legitimate when it reflected the will of the people presented a dramatic shift in the understanding of the relationship between rulers and the ruled. While previously political power was explained and defended in terms of divine and natural rights of the kings and princes, now “people” were declared to be the ultimate source and arbiter of legitimate rule. Article 3 of the 1789 Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen declared: “The principle of all sovereignty resides essentially in the Nation. No body, no individual can exercise any authority that does not expressly stem from the Nation”.20 It was this claim that gave birth to nationalism and ultimately placed nations in the very center of modern politics. Once passive inhabitants of pre-modern political units now became the “Nation”, a self-conscious political community in which all political authority resided. The state was now regarded as deriving its sovereignty not from God and His emissaries on Earth but from the people. At this stage, some conception of who the “people” are and of what binds them together into a single body had to be developed. At first, the notions of “people” and “nations” were used interchangeably to describe a new sovereign. But soon after the French Revolution, it became clear that the idea of government governing in the interests of “the people” was unworkable unless there was some conception of who qualified to be a part of the people and who did not. The Jacobins were among the first who provided an answer to this question. Faced with growing regional revolts and wars with hostile states, the revolutionary regime defined the enemies of France in linguistic

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and cultural terms. In his speech to the National Convention, Jacobin B. Barère, stated: “We have observed that the dialect called Bas-Breton, the Basque dialect, and the German and Italian languages have perpetuated the reign of fanaticism an superstition, revered the domination of priests and aristocrats, and favoured the enemies of France.”21 It would be wrong to conclude that there was a sudden and radically new way of thinking about nations. In medieval times, it connoted linkage to birth and culture. The universities customarily employed the term “nations” to denote groups of students coming from geographically or linguistically related regions. For example, there were four nations in the University of Paris – “l’ honorable nation de France”, “la fidele nation de Picardie”, “la venerable nation de Normandie” and “la constante nation de Germanie”.22 What was new now was the belief that these cultural traits bore political significance. Nations were now understood as historical beings inhabiting particular territories, possessing a shared culture and distinctive national consciousness. But above all, they were sovereign political communities armed with the rights and power to decide on their own how to be ruled and by whom. That automatically meant that foreign rule was suspect and unwelcome. There seems to be an intimate relationship between state, on the one side, and nationalism on the other. Those acting in the name of the sovereign nation were increasingly willing to emphasize mutually reinforcing relationship between citizens and the state. The state provides a political framework for nations, and serves both as a guarantor of their freedom and as the focus of citizens’ loyalty. Citizens’ loyalty belonged to la

patrie, not to God, kings, or some other entities. As Breuilly argued, [The] modern state was now regarded as deriving its sovereignty from the people, not from God. At the same time, the “people” were a particular set of people, often seen as the members of civil society, and also as the occupants of the clearly defined territory the state claimed as its own. Once the claim to sovereignty was made on behalf of a particular, territorially define unit of humanity, it was natural to relate the claim to the particular attributes of that unit.23

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Nationalism and modern nations emerged hand in hand during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries through the processes of questioning the legitimacy of traditional systems of political power. The formation of the modern state played a critical role in changing the form and nature of politics and opened the space for a new political agency – the nation -- to emerge. In that sense, nationalism is a distinctively modern political theory, brought about by the transformation of the state and by the irruption of popular movements demanding political participation. As a theory of legitimate rule, nationalism, first, provided criteria for determining what constitutes sovereign nations, and, second, proclaimed that the state and its institutions were legitimate only if they could have been imagined as the expression of the collective will of the nation. And it is the nation, understood now as a particular unit of population whose members are linked to each other by law and certain common cultural traits, and not some individuals or corporate bodies, which have the right to determine the form of government the state shall take. It was the medium through which political power could be spread throughout the entire population and it is in this sense that the coming of the nation was expressively democratic. According to Mann, “Self-conscious nations emerged form the struggle for representative government, initially born out of the pressure of state militarism. Whatever atrocities were later committed in the name of the nation, its emergence lay with those democratic ideals of this period that we most value today.”24 Although I consider the nation to be a distinctively modern phenomenon shaped by the process of state-making and by the rise of popular movements demanding political power, I reject the view according to which national identity is simply an “invention” of the nationalist intellectuals and/or state officials.25 Although it can be argued that nationalist projects invent tradition and to a certain extent rewrite national pasts, they cannot invent just any tradition and neither can they mechanically create the nation simply out of a mass of people. For national myths to work, to be able to mobilize people and make them respond to their appeals, they have to be recognizable. Connor warned us against the tendency to overemphasize the roles elites play in the nation-building processes. He found the failure of Arab nationalist elite to forge a

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single “Arab nation” as a good reminder of “the danger of placing too great emphasis upon the views of elites in general and intellectuals in particular”.26 If a national movement is to be successful, it must address a community that already exists, however dormant and passive it may be, although the South American case constitutes an important exception to this general rule. As George Schöpflin pointed out, “A myth that fails to elicit a response is either alien to the community or it is inappropriate at the time when it is used, or it can evoke a response only in a small number of those addressed”.27 This claim is confirmed by the example of the failed attempt at creating the so-called Slavo-Dalmatian nation. Opposing the Illyrian national movement which during the mid nineteenth century launched an impressive effort to integrate the populations of the Kingdoms of Dalmatia, Croatia and Slavonia into a single Croatian nation, some Dalmatian oligarchic elites that lived in the costal cities of Split and Zadar and were exposed to Italian culture decided to offer their own alternative nation-building project. The key element of their ideology was the idea of Slavo-Dalmatian nation, of a Dalmatian nation as one of the Slavic nation that differs from the Croatian one primarily by its adoption of Italian language and culture. Their ideology was best summarized in a slogan exclaimed in 1864 by one of their leaders, Antonio Bajamonti: “Slavi anche domani, Croati mai” (We’ll be Slavs tomorrow too, but never Croats). But since they were socially and culturally detached from the community in whose name they claimed to speak, they failed to attract large-scale support and their “nation” soon faded away. Their “myths” simply did not resonate.28

CIVIC/ETHIC DISTINCTION This brings me back to the distinction between the so-called civic and ethnic nations and this distinction’s underlying thesis that democracy cannot be developed and sustain, or will at least face significant obstacles, where nations are defined in ethnic terms. Civic nations, according to Anthony Smith, represent groups of people inhabiting a given territory, having a common economy and common law, with uniform rights and responsibilities, mass public education and a common civic ideology. The criteria for determining who is a member of a

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particular nation are political in nature: based on birth inside state boundaries or on legally set rules and procedures that, theoretically, everyone can satisfy. Contrary to this, ethnic nations represent a group of people bound together by a common name and ancestors and sharing a common past, religion, customs and language. The basis of inclusion and exclusion is not of a political but rather ethnic nature: it is traditional culture with its customs, norms and values, not the legal codes and institutions that provide the ideological bond for the member of the nation.29 As in every ideology, there is some truth in this distinction, but in a very limited sense. There is no doubt that there were some differences in the nation-building processes of the Western and East-Central European nations. To use Mann’s words, Western nations and their corresponding nationalisms were state-reinforcing and the latter were state-subverting.30 But what I want to argue here is that the ethnic/civic distinction overstates these differences and, therefore, that the concepts of ethnic nations and ethic nationalisms cannot provide a valid explanation of the sources of certain undemocratic features which characterized Croatian politics during 1990s. A short journey into history helps. The early Croatian national movement emerged during the first half of the nineteenth century within the framework of the Habsburg monarchy. It emerged with the resistance of the Croatian nobility and the upper echelons of the bourgeoisie against efforts by Austrian and Hungarian elites to abolish political municipal rights belonging to the medieval “nation croatica” and in opposition to linguistic and cultural assimilation of the Slav populations inhabiting the territories of Kingdoms of Dalmatia, Croatia and Slavonia. The concept of Croatia’s historical “municipal” and “state” rights was fundamental to the first and second phases of the nineteenth-century Croatian national movement.31 It was predicated upon the modest but still existing institutions embodying Croatia’s political autonomy and it formed the foundation upon which the idea of the “Croatian political nation” was built. As interpreted by the two strongest political parties of the time – the National Party (Narodna stranka) and the Party of Rights (Stranka prava) this idea contained the image of the Croatian nation as a bearer of sovereignty throughout the Kingdoms of Dalmatia, Croatia, and Slavonia and of the triune

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Kingdom as underpinning of Croatian national state. The nation was understood primarily as a political community consisting of various ethnic groups that, when acting politically, represented the constituent and equal components of the Croatian political nation. In 1867, suffused with this idea of nation, Croatia’s highest representative body – the Sabor, recognized the Serbian ethnic community living within the territory of the triune Kingdom as equal to the Croatian ethnic community. Differences in religion and customs were not considered to have any political significance. This is why the Illyrians, aware of the different ethnic make-up of the Slavic populations, distinguished between the South-Slav, cultural “Illyrianism” and political “Croatism”. The concept of the “Croatian political nation” was elaborated most consistently by Mihovil Pavlinović in his pamphlet “Croatian Thoughts” from 1869. In it he wrote: We want Croatia to be one and whole as a nation. (…) But if we recognize a single Croatian nation residing in unified Croatia, does it mean that we want do deny the Serbs their name? Absolutely not. A Croatian citizen who is a member of the Orthodox Church prefers to be called a Serb rather than a Croat. Let him be. Will that name refer to the confession? Let it be so. Will that name refer to the people? Let it be so. Will it refer to the language? Let it be so too. Will it refer to the alphabet? Let it be. (…) The Serbs follow their faith freely as we Catholics do; they study with us, they administer justice together with us and with us they pass laws: where we command they command too; when we obey they obey too. (…) But, because we all enjoy the same Croatian freedoms, because we all enjoy the same law of the Croatian state and because all of us are the sons of one and only Croatian homeland, we all must be proud of the Croatian citizenship and we all must act in the world as if we were the brothers of the same mother Croatia. If Orthodox brothers in Croatia do not want to be called ethnic Croats they should nevertheless recognize what everybody knows – that they are Croats by virtue of Croatian land and Croatian state. We demand nothing more. 32 Nineteenth-century Croatian nationalism defined the nation primarily in political, not ethnic terms. It recognized the importance of common language and culture but did not argue that “ethnicity” in itself defines the nation. Everyone can join the nation; voluntary political action, not ethnic descent or purity of blood, defined membership in the nation. The key factor in the process of constructing the Croatian nation was the tradition of Croatian historical legal and state

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rights. It was this Croatian historical legalism (as well as the legalism of the Habsburg Monarchy), combined with the liberal theory of the rights of nation to self-determination that logically led to identifying the nation with state territory. This was the view of Ante Starčević, the founder of the Party of Rights and an admirer of the French Revolution and French Constitution, who recognized only the Croatian “political nation” can be sovereign throughout the territory of Croatia. He was aware of the different ethnic make-up of Croatia but refused to identify the nation with ethnicity, common descent or blood since every nation is “a mixture of different people, of different blood”.33 Every country is inhabited with people of various ethnic backgrounds and of followers of different religion. What is damaging to the country is not its ethnic and religious diversity but if it has bad government, if its laws are bad, taxes high and legal security is lacking. All citizens, regardless their ethnicity, should work jointly toward achieving better society. In his 1883 article published in “Sloboda” magazine, he wrote: “Holding to this principle, we sincerely love and take as a brother every Serb and German, Italian and Jew, Roma, and Lutheran etc., everyone who works for the general good of the nation and the homeland; and we are afraid equally of a Croat and a Serb, etc., who acts against these common sacred things. (…) It does not matter if we declared ourselves Hottentots or if each of us named himself differently; what matters is if every one of us was free and happy. Not some people or some names, whoever and whatever they may be, and not some area: only all inhabitants of the Kingdom of Croatia have and can achieve sovereign state rights.”34

Many leading members of the nineteenth-century national movement were not ethnically Croat, but could boast diversity of ethnic backgrounds. Ljudevit Gaj and the liberal bishop, Josip Juraj Strossmayer, the two prominent leaders of the Croatian national revival movement, were of German origins. Ljudevit Vukotinović-Farkas, the author of the movement’s important programmatic document Illyrism and Croatism, was ethnically Hungarian. August Šenoa, the passionate Croatian patriot and founder of modern Croatian prose, was born in a Germanized Czech family that settled in Zagreb just before his birth. For all of them, as well as was for many other nineteenth-century Croatian nationalists, the nation did not represent an exclusive

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community of common blood and descent, but, rather, an inclusive political and cultural being that has sovereign rights throughout the territories of the triune Kingdom. At the same time, their political outlook was secular and liberal. Opposing the old Habsburg regime, their national program included not only demands for broader political and cultural autonomy within the proposed federalized Monarchy, and, eventually, independent statehood, but also included demands for wider political liberties and the equality of all citizens. In this sense, early Croatian nationalism was of a predominantly liberal nature, demanding that the liberal principle of individual freedoms be applied to the nations. True, Croatia also experienced a less “noble” type of nationalism. During the last decade of the nineteenth century Croatia saw the emergence of nationalist ideology that was politically conservative and authoritarian. It was represented by the Pure Party of Rights (Čista stranka prava) that was intolerant towards groups that did not conform to its political program, especially towards Serbs and Croatian politicians willing to forge alliances with Serbian political representatives. Party head Josip Frank collaborated with reactionary Austrian military circles linked to the heir-to-the throne Franz Ferdinand and he gained notoriety as the leader of the political group that was the first to introduce violence onto Croatian political scene. Due to its sweeping electoral defeat in 1906 by the Croatian-Serbian Coalition, the party slowly disintegrated and disappeared into oblivion until it finally dissolved in 1918. Despite the party’s illiberal and authoritarian methods and politics, Frank and his followers adhered to the concept of the Croatian “political nation” and refused to define it in ethnic terms. As a German-speaking Jew who converted to Catholicism during his childhood and who never really mastered the Croatian language, he would not have promoted an ethnically exclusive concept of nation that would have denied him membership in the community and the right to act politically on her behalf.35 Twentieth century Croatian nationalism was most profoundly shaped by the work of Stjepan Radić, the founder and leader of the Croatian Peasant Party that was to become the leading political force in interwar Croatia. His nationalism was liberal, democratic and concerned with individual social and political rights. It was forward-looking. For Radić, the nation was not

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ethnic but a modern political community defined primarily by consciousness and political will. It is not religion or descent that determines the nation since “nationality is something more then the sum of external characteristic; it exist in the consciousness and will of the people that are gathered under its shield and that, regardless of their origin, language and confession live the same life, under the same laws and tradition and strive towards the same ideal”.36 In his program, the national question was most intimately linked to the social question. Both can be resolved only within the states that respect civil rights and freedoms of all of its citizens and that have democratic institutions in which all individuals, social strata and nations can, by legal means, struggle for their own interests. For Radić, the essence of nationalism can be found in constitutionalism and democracy. This is why Croatian nationalism must become “a movement of constitutional democracy”37 that will be open-minded and forward-looking, willing to learn from the experiences of other nations and adopt their positive institutions and political virtues. Here he has in mind the experiences of English, American, and French nation: “There are only three countries in the world today that we consider to share partially similar and partially identical principles and understanding of the state. It is France with her centuries-old sympathies for the rights of the weak for which she had shed lot of her blood; it is Great Britain with her sincere religious sentiments and her rational and sober public life; it is North America with her respect for work and political liberties.”38 Radić described his ideological system as democratic nationalism. It was devoted to the struggle for rights and freedom of individuals, social strata and nations, but excluded territorial conquest, militarism, and chauvinism, since “humaneness is stronger than nationality and humanism is more developed than nationalism”.39 Radić’s concept of democratic nationalism and his insistence on peaceful and law-abiding methods of political struggle influenced the democratic character of the Croatian Peasant Party and, as it became the leading Croatian party in the interwar period, shaped profoundly the democratic nature of the Croatian national consciousness. The processes of political and economic modernization, cultural standardization, and mass education and literacy resulted, as was the case in Western Europe, with the rise of the

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modern Croatian nation. The only difference was that these processes were not parallel with the creation of the national state. Indeed, Croatian nationalism of the nineteenth and early twentieth century for most part was not secessionist. It was neither state-reinforcing nor state-subverting. The most appropriate qualification for it would be that it was state-reforming. It aimed not at the establishment of an independent state of its own but at reforming the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy by replacing its constitutional dualism, which recognized the dominant position of the Austrian and Hungarian nations, with a federal state structure through which all nations within the Monarchy could achieve equal status. The claim for national self-determination was not translated into demands for outright independence but sought extensive political, administrative and cultural autonomy within a common state. That was the salient characteristic of Radić’s national program. He wanted Croatia to have a recognized political unit within reformed AustroHungarian state since he believed that democratic and federally arranged multinational states are superior to national states. The move towards secession came almost unwillingly. It was prompted by external factors – the First World War. The creation of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes that was to be renamed Yugoslavia in 1929 was greeted by the major Croatian political forces of the time, but under the assumption that the new state would be based on the principle of equality of its constituent nations. Unfortunately, the political elites in Serbia disagreed and this discord was to have dire consequences. The royal dictatorship that followed the 1928 assassination of Radić and several other Croatian leaders by the Serbian extremist helped spawn the emergence of a chauvinist, fascist-prone Croatian nationalism. Represented by fringe and extreme political group – the Ustasha movement, that gained fame not by its wide popular support but by the horrendous crimes its members committed during the reign of their puppet Nazi regime – it was authoritarian, brutal and exclusive. To conclude, Croatian national identity as forged by nationalist opponents of the Monarchy was first couched in terms of historical political rights. They, however, soon found that they have to move beyond purely political/legal criteria and appeal to the culturally identity of the groups

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hitherto excluded from political life. Hence, the modern Croatian nation emerged when the natio

croatica of the Croatian nobility merged with a proto-national ethnic community composed of lower social strata. It was, therefore, defined in both civic/political and cultural/ethnic terms. Politically, it provided concept of citizenship and, through the concept of “political” or “state” rights, the idea of sovereignty. Ethnically, it offered language, a common culture and a web of bonds and solidarities. Altogether these formed a new, politically conscious community. Basically, this fusion of civic and ethnic elements, of citizenship and ethnicity, is what characterizes every nation-building process, whether French, Dutch, German, or Croatian. The historical analysis of nation-building processes reveals that this dual character – civic and ethnic – is part of every national identity, irrespective of the specific circumstances under which the nations were formed. The French nation, often taken as an example of a “civic nation” tout

court, is deeply suffused with cultural traits of its dominant ethnie, its language, its traditions, and its values. It was formed not only through the expansion of citizenship rights but also through the processes, sometimes quite brutal, of assimilation and forced integration of the speakers of “inferior” Basque, Breton or Occitan languages into the “superior” Ile de France culture.40 We already saw that French revolutionaries, soon after the Revolution, had to couch the idea of nation in more ethno-cultural terms. The case of the American “melting pot” nation may appear to be much more difficult to explain in ethnic terms. But, as Foner41 has reminded us, the nineteenth-century American republic had no room for Blacks, Amerindians, or Spanish culture. It proclaimed the conquest of New Mexico and the annexation of Texas as triumphs of Anglo-Saxon Protestant civilization against the Catholic world and lower races. “From the outset”, he writes, “American nationality combined both civic and ethnic definition. (…) For most of our history, American citizenship has been defined both by blood as well by political allegiance.”42 Kymlicka is equally critical of the exaltation of the allegedly purely civic character of the American nation and the American nation-building process.43 He points to the opposition of American political elites to accepting a new territory (New Mexico, Texas, Hawaii) as a state as long as the Amerindians or Spanish speakers living there outnumbered Anglophone settlers. In

17


accordance with this “nation-building” policy, New Mexico was not admitted into the union until 1912 because it was considered to be “too Indian”. While in theory the “melting pot” implied that the American nation is primarily defined by its political institutions and liberties, by a specific “American way of life”, in practice it meant that, in order to become fully American, ethnically diverse immigrants had to adopt the language, values, and general culture of the preceding, predominantly Protestant, English settlers. We cannot but conclude, that nation that is defined in purely civic terms simply does not exist.

CROATIAN NATIONALISM IN COMMUNIST YUGOSLAVIA: CROATIAN SPRING Contrary to the conventional views of many Western observers, the main causes underpinning national antagonisms during the first and second Yugoslavia have not been some primordial hatred springing from religious and ethnic prejudices, but rather those antagonisms have been the direct consequence of real and/or perceived political and cultural inequalities and economic exploitation. The Communist Party of Yugoslavia recognized these causes soon after it was established in 1919. The hegemonistic policies of the ruling Serbian elites, the increasing oppression of non-Serb nations, and the severe economic exploitation of those parts of Yugoslavia that until the end of the World War I had been parts of Austro-Hungary44, prompted the Yugoslav communists to abandon their initial a-national stance and adopt the view that the national question was not merely a constitutional question but a central question of revolution. By 1924, and partially under the influence of the Comintern, the Party declared that the national question could not be solved within the framework of Yugoslavia. It proclaimed that every nation has a right to self-determination, including the right of secession to create its own state. In 1928, the CPY went a step further by demanding the destruction of Yugoslavia as an “imperialist creation”, calling on the communists to take a lead in an armed struggle against the discredited state. The worsening international situation and ascendancy of Hitler’s Germany in the mid1930s brought, again under the influence of the Comintern, further changes in the Party’s nationality policy. In 1936, the CPY opted for preserving Yugoslavia, but stressed that it should

18


be reorganized as a federal state in which the rights of all of its nations should be preserved and carefully safeguarded. The following year, and in accordance with this federalist stance, a major reorganization of Party took place and the Communist parties of Croatia and Slovenia were established.45 The Second World War in Yugoslavia ended with the victory of Partisan forces organized and led by the CPY. But this victory was a consequence of the Party’s recognition that the national-liberation struggle could not be just a struggle against occupation but had to be, at the same time, also one for the freedom, equality, and equity of all Yugoslav nations. This evolving political process gained its legal form at the second session of the AVNOJ (Antifascist Council of National Liberation of Yugoslavia), held on 29 November 1943, when it was decided that the new Yugoslavia would be a federation of free and sovereign nations. After the war and consolidation of its power in 1945, the Party parted with its policy of decentralization and federalization and, instead, introduced the policies of strong centralization and unitarism it had once opposed. Yugoslavia was a federal state only on paper, while in practice it was highly centralized state in which all decisions were made by the central bureaucracy. In that sense, the many prerogatives of Federal Croatia, developed during the period of national-liberation struggle, were drastically reduced. When self-management was introduced in the early 1950s, hopes were raised that Yugoslavia would depart from its Soviettype communism and move toward increasing decentralization and democratization of the state and the economy. It soon became clear that the Party was deeply divided over the future direction of the country, especially as regarded decentralization of the economy, with “liberals” pressing for the consistent implementation of the proclaimed politics of self-management and “conservatives” fiercely opposing it. In 1958, for the first time after the war, the national question became a matter of dispute among the Party’s leadership, with Slovenian, Croatian, and Macedonian members protesting against centralistic tendencies and demanding more “autonomy” for the republics. Although the Eighth Congress of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia (LCY)46, held in 1964, was dominated by the “liberals”, their full victory came only in July 1966

19


when hard-liner Aleksandar Ranković, the second man in the Party after Tito47, and his allies were exposed as opponents of Reform and stripped of their positions. The general climate of increasing liberalization of political life and relaxation of Party control that followed the 1966 defeat of the “conservatives” set the stage for the birth of the Croatian national movement, also known as the Croatian Spring. Although its first manifestation was the Declaration Concerning the Name and the Position of the Croatian Literary Language of March 196748, its characters, themes, methods and demands were critically shaped by the new generation of the Croatian communist leaders that, educated and freed from the Comintern style of thinking and managing, introduced new, democratic styles of political behavior and, for the first time after the 1945, opened the space for political participation not directly controlled by the Party. Dissatisfied with the pace of the Reforms that were blocked by conservative forces, located mainly within the federal administration and Serbia, these new leaders – including the president of the League of Communists of Croatia (LCC) Savka Dabčević-Kučar, secretary of the LCC Pero Pirker, President of the Government of the Republic of Croatia Dragutin Haramija, and member of the Presidency of LCY Miko Tripalo -- demanded implementation of the reforms and democratization of the country’s economic and political system. At first, the conflict between the LCC and its opponents was centered on economic issues. The Croatian communist leadership supported reform of the federation and socio-economic system, but considered it insufficient. They were frustrated by the ongoing centralist economic policies that disfavored the Republic and hindered her overall development. They requested the abolition of a federal state capital, a reordering of the federal government’s investment policy, a new foreign currency system, decentralization of financial powers and a more market oriented economy.49 The problem was that, despite economic reform of 1965 and its proclaimed policies of decentralization, the economic situation in Croatia steadily worsened. The revenues earned in Croatia continued to flow into Belgrade, while credits and investments that were granted by central banks and import-export agencies were increasingly unfavorable to Croatia.50 This prompted George Schöpflin to conclude that “the terms of credits granted to the Croatian

20


enterprises were so harsh and the premium payable on foreign exchange so high, that that the banks and re-exporters were exploiting the Croatian economy”.51 No doubt, economic reforms were the key demand of the Croatian communist leaders. They were, however, just one element of broader socio-political changes that sought democratization of Yugoslav communism and federalization of the state based on fully sovereign federal units with parity and consensus in all federal bodies, toleration and respect for differences – national, political, social and personal, de-bureaucratization and democratization of the Party, relaxation of the Party’s monopolistic control over society as well as weakening of the monolithic power of the centralist LCY. The Croatian communist leadership’s reformist streak was manifested in their tolerant treatment of intellectuals and students who in 1971 grew into the independent political force. In the spring of 1971, on the heels of new-found political freedoms that followed the Tenth Session of the Central Committee of League of Communists of Croatia (January 1970), two new centers of political activities in the Republic were formed -- Matica hrvatska (the Croatian Queen Bee – heretofore referred to as Matica), the oldest Croatian cultural institution founded in 19th century during the Illyrian movement, and the Croatian University in Zagreb. These two institutions often challenged the decisions and methods of the republic’s top Party leadership, indicating that the Croatian political scene was becoming increasingly pluralistic. Although primarily interested with the problems of culture, language, and historiography and devoted to the protection and promotion of national culture and identity, in the late 1960s and early 1970s Matica became increasingly engaged in the debates concerning economic and political issues. Through Matica’s numerous publications, intellectuals vigorously demanded changes in the country’s investment and hard currency regimes, substantial reform of the Federation, and respect for differences and personal freedom.52 They eventually became critical of the Party’s political monopoly and arbitrary power. By the spring of 1971, Matica practically operating as an independent party, with structured leadership, massive membership base, network of branch offices, an informal political program and fourteen different publications.53

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With the election in late 1970 and early 1971 of a new student leadership54, it became obvious that students had freed themselves of Party control and were attempting to influence political events in the country. For the most part the students’ political goals reflected those of the top Croatian communist leaders, but their methods, such as the November 1971 strike, were unwelcome. They called for national equality, a new hard currency regime and resolution of the Republic’s economic ills, autonomy of the University, abolition of the Stalinist-type communism and its replacement with democratic socialism.55 With rare exceptions, the nationalism expressed during the Croatian Spring was neither chauvinist nor secessionist. It regarded Serbs and all other minorities living in Croatia as having equal rights with the Croatian people and its character was neither assimilatory nor expansionistic. It was generally democratic, non-violent, and future-oriented, devoted to principles of self-management and socialism with a human face. Tito himself firmly supported the demands of the Croatian communist leaders, even prompting them to take actions against domestic conservative forces, until the spring 1971. Even after that time he hesitated, taking their side as late as September 1971.56 Why, then, was Croatian national movement crushed? The answer is simple – being democratic, pluralistic and open to the wide groups of people, the national movement increasingly acted independently of the Party and posed a serious treat to its monopoly over power. Croatia’s communist leaders became too independent and too tolerant towards different political opinions and had begun to reject Tito’s repeated requests for arresting “counter-revolutionary forces”, showing deference to due legal process and the independence of the court57 and, in so doing, endangering the very foundations of the communist regime. This Tito would not tolerate. In a classical coup-d’etat manner, using the threat of military and police forces, Croatia’s leaders were forced to resign.58 With their resignation on 12 December 1971 Croatia’s reformist aspirations had entered its winter season. In the following months two thousand people were imprisoned, the Croatian communist party was thoroughly purged, thousands lost their jobs and many left the country.59 Soon, reformist elements in other Republics suffered similar fates. In 1972 the reformist leaderships of Serbia,

22


Slovenia and Macedonia were removed and Yugoslavia returned to its past politics of bureaucratic centralism and one-party totalitarianism that suppressed political freedom, retarded culture, crushed existing elements of a market economy and catapulted country into deep economic and political crises that would eventually bring her end.

CONCLUSION As seen from the case of the Croatian national movement, the nation offers the backdrop for democratic politics and through the bonds of solidarity that are encoded in its ethnic substratum provides the basis for the consent to be governed. Through its membership in the nation different groups with often opposing interests can find a common ground upon which they can reach consensus regarding the most basic issues such as a constitution and shared standards of social justice.60 The civic dimension of the nation cannot in itself secure this basic, pre-rational consensus. Citizenship, defined as the package of civil, political and social rights enjoyed equally by every member of society is, indeed, crucial for democracy. It provides rules, methods, and mechanisms which make power transparent and predictable. But, it cannot be the sole foundation of democratic consent. Hence, as George Schรถpflin argued, The real political community that constitutes the state inevitably has ethnic as well as civic quality. Crucially, a polity that is founded exclusively on a civic contract cannot avoid the dilemma of consent, of what would happen when some of the citizens withdrew their consent from the state. Some cement stronger than civic loyalties, therefore, becomes necessary. The insurance policy is usually, though not invariably, provided by ethnicity.61 Yugoslavia lacked such a policy. It lacked democratic citizenship as well. It is questionable whether it would have survived even if it succeeded in conferring it. Even Western democratic states, with relatively long traditions of liberal-democratic politics are increasingly facing challenges from their minority national groups demanding either independence or wider political autonomy. Common citizenship and shared political values did not prevent the rise of

23


secessionist movements among the French-Canadians or help to stabilize the Belgium state. As Kymlicka emphasized, there have been a significant convergence of political values among the Western nations yet this has not made these nations willing to give up their national independence.62 Far from being an irrational obstacle to democratic development, nationalism often serves as the only available vehicle through which nations can establish democratic polities. In that sense, it is first and foremost rational. True, it can have an ugly and destructive side; it can breed intolerance and work in opposition to freedom and democracy. The integral nationalism of Charles Maurras’ “L’Action française”, the nationalism of Italian fascists and German nationalsocialists or Croatian Ustashas, of Le Penn’s “National Front” and Belgium Flemish “Vlaams Blok” party, to name a few, is of that kind. As we can see, aggressive, exclusive and illiberal nationalism can develop in both Western and Central-Eastern Europe. It has nothing to do with the alleged characteristic of nations as all are capable developing exclusive and belligerent or democratic and peaceful nationalism. Which form becomes preponderant depends on external, geopolitical and on internal socio-economic and political factors. Recent Croatian nationalism emerged as a response to the collapse of communist Yugoslavia’s economic, social and political systems. At the start, it was predominantly democratic in character – it combined demands for national independence with demands for a democratic order. Its liberal and democratic orientation was reflected in the goals aspired to by most of the population and in the values that animated the masses – national equality, political freedom, a free-market economy and democracy. A common European culture, spearheaded by calls for integration into the European Union, was the dominant ideal shared by its political leaders revealing, to use Smith’s term, the fundamentally polycentric character of this nationalism.63 Opting, first for restructuring Yugoslavia towards a confederal system and democracy and then for independence, only after that option failed, was not the result of politics governed by irrational forces of ethnicity but rather represented the realistic alternative to the political

24


stalemate that engulfed Yugoslav society, a society already highly divided along economic, political and national lines. At the same time, there was a stream within recent Croatian nationalism that was xenophobic and hostile towards the Croatian Serbian minority. As Serb-Croat relations deteriorated, following the aggressive policies of Serbian president Slobodan Milošević and Serb nationalists so were authoritarian nationalists steadily gaining influence and strength. As the war started Croatian nationalism began to lose its democratic spirit. External pressures of war, subsequent occupation and mass expulsions of ethnic Croats and other non-Serb minority nations from the Serb-occupied territory gave fuel to ethnic hatred and undemocratic nationalist policies in Croatia during the 1990s. Under conditions of high stress and general uncertainty arising from war and occupation, concerns about national survival and demands for preserving the state took precedence over concerns for the respect of individual and minority rights. However, once these pressures were lifted and the Croatian state and society achieved a certain level of basic safety and stability this authoritarian nationalism lost appeal. Nationalism continues to play a role in Croatian politics. In a world organized by the principle of nation-state, it would be rather strange if that were not the case. The nature of Croatian nationalism is changing, however. Results of a 1996 survey showed liberal nationalism to be the dominant outlook in Croatia.64 This kind of nationalism fosters national values but chooses liberal institutions to do so. In a basic way, today’s Croatian nationalism as well as the dominant political discourse in Croatia does not differ from those in Western liberal democracies. As Billig points out, Western nations such as France, the UK and the USA are not free of nationalism and nationalism “provides a continual background for their political discourse, for cultural products, and even the structuring of newspapers”.65 At this point, Croatian nationalism appears to be outward-looking, inclusive and democratic. It recognizes the existence of national minorities as something enriching, not damaging to society and warrants them national rights and the protection of their languages and cultures. It seeks integration into the world of democratic nations, not isolation within parochially understood national culture and polity. But the

25


reasons for this transformation of the Croatian nationalism should not be sought in some sudden change in the nature of the Croatian national identity, in a different manner of conceiving the nation but in the changed internal conditions and regional environment.

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NOTES 1

. For example, Snyder claims that nationalism “takes on a quality of aggression that makes it one of the prime causes for wars”. L. Snyder, Varieties of Nationalism: A Comparative Study (Hinsdale,Il.: Dryden Press, 1976), p. 43. 2 . Elie Kedourie, Nationalism (Oxford: Blackwell, 1993 (1960)), p. 134. 3 . Michael Mann, “Explaining Murderous Ethnic Cleansing: The Macro Level”, in M Guibernau and J. Hutchinson (eds.), Understanding Nationalism (Oxford: Polity Press, 2001), p. 215. 4 . Tamir, Liberal Nationalism, (Princeton: Princeton Univerity Press, 1993), p. 4. 5 . Michael Billig, Banal Nationalism (London: Sage, 1995), p. 38. 6 . Kedourie, Nationalism, p. 143. 7

. The most famous elaborations of this distincion can be found in the works of Hans Kohn and John Plamenatz. See H. Kohn, The Idea of Nationalism: A Study of Its Origins and Background (New York: Macmilan, 1944) and J. Plamenatz, «Two types o Nationalism», in E. Kamenka, Natonalism: The Nature and Evolution of an Idea (Cambera: Australian National University Press, 1973). Recently, Liah Greenfeld and Michael Ignatieff have followed in their footsteps. See, L. Greenfeld, Nationalism: Five Roads to Modernity (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1992), and M. Ignatieff, Blood and Belonging: Journeys into the New Nationalism (New York: Farrar, Strauss & Giroux, 1993). 8 9

.Michael Ignatieff, Blood and Belonging, pp. 7-8. . Bernard Yack, “The Myth of the Civic Nations”, in Critical Review, no.2 (1996), p.196.

10

. According to several Croatian sociologists, these were the theory’s latent but most important functions. See J. Županov, D. Sekulić, Ž. Šporer, “A Breakdown of the Civil Order: The Balkan Bloodbath”, in

International Journal of Politics, Culture and Society, no. 3, (1996), pp.401-422. 11 . See T. Cushman, S. G. Meštrović (eds), This Time We Knew: Western Response to Genocide in Bosnia (New York: New York University Press, 1996). 12 . For more information on methodology, sample and the results of the survey see in R. Hodson, D. Sekulić, G. Massey «National Tolerance in the Former Yugoslavia», in American Journal of Sociology, no.6 (May 1994), pp. 1534-58. 13

Due to the lack of space we cannot deal here with the problem of the breakup of Yugoslavia. Literature devoted to this issue is immense and still growing. See, especially, Branka Magaš, The Destruction of Yugoslavia: Tracking Yugoslavia Break-up 1980-1992 (London: Verso, 1992.), Christopher Bennet, Yugoslavia’s Bloody Collapse: Causes, Course and Consequences (New York: New York University Press, 1995), Rene Lukić and Allen Lynch, Europe from the Balkan to the Urals: The Disintegration of Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), Sabrina P. Ramet, Balkan Babel: The Disintegration of Yugoslavia from the Death of Tito to the Fall of Milošević, 4th edition (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2002.) and Thinking about

Yugoslavia; Scholarly Debates about the Yugoslav Breakup and the Wars on Bosnia and Kosovo (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005.), Victor Meir, Yugoslavia: A History of Its Demise (London and New York: Routledge, 1999.), Marcus Tanner, Croatia: A Nation Forged in War

(New Haven, CT and London: Yale University Press, 1997.). 14 . See, for example, Bogdan Denitch, Ethnic Nationalism: The Tragic Death of Yugoslavia (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1994). 15 .Recently, a number of liberal nationalists claimed that these are positive roles of the nation that in modern society no other forms of collective identity can satisfy. See, Yael Tamir, Liberal Nationalism, David Miller, On Nationality (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995), and Will Kymlicka, Multicultural Citizenship (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995), Politics in the Vernaculars: Nationalism, Multiculturalism, and Citizenship (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001). It also seems to be the view of Anthony D. Smith. See his National Identity (London: Penguin Books, 1991). 16 . Miller, On Nationality, p.29. 17 .John Breuilly, Nationalism and the State (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1993, second edition), p. 401.

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18

. The most elaborated recent account of the relationship between nationalism and modern state formation can be found in Michael Mann, Sources of Social Power, Vol. 1. and 2. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986, 1993.). 19 . That the modern state requires ever higher imputs of consent to make it efficient was argued at length in George Schőpflin, Nation, Identity, Power ( London: Hurst & Company, 2000.). 20 . Quoted in Craig Calhoun, Nationalism (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1997), p. 78. 21 . Quoted in John Breuilly, Nationalism and the State, p.91 22

. On the history of the term “nation” and its semantic transformations see L. Greenfeld, Nationalism: Five Roads of Modernity, pp. 4-7. 23 . Breuilly, Nationalism and the State, p. 374. 24 . Michael Mann, «A Political Theory of Nationalism and Its Excesses», in. Sukumar Perival (ed), Notions of Nationalism (Budapest, London: Central European University Press, 1995), p. 48. 25 . See Ernest Gellner, Nations and Nationalism (Oxford: Blackwell, 1983) and Eric Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger, The Invention of Tradition (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983). 26 . Connor Walker, “Ethnonationalism”, in Etnonationalism: The Quest for Understanding, pp. 7980. 27 . Schöpflin, Nations, identity, Power, p. 87. 28 . Nikša Stančić, Hrvatska nacija i nacionalizam u 19. i 20. stoljeću, (Zagreb: Barbat, 2002). pp. 101-105. 29 . See Anthony D. Smith, Ethnic Origins of Nations (Oxford and Cambridge: Blackwell, 1986), pp. 134-138. To be fair, Smith never claimed that some nations are purely ethnic and others purely civic. In reality, every nations combine both civic and ethnic elements. For him, it is the peculiar feature of the nation to fuse ethnicity and politics. He is talking of two concepts of nations, not two types of nations. 30 . M. Mann, “A Political Theory of Nationalism and Its Excesses”, in. S. Periwal(ed), Notions of Nationalism, pp.44-64. 31 . These phases mostly correspond to those that M. Hroch described as phase A and phase B of the national integration processes. See Miroslav Hroch, Social Precondition of National Revival in Europe (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985). 32 . Quoted in Nikša Stančić, Hrvatska nacija i nacionalizam u 19. i 20. stoljeću, p. 115.

. Quoted in Mirjana Gross, Povijest pravaške ideologije, (Zagreb: Sveučilište u Zagrebu i Institut za hrvatsku povijest, 1973), p. 132. 34 . Ibid. p. 232. 35 .For more information on the Croatian national movement and nationalism see Nikša Stančić, Hrvatska nacija i nacionalizam u 19. i 20 st., Ivo Banac, The National Question in Yugoslavia,( Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1984). Mirjana Gross (ed), Društveni razvoj u Hrvatskoj: od 16. stoljeća do početka 20. stoljeća (Zagreb: Liber, 1981), M. Gross, Počeci moderne Hrvatske: Neoapsolutizam u civilnoj Hrvatskoj i Slavoniji 1850-1860 (Zagreb: Globus), and M. Gross, 33

Povijest pravaške ideologije

. Quoted in Branka Boban, Demokratski nacionalizam Stjepana Radića (Zagreb: Sveučilište u Zagrebu –Institut za hrvatsku povijest, 1998), p.196. 37 . Ibid. p.125. 38 . Ibid. p. 140. 39 . Ibid. p. 174. 40 . Eugen Weber, Peasents into Frenchmen (Stanford: Stanford Univerity Press, 1976). 41 . Eric Foner, The Story of American Freedom (London: W.W. Norton, 1998) 42 . Ibid. p. 38. 43 . Will Kymlicka, Politic in the Vernacular, 2001. 44 . On the wide scale economic exploitation of Croatia under the first Yugoslavia see the excellent study by Rudolf Bičanić, Ekonomska podloga hrvatskog pitanja (Dom i svijet, Ekonomski fakultet Sveučilišta u Zagrebu, Zagreb, 2004., originaly published in 1938.). 45 . See, for example, Gordana Vlajčić, Jugoslavenska revolucija i nacionalno pitanje 1919-1927 (Globus: Zagreb, 1988), Dušan Bilandžić, Hrvatska moderna povijest (Golden marketing: Zagreb, 1999) and Ivo Banac, With Stalin Against Tito: Splits in Yugoslav Communism (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1988). 36

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46

. The Communist Party of Yugoslavia (CPY) was renamed the Ligue of Communists of Yugoslavia (LCY) in 1952. 47 . Until his fall in 1966, Ranković was Vice-President of Yugoslavia, organizational secretary of the Party, and head of the Secret police. 48 . The Declaration was endorsed by nineteen Croatian cultural institution and 130 leading intellectuals. It contradicted the Novi Sad Agreement (1954) which combined the Croatian and Serbian literary languages into Croato-Serbian or Serbo-Croatian, pointing out that Serbian was favored as the “state language”, while Croatian was “disregarded and reduced to the status of local dialect”. The Declaration proposed Constitutional changes which would guaranty equality of “the four literary languages: Slovene, Croatian, Serbian, and Macedonian”, as well as of minority languages. For more information regarding the Declaration and the debate it provoked see Ante Čuvalo, The Croatian National Movement 1966-1972 (East European Monographs, Columbia University Press: New York, 1990.), pp. 59-65. 49 . See Savka Dabčević-Kučar, ’71: hrvatski snovi i stvarnost (Interpublic: Zagreb, 1997.) and Miko Tripalo, Hrvatsko proljeće (NZMH: Zagreb, 2001, 3rd edition.). 50 . For example, in 1964, a year prior to the implementation of economic reform, 58.01 percent of the Republic’s collected revenues went to the central government, while in 1968, the percentage rose to 59.9, in 1969, 60.8% and in 1970, it peaked at 63 percent. In addition, federal investments were distributed in a way that further damaged Croatia’s economy – in the period 1956-1968 Croatia received 18.02 percent of total investments, while Serbia received 43.48 percent of total investments; in the period 1965-1970 the situation further deteriorated with Croatia receiving 16.5 percent compared to Serbia’s 46.6 percent. As for credits distributed by the National Bank, Croatian banks received 18.8 percent in 1966, and 16.3 in 1968 perrcent of the total credits of the National Bank while Serbian banks received 51.7 and 58.6 percent for the same years. Due to the character of her economy – tourism, industrial exports, shipping and remittance from Croatian citizens working abroad -- Croatia became Yugoslavia’s main supplier of foreign currency. Although she contributed 50 percent of all foreign currency entering Yugoslavia, only 9.7 percent remained in her own banks and enterprises. During the same period, Belgrade banks controlled 81.3 percent of the entire amount of hard currency in the country. See Ante Čuvalo, The Croatian National Movement 1966-1972, pp.83-91. 51 . George Schöpflin, “The Ideology of Croatian Nationalism”, Survey, Vol. 19, no.1 (Winter 1973), p.130. 52 . Croatian poet, essayist and translator Vlado Gotovac insisted on the difference in the name of freedom. He was one of eight Croatian intellectuals, active in Matica hrvatska, who were arrested in January 1972 and sentenced for years in high-security prisons under the charges of “counterrevolutionary activities”. See especially his “Autsajderski fragmenti”, Kritika, no.8,1969. 53 . See Čuvalo, Croatian National Movement 1967-1971, Savka Dabčević-Kučar, ’71: hrvatski snovi i stvarnost, Miko Tripalo, Hrvatsko proljeće, 2001. 54 . Ivan Zvonimi Čičak was elected student-prorector on December 1970, Dražen Budiša was elected to the post of the president of Zagreb Student Federation on April 1971, and soon after Ante Paradžik on the post of the president of the Student Federation of the Croatia. 55 . Calling for an end to the students’ strike on 3 December 1971, Ante Paradžik described the character of the student movement with following words: “…neither vulgar nationalism nor dogmatic, revisionist stalinist Marxism never had any success in the University, despite the repression. Humanism and democratic socialism are the main features of this student movement. … Our radicalism is conditioned upon the struggle for a socialist future of us all and of our entire Yugoslav community”. Quoted in Savka Dabčević Kučar, ’71: hrvatski snovi i stvarnost, p.779. 56 . In mid-September, during his visit to Croatia Tito was warmly received wherever he went. At the end of the visit, in his toast in Zagreb he said: „This time I have seen that all kinds of stories being circulated about Croatia are real absurdities – that there is no unity here, that people think differently, that chauvinism exists and flowers, etc. That is not true. I saw the contrary wherever

29


I have been....We have to solve the question of the hard currency regime, of prices, banks, etc., in one word, we have to solve all those questions important to the producer and he must get his rights. ...Here in Croatia, I have seen and learned a lot. That is, next time I will know much better how to assess the different news and stories than I was able to do in the past.“ Quoted in Savka Dabčević-Kučar, pp.682-683. 57 . From 1966 to 1971 there was no political prisoners in Croatia. 58 . See Savka Dabčević-Kučar, '71: hrvatski snovi i stvarnost, pp.978-988. 59 . The political purges in Croatia were massive. In the first three years after the Croatian national movement was crushed more than 50000 people were expelled or left the LCC and more than 5000 managers and political officials lost their job. See Miko Tripalo, Hrvatsko proljeće, p. 237. 60 . See Tamir, Liberal Nationalism and D. Miller, On Nationality. 61 . G, Schöpflin, Nations, Identity, Power, p.301. 62 . Will Kymlicka, Multicultural Citizenship (Oxgord: Clarendon Press, 1995). P. 188-9. 63 . According to Anthony Smith, polycentric nationalism is reminiscent of the dialogue among actors on the common stage. It starts with the assumption that there are many centers of power, that the other groups have valuable and genuinely noble ideas and institutions that can be borrowed and used for the common good. It strives to join “the family” of nations, to become the nation like any other, under the terms of dignified equality. See his Theories of Nationalism (London: Duckworth, 1971), pp. 158-159. 64

. Garth Massey, Randy Hodson, Duško Sekulić, «Nationalism, Liberalism, and Liberal Nationalism in Postwar Croatia», in Nations and Nationalism, no. 2 (2002),

65

. Michael Billig, Banal Nationalism, p.8.

30

Cro davorka matic (final)