Self-‐Monitoring on Domains of Morality 2
Psychology research on morality has changed drastically over the past half century. Researchers constricted the domain of morality to individual development that relied heavily on cognitive reasoning and knowledge (Piaget, 1932; Tapp & Kohlberg, 1971). Specifically, Piaget and Kohlberg both advocated for a development of morality pertaining to the idea of justice and the law (Piaget, 1932; Tapp & Kohlberg, 1971). The ability to become a moral individual was closely tied to one’s understandings of the nature of law and how one could best abide by it. Kohlberg primarily was trying to understand how we can push the individual’s understanding of principled legal development (Tapp & Kohlberg, 1971). Researchers continued to find that there was more to the story of defining morality. Psychology researchers proposed alternative ways in which to define the domain of morality. Carol Gilligan advocated for care to be added to the conception of morality; specifically the way women appear to think about morality (Gilligan, 1982). Along these lines, Turiel, Hildebrandt, and Wainryb (1991) defined the moral domain as related to justice, rights and welfare. As the “caring” aspect to the conception of morality was added, so did the understanding that morality is predominantly social. Turiel and his fellow researchers (1991) were quick to point out that there were no other aspects to morality to be considered. Therefore other values such as purity, authority and loyalty were excluded from the domain of morality (Turiel, et al., 1991). In trying to find a universal way in which to define morality, personal differences got in the way, and therefore morality did not seem to fit in with the domain of social convention. Depending upon various factors (geography, culture, etc.) people could think differently on a variety of issues other than just justice, rights and welfare (Turiel, Hildebrandt, & Wainryb, 1991). Individuals appeared to place importance and relevance on issues concerning