Effect Of Release Type On FTA
tion processes are taking place in the counties that rely primarily on surety bond” (ibid, p. 30). On the other hand, surety counties were more likely than non-surety counties to release defendants with a prior failure to appear and with violent charges — suggesting “that monitoring capabilities, rather than selection effects, explain the efficacy of commercial surety bond in guaranteeing court appearances” (ibid., p. 36). Ultimately, no definitive conclusions were drawn from these mixed findings because of the limitations of the SCPS data (ibid, p. 45). On a loosely parallel track, a PJI staff member recently examined elements of pretrial services programs hypothesized to be associated with lower FTA rates (Levin (2007). No comparisons were made to financial release in this study, as the purpose was limited to exploring what works best for nonfinancial release programs. SCPS data from 1990 – 2004 were combined with a 1999 national survey of pretrial programs to provide the dataset used in the analyses. Again, both selection and supervision seemed to provide the keys to success in lowering FTA. Some of the specific findings pointed to the value of empirically based risk assessment, ability to report noncompliance to the Court, the targeted use of mental health screening, and mental health supervision by the pretrial services program — all of which were associated with lower FTA rates. Other Recent Research Studies that address directly the issue of comparative FTA rates for defendants released on surety bonds versus other forms of release are, to the best of our knowledge, limited to the SCPS-based research described above. However, two contributions to the research literature using other data sources — and addressing other questions — do provide some additional pertinent information. A validation study for the pretrial risk assessment instrument used throughout Kentucky found high pretrial release rates and low FTA rates (Austin et al. 2010). This is interesting because Kentucky outlawed commercial bonds in 1976, meaning that surety bonds were not responsible for any part of the low overall FTA rate of 8% — which is, incidentally, considerably lower than the aggregated FTA rate of 18% for felony defendants in the largest urban counties who were released through a surety bond in 2006 (Cohen and Reaves 2007). The Kentucky validation study included charges of all severity classes, including violations, offenses, misdemeanors, and felonies. Finally, a federally financed study released in May 2011 provides data about misdemeanants’ FTA rates, something missing from all of the studies described above but only marginally relevant here because type of release was not considered in the analysis (Bornstein et al. 2011). Using a dataset of arrests during 2009 and 2010 in 14 Nebraska10 counties, the authors evaluated the effects of various types of notification reminders in reducing the baseline FTA rate of about 13%. Defendants were also surveyed regarding their perceptions of fairness and trust in the criminal justice system. The authors concluded that notification did lower FTA rates, although some types of notification were more effective than others, and that trust in the criminal justice system was also a significant determinant of return to court. 10
Even if release type had been examined, surety bonds would not have been a factor because they are rarely used in Nebraska, although they are not illegal (Schnacke, Jones, et al. 2010; Cohen and Reaves 2007). -11-