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Halllc ol Cognition
common types, move and stiike decisions, accounted for about 25% each; see Figure 8.2).
Still, the commanders in our experiments tended to delegate the entitybased information-gathering responsibility to the intelligence manager. This
helped devolve a substantial cognitive load from the commander and also
served to unify control of the sensor assets. On the other hand, this dele
gation deprived the cell of the critical big picture of the enemy since the intelligence manager was focused on finding and characterizing individual battlespace entities instead of developing an aggregated understanding of the enemy.
In Experiment 6, one of the commanders recognized this deficiency and
saw that bis intelligence manager was overloaded with tasks, while the effects
manager was being underutilized (since many ofthc engagement tasks were
automated orassisted by the (!SE)- Thecommander made the effects manager
responsible for coordinating with the intelligence manager to obtain images for BIM and to conduct BDA assessments. The advantage of placing this
responsibility with the effects manager was obvious—not only did it alleviate the cognitive load placed on the intelligence manager, but it also enabled a rapid recngagcmenl ofassets that were not destroyed by the original engage ment. In general, the flexibility ofCSE facilitated opportunities for creative and unconventional allocation (and dynamic reallocation during the battle) oi
responsibilities between members ofthc command cell. BDA proved to be particularly critical and demanding throughout the experi mental program,ami commanders struggled with ob^ from their available images. More often than not, BDA images (produced with realistic imagery simulator) did not provide enough information to make definitive conclusions about the results of an engagement.Thus, about
90 percent of BDA images from Experiment 4a were inconclusive (Figure 6.5 ofChapter 6). This ultimately led to frequent recngagements of targets in order to ensure they were destroyed. In Experiment 4a, 44 percent oftargets were reengaged, and in Experiment 4b, 54 percent were reengaged. The need to understand the state of enemyentities through effective BDA
was clearly demonstrated in Experiment 4a, Run 6, where a single enemy armored personnel carrier destroyed enough of the Blue force to render the unit combat ineffective. This particular enemy entity had been engaged
early in the battle and suffered a mobility-kill. 1Iowever, the intelligence manager classified the asset as dead based on a BDA picture This mistake was not found until it was too late. The Blue force was unable to continue its mission.
Undoubtedly, tomorrows commanders will greatly benefit from the rich information available to them. At the same time, they will be heavily taxed
with the need to process the vast information delivered through networked sensors—both initial intelligence and BDA. Commanders should expect to
spend more time, perhaps over half of their time, on "seeing" the enemy. Partofthc solution isto equip them with appropriate information-processing