U4 Issue 2013:9
Maximising the efficiency and impact of Supreme Audit Institutions through engagement with other stakeholders
www.U4.no
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A final issue relating to engagement with the relevant parliamentary committee concerns the way in which the committee discusses SAI findings. In order for such a committee to perform its role optimally, it needs to discuss and process findings and recommendations on the basis of a common understanding of budget accountability that, as far as possible, rises above political party and factional conflicts. According to Branislav Radulovi", member of the senate of the Montenegro SAI, committee discussions of SAI findings are conducted strictly along political party lines, obstructing the consensus that is necessary if a committee is to use SAI findings properly.13 Similarly, the discussions of the Croatian Finance and Central Budget Committee are strongly political, according to NGO observers, and even in the Slovene Parliamentary Commission, at a certain stage in the electoral cycle, political in-fighting becomes more regular.14 This underlines the need for the SAI to engage to the maximum extent possible in providing such committees with advice and guidance, such as written materials to prepare committee members for discussions of particular audits.
13 Interview with Branislav Radulovi", 5 November 2012. However, Mr Radulovi" stated that a protocol or memorandum of understanding to specify cooperation with parliament would be useful. 14
Interviews with Zoran Antun Petrovi", Transparency International Croatia, 23 November 2012; Igor #oltes, President of the Slovene Court of Audit, 15 November 2012. 16