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China, Coal and Climate: Dealing with Emerging Economies after Kyoto Civic Exchange Hong Kong October 20, 2006 Thomas C. Heller Stanford University Program on Energy & http://pesd.stanford.edu/ Sustainable Development

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Five Myths 1. Climate Change isn’t a problem 2. Fossil Fuels will Run Out Shortly 3. The “Engineers’ Myth” 4. The “Planners’ Myth” 5. The “Diplomats’ Myth” • Policy Planning can be extended to the global level • All countries should be involved in the most effective solutions • Enforcement is based on sovereign state model

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Kyoto: Climate Change Strategy Industrialized Countries

Emerging Markets

Least Developed Countries

Energy Efficiency

Low price Signal

Trading; Graduation

Trading; ODA

Fuel Switching

Increasing Price Signal

Trading; Graduation

Trading; ODA

Innovation

+ Increasing(?) Price Signal

Technology Transfer; Graduation

?

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Beyond Kyoto •Few OECD nations assume positive costs •Developing nations refuse mitigation commitments •Politically acceptable price signals too low for fuel switching or commercialization of new technologies •Global markets weakly regulated (gamed) •Only a few countries emit most GHGs •Wrong people at the diplomatic table Program on Energy and Sustainable Development - http://pesd.stanford.edu/

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A Madisonian Perspective: Emerging Carbon Currencies 45

40

35 EU

Volume (MTCO2)

30

$/Metric Tonne CO2

25

20 1.5 million 15

10

5

CDM

Apr-01

Nov-01

UK 125,000 CCX

PCF Oct-00

500,000

NSW

May-02

Dec-02

Jun-03

Jan-04

Aug-04

Feb-05

Sep-05

Mar-06

50,000

(5)

(10)

Sources: PointCarbon, International Emissions Trading Association

Reprinted from Victor, House & Joy (2005)

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Limitations of the CDM Model • Tropical “hot air”: currency devaluation – CH4: land fill and flaring • Rising natural gas prices • Local environmental controls

– HFC23: industrial processes gases – Renewable Portfolio standards withdrawal

• High transaction costs – Small Scale Projects – Complex and unsure methodologies for large-scale energy efficiency and fuel switching • Brazilian hydro; Chinese/Indian CCGT

• Baseline identification – Baselines feasible only for marginal activities Program on Energy and Sustainable Development - http://pesd.stanford.edu/

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CDM mistakes • No actual reductions beyond market behavior • Inefficient subsidies • Displace legal controls • Displace voluntary agreements • Existing production expanded to increase baseline • New production registration will increase leakage

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Beyond Kyoto •Few OECD nations assume positive costs •Developing nations refuse mitigation commitments •Politically acceptable price signals too low for fuel switching or commercialization of new technologies •Global markets weakly regulated (gamed) •Only a few countries emit most GHGs (IR) •Wrong people at the diplomatic table Program on Energy and Sustainable Development - http://pesd.stanford.edu/

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Allocation of World Emissions: Only a Few Countries Really Matter

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Building Blocks: International Regimes • Multiple clubs with members sharing local cooperative solutions are more likely to support international regime growth than comprehensive multilateral arrangements – The more closely agreements are built around noncooperative solutions, the more likely they will be implemented – Most international environmental regimes in the past half century have less than 7 members – Trading across fragmented international regimes is limited, reducing the value of wide and diverse membership in each regime

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Beyond Kyoto •Few OECD nations assume positive costs •Developing nations refuse mitigation commitments •Politically acceptable price signals too low for fuel switching or commercialization of new technologies •Global markets weakly regulated (gamed) •Only a few countries emit most GHGs •Wrong people at the diplomatic table (PE) Program on Energy and Sustainable Development - http://pesd.stanford.edu/

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Building Blocks: Sectors •Climate mitigation is a derivative problem of three economic sectors central to growth and development

–Energy –Transportation –Land Use •Break up global problems to manageable scales wherein empowered actors have interests aligned with adequate incentives Program on Energy and Sustainable Development - http://pesd.stanford.edu/

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Building Blocks: Sectors • Government actors from these sectors make decisions on the development paths their economies will follow – Line ministries – Finance ministries

• Political priorities of these actors are nowhere focused on climate, especially in developing countries – Environmental constraints on emitting sectors are resisted unless they advance higher priority goals • Actors from key emitting sectors are rarely

represented in climate negotiations

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Building Blocks: Pillars • Each separate climate problem is best approached through separate institutional pillars that are tailored to the specific problem • The climate regime should be composed of multiple pillars differentiated from one another according to: – The nations involved – The actors from each nation with policy authority – The timelines demanded – The instruments and measures to be used • The Kyoto Protocol, particularly tailored to low level price signals, should be maintained in the UNFCCC framework, but should also be supplemented by new pillars tailored to the diffusion and technology development problems Program on Energy and Sustainable Development - http://pesd.stanford.edu/

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Background Shifts: IEA 2006 •Oil price remains high •Return to coal •Re-carbonization of earlier declining trend to de-carbonization •China overtakes US in CO2 emissions by 2010 •Energy security emerges as core issue •Energy intensity increases in developing countries understated by IEA Program on Energy and Sustainable Development - http://pesd.stanford.edu/

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A Simplified Story Line (1) • Power dominates transport given current fuel prices and technology development – Fleet turnover time is determinative

• A low level carbon tax (equivalent) is a noncooperative climate solution among OECD countries • Energy efficiency gains are non-cooperative solutions among emerging economies – If substantial, policy needed is information rather than international coordination or targets (IRP and DSM) – Domestic issues shift from economic to political economic

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A Simplified Story line (2) • Emerging economies have potential for fuel switching in well-diffused commercial power technologies • Speeding the commercial diffusion of new technologies in power generation and distribution is the ultimate key to climate mitigation • Policies to affect fuel switching and technology innovation are likely to be more indirect and downstream than direct and upstream – Political economy and organization theory are keys Program on Energy and Sustainable Development - http://pesd.stanford.edu/

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Potential CO2 emission reductions: IEA2006 Technology

2015

2030

2050

GT CO2/ year

NGCC

++

+++

++++

1.6

Advanced Steam cycle (coal) IGCC (coal)

+

++

++

0.2

+

++

0.2

++ +++

++++ ++++

1.3 1.3

With CCS Wind

++

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NGCC: midterm:

IEA 2006

• Mature technology – F class turbines since 1990s – Average efficiency (LHV) 42%; new 60%

• Capital costs below coal – US$450-600; typical coal US$1000-1200

• CO2 less than half of coal fired plants – varies with vintage

• Fuel costs 60-85% total generation costs • Peaking capacity & Modularity • Pipe fixed contract and LNG contractual structure • Power as a regulated industry and organizational capacity Program on Energy and Sustainable Development - http://pesd.stanford.edu/

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Post-Kyoto: Climate Strategy

Energy Efficiency

Fuel Switching

Innovation

Industrialized Countries

Emerging Markets

(Positive CO2 Price)

(Residual inefficiency)

Low price Signal; Kyoto + +

Deals: Implementation

Market Development with Program Subsidies Technology Policy Strategies

Deals: Market development

Least Developed Countries ODA

(Short-term)

ODA

(Mid-term)

Deals: Diffusion Pace

?

(Long term)

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State Centered Change •Normative result – Global or national

•State mandate, instruments and enforcement •Barriers •Political Will •Policy shocks?

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Business Centered Change • Define market opportunities – Pricing – Market share – Timing of income flows

• Joint venture associates • Financing plan • Contractual structure (risk assignment) • Competitive response • Supplier and distribution networks • Manage regulatory and political risk (taxes) Program on Energy and Sustainable Development - http://pesd.stanford.edu/

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A natural experiment? • The rise in oil and gas prices is equivalent to a carbon tax in those sectors of more than $100tonne/CO2 • EIA and IEA energy outlooks for 2020/30 both indicate low reductions in emissions below earlier baselines with lower oil and gas prices, even with prices stable at these levels • Increased reliance on nuclear, wind power, conservation and demand declines are importantly offset by increased reliance on coal • Policy options to alter these outlooks include a general carbon tax in addition to the price rises or shifting gas-coal price formation mechanisms to reduce the offset effects • The issue is which policy option is more politically feasible in connection with key emerging economies

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Overview - capacity Generation capacity (1970 - 2020) 1,000 800

GW

600 400 200 0 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015 2020

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Chinese total energy consumption: IEA •2000

•2030

– Coal – Oil * – Gas – Nucl./hydro

69% 25% 3% 2%

*imports 37%

– Coal – Oil* – Gas – Nucl./hydro

60% 27% 7% 6%

*imports 63-70%

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Thought experiment: Gas Deal in China • Best estimates new generation capacity at least 50 GW in 2004 and 60-70 GW in 2005 – Rising production of 14.9% between 2004 and 2005 – Energy intensity exceeds 1.0; electricity 1.4

• June 2006, total installed capacity was 531 GW – More than 70 GW of newly installed capacity to be placed in service this year • New capacity more than 80% coal fired • Approximately 250GW in new power station projects under construction • Approximately 25% planned new capacity supercritical coal

• Imagine China replaces 50 GW of planned coal capacity with natural gas (baseload CCGT) by 2020 • 15% reduction over IEA’s baseline for coal capacity in 2020

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CO2 Savings in Perspective

450 Million Tonnes CO2

400 350 300 250 200 150 100 50 California Emissions in 2001

Gas "Deal" in China

Nuclear "Deal" EU25 CO2 in India Emissions Cuts (8% of 1990 Baseline)

Reductions from 100 Largest CDM Projects

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UK CO2 Emissions Cuts (12.5% of 1990 Baseline)

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China Reference Scenario

Installed Capacity (GW)1 2002 2020 247 560 8 67

Coal Gas Total Capacity2

360

855

1

Source: World Energy Outlook 2004

2

Total capacity includes coal, gas, oil, nuclear, hydro, and renewables.

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China Deal: Load Factor and Carbon Intensity Assumptions

Subcritical Coal

CCGT

Load Factors

0.85

0.90

Emissions rate (tonne CO2/GWh)

920

350

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China Deal: CO2 Savings

Capacity (GW) Total Generation (TWh) CO2 Emissions (million tonnes CO2/year) GHG Reductions (million tonnes CO 2 /year)

Coal Scenario 50 372 343

Gas Scenario 47 372 130

213

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China Deal: 2020 Implications of Coal Displacement 500

125

400

100 300 75 200 50 100

25 0

CO2 Reduction (million tonnes)

Volume of Gas Consumed (bcm)

150

0 0

20

40

60

80

100

GW Coal Displaced

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Central Government Plan to 2020 • Real GDP grows 7-8% per year; GDP p.c. reaches $10,000 (PPP basis) • Primary energy consumption grows 4.5-5% per year • 520 GW (30 GW per year) generation capacity will be added • Natural gas to provide new and clean sources of energy – Over 7% annual growth rate – Consumption to increase from 40 bcm to between 140 and 200 bcm under various policy scenarios Program on Energy and Sustainable Development - http://pesd.stanford.edu/

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Overview – fuel structure 2000

2020

Hydro 24.9%

Hydro 27.1%

Oil 4.7% Coal 69.7%

Nuclear 0.7%

Oil 1.6%

Coal 58.6%

Wind 0.1%

Nuclear 4.2% Gas 7.5% Wind 1.0%

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Central Government Plan • Demand Uncertainty – Domestic (Chinese) gas forecast driven by higher price for gas than coal, driven by – Higher gas costs ƒ Security requirement – 2/3 domestic production, 1/3 imports ƒ Domestic production costs ƒ Infrastructure development costs Program on Energy and Sustainable Development - http://pesd.stanford.edu/

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China’s gas power development • First 2 plants come on line in June 2005 – Gas transported from Tarim Basin by E-W pipeline

• 18.4 GW under construction • Plan is for total of 60 GW in 2020 – 6% national electricity capacity

• 2 re-gasification terminals to open to 2006-07 in Guangdong and Fujian • 15 LNG re-gasification terminals announced by Chinese national oil companies – 9 terminals reported approved by NDRC Program on Energy and Sustainable Development - http://pesd.stanford.edu/

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Benefits of gas market development • Lower unit investment costs • Shorter lead time in construction • Smaller requirement for land occupancy and cooling water • Modularity and lower economies of scale – Local grid networks for high reliability power; – Distributed urban power

• Higher energy conversion efficiency • Lower environmental emissions • Flexible load management and operational safety for local grids – Small unit unreliability (Guangdong 45%, often oil) – Local support at load center for long distance transmission

• Peak shaving – Limited pump storage capacity and long development

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Source: IEA, World Energy Outlook 2004 Program on Energy and Sustainable Development - http://pesd.stanford.edu/

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Challenges to gas market development • Gas dedication to premium use (residential) with coal reserved for power – Energy security concerns reduce supply to domestic gas sources

• Gas-fired power pricing – – – –

Competitive power pools? Environmental adders Peak tariffs (time of day pricing) Local user direct purchase

• Gas turbines imported; coal plants manufactured in China – Equipment cost of gas initially high during learning

• First of a kind projects – Anchor projects with assured off-take generally needed for infrastructure investment – Need for downstream market (local distribution companies and end-use expansion) to support infrastructure for power

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China case: Political Economy • The positive capacity of the central government is sporadic; its negative capacity is substantial • In periods of high growth, major decisions about economic policy are decentralized to provincial authorities • After the division of corporate and ministerial organization in the 1990s, concentrated areas of political and market power lie with leading state corporations – Hybrid or dual firms predominate

• Successful examples of economic development are rapidly copied by other local authorities Program on Energy and Sustainable Development - http://pesd.stanford.edu/

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2. Potential Markets: Beijing, Shanghai,Guangdong

Three regions may account for ~ 50% of total gas consumption

Beijing (pipeline)

Shanghai (pipeline, LNG)

Pearl River Delta (LNG)

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Beijing – Energy consumption 45 40

m illio n t o n s S E C

35

Imported power

30 25

Gas

Oil

20 15 10

Coal

5 0 2000 Program on Energy and Sustainable Development - http://pesd.stanford.edu/

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Beijing -- NG Consumption Structure (2003)

Residential 22%

Industrial 3% Space heating 60%

Commercial 14% Transprt. 1%

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Beijing -- Gas Demand Projection 18

High

16 14 bcm

10.8

10 8

Low

7 6

6 4 2

13.5

11.8

12

16

2.52

0 2004

2010

2020

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2030

49


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Shanghai – Future NG Applications • CCGT • Industrial boilers • Distributed generation • Heating/cooling

2 X 350 MW CCGT under construction Program on Energy and Sustainable Development - http://pesd.stanford.edu/

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Guangdong – Energy consumption 100

m illion tons SCE

80 60

Imported power Gas Oil

40 20

Coal

0 2002 Program on Energy and Sustainable Development - http://pesd.stanford.edu/

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Guangdong – Natural gas application •

Electricity sector will be the largest off-taker – End 2004: 40 GW projected to 100 GW (2020) • mid-2006: 50 GW installed

– 9 units nuclear @ 1 GW per unit – 7 or 8 (4x600) MW coal plants being built (17-20+GW) – 11 gas units (online 2006) or 3.3 GW of planned 30-40 units (10 GW gas fired power total) by 2020 – Hydro contracts from West and Three Gorges (11-18GW) •

Residential and commercial sector

Other industrial uses

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Mine mouth coal price • •

30.0 market price

20.0 $ /to n

power sector price

10.0

2004: Jan – Sept. Actual price for power generation is higher ($22/ton) due to sellers’ resistance against planned price End-user prices are much higher, reaching $60 – $70/ton ($50 $60 for power generation).

0.0 1996

1998

2000

2002

2004

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Supply Chains Compared • Coal State-Owned Railroads

Mine mouth

State-Owned Shipping

Plant

• Natural Gas Well

Liquefaction

Shipping

Re-gas

Pipe

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Plant

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Coal price shifts- October 2006 •Beijing: 588-605 RMB/tce •Shanghai: 570 RMB/tce – 510 RMB/tce at large plants

•Guangzhou: 637-700 RMB/tce •International landed gas price (CIF) = 700 RMB/tce for low sulphur coal – Domestic prices in south approach int’l coal price as a limit – 700 RMB/tce = $3.12 mm/btu (fuel alone) Program on Energy and Sustainable Development - http://pesd.stanford.edu/

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Gas Fuel price shifts- Oct. 2006 US$/ mmbtu

2000

2005

2010

2015

2020

Beijing

4.07

4.74

4.88

5.02

5.02

5.98 (3.10)

5.98

5.98

5.98

8.97

8.97

8.97

7.10

7.10

7.10

Guangdong Guangdong Shanghai

5.68

7.10 (10.15)

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Levellized prices (+ premia) • Fuel costs – Gas costs with rents in transport from port to citygate

• Capital costs – Reported costs on ultrasupercritical • 502.50/mgw installed

– Reported prospective costs on nuclear

• Premia – – – –

Load curve Reliability Security (autonomy) Environment • Emissions path on ultrasupercritical coal 44% efficient

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Revised order: current prices? •Hydro •Coal (with FGD) •Nuclear •CCGT •Wind (60 cents/kw)

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Non-price drivers of gas development in coastal cities (over project lives) • • • • • • •

Local autonomy (federalism) Environmental concerns Peak load curve and tariff controls Afford market development subsidies Exchange rates Capital Market reforms Industrial development: reliability and distributed power • Chinese oil majors Program on Energy and Sustainable Development - http://pesd.stanford.edu/

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12 Reported Scenarios R: Reference (base)

AO: Reference Assumptions A1: Faster Penetration of Demand Technologies

A: Modest Environment

A2: Different costs of capital A3: High availability of cheap gas

C?

BO: Reference Assumptions

B: Strong Environment

B1: Faster Penetration of Demand Technologies B2: Different costs of capital B3: High availability of cheap gas

C: Environment and high availability of cheap gas1 1

C?

C1: Faster Penetration of Demand Technologies C2: Different costs of capital C3: More expensive LNG

This will be either A3 or B3, sensitivity of the models. Program ondepending Energy and on Sustainable Development - http://pesd.stanford.edu/

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Elements for a Deal • Policy package at national &local levels – Energy policy changes – Complementary to market reforms

• Organizations capable of financial and technical risk bearing – Market development

– May be related to upstream asset sales

• Contextual changes – Often indirect changes in security or trade system

• International cooperative mechanisms Program on Energy and Sustainable Development - http://pesd.stanford.edu/

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Decision control of factors influencing Gas Utilization • Chinese governments – Local • Downstream market policy – End user tariff regimes – Off taker contracting • Infrastructure development support and siting (one time) – Infrastructure tariffs • Portfolio choices (during growth) • Financial support allocations • Autonomy of energy supply • Storage facilities

– National • • • •

Energy security Exchange rates Financial and policy deregulation Extra-large infrastructure licensing

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Decision control of factors influencing Gas Utilization • Private firms – Chinese • Policy influence • Capital supply – Multinational • Management of expanded market risks – contractual and financial instrument development – integration of global operations and supply chains

• International (coordination of collective good) – Preferential financing (IFI, Ex-Im) – Climate crediting (e.g. program or sectoral CDM) – Gas/coal relative price formation (private firms/traders/IEA) • levels and volatilities

– international relations (e.g. Iran) Program on Energy and Sustainable Development - http://pesd.stanford.edu/

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Market Structures • Supply and volatility issues • Risk bearing and distribution – No build out without buyers – No buyers if excess volatility (that limits capacity to sell) – Optimal portfolio (buyers and sellers) • Long term contracts (with moderate premia) • Flexibility mechanisms for peak and high demand • Merchant risk (upstream/scale) and hedges

• First mover effects • Feedback from markets into policy Program on Energy and Sustainable Development - http://pesd.stanford.edu/

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Pricing policy: Volatility in global gas markets • Price de-linking from oil (fuel oil and distillates) – – – – –

Gas at projected scale no longer a side product of oil Flexible spot markets separate gas from oil prices Gas and oil seen as non-substitutable quality products Low cost oil reserves lower than gas reserves Volume justifies specialized contracting

• Increase spare capacity – Increase supply: permits on re-gasification facilities – Decrease demand (diversified power portfolio)

• Regulation to encourage long term off-take contracts – Need for anchor projects (creditable for CO2)

• Storage increases facilitated Program on Energy and Sustainable Development - http://pesd.stanford.edu/

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Pacing (organizational issues) • Oil companies and gas culture • Risk re-distribution – New hedging or risk bearing mechanisms to absorb quantity risks upstream

• Mercantile energy security perceptions • Scarcity and price increases in equipment and downstream facilities (ships) • Supply nation political economics – Limited contracting management capacity – Low absorption capacity for budget growth – Domestic gas use at regulated prices

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Deals as international relations •Small numbers game – Deals easier to monitor against gaming than general markets – Not general rules and regulatory capacities but specific arrangements

•Baselines negotiated in the package – Baselines in transition or developing countries in flux – Endogenous to incentives

•Actors with actual involvement in sector •Non-cooperative solutions – Stay close to policy choices in play domestically among authorized agencies and engaged firms Program on Energy and Sustainable Development - http://pesd.stanford.edu/

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Indirect focal points for deals • Asia-Pacific natural gas markets – Regional commodity market stabilization • Supply security

– Decentralization of energy policy – Financial reform

• Energy efficiency implementation in China and India • Amazonian deforestation – Land use and national security

• Advanced nuclear generation – Fuel cycle control (proliferation)

• Hydropower in Southern Africa – Physical security – Infrastructure finance risks

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Deals • Shift Business as Usual – Alternative development paths – Often industry led technology shifts

• Close to policies in play in agencies with decision authority – Development priorities recognized

• Shift policies, infrastructure, context – Not project specific, additional – Subsidies, domestic benefits, carbon markets

• Often may be indirect climate effects (context) – Not necessarily focused on energy policies

• UNFCCC compatible; IFI/Ex-Im supportable Program on Energy and Sustainable Development - http://pesd.stanford.edu/

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Tapping the World’s “Infinite” Gas Resources

White: where the lights are on, satellite imagery Blue Æ Red : Gas resources, with increasing size (USGS) Source:

Baker Institute (Rice) and PESD (Stanford) Joint Study on the Geopolitics of Gas (CUP, forthcoming Program on Energy and Sustainable Development - http://pesd.stanford.edu/

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Revolution in Global LNG Markets • Shift from “old world” defined by: ¾ Few importers ¾ Rigid long-term, take-or-pay contracts with destination clauses ¾ Muted price incentives to divert cargoes ¾ “Buyer takes the volume risk and seller takes the price risk” ¾ Captive customers of regulated utilities ultimately backed contracts

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Revolution in Global LNG Markets • Toward a “new world” defined by more flexible LNG trade and driven by: ¾ Liberalization of gas and electricity markets ¾ Declining LNG costs (esp. liquefaction and regas) ¾ Growth of new markets (Spain, US, UK) ¾ Entry of energy super-majors to gas trade

• Flexible LNG trade will integrate US and European gas (and electric power) markets

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Annexed materials Indian nuclear deal Brazilian biofuels deal http://pesd.stanford.edu/

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Nuclear Deal In India • U.S. - India technology transfer could facilitate the installation of 30 GW of new nuclear capacity. • This would save 230 million tonnes of CO2 if it displaced only coal capacity and 87 million tonnes if it replaced gas. • In practice, nuclear would likely replace a mix of both coal and gas – emissions reduction would fall between 87 and 230 million tonnes.

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India Reference Scenario

Coal Gas Nuclear Total Capacity2

Installed Capacity (GW)1 2002 2020 69 127 13 45 3 9 116

252

1

Source: World Energy Outlook 2004

2

Total capacity includes coal, gas, oil, nuclear, hydro, and renewables.

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India Deal: Load Factor and Carbon Intensity Assumptions

Load Factors Emissions rate (tonne CO2/GWh)

Nuclear

Subcritical Coal

CCGT

0.90

0.85

0.90

0

920

350

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India Deal: CO2 Savings

Displaced Capacity (GW) Total Generation (TWh) CO2 Emissions Reductions (million tonnes CO2/year)

Nuclear Replaces Coal 32 237 218

Nuclear Replaces Gas 30 237 83

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India Deal: Carbon Implications

CO2 Reduction (million tonnes)

350 300 250 200

Coal Natural Gas

150 100 50 0 0

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

40

New Nuclear Capacity (GW)

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CO2 Savings in Perspective 450 Million Tonnes CO2

400 350 300 250 200 150 100 50 California Emissions in 2001

Gas "Deal" in China

Nuclear "Deal" EU25 CO2 in India Emissions Cuts (8% of 1990 Baseline)

Reductions from 100 Largest CDM Projects

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UK CO2 Emissions Cuts (12.5% of 1990 Baseline)

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Amazonian deforestation: sources • Mineral development • Small farmers – Interregional • • • •

Government directed colonization Federalization of lands Infrastructure and road led Network flow from origin regions once established

– Intraregional • Productive (full deforestation) • Non-productive (less initial deforestation, but more plots – Speculation – Sales to large holders (capital gain) and movement

• Large farms and ranches • Urban development (Manaos) Program on Energy and Sustainable Development - http://pesd.stanford.edu/

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Amazonian deforestation: dynamics •Minerals – National security driven – Export earnings from commodities – Tax credits – Input subsidization: electricity • Tucurui

– Labor force spillover

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Amazonian deforestation: dynamics •Small farmers – – – – –

No land acquisition costs No taxation of farm income No taxation of capital gains No stumpage fees or logging fines Weak macroeconomic stability encourages land speculation – Failure to provide agricultural technology or credit encourages turnover – Insecure title leads to social violence and relocation – Opportunity costs exceeded land rents without government action (pace of deforestation induced) Program on Energy and Sustainable Development - http://pesd.stanford.edu/

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Amazonian deforestation: dynamics • Large farmers and ranchers – Subsidies from competing agencies – Available credit and titling capacity allows land acquisition from relocating farmers, after subsidized colonization initiated deforestation and created marketable assets – Land reclassification away from forest preservation (cerrado)

• Urban development – – – –

National security Zona franca Energy subsidies (fuel prices and regional transport) Little actual surrounding deforestation Program on Energy and Sustainable Development - http://pesd.stanford.edu/

85


Amazonia deforestation: deal structure • Eliminate subsidization (no internalization of carbon values) – Tax income and stumpage fees for productive farmers – Capital gains taxation for relocating farmers – Opportunity costs compared to sustainable forestry concessions • Private property rights enforcement better than regional government

– Biofuels development on cleared land for family income

• Domestic costs avoided from climate change – Hydrology shifts in Amazonia precipitation patterns will curtail Southern rains and reduce value of hydropower system

• Carbon storage payments internationally Program on Energy and Sustainable Development - http://pesd.stanford.edu/

86


Annexed materials LNG markets Technology Strategy

http://pesd.stanford.edu/

87


Net US Gas Imports, 1970 – 2025 EIA-AEO 2005 8 LNG

Trillion cubic feet

6

4 Canada

2

0

-2 1970

Mexico

1980

1990

2000

2010

2020

Program on Energy and Sustainable Development - http://pesd.stanford.edu/

88


Relative prices: Coal, gas ,oil

Program on Energy and Sustainable Development - http://pesd.stanford.edu/

89


US Spot, Japanese & European LNG Prices ($/MMbtu) $9.0 US Japan Europe

$8.0 $7.0 $6.0 $5.0 $4.0 $3.0 $2.0 $1.0 $0.0 J

-0 n a

0 J

0 ul -

0 J

-0 n a

1 J

0 ul -

1 J

-0 n a

2 J

0 ul -

2 J

-0 n a

3 J

0 ul -

3 J

-0 n a

4

*Henry Hub for U.S. data, average of Japanese & European landed LNG prices Program on Energy and Sustainable Development - http://pesd.stanford.edu/

90


Forward Prices in Key LNG Markets (US$/MMbtu; 20 July 2005) $16.0 $14.0 UK NBP

$12.0

Henry Hub

$10.0 Japanese Import

$8.0

Spanish Import

$6.0

NW Europe

$4.0 $2.0 $0.0 lJu

05 A

-0 ug

5 S

-0 ep

5

tOc

05 N

-0 ov

5 D

-0 ec

5 J

-0 an

6

Source: Heren LNG Markets Program on Energy and Sustainable Development - http://pesd.stanford.edu/

91


$ per mmbtu

US Gas Prices Linked to Oil Products 11 10 9 8 7 6 5

Gasoil Heavy Fuel Oil Gas

4 3 2 1 0 Jan-98

Jan-99

Jan-00

Jan-01

Jan-02

Jan-03

Jan-04

Jan-05

Purvin & Gertz 2005 Program on Energy and Sustainable Development - http://pesd.stanford.edu/

92


Global LNG Supplies Figure 6 HISTORY AND FORECAST [1] OF FIRM, "PROBABLE" AND "POSSIBLE" LNG LIQUEFACTION CAPACITY BY REGION MILLION TONS OF LNG

Average Annual Capacity Increase Firm - 9.0 MMTPY + Probable - 14.8 MMTPY + Possible - 31.3 MMTPY Average Annual Capacity Increase - 7.9 MMTPY

MIDDLE EAST POSSIBLE [2] MIDDLE EAST PROBABLE MIDDLE EAST FIRM PACIFIC BASIN POSSIBLE [2] PACIFIC BASIN PROBABLE PACIFIC BASIN FIRM ATLANTIC BASIN POSSIBLE [2] ATLANTIC BASIN PROBABLE ATLANTIC BASIN FIRM

20 12

20 05

20 00

Average Annual Capacity Increase - 4.2 MMTPY

19 95

450 400 350 300 250 200 150 100 50 0

19 90

mtpa

MMT

[1] Jensen Estimates [2] Placing Unscheduled Possibles in 2012

Source: James Jensen

Program on Energy and Sustainable Development - http://pesd.stanford.edu/

Jensen

93


Factors Driving U.S. Natural Gas Demand % ∆ Gas Demand = + 1.000 x % ∆ Real GDP + 0.250 x % ∆ Heating Degree Days + 0.075 x % ∆ Cooling Degree Days + 0.075 x % ∆ Real Oil Price - 1.000 x % ∆ Real Gas Price (lag) - 0.300 (constant) Source: Deutsche Bank Program on Energy and Sustainable Development - http://pesd.stanford.edu/

94


Volume (tonnes/yr x 106 )

Volume, distances determine transit mode

5

Pipeline

LNG

4

3

CNG 2

1

ed m s n Tra 1

m (15

(60 s ga s n Tra

) tpa

2

ta) p m

ria e g Al

Stranded

3

4

ak L –

rles a h eC

5

Distance to Market (Nautical Miles x 103) CE Tech Program on Energy and Sustainable Development - http://pesd.stanford.edu/

95


Full Range of Published Scenarios

Program on Energy and Sustainable Development - http://pesd.stanford.edu/

96


Top Innovators and Emitters by World Region North America Western Europe Japan and NICs China CIS

Gross Expenditure on R&D (1994) Scientific Output (SCI Publications, 1995) Carbon Dioxide Emissions (1998)

India & C. Asia Latin America Oceania C & E Europe SE Asia Africa Arab States 0.0%

5.0% 10.0% 15.0% 20.0% 25.0% 30.0% 35.0% 40.0%

Percent of World Total Program on Energy and Sustainable Development - http://pesd.stanford.edu/

97


Elements of a Technology Strategy • Diverse Country-Based Initiatives – Loose international coordination among nations with diverse national cultures of innovation

• Price and technology progress are not either/or – Politically acceptable price signals tend to operate at margins, while vintage shifts may require dedicated policy programs

• Technology development involves a long pipeline from scientific conceptualization through diffusion of commercial production – Common pitfall: premature selection of winners – The pace of development along a pathway is affected by predictable and diverse problems that will crop up along the pipeline, which may be subject to diverse policy influence – Infrastructure development, finance (risk allocation) and law may dominate engineering in much of the pipeline – The feasible technology portfolio may be limited with search space more diverse within a particular pipeline than between technologies in the portfolio – Industries with experience in R&D in particular pipelines more likely than governments to explore successfully this internal search space

Program on Energy and Sustainable Development - http://pesd.stanford.edu/

98


untitled  

Thomas C. Heller Stanford University Program on Energy & Sustainable Development 1. Climate Change isn’t a problem 2. Fossil Fuels will...

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