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ISSN 2192-6921

Independent Review on European Security and Defence − A product of ProPress Publishing Group

Volume N° 29

The spectre of atomic war How to deal with emerging nuclear powers

Interoperability also depends on strategic leadership

The Bulgarian EU Presidency: Citizens first

LtGen Dr Dennis Gyllensporre, Chief of Defence Staff, Swedish Armed Forces

Ekatarina Zaharieva, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Bulgaria A magazine of the Behörden Spiegel Group

Edition 1/2018


Both the deterrence principle that prevented major conventional wars and nuclear annihilation and the detente policy that helped bring about the end of the Cold War have ceased to decisively influence the course of history. Yet no viable alternatives are in sight. Fear and reason underpinned the deterrence system based on mutual assured destruction in the second half of the 20th century. Rationality and predictability drove the thinking and action of the Soviet Union and the United States of America, the two nuclear superpowers. The 1970 worldwide Non-Proliferation Treaty was designed to prevent the emergence of further nuclear powers. 191 countries joined it and only a few countries such as India, Israel and Pakistan, which had and have nuclear weapons, refrained. The bipolar system continued for a few years after the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact in 1991, but it soon began to show cracks as new power centers were created and mutual trust between the two nuclear superpowers dwindled. A new multipolar world order was created based on the US, Russia, China and Europe, with regional powers such as Brazil, India, Japan and Iran gaining influence. After North Korea successfully tested intercontinental missiles potentially capable of carrying nuclear warheads in late 2017, North Korean dictator Kim Jong-un began to threaten the US with nuclear weapons. When the US President responded by threatening to completely destroy North Korea, the need for a new system covering the nuclear powers was abundantly clear. For China, Russia and the US the main objective will be to bring North Korea’s missile and nuclear weapons potential into a binding arms control regime. Rapid resumption of six-power negotiations (US, Russia, China, Japan, North and South Korea) would in practice be tantamount to recognising North Korea as a nuclear

Impressum The European − Security and Defence Union ProPress Publishing Group Bonn/Berlin

Headquarters Berlin: Kaskelstr. 41, D-10317 Berlin Phone: +49/30/557 412-0, Fax: +49/30/557 412-33 Brussels Office: Hartmut Bühl Phone: +49/172 3282 319, Fax: +33/684806655 E-Mail: Bonn Office: Friedrich-Ebert-Allee 57, D-53113 Bonn Phone: +49/228/970 97-0, Fax: +49/228/970 97-75 Executive Media & Content: Andy Francis Stirnal Phone: +49/176 6686 1543 E-Mail:

power – an unpalatable but unavoidable step in view of the current situation. And, after all, the recent start of talks between North and South Korea and the reactivation of the communication channel between the two governments are hopeful signs. The world’s security architecture has been upended, but the danger of a nuclear Hartmut Bühl confrontation can still be held in check politically. Unanimous condemnation of North Korea by the five permanent members of the UN Security Council is a promising sign; and heightened awareness of the growing danger of nuclear warfare could usher in a new era, in which the nuclear powers would rein in their own geostrategic ambitions (Russia/ China) and politically signal predictability (US). But the time has also come for the powers to think beyond deterrence and develop new ways of building mutual confidence and cooperation that are geared to the contemporary world. The goal today is not just to contain the danger of nuclear war but also to develop a response to existing and emerging asymmetric dangers such as terrorism, cyberwar and hybrid warfare. The recognition that the existing world order is a thing of the past and that we are moving into a new order in which we will need to draw up new rules governing international stability, balanced interests, confidence building and predictability, should be reason enough to come to an agreement. Recent history teaches us that to keep the peace, we must work together.

Photo: © Hofmann, Adelsheim

The end of the current world order

Publisher and Editor-in-Chief: Hartmut Bühl, Brussels Deputy Editor-in-Chief: Nannette Cazaubon, Paris; E-Mail: Editor: Alexa Keinert, Berlin; E-mail: Publishing House: ProPress Verlagsgesellschaft mbH President ProPress Publishing Group: R. Uwe Proll Layout: Beate Dach, SpreeService- und Beratungsgesellschaft mbH, Berlin Print: WIRmachenDRUCK GmbH, Backnang The European − Security and Defence Union Magazine is published by the ProPress Publishing Group. The ProPress Publishing Group is the organizer of the congress on European Security and Defence (Berlin Security Conference), the European Police Congress and the European Congress on Disaster Management. For further information about the magazine and the congresses please visit Subscription: This magazine is published in Brussels and Berlin. The copy price is 16 Euro: 3 copies for one year: 42 Euro (EU subscription) 3 copies for one year: 66 Euro (International subscription) including postage and dispatch (3 issues) © 2018 by ProPress Publishing Group Bonn/Berlin A magazine of the Behörden Spiegel Group





19–40 MAIN TOPIC The spectre of atomic war

3 Editorial 6 News

How to deal with emerging nuclear powers



8–18 In the Spotlight The return of Europe 8






Ekaterina Zaharieva, Sofia The Bulgarian Presidency: Citizens first Balance of responsibility and solidarity


David McAllister MEP, Brussels/Strasbourg Only diplomacy can solve the North Korea crisis No solution with military means Jörg Link, Kassel War by accident Historical examples recommend cautiousness Baruch Malewich, Tel Aviv On nuclear controllability and nuclear disasters Ethical aspects of nuclear deterrence

26 Documentation > A grand strategy for South Korea Paper by Seong Whun Cheon, South Korea > History of the nuclear bomb 28

Vladimir Chizhov, Brussels Democratic People’s Republic of Korea: breaking the vicious circle Show restraint and avoid provocative action

Robert Walter, Shaftesbury Brexit is a nonsense Give people the chance for a new vote

Daniel Weimert, Berlin A safe digital information space in pluralistic societies Transnational cooperation is key

29 Hartmut Bühl, Brussels Backsliding into the 19th century Commentary

Beatrice Fihn and Leo Hoffmann-Axthelm, Geneva/Brussels Did we forget about nuclear weapons? EU countries need to act


Zhang Ming-Zhong, Paris View from Taiwan: the future of the geo-economic order in Asia How to adapt to changing realities

Sergiu Nicolae Vintilă, Brussels/Strasbourg PESCO is the step ahead for Europe’s security The door is open for pragmatic implementation Jean-Dominique Giuliani, Paris 2018: the return of Europe? Guest commentary

Photos (cover): © lukszczepanski,, nicehl01 (left), © MFA Bulgaria (right); page 4: eu2018bg (left), © misu, (right); page 5: NATO



41–60 Interoperability A new approach for veritable cooperation

42 32





Documentation The world’s nuclear forces in the 21st century Tong Zhao, Beijing Grand bargain versus incremental approach to disarm North Korea Cultivating trust and change in mindsets Hideshi Tokuchi, Tokyo Need for a long-term strategy to cope with North Korea Maintaining the NPT regime Eunsook Chung, Seongnam Deterring North Korea: a task for the ROK-US alliance No own nuclear weapons for South Korea Michael Eisenstadt, Washington, D.C. Strengthen the Nuclear Deal and counter Iran’s destabilizing activities The US and Europe should work together









“The European − Security and Defence Union” is the winner of the 2011 European Award for Citizenship, Security and Defence

Harald Kujat, Berlin Interoperability: finally an innovative approach A concept to win the future Dennis Gyllensporre, Stockholm Interoperability also depends on strategic leadership Technical solutions are a prerequisite Marshall Slater, Washington Interoperability is the torch in the darkness From vision to action Andy Francis Stirnal, Berlin No vacuum in security! Berlin Security Conference 2017 Interview with Martin Schelleis, Bonn Permanent Structured Cooperation and the German Joint Support Service Technology and leadership have to go together Rostislav Jirkal, Prague Europe is far away from public and private interoperability in cyberdefence Plea for a system of coordinated cybersecurity Karim Michel Sabbagh, Luxembourg Secure flexible satellite communications for peacekeeping and security forces Make leaders communicate securely Debalina Ghoshal, New Delhi The Air and Missile Defence Battle System of the US Army Touching the highest degree of interoperability

Chris Lombardi, Brussels Common solutions for common threats Interoperability is a multi-layered instrument


Authors 2017




Merkel and Macron promise a new Elysée Treaty


January 1963, Charles de Gaulle

PESCO: a priority for the Bulgarian EU Presidency

and Konrad Adenauer signed the

(ed/nc, Paris) Stability

Elysée Treaty aimed at achieving

and security are some

reconciliation between France and

of the priorities of the

the Federal Republic of Germa-

Bulgarian EU Presiden-

ny. French President Emmanuel

cy, which include lay-

Macron and German Chancellor

ing the foundations of

Angela Merkel agreed on 19 Jan-

a Defence Union through the implementation

uary 2018 in Paris to draft a new

of the first EU Permanent Structured Cooper-

French-German treaty during the

ation (PESCO). PESCO was established on 11

(ed/nc, Paris) 55 years ago, on 22

course of the year. The presidents

French President Emmanuel Macron and German Chan-

December 2017 and was joined by 25 Member

of the Assemblée Nationale and

cellor Angela Merkel, Brussels, 14.12.2017

States. A list of first projects for cooperation is

the Bundestag adopted on 22 Jan-

Photo: © European Union


uary a joint resolution calling for a

> Web EU Presidency programme:

new Élysée Treaty. Minister for Eu-

rope and Foreign Affairs Jean-Yves

Le Drian will work in close collabo-

> See the article by Bulgaria’s Foreign Minis-

ration with his German counterpart

ter Ekaterina Zaharieva, and the article by

on all major foreign policy issues

Sergiu Vintilă on PESCO in our chapter In

and the strengthening of bilateral


the Spotlight (beginning page 8).


> See also our chapter Interoperability

> Web Joint declaration: (French)

(beginning page 41) (German)


13th Security Union Progress Report

Frontex launches a new operation

(ed/nc, Paris) On 24 Janu­ ary, the European Commission reported on the progress made towards an effective and genuine Security Union, including priorities such as countering radicalisation, enhancing Commissioner for the Security Union, cybersecurity and protect- Julian King Photo: © European Union, 2017 / EC-Audiovisual Service / Lukasz Kobus ing public spaces. The Commissioner for the Security Union, Julian King, said: “Over the past year we have intensified efforts to close information gaps, fight radicalisation, scale up cyber resilience, and protect our public spaces. This comprehensive approach is bringing results: but we need to keep the momentum going to ensure a genuine, effective Security Union. We must deal with the terrorist problem at its heart – the radicalisation that can drive people in Europe to violent and extremist ideologies. We will continue working with experts, policy makers and internet companies on this vital issue – there is much still to do.”

(ed/nc, Paris) On 1 February, the European Border and Coast Guard Agency Frontex launched Joint Operation Themis in the central Mediterranean to assist Italy in border control activities. The new operation, which replaces Operation Triton launched in 2014, continues to include search and rescue as a crucial component. However, it has an enhanced law enforcement focus by assisting Italy in tracking down criminal activities, such as drug smuggling across the Adriatic. The operational area of Operation Themis spans the central Mediterranean Sea, including waters off Algeria, Tunisia, Libya, Egypt, Turkey and Albania. Frontex Executive Director Fabrice Leggeri said that “Operation Themis will better reflect the changing patterns of migration, as well as cross border crime.” The security component of the operation includes collection of intelligence and other steps aimed at detecting foreign fighters and other terrorist threats at external borders.

> Web 13 Report: // th

Factsheet: //


> Web




First GovSat multi-mission satellite launched

Launch of Govsat-1 satellite, Cape Canavral, Florida, 31.1.2018 

Photo: SpaceX

(ed/hb, Brussels) On 31 January, the multi-mission satellite GovSat-1 was successfully launched aboard a SpaceX Falcon 9 rocket from the Cape Canaveral Air Force Station in Florida. GovSat-1 is the first satellite of GovSat, a public private partnership between the Government of Luxembourg and the world-leading satellite operator SES. Operated by GovSat from the Secure Mission Operations Centre in Luxembourg, the multi-mission satellite will enable critical communications for NATO in theatres of operations, interconnect key institutional or defence sites and support applications such as Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) and communications on the move for NATO. Xavier Bettel, Prime Minister of Luxembourg, said “the launch of GovSat-1 is the beginning of a new space experience for Luxembourg, after the foundation of SES in 1985 and the launch of the first SES satellite nearly 30 years ago.” The GovSat-1 satellite brings differentiated capabilities which complement SES’s existing suite of offerings for governments and institutions.

New US nuclear strategy criticised (ed/hb, Brussels) On 2 February, the Pentagon released a new nuclear arms policy which was instantly harshly critiqued by Moscow, Beijing and Teheran. China immediately commented that it represented a return to the Cold War era and Russia refused the American criticism of being an aggressive nation. Teheran’s Foreign Minister noted that the US will lead the world into disaster. The reason for this being that US President Donald Trump, among other measures such as rearming cruise missiles with nuclear warheads, wants to modernise US nuclear weapons to make them more credible. He wants to do this by reducing the role of warheads’ power to a “tactical” one, thus enabling the US to deter or respond to cyber or CBRN attacks or major conventional aggressions.

> See the article of SES’s President and CEO, Karim Michel Sabbagh, on page 55–56 > Web

Beginning with this edition, we will illustrate our main topic with a cartoon. This first cartoon has been created exclusively for ESDU by Peter Slama, Leipzig.

North Korea could soon be able to install nuclear warheads on its intercontinental ballistic missiles tested in 2017 

Photo: © Gyoungjun,

> See our main chapter The spectre of atomic war on the current nuclear crisis around North Korea (beginning page 19), and read the views of authors from Europe, Russia, China, Japan, South Korea, Israel and the United States.

©: Peter Slama



In the Spotlight

+++ EU Presidency +++

“United We Stand Strong”

The Bulgarian Presidency: Citizens first by Ekaterina Zaharieva, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Sofia

Twelve years ago, my country was at the threshold of EU membership, and I was one of the national experts helping it to cross over. Today, Bulgaria is the first country out of those that have joined since 2007 to take up the Presidency of the Council of the EU. As Foreign Minister, I am humbled to share with my compatriots both the honour and the responsibility of such a historic moment. For the next six months, Bulgaria will preside over the Council of the EU in a spirit of responsibility, balancing the inputs of the Member States and the EU institutions, particularly the Commission. Our Presidency’s programme is based firmly on the plan agreed by the Estonia-Bulgaria-Austria trio, which is also part of the Strategic Agenda for the EU as a whole. It should not come as a surprise, therefore, that we share the same priorities as our European partners – Growth and Employment, Citizens’ Rights, Energy Union and Climate Policies, EU as a Global Actor and Security, Migration and Internal Affairs.

Security and Defence Since the endorsement of the Global Strategy in June 2016, the EU has achieved significant progress in its implementation in the field of security and defence. PESCO The Member States’ determination to carry forward the work on deepening defence cooperation is most visible through the start of the Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO). Now, our concrete task is to extend that political momentum

to the implementation of specific projects within PESCO, thus ensuring that it adds value to the security of the Union and its citizens. European Defence Action Plan We will focus on the implementation of the European Defence Action Plan, as well as on advancing the European Defence Fund and its goal to support defence research and capabilities development. During the current Bulgarian Presidency, we will give special attention to the adoption of a new regulation and to the successful launch of the European Defence Industrial Development Programme, which is expected to create better opportunities for small and medium-sized enterprises operating in the defence sector. We will also give fresh impetus to the development of the EU’s civilian capabilities. Deepening EU-NATO relations Bulgaria will continue the process of seeking better synergies and deepening cooperation between the EU and NATO, especially in areas such as counter-terrorism, situational awareness and capacity building in partner countries. A key strand will be strengthening resilience – ours and our partners’ – in the Black Sea region, the South and in the Western Balkans.

Migration As for migration, we have consistently demonstrated (and expected) solidarity. The unprecedented migration crisis has put immense pressure on the national asylum systems of the

Opening ceremony of the Bulgarian EU Presidency, Sofia, 11.1.2018 


Photo: © Kiril Konstantinov (EU2018BG)

+++ EU Presidency +++

Our firm belief is that the only path ahead for our Western Balkan neighbours is within the European family.”

Ekaterina Zaharieva

Photo: © MFA Bulgaria

EU Member States. This has led to the European Commission’s 2016 package of legislative proposals for reforming the Common European Asylum System. Reality has shown that frontline Member States, including Bulgaria, cannot be left alone to deal with migratory pressure. Comprehensive common measures at an EU level are needed, measures that include burden sharing between the Member States. European Asylum System The reform of the Common European Asylum System should ensure the establishment of an effective and sustainable system of shared responsibility and real solidarity between all Member States. The negotiations on its reform have been ongoing for two years now, and it is time to reach an agreement on the legislative package. Four items are currently being discussed with the European Parliament: the EU Asylum Agency, Eurodac, the Qualifications Regulation and the Resettlement Regulation. Work continues on two other legislative acts – the Directive for the Reception Conditions and the Asylum procedures Regulation – with the

aim of reaching a common approach in the Council. Dublin Regulation On the most important issue, the reform of the Dublin Regulation, the Bulgarian Presidency expects to be able to reach a compromise between the Member States with the right balance of responsibility and solidarity.

Neighbourhood Policy

Bulgaria is acutely aware of its immediate neighbours in the Western Balkans. If we shut our doors to them today, we risk unleashing a new wave of extreme nationalism. Potential instability in the region serves nobody’s interests. There is none more conscious of this fact than the EU, a Nobel Peace Prize laureate and founded on the tenets of peace. This is why our firm belief is that the only path ahead for our Western Balkan neighbours is within the European family. However, as part of the European perspective, which each country needs and deserves, the leaders from each government must secure that same perspective for their fellow citizens by fully implementing the reforms that are demanded and needed by their people. In 2003, the Western Balkan countries were promised EU support to help on their Ekaterina Zaharieva path to accession. Now, we must stand by has been Deputy Prime Minister for Judicial Reform and Minister of Foreign Affairs our words – this is what gives the Union of the Republic of Bulgaria since May 2017. Born in 1975, she obtained a Mascredibility in the eyes of its people, friends ter’s degree in law. In 2003, Ms Zaharieva joined the Ministry of Environment and and allies. Waters on the party list of GERB (EPP). In 2009 she was appointed Deputy Prime Putting our citizens first is our New Year’s Minister of Regional Development. From 2012, she was General Secretary of the resolution. The European project is based President and between 2013 and 2015 was the Chief of Staff of the President. on compromise and on agreement to take Ms. Zaharieva was Minister of Justice between 2015 and 2017. concerted action. That is why the motto for our presidency is “United We Stand Strong”. We are ready.



In the Spotlight

+++ Brexit +++

The deceptive dream of restoring British sovereignty

Brexit is a nonsense by Robert Walter, President of the European Security and Defence Association, Shaftesbury The United Kingdom’s referendum vote last year to leave the European Union was a shock to a large portion of the British population. It was incomprehensible to most European governments, politicians and commentators. For over 50 years, the central tenet of British economic, foreign and strategic policy has been to participate fully in the European project. It was not long after the original six nations signed the Treaty of Rome that the British government realised that their alternative European Free Trade Association was

If the British Parliament is really bold and acts in the long term interest of the people, it can ask to reverse Article 50 and give the British people the opportunity to vote to remain in the EU.” Robert Walter

not going to give them the economic benefits or the political influence that full membership of the European Communities would deliver. Britain’s first application to join the European Economic Community (EEC) was made in July 1961, but thanks to French President Charles de Gaulle’s two vetoes, the application was postponed for a decade. The United Kingdom achieved its

We, here on the continent, haven’t had a change of heart. Our hearts are still open to you.”

Donald Tusk addressing the UK on 16.01.2018

ambition of membership in January 1973. However, domestic sceptics still represented a significant minority that forced the incoming Wilson government to hold a referendum on Britain’s continued membership in June 1975. The result was decisive, 67% to 33% in favour of remaining in the EEC.

Sceptical of symbolic projects In the intervening 40 years the British have always been sceptical of grandiose and symbolic projects, but have nonetheless led the effort to create and develop the single market. Despite the rhetoric of the recent referendum campaign, there have been very few occasions when the UK has been out of line in the development of the European Union. After a long debate, the UK decided not to participate in the Eurozone and also opted out of the Schengen acquis, but a determined group of Eurosceptics continued to fight against the 1975 referendum result. These warriors for an “independent” Britain sought to frustrate the parliamentary approval of every new European treaty. Then, after John Major’s defeat in the 1997 election, the Conservative Party started to haemorrhage electoral support, losing out to the new United Kingdom

What has happened so far? 2017

29.03. Triggering of Article 50 by the British government


22.05. Opening of the Article 50 negotiations (1st phase) • nomination of the European Commission with Michel Barnier as negotiator for the EU • adoption of negotiation directives



Negotiation rounds 1 to 6 focusing on • citizens’ rights • financial obligations of Great Britain • the special situation of Ireland

+++ Brexit +++

On 13 December 2017, the House of Commons voted to give Parliament the final say on any exit agreement the UK government reaches with the European Union. 

Independence Party (UKIP). UKIP has continued to grow and secured the largest popular vote in the 2014 European Parliament elections. To stem this advance by UKIP and answer renewed agitation amongst Eurosceptic MPs, the Conservative Party committed to holding a referendum, and when David Cameron won the 2015 election with an overall majority, he scheduled it for the following year.

A turning point in British history That referendum proved to be a turning point in British history. Sadly, despite the support of every former prime minister and most of the British establishment from business, academia and the arts, the “Remain” campaign was lacklustre and focused on economic arguments in favour of UK membership of the European Union. The “Leave” campaign, in contrast, focussed on emotion, pledging to “take back control”, restore British sovereignty and halt immigration. For good measure, it also promised that the UK’s financial contribution, erroneously quoted as £350 million per week, could be spent on healthcare. The result was close, but 52% decided that they wanted to leave the European Union. There was an immediate fall in the value of the British pound and since then, over the last 18 months, a steady flow of worrying economic news. Many international businesses have put off investment decisions and

Photo: Berit Watkin, CC BY 2.0,

it is still unclear whether the UK’s key financial services sector will remain in London. David Cameron resigned as Prime Minister and was replaced by Theresa May. She had campaigned to remain in the EU, but immediately declared that “Brexit means Brexit”. She appointed prominent “Leave” supporters to her cabinet in key Brexit positions such as Foreign Minister, chief negotiator and international trade minister. Despite this, it took her nearly a year to trigger Article 50 of the Treaty. Negotiations have been slow and the first phase was only concluded in December. This only covers the terms of the financial settlement, a commitment to protect the rights of ex-patriots and a statement on keeping an open border in Ireland. After the December agreement Mrs May said her plans for Brexit will result in a “deep and special partnership” with the EU. She has insisted the UK does not want a Norway-style relationship, and desires closer ties than a Canadian-style trade deal would allow.

What do the British want? So what do the British want and what is the EU prepared to give to secure this “deep and special partnership”? Many of those who voted for Brexit feared immigration and did

What are the latest developments?

08.12. Opening of the 2nd phase of negotiations after “sufficient progress” has been made in the 1st phase. According to European Council president Donald Tusk negotiations should focus on the • transition period • future relations of Great Britain to the EU

15.12. The European Council (EU 27) adopted guidelines for the 2nd phase of the negotiations in which the heads of state and government • agree to a transition period of about two years (March 2019-December 2020) • underline the integrity of the Single Market (with all four freedoms) and the whole of the EU acquis • reaffirm their support for a close future relationship with Great Britain


March European Council adopting further guidelines for the 2nd phase



In the Spotlight

+++ Brexit+++

What kind of future relationship does the UK want with the European Union? We don’t yet have the answer to this question. However, we can proceed by deduction, based on the Union’s legal system and the UK’s red lines. By officially drawing these red lines, the UK is itself closing the doors, one by one. […] It follows that the only model possible is a free trade agreement, which could obviate the need for trade barriers, such as customs duties, and could facilitate customs procedures and product certification.”  Michel Barnier, 09.01.2018 Photo: EC-Audiovisual Service, Lukasz Kobus

Brexit will inevitably mean a shift in the way UK and European companies do business together. But with the next set of negotiations just around the corner, a bold, positive and exciting new chapter in our history together awaits.” Philip Hammond (Chancellor of the Exchequer) and David Davis (Secretary of State for Exiting the EU), 10.01.2018

Photo: Attribution 30 unported CC BY 3.0

Photo: EC-Audiovisual Service, Lukasz Kobus

not truly understand how the EU functioned, nor the consequences of exit. But they felt left behind by globalisation and the economic changes that have taken place in the last 25 years. Many of these voters tend to be poorer than average, less well educated and have rarely travelled in Europe. However, amongst the small, educated, political elite that backed Brexit, there is a vision of a Britain freed from the constraints of Brussels, EU directives and the jurisdiction of the European Court of Justice (ECJ). In this brave new world the UK will negotiate free trade deals across the globe, particularly with the former British Empire, limit immigration to solely the highly skilled and save on its significant net contribution to the EU budget. In their view, the first such trade deal will be with the EU, our largest economic partner. According to the government this should be easy because having been a member for the last 40 years, the market rules are embedded in British law and there is mutual trust. Therefore, they believe that free access to the single market should continue, because, in their words “it’s in Europe’s interest”. Theresa May’s commitment to keep an open border in Ireland is based on this assumption. But as is clear to most of us who know how Europe works, this is all a nonsense. Access to the single market is based on membership. This means you respect the “four freedoms”, pay into the budget and are subject to the ECJ.

United Kingdom will be faced with a series of stark choices. It can leave the EU with no deal and jeopardise peace in Ireland. It can opt for a Canada-style free trade agreement, which has no provision for our successful services sector. Then there is the Norway option, which means we would accept all the EU laws, allow free movement, pay into the budget, but have no say in the governance of the Union. Or, if the British Parliament is really bold and acts in the long term interest of the people, it can ask to reverse Article 50 and give the British people the opportunity to vote to remain in the EU. All other options are madness.

Robert Walter is President of the European Security and Defence Association. For 18 years, he served in the United Kingdom Parliament. Between 2008 and 2011, Mr Walter was President of the Assembly of Photo: private

the Western European Union (European Security and Defence Assembly) in Paris.

In 2010 he was appointed Vice-President of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe in Strasbourg, a position he served in for five years. During this time, Mr Walter was also


2018 – a year of stark choices

Vice-Chairman of British-Irish Parliamentary Assembly and

What “Brexiteers” want can be summed up in the English phrase of “having your cake and eating it”. In the next year, the

Vice-President of Inter Parliamentary Union (2014-15).

+++ Information space +++ Call for action

A safe digital information space in pluralistic societies by Daniel Weimert, M.A. Strategic Communications, Co-Head of the “America(n)s” Program at Polis180, Berlin With interconnectedness on the rise, online communication channels are evolving and becoming increasingly significant. Social networks online are an integral part of our daily lives and an essential tool for opinion leaders and reciprocal agenda setting1. In the recent past, foreign state actors have taken advantage of free online media access by furthering the intentional dissemination of so-called fake news and disinformation. Often, disinformation aims at distorting or manipulating certain narratives or promoting dissent on political, economic, and societal issues to exert a self-serving influence on the society of a country, its integrity and/or politics.

Daniel Weimert is a strategic communications scholar and co-head of the “America(n)s” program in the grass roots think tank Polis180. Born in 1992, he studied communications in Berlin, San Diego and in Paris. After internPhoto: private

ing at the embassy of the United States in Berlin and the Federal Ministry of De-

fence, he is currently the assistant of the head of government relations and strategy at Rohde & Schwarz Cybersecurity.

A necessary differentiation When it comes to politics and the military, cyber and information space are often regarded as the same policy field with similar challenges and opportunities. Hacking critical infrastructure, spreading disinformation and practicing cyber espionage are often simply put together as digital challenges. This neglects the very different nature of these threats and the intended outcome of their initiators. Bracing for hackings and creating resilience in cyberspace is first and foremost a technical issue. Information space, on the other hand, is about the way we as a society are informing ourselves and creating perceptions of our peers, our democratic system, and world politics.

Seeking a common approach Strategic disinformation is targeting a vulnerability that governments, private actors, and society have yet to fully comprehend: human psychology in digital information societies. While embracing the free flow of information and freedom of the press as integral elements of liberal European democracies, we also have to create sustainable resilience against malicious content to mitigate vulnerabilities. To do so, there is a need in the EU to seek and agree on a common definition as well as a common defence and resilience approach in order to close the security gaps these digital and societal vulnerabilities create.

Communication is key Furthermore, we need to acknowledge information space for what it is: a gateway to our thoughts, our privacy, and even our ideology. With more than two billion active users on Facebook, we need to be aware of how much influence the private communication sector has gained over media usage and published content. Even though Facebook has been taking actions against fake news, it will not be able to completely shut off the dissemination of malicious content. Public and private actors need to

come together to discuss the algorithms of social networks and media literacy campaigns for the educationally disadvantaged strata of society rather than debating only regulation policies and media restrictions.

Strengthening transnational cooperation Moreover, EU Member States should create governmental actors with responsibilities to deal with the topic adequately and cooperate effectively with already existing NATO and EU institutions. National measures and institutions will have to be established beyond the Baltics and Scandinavia where threats in information space are already extensively analysed. Considering the cross-cutting nature of threats in information space, we need national responsibilities distinct enough for specialisation, yet flexible enough for quick cooperation with other nationals.

The way ahead Overall, it will be crucial for the future of information space in pluralistic societies to a) push the emancipation of information space as an independent domain from cyber space; b) to agree on a common definition and understanding of informational threats and necessary counter measures in national, EU, and NATO agencies; c) to initiate a long-term dialogue between the private and the public sector; and d) to establish clear responsibilities among governmental bodies on a national level. Finally, it can be said that pluralism can be both a strength and a weakness when it comes to disinformation. In the EU, we will thus need to actively think about how to design the information space of our pluralistic societies in the future in order to mitigate exploitable vulnerabilities, create resilience, and turn pluralism into strength only. 1 The term agenda setting describes processes of making an issue more salient on the political and/or public agenda.



In the Spotlight

+++ Nuclear weapons +++

Nuclear weapons are back in the headlines. Scary as that may be – that’s actually a good thing

Did we forget about nuclear weapons? by Beatrice Fihn, Executive Director, ICAN, and Leo Hoffmann-Axthelm, EU Liaison, ICAN, Geneva/Brussels

After 2016 and the Brexit and Trump votes, 2017 was set to be yet another annus horribilis. And sure enough, 10 years after North Korea’s first nuclear tests, red lines were drawn and crossed, threats issued and met with yet more provocation: nuclear and ballistic missile tests, military exercises, B-52 flyovers, and mutual threats of total annihilation. Shouldn’t it be illegal to threaten the murder of millions of innocent civilians? While not permissible under humanitarian law, it was not quite unambiguous enough for the handful of countries that claim nuclear weapons benefit “security” and “stability”, thereby they are promoting further proliferation.

Historical breakthrough – adoption of the TPNW This brings us to the underreported good news story of 2017. During the G20 Hamburg summit when some of the most powerful nations agreed on not much at all, 122 countries made a breakthrough of historic proportions. 71 years after the first United Nations resolution calling for a ban on nuclear weapons, the UN Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) was adopted on 7 July 2017 in New York.


While a large majority of citizens oppose nuclear weapons in nuclear-armed and nuclear-free states alike, the fact that most EU governments opposed this treaty, championed by Austria and Ireland among others, went largely unnoticed. More pressure is needed to confront the uncomfortable reality that Cold War path dependencies ensure their continued reliance on weapons of mass destruction.

Nuclear deterrence is obsolete It was a mistake to believe that the nuclear threat disappeared with the Berlin Wall. The unnerving number of serious accidents should suffice to do away with the notion of nuclear deterrence, which requires high levels of readiness to ensure the “credibility” that these nuclear weapons would be used at a moment’s notice. This holds true even if deterrence were to work in 100 per cent of cases, which it does not. As recently as 13 January 2018, Hawaiians were led to believe for 38 minutes that Armageddon was upon them. We do not know whether the false alarm prompted preparations for a retaliatory strike, and how far they progressed this time around.

Nobel Peace Prize 2017

The Nobel Peace Prize 2017 was awarded on 6 October 2017 to International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons (ICAN) and presented to the ICAN team in a ceremony in Oslo (Norway) “for its work to draw attention to the catastrophic humanitarian consequences of any use of nuclear weapons and for its ground-breaking efforts to achieve a treaty-based prohibition of such weapons”. ICAN is a coalition of non-governmental organisations in one hundred countries promoting adherence to and implementation of the United Nations nuclear weapon ban treaty. After its beginning in Australia ICAN was formally launched in Austria in April 2007.

Nobel Peace Prize ceremony in Oslo, 11.12.2017. From left to right: Berit Reiss-Andersen, Chair, Norwegian Nobel Committee, Setsuko Thurlow, Hiroshima-survivor, and Beatrice Fihn, Executive Director of ICAN

> Web:


Photo: Jo Straube/ICAN

+++ Nuclear weapons +++

President Trump and Kim Jong-un appear to believe they can increase their status by threatening to wipe out entire cities. The rest of us can only look on in horror. But we are not passive onlookers. There is something you can do, an alternative, positive step European countries need to take.”

Beatrice Fihn/Leo Hoffmann-Axthelm

The bilateral block-confrontation gave way to an unmanageable tangle of deterrence relationships, in which even the UK improbably claims to deter North Korea, while we all hope that the fourth and fifth wars between India and Pakistan continue to remain nuclear-free. A “limited” exchange in Kashmir would send enough smoke into the atmosphere to make more than a billion of the world’s most vulnerable people starve.

Nuclear sharing undermines the NPT The EU and its HR/VP, Federica Mogherini, have played a key role in the peaceful solution that ensures Iran will not join the nuclear club. We rely on the EU’s efforts in ensuring the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPoA) is upheld even if the US should fail to abide by its side of the deal, a scenario thankfully averted for now. And yet – if a country like Belgium “needs” American nuclear weapons deployed on its territory to ensure its “security” even while surrounded by friends, it becomes an increasingly tough

While the world is confronted with new nuclear tests and the risk of a nuclear crisis, today’s award of the Nobel Peace Prize to the International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons makes strongly the case for non-proliferation and disarmament as a goal of the entire international community, Photo: EEAS, cc by nc 2.0, the way to secure long term peace and security. (...) In our difficult and chaotic world, the Nobel Peace Committee has once again pointed towards one of the greatest threats of our time and on the need for international cooperation to achieve peace and security.”

Federica Mogherini on 6 October 2017

sell to ensure that nuclear weapons are not seen as status symbols that confer power. Still, nuclear sharing continues as part of NATO’s policy of a “nuclear alliance”, even while its Strategic Concept commits NATO to “create the conditions for a world without nuclear weapons”. Such conditions include a ban on the weapons, more pressure on nuclear-weapon states to implement oft-agreed disarmament commitments, and an opt-out from NATO extended deterrence. Nuclear sharing on the other hand undermines the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) which is the cornerstone of the global non-proliferation and disarmament regime (see documentation on page 22).

EU countries need to act At the end of the day, the vast majority of nations is doing just fine without nuclear weapons. Eliminating them is not a technical hurdle, but does require large amounts of political will, including the willingness to change perceptions and delegitimise these weapons at every level. Until we do, a handful of countries will continue putting us all at risk in a short-sighted attempt to protect what they see as their security. But it takes more than a clear moral and legal stance to make nuclear weapons disappear. This is where the EU and its Member States come in. President Trump and Kim Jong-un appear to believe they can increase their status by threatening to wipe out entire cities. The rest of us can only look on in horror. But we are not passive onlookers. There is something you can do, an alternative, positive step European countries need to take. Codifying their conviction that nuclear weapons have no place among us by ratifying the treaty ban on nuclear weapons will send an unequivocal message: there is no more time for strategic patience, if ever there was. If nuclear weapons are allowed to stay, their eventual use is a statistical fact, unleashing unthinkable, catastrophic humanitarian consequences. The rest of us should stop enabling them.

Beatrice Fihn is Executive Director of ICAN.

Leo Hoffmann-Axthelm is ICAN EU Liaison.

Source: EEAS

> See also our main chapter (beginning page 19)



In the Spotlight

+++ PESCO +++

The door is open for pragmatic implementation

PESCO is the step ahead for Europe’s security by Dr Sergiu Nicolae Vintilă, Policy Advisor, European Parliament, Brussels/Strasbourg

The establishment on 11 December 2017 of the Permanent Structured Cooperation on Security and Defence (PESCO) by a Council decision was hailed as historic by the European Union’s high officials. PESCO was established within the Union framework between 25 Member States “whose military capabilities fulfil higher criteria (…) and which have made commitments to one another in this area (…) with a view to the most demanding missions and contributing to the fulfilment of the Union level of ambition”. While most analysts see PESCO as a potential game changer for European defence, others see little prospect for its realistic implementation. One reason for scepticism is the 10-year delay in launching PESCO, “the sleeping beauty of the Lisbon Treaty”. Until recently, Member States were reluctant to go ahead with it due to an unwillingness to spend more in a time of financial crisis, a preference for bilateral or regional cooperation arrangements, and often divergent interests and protection of national defence industries. Smaller members feared the creation of a two-tier Europe of defence. Political will lacked overall.

PESCO is binding and inclusive Nevertheless, PESCO can now deliver. It is binding, unlike the previous attempts to further European defence, inclusive, as encouraged by Germany during negotiations, and at least some initial projects are ambitious, as favoured by France. More projects are to come.

If PESCO objectives are not pragmatically implemented, then the beauty will be dormant again, and there will be no prince able to wake her up once more.” Sergiu Vintilă

PESCO is also part of a comprehensive defence package. Joint capability projects will benefit from increased common financing through the European Defence Fund (EDF). The recently launched Coordinated Annual Review on Defence (CARD) can prioritise areas where strategic capabilities are needed. Championed by a core group of states – Germany and France, together with Italy and Spain, also leading substantive projects – as well as the European Commission and the High Representative/Vice President (HR/VP), PESCO can achieve necessary momentum for reaching its objectives.

Success cannot be taken for granted

Dr Sergiu Nicolae Vintilă has been the policy advisor to Professor Ioan Mircea Pașcu MEP, Vice-President of the European Parliament, since 2009. For more than 25 years, he has taught postgraduate courses, including international relations theory, security and strategic studies and the EU in world affairs at the National School of Photo: private

Political Studies and Public Administration in Bucharest, the NATO School, Oberammergau, and the University of Luxembourg. Between 2001 and 2009 he held senior management

positions in the Ministry of Defence of Romania, including the positions of Director of the Defence Policies Directorate and Defence Advisor in the Permanent Delegation of Romania to NATO, Brussels.


The initial projects can make PESCO a reality in several areas: investment, capability development, operational readiness, more integrated forces with the creation inter alia of a European Medical Command, cyber rapid response teams and, particularly relevant, increased military mobility and the EUFOR Crisis Response Operation Core (EUFOR CROC). The business case for an integrated approach is clear. The projects will be prepared in different groups and there will be structured cooperation for more ambitious participants within the PESCO framework. As PESCO is intergovernmental, the respon-

+++ PESCO +++

Signature of PESCO on 13.12.2017 in Brussels. From left to right: Timo Soini, Finnish Minister for Foreign Affairs; Peter Hultqvist, Swedish Minister for Defence; Margot Wallstrom, Swedish Minister for Foreign Affairs; HR/VP Federica Mogherini; Didier Reynders, Belgian Federal Minister for Foreign, External Trade and European Affairs; Steven Vandeput, Belgian Minister of Defence; Ekaterina Zaharieva, Bulgarian Minister for Foreign Affairs

Photo: © European Union


PESCO – the way ahead sibility for implementation lies with participating states. The success of the initiative cannot be taken for granted and is a factor of the 25 capitals fulfilling the 20 binding commitments made to each other. National implementation plans and the formal adoption of the list of projects, due early this year, must prove that political commitments are backed by real collaboration in joint capability development and the operational dimension.

(ed/nc, Paris) The Permanent Structured Cooperation on security and defence (PESCO) is outlined in the Treaty of the EU, Articles 42 (6) and 46, as well as Protocol 10. On 11 December 2017, the Council of the European Union adopted a decision establishing PESCO and its list of participants. A total of 25 Member States1 have decided to participate in PESCO. Structure PESCO has a two-layer structure: • Council Level: Responsible for the overall policy direction and

Preparing for the future

decision-making including as regards the assessment mech-

A key task for 2018 will be to establish rules allowing the participation of third countries in PESCO projects (and thus keeping the UK as close as possible). Considering that after Brexit, 80% of NATO’s defence expenditure will come from non-EU NATO allies, NATO Secretary General stressed the need for the fullest possible involvement of non-EU NATO members in PESCO consultation and implementation. A new EU-NATO joint declaration will be signed in July at the upcoming Alliance summit, with PESCO most probably a focal point. The binding PESCO commitment to invest more in defence will also serve as a response to repeated US burden-sharing calls. Seen in the grand strategic picture with existential challenges to European security and to the European integration project itself, PESCO is part of a defence package that must be inclusive to be credible. PESCO is, by name and design, a long-term project. Substantive results will not be visible immediately. If PESCO objectives are not pragmatically implemented, then the beauty will be dormant again, and there will be no prince able to wake her up once more.

anism to determine if Member States are fulfilling their commitments. Only PESCO members vote, decisions are taken by unanimity (except decisions regarding the suspension of membership and entry of new members which are taken by qualified majority). • Projects Level: PESCO’s effectiveness will be measured by the projects it will develop. Each project will be managed by those Member States that contribute to it, in line with general rules for project management to be developed at overarching level. Next steps Further decisions will be taken on: • the list of projects to be developed under PESCO (expected early 2018); • a common set of governance rules for projects, which could be adapted for individual projects; • the general conditions under which third States could be invited to participate in individual projects. 1 The participating Member States are: Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Croatia, Cyprus, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Ireland, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovenia, Slovakia, Spain and Sweden.



In the Spotlight

+++ Europe +++


2018: the return of Europe? by Jean-Dominique Giuliani, Chairman, Robert Schuman Foundation, Paris

In the international arena, 2018 might very well mark the return of Europe. America is struggling, China is seeking partners, Russia is bogged down in its past, the Middle East is in turmoil, Africa is still unstable, and the world is seeking answers to the excesses and failings of globalisation. At the same time Europe has returned to the path of real growth. With the return of France, the time for reform has also come. The grand German coalition, now emerging,

places the Union’s future at the heart of its discussions. The British, who have become the noisiest supporters of the Single Market, are trying to explain its virtues to its citizens so that they can remain ... and yet leave! Populism, which is still a burning issue, has been contained to date. And Emmanuel Macron, after having illustrated in the ballot boxes European citizens’ attachment to what has been built, but which is constantly denigrated by blasé elites, is about to provide real proof by offering them an open debate about this. Finally, Europe has accepted to take care of its own security, to mobilise at least; and it seems to be increasingly aware of its economic power and to be using it. Of course, we can never be sure that pressure will lead to revolution, but objectiveness helps us see that never have we had such opportunities to offer Europe a real chance to bounce back. A new generation of leaders seems to want to do this. Success is the best thing we might hope for them.

Emmanuel Macron and Jean-Claude Juncker at the Brussels European Council, 14.12.2017 

This article was published first on 21 January 2018 at

Photo: © European Union, 2018 Source: EC-Audiovisual Service

► Publications


The 4th edition of the Robert Schuman

information sheets and summarised sta-

ed, which guaranties

Foundations’ Permanent Atlas of the Eu-

tistics, it offers a unique portrait of Europe

the most up-to-date

ropean Union (Jean-Dominique Giuliani/

that is accessible to the widest audience.

information on a

Pascale Joannin) will be published in April

It is a vital tool to learn about and under-

constantly evolving

2018 (in French).

stand the issues at stake in the 21 centu-


The Atlas is an introductory work of refer-

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The English edition is supported by the

ence to the Union, its institutions, each of

a world undergoing deep change.

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The spectre of atomic war

With contributions from politicians and academics, this chapter will enlighten as to how the Non-Proliferation Treaty could be enforced, how the Iran deal could be saved, if and how North Korea could be tamed in its destructive policy and how to bring world powers to credible cooperation.


This large-scale crisis cannot be solved with military means

Only diplomacy can solve the North Korea crisis by David McAllister MEP, Chair of the AFET Committee, European Parliament, Brussels/Strasbourg

The Korean Peninsula has been a major focal point of global attention over recent months. Last September, North Korea conducted its sixth nuclear test with seemingly the most powerful nuclear bomb to date. The North Korean regime claims that this test demonstrated the success of its hydrogen bomb, seven times stronger than the one dropped on Hiroshima. In late November, an intercontinental ballistic missile that could reach the United States’ mainland and even Europe was tested. The North Korea crisis now has the potential to develop into a large-scale conflict, affecting a variety of actors across the globe. With Pyongyang’s claims of nuclear statehood, the goal of a complete, verifiable and irreversible denuclearisation of the Korean peninsula appears to be more difficult than ever. In this challenging situation, it is of paramount importance to remain vigilant. Military escalation – even without the use of weapons of mass destruction – could cost millions of lives. It remains unclear to what extent North Korean leader Kim Jong-un will follow through with his aggressive and belligerent rhetoric. But US President Trump’s reaction to North Korean threats, including claims that “only one thing will work” and that further threats by the regime would be “met with fire

It is necessary to increase diplomatic pressure on North Korea whilst simultaneously calling for a peaceful solution to the crisis through political dialogue.” David McAllister MEP

and fury like the world has never seen” is perilous. This crisis cannot be solved through military means.

Further increase of diplomatic efforts Instead, it is necessary to further increase diplomatic efforts. The message remains clear: the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) must abandon its nuclear weapons and ballistic missile programme in a complete, verifiable and irreversible

UN Security Council adopting unanimously a resolution on the extend of sanctions against DPRK, New York, 23.3.2017


Photo: United Nations/Manuel Elias

The spectre of atomic war

manner and return to the safeguards of the Non-Proliferation Treaty and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). The actions of Pyongyang undermine, amongst others, the global non-proliferation and disarmament regime. Diplomatic pressure on North Korea must be increased, whilst simultaneously calling for a peaceful solution to the crisis through political dialogue. This requires endurance. The European Union could be a helpful partner. The nuclear deal with Iran – the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPoA) – took twelve years of difficult negotiations to be implemented (see documentation on page 38). The two cases are hardly comparable; however, with this agreement the EU has established the strongest ever monitoring system. The IAEA has nine times reported that Iran is implementing all of its nuclear-related commitments. Despite resurging regional tensions, the agreement works and fulfils its purpose.

The EU sanctions regime The European Union is clear in its message that the full and robust implementation of United Nations Security Council resolutions is essential in order to exert effective pressure on the DPRK and bring it to the negotiating table. Sanctions are not a goal in and of themselves. They are an instrument to encourage a political process and open channels for meaningful negotiations. For these reasons, the last United Nations Security Council resolutions were an important step in increasing the pressure on the Pyongyang regime. The European Union has successfully adopted additional autonomous measures that go beyond those decided by the UN. These measures include, amongst others, a far-reaching export and import ban for a long list of goods, limitations to EU investment in all sectors and a further restriction of personal remittances sent to North Korea. The EU sanctions regime is the most restrictive in operation. Trade between the

David McAllister MEP is Chair of the Committee on Foreign Affairs in the European Parliament. Born in Berlin in 1971, his political career started in 1998 when he became a Member of the State Parliament of Niedersachsen Photo: © European Union 2017 - Source : EP

(Lower Saxony) – a position he held until 2014. He served as Prime Minister of Niedersachsen between 2010 and 2013.

Since July 2014, he is a Member of the European Parliament and a Vice-President of the European People’s Party (EPP).

DPRK and the EU has virtually come to a halt. The European Union remains willing to play an important part in a diplomatic solution, working with all the stakeholders to exert maximum economic and political pressure on the North Korean regime.

China’s role is key As China is North Korea’s most important trading partner and main source of food and energy, the role of the big neighbour in the north is key. The Chinese government must exert its influence and increase its political and economic leverage to ensure North Korean compliance and a full implementation of the sanctions. So far, the effectiveness of the sanctions has been partly undermined by the reluctance of some countries and companies to enforce them. Recently, the Chinese government has finally increased the pressure – this must continue. Increased and comprehensive sanctions will take further time to have meaningful impact. Nevertheless, maintaining economic and political pressure, whilst keeping the door to dialogue open, is the only way for a peaceful solution to this serious crisis.

documentation Opened for signature in 1968 and entered

ty prohibits a full range of nuclear-weap-

Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT)

into force in 1970 the NPT was extended

on-related activities, such as undertaking to

indefinitely on 11 May 1995. A total of 191

develop, test, produce, acquire, possess or

States have adhered to the treaty (India,

stockpile nuclear weapons, as well as the

(ed/nc, Paris) The NPT is an international

Israel, Pakistan, and South Sudan remain

use or threat of use of these weapons.

treaty aimed at limiting the spread of nucle-

non-signatories). North Korea announced

Nuclear-armed States and most of their al-

ar weapons and weapons technology. The

on 10 January 2003 that it was withdrawing

lies stayed out of the negotiations. Immedi-

NPT is based on three pillars:

from the NPT.

ately following its adoption, the US, the UK

1) Non-proliferation: states without nuclear weapons will not acquire them;

and France issued a joint press statement

The Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW)

saying that they do not intend to sign, ratify

3) Peaceful use of nuclear energy: all states

On 7 July 2017, the TPNW was adopted at

it has been ratified by at least 50 countries.

can access nuclear technology for peace-

a UN conference in New York. Opened for

ful purposes, under safeguards.

signature on 20 September 2017, this trea-

2) Disarmament: states with nuclear weapons will pursue disarmament;

or ever become party of the treaty. The Treaty will enter into force 90 days after

Source: United Nations



North Korea: historical examples of unintentional wars recommend cautiousness

War by accident by Dr Jörg Link, retired university Professor with a focus on strategic management, Kassel

It is a big mistake to believe that wars always arise from the intentions and actions of determined decision-makers. Often it is more of a gradual development of tension between states, needing merely an unfortunate impulsive action to lead into catastrophe. The outbreak of World War I followed this pattern: on 28 June 1914, the car in which sat the Austrian successor to the throne stopped directly in front of his assassin. On 28 July 1914, the U-turn in Wilhelm the Second’s view regarding the question of support towards Austria was lost in the midst of bureaucracy. Such unfortunate impulses may come from different sources, as demonstrated in the following comments.

The importance of people

around Cuba and no ship possessing armament was allowed to pass. On 27 October 1962, the Soviet submarine B 59 is attacked by American destroyers with depth charges. The submarine does not want to surface, although there is a lack of oxygen and a temperature of more than sixty degrees centigrade because the air conditioning has broken down. There is no radio contact, the boat is isolated. B-59 has on board twenty-one conventional torpedoes and a nuclear one with almost the power of the Hiroshima bomb. The commander orders the atomic torpedo to be prepared for firing. Only a few moments now separate the world from a nuclear strike which would destroy all four US warships in the immediate vicinity of B-59. Supposedly, this would have produced a sweeping nuclear war. The commander of the boat already has the political officer’s approval and second set of codes necessary for launching the nuclear torpedo. Only the launch button needs to be pressed. However, the Chief of Staff on board of B-59 intervenes. He vetoes the torpedo launch and is not intimidated by the resistance of the two other officers. He commands the deactivation of the nuclear weapon. In relation to this situation, McNamara, then Secretary of Defense, is often quoted: “at the end we lucked out. It was luck that prevented nuclear war. We came that close to nuclear war at the end.”

Numerous observers agree that the two opponents in the North Korean conflict, Donald Trump and Kim Jong-un, exhibit behavioral features consistent with narcissism. A typical character trait is the overwhelming feeling of one’s own importance, greatness and superiority. Highest admiration and firm support is expected and demanded. Displaying one’s self is more important than anything else. The relationship with reality and truth is distorted. Professional strategic management in the area of politics is marked by the deliberation of ideas, alternatives and decisions: critically questioning oneself and allowing and encouraging the critical questions of others. However, when it comes to management objectives and strategies, a narcissistic personThe importance of structure ality is prone to a policy of demonstrative strength and power. Protective structures can help to prevent accidental wars. This kind of strategy often begins with a war of words, as the The US constitution stipulates that war must be declared by Trump/Kim Jong-un example shows. Mutual disparaging comCongress, except in case of a national emergency, such as a ments and threats mark the beginning sudden attack on the USA. In such a of the journey to steadily growing case, the president carries a suitcase tension. One incentive – such as the with him containing the information Prof Dr Jörg Link massive concentration of US military necessary for triggering a nuclear has been dealing with forces along the coast and border of strike. A telephone conference with the 20th century history for North Korea, or the “testing” of an Secretary of State and the Chairman of decades. He was Profesatomic bomb near Japan and Guam the Joint Chiefs of Staff is to take place sor of Economics at the – may suffice to bring about armed immediately. If it comes to the worst, universities of Frankfurt conflict. the Chairman receives from the presiam Main and Kassel Photo: private dent the order to strike. (Germany), with a focus If, for example, a Soviet submarine near The importance of situation on strategic management. Author and editor the US coast started a nuclear attack, The danger of a situational – meaning of 16 books, he has studied the significance of there would only be a ten-minute reacno longer manageable at the highest accidents in history in his last book “Schrecktion window. The timeframe would look level of administration or government momente der Menschheit” (Moments of the same in the case of a North Korean – crisis was made particularly clear Shock for Humanity). missile attack on Japan. Sometimes, during the 1962 Cuba crisis. The Unitbad luck is given an opportunity to play ed States had erected a sea blockade


The spectre of atomic war

Growing tensions in the North Korean crisis give various opportunities for the outbreak of war by accident.” Jörg Link

People’s Republic of Korea”, “First Chairman of the National Defence Commission” and “Supreme Commander of the Korean People’s Army”. Numerous executions of members of the highest leadership elite show Kim Jong-un’s determination and self-assertion. There is no challenge of him on the horizon. The likelihood of bad luck striking is high again.

The Cuban Missile Crisis 1962 The Cuban Missile Crisis of October

Prime Minister Castro in July 1962 to

blockade to enforce a strict quarantine

1962 was a direct confrontation be-

place Soviet nuclear ballistic missiles in

on all offensive military equipment be-

tween the United States and the Soviet

Cuba able to hit the United States’ east

ing shipped to Cuba. Having reached a

Union during the Cold War. It is consid-

coast within a few minutes. President

critical phase of confrontation in October

ered as the moment the world came

John F. Kennedy was advised by the Joint

1962, the crisis finally ended with the

closest to global nuclear war. The US Bay

Chiefs of Staff to consider an air strike

removal of the soviet nuclear missiles

of Pigs invasion (17 April 1961) failed to

on Cuba and Soviet Foreign Minister

from Cuba and, in return, the withdraw-

overthrow Fidel Castro’s regime in Cuba.

Andrei Gromyko warned that this could

al of American nuclear missiles from

After this, Soviet Premier Nikita Khrush-

mean war with the Soviet Union. Rather

Turkey and Italy.

chev reached a secret agreement with

than a strike, Kennedy ordered a naval

UN Security Council meeting during the Cuban Missile Crisis,

Dr Mario Garcia-Inchaustegui (2nd from left) of Cuba, conferring

New York, 25 October 1962. The members of the Council are

with. V.A. Zorin (right) of the USSR, President of the Council

looking at photographs and maps showing the installation of

for October 1962. With them are V.L. Oleandrov (left) and. R.S.

ballistic missile site in Cuba

Ovinnikov, both members of the USSR Mission

“ Acting UN Secretary-General U Thant

I call upon Chairman Khrushchev to hold and eliminate this clandestine, reckless and provocative threat to world peace and to stable relations between our two nations. I call upon him further to abandon this course of world domination, and to join in an historic effort to end the perilous arms raise and transform the history of man.“

leaving for Cuba to hold talks with Prime

US President John F. Kennedy, Radio and

Minister Fidel Castro in an effort to re-

Television address to the Nation, 22.10.1962

solve the Cuban missile crisis, 30.10.1962

Fidel Castro, Prime Minister of Cuba (1963)

Photos: United Nations//Yutaka Nagata


a role, as in 1983 when a Soviet reconnaissance satellite wrongly reported the launch of five US intercontinental ballistic missiles. It was only thanks to the calm reaction of the officer on duty in the early warning system that the preparation of the Soviet nuclear counter-strike was stopped. Kim Jong-un claims to have a nuclear arms control switch on his desk too. His use of nuclear armament may be even more brazen than Trump’s. He is the “Supreme Leader of the Democratic



Ethical aspects of nuclear deterrence in a multipolar world

On nuclear controllability and nuclear disasters by Baruch Malewich, Scholar of ethics, strategy and technology, Tel Aviv

The current crisis in the Korean Peninsula is unsettling. However, it also provides an opportunity to reexamine the role of nuclear weapons and our belief that they provide stability, namely by analysing the meaning of deterrence. The two underlying assumptions on which the strategy of nuclear deterrence is founded are that nuclear weapons are reliable and controllable, and that the lower tiers of the chain of command are lacking any kind of agency. The weapons, therefore, are often portrayed as mere instruments of the state governed by rational leaders. This argument is used by proponents of deterrence to morally justify the possession of nuclear weapons based on inductive reasoning: our ability to avoid nuclear disasters so far implies that we can avoid them indefinitely. However, each of these claims can be refuted on either empirical or theoretical grounds and this article strives to do just that.

A history of nuclear disasters

alarm. He disobeyed orders to launch a retaliatory nuclear attack on the United States, thereby preventing nuclear war. While he was reprimanded for his actions, his story shows that nuclear weapon operators do have some agency, however limited. Yet the agency that could save the world might also lead to its demise. In 1979, a technician at the North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) accidentally inserted a computer training tape – depicting a full-blown Soviet missile attack against the United States – in an operational NORAD computer. Not realizing the mistake, nuclear forces across the United States went into a state of high alert, getting ready to launch nuclear strikes against the Soviet Union. Despite all regulations, a simple human error could have been enough to jeopardize civilization as we know it.

The nuclear roulette

Though there are abundant examples to support this claim, it is not futile to examine the theoretical aspects of the debate When considering nuclear disasters, we often think of radiregarding the (de)stabilizing effects of nuclear weapons. Such oactive contamination cases – the likes of which occurred aspects are often overlooked or abandoned in favor of far in Chernobyl and Fukushima. However, a US Department of more simplistic questions, namely what would be the effects of Defense report compiled in 1981 lists 32 individual nuclear “country X” acquiring nuclear weapons. Consequently, current weapon-related accidents, many of which could have resulted discourse on nuclear weapons is limited to matters of proliferin an unwanted nuclear detonation. An emblematic example of ation, and horizontal proliferation at that.1 Discussing nuclear such an accident is the 1961 Goldsboro crash: a B-52 bomber, carrying two Mk-39 hydrogen bombs (each approximately 2500 accidents is crucial because it brings forth another aspect of times stronger than the Hiroshima bomb), disintegrated in nuclear discourse – that of luck. The premise is simple: nuclear midair. A safety parachute was successfully deployed for one of disasters and lethal errors have not been avoided as a result the bombs; the other fell freely towards of controllability and reliability; rather, the ground. Upon impact, three of the thanks to sheer coincidence. Former four safety mechanisms failed. A single American Secretary of Defense Robert Baruch Malewich two-way safety switch, a cheap electrical McNamara, who was in office during the holds an MPhil in International Relacomponent one can find at any hardware Cuban Missile Crisis, and many other tions and Politics from the University store, was miraculously undamaged and Cold War-era rationalists, admitted this of Cambridge and a BA in Government prevented the bomb from going off. Techto be the case. If luck is involved, a series from the Interdisciplinary Center Hernology, therefore, fails to reliably protect of random events, unforeseeable by zliya, Israel. A former intelligence ofus from nuclear disaster. safeguards and protocols, might result ficer and a current peace activist, Mr in a catastrophe of unimaginable scale. Malewich focuses on the intersection Simply put, just because we avoided disInadvertent power of weapon technology and ethics. His asters in the past does not mean we will In 1983, during a tense period of the Cold MPhil dissertation dealt with the moral be sufficiently lucky in the future. War, the launch detection early-warntheories of nuclear warfare, focusing ing system at a Soviet command center on the work of philosopher Günther Anreported an incoming missile attack. ders; he is currently looking to expand Coincidence, not control Against all protocol, the duty officer, this work through a PhD programme. Let us take the Petrov example – a comStanislav Petrov, concluded that the puter error that raises a false alarm of report was a computer error and a false an incoming nuclear strike – and apply it


The spectre of atomic war

Current discourse on nuclear weapons is limited to matters of proliferation, and horizontal proliferation at that. The discussion of nuclear accidents is crucial because it brings forth another aspect of nuclear discourse – that of luck.” Baruch Malewich Photo: private

to the Indian Subcontinent. India and Pakistan, bitter political rivals, are both in possession of nuclear weapons. However, unlike the Cold War United States and Soviet Union, these two countries share a border. Hence, in the case of an incoming nuclear attack, either country will have about five minutes to respond before potentially losing its nuclear and/or political assets – compared to approximately 30 minutes in the Cold War case. This does not leave enough time to even fully examine the possibility of a technical error; in fact, it barely leaves enough time for the political leadership to issue any series of clear orders. This is what is often referred to as the “use it or lose it” dilemma, that can be triggered – with dire results – due to so-called bad luck.

► Author’s


Eric Schlosser, “Command and Control”. An investigative journalism book covering the 1980 nuclear accident near Damascus, Arkansas, one of the most severe nuclear accidents to occur on US soil (also available as a Netflix documentary under the same name). Benoît Pelopidas, “The unbearable lightness of luck: Three sources of overconfidence in the manageability of nuclear crises”. An article critiquing how nuclear crises are managed, as well as how policymakers and academics derive future lessons from such crises.

In the shadow of the bomb On 13 January 2018, the people of Hawaii received a false alert on their smartphones warning of an incoming ballistic missile attack. The message spread panic and sent people running for shelter, and it took local authorities 38 minutes to send a message cancelling the state of alert and admitting the alert was, indeed, false. For those 38 minutes hundreds of people thought they might die instantly. This incident proved that nuclear accidents are not a thing of the past; and that while the Cold War is long since over, we are still very much living in the shadow of the bomb.

Günther Anders, “Theses for the Nuclear Age”. A short mass by one of the most prominent philosophers dealing with living in the age of atomic warfare and nuclear deterrence. Peter George/Stanley Kubrick, “Dr. Strangelove or: How I learned to stop worrying and love the bomb”. A cult novel-turned-film on the ease of accidental nuclear war; dark and hilarious, it is surprisingly accurate, and remains a mustwatch for anyone interested in the field. “The Man Who Saved the World” (film).

Conclusions The assumptions that make nuclear deterrence appear logical fail to withstand the test of time. Nuclear weapons – and the technologies surrounding them – are prone to technical failure; operators of nuclear weapons are agents, and, as such, make errors. Finally, we must ask ourselves: can we really leave such scenarios to chance? The answer, this author believes, must be a resounding “NO”. The technical and political realities we live in put us all in grave danger, but as Hölderlin wrote, “where danger is found, there also rises that which saves”. This danger should therefore be used as a moral imperative to work – once again, and hopefully for the ultimate time – towards global nuclear disarmament.

A documentary on Stanislav Petrov and the 1983 nuclear crisis. “Bill Perry’s South Asia Nuclear Nightmare” (YouTube video). Former Secretary of Defense William J. Perry specifies the terrifying, yet not unlikely, scenario of nuclear escalation in South Asia.


“Horizontal proliferation” is used to describe the acquisition of nuclear weapons by formerly non-nuclear weapon states, whereas “vertical proliferation” is used to describe further buildup of nuclear arsenals by nuclear weapon states.




“Managing a nuclear-armed North Korea: a gran and peacefully unified Korea” A paper by Dr Seong Whun Cheon, visiting research fellow at the Asan Institute for Policy Studies The author of this paper observes that North Korea’s development of nuclear weapons is a major threat to the South’s national security and a key obstacle Dr Cheon’s article was on the path toward peaceful unification and prosperity for the Korean people. first published in the His paper lays out the need for a grand strategy for South Korea to manage a International Journal of nuclear-armed North Korea, with the objective of containing the North’s miliKorean Studies, Volume tary expansion and nuclear coercion while promoting constructive changes in XXI, N° 1, Spring/SumNorth Korean society. Reinforcing ROK-US military readiness, including the mer 2017, pp. 119-149 Photo: ASAN Institute possible redeployment of American tactical nuclear weapons in South Korea is part of this grand strategy. For the author, this would be “an equalizer to counteract the strategic imbalance of the North’s nuclear monopoly and leverage to help negotiate away its nuclear weapons in future nuclear disarmament talks.” He also envisaged the possibility – if the United States refuses South Korea’s request to redeploy tactical nuclear weapons – of Seoul temporarily withdrawing from the NPT (according to Article X of the treaty) and launching its own nuclear development programme. The paper first summarises the assumptions and lessons learned that span six South Korean administrations until March 1991, when the North’s nuclear ambitions first became public. It then sets out ten policy recommendations to manage a nuclear-armed North Korea, based on the author’s 28 years of experience in academia and government.

History of the nuclear bomb 1940 – 1950

1950 – 1960

1960 – 1970

1970 – 1

US drops atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki

UK tests nuclear weapon in Australia

Nuclear tests banned in Antarctica

Partial Test Ban Treaty opens for signature

Latin America becomes nuclear-free

India conducts first nuclear test

Aug. 1945

03.10. 1952

01.12. 1959

05.08. 1963

14.02. 1967

18.05. 1974

16.07. 1945

29.08. 1949

01.11 1952

13.02. 1960

16.10. 1964

01.07. 1968

US conducts first ever nuclear test

Soviet Union tests its first nuclear bomb

US tests the first hydrogen bomb

France tests its first nuclear weapon

China conducts its first nuclear test

Non-Proliferation Treaty is signed


The spectre of atomic war

nd strategy for a denuclearized

Abstract “Managing a nuclear-armed North Korea is South Korea’s grand strategy to protect the nation’s vital security interest in the short term and achieve peaceful unification in the long term. Its foundation rests on two pillars of containing the North’s military expansion and nuclear coercion, and promoting constructive changes in North Korean society. This strategy of management is neither appeasement based on unfounded optimism of the North Korean leadership nor an intimidation tactic to overthrow the Kim Family Regime. Under the assumption that genuine peace or national integration is not possible unless North Korea is denuclearized and its society transformed, it is a strategy that exercises full vigilance toward the North and applies all available means and methods to reduce political and military threats from Pyongyang. It also patiently encourages gradual and fundamental changes in North Korea as the ultimate path to a denuclearized and unified Korean peninsula. The management strategy understands that no dialogue with North Korea could resolve the nuclear problem with a single stroke, and thus, it keeps expectations low and objectives achievable. It does not anticipate a sweeping deal to denuclearize North Korea. This article articulates flawed assumptions and failed policies held by six South Korean administrations over the past 26 years and presents ten policy recommendations for fulfilling South Korea’s grand strategy in the future.” “Managing a nuclear-armed North Korea: a grand strategy for a denuclearized and peacefully united Korea” by Dr Seong Whun Cheon, South Korea > An updated version of Dr Cheon’s paper can be found via the blog of the ASAN Institute:


1980 – 1990

1990 – 2000

2000 – 2017

A million people rally for disarmament

Israel’s nuclear programme revealed

Africa becomes a nuclear-free zone

India and Pakistan conduct nuclear tests

UN adopts nuclear weapon ban treaty

12.06. 1982

30.09. 1986

11.04. 1996

May 1998

07.07. 2017

06.08. 1985

15.12. 1995

24.09. 1996

09.10. 2006

South Pacific becomes nuclear-free

Southeast Asia becomes nuclear-free

Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty is signed

North Korea conducts nuclear test Graphik: B. Dach, ESDU source: ICAN/UN



All stakeholders have to avoid provocative actions and aggressive rhetoric

Democratic People’s Republic of Korea: breaking the vicious circle by Ambassador Vladimir Chizhov, Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation to the EU, Brussels

The Korean Peninsula’s nuclear problem remains a major and ever-growing challenge to security in Northeast Asia and beyond. Russia has consistently condemned Pyongyang’s nuclear tests as being in violation of international law and has supported all UN Security Council (UNSC) Resolutions imposing sanctions on the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK). Pyongyang’s aspiration to gain nuclear power status is unacceptable.

has been the Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation to the European Union since 2005. Born in 1953, he graduated with honours from the Moscow State Institute of International Relations Photo:

(MGIMO University) and joined the diplomatic service in 1976. Over his career,

Growing concerns

Ambassador Chizhov has been a member of embassy staff in

The test missile launches that Pyongyang claims are now capable of reaching US mainland territory are extremely risky, a matter of grave concern and a direct threat to stability. That being said, to look at this issue by placing all responsibility solely on North Korea would be a gross simplification which could prevent us from developing adequate and realistic solutions.

several European countries and has held several positions in

General context While it is clear that DPRK’s behaviour is irresponsible and highly provocative, a serious analysis of the root causes of the current tensions cannot disregard the behaviour of other important international actors. Whether it is the heavy US military presence in the region, the efforts to establish a full-scale political and economic blockade of North Korea, or the permanent military exercises on and around the Peninsula, these are perceived by Pyongyang as a direct existential threat. Continuing along this course cannot pave the way to a settlement. The outcome of such short-sighted policies is the opposite – antagonisation of North Korea. A recent series of unscheduled military drills held by the US and its allies in the region has led to further escalation of tension. One might be under the impression that Washington is deliberately provoking Pyongyang to act recklessly in order to gain a pretext for an attack against the DPRK. Another destabilising factor is the deployment of American anti-ballistic missile (ABM) systems in South Korea and Japan, an element of the ongoing unilateral development of the US global missile defence system.

The Russian-Chinese roadmap The situation around the Korean Peninsula can be characterised by the following formula: provocation, a UNSC resolution and sanctions, then more provocation, etc. It is clear that the pressure of sanctions alone, the potential of which


Ambassador Vladimir A. Chizhov

the European Department of the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In 2002, he became Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs.

has by now been depleted, has not produced the desired result. Pressure can only be effective if backed by diplomacy. The need for political efforts in this regard is stipulated in all relevant UNSC Resolutions. Going forward with this vision, Russia and China have come up with a “roadmap” based on concrete proposals. At the first stage: Pyongyang should refrain from carrying out new tests, while the United States and South Korea should stop, or at least reduce, the scale of joint military exercises near the borders of the DPRK. At the second stage: the “roadmap” provides for the adoption of bilateral agreements on the general principles of relations between the DPRK, the US and South Korea. At the third stage: negotiations on a proper security system in Northeast Asia are launched.

Show restraint and avoid provocative actions To create conditions for the reopening of dialogue, it is necessary for all stakeholders to show restraint and avoid provocative actions and aggressive rhetoric. This applies equally to Pyongyang, Washington and its regional allies. Military escalation on the Korean Peninsula would lead to a catastrophe. Russia has always stressed the need to implement not only the sanctions but also the equally binding political provisions of all relevant UNSC Resolutions. Our “roadmap” is on the table and we call upon all interested parties to support it. In the end, there is no alternative to diplomacy if we are to achieve the complete denuclearisation of the Korean Peninsula.

The spectre of atomic war


Backsliding into the 19th century by Hartmut Bühl, Editor in Chief, The European – Security and Defence Union, Brussels

The National Security Strategy (NSS) reports that the US President submits to Congress each year have traditionally been a fairly reliable indicator of Washington’s international intentions and a harbinger of things to come, both positive and negative. The meticulously considered, carefully weighed NSS reports were therefore analysed and taken seriously around the world.

The President’s fingerprints The National Security Strategy report that Donald Trump personally presented at the end of his first year in office does not live up to expectations – or, seen in a different light, perhaps it does, since nothing better was to be expected of the 45th President of the United States. The President’s fingerprints are all over the report, which is essentially a reiteration of his long string of erratic, emotional tweets alternating banalities with problems to which no solutions are suggested. The serious parts of the NSS report, drafted by his advisers, are undermined by the President’s ad hoc, improvised, emotional comments. Trump sees the United States as engaged in a battle for supremacy with China and Russia. Both, in his view, are “revi-

No solutions Looking toward the virulent conflict with North Korea and the incipient conflict with Iran, he accuses Obama of failing to come to grips with North Korea and making an incomprehensibly bad nuclear deal with Iran. He offers no solutions for the conflict in the Middle East. Trump is convinced that open borders are undermining Americans’ confidence and that international trade deals are weakening the US economy, and that both stand in the way of his America First policy; he therefore believes that the US must strengthen border control and withdraw from international agreements.

What is left

Our government’s first duty is to its people, to our citizens – to serve their needs, to ensure their safety, to preserve their rights, and to defend their values.” Donald J. Trump

President Donald Trump delivers remarks regarding the Administration’s National Security Strategy, 19.12.2017 

sionist powers” that are “attempting to erode American security and prosperity.” China, he says, is seeking to displace the United States in the Indo-Pacific region and Russia is interfering in the domestic political affairs of America’s allies in an attempt to divide them from the United States. In the same breath he praises Putin as a partner and says that he will attempt to build a “great” partnership with China and Russia, but in a manner that always “protects our national interests.”

Photo: the White House, Joyce N. Boghosian, Public Domain Mark 1.0,

Trump’s National Security Strategy speech has made it crystal clear that he is living in his own world and that as a result the real world faces major changes and America stands to lose its status as a world power. “America First” leaves a vacuum that will spark a contest for world leadership. The great power mind-set of the 19th century is gaining ground. Major regional wars once again seem possible and fear of another great war is spreading. “America First” throws down the gauntlet to the world community. Trump leaves no one in doubt that his strengthened United States will play a role in the world but that “America First” is the only governing principle he is prepared to contemplate. The core vision of a liberal world order strongly influenced by the United States and a world community built on traditional American values, in which democracy and human rights are indispensable stabilising factors worth fighting for, has now been superseded by Trump’s focus on enhancing American economic interests; and economic policy is now driving US foreign and security policy. The world will need to temper the erratic policies and moods of the 45th President of the United States if it is to fend off serious damage to the international community.



How to adapt to changing realities

View from Taiwan: the future of the geo-economic order in Asia by Ambassador Zhang Ming-Zhong, Representative of Taiwan in France, Paris

With the world’s economic center of gravity shifting to Asia, the region’s geo-economic landscape, as well as the ensuing political and security order, will steadily have a greater impact on the world. The three areas of France’s core interests – security, climate and economics – are deemed inflexible to French President Emmanuel Macron. Their success, however, depends largely on the outcome and circumstances in Asia. Having its prosperity intertwined with Asia, policy regarding this region deserves Europe’s highest attention.

The rise of China The rise of China is a central factor dictating the development of Asia’s geo-economics. Its comprehensive surge of power has reshaped the political, economic and security landscape in Asia, as well as the world. Devoting its full strength to implementing the ambitious One-Belt-One Road initiative, China aims to transform its economic weight into bigger political influence. It wants to do this by connecting countries in Asia and Europe and bridging the existing infrastructure gap via the establishment of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) and the Silk Road Fund. After its first summit for the initiative, China has signed cooperation agreements with 80 countries and international organisations and has achieved more than 270 cooperation results. In the future, the initiative

will be further expanded to develop the existing mechanisms of cooperation with Africa and Latin America, so as to dominate and construct a new international order that meets its own national interests.

Xi Jinping’s ambition With the closure of the 19th National Congress of the Communist Party of China, Chinese President Xi Jinping has established his own “Xi Jinping thought” and sets out as the most powerful leader of China since Mao Zedong. He is expected to fast-track China’s foreign policy, consolidating China’s status as a grand power promoting world peace, globalisation and free trade. This will, in practice, be based on his personal political will. While pragmatically cooperating with China in international affairs, the US – China’s main strategic competitor – mindfully seeks ways to counter the blow it received since China has also strategically increased its military presence.

China’s increased military presence We should not ignore China’s military strategy and increased presence. For example, China’s first aircraft carrier, “Liaoning”, an unfinished aircraft carrier purchased by a Hong Kong private company in 1998 to build a floating hotel and casino ended up being an aircraft carrier and has frequently passed through the Taiwan Strait to enter the waters of South China Sea since 2012. Furthermore, China launched its second aircraft carrier in 2017 and prepares to build a third. In July 2017, China established its first overseas permanent military base in Djibouti, strategically located at the junction of three continents, overlooking a passage of water used by 30% of the world’s shipping trade. Though described as a “logistics support” instead of a “military” base, the Djibouti base would also undoubtedly cement China’s military, economic and strategic influence in the region.

Regional tensions

G20 Summit in Hangzhou, China, 4.9.2016 


Photo: © European Union

As recently as 4 January 2018, China launched the northbound M503 flight route in the Taiwan Strait and the

The spectre of atomic war

Photo: © Ambassador Zhang Ming-Zhong

W121, W122 and W123 east-west extension routes without prior negotiation with Taiwan. This one-sided launch of controversial flight routes not only violates the agreement reached between the two sides in March 2015, but also endangers aviation safety and upsets the status quo across the Taiwan Strait. The unilateral activation of these four airways is a provocation impacting regional security. We call on all parties not to use these routes as serious safety concerns remain.

China’s comprehensive surge of power has reshaped the political, economic and security landscape in Asia, as well as the world.” Ambassador Zhang Ming-Zhong

Since President Tsai Ing-Wen’s inauguration in 2016, China has unilaterally suspended cross-Strait communication mechanisms under the pretext of Taiwan’s lack of recognition of the 1992 Consensus, and forcefully imposed pressure on Taiwan’s diplomacy and international participation. Despite escalating pressure from China and the power struggles between big regional powers, the challenges can also be seen as vast opportunities.

Taiwan’s strategic position Looking ahead, Taiwan will use its unique strategic position and continue its unwavering pursuit to participate in regional economic integration, avoid economic dependency on China via the New Southbound Policy, and strengthen industrial ties with other partners such as the US and Europe, so as to weather the ever-changing dynamics of Asia’s economic and political order. Taiwan will minimise the risks to national security while maximizing regional cooperation in the face of regional challenges and tension-raising developments.

Ambassador Zhang Ming-Zhong has been the Representative of Taiwan in France since 2015. Born in 1960 in Taiwan, he studied at the Fu-Jen Catholic University, Université Catholique de l’Ouest in Angers and at Sciences-Po in Paris. Mr Zhang began his professional career as Secretary in the Taipei Representative Office in France in 1992, followed by several senior positions in embassies and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. From 2006 to 2007, he served as counsellor to the general secretary in the Office of the President, and a year later in the National Security Council. In 2009, Mr Zhang was appointed Ambassador to Burkina Faso, a position he held for three and half years. Prior to his current Xi Pinjing, President of the People’s Republic of China (on the right)

appointment, he was director general of European affairs in

with Jean-Claude Juncker, President of the European Commission, at

the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

the G20 Summit in Hangzhou, China, 4.9.2016

Photo: © European Union



The world’s nuclear forces in the 21st century The articles in this chapter make it clear: the threat posed by nuclear weapons in the 21st century remains. Currently, nine states possess nuclear weapons. Altogether in 2017, these added up to about 14,950 weapons. This chart gives an overview of the numbers of nuclear weapons per country (including deployed, stored and other warheads). In parallel, endeavours to curtail the proliferation of nuclear weapons include the establishment of Nuclear-Weapon-Free Areas and the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.


215 Ratification in 1968


300 USA

Accession in 1992

6800 Ratification in 1970

Israel 70-80 The Nuclear-Weapon-Free (Sea) Areas are established by nine treaties in total. In these

Number of nuclear weapons

areas, the acquisition, possession, placement, testing and use of nuclear weapons is banned.

Not signed

In addition to the areas indicated in the map,

Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT)

the treaties also cover the prohibition of the emplacement or testing of nuclear weapons in the Antarctica and in the outer space or on

Nucelar-Weapon-Free Areas

celestial bodies. The treaties were established

Nucelar-Weapon-Free Sea Areas

stages regarding signature, ratification or entry

between 1959 and 2006 and are at different into force.

All figures are approximate and based on public information. The numbers contain uncertainties but are issued concordantly in different sources. The estimates given h to Abolish Nuclear Weapons (, and the Nuclear Threat Initiative and the International Peace Institute.


The spectre of atomic war

Only Russia, the US, France and the UK

have nuclear

warheads deployed, meaning that these are immediately operationally available. There is no secured, public data about the warheads’ status and operational readiness of the remaining nuclear powers. The figures of North Korea, especially, are estimates as there is no confirmed, open-source information that the country has produced or deployed operational nuclear warheads.


7000 Ratification in 1970

North Korea 10-20

Withdrawal from the NPT in 2003


270 Accession in 1992 Iran is by some experts classi-

Pak Pakistan 130-140 Not signed


Not signed

proliferation concern”. It possesses complete uranium fuel cycle capabilities but is under intense international supervision and reassured in the 2015 “Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action” that its nuclear programme is “exclusively peaceful”.

Graphik: B. Dach, ESDU


fied as a state with “immediate

here are based on “Trends in world nuclear forces, 2017” by SIPRI (, official figures by the UN (, the International Campaign



Cultivating trust and a change in mindsets to move away from a possible nuclear war

Grand bargain versus incremental approach to disarm North Korea by Tong Zhao, Fellow, Carnegie’s Nuclear Policy Program, Carnegie-Tsinghua Center for Global Policy, Beijing

Tensions over the North Korean nuclear crisis have grown so serious that the risks of a major military conflict breaking out soon are all too real. Facing a possible nuclear conflict, both North Korea and the United States say they prefer a negotiated solution. But is it possible to reach a major quid pro quo, in which North Korea commits to abandoning its nuclear weapons in return for normalized relations, security guarantees, and sanctions relief from the United States and other key international players? The answer is likely to be no. North Korea and its international interlocutors have struck grand bargains over its nuclear program before – in particular, the 1994 Agreed Framework and the 19 September 2005 Joint Statement of the Six Party Talks. The failure of these agreements is instructive.

Why previous agreements failed One fundamental drawback to these agreements was the asymmetrical nature of the commitments required of the two sides. The United States and the other international parties committed to providing economic and energy aid and promised to normalize relations with North Korea, undertake no military attack against it, and strive to establish a peace regime on the Peninsula. Except for aid, these commitments were all political ones that, even though they were made sincerely, could be reversed overnight if the political will to implement them was lost. North Korea’s side of the bargain, on the other hand,

entailed a commitment to giving up its existing nuclear weapon capabilities. Such changes to material capabilities, once accomplished, are very difficult to quickly and fully reverse. Implementation of such grand bargains, therefore, requires a high level of confidence and trust on behalf of North Korea in the other parties, to be maintained throughout and after the denuclearization process.

Deep and growing distrust History has shown, on multiple occasions, the challenges of abruptly generating such a high level of trust out of nowhere, let alone maintaining it, given the long history of deep and longstanding hostility between North Korea and the United States and its partners. Even when Pyongyang was able to agree to a grand bargain, North Korea subsequently kept having trouble trusting that asymmetric commitments would be upheld. It therefore always felt the need to develop a hedging strategy in case the other parties failed to stick to their side of the bargain. Admittedly, there are different interpretations of history, especially regarding who was more responsible for the problematic implementation of the agreements, but the asymmetric nature of commitments seems an inherent and important reason why previous attempts to implement a grand bargain with North Korea failed.

What is the way forward? Since the last time North Korea explicitly committed to denuclearization – which was before Kim Jong-un came into power, distrust between North Korea and the United States has only grown. As a result, there is even less hope today that another grand bargain with North Korea could work. What is the way forward then, if deep distrust prevents North Korea from being able to commit to the goal of denuclearization upfront?

US President Donald Trump adressing the UN Assembly’s annual general debate on 19.9.2017 in New York. During his speech he threatened to “totally destroy” North Korea if the US finds itself “forced to defend itself or its allies.” 


Photo: © United Nations 2009-2018

First option: coercive pressure One option is to try to force Pyongyang to accept denuclearization through coercive pressure. This seems to be the current strategy of the Trump administration. The problem with this is that there is no guarantee that coercion could force North Korea to back down, even if the pressure was strong enough to threaten the regime’s survival. Having learned the lessons of Saddam and Qaddafi who gave up their nuclear development programs and were later dispelled from power and killed, the

The spectre of atomic war

The statues of Kim Jong-un’s grandfather Kim Il-Sung, and of his father Kim Jong-Il at the Mansudae Grand Monument in the North Korean capital Pyongyang 

Photo: © Mieszko9,

North Korean regime, if pushed into a corner, would be more likely to resort to nuclear brinksmanship rather than capitulation. Pyongyang might estimate that Washington has more to lose in a nuclear exchange and would therefore be more likely to blink first.

some additional verification measures could be considered, starting with the least intrusive ones. Only after all these steps are achieved would it be realistic to consider more radical measures, such as gradually rolling back North Korea’s existing capabilities.

Second option: incremental approach The second option is to acknowledge the fundamental problem of distrust and take an incremental approach towards achieving denuclearization. Given that North Korea completely rejects it at this moment and forcible denuclearization is much too risky, achieving an agreement with North Korea appears beyond reach. However, the relevant parties can still take steps towards denuclearization without everything been mapped out. For example, initial steps towards de-escalation, which could involve modest limits on North Korea’s capabilities, could be focused on the shared objective of preventing a nuclear war and building some modicum of trust. The hope is that if such measures were successfully implemented, it would pave the ground for exploring more ambitious next steps. After successful cycles of positive interactions, a less paranoid North Korea would gradually be in a better position to reconsider its nuclear program and all relevant parties would be increasingly able to jointly identify a clear pathway from there to denuclearization.

Building trust needs time North Korea may be willing to take the early steps, even in the absence of any trust, as such steps wouldn’t deprive it of the basic nuclear deterrent it has obtained. As long as positive cycles of restraint and reciprocity are initiated, we would move away from a possible nuclear war. In the meantime, the engagement process itself would create additional opportunities for the international community to influence and shape Pyongyang’s nuclear activities towards less provocative and less destabilizing ones. The bottom line is, the only alternative to a violent (and possibly catastrophic) solution of the nuclear crisis is an incremental and probably long-term approach. Sufficient time is necessary for trust to be cultivated and minds changed.

Tong Zhao is a fellow at the Nuclear Policy Program of the Carnegie Endowment for Interna-

De-escalation is key

tional Peace, based at the Carnegie–Tsi-

Steps to begin this process should start with the easiest and least objectionable. In the first stage, efforts could focus on de-escalating tensions. For example, North Korea could refrain from flying missiles over Japan and South Korea in return for the United States keeping its strategic bombers from flying too close to North Korean airspace. In the next stage, Pyongyang could declare a moratorium on nuclear and missile tests and, in return, Washington and Seoul could suspend or downscale major military exercises and lift some economic sanctions. Such measures don’t require special verification provisions and would be relatively reversible. If these measures were achieved and maintained, North Korea could go further and suspend fissile material production, in exchange for more reciprocity such as further reduction of economic sanctions. At this stage,

nghua Center for Global Policy in Beijing. He has a B.S. in physics and an M.A. in Photo: private

international relations from Tsinghua University, as well as a PhD in science,

technology, and international affairs from the Georgia Institute of Technology. Mr Zhao has held a number of positions in academia and politics, including as a non-resident WSD-Handa Fellow at the Pacific Forum CSIS and working for the Office of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Government of Beijing Municipality. Prior to his current position he was a Stanton Nuclear Security Fellow with the Managing the Atom Project and the International Security Program at the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at Harvard University.



Maintenance of the NPT regime should be the primary objective of the containment strategy

Need for a long-term strategy to cope with North Korea by Hideshi Tokuchi, Senior Fellow, National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies, Tokyo

The breakout of the Korean War in 1950 indicated the global and military nature of the Cold War and the international role of China. The present North Korean threat reminds us of the global and military nature of the situation on the Korean Peninsula, and it makes us rethink China’s role, too. A long time has passed since North Korea’s declaration to withdraw from the NPT, and since its first nuclear test. North Korea continues to develop nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles, defying the Framework Agreement of 1994 and the Joint Statement of the Six-Party Talks of 2005, and also ignoring the resolutions of the UN Security Council. It is even trying to have Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs), which neither India, Pakistan nor Iran has.

Denuclearization of North Korea Our purpose should not be slowing down North Korea’s nuclearization, but its denuclearization. While international solidarity is a must in order to achieve this goal, China, North Korea’s most important neighbor, is more concerned about the possibility of an inflow of refugees and also about a larger influence of the US over the entire peninsula in the aftermath of confusion. After all, China is the ally of North Korea. It is not certain how serious China is about pressuring North Korea. Russia, another important neighbor, is under international sanction because of its behavior in Europe, and thus it cannot be expected to be proactive on imposing sanctions. Russia is more concerned about being encircled by the missile defense systems of the US and of

Hideshi Tokuchi has served as Japan’s first Vice-Minister of Defence for International Affairs from July 2014 until he left the government in October 2015. Born in 1955, he received his Bachelor of Laws degree from the Photo: private

Donald Trump vs. Kim Jong-un Meanwhile, the US has problems, too. President Trump’s “America Firstism” is already weakening the US soft power. It will undermine even its hard power, by damaging US economy. The entire world is illegitimately challenged by North Korea, but this issue is often viewed as an issue between Kim Jong-un and Donald Trump because of their exchange of colorful words. The false image does not contribute to the solution of this issue. In December 2017, President Trump released his administration’s National Security Strategy, which articulated its resolve to “preserve peace through strength.” The US should exercise its strong leadership for the solution of the North Korean problem in accordance with this strategy. The role of the US continues to be pivotal, as the security of the Asia-Pacific is still underpinned by the US-centered alliance network.

There are no short-term solutions As it is a matter of time before North Korea possesses ICBMs with a nuclear warhead, this is an urgent issue, but there are no short-term solutions. As some experts from Japan and the US propose, a long-term containment will be the only viable option. The ideas of double suspension and freeze would end up benefitting North Korea. North Korea’s intention to send its athletes to the Pyeong-chang Olympics should not be mistaken for its willingness for denuclearization. The US, Japan and South Korea must assume the central role of persistent and firm containment. These three countries must enhance their defense postures by strengthening the Japan-US and US-Korea alliances and their trilateral cooperation. Japan must show its strong resolve to bear some containment related risk in its next defense plan, expected later this year. Japan and South Korea must continue to cooperate in spite of their bilateral political difficulty.

University of Tokyo in 1979, also joining the Defence Agency of Japan in this year,

and his Master of Arts in Law and Diplomacy degree from the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy in 1986. In the Ministry of Defense Mr Tokuchi also had served as the Director-General of four bureaus such as operations and defence policy. He is a senior fellow at the National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies and a visiting fellow of Sophia University’s Institute of International Relations.


its allies. As China and Russia are authoritarian states, it is too optimistic to think they would be willing to buttress the US-led international order against North Korea.

The future Northeast Asian order Maintenance of the NPT regime should be the primary objective of the containment strategy. Neither Japan nor South Korea have a nuclear option. The other objective is stability of Northeast Asia. Though military options should not be denied as a means to keep pressuring North Korea, the important thing is not to predict the scenarios for military operations, but to establish a vision for the future of the Northeast Asian order.

The spectre of atomic war

The South Korean government will not pursue a nuclear path

Deterring North Korea: a task for the ROK-US alliance by Dr Eunsook Chung, Senior Fellow, The Sejong Institute, Seongnam, South Korea

The Kim family’s third generation-ruler Kim Jong-un has been doing his utmost to be recognized as the world’s newest nuclear power, in spite of the UN Security Council’s non-proliferation sanctions imposed since 2006. North Korea conducted four more nuclear tests since Kim Jong-un came to power (2013, 2016, and 2017). In July and November 2017, North Korea announced they have successfully developed intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM) capable of reaching the US territory to the shock of international community. After testing in November, Kim declared his nuclear force is now “completed”.

Dr Eunsook Chung is a senior fellow in the department of security strategy studies at the Sejong Institute, South Korea. She is a graduate from the Korea University, Seoul and received her PhD from the Ohio State University, Columbus. Between 2009 Photo: private

and 2011, Ms Chung was director of re-

search at the Sejong Institute and vice president until 2012. She is currently serving as a member of the board of directors

A nuclear deterrence for South Korea?

for the Academic Council on the UN System (2015–2018), as

In South Korea, a question has come up in the public opinion whether the US will sacrifice Los Angeles to save Seoul. According to the result of the latest Gallup Korea poll taken after the sixth nuclear test, most people in South Korea do not think the North will actually start a war. The result shows that still 60 percent of South Koreans in theory support nuclear weapons for their country as a credible deterrent. But in practice, nuclear deterrence or the doctrine of mutually assured destruction (MAD), common to the strategic relations between the two superpowers during the Cold War is likely to increase the risk of a simple accident. Misunderstandings or miscalculations could trigger a full nuclear exchange on the Korean Peninsula, even though Seoul is expected to overcome financial, normal,

a member of the advisory committees for Republic of Korea (ROK) Navy (2008-present) and the ROK Ministry of Unification (2009-present). Ms Chung has published extensively on international relations, nuclear policy and security and defence issues.

legal and technical hurdles. As Winston Churchill warned in his speech in 1955, the principle of deterrence does not cover the case of dictators in the mood of Hitler when he found himself in his final dugout. The South Korean government will not pursue a nuclear path like its predecessors. President Moon Jae-in has promised a path toward denuclearization of the whole peninsula, so despite its people’s strong desire, there is only a little chance of South Korea going nuclear.

Relying on the US external deterrence

US President Donald Trump welcomes Moon Jae-in, President of the Republic of Korea, to the White House, Washington, D.C., 30.6.2017

Photo: © Official White House Photo/Shealah Craighead

South Korea has been relying on the US external deterrence, the so-called US nuclear umbrella. The US and South Korean governments regularly hold meetings of the Extended Deterrence Strategy and Consultation Group (EDSCG), and at the latest meeting held in Washington D.C. on 17 January 2018, the US reiterated its unwavering commitment to draw on the full range of military capabilities to deter potential acts of North Korean aggression. The US reassured South Korea in more conventional ways like its recent raising of the payload limit on South Korean ballistic



missiles in the wake of North Korea’s sixth nuclear test and providing it with more advanced military equipment. Perhaps, to ease the fear, the US could redeploy its tactical nuclear weapons which had been deployed in South Korea during the Cold War days in 1958–1991 in addition to the already deployed regionally focused ballistic missile defense systems, such as the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD). Polls showed in August 2017 that nearly 70 percent of South Koreans support redeployment. The debate over practicability and effectiveness of the possible redeployment is still going on, and the gap has not been narrowed, creating a sharp division in the South Korean politics. The main opposition Liberal Korea Party, a conservative political party, calls for a redeployment of tactical nuclear weapons, while the ruling Democratic Party and President Moon Jae-in are driving more for a diplomatic and political solution.

After 2018 Winter Olympics Surprisingly, on 20 January North Korea announced that it will send 22 athletes to compete in three sports at the Win-

ter Olympic Games to be held in Pyeongchang, South Korea. Furthermore, North and South agreed to march together at the opening ceremony on 9 February. The Moon Jae-in administration is persuading both South Koreans and the international community, including the US, that the North’s participation will guarantee a peaceful Olympic and open a window of opportunity for post-Olympic dialogues with the North in order to find other areas of cooperation that would ultimately lead to the solving of North Korea’s nuclear problem and peace on the Peninsula. Despite the Moon administration’s effort, many people in and outside South Korea still express concerns and insist that a cautious approach is imperative, as the prospect for North Korea’s nuclear weapons program remains very murky, in view of Kim’s emphasis on a nuclear path in the recent New Year Speech. He said that North Korea would focus on mass production of nuclear warheads and ballistic missiles for operational deployment in 2018 and that he has a nuclear button on his desk. If Kim insists on nuclear weapons and threats, he will gain nothing but more sanctions and isolations.


EU satisfied with implementation of the Iran nuclear deal (ed/ak, Berlin) After almost a decade of

relations with Iran including benefits for

diplomatic effort, the Joint Comprehen-

the Iranian people. It strengthens cooper-

sive Plan of Action (JCPOA) on Iran’s nucle-

ation and allows for continuous dialogue

ar programme was concluded in July 2015

with Iran.

in Vienna and later endorsed by a UN Se-

3. The European Union considers Presi-

curity Council Resolution. A milestone

dent Trump’s decision not to certify Iran’s

was reached in January 2016, when the

compliance with the Joint Comprehensive

International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)

plan of action as being in the context of an

verified that Iran had met the require-

internal US process. The EU encourages

ments laid out in the agreement. On this

Mohammad Javad Zarif, Iranian Foreign

the US to maintain its commitment to the

so-called Implementation Day, economic

Minister, on the right, and HR/VP Federica

JCPOA and to consider the implications

and financial nuclear-related sanctions by

Mogherini during a EU/E3+3 and Iran

for the security of the US, its partners and

the EU, the UN and the US were lifted. In

Ministerial Meeting on JCPOA, New York,

the region before taking further steps.

October 2017, the EU issued the following

20.09.2017 Photo: © European Union, 2018 / Bryan R. Smith

4. While the EU expresses its concerns

statement on the JCPOA and its imple-


related to ballistic missiles and increas-

mentation. On the January 2018 meeting

the region. Its successful implementation

ing tensions in the region, it reiterates

of EU/E31 and Iran on the JCPOA, HR/VP

continues to ensure that Iran’s nuclear

the need to address them outside the

Federica Mogherini acknowledged anew

programme remains exclusively peaceful.

JCPOA, in the relevant formats and fora.

the compliance of Iran with the commit-

The EU underlines that the International

The EU stands ready to actively promote

ments made in the agreement, confirmed

Atomic Energy Agency has verified 8 times

and support initiatives to ensure a more

in by now nine reports issued by the IAEA.

that Iran is implementing all its nuclear

stable, peaceful and secure regional envi-

related commitments following a compre-


“1. The JCPOA, the culmination of 12

hensive and strict monitoring system.

5. At a time of acute nuclear threat the EU

years of diplomacy facilitated by the EU,

2. The EU is committed to the continued

is determined to preserve the JCPOA as a

unanimously endorsed by UN Security

full and effective implementation of all

key pillar of the international non-prolifer-

Council Resolution 2231, is a key element

parts of the JCPOA. The EU underlines that

ation architecture.”

of the nuclear non-proliferation global ar-

the lifting of nuclear related sanctions has

chitecture and crucial for the security of

a positive impact on trade and economic

1 EU/E3: France, Germany, United Kingdom EU/E3+3: EU/E3 + China, Russia, USA

Source: EEAS

The spectre of atomic war

How the US and Europe can cooperate

Strengthen the Nuclear Deal and counter Iran’s destabilizing activities by Michael Eisenstadt, Kahn Fellow and Director, Military & Security Studies Program, The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, Washington, D.C.

In the run-up to the 2016 US elections, Donald Trump vowed that if elected president he would, alternatively, “rip up” the nuclear deal with Iran (which he called “the worst” deal ever), or strictly enforce it. This binary approach continues to characterize the Trump administration’s handling of this issue. On 12 January 2018, President Trump announced that his administration would seek a “new supplemental agreement” with key European allies “that would impose new multilateral sanctions if Iran develops or tests long-range missiles, thwarts inspections, or makes progress toward a nuclear weapon.” He also pledged that the United States would pull out of the nuclear deal (or Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, JCPOA) if the allies could not reach an agreement by May of this year.

The shortcomings of the deal No one really knows what President Trump will do in May. But Americans and Europeans who want the nuclear deal “fixed” and not “nixed,” must work quickly to address the president’s concerns about its shortcomings, which are shared by many Americans. First: many of the most important limits “sunset” (or disappear) by year fifteen of the agreement. The JCPOA therefore defers, but does not solve the problem of Iran’s nuclear program, and may simply delay the next nuclear crisis with Iran. Second: the JCPOA effectively confirms and legitimizes Iran’s status as a nuclear threshold state, perhaps paving the way for

a nuclear cascade in the region, and potentially even an Iranian bomb. Third: Iran’s rejection of inspections at military sites (where nuclear work occurred in the past) risk creating sanctuaries where proscribed, low-signature activities may occur.

Washington and its European allies should work together to find ways to strictly enforce and strengthen the deal, while countering Iran’s regional activities.”  Michael Eisenstadt

Fourth: the architects of the JCPOA sought to buy time, without a strategy for using that time to address the deal’s shortcomings and avert another nuclear crisis with Iran in the future. Finally: Tehran has used the JCPOA to provide political cover for a variety of destabilizing activities —proxy conflicts in Syria and Yemen and with Saudi Arabia, and actions that may set the stage for the next Israel-Hizballah war, or yet another jihadist mobilization. This has cooled American ardor for the nuclear deal, and raised concerns that Iran might be emboldened Michael Eisenstadt by its regional successes to test or violate is Kahn Fellow, and director of the Military and Security Studies the JCPOA in the future. Program at The Washington Institute for Near East Policy. He But the Trump administration’s approach earned an MA in Arab Studies from Georgetown University. Prior is also problematic. By prioritizing efforts to joining the Institute in 1989, Mr Eisenstadt worked as a military to “fix” the JCPOA on a deadline, Washanalyst with the US government. In 1992, he took a leave of abington risks fomenting a crisis with its sence from the Institute to work on the US Air Force Gulf War Air Photo: private allies that could complicate these efforts Power Survey. Mr Eisenstadt served for twenty-six years as an ofto strengthen the JCPOA, and to counter ficer in the US Army Reserve before retiring in 2010. His military service included stints Iran’s regional activities. Rather, Washin Iraq, Israel, the West Bank, and Jordan, Turkey, the Office of the Secretary of Defense, ington should seek to achieve synergies the Joint Staff, and US Central Command headquarters. A specialist in Persian Gulf between these two legs of its strategy, levand Arab-Israeli security affairs, Mr Eisenstadt has published widely on irregular and eraging the credibility and trust garnered conventional warfare and nuclear weapons proliferation in the Middle East. by effective efforts to work with allies to push back against Tehran, to work with



Hassan Rouhani, President of the Islamic Republic of Iran, addresses the general debate of the UN General Assembly’s seventy-second session, New York, 20.9. 2017 

these allies to fix the JCPOA, and deter Iran from violating it down the road. As for concerns that pushing back against Iran could undermine the JCPOA, the nuclear deal will stand or fall on its own merits. If Iran can pursue its interests in the region without excessive concern for the JCPOA’s future, there is no reason why the United States and Europe should not do the same.

and Europe from imposing new sanctions in response to missile-related activities in defiance of UNSCR 2231 (which gave legal force to the JCPOA) — particularly individuals and entities that are part of the missile industry’s supply chain, which would include many industries not previously sanctioned. This could send ripples through key sectors of Iran’s economy.

The US and Europe should work together

If, a decade or more from now, Iran continues its destabilizing activities and is set to resume the large-scale enrichment and stockpiling of uranium (permitted by the JCPOA after fifteen years), that might be the time to consider the pros and cons of remaining within the JCPOA, and of legislation mandating the snapback of national nuclear sanctions, should Iran try to become a nuclear threshold state or attain a rapid breakout capability. Such a decision would presumably be influenced by the overall tenor of US-Iran relations, and by whether UN Security Council snap-back sanctions (which expire after ten years) have not been renewed. And it will be based on an assessment of whether the threat of renewed national and multilateral sanctions might more effectively deter Iran from stockpiling fissile material or attempting a nuclear breakout, than the threat of force. Diplomacy is the art of the possible. While the gaps between US and Europe positions are wide — Washington wants concrete steps to fix the JCPOA, Europe wants unequivocal backing for the deal—the potential price of failure will hopefully provide sufficient motivation to bridge these differences, and to conclude what might well be “the ultimate deal.”

Washington and its European allies should work together to find ways to strictly enforce and strengthen the deal, while countering Iran’s regional activities. This will mean rebuffing Iranian efforts to test limits, exceed caps, and carve out “exceptions” to the accord, while simultaneously addressing shortcomings related, inter alia, to the monitoring of centrifuge production facilities, the inspection of military sites, and to the authorities granted inspectors under the Additional Protocol.   A framework of incentives and disincentives The US and Europe should, moreover, create a framework of incentives and disincentives to shape Iran’s future proliferation calculus, and dissuade it from resuming the industrial-scale enrichment and stockpiling of uranium, or the reprocessing of spent fuel. And they should launch a sustained information campaign to convince the Iranian people and their leaders of the high costs of Iran’s nuclear program, the dangers that nuclear facilities pose for countries — like Iran — located in active seismic or conflict zones, and the dangers of a regional proliferation cascade that could someday jeopardize Iran’s own survival. Meanwhile, the United States must continue to enhance its ability to deter an Iranian nuclear breakout by military means—while its allies should signal their support for such an option, should it become necessary. The missile regime As for missiles, the JCPOA does not prevent the United States


Photo: United Nations/Cia Pak

Preparing the future

Michael Eisenstadt’s most recent publication is “Regional Pushback, Nuclear Rollback: A Comprehensive Strategy for an Iran in Turmoil” (Washington Institute, 2018):

Interoperability The area of defence is consistently exposed to the challenges of its political, societal, military and technological environment as well as its alliances. It is fundamental to adapt and operate as a partner in the international system within the framework of the UN, OSCE, NATO, EU etc. Interoperability thus becomes the essential mechanism for effective cooperation. Today, we are far from this ideal. This is why NATO has set itself the goal of developing universal standards for the command and control systems of its member states, a decision which will undoubtedly make a difference. However, the art of leadership is not solely based on standards, technologies and industrial capabilities – it is the military leader and their troops who remain at the centre of all thought and action in this area.


Interoperability requires understanding of culture, business value, governance, and technology

Interoperability: finally an innovative approach by Harald Kujat, General (ret), former Chairman of the NATO Military Committee, Berlin

Recently I had the opportunity to contribute to a paper on interoperability that went to the president of the United States. Of course many papers reach his desk, but I know that he read this paper and had an initial good reaction, saying: “We’re not doing this already?” No, Mr President, we are not doing this in the US, nor in NATO, nor in Europe. Something he considers so common sense as to be shocking in its absence is nevertheless accepted. The paper outlined that the cost of systems integration will be 180 billion dollars a year. It highlighted several major US programmes that will require extensive improvements in the near future and it also portrayed uncalculated damage that has resulted and will result again because products and services do not work currently together. This short document comes from the Network Centric Operations Industry Consortium (NCOIC), a small non-profit organisation formed of individuals who firmly believe that making information flow as easily as possible between systems is a global issue (see page 46–47). This issue has industry and governments on both sides of it and is thereby producing noise rather than clarification. National budgets squandered, lives risked, and the required conversation is muted by both industry and the governments that serve the populace. Interoperability is the solution, integration is the perpetual fix and money and social benefits are the cost. Interoperability built into the systems that carry information. Interoperability

General (ret.)

built into the devices that soldiers, doctors and first responders carry to their jobs, interoperability from the first second to the last as each product is designed, built and used.

Initiative enhancing interoperability It is this understanding that is the starting point for NCOIC and NATO Allied Command Transformation on an initiative to enhance the interoperability of NATO’s Federated Mission Networking (FMN) capability. The latter is being developed to support command, control and decision making in future operations through improved information sharing.

Interoperability is the solution, integration is the perpetual fix and money and social benefits are the cost.” Harald Kujat

NCOIC will assess the evidence of interoperability within different solutions and whether they meet FMN needs. Having this evaluation in hand before products and services are purchased can help reduce cost, delays and risk in the development of the FMN environment. By getting products and services that work together before acquisition, the investment needed for integration can be lowered or Harald Kujat eliminated: fixing interoperability issues was born in 1942 in Mielke. He joined the German Armed Forces after system acquisition can add up to 40 on 1 July, 1959 and completed the 20th General Staff Course percent in integration costs. (Air Force), at the Command and Staff College, Hamburg. 1992–1995 Chief of Staff and Deputy German MilRep to the

Photo: private

NATO Military Committee and Western European Union, Brus-

Interoperability – a broad approach

sels. 1996–1998 Director, IFOR Coordination Centre (ICC),

Interoperability requires a foundational understanding of culture, business value, governance and technology. This broad approach requires simplification of thought. It also requires the government to ask the product suppliers very basic questions: “Are you interoperable with my system?” Simplicity at a macro level does not trans-

SHAPE, Belgium and later Assistant Director, International Mil-

itary Staff (Plans & Policy) and Deputy Director, IMS, NATO Headquarters, Brussels. 1998–2000 Director of Policy and Advisory Staff to the German MOD, Berlin. 2000– 2002, Chief of Defence (CHOD), Federal Armed Forces, Berlin. 2002–2005, Chairman of the NATO Military Committee, Brussels.



Closing ceremony for multinational exercise Iron Sword 2014 with nine NATO member countries, 13.11.2014, Lithuania 

Photo: © US Army Europe, public domain,

late to interoperability at a micro level. However, the basic failure of government agencies is the inability to maintain a macro level simplicity. Without the macro effort first and foremost, broad government interoperability fails every time, integration costs increase, so does the time necessary for implementation and social impacts continue. Most organisations and agencies view making a technical change as the quickest path to achieving an interoperable solution. Yet as is typically the case, a single technical solution completely fails or falls significantly short of the objective,

► terminology The Federated Mission Networking (FMN) capability aims at supporting command and control and decision-making in future NATO operations through improved information-sharing. FEDERATED FMN is a key contribution to the Connected Forces Initiative (CFI), helping NATO and Partner forces to better communicate, train and operate together.

primarily because it has become obsolete by the time it is implemented.

The concept to win the future A three-step concept creates the overall intertwined high level direction: 1. What are the communities of interest? 2. What attributes make the products in the community interoperable? 3. Do the products purchased have those attributes? First responders, health providers, surveyors and even librarians are all communities of interest. Each has unique as well as not so unique aspects. The aspects become attributes. Communities have attributes and the products and services that the communities purchase also have attributes. The attributes may exist in one or more community. One community, one attribute – simple! Multiple communities, multiple attributes – complex! This three-step thought process is simple in the macro sense, keeps government agencies aligned, and moves toward the simple goal of interoperable products and services.

MISSION FMN enables a rapid instantiation of mission networks by federating NATO organisations, NATO Nations and Mission

Stop wasting common goods

Partner capabilities, thereby enhancing interoperability and infor-

The small group of NCOIC thinkers has defined the process so that interoperability is phased into a short term period, aligning products with legacy systems, as well as providing a future that is far more effective and cost effective. Governments, starting with our defense ministers, will need to step back and determine that for the common good and because of the waste of resources, it is no longer acceptable for the solution to remain at our doorstep.

mation sharing. NETWORKING Federated Mission Networking is a governed conceptual framework consisting of people, processes and technology to plan, prepare, establish, use and terminate mission networks in support of federated operations. Source:



Interoperability goals are to be integrated into strategic oversight

Interoperability also depends on strategic leadership by Lieutenant General Dennis Gyllensporre, Chief of Defence Staff, Swedish Armed Forces, Stockholm

Modern warfare requires agile forces that act together coherently, effectively and efficiently in support of strategic objectives. For the Swedish armed forces, strategic leadership has been a critical factor of success, providing guidance and impetus for the development of interoperability. During the Cold War, Sweden positioned itself as a neutral nation. In essence, its policy rested on three pillars; a total defence concept that could endure isolation, a large force designed to deter hostilities and to further raise the threshold – they were deliberately not interoperable with the Allies – and a national defence industry as a key component to ensure independency and make it possible to equip the armed forces with unique technological solutions.

Lieutenant General Dr Dennis Gyllensporre currently holds the position of Chief of Defence Staff in the Swedish Armed Forces HQ. He holds a Military Masters of Arts and Science from the US Army Command and General Staff College, as well as a PhD in Policy Analysis and Governance from the Maastricht Photo: private

first commissioned in 1987 and has since held various

operational positions. He has also served in missions in Bosnia, Sudan and Afghanistan. In 2015 he was assigned to the Swedish National Defence University as Associate Professor in political science with a focus on security policy and strategy. Prior to his current position, he served as Head of the Plans and Policy Department in the Swedish Armed Forces HQ.

The strategic framework of interoperability Joining the EU and NATO’s Partnership for Peace (PfP) marked a turning point. Troop contributions to NATO-led operations in the Balkans were stark evidence of a change in policy. Accor­ dingly, deliberate interoperability efforts started in the late 1990s. From this point onwards, it has been pursued in four phases: 2000–2004: During the first phase, the earlier defence concept, driven by a large scale threat of invasion, was abandoned. While focus remained on national tasks, the need to participate in international operations was acknowledged. The Planning and Review Process (PARP) within the PfP became the vehicle for change. Selected units from all services were identified to spearhead the transformation by making them interoperable. The long term objective was to put all units through the same transition. A wide range of Partnership Goals was adopted and implemented. Rather than addressing interoperability as a

Graduate School of Governance. Dr Gyllensporre was

separate issue, these goals were integrated into force development and thus streamlined in established processes the apportionment of resources, evaluation of performance and strategic oversight. 2005–2009: In the second phase, the EU security strategy played a key role. A flexible defence concept was outlined with a focus on the ability to contribute to international peace and security, while maintaining capabilities for territorial integrity at home. Availability, deployability and usability were key tenets that reflected the EU Headline Goal 2003. Commitment as a framework nation for an EU Battlegroup on standby in 2008 became the forerunner of interoperability: Sweden provided some 2,000 soldiers from all services on high readiness alert together with forces from Estonia, Finland, and Norway. More importantly, the preparations raised interoperability efforts to another level as multinational units were developed and trained over several years, in

In the early phases, visionary long-term conceptual ideas, based on technological advances, provided the key inspiration. Today, interoperability is increasingly driven by readiness requirements and Dennis Gyllensporre operational needs.” 



Training in headquarters during a Nordic Battlegroup excercise 

close cooperation with contributing nations. Strategic leadership included agreements on common training objectives and mechanisms for evaluation that were consistent with national priorities and EU directives. 2010–2014: The direction for the third phase of transformation was shaped against the backdrop of the war in Georgia in 2008, the EU Lisbon Treaty and a new national policy on defence. As the new policy declared that national defence could be conducted alone or together with partners, it raised the level of interoperability requirements. In essence, no distinction was made between international and national tasks. Based on shared values, it was deemed appropriate to designate the Nordic Defence Cooperation (NORDEFCO) as the main driver for interoperability in the whole life cycle from conceptual ideas to combined operations. Being interoperable in the development of new capabilities would ensure interoperability in operations. In particular, unit level exercises were promoted by the delegating authority, as well as a decrease in bureaucracy. Alongside the national oversight, Nordic working groups were established and chiefs of defence or their representatives would meet to assess and provide strategic direction several times annually. Since 2016: The most recent step was driven by the illegal Russian annexation of Crimea. It triggered a firm emphasis on national defence, as opposed to international operations, and introduced a stronger bilateral dimension, in particular with regards to Finland. The cooperation with Finland covers stand-alone operational planning for contingencies, including self-defence as proclaimed in the United Nations Charter. This effort highlights the importance of building

Photo: Š Swedisch Armed Forces

personal relationships between key players. Services are tasked with integrating cooperation with Finland in force development as much as possible, including in exercises and training at all levels. The Navy cooperation revolves around the establishment of a Swedish-Finnish Naval Task Group. In 2017 it reached initial operational capability. To ensure coherence, bilateral strategic discussions involving all service chiefs are convened periodically. A major litmus test for Swedish interoperability was provided by capstone exercise Aurora 2017, the most comprehensive national exercise in over 20 years. The exercise included all services, some 40 civilian agencies and units from Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Lithuania, Norway and USA. The evaluation has yet to be finalised.

Conclusion Since the post-cold war transformation began, interoperability has been at the core, albeit with a changing scope. In the early phases, visionary long-term conceptual ideas, based on technological advances, provided the key inspiration. Today, interoperability is increasingly driven by readiness requirements and operational needs. Strategic leadership has operationalised policy priorities into concise and tangible objectives and measurable performance targets. It has ensured the attention of management as well as a clear understanding at all levels of the crucial role interoperability. While the distinct phases have made use of different vehicles to meet objectives, previous tools have remained in support of them. Hence PARP and the Partnership Goals remain fundamental for interoperability. Above all, progress is a product of persistent hard work at unit and tactical level. Nevertheless, interoperability also depends on strategic leadership.



A future where products and services are built to be interoperable

Interoperability is the torch in the darkness by Marshall Slater, CFO, Network Centric Operations Industry Consortium, Washington

Several general officers with experience in military crises realized that the new age of information domiMarshall “Tip” Slater nance wasn’t working for their forces. These generals, is Chief Financial Officer of the Network Centric Operafrom both Europe and the US, were watching twentitions Industry Consortium (NCOIC). He received a Maseth century forces struggle to enter the twenty-first ter of Aeronautical Science degree from Embry-Riddle century. One of these officers, LtGeneral Carl O’Berry, Aeronautical University in Florida and a Bachelor of retired from the US Air Force and convinced his new Science degree in business administration from the civilian employer to help an industry consortium University of Massachusetts Lowell. Mr Slater had a Photo: private tackle some of the challenges facing the military. As distinguished career in the US Air Force, retiring as is typical of a general, he considered the benefits for a Colonel. Before joining NCOIC, he worked for a decade with the Boeing the greater good rather than the bottom line profit Company, where he was director of Virtual Operations. His other positions margin. Thus, the vision for a new consortium was set included deputy director of Strategic Architecture for Boeing Integrated Deand the Network Centric Operations Industry Consorfense Systems and director of Business Development for Boeing Governtium (NCOIC) was created. ment Information and Communications Systems. As luck would have it, during a trip to NATO headquarters in Brussels, LtGen O’Berry met with another visionary, chairman of the NATO Military Committee, the German From vision to action General Harald Kujat. That initial fifteen-minute courtesy call Have you ever worked for a visionary? It can be simultaneextended into a two-hour meeting, sending staff into a frenzy ously a terrific and terrible job. Terrific because it’s new and to reschedule multiple high level meetings. The two generals always exciting, terrible because it’s new and always excithad a similar vision that would move military and non-military ing. There’s the constant push of new ideas that the visionary organizations into the new century with a torch that would loves, as well as the tracking, cataloguing and costing of assemble armies. Not just armies of soldiers, but also commuthose ideas, which the visionary hates. The latter was and nities of interest (COI) such as armies of military and non-milioften still is my job. It’s time for governments to know that tary organizations, countries, and NGOs; and all with the ability interoperability across domains is possible, and above all to instantly band together to create the greatest multinational achievable. This is the description of the ideas and the cataassistance effort since World Word II. I had the opportunity to loguing that have taken place for fourteen years – fourteen work for them. years of study regarding the vision and tools of interoperabil-

Graphik: ESDU, Source: NCOIC



Meeting of NCOIC and NATO ACT leaders to discuss interopeability verification, December 2016, Arlington/Virginia

ity that actually make it work crossing COIs. Interoperability crossing countries and market COIs, allowing vast groups of players to rapidly assemble, solve large complex problems and ultimately be disassembled when no longer needed is a real problem. Common examples are first responders, medical communities, military operations and banking. Each has its own COI and operates within these unique communities very neatly. Yet there are times when the communities need to overlap and produce unique results for a much greater need. There must be, for the rapid integration of capabilities, the ability to change while operating and to implement a swift disassembly. This need increases as the twenty-first century moves forward and the interrelationships of communities increase in both desire and complexity.

A revolution in interoperability Fourteen years later, the NCOIC’s new ideas have become the tools and cataloguing has become the process. The range of tools that were developed began with the simple yet necessary cataloging of an interoperability document of terms and definitions. Once it was determined that industry and government could talk to one another, concepts such as minimum level of interoperability were established. Subsequently, the uniquely odd relationship between technology, business value, culture and governance was identified and quantified. In order to actually build an interoperable system, a refocused technical model became the Management Model. The model was tested and used in a real world organizational development within NATO. The latest project that capped the NCOIC processes identifies a future where products and services are built to be interoperable using a simple but unique cross-domain Interoperability Verification (IV) initiative. After fourteen years of work by technical and demonstration teams and contracts with government organizations, the NCOIC sits upon the most comprehensive collection of inter-

Photo: © NCOIC

operable tools and processes ever created. This cross-domain interoperability, now very doable, still requires a modicum of thought and effort to establish so that it enables the creation of a rapid assembly process. This can be done in the highly unique environment that formed these tools and processes. This unique tool that resides within the NCOIC’s uniquely neutral and legal environment allows industry, academia and governments to come together and use these tools to solve large complex issues.

Making the complex simple All the ideas mentioned fall into three boxes (see diagram on the left): • The organizations and government identify their needs and communities. • The industry provides the tools, technology and the market vision. • The NCOIC enables the processes, brings the communities together to assemble, change and disassemble. Thus the processes developed by the NCOIC over fourteen years find common ground for each community, enabling capabilities to be used in governance documents that highlight rules of interoperable needs, capabilities for acquisition, and processes for organizations to rapidly integrate and subsequently dissolve. All these years of dedication to solve the interoperability challenge have resulted, as each of the NCOIC advisors has pointed out, in making the complex simple. Reviewing all the work the NCOIC has accomplished in this area and reading all the verbiage feels exhausting, but simplicity truly is the key. Years ago came a vision, today the tools to make it work, and tomorrow the ability to make the world a better place. > Web NCOIC Website:



Berlin Security Conference 2017 – conference report

No vacuum in security! by Andy Francis Stirnal, Berlin correspondent, The European – Security and Defence Union, Berlin

The Berlin Security Conference of November 2017 took place – as always – against the backdrop of medium-term and day-today political developments. ‘Europe Under Pressure: Security and Defence in Unpredictable Times’ was, appropriately, the title of the event, which attracted 1000 participants from more than 50 countries and is probably the largest event of its kind in Europe.

understood as a recommendation for European action. Rapid technological advancements and the pace of digitisation requires a faster and improved procurement process. Hybrid challenges and the pressure towards interoperability cannot otherwise be met.

Composition as a unique selling proposition

While other important Security Conferences are political showcases par excellence, the Berlin Security Conference (BSC) is also developing into a forum for tailored and pragmatic This year’s host country, the non-NATO member Sweden, European debates. The particular composition of this year’s proved to be a particularly appropriate nexus for debates conference participants allowed for implementation-oriented on the key challenges of European security. In their opening expert dialogues on the overall concept of military defence, its speeches, Swedish Defence Minister Peter Hultqvist and Per material readiness for Thöresson, Ambassador deployment and how to of the Swedish Kingdom operationally address in Germany, stressed challenges triggered the need for intensified by geopolitics and techsecurity cooperation nology. High-ranking in Europe. The security 1 6 th C o n g r e s s o n E u r o p e a n S e c u r i t y a n d D e f e n c e soldiers, senior military challenges in the Baltic representatives, Euroregion due to Russian pean politicians, scien­ activities are a pressing tists and industry experts who rounded out the perspectives issue for both European countries and NATO. The new rugged offered on security challenges – all tackled analysis of technical tone of the US, along with Brexit, require that the EU27 considfeasibility. This testified to the successful implementation of er European defence more seriously than ever. what organisers described as the conference’s objectives, The presentation of this year’s “Strategic Foresight Report” by namely, as described by one: “Providing a deeper insight and General Denis Mercier, Supreme Allied Commander Transdelivering suggestions for solutions.” formation, highlighted challenges that can be immediately

European security within and beyond NATO



Berlin Security Conference

Panel discussion during the high-level Military Forum on the stability of the Nothern

Helga Schmid, Secretary General of the European

Flank of Europe

External Action Service 

Photos: Klaus Dombrowsky


PESCO – more than the sum of individual parts European defence policy is being forced to adapt to massive geopolitical-strategic and operational-technological shifts. In the face of changed operational scenarios, reliable political signals are needed to stimulate new developments. It is equally important to sustain existing levels of development of skills, capacities and technologies. Such signals have recently been issued from Brussels regarding the Permanent European Security Cooperation (PESCO). The feeling that a debate centred around a common European defence had gained momentum was tangible at the BSC17. The six Chiefs of the organisational areas of the German Bundeswehr (Army /Air Force/ Navy/ CID- Service/ Joint Support Service/ Joint Medical Service)1 took the “Future Force Forum” as an opportunity to analyse and name challenges for a common European defence. They did so as representatives of the German Armed Forces – but, to a certain extent, also on behalf of European forces. Their input provided valuable insights into the possibilities and necessities of a European perspective. The forum chaired by the Chairman of the defence committee of the Bundestag, Wolfgang Hellmich MP, thus became a kind of blueprint for subsequent discussions that will take place in European capitals and in the European capital. One of the key arguments could be summed up as such: the reconstruction of lost capacities takes a long time. Closer European cooperation should avoid repeating past mistakes, in which the sole motivating factor was saving money. Rather, comprehensive start-up financing is needed to achieve full European operational capability.

message was both unambiguous and dire: “What the Europeans themselves do not do for the stability of the continent, no one else will do, either!“ However, he insisted that there will be no security vacuum. Or, as he put it in his charming mother tongue, “aucun vide sécuritaire”. The bilateral military operational relations between the EU and the UK will continue to exist and the EU-NATO strategic partnership will not be affected by Brexit, he said. Sarah MacIntosh, Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom to NATO, agreed with Michel Barnier when she said that Britain remains a European country: “That is why London will continue to support the European Union in international peacekeeping”. Some listeners and attentive followers of the debates might have thought, fleetingly, of the Faustian paradigm: there is something good in any bad thing. London – deprived of its blocking option in Brussels – could adopt a more open attitude towards common European defence.

Outlook The important debates of the 2017 conference will be continued this year when the Netherlands – partner country of the Berlin Security Conference – hosts. Brexit negotiations will still not be over, NATO will continue to exist and Russian aircrafts will still fly in the Baltic region. There will be an ongoing need for an exchange in expertise on topics such as artificial intelligence, cyber security, digitisation, interoperability, hybrid warfare and the capacity of European societies to deal with threats – both those that are real and those that are only perceived.

Brexit: nightmare, or just restless sleep? Michel Barnier, European Chief Negotiator for Brexit, spoke for the first time in this capacity addressing a large audience when describing Brexit’s implications for European defence. His

1 LtGen Jörg Vollmer (Army), LtGen Karl Müllner (Airforce), Vice Admiral Andreas Krause (Navy), LtGen Ludwig Leinhos (CID-Service), LtGen Martin Schelleis (Joint Support Service), and LtGen (MC) Dr Michael Tempel (Joint Medical Service)

Uwe Proll, organiser of the BSC, with (left to right) Hans-Gert Poettering, former EP President, Ambassador Jir˘í S˘edivy´ , BSC President, and Michel Barnier, EU Brexit Chief Negotiator

General Denis Mercier, NATO’s Supreme Allied Commander Transformation

Photos: Klaus Dombrowsky



Interoperability in Europe: bringing together different organisational structures and cultures

Permanent Structured Cooperation and the Germ Interview with Lieutenant General Martin Schelleis, Chief of the German Joint Support Service, Bonn

The signing of the agreement on Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) by 25 Member States symbolised an important step for the European Union in its progression toward a Security and Defense Union. The objective: strengthening European military capabilities through multinational cooperation. Initial specific PESCO projects are aimed mainly at the standardisation of procedures, training and equipment. Accordingly, PESCO will contribute to improving the interoperability of armed forces in Europe. The German Joint Support Service could serve as a model, because it has already succeeded in nationally consolidating cross-service tasks previously split within the German forces, the Bundeswehr. Moreover, its holistic approach to multinationalisation involving the establishment of a ‘Combined Joint Support Service’ seems to make it ideally suited for acting as the core element of a European network of armed forces for command and control and support tasks.

Martin Schelleis: Since it was established almost two decades ago, the Joint Support Service has been the connecting element for the German armed forces. It is the central area of military support of the Bundeswehr both during routine home base duty activities and on operations. Today, this mainly includes capabilities in the fields of command and control, logistics and protection. Wherever units of the Bundeswehr are deployed, the Joint Support Service is there also.

The European: General Schelleis, you are the Chief of the Joint Support Service (JSS), the second largest organisational area of the German Bundeswehr. As central provider of support for the Bundeswehr, words like cooperation and interoperability are familiar to you. What can Europe or those responsible for PESCO learn from you in this respect?

The European: That means that success is based on a certain technical interoperability, doesn’t it? Martin Schelleis: Creating interoperability between varying technical systems is demanding and not trivial at all. However, bringing together different organisational structures and cultures is even more difficult.

The European: What was the guiding principle to establish a Joint Support Service? Martin Schelleis: The guiding principle for the establishment of the Joint Support Service was the concentration of common tasks previously distributed redundantly in part among the services. The important thing, then, was to find a way of consolidating the established systems of these services within the Joint Support Service, to bring about an overall increase in effectiveness and efficiency.

LtGen Martin Schelleis meeting with Hartmut Bühl at the Berlin Security Conference, November 2017 


Photo: Klaus Dombrowsky

The European: Solutions are rather difficult within national forces, but what about within alliances or the European Union? Martin Schelleis: You are right, the challenge we are facing at the moment, namely to ensure interoperability in Europe, is even more complex! What we are talking about here is a harmonisation of the systems, structures, procedures and cultures of more than twenty nations. This is challenging – but not impossible! The success of the Joint Support Service at a national level now encourages us to take similar steps in a European framework. I am optimistic that, based on our good experience, we will be able to give an important stimulus for the implementation of PESCO projects.


man Joint Support Service

Host Nation Support in Germany during ATLANTIC RESOLVE 2017: German Military Police and US Army in cooperation 

The European: With the announcement of PESCO, more than 50 projects have been suggested to date, 17 of which should soon become more concrete. Where do you see the priorities of the JSS? Martin Schelleis: In view of the broad capability spectrum of the Joint Support Service, there are a lot of connecting points throughout the field of support. Specifically, however, I see the Joint Support Service as initiator and pacemaker in the field of logistics. The European: Would you please elaborate on the leading role you see for Germany. What is the rationale behind it? Martin Schelleis: Because of the increased importance of collective defence, Germany takes a key role in this context, not only as a provider of forces. Due to its central geographical position in Europe, it will – in many cases – become the receiving and transit country for allied armed forces and the joint rear area. Particularly in the context of actual operations, Germany will quite likely turn into a logistic hub and a zone of communications at the same time. It is, therefore, of particular importance to us to provide in a ‘whole-of-government approach’ a functioning system, ensuring the fulfilment of military support requirements, even by falling back on commercial services. The European: Will the system design be transnational? Martin Schelleis: Such a system should be designed transna-

Photo: Bundeswehr/Bier 2017

tionally right from the beginning, as German and allied armed forces usually have to be deployed to manoeuvre areas and theatres of operations outside Germany. This is, for example, one of the objectives of our proposal for a PESCO project; “network of logistic hubs in Europe”. The European: What are the advantages of such a European network? Martin Schelleis: A multinational network of bindingly assured logistic services and facilities is meant to provide the nations involved with efficient and robust support under unified command, not only during routine duty, but also during exercises and on operations. The European: Is this also valid “out of area”? Martin Schelleis: For sure, such a network will improve responsiveness, increase capacities and enhance sustainability for military operations both inside and outside of Europe. The provision of logistic services will be simplified and expedited. Germany will be able to make a valuable contribution in this context by drawing on the technical and leadership competences of the Joint Support Service in logistic matters. The European: Is the PESCO project not competing with comparable projects or hampering those carried out within NATO? Martin Schelleis: I am smiling, because this question al-



Lieutenant General Martin Schelleis has been the Chief of the German Joint Support Service since 2015. He graduated in Business Administration from the Bundeswehr University in Hamburg and became a fighter pilot. After taking the General Staff Course in Hamburg (1993-1995), Mr Schelleis joined the Combined Joint Planning Staff at SHAPE in Casteau. From 1999 to 2001, he was Officer for Policy Planning in the Ministry of Defence, Bonn, and then Commander of the air base in Büchel and Kabul (Afghanistan), where he commanded the Air Force Wing 2. Between 2006 and 2009, Mr Schelleis was Chief of the Policy and Concepts Implementation Branch at the Joint Force Command HQ in Brunssum and Chief Information Coordinator in Kabul. In 2009, he returned to Germany and joined the Air Staff Division of the MOD in Bonn as Director of a Revision Task

The European: General, please allow us a very concrete question. Do you have first tangible results of your efforts? Martin Schelleis: In this respect, we are already very far advanced. Under German lead, twelve nations are already working on strengthening logistic capabilities. In a first phase, a personnel pool for a permanent ‘Joint Logistics Support Group Headquarters (JLSG HQ)’ has successfully been filled. Firstly, for the purpose of the proficiency training of this personnel pool I mentioned, a JLSG Coordination and Training Center (JCTC) was established at the Bundeswehr Logistics School in Garlstedt in October 2017. Meanwhile, initial multinational training sessions have been completed successfully, and the trained personnel has been certified. Secondly, we would like to establish not only a multinational JLSG HQ that is available at any time, but also specialist support units, such as a battalion for Reception Staging Onward Movement (RSOM).

Force. Prior to his current position, he was Commander of the German Air Force Command in Cologne.

ways comes up. No hampering, on the contrary! It is not only possible to profitably link the project to other PESCO projects, such as the Dutch project about ‘simplifying and standardising cross-border military transport procedures’. It also fits brilliantly into our initiative for multilateral and cross-border ‘enhanced Host Nation Support’. We are going to pursue this within the scope of our logistic cluster of the NATO ‘Framework Nations Concept (FNC)’.

The European: We understand that PESCO formats of cooperation within the EU and FNC of NATO do not preclude each other? Martin Schelleis: Right, and indeed they strengthen cooperation on a wide front. Two heterogeneous systems are capable of cooperating almost seamlessly – the classic definition of interoperability. The European: What a progress in interoperability! I wish you, General, and the women and men engaged in this project, further success and we thank you for this conversation. *The interview was conducted by Nannette Cazaubon and Hartmut Bühl

Joint Logistic Support Group Coordination and Training Centre – the Centre of Competence for multinational logistic Command and Control Photo: Bundeswehr/Woller 2017



A system of coordinated cybersecurity at European Union level is imperative

Europe is far away from public and private interoperability in cyberdefence by Rostislav Jirkal, Chairman of the Board, CyberGym Europe a.s., Prague

Cybersecurity and cyberdefence have become important areas where the responsibility of a state towards its citizens is of universal importance. At the same time, however, the task of carrying out activities in virtual space has many important specifics. Modern society has long been accustomed to the fact that the state provides services such as fire protection, police protection, state border protection and many others without which citizens cannot imagine today’s everyday life. Most of these services are ensured by specialised organisations established by the state. Unfortunately, this model cannot be applied in virtual space.

Rostislav Jirkal heads up the CyberGym Europe project and is the founder of the Servodata Group, which is ranked as one of the 30 largest IT companies on the Czech market. An IT manager and expert since 1987, he established the Servodata Group in the early 1990s. Photo: private

2017 and provides training for cyber security incident response teams. Mr Jirkal is an active member of the Armed Forces Communications and Electronics Association (AFCEA) and serves as Vice-President of the AFCEA Czech chapter.

Functional models for interoperability Cybersecurity and cyberdefence represent areas in which it will be necessary to create a functional and effective system of cooperation among state institutions and bodies, stateowned organisations and the private sector. The building of functional models for this cooperation is currently largely in the first stages. Large institutions operating in the financial sector, particularly banks which are part of multinational corporations, are relatively advanced in cybersecurity. They invest significant resources into capabilities for local teams as well as into the development and distribution of widely applied methodologies. This is mainly caused by the fact that banks have been a traditional target of cyberattacks for many years. Losses they have incurred as a result of cyberattacks can therefore easily justify the release of considerable resources invested in higher protection capabilities. Another significantly advanced sector is energy. Again, large energy multinationals drive the


The CyberGym Europe project was established in

development. Both of these examples illustrate effective multinational cooperation albeit only on the level of economically linked entities.

Need for shared international intentions However, when we look at the work of relevant institutions which were given responsibility for cybersecurity and cyberdefence by legislation, we find that multinational cooperation occurs only in part. As methodologies and intentions are only partially shared, factual cooperation is therefore very limited. The reason is mainly the inconsistency of national legislation adopted in individual countries. In practice, cooperation is limited, usually to the level of special services. If we keep looking into what the level of cooperation is between private entities and the relevant state-owned organisation, it is rather difficult to define the obligations and responsibilities of private and state-owned entities through legislation. However, there is no format for effective cooperation in which important know-how can be transferred between the two. Nevertheless, virtual cyberspace has one important feature: the absence of physical boundaries between states, organisations and individuals which creates unprecedented space for attackers. That is why building an effective national system of cybersecurity and cyberdefence is a complex issue as it requires a focused and coordinated effort from all private as well as state entities.

Building an effective national system of cybersecurity and cyberdefence is a complex issue as it requires a focused and coordinated effort from all private as well as state entities. “ Rostislav Jirkal

The private sector The private entities mentioned (banks, energy groups) now have significant operational and


Photo: perspec Photo88, CC BY SA 2.0


Cybersecurity process know-how as well as experience in training and team training. Training polygons are gradually being developed to enable organisations, using special training methods, to achieve similar results to the ones fire or army units accomplish in their training. Disaster relief and military The situations that workers operating and managing largescale infrastructures are exposed to are actually very similar to the situations that military units in the line of battle or fire brigades rescuing people from a burning high-rise building find themselves in. The expertise of a training polygon thus enables cybersecurity teams to manage today’s common automated attacks. Additionally, it allows them to manage targeted attacks led by hacker groups based on an order as well as the most complex cases when an attack is conducted using a so-called insider, i.e. the attacker’s collaborator is part of the attacked organisation.

very limited by both practical and legislative barriers. Despite that, it is impossible to give up on a fast approach when building an effective system of global cybersecurity and cyberdefence using all available resources, both on the level of state and private organisations. Based on my 10 years’ experience with AFCEA*, I would recommend a call to action of the AFCEA and similar associations. AFCEA was established with the goal of building a bridge between public, private and academic spheres.

Plea for EU cybersecurity coordination This first step at the national level should soon be followed by the creation of a system of coordinated cybersecurity at the level of the EU or the European Economic Area. This is such a significant task that it needs to be incorporated in fundamental short- and medium-term strategies of all States as soon as possible. * AFCEA: Armed Forces Command and Electronics association

How to gain efficiency By utilising the current modern methods of applied psychology which support the creation of high-performance teams, such as astronaut or air traffic teams, top-level capabilities can be built. These will prevent attackers from achieving their goals and effectively protect managed assets. In reality, relevant state authorities are not too interested in using the know-how of private organisations. They focus on legislation and on the reporting obligations of organisations which form part of a critical information infrastructure of the state defined by legislation. Dissemination of information to other organisations about a recorded cyberincident potentially under risk rarely works effectively nowadays. States, in fact, often have high-quality know-how at their disposal in their special services units. However, sharing their know-how with other participants in cybersecurity systems is


► events

NITEC18 NITEC18 will take place from 22-24 May 2018 in Berlin. NITEC is an annual flagship event jointly organised by AFCEA Europe and the NATO Communications and Information (NCI) Agency. This three-day industry conference offers an insight into the Alliance’s emerging technological and cyber needs and provides direct access to programme managers. > Web


Secure satellite communications as a force multiplier

Secure flexible satellite communications for peacekeeping and security forces by Karim Michel Sabbagh, President and CEO, SES, Luxembourg

Over the past few years, the security environment in Europe has changed dramatically. Echoing this reality, NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg recently said “The World is more dangerous today than it has been in a generation – the sheer number of converging threats is making the world increasingly perilous.” Fighting these complex issues requires adaptation and new approaches. The application of speed, flexibility, resilience and the deployment of the right set of tools are important in fighting conflicts. This ‘hybrid warfare approach’ defines Space as a key component. We should consider three factors that, if combined, can effectively guarantee and strengthen flexible and resilient space communications services for Europe and beyond, thus creating for allies and cooperating partner’s opportunities to interoperate. These three factors are: • Flexibility and resilience of satellite capacity acting as a force multiplier • Acceleration of capabilities and investment in the next generation of distributed networks to prepare for unpredictable threats • Innovation in new end-to-end solutions for civil and military applications

Designed exclusively to address governmental and institutional user needs, GovSat-1 is a highly secure satellite that will offer X-band and military Ka-band capacity 

Photo: Orbital ATK

Flexibility and resilience as a force multiplier Today, agile and reliable satellite communications are an essential capability for peacekeeping and security forces as they deploy at a moment’s notice. SES’s multi-frequency and multi-orbit fleet includes Geostationary Earth Orbit (GEO) and Medium Earth Orbit (MEO) satellites. This combination is a technological leap and is a well proven force multiplier for defence forces and peacekeeping missions who need flexible, scalable and resilient services across domains and geographies.


Our GEO satellites positioned at 36,000 km above Earth each provide coverage of over one third of the Earth’s surface, connecting people and businesses in a cost-effective way. The key GEO differentiator is a powerful downstream connectivity for video and data transmission. The growing demand for secure geostationary communication is mostly driven by bandwidth-hungry Intelligence Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) platforms, Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) as well as other autonomous land and maritime platforms. In the IRS arena, SES serves as a preeminent provider of capability to these platforms, ranging from supporting the US government to the more recent increase in supporting NATO and friendly forces globally. • GovSat, a joint venture between the Govern ment of Luxembourg and SES, is providing a securely managed satcom capability within the Alliance Ground Surveillance programme (AGS). NATO defence and security committee, 8.10.2017

The Space domain and Allied Defense improvements in space technology drive the development of advanced military systems; they are important force multipliers when integrated into joint operations.”



• With our MEO satellites, we continue to engage antenna manufacturers and providers to innovate an ISR solution leveraging this higher throughput, low latency capability. Our objective is to bring UAV platforms to a place where they can deliver greater than 50 mbps from the aircraft in execution of their mission. Secure systems are the top concern of any government or insti­tution, and satellite-enabled solutions offer the assurance required. In this line of thinking, we continue to sustain the current demand for GEO satellites and prepare to meet future requirements. • By the end of last year, SES GS was delivering nearly four Gigabits per second of managed MEO services supporting thirteen sites globally to customers ranging from the Department of Defense (DoD) to the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA). • In 2017 we started serving new African government customers leveraging our MEO capability to help bridge the digital divide and provide hundreds of Mbps connectivity reaching sites for e-government, education and health across the country. Our portfolio of international government business has doubled over the past two years, reaching 70 government entities globally.

Acceleration of capabilities We need to build for the future. For governments, this translates into the requirement for resilient and distributed capabilities to serve a variety of downstream domains and applications. On 31 January 2018, GovSat’s first satellite, GovSat-1, was launched from Cape Canaveral. This multi-mission satellite represents our first engagement in military frequencies and further indication of our commitment to serve this market. It will be operated by GovSat. GovSat-1 is a highly secure satellite with encrypted command and control and anti-jamming capabilities. It will offer X-band and Military Ka-band capacity over Europe, Africa, the Middle East, and substantial maritime coverage over the Mediterranean and Baltic seas, as well as over the Atlantic and Indian oceans. In November 2017, we led a consortium of industry partners to sign an agreement with the European Space Agency (ESA) to set up Pacis-1 as part of ESA’s Govsatcom Precursor programme. This is the first step in demonstrating how the European space industry can support the EU’s Govsatcom initiative. It will develop and demonstrate innovative ‘system of systems’ and technology solutions for pooling & sharing of existing or future secure satellite communications systems and services, creating opportunities for interoperability. From 2021, seven next-generation MEO satellites will be added to our fleet, setting new industry benchmarks. Called O3b mPOWER, the new system marks a new era of space economy in which distributed capabilities become more accessible, flexi-


O3b mPOWER will offer a dramatic increase in throughput, to deliver multiple terabits globally 

Photo: SES

ble and shapeable. O3b mPOWER will offer a dramatic increase in throughput to deliver multiple terabits globally having more than 4000 beams per satellite, covering about 400 million of square kilometres and capable of powering any mission, anywhere.

Innovation in new end-to-end solutions Today governments need reliable, flexible services that can be switched on rapidly and adjusted on demand across the entire global network. • In 2017 we launched our Rapid Response platform for Defence, Security and Humanitarian Missions. A multi-orbit, multi-band solution can be deployed as a ‘plug-and-play’ asset and is designed to power missions by supporting a variety of bandwidth-hungry applications. • In addition, our fleet continues to support critical humanitarian and connectivity restoration missions. In October 2017, SES worked with Project Loon and several local technology partners to restore 4G/LTE connectivity in Puerto-Rico in the aftermath of hurricane Maria. • Recently, we also deployed high speed connectivity solutions for peacekeeping troops reaching the most challenging places in Africa, some of them in ongoing conflicts. • Finally, the communications capabilities offered by satellite technology can efficiently address various challenges that governments face, including border management or migration management, to name but a few.

Preparing the future To meet the increasing requirements of the future, our strong assets will soon be reinforced by a generation of new and improved capabilities. And whilst our current and future satellite constellations are already an important force multiplier and offer resilient, reliable and flexible solutions in unpredictable times, we should also acknowledge that other elements, such as a stronger European Defence, are key in dealing effectively with crises and enabling various governmental missions. We are committed to work closely with all institutional European stakeholders to continue developing their next generation communications capabilities.


Prospects and existential complexities versus interoperability

The Air and Missile Defence Battle System of the US Army by Debalina Ghoshal, Independent Consultant and Strategic Analyst, New Delhi

The US Army’s Integrated Air and Missile Defence Battle Command System (IBCS), manufactured by Northrop Grumman, is an integral component of the Integrated Air and Missile Defence System (IAMD). The latter is a system developed not only to cater to ballistic missile threats, but also to unguided missiles, cruise missiles and air breathing weapons. The complexity of IBCS poses a few problems and raises the following questions: Is it the large amount of requests for interoperability that leads to the malfunctioning of software? Will the system survive or be replaced – after a long delay – by an even more technologically sophisticated one? Are the growing requests on interoperability preventing the forces from getting the systems they need? Is this the flip side of the coin when it comes to interoperability?

Highest degree of interoperability

ment command, control, communications, and intelligence systems. The defence systems that would be integrated are the Patriot, Surface-Launched Advanced Medium Range Air-toAir Missile, Joint Land Attack Cruise Missile Defence Elevated Netted Sensor, improved Sentinel Radar, the Terminal High Altitude Area Defence system and the Medium Extended Air Defence System. For instance, in 2016, during the dual engagement test conducted by the US Army, IBCS used tracking data from Sentinel and Patriot radars and provided command and control of a Patriot Advanced Capability (PAC)-3 to destroy a ballistic missile target and PAC-2 to destroy a cruise missile. The IBCS program focuses on war-fighter decision processes and tools that focus on “intuitive situational understanding for time-critical engagements.” According to Linda A. Mills of Northrop Grumman, “IBCS takes care of the science of warfare, so the war-fighter can focus on the art of warfare”.

IBCS is a revolutionary command and control system developed to deliver a single, unambiguous view of the battle-space. Why do we need network integration? The ability to track aircraft and missiles provides combatant The integration of systems is advantageous in six ways: commanders and air defenders the opportunity to take critical 1st: integrating sensors and interceptors provides wider area decisions in seconds. It was a concept developed during Opersurveillance and therefore, greater protection; ations Desert Storm and Iraqi Freedom with, as top priority, the 2nd: integrating the systems allows NATO to fill the capability improvement of mission command. gaps that exist in the battle command system rather than Benefits of IBCS at a glance having to purchase the complete weapon system; • It ensures that the demands of diverse missions, environ3rd: the command system prevents air and missile defence units ments and rules of engagement are met. from intercepting the same target; • It provides wider surveillance and broader protection areas 4th: IBCS provides a larger area defended against varied threats; by networking sensors-interceptors together rather than just 5th: IBCS provides advanced engagement techniques and will linking them. be capable of managing warfare across all sensors and • It establishes one net-centric command and control system, weapons; thus reducing points of failure and increasing the flexibility to deploy smaller force packages. • It creates a standard approach across forces to eliminate multiple logistics tails, and alter the Debalina Ghoshal training paradigm. is a Research Associate in the National Security Group at • Current sensors and weapon systems are intethe Delhi Policy Group. Born in 1987, she completed her grated with future ones in an affordable manner. Master’s degree in International Studies in 2011 while • It establishes the means to connect complemeninterning at the Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies in tary and coalition systems for joint multinational New Delhi in 2010. Before joining the Delhi Policy Group, missile defence. she worked at the Centre for Air Power Studies, where Photo: private

she was promoted from Research Associate to Associate

The integration of systems

Fellow. Ms Ghoshal has published numerous articles in books and peer-re-

IBCS integrates air and missile defence systems to improve the efficiency of IAMD by incorporating them with sensors, weapons and battle manage-

viewed and popular magazines, such as Defence Review Asia and Diplomatic Courier. She is also lectures regularly on defence and military issues.



There is an open, network-centric, system of systems solution that helps IBCS to optimise battle management command and control as well as significantly improve cost effectiveness and flexibility. However, the system is undergoing a software malfunction which is delaying the Army’s revolutionised air and missile defence system. Debalina Ghoshal

6th: integrating the data acquired from various sensors allows IBCS to compare and resolve conflicts that an individual air and missile defence system is not capable of. It accurately classifies, identifies and defuses potential threats and provides accurate data to the system.

Existential complexities There is an open, network-centric, system of systems solution that helps IBCS to optimise battle management command and control and significantly improve cost effectiveness and flexibility. However, as mentioned earlier, the system is undergoing software malfunctioning which is delaying the implementation of the Army’s revolutionised air and missile defence system. The software has great responsibility as it is meant to replace the Army’s seven command and control systems with a single network-centric system. This is a complex task. Since the system would be integrated with existing NATO air and missile defence systems, it would be able to feed data to launch any of the air and missile defence weapons – a daunting task. This integration is crucial, as the NATO Assistant Secretary General for Defence Investment Camille Grand stresses, interoperability is “the critical element” of the allies’ ballistic missile defence program. NATO allies are seeking an interoperable command



and control system for the European continent and have invested over $1.1 billion to develop one. IBCS would employ advanced radar and sensor systems that would collect more data than before. For effective integration, older sensors would need to be upgraded to be able to collect the same amount of data. All this is a complex and hard process and hence, there is a lot of pressure on the software. In addition, IBCS is also expected to work with the Space and Missile Defence Command regarding directed energy weapons. In addition, the command and control system has to integrate with that of the Missile Defence Agency, as well as the Navy’s sensor net and the Air Force’s long range radar. This requires a complex process as the three strands have always had varied command and communication systems.

When will the program be operational?

The operationalisation of IBCS will not happen before four years from now, considering the delays and setbacks. It was scheduled to be operational by 2019, but all these delays are the result of the IBCS design review conducted in 2012, which yielded few positive results. To elaborate, IBCS will undergo three phases: the first includes a preliminary design review, the second includes a system design and development program and the third includes production. In fact, reports claim that the ‘Milestone C’ decision that will decide whether the program would enter the production phase and subsequent deployment will not happen before FY20. Such delays will also increase the total cost of the program. For instance, IBCS is now expected to cost $7billion or even more, but in 2010, the expected cost was around $577 million, making it a cost-effective command and control system. However, should IBCS succeed, according to Colonel Lloyd McDaniels, project manager of IAMD, as IBCS would connect IAMD to the Global Information Grid (GIG), it would transform air and missile defence systems from a “stovepipe configuration” to a single integrated picture. Photo: Northrop Grumman, Washington, D.C.


Overcoming the fragmentation of defense industries in Europe

Common solutions for common threats by Chris Lombardi, Vice-President Business Development Europe, Raytheon International, Brussels

In 2007, the Lisbon Treaty set down a firm objective for a cooperative framework for the integration of military capabilities across Europe – a goal that would later take shape through the establishment of the Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) for European defense. Since then, the need and desire for partnership across the EU has only intensified. This past September in Tallinn, EU High Representative Federica Mogherini acknowledged the need for further unity, telling an informal meeting of EU Defense Ministers: “What we are offering is a platform for joining investments, joining projects and in this manner, overcoming the fragmentation that is currently characterizing especially the environment of defense industry in Europe.” As a result, the EU is not only NATO’s closest partner, but also the main driving force behind the continent’s security policy.

How can Europe outpace the threat?

What we are offering is a platform for joining investments, joining projects and in this manner, overcoming the fragmentation that is currently characterizing especially the environment of defense industry in Europe.”  Federica Mogherini

proach must be considered. On the procurement side, interoperability allows shared maintenance and acquisition strategies, thereby reducing risks and costs while keeping allies ahead of the threat. On the tactical side, interoperable systems allow for a quick response-time in a crisis and help foster a more cohesive strategic approach through joint training exercises. On the battlefield, nations can share equipment and keep the logistics lean and solid. I will use as an example the layered air- and ballistic-missile defense for Europe.

Europe’s aspirations will provide a substantial improvement to current European defense procurement. At the moment, required resources are not being used smartly. Nations invest separately and national governments strive to find the right balance between managing limited national budgets while driving investment to protect their people, sovereignty and infrastructure. These limitations could be overcome by working together on How can European air and missile defense shared capabilities and smart investments to protect the whole be achieved? of Europe. The launch of the European Defence Fund (EDF) Interoperability is especially pivotal for successful layered airrepresents a significant step toward this goal by supporting EU and ballistic-missile defense. Complex ballistic-missile threats Member States in joint initiatives, as well as research procan occur at different ranges and altitudes and would put grams that help to establish collective Europe’s defense capabilities to security. The EDF could incentivize allied the test. countries to identify opportunities for Several nations are already imjoint investment and the procurement of plementing this comprehensive Chris Lombardi proven and effective systems, helpinteroperability in their air and is Vice-President Business ing to ensure that Europe can acquire missile defense systems, with Development Europe at Raythe capabilities it needs concurrently the APOLLO project of Germany theon International. He rewith NATO. To facilitate a new level of and the Netherlands serving as a ceived a bachelor’s degree true common European security, the blueprint in Europe. The annual in international affairs and interoperability of advanced and proven live-fire exercises with integrated political science from the Photo: Raytheon International defense capabilities is crucial. Patriot air and missile systems University of Colorado and in Crete and the interweaving a master’s degree in international relations from of the command structures has Interoperability is a multilayered the Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced Internationshown the real potential of joint al Studies (SAIS), Johns Hopkins University. Prior instrument interoperable forces. Equally, The wide field of interoperability is to joining Raytheon in 2002, Mr Lombardi worked the success of “Aurora 17” – the indeed not limited to plugging one defor other major defence contractors in the fields largest multinational exercise fense system into another; many other of ballistic missile defense and naval intelligence. in Sweden for 23 years – sent a equally important aspects of this ap-



Raytheon‘s Patriot AESA Radar with 360-degree capability is

More than 100 tactical ballistic missiles were intercepted in combat operations around

based on advanced GaN technology 

the world since January 2015 – mostly with Guidance Enhanced Missiles (GEM-T)

Photos: Raytheon International

strong signal to other European allies that interoperability is the way forward. In this instance, US Patriot units supported the Swedish forces in the air and missile defense element of the exercise. Meanwhile, with more than 13 nations participating and a wide range of exercise locations across Germany, the Czech Republic, Lithuania and Romania, “Tobruq Legacy 17” also showed the potential effectiveness of the deployment of interoperable air and missile systems in Europe. All three exercises have proven that common training, testing and operations of a single air and missile defense system such as Patriot brings several layers of capabilities in one, providing an advantage for countries that want to increase the effective-

ness of their protective systems while simultaneously reducing costs. A constantly updated shared threat database prepares Patriot systems in Europe for threats from all over the world. To provide layered air and missile defense for Europe, Patriot is then integrated with forward deployed sensors, US Navy Aegis ships and the Aegis Ashore sites in Europe to provide the continent’s only upper tier defense from the growing threat of ballistic missiles.

The path towards the protection of Europe

It is increasingly clear that European air and missile defense can only be achieved collaboratively. Europe has already taken the necessary steps but needs to carefully assess its capability gaps and partner with countries and companies that can address them. Given the urgency of the current threat, it would be judicious for countries to invest in combat-proven systems that are designed to be upgraded. There is no time to invest in the development of systems that have not been tested or fielded – systems that may take 10 to 15 years to catch up – and the development costs and risks of keeping proven systems ahead of the threat must be shared among partners. European countries have the opportunity today to make smart investments in interoperable systems in order to outpace the threats of tomorrow. The stakes are high, but partnership and a common-sense approach to interoperability will undoubtedly pave the way for a joint protection of European The Patriot system is the backbone of 14, soon 16, partnership nations – here seen during a US Army citizens. exercise


Authors 2017

Authors 2017 Author/ Title





Arnold, Andreas CBRNe protection for all missions



Balis, Christina The return to transatlantic normality



Boum-Yalagch, Olzod The world’s destiny hangs on the future oft he Paris Agreement



Brewin, Richard (Interview) Powering military capability in a charging security environment



Bühl, Hartmut • 29 March 2017 – beginning of the end of the UK? • Trump between isolationism and protectionism

27 28

13 52

Cazaubon, Nannette 60 years of the Rome Treaties – time to take stock



Edge, Jim NATO Alliance Ground Surveillance



Erdmann, Christoph Telecommunications need protection



Favin-Lévêque, Jacques European defence – time to leave hesitations behind



Gahler, Michael Making the EU fit for defence tasks



Gijsberg, Koen Strength in partnership



Giuliani, Jean-Dominique Europa first!



Hahn, Johannes Global stability through the EU’s neighbourhood and enlargement policies



Hohlmeier, Monika Galileo: Public service of general interest in the EU



Kamp, Karl-Heinz How to deal with the end of reliability?



King, Julian Europe needs an effective and sustainable Security Union



Knaus, Gerald Ex meridie lux – a Malta Plan for the Mediterranean



Kreienbaum, Bernd Are Europe’s space defence ambitions on the rise?



Lindemann, Florian (Interview) Cybersecurity preparedness – an educational approach



Luyckx, Olivier The EU-guided CBRN Centres of Excellence



Martini, Peter Cyberwar – will it take place?



Michaelis, Susanne Making progress in energy efficiency for NATO forces



Ali, Shahzad EDA: protecting forces in theater and citizens at home




Author/ Title




Monet, Jean-Paul How robots can foster civilian emergency response



Paşcu, Ioan Mircea (Interview) The Minsk II Agreement ist the only base for détente



Panagiotis, Kikiras EDA: protecting forces in theater and citizens at home



Perruche, Jean Paul How to go from a national to a European defence



Pons, Esteban González Making the EU fit for defence tasks



Popp, Thomas Preparing for the future with innovative decontamination systems



Quevauviller, Philippe Horizon 2020 – chances to reduce CBRNe risks



Rogers, Denis (Interview) Powering military capability in a charging security environment



Round, Peter Cooperation in cyber is a must



Sabbagh, Karim Michel Satellite communications for security and defence solutions



Schmid, Helga The EU’s response to CBRN risks and threats



Schönbohm, Arne No successful digitalisation without cybersecurity



Schuster, Martin Microgrids: an effective tool in developing countries



Schuwirth, Rainer The exasperating talk of a European army



Schwab, Andreas The NIS Directive – a European approach to cyber security risks



Stirnal, Andy Francis Time for demand-driven supply of cyber innovation



Suissa, Rachel Brexit – rethinking the European Neighbourhood Policy



Szklarski, Bohdan Trump and Europe: times of new uncertainty



Trakimavičius, Lukas Making progress in energy efficiency for NATO forces



Ullmann, Harlan K. Is America reliable?



Vălean, Adina-Ioana Protecting EU’s citizens and environment



Vella, George Malta’s efforts to resolve the refugee crisis



Viola, Roberto The EU’s effort to protect the digital society and economy



Wainwright, Rob A European strategy to counter cybercrime



Zoller, Markus A. Challenges in international security




Berlin Security Conference

17 t h C o n g r e s s o n E u r o p e a n S e c u r i t y a n d D e f e n c e

Berlin Security Conference 2018 European Security and Defence – remaining transatlantic, acting more European

27 – 28 November 2018, Vienna House Andel’s Berlin

Photos: Dombrowsky

Visit us on Europe’s le ading even for Europe t an Security and Defence

Impressions of the BSC 2017

The Berlin Security Conference  One of the largest yearly events on European Security and Defence  Meeting place for up to 1 000 participants from more than 50 countries  International forum for members of parliament, politicians and representatives of the armed forces, security organisations and industry  Partner in 2018: Netherlands  Former Partners: Russia, United Kingdom, Turkey, USA, France, Sweden  Exhibitions with companies from Europe and abroad  Organised by the – Germany’s leading independent Newspaper for the Civil and Military Services

Further Information:

The European - Security and Defence Union  

Issue 29

The European - Security and Defence Union  

Issue 29