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ISSN 2192-6921

Independent Review on European Security and Defence − A product of ProPress Publishing Group

Volume N° 24

MAIN TOPIC

The CSDP in action!

“Our future thinking should not exclude defence aspects, which must be seen in complementarity with NATO” Lt General Wolfgang Wosolsobe, DG EUMS

Meeting energy and environment challenges Sharon McManus, Energy Project Officer, EDA, Brussels

Disaster management: strengthening the EU tool box Hans Das, Head Civil Protection Policy Unit, DG ECHO, EC, Brussels

www.magazine-the-european.com A magazine of the Behörden Spiegel Group

Edition 2/2016


Editorial

The chances of the free trade agreement between the US and Europe becoming a reality are dwindling. Was the urgent appeal launched in favour of the deal by outgoing President Obama during Germany’s Hannover Messe last April already the swan song for an agreement that Europe needs more urgently than the United States? Economists from both shores of the Atlantic have the arguments to support their case that an unlimited exchange of goods between Europe and the United States could give Europe’s economies a long-lasting boost, hence also a competitive edge and greater stability. However, TTIP opponents on both sides of the Atlantic are rallying increasing numbers of supporters with their fear mongering and anti-progressive ideas. Isolationist thinking is gaining ground in the United States, while a new wave of anti-Americanism is sweeping through Europe, with names like Amazon, Google and Apple being brandished as symbols of Europe’s “dependence”. In neither the US nor Europe do the political calendars bode well for the agreement. The US will be electing a new President in 2016, while in 2017 there will be landmark parliamentary elections in Germany and presidential elections in France. The American election campaign, with both presumed candidates pandering to populist anti-TTIP sentiments, is already casting a long shadow, while right-wing movements and parties will be doing their bit to counter the agreement in Europe. Understandably, the European Commission and the Member States are seeing dark clouds on the horizon, as the hope of wrapping up the deal by the end of this year fades. In spite of everything they have achieved in the negotiations they seem to be fighting a losing battle with the opponents of the TTIP.

Impressum The European − Security and Defence Union ProPress Publishing Group Bonn/Berlin Headquarters Berlin: Kaskelstr. 41, D-10317 Berlin Phone: +49/30/557 412-0, Fax: +49/30/557 412-33 Brussels Office: Hartmut Bühl Phone/Fax: +33/684806655 E-Mail: hartmut.buehl@orange.fr Bonn Office: Friedrich-Ebert-Allee 57, D-53113 Bonn Phone: +49/228/970 97-0, Fax: +49/228/970 97-75 Advertisement Office Bonn: Karin Dornbusch Phone: +49/228/970 97-40 E-Mail: Karin.dornbusch@euro-defence.eu

The EU may have made a mistake, however, in failing to publicly discuss in a timely fashion the TTIP opponents’ justified concerns about a shift of decision-making powers towards non-democratic institutions (to wit, arbitration tribunals). While the deal may not be a problem in itself, as Hartmut Bühl stated by Mr Obama in Hanover, the “secrecy” in which the Commission has shrouded the negotiations at the United States’ request gives TTIP opponents the fatal impression that the EU has no interest in codetermination and transparency. The proponents of TTIP have understood that this agreement takes the long-term view, above all in setting common standards for research and development on future-oriented projects. If Europe does not pull in the same direction, it will in future have to bow to standards set by the US and others. It may start lagging behind in many areas in which for the time being it is still competitive, a state of affairs that would be dangerously confirmed by a possible future free trade agreement between the US and ASEAN. It is a pity that any objective discussion about the trade agreement has become impossible. Misunderstandings and prejudices about the other side’s interests – epitomised by such buzzwords as “chlorine-washed chicken” – hamper a constructive exchange about the future of European trade relations. However, a lot is at stake: the European nations have recognised that Europe will have no chance of grasping the opportunities of digitalisation if the agreement is buried.

Photo: © Hofmann, Adelsheim

Time is against the TTIP

Publisher and Editor-in-Chief: Hartmut Bühl, Brussels Deputy Editor-in-Chief: Nannette Cazaubon, Paris; E-Mail: nannette.b@gmx.net Publishing House: ProPress Verlagsgesellschaft mbH President ProPress Publishing Group: R. Uwe Proll Layout: SpreeService- und Beratungsgesellschaft mbH, Berlin Print: Heider Druck GmbH, Bergisch Gladbach The European − Security and Defence Union Magazine is published by the ProPress Publishing Group. The ProPress Publishing Group is the organizer of the congress on European Security and Defence (Berlin Security Conference), the European Police Congress and the European Congress on Disaster Management. For further information about the magazine and the congresses please visit www.magazine-the-european.com Subscription: This magazine is published in Brussels and Berlin. The copy price is 16 Euro: 3 copies for one year: 42 Euro (EU subscription) 3 copies for one year: 66 Euro (International subscription) including postage and dispatch (3 issues) © 2016 by ProPress Publishing Group Bonn/Berlin A magazine of the Behörden Spiegel Group

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THE EUROPEAN – SECURITY AND DEFENCE UNION

THE EUROPEAN – SECURITY AND DEFENCE UNION Vol No 24

Content 17–38 MAIN TOPIC

3 Editorial 6 NEWS 8

The CSDP in action! The EU needs a more systematic approach to the CFSP/CSDP

UNHCR on new Greek refugee sites Documentation

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Wolfgang Wosolsobe, Brussels The European Union’s development in Security and Defence A spirit of cooperation is needed

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22

9–16 In the Spotlight Europe – one new challenge after another: refugees, Brexit, nationalism ... 10 Hartmut Bühl, Brussels If Brexit has to happen – then let it be done consistently There is some hope left 12

15

24

26

28

Gerald Knaus, Make the EU-Turkey agreement work! Mismanagement is hampering success

Alexa Keinert Europe in turmoil – what would Kant say? Plea for more transparency

31 35

37

Karl von Wogau, Brussels The future of the Eurocorps A key operational unit for the EU Franz Pfrengle, Strasbourg Eurocorps – a force for the European Union Spearhead of the CSDP Klaus Wittmann, Berlin NATO’s Warsaw Summit in July 2016 Preserving unity – looking ahead Hans Das, Brussels Strengthening the EU toolbox for Disaster Management and Humanitarian Aid Preparing for all scenarios Andy Francis Stirnal, Berlin FRONTEX – a fresh start? Reshaping the mandate EU missions and operations Documentation Jean-Marc Renucci /Aurélien Seguin, Paris The ATHENA mechanism’s smooth reform Global strategic capabilities to be procured Andrea Watts, London Into Africa: the unintended strategic outcome of “entente frugale” A quiet reversal of UK security strategy

Photos (cover): © EUMS, © EDA (left), © EU/ECHO/ Julie de Bellaing (right); page 4: © European Union 2016, EuropeanParliament (left), © EUMS (right)

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Content

39–52

53–62

Future Capabilities

Hybrid Energy Solutions

The Union must take a real interest in strengthening member states’ capabilities

Energy management and hybrid systems are not just a passing trend

40 Michael Gahler MEP, Brussels/Strasbourg The EU’s added value in improving member states’ capabilities Creating a new rationale 42

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45

48

54

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Jean-Paul Perruche, Paris An urgent need for deeds to match words The abyss between intentions and reality

Christina Balis, Paris The price of sovereignty Brexit threatens leadership in European defence

Thomas Homberg, Schrobenhausen European and transatlantic armaments cooperation Weak points and success drivers

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Sharon McManus, Brussels The European Defence Agency: meeting energy & environment challenges From Military Green to Mali Michael Rühle, Brussels NATO’s Comprehensive Approach to Energy Security The energy and security link Zsolt Végvári, Budapest Capable Logistician 2015 (CL15) An exercise using hybrid energy Interview with George Troullinos, Athens A strategy for supplying camps with smart energy Tailoring systems to demand

Christoph Erdmann, Düsseldorf A protective shield against electronic eavesdropping Data protection solutions

51 Michael Delueg, Vienna Joint forces command (JFC) and civil-military collaboration A crisis management system “The European − Security and Defence Union” is the winner of the 2011 European Award for Citizenship, Security and Defence

page 5: © EDA (left), Malcolm Lesley/Consultant (right)

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THE EUROPEAN – SECURITY AND DEFENCE UNION

Refugee and Migration Crisis

EUNAVFOR MED

Decrease in refugee arrivals in Greece

Operation Sophia extended

UNHCR figures show that so far this year, over 200,000 people have made the journey to seek safety in Europe. Almost three-quarters of these had travelled from Turkey to Greece prior to the end of March. Some 46,700 of these went to Italy. The North Africa-Italy route is dramatically more dangerous: 2,119 of the 2500 deaths reported so far this year are among people mak- Portuguese police officer during FRONTEX mission ing this journey. near the Greek island of Lesbos Since the beginning of April, the Photo: © European Union , 2015 / EC – Audiovisual Service / Angelos Tzortzinis number of people reaching the Greek coasts by sea has sharply decreased. There was an average of 119 daily arrivals in April, and only 51 daily arrivals between 30 May and 5 June which constitutes an 94% decrease compared with 870 daily arrivals in March. This is attributed to a variety of factors, such as the EU-Turkey agreement (which foresees that all new irregular migrants crossing from Turkey to the Greek islands as of 20 March 2016 will be returned to Turkey), the NATO operation in the Aegean, and the closure of the Balkan route. > To read more on the refugee crisis, see our interview with Gerald Knaus, Chairman and Founder of the European Stability Initiative (ESI), who recently travelled to Greece and the island of Lesbos to find out how well the EU-Turkey agreement is working in practice. (pages 12–13)

NATO Mission in the Aegean Sea On 21 April, NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg visited FGS BONN, the German flagship of Standing NATO Maritime Group 2 (SNMG2), currently deployed to the Aegean Sea. SNMG2 had arrived in the Aegean within 48 hours of the NATO Defence Ministers’ decision of 11 February to deploy ships to that area to support Greece and Turkey, as well as the European Union’s border NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg on his way agency Frontex, in their efforts to to the Aegean Sea, 21 April 2016 Photo: NATO tackle the refugee and migrant crisis. Thanks to the information collected by NATO ships, Greece, Turkey and Frontex are taking more effective action to break the business model of human traffickers and save lives. SNMG2 is a multinational maritime force made up of vessels from various Allied countries. These vessels are permanently available to NATO to perform different tasks ranging from exercises to operational missions. The force is currently under the command of Rear Admiral Jörg Klein, German Navy, and falls under the authority of Allied Maritime Command (MARCOM), Northwood, United Kingdom.

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On 23 May, EU Foreign Affairs Ministers underlined the need to enhance the capacity of EUNAVFOR MED Operation Sophia to disrupt the business model of human smugglers and trafficking networks and to contribute to broader security in support of the legitimate Libyan authorities. To that end, the Council agrees to extend the mandate of the EU military operation in the Southern Central Mediterranean (launched on 22 June 2015) by one year and, while retaining the focus on its core mandate, to add two further supporting tasks: 1) capacity building and training of, and information sharing with, the Libyan Coastguard and Navy, based on a request by the legitimate Libyan authorities taking into account the need for Libyan ownership; 2) contributing to information sharing, as well as implementation of the UN arms embargo on the High Seas off the coast of Libya on the basis of a new UNSC Resolution. web: http://tinyurl.com/jh6atzq > All ongoing civilian and military EU missions are listed on pages 31–33 > See also our Main Topic chapter “The CSDP in action!” (pages 18–38). This chapter opens with an article by the Director General of the EU Military Staff, Lt Gen Wolfgang Wosolsobe (pages 18–20)

COUNcil

External aspects of migration On 23 May, the Foreign Affairs Council adopted conclusions on the external aspects on migration in which it called for a strengthened common approach, emphasised the importance of cooperation in the area of returns and readmissions and commented on developments in the Eastern and Central Mediterranean route. Web: http://tinyurl.com/z3rseub


News

EU-NATO

Future Capabilities

Closer EU-NATO cooperation At the opening of meetings of the NATO Foreign Ministers, NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg stressed the need for closer cooperation with the European Union. In the presence of High Representative Federica Mogherini, Mr Stoltenberg called the two organisations “unique partners” working closely to fight illegal trafficking in the Aegean Sea. At the upcoming Warsaw Summit, NATO and the EU are aiming for a joint statement on cooperation, the fight against hybrid threats and a programme of NATO and EU exercises. > See the Article by Brig Gen (ret) Dr Klaus Wittmann on the upcoming NATO Summit in Warsaw in July 2016 (pages 24–25)

EU Battlegroups

Eurocorps becomes Force Headquarters At the end of the exercise “European Endeavour 16” (EUEN 16) conducted from 23 May till 2 June as the last of a series of test exercises, the Eurocorps multinational headquarters was certified to assume the role of a Force Headquarters for a European Battlegroup (EUBG) during the 2nd semester of 2016 (EUBG 2016-2). This Force Headquarters is composed of the Eurocorps headquarters and the contributions from Troop Contributing Nations including the dedicated Framework Nation Germany, as well as Austria, the Czech Republic, Croatia, the Netherlands, Ireland and Luxembourg. From 1 July 2016 onwards the Force Headquarters will be on stand-by for a possible activation by the European Union.

EDA Annual Report The European Defence Agency (EDA) recently published its Annual Report for 2015. The publication gives an overview of new developments which occurred in 2015 such as the adoption of the revised EDA Council Decision, as well as of the progress made in implementing the revised Capability Development Plan (CDP), the four key capability programmes and the roadmaps for future cooperation projects. Also showcased in the report are activities such as support to operations, research and technology (R&T), Single European Sky, exercises and training, energy and environment or VAT exemption on cooperation projects, which all progressed substantially in 2015. web: http://tinyurl.com/zsndg2v > See also our chapter Future Capabilities (pages 39–53), opening with an article by Michael Gahler MEP on the urgent need to improve Europe’s military capabilities (pages 40–41)

smart energy

EDA Energy Consultation Forum The second Conference on Sustainable Energy in the Defence and Security Sector took place on 8-9 June in Dublin as part of a two-year Consultation Forum (CF SEDSS) that was launched in January 2016. Following the successful start in Brussels, a European Defence Energy Network (EDEN) was established and is growing. Experts from national administrations, industry and academia continued their exchange in Dublin in three parallel working groups: energy management; energy efficiency focusing on buildings; and renewable energy.

The successful staff of Eurocorps HQ, May 2016

Photo: Eurocorps PAO

web: http://www.eurocorps.org > See the article by the Chief of Staff of Eurocorps, Brig Gen Franz Pfrengle (pages 22–23)

> This edition of our magazine again includes a chapter on Hybrid Energy Solutions aimed at reducing the use of fossil resources in the defence and security sector (pages 53–62) > See the article by Sharon McManus, EDA Energy Project Officer (pages 54–55)

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documentation

UNHCR worries about conditions at new refugee sites in Greece

(ed/nc, Paris) At the end of May, more than 8000 people were evacuated from the improvised Idomeni refugee camp on the Greek border with the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. At a briefing on 27 May in Geneva, UNHCR spokesperson Melissa Fleming expressed the UN refugee agency’s concerns about the bad conditions at several sites to which refugees and migrants had been evacuated. UNHCR also remains concerned about families being separated during their transfer. The agency renews its call for the immediate identification and establishment of new sites commensurate with the needs, and in full compliance with basic humanitarian requirements. UNHCR briefing note of 27 May 2016 “UNHCR is seriously concerned about sub-standard conditions at several sites in northern Greece where refugees and migrants were evacuated this week from the makeshift site at Idomeni, and urges the Greek authorities, with the financial support provided by the European Union, to find better alternatives quickly. UNHCR agrees that the makeshift site at Idomeni on the Greek border with the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, where refugees had been staying in abysmal conditions, needed to be evacuated, and notes that this has been completed without the use of force. However, the conditions of some of these sites to which the refugees and migrants are transferred fall well below minimum standards. Some of the refugees and migrants who had been living in Idomeni have been moved into derelict warehouses and factories, inside of which tents have been placed too tightly together. The air circulation is poor, and supplies of food, water, toilets, showers, and electricity are insufficient. Refugees transferred by bus from Idomeni received little information about conditions at the new sites and the duration of their stay there. UNHCR remains concerned about families being separated during their transfer. Spontaneous arrivals of refugee families, some of whom left Idomeni

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Idomeni refugee camp on the Greek border with the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, March 2016

Photo: © European Union , 2016, Source: EC – Audiovisual Service / Sakis Mitrolidis

on foot, have been reported at a number of the sites, which are already overcrowded. Poor conditions at these sites are compounding the already high level of distress of refugee families, fueling tensions within refugee populations and complicating efforts to provide required assistance and protection. UNHCR is in close contact with the Alternate Minister of Interior in charge of Migration Policy and proposes that the improvements it had suggested for some of the sites envisaged could be made as a matter of priority. UNHCR will continue to assist the Greek authorities to provide emergency assis-

tance and urgently improve conditions at these sites where possible. Where it is not possible to bring conditions up to minimal humanitarian standards, alternatives need to be found and made ready to accommodate refugees. UNHCR renews its call for the immediate identification and establishment of new sites commensurate with the needs, and in full compliance with basic humanitarian requirements. While such emergency temporary sites are necessary at present, UNHCR at the same time continues to increase the number of accommodation places through apartments and other reception facilities.” Web: www.UNHCR.org


In the Spotlight

“Let’s acknowledge that the answer to

every problem is not always more Europe. Sometimes it is less Europe.” David Cameron, UK Prime Minister

keep the United Kingdom in the EU, but that the UK must also make every effort in order to be able to stay.”  Martin Schulz, EP President

Photo: © European Union 2016, EP

“I believe that we must do everything to


THE EUROPEAN – SECURITY AND DEFENCE UNION

When egotism and a special status replace the community spirit

If Brexit has to happen – then let it be done consistently by Hartmut Bühl, Editor-in-Chief, The European – Security and Defence Union, Brussels

On 23 June 2016 the British people will be voting on whether the United Kingdom is to remain in the European Union. Just weeks away from the referendum, it is impossible to predict the outcome. The decision is in the hands of the British – and we can only hope that they will opt in favour of remaining within the European Community. In any case, the referendum will have far-reaching consequences not just for their country, but also for the other member states and for the Union as a whole. It comes at a time when the European Union already has its hands full with all the problems caused by the refugee crisis.

The stakes

Not a word on solidarity

Exit rules Although there are still no precise rules governing the procedure under Article 50 of the Treaty of the European Union (TEU), certain modalities have been laid down with a view to the procedure for a member state’s possible application to leave the Union. What is clear is that the European Union has the same rights in terms of shaping the exit modalities and future status of the United Kingdom as the country itself. It will be a long process that might weaken the European Union and will certainly not make the UK stronger – facts that probably have not been made clear to the British voting public.

Brussels seems to be pinning its hopes on the scales being tipped by voters’ fears of the financial complications and of the economic disadvantages that Brexit would entail for the UK. It is striking that concepts like solidarity, community spirit, European integration or common responsibilities in the area of conflict management and peacekeeping seem to be practically absent from this referendum campaign; what seems to be at issue, for Brexit supporters and opponents alike, is, to put it simply, money. If Brexit does happen, both camps seem to be speculating that the UK will continue playing an important role in and enjoy a special status with regard to the EU, with of course as few specific obligations towards it as possible. The Union should make it quite plain to the British public before the referendum that, while it recognises the problems that Brexit will pose for it as well, there can be no special treatment for the UK.

The House of Commons – the heart of UK politics

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The EU has very precise rules governing the admission of new member states to the Union, but practically none regarding the procedure for leaving it. The Commission should have adopted such provisions long ago, back in 2009 when the possibility for a member state to leave the Union was enshrined in Article 50 of the Lisbon Treaty (see box). We can only speculate that this has not been done due to the belief that “once a member, always a member.” But since nothing was done then, everything remains to be negotiated now.

Negotiations The first step is exit negotiations leading to an agreement that the European Council must adopt by a qualified majority after having obtaining the consent of the European Parliament. If no agreement is concluded within two years, that state’s member-

photo: Berit Watkin, CC BY 2.0, flickr.com


In the Spotlight

► Article 50

ship ends automatically, unless the European Council and the member state concerned decide jointly to extend this period. This rules out the possibility, often speculated about in London, of negotiating an association agreement during that period. Should the UK Government apply for an association agreement, this must be dealt with separately from the withdrawal procedure. Normally it would take seven years for the EU to negotiate an association agreement with other applicants – why make an exception in this case? Consequences • There will be a procedure for the British Prime Minister to follow. After the referendum, if the country votes in favour of Brexit, he will attend one last Council meeting with his fellow heads of state and of government, and after that will no longer be able to participate in any meetings concerning the Brexit negotiations. • It goes without saying that the UK will have to be passed over for the EU Presidency in 2017 and replaced by another state or the next country on the list after the UK. • Logically, the British Commissioner should step down, since he would otherwise be involved in the negotiations in his capacity as the Commissioner in charge of finances. • The 73 British MEPs, whose mandate would normally run until 2019, should also be given an appropriate opportunity to step down. They should not, in any case, participate in any EP votes pertaining to the exit agreement. The British are hoping to make their way, somehow, through these negotiations and to come out ahead. The British Government may try to obtain a special status – and thus be rewarded for Brexit?

The EU should not make any concessions The EU should not show any form of weakness in the Brexit negotiations, even if the UK has greatly contributed to the Union during its 43 years of membership. Any concessions would only encourage those people in the other member states who would also like to see their country exit the Union. The EU must therefore be consistently tough and leave aside its feelings of sympathy for the UK. The same applies with regard to the 27 other member states that will have to endure painful cuts in a number of areas. The basis for the negotiations should be as follows: • no locking onto the single market; • the obligation to leave the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP); • and thereby no more systematic blocking of the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP); • forfeiting of the right to participate in police cooperation and many other things. The British must be made to realise before the referendum that Brexit is going to hurt.

Treaty on European Union (TEU) ► 1. Any Member State may decide to withdraw from the Union in accordance with its own constitutional requirements. ► 2. A Member State which decides to withdraw shall notify the European Council of its intention. In the light of the guidelines provided by the European Council, the Union shall negotiate and conclude an agreement with that State, setting out the arrangements for its withdrawal, taking account of the framework for its future relationship with the Union. That agreement shall be negotiated in accordance with Article 218(3) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. It shall be concluded on behalf of the Union by the Council, acting by a qualified majority, after obtaining the consent of the European Parliament. ► 3. The Treaties shall cease to apply to the State in question from the date of entry into force of the withdrawal agreement or, failing that, two years after the notification referred to in paragraph 2, unless the European Council, in agreement with the Member State concerned, unanimously decides to extend this period. ► 4. For the purposes of paragraphs 2 and 3, the member of the European Council or of the Council representing the withdrawing Member State shall not participate in the discussions of the European Council or Council or in decisions concerning it. A qualified majority shall be defined in accordance with Article 238(3)(b) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. ► 5. If a State which has withdrawn from the Union asks to rejoin, its request shall be subject to the procedure referred to in Article 49. Source: http://eur-lex.europa.eu

Outlook In all likelihood there will be a negotiating marathon, particularly in view of the fact that the United Kingdom, with an 11 billion euro contribution in 2014, is the fourth biggest contributor to the Union budget. What will happen to those funds and what is to be done about the subsidies that the UK Government has already pocketed, including the 5.2 billion euros for British farmers and 4.9 billion euros for rural development, not to mention billions more elsewhere. There seems to be one question after another in the absence of any established procedures. We must hope that the European Commission will be a tough negotiator if Brexit does indeed happen, in order to make it clear to other countries that an exit application would be like running up against a brick wall. The best outcome, however, would be for the British to be made so aware of the consequences that they will vote against Brexit on 23 June 2016. Afterwards we would then, together, need to find an answer to the question of what a European identity means for nations with such diverse interests.

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THE EUROPEAN – SECURITY AND DEFENCE UNION

Serious mismanagement is hampering a solution to the refugee crisis in Europe

Make the EU-Turkey agreement work! Interview with Gerald Knaus, Chairman of the European Stability Initiative (ESI), Istanbul

The European: Mr Knaus, you are the Chairman and founder of European Stability Initiative (ESI). Reputedly you were the guiding spirit behind the Merkel plan for resolving the refugee crisis. You have just come back from the Greek island of Lesbos. Generally speaking, the EU’s plans for tackling this crisis with Turkey’s involvement do not appear to be working out in Greece. The recent meeting between Ms Merkel and Mr Erdogan was very cold and business-like. The European Parliament has distanced itself from the EU-Turkey plan. The Chancellor still appears to believe in her policy, but is it all starting to unravel? How do you perceive the situation? G. Knaus: In autumn 2015 we predicted that the right strategy by the EU and cooperation with Turkey might lead “within six weeks to a dramatic fall in the number of crossings in the Aegean.” The EU-Turkey agreement entered into force on 20 March. In fact, it only took two weeks for the number of daily crossings to fall from more than 1,100 a day in the first twenty days in March to one tenth that number in April, and to around 40 a day in May. And while some 800 people died in the Aegean in 2015 according to IOM (International Organization for Migration), following the entry into force of the agreement the number of people who drowned in the Aegean fell sharply, from 257 in January this year to zero in May.

“Today, the road to a credible EU policy on asylum passes through Lesbos.” Gerald Knaus

The European: Doesn’t this show that the agreement is working well, despite all the criticism? G. Knaus: Yes, all of this shows that with the right focus this agreement can produce results. And yet, there are reasons to worry that this focus is missing. The total number of people on the Greek islands (Lesbos, Chios, Samos, Leros, Kos) is now around 8,500. When I was in the Aegean a few days ago I learned from Greek officials that there were only two Greek asylum case workers for more than 2,200 people on Chios, and nobody at all for 500 people on Leros. At the same time the Greek Asylum service told the European Asylum Support Office (EASO) that it did not need more asylum case workers from the EU! This is a sign of serious mismanagement. As is the fact that such information is not published officially. EU reports on

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the implementation of the agreement do not state how many Greek case workers are working or how many cases they have decided. The European: Does this mismanagement come as a surprise to you? G. Knaus: All of this was predictable. The tiny Greek Asylum Service has less than 300 people. It did not function before 2013 and was staffed in the middle of an economic crisis. It has been struggling to cope ever since. And today it is again totally overwhelmed. One example: there are today some 46,000 people who might want to apply for asylum on the Greek mainland. Currently, for Arabic speakers, there is one hour a week, on Wednesdays at 1 pm, when they can apply for an interview for asylum via a Skype connection; and this connection rarely ever works. The European: And in human terms, what does this mean for the refugees? G. Knaus: In the Moria refugee camp on Lesbos there are many people who have been stuck for more than two months, with no chance to apply for asylum, and no information on what happens next. In the camps there is no management, and too little security. The EU and Greece should regard the treatment of these asylum seekers as a way to give an example. How else can they hope to see standards rise in other countries, such as Turkey, if conditions are bad in an EU member state? The European: Can you describe the current situation in these camps in Greece? G. Knaus: Those who work in these camps are very concerned today: there are riots and a lack of security, for those who are there as well as for outsiders. Even the few people who had an interview and who might even find that their claim is judged admissible, and that they can stay in Greece, have no prospects. This essentially means that due to the lack of a functioning asylum system they will face many months, if not years, of waiting for a real asylum procedure. If for some reason more people begin to arrive again on the islands – today, on some days, not one person arrives in Lesbos – the situation on the islands and on the mainland might quickly get out of control. And yet, all of this is avoidable, and could still be addressed with the right focus. The European: What practical solutions do you propose? G. Knaus: The EU and Greek authorities need to get their act together: the problems we see are due to lack of management


In the Spotlight

The life jackets of thousands of refugees and migrants. Picture taken by Gerald Knaus in the Lesbos countryside.

and bad organisation. Given how much is at stake this is surprising. What is needed is a serious EU Asylum Support Mission to take over the processing of asylum interviews on all islands, as a temporary measure, on the basis of Greek and EU law. At the end Greek officials might still take the final decision, but there is no reason at all that interviews and decisions are not being prepared on all islands today. The European: How could this be organised? G. Knaus: The best would be for Alexis Tsipras, the Greek prime minister, to invite the European Commission to reorganise its support urgently. This would be a pilot effort for future EU asylum operations in states with large numbers of asylum applications. A double-headed leadership, with one senior Greek official and one former head of an EU member state asylum office, could then run a coherent operation. The Greek asylum service would second case workers to this mission, as would member states. This would not even require a huge number of people: 300 asylum case workers, plus interpreters and administrative support, deployed on the islands, would be sufficient. Member states have pledged to make even more people available already. 300 people could aim to resolve 6,000 asylum claims in twenty working days, as one claim a day per case worker is realistic even now. The European: Which could be the immediate effect of the action you propose on the situation in Greece today and on the European asylum policy in the future? G. Knaus: Within a few weeks all claims on the islands would be decided. And then, once all claims on the islands are resolved, the mission should relocate to the Greek mainland and help Greece decide asylum applications and relocate refugees to the rest of Europe by the end of 2016. At the same time, the resettlement from Turkey foreseen in the agreement has to begin in earnest. And a mechanism ensuring full transparency for

what happens to everyone taken back from Greece to Turkey should be a key condition for visa freedom by the end of June 2016. Without this the whole EU-Turkey agreement risks failing. This would be crucial help for Greece. It would be an important success for the European Commission. It would also be a crucial step towards a credible European asylum policy. As Robert Schuman once put it: “Europe will not be built all at once, or according to a single plan. It will be built through concrete achievements.” Today, the road to a credible EU policy on asylum passes through Lesbos.

photo: G. Knaus

The European: If ever the EU-Turkey plan fails, what would be the likely political consequences for Europe? G. Knaus: Not having a deal with Turkey would be a disaster for Greece, bad for Turkey (which would be left without serious EU support) and bad for refugees, both for those now in Greece and those now in Turkey. It would also be very bad for the EU. The EU has failed to make relocation work so far. It is unable to ensure that its standards for treating refugees are implemented in EU member states. A breakdown of the EU-Turkey deal because of managerial incompetence on Greek islands would only embolden European populists, who already push an anti-refugee, anti-liberal, anti-European and anti-Muslim agenda. The political objective has to be to mitigate these risks. And the best way to do so is to make the agreement work. All ESI reports can be found here: www.esiweb.org

Gerald Knaus is ESI’s founding chairman. He spent five years working for NGOs and international organisations in Bulgaria and Bosnia and Herzegovina. From 2001 to 2004, he was the director of the Lessons Learned Unit of Photo: private the EU Pillar of the UN Mission in Kosovo. In 2011, he co-authored, alongside Rory Stewart, the book “Can Intervention Work?” He has also co-authored more than 80 ESI reports as well as scripts for 12 TV documentaries on south-eastern Europe. He is a founding member of the European Council on Foreign Relations and for five years he was an Associate Fellow at the Carr Center for Human Rights Policy at Harvard University’s Kennedy School, where he was a Visiting Fellow in 2010/2011 lecturing on state building and intervention. Twitter: @rumeliobserver.

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The European – Security and Defence Union The leading magazine for Europe’s Security Defence Community This magazine of the BehördenSpiegel Group, published and edited by Hartmut Bühl, is independent and makes a vital contribution to the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). By linking his magazine to the ProPress Publishing Group’s three most important annual conferences in Europe on European Security and Defence • the European Congress on Disaster Management (next congress 20/21 Sept 2016, www.civil-protection.com) • the Berlin Security Conference, the Congress on Security and Defence (next congress 29/30 Nov 2016, www.euro-defence.eu) and • the European Police Congress (next congress 21/22 Feb 2017, www.european-police.eu) Hartmut Bühl has succeeded in creating a veritable platform for community–building among the authors and readers of the magazine and the Congress participants. “THE EUROPEAN SECURITY AND DEFENCE UNION”

Winner of the European Award 2011 for Citizenship, Security and Defence

The magazine with its three editions in February, September and November is distributed worldwide but first and foremost throughout the EU and NATO institutions in Brussels as well as the governments, parliaments, armed forces and industries of the EU and NATO member states.

Authors of the magazine My vision of Europe Jean-Claude Juncker, President of the European Commission, Brussels

Worldwide secure governmental communications – a step towards global security Karim Michel Sabbagh, President & CEO of SES, Betzdorf

The European: 1/2015

The European: 2/2015

A sea of despair: where is the EU? Ana Gomes, MEP European Parliament, Brussels/Strasbourg The European: 2/2015

> Further Information about the magazine: www.magazine-the-european.com

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In the Spotlight

Communication in and about the European Union

Europe in turmoil – what would Kant say? by Alexa Keinert, Editorial Assistant, The European – Security and Defence Union, Berlin

Europe is in dire straits – this seems to have been the case at least since the Euro crisis. While there are numerous internal and external factors that have led to the current situation, generating contestation and criticism against the EU, this article will focus on just one aspect of those crises that is omnipresent but often overlooked: communication.

At the core of democratic societies: a lively public Why is communication so relevant here? The answer lies in the very beginnings of democratic society in modern Europe and in our normative and philosophical understanding of it. According to Immanuel Kant, to have a claim to validity and legitimacy a thing must be made public, for that which is kept hidden creates mistrust, while openness and accessibility enable accountability. Thus public debate and communication are central to modern democratic societies. It is the media and civil actors that most actively create this open discourse, by acting as an interface between governments and the public, as decoders between the two spheres. The European Union, with its population of almost 800 million, should not be any different in this regard: its impact on the everyday lives of European citizens is too great.

polarised positions on Union issues. This development is slowly replacing the technocratic approach that for a long time dominated the process of building the European Union.

Controversy instead of technocratic communication

The legacy of the past

Yet a failing for which the European Union is all too often criticised is its lack of a genuine European public sphere: there are almost no media that reach a Europe-wide audience. The few exceptions that do have a European scope – like the Arte television channel or this magazine – are restricted to specific issues and elite audiences. Interestingly, students of the Euro-

In spite of this positive development, there are normative as well as pragmatic reasons for calling for (even) more transparency in and better communication about and by the EU. But what are the reasons for this persistent shortfall? As recently pointed out by Frans Timmermans in an interview with the German weekly Die Zeit, a top-down, paternalistic approach to European integration made sense in the early years, when there was still “a lot of hatred” within European societies2. The idea was to convince Europe’s war-weary peoples not with arguments in public debates, but first and foremost with tangible results, with improvements in their daily lives. However, these societies have changed over the past decades, as have their expectations with regard to the political elites that govern them, whether at regional, national or European level. But, as Commissioner Timmermans pointed out, the European Union has not evolved accordingly.

“The European Union of the future has to be more transparent and communicative.” Alexa Keinert

pean public sphere and media observed1 that news coverage in European countries became more transnational during and due to what is frequently perceived as the ‘beginning of the end’ of the European Union: the Euro crisis. During this crisis, domestic issues took on a clearly European dimension, with problems in one member state impacting national policies in other member states. At the same time, EU policy-making became more politicised, with growing public controversy and increasingly

Commissioner Andrus Ansip in dialogue with citizens at the Humboldt Universität in Berlin 

photo: © European Union, 2015

No interest in Europe? Needless to say, communication is a two-way street. The EU’s (insufficient) public relations efforts must contend with predominantly negative reports about the EU on the one hand, and the extraordinary complexity of the Union, on the other. For the media, it is the dramatic nature of events and their closeness to

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THE EUROPEAN – SECURITY AND DEFENCE UNION

Alexa Keinert is the editorial assistant for this magazine. She recently obtained a Bachelor’s degree in communication and political sciences at the Freie Universität in Berlin. Since 2014 she has been involved in a research project exploring agenda-setting processes bePhoto: private tween online and mass media. Prior to her studies, she spent nine months in Brussels working for a policy platform on European foreign and security policy issues.

home that makes them newsworthy. The focus of news coverage tends therefore to be national, and on the negative rather than positive: good news is not news. In addition, politicans all too often contribute – for ideological or strategic motives – to the negative vision of the EU that seems increasingly to be dominating the public debate. To put it bluntly, they find it easy to shove the blame for unpopular decisions, regulations or outcomes onto the European level, stressing their powerlessness in the face of the European institutions, while attributing the achievements of the Union to themselves and the nation states. All this fuels the current climate of Euroscepticism instead of fighting prejudice and enlightening the public about the functioning and accomplishments of the EU, but also the areas in which it still needs to make progress.

The EU – a new narrative? It is enough to glance at the table of contents of this magazine to see that Europe is in turmoil: one member state is giving serious consideration to leaving the Union; others are under strain due to the failure to reach agreement within the EU on an equal distribution of refugees; the EU is being strongly criticised for its position in the TTIP negotiations; a rejection of

the European Union as a whole is gaining ground throughout Europe. Certainly, poor public relations cannot be held solely to blame for the current critical state of the EU. However, the example of the TTIP negotiations demonstrates that a lack of transparency and communication generates profound distrust and uncertainty with regard to the EU’s positions and objectives. Reflecting Kant’s normative theory that legitimacy is inextricably linked with publicity in the sense of transparency and accessibility, the basic demand of the TTIP opponents is that the public should be informed and involved. Instead of having a strong voice in the public debates about TTIP and the other abovementioned issues, the European Union has left the field to lobbies, advocacy groups, critics and anti-EU populists. What we are experiencing is polarisation and conflict: a community spirit and confidence in the Union and its ability to deal with the current challenges are almost nowhere to be found. The European Union of the future has to be more transparent and communicative.

Time to speak out It is difficult to predict what will happen on 23 June, which parties will win the upcoming national elections or how the refugee situation will evolve, and how all this will change the European Union, but clearly the EU of the future has to be more transparent and to make itself understood. What is needed is constant two-way communication, a real exchange of ideas, between citizens and the EU. It is, of course, difficult to influence which stories and events will be covered by the mass media, but the EU needs to be more present in, instead of only being the subject of, public debates. This does not mean that we should only hear about success stories from now on: conflicting opinions are essential to proper debate. There are comprehensible arguments against TTIP or in favour of Brexit, even for “good” Europeans. There are concerns and doubts about the right way to deal with the current critical situation. These must be addressed through a serious exchange of views. In summary, the European Union must become more tangible – not only through outcomes but also in their communication and as a political idea – and closer to its citizens. At the same time it must be made clear that the Union is more than its four institutions. It is essential to recall that the EU is not just a bureaucratic structure but represents the great ideal that has been crucial for (re)building this continent over the last 70 years and shows the way ahead towards an even more interconnected and globalised future. Or as Frans Timmermans put it, “Europe must become able once again to dream”. Thomas Risse (Ed.) 2015. European public spheres: politics is back. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

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European citizens showing their disagreement with TTIP at demonstrations in Brussels 

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photo: greensefa, flickr.com, CC BY 2.0

2 Read the complete interview here (in German only): http:// bit.ly/1TKTTwb.


Kolumnentitel

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The EU has proven its ability to successfully conduct military operations, disaster-relief and humanitarian missions as well as border protection operations through its agency Frontex. However, it lacks the strategic capabilities to live up to the complex requirements of future military operations. The EU must put an end to its dependence on NATO and develop its own strategic capabilities once and for all.

Photo: Š kaninstudio, Fotolia.com

The CSDP in action!

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THE EUROPEAN – SECURITY AND DEFENCE UNION

A spirit of cooperation is decisive for further coherence

The European Union’s development in Security and Defence by Lieutenant General Wolfgang Wosolsobe, Director General EU Military Staff, Brussels

It gives me special pleasure to write this valedictory contribution as Director General EU Military Staff (DGEUMS) and I am grateful for the opportunity to do so. Throughout my three years at the head of the European Union Military Staff, I very much appreciated “The European” and its unflagging push for a stronger European Defence. What I can offer here is a short look back over three years of sharing responsibility for the development and practice of the EU’s Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) from a military point of view, and some reflections for the future.

A look back The most striking aspect of this look back is an increasingly dynamic operational and security environment. Since 2013, we have seen critical developments in Mali, the Central African Republic, Ukraine and Libya, all with a strong impact on the EU’s crisis management in all its aspects. The crises in the Middle East, Yemen, south Sudan and the Lake Chad region (Boko Haram) touched the EU crisis-management mechanisms less directly, but required steady and growing attention. Terrorism these days is largely, but not exclusively linked to Daesh. It confronts EU citizens with additional and immediate challenges. The war in Syria has sparked an unprecedented wave of refugees. Neither affected EU Member States nor the EU itself has thus far been able to find satisfactory

“The separation lines between internal and external security no longer determine the shape of CSDP and we therefore should think about a broader context for military capability development.” Lt Gen Wolfgang Wosolsobe solutions. With the growing likelihood of seeing a much bigger flow of migrants heading for Europe from the African continent, the current events are a necessary wake-up call to be better prepared for later, much bigger challenges. One major underlying reason for the growing streams of migrants is climate change, worldwide and particularly in Africa.

The comprehensive approach... I started my term as DGEUMS at a moment when the European External Action Service (EEAS) was still a very young

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Lt General Wosolsobe with High Representative/Vice President Federica Mogherini, Brussels, May 2016

photo: John O’Loghlen, EUMS

organisation, greatly focused on refining and adapting its own organisation. In the meantime, the EEAS has gathered speed, and it did so in the circumstances described above. Its necessary adaptability included an improved understanding of the opportunities offered by the military dimension and I can clearly confirm that much more account is taken of military considerations than in earlier years.

...is more than just civ-mil cooperation These past years have brought home that a genuinely comprehensive approach has to be much broader than just civ-mil cooperation. The latter remains, however, an important building block for much wider cooperation between the EEAS and the European Commission departments dealing with external relations. The years since autumn 2014 have seen a reinforced and fruitful effort, at the level of the High Representative/Vice President (HR/VP), to harmonise lines of action across institutional boundaries. This will remain a dynamic process for the foreseeable future.

Cooperation between the EU and NATO The European Councils on Security and Defence of 2013 and 2015 unequivocally included the military in the EU’s instruments for addressing future security challenges. It was regularly highlighted that only close cooperation between the EU


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and NATO can unleash the full potential of European defence and security capabilities. Since 2010, the US has never ceased to call for a stronger European contribution to the transatlantic security effort. Such strategic messaging will be further reinforced with the publication of a European Global Strategy (EGS), intended for the European Council in June. This strategy should be the condensation of the experience of the past years, blended with an analysis of how that experience will translate into the future. It will be based on both values and interests.

What can we expect from the global strategy? It is reasonable to expect the EGS to become the starting point for a powerful process aimed at a real shift in European defence capabilities, in all respects. The EGS and the documents derived from it will have to describe how the EU intends to shoulder a larger share of the security burden. Whatever shape the follow-on process is to take, it has to build on the Strategy, be triggered by a high-level decision by Member States and involve Member States throughout the process. Only if these conditions are met can we expect Member States to provide the necessary hardware and software to strengthen European Defence and to consider the EU as an effective political framework for military action. The separation lines between internal and external security no longer determine the shape of CSDP and we should therefore think about a broader context for military capability development. Our future thinking should not exclude defence aspects, which must be seen in complementarity with NATO.

The common security interest must prevail What counts is the common security interest. This can also be effectively addressed in a NATO, UN or multilateral grouping.

Lt Gen Wolfgang Wosolsobe has been Director General of the EU Military Staff since 2013. Born in 1955 in Austria, he started his military career in 1974. In 1987 and 1988 he studied at France’s École Supérieure de Guerre Interarmées and Cours Supérieur Interarmées. In 1991 he joined the Austrian Diplomatic Mission in Geneva. His international career continued with his assignment from 1992 to 1997 as Defence Attaché to France. Back in Austria, he took over the command of the Austrian Special Forces. He was appointed Director for Military Policy in 1999, a post which he occupied until 2005. From 2007 until taking up his current post he was Military Representative in Brussels.

It is my profound conviction that it will be more and more difficult to deal with security challenges alone, as individual States. The Global Strategy, its follow-on documents and the European Defence Action Plan (EDAP) should provide the framework for more cooperation and cooperative action in security and defence. A sound level of cohesion and complementarity with NATO has to be sought. The conclusions to be drawn from the Strategy will relate not only to capability development in terms of armaments and equipment, but also to command structures, rapid reaction and situational awareness. The higher risk and frequency of serious security incidents and hostile action call for a more solid command structure, if only to maintain the current level of ambition. This is especially true for the non-executive military missions. Higher risk, higher tempo and higher complexity, as well as reduced predictability will require a step change in situatio-

Overview of the Operations and Missions of the European Union 2016

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THE EUROPEAN – SECURITY AND DEFENCE UNION

nal awareness and the EU’s capacity for strategic analysis. We need more Intelligence, Surveillance & Reconnaissance (ISR) at all levels and we need to better connect all the tools at our disposal, including EU delegations. All this should make for considerable improvement in the area of rapid response. Rapid response, once again, is not just about hardware: the spirit of rapid response has to be integrated into the security policy software of 28 Member States. Given the challenges NATO has to face and will be addressing at the Warsaw Summit, the EU’s rapid response planning should take NATO’s intended measures in this area into account. It is not only in the area of rapid response that we need to become more nimble and flexible: the same is true of the use of our mandates in existing missions and operations, both civilian and military. More needs to be done to better support regional approaches, benefiting from a CSDP presence in some parts of a region, whether it be the Sahel or the Horn of Africa.

A spirit of cooperation is decisive The comprehensive approach has progressed, but needs to be strengthened further. Coordination between an EU operational presence and non-EU actors is key, not only in terms of operational de-confliction and mutual support, but also of defining common objectives. The link between a steady situational awareness, early warning, security sector reform and crisis management has to become more systematic and must

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draw during all phases on all of the EU’s resources. For the same reason it is necessary to strengthen cross-institutional coordination. The EU’s progress in the field of capacity building for security and defence must be accelerated.

Conclusion These past three years have without a doubt seen a further strengthening of the EUMS as the sole provider of coordinated and consistent military advice, drawing on all sectors and layers of military experience and knowledge. This could not have been achieved in what is an ever more demanding environment without the sustained efforts of every single member of this staff. I am therefore confident that my successor, Lieutenant General Esa Pulkkinen (FIN Army), building on his wide-ranging and very European experience, will further build and strengthen the role of the EUMS as a building block of CSDP.

Above and beyond the EUMS, my thanks go to all the Operation and Mission Commanders and their personnel. It was extremely rewarding to cooperate with these highly qualified officers and to benefit from their wide-ranging experience. I wish ”The European”, and all those producing this most valuable review, many fruitful years of further contributing to the vital task of strengthening European Defence.


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A key operational unit for Europe

The future of the Eurocorps

by Dr Karl von Wogau, Honorary Member European Parliament, Secretary General of the Kangaroo Groupe, Brussels

(ed/hb, Brussels) At a meeting on 12 May with members of the Eurocorps in Strasbourg Karl von Wogau stated that the Eurocorps should play a central role in the Common Security and Defence Policy and become the preferred headquarters of the European Union. He suggested, moreover, that its five framework nations (France, Germany, Spain, Belgium and Luxembourg) should take the decision to place the Eurocorps at the permanent disposal of the European Union. When it comes to the Common European Security and Defence Policy CSDP, the European Union stands at a crossroads. In the 2003 Security Strategy it was still possible to say that Europe had never been so prosperous, so free and so secure. The events in Ukraine, Syria and Libya have profoundly changed this picture, however. Moreover, we are confronted with increasing instability at our borders, with a proliferation of arms, terrorism and hybrid warfare. If we continue to believe in an autonomous CSDP, we must strengthen the instruments created since the Helsinki and Cologne Summits.

A successful but low political profile The missions that have made use of the CSDP instruments have had a very low profile. The operations in the Congo, Chad, the Horn of Africa and Mali have been presented in the media as missions of the participating nations. There has been scarcely any awareness at all that these were European Union missions and that these soldiers were serving under the European flag. At this point, we have to make a choice: either we abandon the idea of an autonomous CSDP, or we take an initiative that will demonstrate that this idea is still alive.

coming the preferred operational headquarters of the European Union, whichever the operation. This would streamline the sometimes very time-consuming procedures, because unlike national headquarters the Eurocorps is already a multilateral HQ. This of course implies some major changes in governance, procedures and capabilities. In addition, common equipment in the field of Information, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (C5ISR) as well as in Cyber Security areas should be developed. This could be partly financed from the EU budget. But we should also discuss the human factor and – for me this is an urgent task – we must seek solutions to the problem of the very different social situations of the soldiers deployed in common European operations.

The creation of a true European pillar within NATO As a long-term goal we must build the European pillar of NATO. We will need to convince our American friends, who have always been critical of what they call a European caucus, that it is better to have one strong partner instead of 27 weak ones. Today we have a NATO of 1 plus 27. We should move towards a NATO that relies on the US as a superpower and the European Union as a strong European partner, as well as on several other allies with different levels of strength. But at the same time we have to convince our European governments to take more responsibility for the security of our continent and to organise themselves in a way to make this possible. The Eurocorps should become not only a useful instrument, but also a symbol for a Europe that contributes more to its own security.

Make the Eurocorps the instrument of the EU I therefore propose that the Framework Nations take the initiative of making the Eurocorps a centrepiece of the CSDP. This initiative will have to start with a smaller group of member countries, as was the case with Schengen and the Euro. The Eurocorps framework nations (France, Germany, Spain, Belgium, Luxembourg and later Poland) represent a good mixture of big, medium-sized and small member countries. This combination has been a good recipe for successful initiatives in the past. I therefore think that this group of countries would be well suited to launch this project. It could take the form of a simple agreement and then, at a later stage, feed into Permanent Structured Cooperation. That would mean that the Framework Nations would decide as a first step to place the Eurocorps at the permanent disposal of the European Union as proposed by the European Parliament. It would also mean the Eurocorps be-

Dr Karl von Wogau is Secretary General of the Kangaroo Group. Born in 1941 in Freiburg, he obtained his doctorate in law and economics. Member of the European Parliament from 1979 to 2014. He was Chairman of the EP Committee on Economic and Monetary AfPhoto: private fairs and Industrial Policy. From 2004 until leaving the EP, Karl von Wogau was Chairman of the Subcommittee on Security and Defence.

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THE EUROPEAN – SECURITY AND DEFENCE UNION

Operational for more than a decade in NATO missions

Eurocorps – a force for the European Union by Franz Pfrengle, Brigadier General, DCOS Operations Eurocorps, Strasbourg

Bamako, 18 December 2015 The final note of the European Anthem played by the Malian Armed Forces band in the noonday heat of the parade ground of Malian Armed Forces engineer battalion following the transfer of authority from Brigadier General Franz Pfrengle to Brigadier General Werner Albl marked the end of the Eurocorps’ first deployment for the European Union. With a little less than 60 soldiers of all ranks this deployment might appear to be a small contribution to the more than 500-strong European Union Training Mission Mali (EUTM Mali). But given that the majority of those soldiers filled key posts in the mission, including in the Command Group, and despite the fact that they were not officially sent under the Eurocorps flag, this deployment was the first widely visible sign of the rebalancing of the Eurocorps effort between the EU and NATO defined by Lieutenant General Alfredo Ramírez as a core aim of his stint as Commanding General. It is necessary to look back over the recent history of the Eurocorps in order to understand the reasons and the framework for this rebalancing.

The founding idea was to push European Defence When Eurocorps was founded in 1992, the idea was to give a push to a more European Defence following the end of the Cold War. Just one year later, in order to show that the aim of this initiative was not competition but complementarity with NATO, the Eurocorps became closely linked with the NATO structures via the so-called SACEUR Agreement. Only two of the current High Readiness Force HQs were in existence at that time: the Allied Rapid Reaction Corps and Eurocorps. In keeping with this logic and due to the rapidly evolving political environment, with the process of European integration and the reliance on NATO’s crisis-proofed structures to handle the crises around Europe

and other parts of the world, the focus of European crisis-management efforts shifted to the comprehensive approach and to small-scale missions.

... but NATO prevailed There was no strong common political resolve to build a strong redundant European military structure. For Eurocorps this meant that, apart from the initial idea, it was the NATO procedures and operations that provided the main criteria and guidance for its own organisation and focus. This is why all major Eurocorps engagements such as, for example, SFOR, KFOR, ISAF and NRF, were for NATO or within the NATO structure, until

Eurocorps’ headquarters during the NATO NRF exercise “Steadfast Jaguar” on the island of Cap Verde in 2006, where the multinational army corps proved its complete operational readiness

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photo: © Eurocorps/POA


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the Framework Nations adopted the new concept of employment in 2014 and decided on the Mali deployment in January 2015.

On the way to becoming the CSDP spearhead With the stepping up of European cooperation, as entrenched, for example, in the 2009 Lisbon Treaty, as well as the evolving security situation on Europe’s periphery, it became increasingly necessary for the EU to develop or further develop its own crisis-management and crisis-prevention tools in order to implement its Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). This was particularly the case in Africa, with which the European states have close ties due to their history and, in particular, their geographic proximity. It was both possible and necessary for Eurocorps as a truly multinational, fully deployable and highly autonomous headquarters, with its European core idea and representing through its framework and associated nations more than 50% of the European population, to be part of that development. Taking advantage of the recently approved Concept of Employment for Eurocorps and Letter of Intent between the EU Military Staff (EUMS) and Eurocorps, it is the aim of Eurocorps to become the preferred military asset of the EU. Nevertheless, the strong ties with NATO that have constituted the main reference framework for the last 20 years can and will not be loosened.

Brig Gen Franz Xaver Pfrengle was appointed Chief of Staff of EUROCORPS in January 2016. Born in 1956 in Furtwangen, Germany, he joined the Bundeswehr in 1975 and took part in the Engineer Officer Training scheme, pursuing studies in mechanical engineering at the Bundeswehr University, Hamburg. After participating in the UNOSOM mission in Somalia, he became Section Chief G3 Operations at the EUROCORPS headquarters. He joined the German Ministry of Defence as Assistant Branch Chief of “Military Policy and Bilateral Relations” in 1998, and, after two years as Course Director at the Army General Staff Course in Hamburg, he returned to the MoD in 2002 to work as Assistant Director for Europe, ESDP and Africa. Prior to his current position, Mr Pfrengle was Deputy Chief of Staff Operations EUROCORPS and was deployed as Mission Commander of the EUTM to Mali.

There are capabilities to be used Eurocorps’ potential value for the EU stems mainly from its two core strengths: its modularity and its unique multi-nationality. Modularity means being able to detach specific capabilities in well-defined domains while keeping options open for the use of remaining HQ assets. This is of particular interest for the EU, because up until now all CSDP operations have been much smaller in size than the recent NATO operations. A good example is the commitment to deploy the core of the EUTM Central Africa Mission HQ while at the same time providing a Force HQ for one EU Battle Group (EUBG). The truly multinational nature of Eurocorps, which is often seen as a two-sided coin during peacetime, is of the utmost importance when it comes to the EU’s CSDP missions. During the recent deployment within EUTM Mali, one cannot over-emphasise how useful it was that the key personnel of the mission already knew each other, having worked together in Strasbourg, and were aware of the difficulties of working in a multinational environment and how to mitigate them. This was a key experience for Eurocorps and showed the usefulness of permanent multinational structures as a form of preparation per se for CSDP missions.

There will always be close links with NATO In light of the strong advantages of a closer connection between Eurocorps and the EU, the question that arises is why Eurocorps wants to strike a balance between the EU and NATO rather than focusing entirely on the EU. One reason is the need to remain in the strong and mission-proofed framework of the

Brigadier General Franz Xaver Pfrengle in Mali 

photo: © Eurocorps

NATO procedures and structures. The second and main reason, which is also clearly visible in the history of Eurocorps, is that the CSDP was never meant to compete with NATO but rather to close the gap that existed between NATO’s common defence focus and its own crisis-prevention interests in the EU’s neighbourhood. This is why it is so important, particularly in times of constrained budgets, to maintain and develop synergies wherever possible.

Looking to the future of Eurocorps The way ahead is clearly indicated by the intentions and commitments announced by its Framework Nations. With the NATO commitment for the Land Component Command of the Very High Readiness Joint Task Force on the horizon for 2020, the assignment to two successive EUBG Force HQ tasks while at the same time being deployed to at least two CSDP missions within 24 months underlines the will to strengthen the partnership formally set out in the Letter of Intent with the EUMS. This theoretical construct must now be fleshed out with real actions to the mutual advantage of both the EU and Eurocorps.

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Preserving unity – looking ahead

NATO’s Warsaw Summit in July 2016 by Dr Klaus Wittmann, Brigadier General (ret), Senior Fellow, Aspen Institute Germany, Berlin

In Berlin, the departing SACEUR, General Breedlove, recently talked about “the road through, not to Warsaw”. Indeed, NATO Summit meetings are not endpoints, but stages in the continuous transformation of the Alliance. Taking place biennially, these meetings of NATO’s Heads of State and Government serve the purpose of self-ascertainment and important decisions, and they have a catalytic function for consensus-building: topics of months-long dispute at staff and ambassador levels are in the end not important enough to bother the “Chiefs” with. Still, this is a special summit, conducted in the capital of a former Warsaw Pact member, where NATO’s opponent alliance was once founded. Also, it is the first since the one in Cardiff, Wales, in September 2014, where initial conclusions were drawn from the awareness that a new confrontation with Russia had started – a Russia which pushes aside the rules of the European security order laid down in Helsinki 1975 and confirmed in Paris 1990, and which uses brutal (albeit partly covert) military force for furthering its objectives. NATO is back in the Article 5 world. This has grave implications.

Collective defence remains a core task Important to realize: NATO’s history is commonly told in three phases: Cold War, “stability transfer” to Central and Eastern Europe, and out-of-area operations. This is a correct periodization, but it is often misunderstood – as if the new phase with its tasks had replaced the previous one. No, new missions have come on top: the security of its members will remain a permanent NATO task, much remains to be done for a “Europe whole and free”, and foreign missions will also be asked of NATO in the future. “NATO 4.0”, proclaimed by some analysts, is gewgaw without cognitive value. Collective defence, crisis management and cooperative security are NATO’s core tasks, and after the pendulum had swung drastically to the out-ofarea side (also with regard to military capabilities), President Putin reminded Allies of the central priority of territorial and alliance defence.

Preserve the cohesion of the Alliance The main task of the Warsaw Summit will be to preserve Alliance cohesion. On the one hand, NATO’s (and the EU’s) unity vis-à-vis Russia’s aggression was unexpected by the Kremlin, and at the Wales Summit the right decisions were made for enhancing capabilities, readiness, reaction time and reassurance for the exposed Eastern Allies. On the other hand, the Southern NATO members do not want to see overly exclusive priorities in

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Dr Klaus Wittmann, Brig Gen (ret) was born in Lübeck in 1946. He is Senior Fellow at the Aspen Institute Germany and teaches contemporary history at Potsdam University. In 2008 he ended a 42 year career in the German Bundeswehr service Photo: private that included troop command, academic phases (university studies in history and political science as well as a year at the International Institute for Strategic Studies, London), political-military work in the German Ministry of Defence and at NATO Headquarters, and positions in higher military education. His last assignment was Director Academic Planning and Policy at the NATO Defence College, Rome.

the East in light of the threats emanating from across the Mediterranean – although it is clear that state failure, extremism, lack of prospects and terrorism are not amenable to military measures. NATO needs a 360° view and must satisfy the interests of all its members. Other topics for Warsaw include the Partnership policy, the future of NATO enlargement and its nuclear strategy. Also necessary are conceptual progress and decisions on “hybrid” warfare and cyber threats – and closer cooperation with the European Union.

Implementation of the Wales decisions Regarding the implementation of the Wales decisions, there will be a stocktaking of the Rapid Reaction Plan (RAP), defence preparations in CEE countries, readiness of headquarters like that of the Multinational Corps Northeast at Szeczin, exercises and reinforcement preparations. Understandably, the Eastern Allies want as much NATO military presence as possible, demonstrating – like in the Cold War with the “layer cake” General Defence Plan along the inner German border - that an attack on one is an attack on all. NATO must be visibly ready for, and capable of, defending every square inch of its members’ territory and, preferably, deterring any encroachment by a Russia of which nobody knows how far the leadership is prepared to go in its policy of brinkmanship. The majority of Allies will want to remain within the confines of the NATO Russia Founding Act of 1997. Even if violated by Russia in letter and spirit, it is to be preserved “for better times”


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– just as the NATO-Russia Council (which, in its crisis-management mode, should have been meeting quasi permanently since the outbreak of the Ukraine conflict). But it is not true that the Founding Act “forbids” the stationing of NATO troops in CEE countries. Politicians and media who contend this should look at the text, where a unilateral NATO commitment is reaffirmed in cautious terms: “NATO reiterates that in the current and foreseeable security environment, the Alliance will carry out its collective defence and other missions by ensuring the necessary interoperability, integration, and capability for reinforcement rather than by additional permanent stationing of substantial combat forces.” This leaves a lot of flexibility; the one US brigade and several battalions envisaged for (rotational) “persistent” instead of “permanent” stationing are certainly below that threshold.

The future relationship with Russia An important subject for this summit as well as for the ensuing ones and for many other fora is the future relationship with Russia. For this, the 1967 Harmel philosophy of defence and détente, firmness and readiness for dialogue is still the right

concept, even in the face of President Putin’s intransigence and reliance on nuisance power, prevention force, surprise actions and intimidation of, if not blatant aggression against, neighbours. For in the long run, it is clear that, like the declining Soviet Union, Putin’s Russia needs “new thinking” in foreign and security policy – as part of its urgent modernisation. The West, particularly NATO, should facilitate this by self-critically acknowledging its share of the responsibility for the gradual worsening of the relationship over the last almost 20 years (which, however, by no means justifies military aggression). The offer for cooperative as opposed to confrontational security must be held out, and the long-neglected serious discussion about Russia’s place in the European security order should at last be initiated, over the long haul, with patience and an extremely frank debate about both sides’ respective interests. It is true that in the long run security in Europe cannot be organised against, but only with Russia. But it is also true that the Russian leadership has for the foreseeable future made many countries more concerned about security from Russia. That is in nobody’s interest.


THE EUROPEAN – SECURITY AND DEFENCE UNION

The EU needs to prepare for all scenarios

Strengthening the EU toolbox for Disaster Management and Humanitarian Aid by Hans Das, Head of the Civil Protection Policy Unit, DG ECHO, European Commission, Brussels

The recent refugee and migration crisis has given rise to unprecedented humanitarian needs within the European Union. These come on top of an increasing trend in natural disasters and man-made disasters in recent years. Science predicts that future disasters will be more extreme and more complex, with far-reaching and longer-term consequences as a result. Recent terrorist attacks have brought home the need to prepare for all scenarios, and the Ebola crisis has demonstrated the devastating effect of public health threats if these are not managed properly from the outset. Against this backdrop, Europe is stepping up its cooperation in the field of disaster management, adding new instruments to its toolbox in order to address these global challenges in a timely and tangible manner. This article focuses on two new developments, which both show the Union’s capacity to take decisive action in the face of growing threats.

A new Emergency Support Regulation Between January 2015 and April 2016, almost 1.2 million people – refugees, asylum-seekers and migrants – made their way to the European Union by sea, either to escape conflict in their countries of origin or in search of a better and safer life. The crisis has sparked an urgent need for essential relief items, equipment and services to meet the basic needs of refugees. Since September 2015 Hungary, Slovenia, Serbia, Croatia and

Hans Das

Photo: © EU/ECHO/ Julie de Bellaing

has been the Head of the Civil Protection Policy Unit of the European Commission since March 2012. His responsibilities include all policy development and international cooperation in the field of European civil protection. Previously, he was the Head of DG ECHO’s Emergency Response Unit. Hans Das joined the European Commission in 2004.

Greece have all activated the Union Civil Protection Mechanism (UCPM)1 to request in-kind assistance. Many Member States have made, and are continuing to make, meaningful contributions, notwithstanding the fact that they are themselves experiencing pressure on resources. During an emergency with wide-ranging impacts that potentially affect all Member States, it is not always possible for the latter to provide assistance to others in need. Against this background it became clear that the funding instruments that the EU has at its disposal (e.g. the Asylum, Migration and Integration Fund – AMIF – or the Internal Security Fund – ISF) and the

NEWS

World Humanitarian Summit On the occasion of the World Humanitarian Summit on 23-24 May in Istanbul, Kristalina Georgieva, Vice-President of the European Commission, Neven Mimica, Commissioner for International Cooperation and Development and Christos Stylianides, Commissioner for Humanitarian Aid and Crisis Management, issued the following statement (excerpts): “Every day, thousands of innocent people are the victims of natural disasters

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and conflict. Over 130 million men, women and children depend on humanitarian assistance across the world, and the needs are constantly growing.(…)We welcome the political communiqué endorsed on this occasion. The European Union pledged individual commitments at the summit concerning policies, programmes and funds it is responsible for and is committed to strong progress on each of the five core responsibility areas, for which core commitments

have been formulated by the UN. The World Humanitarian Summit has come to an end today, but our work towards a new global partnership linking political action to prevent crises, development assistance and more effective and principled humanitarian aid has only just begun. The challenges we are facing are complex, and there is no simple solution.(…)” web: www.worldhumanitariansummit.org


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ESCRIM Field Hospital, France

voluntary assistance provided via the UCPM could not cater for all the needs of refugees and that further action was required in order to avoid the makings of a humanitarian tragedy. This led the European Commission to propose a new Emergency Support Regulation for the Union. This was agreed and formally adopted by the Council on 15 March 2016.2 This new instrument enables the European Commission to provide emergency financial support to implementing partners, particularly the European Commission’s humanitarian partners3, for urgently needed emergency support within the EU. It is the very first time in the history of the EU that financing is being provided to support humanitarian relief operations inside the Union. To help respond to this crisis the Union will make available 700 million in emergency support over the course of the next three years. The first projects to be selected received support as early as 18 April 2016 and are already having a positive impact on the ground. This instrument can also be used to respond to future exceptional disasters with severe and wide-ranging humanitarian consequences for the Member States.

Corps (EMC). The EMC will bring together emergency medical teams, public health experts, mobile laboratories and medical evacuation capacities, as well as teams and experts in the area of public health, medical coordination and logistical support. Belgium, the Czech Republic, Finland, France, Luxembourg, Germany, Spain, Sweden and the Netherlands are amongst the first contributors to the EMC. The EMC teams can be mobilised for any type of emergency with health consequences, at short notice, as and when needed. Quality and interoperability standards are being developed, in close cooperation with the World Health Organisation, and teams participating in the EMC will Photo: ESCRIM need to undergo joint EU-WHO certification. In return for their availability and certification, they benefit from EU funding for adaptation and deployment. The EMC is expected to significantly increase the availability of doctors and medical equipment in response to emergencies, and will also make for better emergency response planning and preparations. The nine European countries that have contributed to the first EMC teams have led the way. Cooperation is at the heart of the EMC and we look forward to the participation of more UCPM countries to ensure the success of this project aimed at genuine European solidarity during disasters.

Conclusion In today’s interconnected world, European cooperation is indispensable in order to provide an efficient and coordinated response to wide-ranging disasters in Europe and worldwide. The European Medical Corps and the new EU emergency support instrument are relevant and timely illustrations of Europe’s determination to be a force for positive change and to address the new challenges of today’s globalised world.

Learning from Ebola – European Medical Corps The Ebola outbreak in Western Africa, which killed more than 11,000 people, was a wake-up call for the international community to take urgent action to strengthen the world’s capacity to respond to health emergencies. Learning the lessons from Ebola, the European Commission took rapid steps to reinforce the coordination and planning of the health emergency response in Europe, while contributing to the global efforts in this field led by the WHO. Less than a year later, in February 2016, the EU launched the European Medical

Created in 2001, the UCPM facilitates cooperation in disaster prevention, preparedness and response among the 34 participating states: 28 Member States plus Norway, Iceland, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia and Turkey.

1

2

3

Council Regulation (EU) 2016/369 on the provision of emergency support within the European Union.

Namely, international organisations and agencies, non-governmental organisations in the field of humanitarian aid and specialised services of Member States.

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THE EUROPEAN – SECURITY AND DEFENCE UNION

FRONTEX 2016: new challenges, new name, new mandate

FRONTEX – a fresh start?

by Andy Francis Stirnal, Correspondent for The European - Security and Defence Union, Berlin

The European Commission proposal to reshape the mandate, the mission and the financing method of the European Border Management Agency – known as FRONTEX – is currently drawing the attention of actors inside and outside the legislative triangle of power. More than ten years after its establishment, the agency is in a difficult position: while it is now needed as never before, FRONTEX has also attracted a good deal of criticism regarding both its policies, and its role as a representative of the European Union. The process, the issues and the timing of the discussion about a new FRONTEX mandate are also determined to large degree by the extent and scope of the refugee situation – a recurring problem faced by Europe, whose intensity increases in spring and summer - with regard to its humanitarian dimension. This crisis, in turn, has a strong impact on the credibility of European institutions and politics, as well as Europe’s effectiveness in the arenas of the public sphere and community spirit.

A European agency – but no actor But let’s be specific. The origin of the agency lay in the will and understanding, that in order to foster a central principle of the Union - the free movement of people – a coordinated approach was needed. This coordinated approach needed to define and manage the borders of the area where free movement should be guaranteed. But limitations in the mandate and the operational capacity of FRONTEX have restricted its ability to address, manage and cope with the situation created by the increased

migratory influx in the past months in an effective and accepted way. Why is that? FRONTEX is currently not able to purchase its own resources, nor does it have its own operational staff. The agency is depending on member state contributions, their equipment and capacities including the “deliberate will” to cooperate. One consequence – which might have been desired, once – is that the agency is unable to carry out its own return or border management operations without the prior request of a member state. Neither does FRONTEX have an explicit mandate to conduct search and rescue operations.

There is a new kid in town The new agency will be strengthened and reinforced to address all the issues the Commission proposal states. The new shape of the agency is intended to bring union-wide standards for border management to all external borders. Included in this plan are liaison officers, who will be seconded to member states, as well as a deepened exchange of data. The permanent staff will double, and to be deployed for the first time using equipment. The agency will purchase, own and appoint this equipment to operations on the basis of so-called “vulnerability assessments” on short notice. An additional reserve pool of border guards, along with a technical equipment pool will be at the disposal of the agency to avoid the shortages of staff and equipment that the agency saw in the past. This proprietary equipment of the future agency can be – following the Councils negotiating position communicated in April 2016 – complemented by equipment in co-ownership with the member states. The latter can acquire the needed means of transport and operating equipment under the Specific Actions of the Internal Security Fund. Alongside these changes comes a new name for the agency whose exact “scale” seems to be subject to discussion. The European Commission’s proposal for a “European Border and Coast Guard Agency” appears to have lost the “coast guard” element over the course of discussions in the European Council. The Permanent Representative struck this phrase from their negotiating position on the proposed regulation on the European Border Guard. As we see, the changes in the Council document are not just formal in nature.

Is the intergovernmental approach outdated?

FRONTEX Director Fabrice Leggeri at a panel discussion at the Dahrendorf Symposium Berlin, 27 May 2016. On his left, Judy Dempsey from Carnegie Europe 

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Photo: © FRONTEX

A very controversial element of the Commission proposal for a strengthened mandate concerns the allowance for operations to take place in the absence of the agreement of the member state on whose territory the operation takes place. Besides monitoring and supervisory responsibilities, the commission


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“The new mandate brings new structures and budgetary rules alongside a reshaped area of responsibility.” Andy Francis Stirnal envisaged the capacity for an intervention in urgent situations – either at the request of a member state or when a member state is unable or unwilling to take timely corrective action after an ‘urgent situation’ (one that puts the Border Security and the functioning of the Schengen area at risk) is identified. These implementing procedures that follow a prior vulnerability assessment appear to be softened in favour of a stronger involvement of the European Council with regard to the “potential politically-sensitive nature” of the measures to be decided, often touching on national executive and enforcement powers. The “European Border Guard Agency” shall determine the actions to be taken but an operational plan should be drawn up with the member state concerned.

Central debates in the European Parliament Several very important issues, however, are outlined in the current proposals and statements in an ambiguous manner. Within the very long list of future tasks and operations that are meticulously described in the relevant documents – ranging from the setting up of European Border Guard Teams, including a rapid reserve pool that is to be deployed in joint operations with member states, rapid border interventions and management operations as well as in return operations – a clear statement for search and rescue operations does not appear. The Commission proposal as well as the Council’s negotiating position barely stipulate that the operations planning should take “into account that some situations may involve humanitarian emergencies and rescue at sea”, as outlined in the Council proposal. The FRONTEX Director Fabrice Leggeri is an important voice in the discussion of a new mandate. In April 2016 he stated in the Guardian that the Joint Operation Triton “cannot be a search-and-rescue operation” denying that in the operational plan provisions for proactive search-and-rescue action could be implemented. This unclear position is surprising. Certainly, and it does not meet current needs. Indeed, that FRONTEX is capable of saving lives is clear – operation TRITON rescued nearly 60.000 people in 2015 in the Central Mediterranean. FRONTEX proved its competence. And, for the sake of Europe’s Values, it should be enabled to continue to do so.

ary arguments – and will likely push for a clearer commitment when it comes to such “ideas” as were stated Commissioner Dimitris Avramopoulos. At least, the Council acknowledges in his negotiating positions the need for training in relevant Union and international law, including on fundamental rights, access to international protection and appropriate search and rescue policies. On 30 May 2016, the Civil Liberties Committee in the European Parliament officially backed the plan to set up an integrated border management system for the EU. Rapporteur Artis Pabriks (EPP) stressed that the “EU needs safer, better managed external borders and thus the European Border and Coast Guard (EBCG) as soon as possible.” How to reach that aim while equally considering the operational, political as well as the humanitarian dimension is now negotiated in trilogue talks between the European Parliament, Council and Commission. Although this year means a fresh start for FRONTEX, it cannot be excluded that a 2016 edition of the “Mediterranean Sea Drama” will follow the very well-known – but unbearable – script we have seen thus far.

A counterpoint made by the Frontex Director In contrast, Fabrice Leggeri chose moderate tones during the Dahrendorf Forum in Berlin on 25 – 27 May 2016, when he expressed that “Europe needs a credible border, not necessarily a closed border”. This view is potentially closer to the position of the European Parliament, which stressed already in December 2015 in a non-binding resolution that the fundamental rights of migrants and asylum seekers should be considered in a new FRONTEX mandate. It is very possible that the European Parliament will be a strong negotiator – equipped with budget-

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documentation

EU Missions and Operations as at May 2016 Since 2003 the EU has launched 30 civilian and military missions and operations. Currently 17 missions and operations are being conducted by the Union worldwide (6 military and 11 civilian). This table is based on information received by the EU Military Staff (EUMS) in May 2016.

EU FORCE ALTHEA (EUFOR)

EUAM UKRAINE TYPE

EU Advisory mission for civilian security sector reform.

OBJECTIVE

Contribute to the development of effective, sustainable and accountable civilian security services. Contributing to strengthening the rule of law in Ukraine.

MANDATE

The mission was launched July 2014 and its current mandate is till 30 November 2017. Headquartered in Kyiv with a mobile presence in the regions.

COMMITMENT

Head of Mission: Kestutis Lancinskas (LT). Strength: Altogether 173, deployed 88 international and 72 nationals. Budget: €15 Mio for December 2015 to December 2016.

BOSNIA AND HERZGOVINA (BIH) TYPE

Military EU-led operation. UN Chapter VII mission.

OBJECTIVE

Maintain a Safe and Secure Environment (SASE), and conduct capacity building and training of the Armed Forces.

MANDATE

In December 2004, EUFOR took over responsibilities from the NATO-led Stabilisation Force (SFOR) Berlin+ arrangement operation.

COMMITMENT

Commander: General Sir Adrian Bradshaw (UK) is the EU Operations Commander; Major General Schroetter (AT) is the Force Commander. Strength: 631 troops from 17 EU Member States and 5 Third Contributing States.

EULEX KOSOVO

Europe / Asia

TYPE

EU Rule of law mission under the CSDP.

OBJECTIVE

EULEX Kosovo’s task is to monitor, mentor and advise local authorities with regard to police, justice and customs, while retaining executive responsibilities in specific areas of competence.

MANDATE

Launched on 16 February 2008, the mission’s current mandate runs until 14 June 2016. Headquartered in Pristina.

COMMITMENT

Head of Mission: Gabriele Meucci (IT) Strength: 800 international mission members and 753 local staff. EU Member States and five Third State Contributors: Norway, Switzerland, Turkey, USA and Canada are supporting the mission. Budget: €77 million for 15 June 2015 to 14 June 2016.

EUNAVFOR MED

CENTRAL SOUTHERN MEDITERRANEAN TYPE

Operation SOPHIA – EUNAVFOR MED

OBJECTIVE

Operation to contribute to disrupting the business model of human smuggling and trafficking networks in the Southern Central Mediterranean. Undertake systematic efforts to identify, capture and dispose of vessels as well as enabling assets used or suspected of being used by migrant smugglers or traffickers.

MANDATE

The operation shall end no later than 12 months after Full Operational Capability (FOC) 2016. The EU Operation Headquarters is located at Rome (Italy)

COMMITMENT

Operation Commander: Rear Admiral (UH) Enrico Credendino (IT Navy) Force Commander: Rear Admiral (LH) Andrea Gueglio (IT Navy). Strength: Currently 21 Member States are participating in the operation. The flagship is the Italian Aircraft carrier CAVOUR, 3 surface units and 6 Air Assets will be deployed. Budget: €11.82 million from July 2016 to July 2017.

civilian mission

EUPOL AFGHANISTAN EU Police mission with linkages into wider rule of law.

OBJECTIVE

EUPOL Afghanistan supports the building of a civilian police force operating under an improved rule of law framework and in respect of human rights with Institutional reform of the Ministry of Interior (MoI) and professionalisation of the Afghan National Police (ANP).

MANDATE

Launched on 12 June 2007, the mandate expires on 31 December 2016.

COMMITMENT

Head of Mission: Pia Stjernvall (FI). Strength: 316 staff, deployed 124 international and 143 local staff. Budget: €43.6 million in the year 2016.

EUMM GEORGIA TYPE

EU civilian monitoring mission/ CSDP framework.

OBJECTIVE

Following the 2008 armed conflict in Georgia, EUMM provides civilian monitoring of parties’ actions, including full compliance with the Six Point Agreement and subsequent implementing measures on a countrywide basis throughout Georgia, including South-Ossetia and Abkhazia. Close coordination with the UN and OSCE.

MANDATE

Launched 15 September 2008, the Mission’s mandate has been extended to 14 December 2016. Headquarters in Tbilisi with 3 Regional Field Offices in Mtskheta, Gori and Zugdidi

COMMITMENT

Head of Mission: Kestutis Jankauskas (LT) Strength: Currently 23 EU Member States are contributing to the mission.

military mission

graphics: The ESDU/Beate Dach, source: EUMS

TYPE

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THE EUROPEAN – SECURITY AND DEFENCE UNION

EU Missions and Operations as at May 2016 EUBAM LIBYA

EU INTEGRATED BORDER MANAGEMENT ASSISTANCE MISSION

EUTM MALI

EU TRAINING MISSION, MALI

TYPE

EU Border assistance

TYPE

Military mission to contribute to the training and advice of the Malian Armed Forces (MaAF).

OBJECTIVE

OBJECTIVE

Support the training and reorganisation of the Malian Armed Forces and to help improve its military capacity, in order to allow, under civilian authority, the restoration of the country’s territorial integrity.

Support the Libyan authorities to develop capacity to enhance the security of their land, sea and air borders in the short term and to develop a broader Integrated Border Management strategy in the long term. Headquarters in Tripoli (national) and Tunis.

MANDATE

Launched on 18 February 2013. On 23 March 2016, the Council of the EU decided to further extend the mandate of EUTM for a period of two years, until May 2018. EUTM Mali shall not be involved in combat operations and mentoring. It’s actions shall extend up to the river Niger Loop, including Gao and Timbuktu. The headquarters is placed in Bamako; the training area is in Koulikoro.

MANDATE

Launched on 22 May 2013 with an extended mandate until 21 August 2016

COMMITMENT

Head of Mission: David Ramos Peinado (ES). Strength: 111 International staff. Budget: €26.2 million.

COMMITMENT

Mission Commander: Brigadier General Werner Albl (DEU) exercises the functions of EU Operation Commander and EU Force Commander. Strength: 550 personnel including 200 instructors, mission support staff, Force Protection and Air MEDEVAC (in total 23 EU contributing states + 4 non EU) Budget: Common costs for the current mandate are estimated at €27.7 million. For the third mandate the common costs are estimated at €33.4 million.

EUCAP SAHEL

Africa / Middle-

MALI

TYPE

EU Capacity building mission

OBJECTIVE

Support the restructuring of the Malian internal security forces with a view to help Malian authorities implement their Security Sector Reform through a combination of training activities and the provision of strategic advice. In this, it complements the work of the EU Military Training Mission.

MANDATE

Launched in April 2014. Mandated to: 14 January 2017. The headquarters of the Mission is in Bamako.

COMMITMENT

Head of Mission: Albrecht Conze (DE) Strength: 73 international and 29 national staff Budget: €15.1 million for Jan 2016 to Jan 2017.

EUCAP SAHEL NIGER TYPE

EU Capacity building mission.

OBJECTIVE

Improve the capacities of Nigerien Security Forces to fight terrorism and organised crime as well as better control irregular migration flows in an effective and coordinated manner, with a view to contribute to enhancing political stability, security, governance and social cohesion in Niger and in the Sahel region.

MANDATE

Mandate from 16 July 2012 until 15 July 2016. Headquarters in Niamey and field office in Agadez.

COMMITMENT

Head of Mission: Filip De Ceuninck (BE). Strength: 79 international and 48 national staff. Budget: €18.4 million for July 2015 to July 2016.

civilian mission

military mission

graphics: The ESDU/Beate Dach, source: EUMS

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EUSEC RD CONGO

DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO (DRC) TYPE

Support mission for Security Sector Reform (SSR)

OBJECTIVE

Provide advice and assistance on defence reform in the DRC with the aim of assisting the Congolese authorities in establishing a defence apparatus capable of guaranteeing the security of the Congolese people.

MANDATE

Launched on 8 June 2005, will expire on 30 June 2016. The mission is located in Kinshasa.

COMMITMENT

Head of Mission: Colonel Johan de Laere (BE). Strength: 10 military and civilian personnel from 4 EU Member States + 17 local staff. Budget for this final mandate is €2.9 million.


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EUPOL COPPS

EU BAM RAFAH

OCCUPIED PALESTINIAN TERRITORIES

OCCUPIED PALESTINIAN TERRITORIES

TYPE

EU Police and rule of law mission

OBJECTIVE

Contribute to the establishment of sustainable and effective policing and wider criminal justice arrangements under Palestinian ownership in accordance with best international standards, in cooperation with the EU’s institution building programmes.

MANDATE

Launched on 1 Januray 2006; extended until 30 June 2016. Headquartered in Ramallah.

COMMITMENT

Head of Mission: Rodolphe Mauguet (FR) Strength: 53 international staff and 41 local staff Budget: €9.17 million (July 2015 to June 2016).

TYPE

EU Border assistance and monitoring mission

OBJECTIVE

To provide a “Third Party” presence at the Rafah Crossing Point (RCP) on the Gaza-Egypt border, and to contribute to confidence building between Israel and the PA.

MANDATE

Operational phase began on 25 November 2005 and was extended to 30 June 2016. Operations have been suspended since June 2007 due to Hamas’ violent takeover of the Gaza Strip. The mission is prepared to redeploy to the RCP once political and security conditions allow.

COMMITMENT

Head of Mission: Natalina Cea (IT) Strength: 4 international mission members; 7 local staff; 4 visiting experts. Budget: July 2015 to June 2016 is €1.27 million.

EUCAP NESTOR

HORN OF AFRICA AND THE WESTERN INDIAN OCEAN

East

TYPE

Capacity building mission

OBJECTIVE

The mission aims to strenghten the maritime security capacity of host countries to effectively govern their territorial waters and to reinforce their ability to fight piracy better. Mission’s efforts in Somalia will concentrate on mentoring and advising Somali partners. The mission is complementary to Operation ATALANTA and EUTM Somalia.

MANDATE

Launched in July 2012, mandate till December 2016. Headquarters in Mogadishu with a back office In Nairobi and field offices in Somaliland and Puntland.

COMMITMENT

Head of Mission: Simonetta Silvestri (IT). Strength: 47 international and 29 national staff. Budget : €12 million from December 2015 to December 2016

ATALANTA – EUNAVFOR SOMALIA TYPE

Counter-piracy maritime operation.

OBJECTIVE

The operation includes: Protection of vessels of the World Food Programme (WFP) delivering food aid to displaced persons in Somalia; deterrence, prevention and repression of acts of piracy and armed robbery off the Somali coast; protection of vulnerable shipping off the Somali coast on a case by case basis. Cooperation with the Operation ATALANTA.

EUTM SOMALIA

Launched on 8 December 2008. The EU Operation Headquarters is located at Northwood (UK).

TYPE

Training, Advising, Mentoring.

OBJECTIVE

Contribute to building up the Somalia National Forces (SNF), provide political and strategic level advice to Somali authorities within the security institutions (Ministry of Defence and General Staff), support and advise on Sector Security Development, as well as specific mentoring, advice and capacity building in the training domain.

MANDATE

The mandate of 22 January 2013 is valid until December 2016. The mission Headquarters is situated in Mogadishu

COMMITMENT

EU Mission Commander: Brigadier General Morena (IT) Strength: 130 personnel from 11 Member States and Serbia + 9 local staff. Budget: €11.6 million estimated common costs for the extended mandate (Jan 2013 – March 2015).

MANDATE COMMITMENT

Operation Commander: Major General Martin Smith (UK) Force Commander: Rear Admiral Jan Kaack (DE) is the EU Force Commander. Strength: 1013 staff members, 20 EU contributing states and 2 non-EU states. Operation ATALANTA typically consists of between 4 to 8 surface combat vessels and up to 2 Maritime Patrol Aircraft. Budget: €6.3 million for common costs in 2016.

EUMAM RCA

CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC TYPE

Military mission to contribute to the training and advice of the CAR Armed Forces (FACA)

OBJECTIVE

Contribute to the African and international efforts to restore stability and support the political transition in the country.

MANDATE

Current mandate from March 2015 to July 2016

COMMITMENT

Mission Commander: Brigadier General Laugel (Fr)

EU TRAINING MISSION

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THE EUROPEAN – SECURITY AND DEFENCE UNION


MAIN TOPIC

Investing in Europe’s global capabilities to create more efficiency

The ATHENA mechanism’s smooth reform

by Jean-Marc Renucci, Lieutenant General (ret) and Aurélien Seguin, Executive Committee EuroDéfense-France, Paris

The Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) as defined by the Lisbon Treaty aims at developing a global approach shared by the United Nations and NATO. A draft report issued by the European Parliament1 on the financing of the Common Security and Defence Policy called for the development of synergies between the military and civil sectors, implying that the EU should be able to intervene autonomously beyond its borders. From the generation phase to the deployment-of-force phase the budgetary factor remains a key issue; however, Article 41-2 of the Lisbon Treaty prohibits the EU from using its budget to finance the implementation of military missions abroad. In 2004, in order to avoid condemning the European ambition of developing a credible EU rapid intervention capability to failure, the Union adopted the so-called ATHENA mechanism to manage the funding of the common costs of EU operations with military or defence implications2.

Limited scope for financing military operations This mechanism handles the funding of the so-called “common costs” of all future EU military operations, from the preparatory phase to the completion of the mission, within the limits of a list appended to the decision. In order to comply with the treaties, the Athena mechanism functions separately and independently from the European budget. At the functional level, 27 Member States are part of a Special Committee that monitors the Administrator’s activities. At the structural level, ATHENA does not have its own budget; the funds that it manages fluctuate annually according to the operations carried out: 74 million euros in 2014. Common costs assumed by the EU remain limited3. However, the legal uncertainty of the text gives some leeway. Some States prefer to maintain this way of dealing with reimbursements on a case-by-case basis, in particular for reasons of proportionality and rationality. This avoids any attempts on the part of Member States to use the Athena solidarity mechanism for the funding of their national capabilities.

The revision facilitates cooperation among forces Despite this limited scope of action, ATHENA has a degree of flexibility, in particular in Articles 15 and 17. The revised version of the decision, adopted in 2015, introduces two major innovations in Articles 29 and 30. New Article 29 refers to a pre-financing mechanism created in 2005: it was previously not possible to pre-finance missions through this mechanism, a situation that is changed by this new provision. ATHENA is now able to temporarily fund “non-common” costs in order to facilitate EU forces deploy-

Lt Gen (ret) Jean-Marc Renucci, born in 1945, trained in the “Corse et Provence” division of Saint-Cyr (1964-66). He holds the highest distinction of Superior Military Competence and was an auditor of the 44th national session of the IHEDN. He has held several positions within forces Photo: private (Chief of the 10th Infantry Battalion, 6th regiment), military academies (Professor at the Ecole de guerre and Commander of the l’Ecole supérieure et d’Application du Matériel), and the French Military Staff (Chief Logistician in the French Military Staff and Inspector Logistician of the army). Prior to retiring he was Head of the Army’s Materials Directorate.

Aurélien Seguin is Project Officer for an Intergovernmental Organisation in Paris. Born in 1986, he graduated from the universities of PanthéonAssas Paris II, Lille II and Panthéon-Sorbonne Paris I, with a specialisation in European, maritime and international law. Mr Seguin Photo: private began his career at the French MoD before working as a junior legal adviser and project officer for the OECD and UNESCO. Interested in international security issues, he has been strongly committed to this field for many years; he was junior auditor of the IHEDN in 2009 and has been a member of the EuroDéfense-France Executive Committee since 2012.

ment. The mechanism serves from the practical point of view as a support fund for facilitating rapid action by the Union. The amounts remains limited since this advance payment cannot exceed 20% of the mission’s total budget. Nevertheless, it shows the willingness of the EU to give itself the financial resources it needs to be able to respond rapidly to crises. Beyond this facilitator role, assuming these non-common costs on a temporary basis also means that such funds can be allocated to a wide range of equipment currently not covered by the decision. This could represent an important step towards greater EU involvement in conflicts. In addition, Article 30 now makes provision for managing third party financial contributions. This is a turning point for the financial planning strategy of missions abroad. From now on,

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THE EUROPEAN – SECURITY AND DEFENCE UNION

the EU will be able to share the financing of missions with other organisations or states. This opens the door to a new way of thinking in the area of international cooperation. This micro-revolution could possibly lead to a different distribution of the financial resources of the Commission, which up until now was not able to contribute to ATHENA. This is the reason why the European Commission was extremely reticent about this provision and was anxious to ensure that its own budget rules (including the financial rules) and control over funds would continue to apply after the entry into force of this provision, in particular as far as civil projects are concerned.

Creating a European crisis-management entity The European Commission, via ECHO, the Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection Office, has substantial financial resources. It also has programmes aimed at financing research and development activities, in particular within DG DEVCO. These complementary financial capacities will ensure a useful comprehensive approach. If the Commission deems it legally appropriate and compliant with the treaty provisions, and if required by the mission, Article 30 allows the financing of non-lethal equipment contributing to the achievement of the mission. Under this provision ATHENA will be able to manage internally, under its own rules, projects aimed at supporting training or advisory missions for the purpose of capacity building. This dual strategy combining the know-how of external action stakeholders will contribute to creating a heavyweight European entity able to intervene across the international crisis-management spectrum.

capabilities to take part in missions abroad. At present this provision, which has been unfavourably received by some member states, could be foreseen, but only if so decided by the Council (Appendix III, Part B). The financing of non-lethal equipment for the armies trained by the Union during EU training missions could also be integrated into the common-costs definition. This would help to reinforce the sustainability of the missions by providing the national stakeholders directly involved with the means to apply, in optimal conditions, the know-how handed down by the EU instructors.

Providing the EU with global capabilities Recent EU training missions have demonstrated the importance of this approach and it is thus up to the next ATHENA review to complete the engaged process. However, it is regrettable that, 10 years after the establishment of the mechanism, the EU remains in a midstream situation. The EU should take this step and provide its external policy with enough capabilities to ensure the practical efficiency of the global approach set out on paper. This is all the more important given that the EU has to face new stakeholders with global ambitions on the international scene, as well as new asymmetric and multidimensional threats. ATHENA is one of the key mechanisms for providing the EU with global capabilities. Without financial capabilities, the EU’s capacity to intervene will remain weak. To truly become a leading global player in promoting peace and security, the EU has to invest in security matters and to strongly support its Member States in this field. This is one of the key challenges for the coming years.

Future strategies for the ATHENA mechanism On a triennial basis, the new ATHENA should be reviewed in 2017. This could be the opportunity to introduce into the common-costs definition a deployment package with the full financing of infrastructures, security stocks and strategic airlift costs. Such a package, in particular with the strategic airlift costs, would allow EU Member States without full deployment

1

2014/2258(INI)

2

Council Decision 2015/528 of 27 March 2015, repealing Decision 2011/871/ CFSP/ J.O. L 63 28.2/2004, p.68

3

Article 15 and Appendices I, II, III, IV and V of the Council decision
(CFSP) 2015/528 of 27 March establishing a mechanism to administer the financing of the common costs of European Union operations having military or defence implications (Athena) and repealing Decision 2011/871/CFSP.

A broader-based Athena mechanism would facilitate the rapid engagement of EU forces Photo: ESDU, Archive

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MAIN TOPIC

Lessons learned from the UK military involvement in Africa

Into Africa: the unintended strategic outcome of ‘entente frugale’ by Squadron Leader Andrea Watts, Ministry of Defence, London

When analysing UK Security Policy since 2010, it would be understandable to conclude that the UK’s dominant area of strategic interest, outwith the European locale, remains the Middle East. The proclaimed importance of countering the threat posed by Daesh as part of the global coalition, the 2015 agreement to construct the first permanent British military base in the Gulf for 40 years and the political acknowledgement that in light of the United States focus on the Asia-Pacific region, Europe has to step up its engagement in the MENA region, all point to a clear appetite to remain politically, militarily and economically focused on the region. There is no doubt that this type of prioritisation of geo-political and security interest is to be welcomed, particularly in an era of financial austerity, and at a time when the post-conflict rebalancing of UK military assets is very much required.

UK security strategy: a quiet reversal Yet a closer look at current military operations contradicts this assumption: it quickly becomes apparent that over two thirds of the overseas operations taking place in March 2016 are in sub-Saharan Africa, and are not limited just to the ‘Southern Mediterranean’ hinterlands of North Africa. This marks a clear (albeit quiet) reversal of the UK’s long-standing post-Cold War security policy that Africa has not been a strategic concern for the UK. This is not to say that Africa has not been a focus for broader UK ‘human security’ efforts or that UK troops have not set foot in

Africa during this time, but the consensus held by most political observers remained firm; British foreign and security policy has simply been focused elsewhere.

Drivers for the UK military engagement in Africa There may be three main drivers for the exponential rise in UK military support to the African region in the past 6 years: firstly the growth in multiculturalism and issues-based politics in Western societies has led to the creation of significant interest groups within nations that amplify narratives and concerns that would have previously been dismissed by political elites. Secondly, the prioritisation of the ‘prosperity agenda’ in all aspects of UK government foreign policy has led to a convergence of economic interest in ‘growth markets’ with wider security activity, confusing the objectives of both. Thirdly, the drawing down of enduring operations in Afghanistan has led to a ‘use it or lose it’1 approach taken by military decision-makers.

Agreement with an unexpected outcome However, a far more influential factor appears to have been the 2010 Lancaster House Defence Security accord, which agreed to continue with the development of the Anglo-French Combined Joint Expeditionary Force (CJEF) and align British and French security interests more closely. This agreement has proven to be far more dynamic in its outcome than the earlier 1998 St Malo

A Sierra Leonean woman and her child follow a UK serviceman carrying food to their village Photo: Contains public sector information licensed under the Open Government Licence v3.0.

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THE EUROPEAN – SECURITY AND DEFENCE UNION

Andrea Watts is a graduate in Politics from the University of York. She holds an MPhil in International Relations from Cambridge University and has served in the Royal Air Force for 15 years. During this time she has deployed to Afghanistan and Latvia, as well as serving at the Ministry of Defence, Whitehall. The views expressed in this article are the author’s own, and do not reflect the view or official position of any department within HM Government.

agreement, which nominally sought bilateral cooperation between the UK and France on African security matters, but resulted in few British ‘boots on the ground’. The French forces, in contrast are (in the words of Jeremy Bender) “all over Africa”2, with many observers noting that they never really left their colonial outposts. Last year, France had over 3,000 troops spread across five countries in Africa – Mali, Mauritania, Burkina Faso, Niger and Chad – as part of one operation alone, Operation BURKHANE. Based in Chad, the operation aimed at disrupting potential militants’ threat across the Sahel region of the continent. This was in addition to the 2,000 French troops conducting operations in the Central African Republic, and the French military training teams continuing capacity-building efforts in Libya, following the 2010 NATO-mandated intervention.

An odd pair: British and French forces in Africa Sharing the economic burden of international power projection is a logical step when finances are tight, but entering into an alliance with a partner that holds such long-standing and clearly defined geo-political interests was always likely to bring another, unfamiliar, dimension to British security priorities. When combined with an acknowledged institutional weakness in British strategic security thinking, the risk that British military forces might find themselves operating in unchartered territory was rather an obvious one. When British troops deployed to Mali in 2013 in support of French counter-terrorism operations, forces were at an immediate linguistic and cultural disadvantage, and remained dependent upon their French comrades. As a result of its colonial heritage, France maintains a network of support and partners in Africa that has been carefully fostered for many years. Unlike the UK, French military involvement in Africa is not a novelty; it is based upon a long tradition and deep expertise. In contrast, the unfamiliarity of this theatre to both British policy-makers and deployed personnel marks a significant weakness in the delivery of operational success.

Risks of a fragmentary diplomatic network This observation reflects the truth for many of the officials serving within defence and foreign policy roles, as much as it does for the ordinary British citizen. Nor do UK security forces have an established network of regional diplomatic and cultural advisors ready to draw upon, as the diplomatic engagement of the UK in large areas of Africa relies on so-called micro posts staffed by only

38

one or two UK diplomats. The risk is therefore twofold; firstly confusion in the UK’s stated areas of geopolitical interest risks exacerbating the strategic vacuum, which, in turn, leads British decision-makers vulnerable to the influence of new allies, keen to draw upon British assets, to augment their own economically limited security assets.

Implications of the shift in the UK’s security policy The bringing together of these factors might therefore offer the beginnings of an explanation as to the dramatic rise in African deployments that British forces are undertaking, and that now have come to characterise the current operational landscape. The first step in avoiding the repetition of recent history is to recognise, and explicitly acknowledge, this shift in security policy and the associated impact it will have upon military intelligence and understanding. Once accepted, steps could be taken to ‘plug’ the cultural and linguistic gap that acts to disadvantage British troops so significantly, in contrast with their French counterparts. This will require the current community of senior military leaders to be more robust in their questioning of foreign and security policy decisions, specifically those that result in British military assets operating in sub-Saharan Africa, to ensure that the political enthusiasm in the Anglo-French security project is held to appropriate, and expert, account.

There are mutual benefits Although this shift in policy focus brings significant risk to UK forces, it does offer a similar level of opportunity to nurture the original stated aim of the common security policy. The aspiration to enhance and strengthen European military forces, to enable them to act without the support of the USA remains a very real requirement. Yet the overwhelming need to rebuild shattered national economies, combined with the need to focus on the humanitarian and policing challenges of irregular migration, has seen many member states relegate military security further down the list of national priorities. However, should the UK be minded to expand and deepen the number of exchange programmes in place with our European partners, the mutual benefits would be clear: firstly, British forces would benefit from broader cultural ‘memory’ and linguistic abilities offered by other European nations. Secondly, British military forces are well trained and experienced, providing opportunity for nations with little, or no, experience of deploying overseas to witness first hand the structures, skill sets and support services needed to successfully operate, and take this knowledge back to their own headquarters. This could prove an invaluable method for rejuvenating the common security policy at a time when it needs it the most.

1

“Providing Peacekeepers: The Politics, Challenges, and Future of United Nations Peacekeeping Operations” Alex J. Bellamy, Paul D. Williams, Oxford University Press, 2013 pp 114

2

“France’s Military is All Over Africa”, Jeremy Bender, Business Insider http:// uk.bu sinessinsider.com/frances-military-is-all-over-africa-2015-1?r=US&IR=T


Kolumnentitel

“Capabilities, capabilities, capabilities” Lord George Robertson naming his three priorities as NATO Secretary General, Prague 2002

Future Capabilities

Photo: © zhu difeng, Fotolia.com

The EU needs to provide its Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) with adequate capabilities to ensure the efficiency of its global strategy

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THE EUROPEAN – SECURITY AND DEFENCE UNION

It will take a lot to significantly improve Europe’s military capabilities

The EU’s added value in improving Member States’ capabilities

by Michael Gahler MEP, Spokesperson on security and defence of the EPP Group, Brussels/Strasbourg

A recent collaborative study of the EU Institute for Security Studies on “Envisioning European defence” painted a rather grim picture of past efforts to provide urgently needed capabilities: “We have not yet done what it takes to significantly improve Europe’s military capabilities”. Although I fully believe that this description perfectly summarises the current unsatisfactory situation, I suggest being more precise in identifying responsibilities.

The political will is missing I am convinced that we would have been much better off if Member States and the Commission had simply implemented their past decisions. Even after two defence summits of the heads of state and government in 2013 and 2015, I cannot see that the EU’s added value in improving capabilities has been touched upon so far. Let me recall that we started six years ago with a promising German-Swedish initiative on pooling and sharing. It is still not understandable why this initiative was reduced to a list of just 11 projects from initially 300 ideas. On top of this, most of those projects pertained to already ongoing fields of cooperation. Unfortunately, nobody seems to consider pooling and sharing as still being relevant and neither have there been any new follow-up projects. Another splendid initiative has been kept in governments’ drawers instead of being used to pave the way ahead: in November 2014 our governments agreed on the “Policy Framework for Systematic and Long-Term Defence Cooperation”. In this document they promised to deepen defence cooperation

Michael Gahler MEP in the building of the European Parliament in Strasbourg

Photo: © European Union/ EP

“as a way to develop, deploy and sustain future-oriented military capabilities”. Although they suggested using the European Defence Agency (EDA) as a catalyst for cooperative programmes and implementing Art. 42 TEU (Lisbon Treaty) on a “European capabilities and armaments policy” (ECAP), nothing has been happening in this regard. Instead of implementing these intended activities, the UK government has been successful in freezing EDA’s budget for six years now. And on ECAP there is no Council initiative to report.

Hope for more stringency in the Commission

Michael Gahler MEP was born in 1960 in Frankfurt/Main. Since April 1999 he has been a Member of the European Parliament. Currently he is a Member of the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the Transport and Tourism Committee, and serves as the EPP Coordinator in the Subcommittee on Security and Defence. He was the Rapporteur for the parliamentary report on the European Defence Technological and Industrial Base which was adopted in November 2013 and a member of the Commission’s high-level group of personalities on defence research. Together with other MEPs he initiated a pilot project on CSDP-related defence research in the EU budgets 2015 and 2016.

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However it is not only the Council that is to blame for the failure to implement past decisions. Even before the EU defence summit in 2015, I submitted a written parliamentary question to the Commission enquiring about the fate of the 2013 defence roadmap on a possible EU-wide security-of-supply regime, monitoring defence procurement and investigating ‘government-to-government sales’. Although the Commission promised all these actions, nothing has been done up until now. Instead of delivering results the Commission stated its intention to work on a new Defence Action Plan to be delivered in autumn this year. I desperately hope that we will finally see results and that this new plan will not just be a reaffirmation of past decisions. The only area where I can clearly see things moving is that of


Future Capabilities

documentation

Pilot Project on Defence Research (ed/ak, Berlin) On 23 March 2016, the European Defence Agency (EDA) officially launched a call for proposals for the Pilot Project on Defence Research. The aim of this call for proposals, together with other decisions by the European Commission and the European Parliament, is to strengthen the European Defence Technological and Industrial Base as well as EU member states armed forces by means of research in defence-related technologies with a total funding of €1.4 million. Overview and objective “The objective of the present call for proposals is to award grant agreements within the scope of the Pilot Project (PP) for research in the field of Defence, in particular (1) two technological development projects in the area of defence and (2) one research and development project linked to certification for military and civil uses. The aim is to develop a proposal that: (1) fosters research cooperation between

defence research actors in European Union Member States, (2) strengthens the defence industry’s competitiveness and (3) raises the level of defence technological and industrial capacity for the armed forces.”

Research. The Pilot Project has been entrusted to EDA by the European Commission through a Delegation Agreement. As a result, EDA is responsible for the execution and management of the projects.”

Context “The European Commission, in agreement with the European Council, will launch a Preparatory Action on Defence research, as foreseen in the Commission’s 2013 Communication on the defence and security sector and the 2014 implementation roadmap, which will start in 2017 and last for three years, in order to test and prepare the ground for a possible Defence research programme in the next Multiannual Financial Framework. The Pilot Project, has been introduced by the European Parliament in the EU budget (2015 and 2016), with the aim to test the conditions for Defence research in the EU framework and pave the way for the planned Preparatory Action on Defence

Specific topics • PP-15-INR-01: Unmanned Heterogeneous Swarm of Sensor Platforms • PP-15-INR-02: Inside Building Awareness and Navigation for Urban Warfare • PP-15-STAN-CERT-01: Standardisation of Remotely Piloted Aircraft System (RPAS) Detect and Avoid (DAA)

the development of EU funding for defence research. Thanks to an initiative on a pilot project for defence research that I took jointly with some fellow Members of Parliament, a first major step was taken with a call for proposals for this project at the end of March 2016. Based on this pilot project the Commission is supposed to present a preparatory action in the 2017 budget. The main challenges are to get the Commission’s proposal right, to garner financial support and to prepare the main programme, starting with a minimum budget of 3.5 billion Euros in the next multiannual financial framework. Hopefully in June 2016 the EU will finally get serious about capability generation, given that the EU global strategy on foreign affairs and security is due to be presented this summer. As a follow-up to this document we urgently need to translate these rather general deliberations on foreign affairs into substantive recommendations for the defence area. This is why the European Parliament together with national parliaments has called for the launch of a process leading to a future EU White Paper on Security and Defence. Such a document would tie up the loose ends of Europe’s strategic

Deadline The deadline for the submission of proposals has been extended from 20 May to 23 June 2016. The revised project call text can be found here: http:// tinyurl.com/zde5jwu Quotes retrieved from Call for Proposal (version 29 April 2016): http://bit.ly/1XZqDUv

thinking with regard to capability generation at the EU level. This future White Paper will set out how defence cooperation and capability generation can be better organised and harmonised within a future European Defence Union. Such a Union can be built in the framework of the current EU Treaty on the basis of the provisions on Permanent Structured Cooperation (Art. 46 TEU).

A new opportunity for Member States to contribute This Union would finally put an end to the uncoordinated and isolated islands of military cooperation and ad hoc efforts in the field of capability generation. In addition, the Defence Union could benefit from EU funding and EU legislation. In line with these developments, Member States could present an EU defence review on existing capabilities leading to new realistic military headline goals. Only as a second step the Commission will need to present a new EU action plan and to define what will be the EU’s contribution and added value in terms of improving Member States’ capabilities within the Defence Union.

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THE EUROPEAN – SECURITY AND DEFENCE UNION

European Defence – the abyss between intentions and reality

An urgent need for deeds to match words by Jean-Paul Perruche, Lieutenant General (ret), President of EuroDéfense France, Paris

A European army is an unrealistic project in the short term, but it should remain the objective that fosters ever closer military cooperation between European states. This is the only option likely to lead to the level of power necessary to defend those countries’ interests in the 21st century, as opposed to the illusions of promised by a withdrawal into nationalist isolationism. How can one not be struck by the abyss between the reality and the intentions of the EU’s Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) as set out in the conclusions of the latest European Councils to have dealt with defence? › December 2012, “The European Council remains determined to improve the efficiency of the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), which is a concrete EU contribution to international crisis management.” › December 2013: “The European Council asks its member states (editor’s note: i.e. asks itself) to deepen defence cooperation by improving their ability to conduct missions and operations by taking full advantage of synergies…” › June 2015: “The CSDP must be given more efficiency and visibility, and must be made to focus on results. Both civilian and military capabilities must be developed, and the European defence industry reinforced… The European Council remains determined to ensure the availability of essential capabilities and to remedy critical inadequacies through concrete projects drafted by member states with the support of the European Defence Agency…” The reality is however other, as revealed by the crises of the past several years: the fiasco of the 2011 Libyan crisis, the belated and minimal response to the 2013 crisis in Mali, the calamitous generation of forces for the launch of EUFOR RCA in 2014, the EU’s complete absence from Ukraine, etc. As for the creation of a genuine industrial and technological base for European defence, the first faltering steps are only just being taken. It is therefore not only legitimate, but also vital to ask why there is such a gulf between affirmed intentions and the reality, since this divide is perceived by our fellow citizens as yet one more sign of the EU’s powerlessness, which is detrimental not only to the credibility of the European project, but also to that of the EU’s political leaders!

Two key factors at the root of the problem Firstly, the delegation of defence responsibility by most European states to NATO, and therefore to the United States, exempts them from a responsible defence effort on the national level and inhibits an essential common and global reflection at the European level. In the field of defence, the European

42

Lt Gen Jean-Paul Perruche is a qualified expert for the European Parliamant and President of EuroDéfenseFrance. He was Director General of the EU Military Staff from 2004-2007.

Photo: private

Council sets only general directions with no real reference to identified strategic interests. It often convenes in reaction to events, and lacks the ability to anticipate. The fear of American withdrawal, which could be encouraged by autonomous action on the part of European states, seems ill-founded, however, if one recalls the repeated warnings by American leaders about the need to rebalance the burden of European security and their reserved reaction to the crises that have emerged south of the Mediterranean in the past few years. The American security guarantee is neither eternal nor unconditional. Secondly, differences in size, history and geography between EU member states entail vast differences in terms of foreign and defence policy interests and ambitions, reinforced by diverse cultural viewpoints regarding the use of military force. These differences can only be overcome by a global approach to the security of the EU within its current borders, which will allow it to take into account the needs of all its member states, to bring their ambitions into line with the challenges of the Union which they have built, and to create the foundation for their solidarity. This should also help them to move beyond the sovereignty dilemma by re-establishing the link between sovereignty and power (for what is sovereignty without power?) and by clearly drawing the line between shared European sovereignty and that which should be exercised on the national level.

Sovereignty within the European Union The efficient European defence that the majority of our fellow citizens from all sectors of European society want will only make sense if our states break with the culture of dependency and reinforce their solidarity by adopting a global and common approach to their security. Failing this, deeds will fail to match words and European defence will remain a myth.


Future Capabilities

How Brexit threatens British leadership in European defence

The price of sovereignty

by Christina Balis, PhD, Principal and Director of Avascent’s European operations, Paris

Ahead of the June 23 referendum on Britain’s possible exit from the European Union, making the case that Europe is good for British defence and British defence industry is, in the memorable words of the late German statesman Helmut Schmidt, like taking “the position of a man who, in front of ladies and gentlemen from the Salvation Army, tries to convince them of the advantages of drinking”. Schmidt’s masterly speech was held at the November 1974 Labour Party conference, some six months before another high-stake British referendum on Europe, when a relatively pro-European conservative wing and a highly divided Labour Party held the question in balance.

Defence – not a major subject in the Brexit debate Understandably, defence has not figured prominently in the Brexit debate or in the arguments of the Remain campaign. As the country with the largest defence budget in the EU, close political and industrial ties to the US, and the most consistent European commitment to maintaining military capabilities, Britain faces seemingly little risk from distancing itself from the continent, where the number of nations meeting their NATO military spending targets can be counted on one hand. Industrially, the benefits for defence firms are similarly hard to see in contrast to, say, the aerospace industry, with its highly integrated supply chains across Europe, or the space sector, which depends heavily on access to EU R&D funds and flagship European space programmes such as Galileo and Copernicus. The defence industry in Europe can point to neither free trade gains nor a net positive experience with multinational efforts.

Dr Christina Balis is director of European operations at Avascent, the leading global defence and security management consulting firm, where she works with corporate leaders and financial investors operating out of or looking to expand to Europe and adjacent geogPhoto: Avascent raphies. She holds joint business degrees from German and UK universities, and graduate/postgraduate degrees in international relations from the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies in Bologna, Italy, and Washington, DC.

Future Combat Air System demonstration project), influencing evolving EU defence procurement directives, or accessing a sizable share of EU funds post-2020, including a for the first time dedicated defence R&D budget worth potentially 3.5 billion? Negotiating third-country participation in EU programmes is certainly an option. Norway and Switzerland get by this way, even though such status affords no say over key decisions while still requiring a contribution to the common EU budget. Seen through the lens of recent history, it is easy to dismiss the potential for greater European defence integration. Naysayers can point to glacial institutional reforms producing more acronyms than successful EU-led projects, missed industrial consolidation opportunities such as the failed 2012 EADS-

Less ability in shaping the defence internal market Such an interpretation overlooks, however, the long-term risks a Brexit scenario poses to Britain’s leadership role in European defence, if not globally. An exit from the Union would deny future British governments a say in the direction and rules shaping Europe’s evolving defence internal market. Those who downplay Brexit’s risks to the British defence sector argue that quitting the EU will have little impact on Britain’s participation in key multinational projects such as the Eurofighter Typhoon fighter jet and the A400M military transport aircraft, on UK-French cooperation in unmanned systems and missiles, or on the country’s on-going involvement in the EU’s 80 billion Horizon 2020 research and innovation fund. That may be true for now. But will British defence interests, once outside the core EU political and economic circle, be as effective in securing substantive participation in potentially game-changing next-generation programmes (consider the successor to the current

Bilateral cooperation will not be hampered – they hope. Watchkeeper UAS, a product of French-British cooperation photo: Richard Seymour © THALES

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THE EUROPEAN – SECURITY AND DEFENCE UNION

BAE Systems merger, and a relative resurgence in government-to-government cooperation at the expense of EU-led efforts. But this would not be the first time that British politicians misread the future.

Britain risks being left behind again Having missed the opportunity to be present at the creation of the Coal and Steel Community in 1950 and of the Common Market in 1956, the UK lost future influence over the direction of the European project. As Prime Minister Tony Blair put it in his 2001 speech on Britain’s role in Europe, “We said that it wouldn’t happen. Then we said it wouldn’t work. Then we said we didn’t need it. But it did happen. And Britain was left behind.” However daunting the prospects may look today, it is hard to deny the slow, steady progress toward a European defence internal market propelled by the forces of competition, innovation and increasing specialisation. Beyond the threat of being left behind (again), Brexit would also hurt British innovation and competitiveness, forcing industry to reconsider where it places its long-term bets. As a recent internal letter by senior Airbus executives to UK staff stated, “Our business model is entirely based on our ability to move products, people and ideas around Europe without restriction … we do not believe leaving will increase the competitiveness of our British-based operations”. Non-European aerospace

and defence firms with an established presence in the UK also stand to lose from reduced access to funds, markets and technology partners across the continent, not to mention the increased tax and administrative burdens that would affect all companies operating across the English Channel from whichever side. What ultimately shapes investment decisions by Europe’s defence industry is not calls for a European army or a European Defence Union. Rather, it is the reality of reduced bureaucratic hurdles, a consistent and stable regulatory environment, and the prospect of a pooled European demand for viable, industry-led programmes.

Brexit presents a real long-term risk to the UK Brexit presents a real long-term risk to the UK and European defence technological and industrial base and could have a lasting effect on the future shape of the European defence market – be it in relation to on-going industrial realignments, nascent R&D initiatives or forthcoming collaborative procurement programmes. Even in today’s reality of concentric European circles and Europe à la carte models, being part of the core has its advantages.

Originally published by Avascent (europe.avascent.com)


Future Capabilities

Weak points and success drivers

European and transatlantic armaments cooperation by Thomas Homberg, Managing Director, MBDA Deutschland GmbH, Schrobenhausen

European armaments cooperation is not just one among a number of alternatives or options. It is in fact the only option, given the risk and threat environment facing us both today and tomorrow and the resulting political considerations, as well as the very concrete and obvious industrial requirements. We are well aware of this, but we are not acting accordingly. We still remain fragmented, in terms of budget, procurement programmes and the defence industrial structure.

National defence budgets According to the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), defence spending in Europe has fallen by more than 14.0% since 2007, despite growing threats and risks. In 2014, average defence expenditures represented only approx. 1.4% of GDP. Consequently, no European nation is capable any longer of financing all the necessary capabilities required to meet current and future threats on its own, notwithstanding budget increases like those recently announced in Germany. This also affects research and development (R&D), the cornerstone for providing robust answers to current and future threats. Research is an essential prerequisite for technological superiority and competitiveness on the global market, enabling European industry to support the requirements of European nations’ armed forces in an optimum fashion.

The fragmented European industrial landscape The European defence industry suffers from a high level of fragmentation. The majority of investments are conducted on a national level, rather than in cooperation. Both trends – R&D budget reductions as well as R&D investment fragmentation – lead to European skill and capability limitations. This parsimony ultimately gives rise to at least four glaring weaknesses: 1. Military capability gaps due to inefficient use of already constrained budgets; 2. Interoperability issues in operational and logistic terms during deployments as a result of the different equipment; 3. Redundant, uncoordinated and hence inefficient procurement in uneconomically small development and production lots; 4. Sustainability issues in key technologies and capabilities as a result of the competitiveness challenges arising from the lack of the necessary critical mass required by industrial companies.

Thomas Homberg has been Managing Director of MBDA Deutschland GmbH and a member of the MBDA Executive Committee since August 2012, when he also became Executive Group Director Improvement with responsibility for all MBDA efficiency and improvePhoto: MBDA ment programmes. Born in 1966 in Kassel, he studied business at the Bundeswehr University in Hamburg. He was a paratrooper and general staff officer in the German Bundeswehr, then Military Attaché at the German Embassy in Paris before joining EADS in 2003. He was head of Strategic Business Development for the Defence and Security Systems business unit at EADS headquarters in Ottobrunn and Paris (2003 to 2005), and then of Corporate Strategy and Planning at EADS (2005-2007). In 2008 he became Corporate Vice President, Head of Strategic Coordination responsible for EADS corporate strategy.

Successful recipes for cooperation Undoubtedly there have been efforts towards consolidation and cooperation: • We have successfully created some true EU defence companies such as Airbus or the missile systems group MBDA. These groups, global market leaders, are competitive and sustainable. • The Franco-German project for the merger of KMW and NEXTER has got off to a successful start. • We have launched EU cooperation programmes that have yielded capabilities which would have been unaffordable on a solely national basis. The Ariane, Eurofighter, A400M, TIGER, NH90 and METEOR missile programmes are good examples. • Finally, we have established a diversified, international supply base. As a consequence, our military systems are almost without exception international, due to their international components. Although I recognise these achievements, I nevertheless see substantial challenges in a number of joint programmes. Many were delayed and more costly than planned, while others were delivered on time, on cost and on quality. But what works, what does not and why?

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MEADS 360 degree Multifunction Fire Control Radar ( MFCR)

Let me describe one international missile programme: Meteor. METEOR, an EU, six-nation air-to-air missile programme, delivered the first missiles in 2014, on time, cost and quality. I believe there is one overriding factor behind its success. Cooperative programmes can succeed if they are launched on the basis of ONE common and harmonised military requirement. A key driver for success is to have one specification, one design, leading to one product, delivered as such to each of the six EU member states.

The crucial factors for success As lessons learned I would like to highlight three factors that are critical to the success of international armaments cooperation: The 1st factor: Reduction of complexity and risk can be achieved through harmonisation of requirements. As our armed forces usually operate in coalitions, requirements should be harmonised on the customer side. On the industrial side, we need to refrain from over-specification and tailor-made solutions, since each additional version of a product adds risks. The 2nd factor: Specialisation requires the acceptance of a higher level of mutual dependence on both industry and policy levels. Cooperation calls for give and take. Not every nation and cooperation partner can contribute to exactly the same extent. The more clearly we define roles and responsibilities, the more efficiently we will invest and operate, by avoiding redundancies and overlaps.

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Photo: MBDA

The 3rd factor: A harmonisation of European export policies: the procurement requirements of the armed forces in Europe are not sufficient on their own to maintain the capacities and skills that the European defence industry needs to sustain its competitiveness. In this respect, it is vitally important for the European defence industry to export to third countries. We must boost ongoing efforts to strengthen and harmonise arms export policies. Of course, export decisions are political decisions. The objective of intensified European cooperation, as recently and so aptly stated by the German Minister of Defence, will not be achieved without a harmonised European export policy.

Transatlantic armaments cooperation Over the last few years, the armaments trade across the Atlantic has been imbalanced and various European NATO member states still procure a wide spectrum of US systems and platforms, including aircraft, helicopters, unmanned aerial systems and missile systems, leading to a significant US defence trade surplus with European countries. At the same time, direct sales of European platforms and weapon systems to the US Armed Forces are rather limited, and US market access remains difficult for European companies. There are a few successful examples of European access to the US defence market, for instance the LAKOTA light utility helicopter, produced and assembled by Airbus Helicopter Incorporated in Mississippi.


Future Capabilities

Rare examples of joint transatlantic armaments projects The EU Institute for Security Studies (EUISS) has identified the following key factors: 1. US and European force planning processes are conducted almost independently of each other. Consequently, systematic harmonisation of military requirements does not happen and is therefore considered almost impossible. 2. Transatlantic cooperation is hindered by a fundamental imbalance in investments and budgets between the US and Europe: the US is more focused on one budget, one customer, research, development and procurement than Europe, with its fragmented approach. 3. There are fundamental structural market differences between the EU and the US: European countries face great difficulties in efficiently combining their resources, with negative effects on volume and competitiveness, while the US has a largely optimised industrial structure with global industrial market leaders in literally all segments. 4. Industrial defence cooperation obviously requires strong political support; as we know, this is the rule in the US but it is more challenging in the EU. Nevertheless, various transatlantic cooperation programmes exist. Two examples: • The Rolling Airframe Missile (RAM) programme, in which the US, Germany and other nations participate, is operational aboard more than 100 vessels, with more than 4,500 missiles delivered and many more to come. • The NATO Evolved Sea Sparrow Missile (ESSM), developed by 12 nations, including the United States and Germany. The programme has over 2,500 missiles in service or in production, and a further 1,500 missiles are planned. Why couldn’t these programmes serve as a model for new transatlantic cooperation projects?

It is significant that our transatlantic cooperation experience within the MEADS programme reflects the same success factors that I enumerated for meaningful European cooperation: one system, one industrial structure and sharing risk and success. And to this I would add the dedicated collaborative effort of the three partner governments.

The way ahead Intensified cooperation is not at all a given, but it is the only viable option in times of rising threats and constrained defence budgets. Harmonisation of military requirements is the starting point for successful cooperation in both the European and the transatlantic context. Without a higher level of country-by-country role specialisation in a European context and concomitant acceptance of a higher level of mutual dependency, we will not achieve any substantial progress in cooperation beyond the status quo. Defence cooperation requires political will and the harmonisation of policies, including in the export area.

Future cooperation prospects One such example is the MEDIUM EXTENDED AIR DEFENCE SYSTEM (MEADS) which was launched as a trilateral development programme between the US, Germany and Italy. Development was successfully finalised in December 2014. The German decision to use MEADS as the foundation for the future German tactical air and missile defence system known as TLVS creates new and promising perspectives for future transatlantic cooperation, including on an industrial level. With TLVS/MEADS we will continue the successful industrial cooperation with our partners. We are convinced that the outstanding capabilities of TLVS/ MEADS will encourage other countries on both sides of the Atlantic to follow suit. And ultimately, we and our US partner both believe that the US will consider appropriating specific MEADS technologies for its own future ground-based air defence system. The MEADS radar and lightweight launcher could be components of the new US air defence system.

MEADS successful flight test nr 2

Photo: MBDA

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Solutions for securing all data in need of protection

A protective shield against electronic eavesdropping Interview with Dr Christoph Erdmann, Managing Director of Secusmart, DĂźsseldorf

The European: Secusmart, a subsidiary of Blackberry, is a worldwide leader in the field of anti-eavesdropping solutions. How is your company positioned on the market? C. Erdmann: Globally, we are the first and only company offering a reliable, multi-platform anti-eavesdropping solution officially approved for governmental use. No other company has such a large product portfolio for protecting sensitive communications. By the end of last year, we had presented SecuSUITE for Enterprise, a solution that can be used on a variety of mobile operating systems such as iOS, Android and BlackBerry 10. With this solution, we enable enterprises to communicate safely, in any country around the globe, and independently from any phone provider operating system. The European: Since when have you been equipping government agencies, for example in Germany? C. Erdmann: Secusmart has been supplying German government agencies with SecuSUITE for BlackBerry 10 since 2013. In 2014, the Federal Security Network was extended beyond SecuSUITE for BlackBerry 10 to include eavesdropping protection solutions for telephone switchboards (SecuGATE LV) and teleconferences (SecuBRIDGE) as well as secure desk telephones. More than 20 government administrations use SecuSUITE for Government to encrypt mobile voice and text communications.

Dr Christoph Erdmann is founder and Managing Director of Secusmart GmbH and head of Technology and Product Management. A specialist in digital voice processing, he holds numerous patents and has produced various publications in this field. In 2006 he was awarded photo: secusmart the Borchersplakette by the RWTH Aachen for his exceptional scientific work. While there, he also wrote his dissertation, for which he received the renowned E-Plus award in 2004. Prior to founding Secusmart GmbH, he worked as Technology Manager for NOKIA.

The European: What is the objective of the SecuSUITE for Government security solution? C. Erdmann: It is designed to protect mobile communications on a variety of platforms, while meeting the needs of governments and of industries working close to governments around the world. To this end, SecuSUITE for Government has taken the tried-and-tested technology found in SecuSUITE for BlackBerry 10 and made it available on multiple platforms. As well as enabling the secure end-to-end encryption of telephone calls, the solution encrypts text messages. Secusmart uses IP-based

Diagram of SecuTABLET photo: secusmart

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Future Capabilities

“The digital enemy is invisible, and the impact of having information intercepted will only become apparent much later Christoph Erdmann – when it is too late to take action.” mobile data connections such as EDGE, UMTS/HSPA and LTE as well as Wi-Fi, the high security level of which is in line with the NIAP security standard. The European: The market is crowded with new ideas for security software solutions worldwide. Is your strategy global, or do you restrict your operations to several “main” countries? C. Erdmann: Since the BlackBerry infrastructure is available worldwide, we follow a global strategy. However, we of course see our home market of Germany as a main country of operation; the German Government was the first state administration to use our solution package, and – with more than 10,000 devices currently in use – it still does so today. But both the government and enterprise services are available in every country around the globe. The European: At CeBIT 2015, Secusmart rounded off its portfolio by unveiling the SecuSUITE, which enables NATO-restricted voice and data to be accessed and processed on the go. Could you briefly resume the main features of that security solution for our readers? C. Erdmann: The SecuSUITE for Government solution enables secure mobile phone communications, secure texting, and PIM such as calendar, address book and notes – on the familiar platform of a smartphone. We have refined our technology and created scalable solutions that depend on our clients’ needs. The SecuSUITE for Government allows NATO-restricted voice communication, and includes hard- and software-based encryption. For enterprises, we have developed SecuSUITE for Enterprise, a solution that works without the Secusmart Security Card (SSC). The system provides full security with just a smartphone app, and is based on the same technology as the government and NATO solutions.

The European: And which solution does it provide? C. Erdmann: The solution in use by the German Government provides soft- and hardware encryption based on the Secusmart Security Card (SSC). This solution has been approved by the German security administration for the handling of internal and strictly confidential information. As SecuSUITE for Government, it is already in use within more than 20 administrations around the globe. We combine outstanding compatibility and user comfort with the solution that has won over government administrations by conforming to the strictest requirements, i.e. those of Germany. The European: How important is security for enterprise buyers? C. Erdmann: There is a growing awareness within the business sector of the importance of protecting mobile communications. There are known cases in which industrial espionage has influenced contracts worth several billions of dollars. Whatever

Secure telephone calls with the BlackBerry family

The European: Your main customers are the companies and governments that use your SecuSUITE for Government. What can these security solutions achieve and what sets them apart from other solutions? C. Erdmann: Our solution portfolio is the right choice for various requirements. SecuSUITE for Enterprise can easily be implemented by companies with different mobile operating systems in use, such as iOS, Android or BlackBerry 10. The administration of the solution does not interfere with any mobile device management system, and it can easily be implemented on each device. The encryption technology is based on the same software architecture as the solution for governments, which means that it is compatible as well.

photo: secusmart

the department – from M&A and accounting, to top management and engineering – highly critical information is regularly exchanged every day. And even the contents of features such as a calendar or a phone book on heavily used smartphones can reveal secrets. Anyone who would like to make specific phone calls in the privacy of a closed room should consider encryption. The European: And how do you meet the security requirements of private customers in this field?

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the strict security requirements of the German Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) for Android devices, without having to compromise on user experience. The European: But only for those who use the fully app-based solution? C. Erdmann: For sure, the secure app provides all these functions.

SecuTABLET with secure apps photo: secusmart

C. Erdmann: We do not yet focus explicitly on private customers. Our main mission is to protect the data and communications of states and enterprises. But it goes without saying that our appbased solution can be used within a family as well. The European: At CeBIT 2016 you were able to announce another important achievement: the granting of VS-NfD level approval (provisional) to the SecuTABLET by the German Federal Office for Information Security (BSI). What does this mean? C. Erdmann: SecuTABLET provides a solution for secure voice and data communication on a standard commercial tablet. The product is primarily intended for organisations with high standards for secure mobile communications. SecuTABLET combines ease of use and security in compliance with the German security classification VS-NfD (classified – for official use only). The European: And what does it implement? C. Erdmann: It implements the following security features: storage encryption, transport encryption, and secure data transfer between apps. All security features make use of the Secusmart Security Card (SSC) as a hardware-based cryptographic anchor. The operating system on the Samsung tablets is a standard version of Android with security enhancements. Each app is secured in an individual container. The product retains the simple and intuitive operation of a typical Android environment, allows for the parallel use of business and personal apps, and there is no need for specific user training. The European: Does this mean, for example, that the German Chancellor can communicate in a secure fashion with her ministers or fellow heads of government and use the same equipment for private communications? C. Erdmann: Exactly. All devices include both a personal profile, which can even be used for apps such as Twitter, and a fully secured profile, which includes messaging, calendar, voice calls and a phone book. The new SecuTABLET is a further milestone in Secusmart’s creation of mobile security solutions and enables our clients to keep up with the demands of modern business by working on tablets when on the move. We have been able to fulfil

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The European: SecuTABLET is integrated within the existing SecuSUITE infrastructure and is a milestone for mobile security solutions, allowing standard tablets to be used on the move with no risk to security. How do you ensure that the level of security is maintained? C. Erdmann: SecuTABLET was developed by Secusmart, IBM and Samsung. Each of the developers provided a defined-fraction hard- or software infrastructure, resulting in an extremely secure architecture being used for the tablet. The heart of SecuTABLET is the Secusmart Security Card, which has proven to be a security fortress. It is basically impossible to copy or hack it, and we will maintain this level of security by performing ongoing development work. The European: So the user needs a Secusmart Security Card to ensure the safe encryption of mobile data transfers. This must be a mini-computer within the computer. How does it work and are there other technologies involved? C. Erdmann: The Secusmart Security Card is at the heart of all Secusmart solutions, where it is responsible for protecting emails, text messages and voice communications. The miniature computer, which is integrated into a standard micro SD card, contains the NXP SmartMX P5CT072 crypto-controller with a PKI coprocessor for authentication. An additional high-speed co-processor encrypts voice communications and data using the 128-bit Advanced Encryption Standard (AES). AES is currently considered to be the most secure and efficient algorithm for the symmetric encryption of data and voice communications. To encrypt information, the smart card enables 340 sextillion keys: in theory, it would take approximately 149 billion years to crack the code created. SecuSUITE for BlackBerry 10 is therefore able to meet all the German Government’s requirements for secure mobile telecommunications at the “classified – for official use only” security level. The European: So the upshot is that your voice communications, your text messages and your emails are secure. C. Erdmann: Yes, and, what’s more, the calendar, phone book and other functions are also fully encrypted. For Secusmart, security does not end with the encrypted phone call; we deliver a security solution that secures all data in need of protection. The European: Mr Erdmann, thank you very much for talking to us. We look forward to hearing about the next new developments! The interview was conducted by Editor-in-Chief Hartmut Bühl


Future Capabilities

A concept for crisis and disaster management

Joint forces command (JFC) and civil-military collaboration by Michael Delueg, Product Manager, Frequentis AG, Vienna

Today the various military forces (Army, Navy, Air Force) have their own command and control infrastructure and rules. But in order to meet future challenges, new ways of thinking and acting are required. A crisis or disaster does not respect organisational structures or borders. In order to safeguard troops and their physical assets, all military organisations must be able to react at a moment’s notice. This requires shared situational awareness, cooperation, collaboration and communication. The Frequentis joint forces command (JFC) concept enables all military forces to work and act on one operational platform at the same time. New possibilities for joint command and control can be generated on the basis of the existing infrastructure. Strategically, the JFC concept is established as a higher-level command centre to coordinate and manage all forces for command & control, crisis and disaster-management purposes. Each force continues to utilise its existing procedures and systems.

What the joint forces command concept means Today each armed force has within its organisation an information system that is incompatible or non-integrated with other data systems. But the command and control (C2) systems on both the tactical and operational levels are also different. The aim is to bring all this information and functionality together via a scalable joint forces command (JFC) concept. On the strategic level all information is consolidated. The systems feeding information into this level are not required to make operational changes. Each force decides on its own what to share at this strategic level. Each force commander can continue to use the current well-known systems, and is then responsible for providing verified data to JFC at the next hierarchical level (see box).

The concept of joint forces command (JFC)

â–ş System information

Four categories need to be addressed: Common Operational Picture (COP) One COP with visibility across all forces and the ability to make command decisions cross-functionally. Command and Control One joint forces command tool with force tracking and smart communication possibilities. Voice Communication System One integrated voice communication system connected to the existing communication environment to enable consistency of contact medium across all forces. Incident Management One system providing customised workflow support and incident management adoptable at any time.

Example: flooding use case scenario When talking about crisis and disaster management a comprehensive shared situational awareness (SSA) across all armed forces is a basic requirement. To support this, the Frequentis common operational picture solution addresses eight criteria as basic principles shown in a flood-related emergency situation arising in a densely populated area. How can the Frequentis JFC solution concept help to achieve a shared situational awareness and joint approach? 1. Maps show where the water is currently flowing and where it is projected to flow: all based on geographic information systems (GIS) data.

Photo: Š frequentis

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THE EUROPEAN – SECURITY AND DEFENCE UNION

Michael Delueg is a Product Manager in the Defence Division of FREQUENTIS. He obtained a Master’s degree in engineering science in 2010 and is a certified software project manager. He worked for more than five years as a product manager for an international emphoto: © Frequentis bedded company located in Vienna before joining FREQUENTIS, where he is responsible for new products in the Air Defence & Military Air Traffic Management fields. Mr Delueg is specialised in innovative defence products e.g. joint forces command, national air policing and other command and control systems.

2. Blue Force Tracking helps to identify what the core competencies of these organisations are and where they are. 3. Forces indicate what human resources are available to assist with protecting life and infrastructure. This already shows the importance of an integrated military and civilian approach. 4. Sensors gather information from closed-circuit television, unmanned aerial vehicles, radar and other monitoring equipment in order to get a live picture of the current situation. 5. Places of interest are required to see if there are high risk targets for flooding damage, like hospitals, schools, highways, airports, etc., that need to be prioritised. 6. Geographical information delivers topology and meteorological data to predict the potential impacts. 7. Transportation – this criterion is important in addition to human resources to see what transportation resources are available to help with possible evacuation. 8. Communication is the cornerstone for sharing all information via the voice and data communications infrastructure. Additionally, voice and screen recording is included according to legal requirements.

Civil-military collaboration The concept: The Frequentis tools also allow integration with civil aviation authorities, maritime agencies, public transportation authorities and emergency services organisations. The solution concept is based on the Frequentis Component Framework, which provides modular C5I software components. The industrial experience of all Frequentis’ business units, for example experience from the Maritime and Public Transport Emergency Management Systems, is incorporated into this framework, allowing customers to benefit from cross-industry expertise. An incident management workflow mechanism allows the assignment and tracking of tasks across the military and civil organisations involved. Additionally, encryption and recording of the information transferred are provided, as this may be required in order to support future training or potential legal actions. Technical solutions: From a technical point of view the solution is based on the use of commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) products, and takes redundancy and virtualised hardware into account. This allows highly available and customised solutions to be implemented in an expedited manner. The provision of customised solutions with maximum cost efficiency enables flexibility, scalability and a service-oriented architecture. Frequentis solutions are also ready to integrate new functions and partner systems at any time. Innovative user interfaces and functions play a key role in combining these elements. For example voice communication systems are fully integrated and the user can communicate easily through “Click-to-dial” functions, out of the common operational picture. Making it easy for users to communicate and act in a situation in which every second counts is at the core of Frequentis solutions, together with providing common high reliability and availability standards for safety-critical communication and information. www.frequentis.com

Military Controller and National Air Policing Centre Solution 

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Photo: © frequentis


Kolumnentitel

Hybrid Energy Solutions

Photo: Š Nikokvfrmoto, Fotolia.com

The dangers of the greenhouse effect make it necessary to reduce the consumption of fossil fuels in all areas. In the search for new capabilities in the fields of development aid, rural development, disaster prevention and humanitarian assistance, as well as within the armed forces, there is considerable interest in mobile and scalable energy systems designed to limit the use of fossil fuels.

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THE EUROPEAN – SECURITY AND DEFENCE UNION

From Military Green to Mali

The European Defence Agency: meeting energy & environment challenges by Sharon McManus, Energy Project Officer, EDA, Brussels

In 2011 the European Defence Agency (EDA) spearheaded the first targeted approach to managing energy in the military with its innovative initiative called ‘Military Green’. Combining the EU military concept for Environmental Protection and Energy Efficiency, national armed forces priorities and EU directives, Military Green defined the concept, the principles and responsibilities to meet the energy and environmental challenges of the military.

A comprehensive approach to meet objectives Military green resulted in a dedicated Energy & Environment Working Group in the EDA, which has been in place since 2014 and takes a comprehensive approach to managing energy in the military. The approach is simple; understand the strategic drivers for the military, define the scope of the challenge through data collection and analysis, educate and inform, focus on efficiency first and then finally on alternative energy sources.

Why? The importance of strategic drivers Understanding the energy strategic drivers for the military (e.g. cost, resilience, force protection, environmental concerns, security of supply, autonomy, legal requirements, etc.) can be difficult as there is no ‘one size fits all’ approach and individual Member States (MS) have different priorities and policies. In fact, even within the armed forces of individual MS, the priority areas and strategic drivers will vary between services, branches and corps of the military. Hence, it is imperative to understand how and where energy is used and integrate all of the stakeholders in a cross-functional and integrated system which allows for bespoke yet systematic military solutions to be created for each individual challenge.

Lack of military energy data capture To date there has been no global capture of energy usage in the military at European level; all available statistics are based on interpolation and estimations. Member States individually have data available and work has recently begun in EDA on a data collection programme. This data collection, analysis & sharing ( DCAS) aims to collect information from Member States, at a macro and non-sensitive level, on the significant energy users of energy and fuel sources in the military. The data will initially be used to prove or disprove the assumption that the military is one of the biggest single energy-using sectors in Europe; it will then be used to define the scale and complexity of the challenge facing the sector and assist MS in setting priority areas for attention in terms of R&D, procurement, design and operational control over the coming years.

EDA initiatives to match objectives

Unfortunately experience shows that many organisations prefer to take the technology and renewable options first, expecting to see a rapid decrease in energy use, but the reality is very different. All organisations that employ an energy management systems approach and are committed to the system see vast improvement in terms of energy reduction and environmental impact. Those that don’t invariably see brief decreases in energy use followed by a gradual increase over time.

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1. Energy Management Systems (EnMS) A comprehensive Energy Management Systems (EnMS) Training course which will be offered to MS to educate and assist them in applying a systems approach to energy management will include not only classroom activity but also ongoing mentoring to aid Member States (MS) apply the principles of the system in their own armed forces environment. 2. Smart Energy Camp Technical Demonstrator The Smart Energy Camp Technical Demonstrator in the EU Training Mission Camp in Mali is the first of its kind to be deployed into a truly operational, multinational deployed camp and has three main objectives: • to test and verify the efficiency of various types of flexi-


Hybrid Energy Solutions

ble, combat-suitable photovoltaic panels in specific climatic conditions and test the integration of renewables with battery storage in a deployment scenario; • to test ‘demand management’ technology and its impact on inhabitants; • to collect reliable data for analysis and sharing with MS and to develop benchmarks for planning support tools for CSDP operations. BAE systems from the UK are the contractor for this project. The microgrid system supplied 33% of the test building’s load and 40% of the peak load and allowed all rooms to have functioning air-conditioning when no external supply was available. Member States are now considering the next phase of this project including an upscaling of the equipment installed to provide more renewable power to the camp, water management technologies, waste management technologies including waste to energy conversion and further efficiency measures. 3. Smart Blue Water Camps The Smart Blue Water Camps Project focuses on water management techniques and technology for fixed military installations. The project aims to achieve improved Security of Supply, Environment Impact Reduction, Cost Savings, better Environmental Awareness and Project Replicability. 5 Member States are partaking in the project. The project will be carried out in two phases, investigation and assessment followed by implementation, monitoring and knowledge transfer. 4. Consultation Forum for Sustainable Energy in the Defence & Security Sector The Consultation Forum for Sustainable Energy in the Defence and Security Sector (CF SEDSS) is a unique platform funded by the European Commission to engage Ministries of Defence and armed forces in a European Defence Energy Network (EDEN) to improve energy management, efficiency and the use of renewable energy on fixed military installations in Europe. The focus of the work, through three parallel working groups, is on assessing and implementing the existing EU energy legislation specifically the Energy Efficiency Directive, the Energy Performance in Buildings Directive and the Renewable Energy Directive and the objectives are: (1) to assess where EU energy legislation is applicable to the defence sector and more impor-

Training in the EU Smart Energy Training Camp in Mali

Sharon McManus is the European Defence Agency Energy Project Officer and is responsible for the EDA’s Energy & Environment Working Group and the Consultation Forum for Sustainable Energy in the Defence & Security Sector. She has a bachelor’s degree in civil enPhoto: private gineering, a master’s degree in energy engineering and has 20 years’ service as an engineer corps officer of the Irish Defence Forces, where she has worked in both combat and infrastructural roles. Sharon served on deployment with UNMIL, KFOR and MINURCAT missions. She was the Defence Forces Energy Manager between 2007 and 2012 when the Irish Defence Forces were accredited as the first Defence Forces in the World to the ISO 50001 International Energy Management Standard.

tantly where not; (2) to stimulate projects in key areas; and (3) to identify funding streams for such projects. A series of five meetings is planned over a two-year period and the process will be managed by the European Defence Agency as the main interlocutors between EU policies and EU armed forces. The first forum meeting took place in Brussels in January 2016, the second takes place in Dublin in June 2016 and the third will take place in Italy in November 2016. Two further meetings will take place in 2017.

The way ahead The EDA is a platform for MS to focus on energy challenges, both operationally and domestically, in a collaborative way and provides a unique opportunity for armed forces to develop energy efficiency, resilience and autonomy in cooperation with their national programmes and other organisations such as NATO’s energy security agenda and the International Energy Association. All platforms provide an opportunity to bring experts together and to drive this well accepted but not, as yet, well-developed military capability forward. There are many challenges to be overcome not least of which is the identification of the unique strategic drivers which motivate individual armed forces to invest financially and psychologically in this cross-functional task. We must bear in mind at all times that the mission comes first but that energy is more than a commodity: it is as essential to the mission as food, water and ammunition. Military energy efficiency, resilience and autonomy are key to sustaining operations at home and abroad but additionally, advances in this field will benefit the wider national economic and environmental strategic objectives of each Member State and of Europe. Photo: © EDA

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The Alliance must stay abreast of the security implications of global energy trends

NATO’s Comprehensive Approach to Energy Security

by Michael Rühle, Head Energy Security Section, Emerging Security Challenges Division, NATO, Brussels

Whoever believes that energy developments do not have security implications for NATO should think again. Over the past two years a plummeting oil price has become a growing challenge to the internal stability of producing countries from Russia to the Gulf, a development that could confront NATO with a perfect storm right on its doorstep. Moreover, Russia has managed to integrate energy into its “hybrid war” toolbox which it applied against Ukraine, while the so-called Islamic State had for far too long been able to finance its terrorist activities through illegal oil sales.

Energy and security are inextricably linked Given these major challenges, NATO’s energy security agenda cannot be confined to enhancing the energy efficiency of Allied forces. While military energy efficiency is a strategic value in itself, not least because it could contribute to meeting the energy requirements of NATO’s military reinforcement strategy for Eastern Europe, the Alliance must also stay abreast of the security implications of global energy trends. This requires NATO to enhance its strategic awareness of critical energy developments, integrate energy considerations into exercises, and utilise its education and training network to prepare a new generation of diplomats and officers for a world in which energy and security will be inextricably linked. All these areas are increasingly reflected on NATO’s agenda: Strategic Awareness: NATO Allies have long been sharing intelligence, including on energy-related developments. However, NATO also needs to beef up its strategic analysis capabilities in this regard. Accordingly, SHAPE’s Comprehensive Crisis and Operations Management Centre (CCOMC) has enhanced its energy security expertise, providing NATO’s leadership

Michael Rühle

Photo: private

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is Head of the Energy Security Section in NATO’s Emerging Security Challenges Division. Previously he was Head of the Policy Planning and Speechwriting Section in NATO’s Political Affairs Division. He has published widely on international security issues.

with timely analyses on global energy issues. NATO is also reaching out to other organisations, notably the International Energy Agency and the European Union, to benefit from their expertise. IEA and EU experts, including the EU’s Energy Commissioner, are now regular briefers at the North Atlantic Council’s discussions on energy developments. Exercises: Over the past years, some NATO exercises have featured energy-related elements. However, there have also been events specifically dedicated to energy security, such as a Table-Top Exercise on the protection of critical energy infrastructure, organised by the NATO Energy Security Centre of Excellence in Lithuania. The fact that this exercise featured the participation of several experts from NATO’s partner countries also indicates the potential of such events as an attractive addition to NATO’s partnership activities. The Alliance’s renewed focus on the military dependency on civilian energy infrastructure in the context of the Readiness Action Plan, coupled with increasing concerns about risks to critical energy infrastructure and supply routes on which military reinforcements depend, could further increase the demand for integrating energy-related scenarios into exercises. Education and Training: The first Energy Security Strategic Awareness Course, held in September 2016 at the NATO School in Oberammergau, marked a new stage in NATO’s education and training effort. By covering the main pillars of NATO’s energy security agenda, the course laid the groundwork for building a coherent training landscape in this domain. Further courses, including online learning opportunities, are being offered by the NATO Energy Security Centre of Excellence in Vilnius and the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey. Together, these courses, some of which also include lectures and role-playing exercises on the behavioural dimension of military energy efficiency, will significantly expand the pool of expertise of civilian and military staff in NATO as well as in partner countries.

Conclusion Enhancing energy efficiency in NATO’s military forces may be the most visible dimension of NATO’s energy security agenda. However, the topic is much broader and thus requires a far more comprehensive approach. Such an approach, ranging from staff talks with the EU to new training courses, is already under way. It will make NATO a more holistic organisation, better able to meet the challenges of the globalisation age.


Hybrid Energy Solutions

Spectacular NATO exercise in Hungary using hybrid energy

Capable Logistician 2015 (CL15)

by Zsolt Végvári, Lieutenant Colonel, Research, Technology and Science Department, MOD, Budapest

The Capable Logistician 2015 (CL15) international logistic standardisation and interoperability field training exercise was held in Hungary’s Bakony Military Training Area last summer. For two weeks some 2 000 soldiers from more than 20 countries cooperated in order to achieve the main goals of the exercise, which was the biggest military event of recent times in Central Europe. It was organised by the Multinational Logistic Coordination Centre (MLCC) located in Prague, which is an independent institution, although all the participants were NATO member or candidate states.

Energy in the defence sector In the defence sector smart or hybrid energy refers to the latest range of equipment, technologies and solutions being developed and deployed with a view to the use of renewable energies to reduce energy consumption and waste. It concerns the whole supply chain, from the production and storage to the distribution and consumption of energy, and is geared to energy efficiency and sustainability as well as environmental protection. Given that the participating armies had few or even no smart energy devices, it was a wise decision to invite civilian enterprises to participate for the first time in the exercise, where their role was to supply smart energy to the forces. The smart energy industry formed its own MILU (Multinational Integrated Logistic Support Unit) to supply forces and installations with energy produced from alternative sources. This smart energy MILU (SE MILU) was created with the support of NATO’s Emerging Security Challenges Division

A hybrid microgrid providing power to CL15 functional tents

Lt Col Zsolt Végvári is a senior engineer with the Defence Economic Bureau of the Ministry of Defence. In 2000, he graduated from the Technical University of Budapest with a Masters in Electrical Engineering and is currently carrying out doctoral training at the National Public Service University. Mr Végvári joined the Hungarian Defence Forces in 1995, and following several positions he became branch leader of military investments in 2006. In 2008, Mr Végvári started working as a legal and financial supervisor at the Ministry of Defence Controlling Bureau. Prior to his current positions, he worked for two years as a financial analyst.

in Brussels and the Energy Security Centre of Excellence in Vilnius, Lithuania, and coordinated by a specialised Hungarian team of officers.

Microgrids The function of microgrids is to produce electricity by means of the coordinated use of renewable energy sources like solar and wind, conventional generators and massive battery storage. Microgrids for civilian use In civil use, local consumers are connected directly and everything is controlled by a smart management system. The principle is to produce a maximum of energy from renewable sources. Any surplus energy is used to charge batteries in order to provide a supplementary power supply. When renewables are unable to produce and the batteries have been discharged the generators start running. Thus the management system ensures maximum efficiency of energy production and consumption at all times. In civilian solutions the batteries and generators – the most expensive parts – are often replaced by a system of power lines for energy storage. These architectures can generate significant savings but are absolutely not Photo: Malcolm Lesley/Consultant suitable for military purposes.

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THE EUROPEAN – SECURITY AND DEFENCE UNION

Traditional fuel support for US Forces Photo: US Army

Microgrids for military use For military leaders, reducing the use of fossil fuels for electricity production also means cost savings for armies, but this is secondary to the objectives of enhancing forces’ logistic independence and operational safety and saving the lives of soldiers travelling in seldom protected fuel convoys. Obviously a military system must also be robust and resistant to environmental forces, as well as being easy to deploy and maintain even by non-experts. A number of state-of-the-art technologies such as LED lamps (Rold/ Setolite), insulated tents with capillary cooling systems (Steep), insulated tents with air-conditioning (Schall) and water purification (Blücher) were deployed during CL15. But the most striking and spectacular feature of SE MILU was its electricity production.

Pfisterer’s CrossPower System

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Photo: Gaul

Microgrids in CL15 Various types of microgrids were used during CL15, including that of the Dutch company ESTechnologies, the German Multicon Solar container-based systems and Germany’s Pfisterer, all suitable for the individual supply of electricity far from power lines and energy infrastructure. They all used civilian technologies that had been adapted to a military environment. Given the Hungarian climate their main energy source was the sun, but all the systems also incorporated a powerful storage system and generators. Only the NATO tender winner Pfisterer, with its technologically advanced “MEMS” prototype (now in the series production phase and called “CrossPower”) used an additional wind generator. Each of these systems was deployed far from the others but close to MILUs in accordance with the exercise plan and in order to avoid major losses in the supply lines. ESTechnologies supplied electricity to the office tents of the exercise support team, while Multicon Solar supplied the military police battalion and Pfisterer supplied the Fuel and Infrastructure Engineering MILUs throughout the exercise, without interruptions or failures. Given the size of these systems, the deployment and redeployment times (including terrain work) were surprisingly short: between 4 and 8 hours. Their common attribute was their housing in the form of standard containers, a solution that makes for easy removal and transport as well as a high degree of flexibility and modularity. By changing their interfaces the three systems can easily be connected to power lines and can support electricity from networks using different voltages. None of them involved a special type of generator: the generators used during CL15 were self-contained, demonstrating that these systems can cooperate with any kind of generator, including the existing military ones. Intracom Defense Electronics’ product was of particular interest. This Greek hybrid system was developed from the outset for military purposes. A modern diesel generator, the batteries


Hybrid Energy Solutions

and the management system are housed in a relatively small casing and renewables can be connected from outside. Due to this philosophy the Greek solution is not scalable and is less flexible, but it is very compact and deployment takes less than an hour. The manufacturer proposes this system primarily for the supply of unmanned stations.

Mobile accessory systems The third type was mobile systems. In fact these are not real microgrids because certain elementary parts are missing, but they proved to be really useful in the real-life conditions of CL 15. The most basic systems were simple solar panels mounted on wheeled, “solar trailers”. These devices do not function on their own, but can be attached whenever necessary to an up-and-running microgrid. Some trailers were equipped with an on-board management system, as well as batteries and various types of connectors, enabling them to supply smaller military facilities, for example in the event of a blackout. Their deployment time is close to zero; once connected the batteries can supply electricity immediately, and can continue later in conjunction with the solar panels or a connected generator. During the exercise these systems were successfully tested in emergency scenarios. A unique system used during the exercise was the WP 90 smart energy water purification system manufactured by the German company Blücher. The system, which can be carried by four soldiers on an EU palette or transported on a trailer, is supported by two solar panels. The system, which was able using coal cartridges to produce 400 litres of drinking water from a lake in just one hour with maximum requirements of 2Kw per hour, was a surprise.

Lessons learned The military microgrids yielded convincing results during the exercise, using 40 to 50% of the normal fuel requirements over a 24-hour period. The most important lesson learned was that

Soldiers installing BLÜCHER’s BWP400 system, which delivers 8 000 litres of drinking water per day with a power consumption of no more than 1 kW from various energy sources 

Phots: Blücher

the technology has attained the necessary level to be used by modern armies. It was also demonstrated that civilian companies have a role to play in real-life military operations, performing missions within a military structure and collaborating with military forces. The CL15 exercise marked the successful introduction of the smart energy concept and was an example of forward-looking and mutually beneficial cooperation between the military and civilian sectors. I am certain that microgrids will become widespread in the camps of the future, thus putting a stop to the wasteful use of fossil fuels that contributes to climate change.

Dr Michaelis presenting the CL15 Smart Energy Unit to energy experts 

Photo: Susanne Michaelis/NATO

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THE EUROPEAN – SECURITY AND DEFENCE UNION

Military and civil applications adapted to demand

A strategy for supplying camps with smart energy

Interview with George Troullinos, CEO, INTRAOM Defence Electronics, Athens, Greece

The European: Mr Troullinos, you are the CEO of Greece’s internationally renowned top defence electronics and communications company. What is the composition of your portfolio?  G. Troullinos: INTRACOM Defense Electronics (IDE) is Greece’s leading defence electronics systems provider. We possess unique know-how for the design, development and manufacture of products incorporating state-of-the-art technology in tactical communication systems, information security, C3I, surveillance, reconnaissance and security systems. We are strongly engaged in hybrid electric power and electric energy storage systems, and other core business areas are missile electronic components, software for military applications and test equipment. The European: What about international cooperation: who are your preferred partners? G. Troullinos: IDE participates in international development and production programmes, as well as in international cooperation for the production and export of defence equipment, and is a registered member on NATO’s vendors list. The company’s products and services are deployed in Cyprus, England, Finland, France, Germany, Luxemburg (NSPA), Sweden and the US.

►IDE in international programmes

Currently IDE participates in the following international development and production programmes: • IRIS-T air-to-air missile: Development & production of the Guidance Section Power Supply, Telemetry Section and Field Test Equipment (six nations programme led by DIEHL BGT). • Evolved SeaSparrow Missile (ESSM): Development and production of telemetry electronics, as well as other missile electronics (multinational programme led by Raytheon). • AWACS Mid-Term Modernisation Programme: development and production of the intercom systems, airplane structural kits and mission simulator kits (NATO programme led by BOEING). • IRIS-T SL programme: Full Scale Development of Missile Data Link System for the IRIS-T Surface Launched, ground-to-air missile system (German programme).

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Dr George Troullinos is CEO of INTRACOM Defense Electronics (IDE) and Chairman of the Board of Directors of the Hellenic Aerospace & Defense Industries Group (HASDIG). He holds a PhD in Electrical Engineering from the Georgia Institute of Technology, Atlanta, USA, and photo: IDE studied Business Administration at Rice University, Houston, USA. After work experiences in the USA, Mr Troullinos joined INTRACOM in 1992 and formed the company’s Defense Communications Department. In January 1999, Mr Troullinos was appointed General Manager of the Defense Systems Division. In January 2006 he became CEO of the newly formed IDE.

The European: Do you run your own R&D labs? G. Troullinos: IDE participates in joint multinational development and production programmes in cooperation with major international defence systems companies: it invests annually a significant amount in R&D activities for the development of cutting-edge defence and security systems. In order to facilitate the rapid design and development of technologically advanced, high-quality products and systems, IDE operates sophisticated R&D laboratories within its facilities, which maintain a high level of specialisation and are equipped with modern infrastructure. Through its involvement in these development and production programmes and in the manufacture of numerous major defence systems and products, IDE has developed cooperation with defence industry leaders such as Raytheon, Boeing, Northrop Grumman Diehl BGT Defence, Kraus-Maffei Wegmann, Saab and Thales. The European: You mentioned IDE’s expertise in the use of high-end technologies in the design, development and manufacturing fields. One sector in your repertoire is that of tactical systems for the armed forces. What are your fields of excellence? G. Troullinos: IDE aims at developing cutting-edge defence products and competitive secure communications solutions that will meet the current and future needs of the defence and security sectors at international level.


Hybrid Energy Solutions

Intracom Defence Electronics’ offices near Athens Photo: IDE

The European: IDE is one of the main Greek suppliers to the Greek forces. Is Greece your main focus? What is your export strategy and who are your preferred customers outside your country? G. Troullinos: Due to the peculiarity of the defence procurement market, our marketing strategy is very specific and focused on countries with significant opportunities where the INTRACOM Group is already present. We also concentrate on strengthening our product marketing through framework agreements with leading manufacturers in the international defence arena. Also, as stated earlier, a major effort goes

into participating in international development and production programmes together with other defence manufacturers worldwide. To achieve these goals, a significant component of our development strategy is the continuous improvement of the competitiveness of our products and services in terms of quality and cost. This is achieved through substantial investments in our industrial infrastructure and personnel, all targeted to allowing IDE to extend its participation in upcoming defence procurement programmes and export activities as well as to supporting diversification. In this line, IDE enters in the fields of hybrid

Nannette Cazaubon discussing with George Troullinos in his office Photo: IDE

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THE EUROPEAN – SECURITY AND DEFENCE UNION

electric power and electric energy storage systems as well as surveillance, reconnaissance and security. The European: IDE’s activities in the hybrid electric power and electric energy storage systems areas come into that category. Could you tell our readers a little bit more about the overall system? G. Troullinos: IDE’s Hybrid Electric Power Systems (HEPS) is a product family comprising a range of modular configurations of diesel generators, power electronics, energy storage and air-conditioning units that are controlled by an Energy Management System. The main objective is to provide the user, through the HEPS family, with high-quality and high-reliability hybrid power systems that present lower life-cycle-cost compared to conventional solutions. Thanks to our experience in the defence business we have the capability to equip these systems with a number of features that are of great value to our customers. The European: And what are their fields of application? Are the systems you have so successfully tested also intended for the civil sector? G. Troullinos: In principle civil sector requirements are less strict than military requirements. Our systems are therefore perfectly adapted not only to the military but also other markets, although with a different degree of ruggedisation. Civil camps, islands and off-grid areas are possible applications alongside the military ones. It takes time for the military to be convinced about new technologies, however it is becoming more cost and environment-sensitive and there are currently NATO initiatives in the direction of smart energy products for military use.   The European: Rumour has it that in March you presented NATO and the EU with the model of a modular system for the supply of electrical power to military camps; the system is environmentally friendly and enables big savings on fossil fuels. On what principle is the system’s modularity based? G. Troullinos: IDE products are developed following a combination of “component-sharing” and “mix” modularity principles allowing the construction of several models with a limited range of carefully selected and developed subsystems. Most importantly, IDE products can be combined with each other and are interoperable with a range of conventional systems, according to a “sectional modularity” principle (like Lego bricks), in order to meet different application-specific requirements. We successfully applied this principle to our communication products and are using this expertise for hybrid systems as well.  The European: This means that with several of your systems you can cover an increase in requirements, following the extension of a camp, for example? G. Troullinos: Yes. The overall system configuration is dy-

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► Main fields of excellence

IDE’s main fields of excellence, involving continuous investments in new technologies to ensure a leading position on the local and international scene, are: • Tactical Communications: Products developed in this area include Wideband Radios (Spartan, WiWAN and SeaNNet), Intercommunication Systems (WiSPR, Tacticon, and NAUTiCON) and Satellite Communications (VSAT Cronos). • Data Links and Telemetries: Design, development, qualification and production of missile data link and telemetry systems for surface-to-air (ESSM missile), air-to-air (IRIS-T missile) and ground-to-air missiles (IRIS-T SL missile). • Missile Electronics: IDE develops and manufactures advanced missile electronics that meet the operational requirements of its customers, and has manufactured electronics modules (SRUs and/or LRUs) for the following missiles: PATRIOT PAC3, CROTALE NG, RAM and Phalanx Close-In-Support Weapon System. • Information Security: The SECLINE product line of encryption devices (SECLINE MBit, SECLINE a-PLUS and SECLINE IP) is designed to utilise standard as well as dedicated cryptographic algorithms. • Hybrid Power Systems: IDE entered the era of environmentally safer energy with a series of Electric Power Conversion, Storage, Cost-Saving and Energy Management products. • Homeland Security: IDE provides state-of-the-art technology and integrated systems for public safety agencies.

namic and can be intentionally modified to adapt to changes in the field of application. For example, a number of systems with capacities ranging from 5 to 60KW can be combined (forming microgrids) to replace conventional solutions of some hundreds of kilowatts. The European: How does the system deal with changes in the availability of resources and power requirements? G. Troullinos: Indeed, the overall system auto-adapts continuously to changes in resources availability and power requirements. The system offers powerful but user-friendly programming capabilities that allow a degree of – let’s say – “software defined” power configuration, where the user can set different levels of consumer importance and different time priorities. These features are a good tool for supporting energy accountability in busy environments (like a camp for example), while at the same time offering a big tactical advantage by smartly reallocating system power reserves in order to sustain power supply to critical consumers, even in situations of scarce resources. The European: Mr Troullinos, many thanks for this discussion!


CrossPower: Smart Energy wherever you need it

CrossPower provides a stable, reliable power supply for civil or military camps, supply centers and field hospitals – anywhere it is needed. The scalable hybrid power generation system combines an energy management system and a mobile solar and wind farm with conventional diesel generators and battery storage. The system offers more than 50 % fossil fuel savings and ensures 100 % availability of supply day and night.

www.pfisterer.com

the power connection


The European - Security and Defence Union  

Issue 24

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