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McGill Journal of Political Studies 2010 Editor-in-Chief:

Olga Redko

Associate Editors: Seyoung Choe Glenn Gibson Nicole McLaren Daniel St. Germaine Cover Design:

Édith Drouin Rousseau

Funding provided by: McGill Political Science Students’ Association (PSSA) Arts Undergraduate Society (AUS) The opinions expressed herein do not represent those of the editors, the PSSA, or our sponsors. The McGill Journal of Political Studies accepts submissions written as part of undergraduate coursework. To learn more about the McGill Journal of Political Studies or the McGill Political Science Students’ Association, visit our website at http://www.mcgillpssa.com.


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Table of Contents Editor’s Note: The McGill Journal of Political Studies is an annual student-run journal which seeks to publish high-quality undergraduate political science papers on a variety of subjects that cover a number of subfields within the discipline. The eleven papers selected for this year’s Journal are of outstanding calibre, and it has been the pleasure of the editorial team to edit and assemble them into the publication before you. Olga Redko Editor-in-Chief

Rational Animals: the Neurobiology of Persuasion...................................................................................3 Alexandra Swann uses neurobiology and Aristotle’s account of rhetoric to explain how political persuasion is made possible by human beings’ shared perceptions of emotion and interpretations of morality.

Strategic Reform in Jordan.............................................................................................................................13 Shayna Goldman discusses the Jordanian government’s strategies to retain influence over Jordan’s society, and their implications for liberal political reform in the country.

A Crisis in the Shadows: the Failure of HIV Prevention in Canada....................................................22 Sean Stefanik writes about the different options the Canadian government has to mitigate the spread of HIV infection, providing a critique of the most commonly promoted strategies.

The Eighth Amendment Concerning Life Imprisonment of Juveniles without Parole.................................................................................................................................30 Julie Beauchamp evaluates the legitimacy of life sentences for juveniles convicted of non-homicide crimes in light of the Eighth Amendment to the US Constitution and various Supreme Court cases.

The Two-Nation Theory: an Evaluation of Its Application to Sri Lanka............................................39 Kartiga Thavaraj argues for the examination of Sri Lanka under the Two-Nation Theory most commonly applied to India and Pakistan, assessing the implications of directing this theory at Sri Lanka’s conflicting groups.

Female Suicide Terrorism: Empowerment or Subordination?..............................................................43 Stacey Waterman questions whether recruiting females into suicide terrorism in Palestine can be perceived as a means of empowering women.

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L’implication de la Russie dans la Grande Guerre: Le Japon et l’Allemagne étaient-ils des boucs émissaires?..................................................................................................................51 Éléna Choquette examines the Soviet Union’s internal political motivations for becoming involved in external conflicts.

Secularization and the Rise of Queer Politics in Uruguay.....................................................................59 Quinn Albaugh discusses the link between declining religiosity and greater acceptance for queerfriendly policies in Uruguay.

Examining John Locke’s Defense of European Colonization of America...........................................65 Timothy Apedaile offers a critique of Locke’s theory of property as it has been applied to European settlement of Aboriginal lands in North America.

The Politics of Federalism and Canada’s Climate Change Policy......................................................69 Emma Hautecoeur writes about the means by which the Canadian federalist structure has hindered the development and enforcement of environmental policy within the country.

The Aid to End Aid-Dependency: Cape Verde and the Millennium Challenge Account............................................................................................................................................81 Molly Krishtalka uses Cape Verde as a case study to discuss the difficulties of weaning developing states from their dependency upon foreign aid. About the Contributors...........................................................................................................................................96 About the Editors...................................................................................................................................................97

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Rational Animals: The Neurobiology of Persuasion Alexandra Swann Human existence is partially characterized by an ongoing tension between the ‘self’ and ‘others’. We are deeply relational but existentially independent beings. How then do discrete autonomous individuals unite into collective entities like nations, factional groups or other political organizations? Related to the issue of affective social integration is the role of emotion in democratic politics. Contemporary discussions of emotions often reinforce an inherited conceptual binary between reason/emotion, privilege particular passions as being positive or negative, or (most often) ignore the role of emotions in politics altogether (Tarnopolsky 2010). This problematic binary also appears in discussions about democratic discourse, and whether there can be an appropriate public role for affective rhetorical language as opposed to dispassionate philosophical discourse (Abizadeh 20007). In this paper, I explore these issues using recent neurological studies of emotion combined with Aristotle’s account of rhetoric. I argue that the shared neurobiological structure of morality is what enables the exercise of political power through persuasion. To demonstrate this, I will first discuss contemporary neurological theories of emotion and use them to argue that emotions are an essential part of moral learning and behavior. Then, I will use Aristotle’s discussion of rhetoric to demonstrate the link between morality and political persuasion, based on the relationship between virtue and the rhetorical proofs of logos, pathos and ethos. Breaking down Binaries After a century of neglect, the study of emotion in neuroscience is becoming popular once more. Previously, emotions had been passed over in favour of experiments dealing with attention, perception, memory and language, in part because of difficulties in clarifying the subject matter and the brain systems related to emotions (Damasio 2001). However, new techniques for monitoring brain activity and data from case studies about injuries have led to a renewed interest in the subject, which is as a result now generating research with the possibly profound implications for political and moral philosophy. In this section, I will offer a simplified explanation of synaptic circuitry before turning to a neurological account of emotion. My general argument is that emotions are an essential component of the way moral learning is stored and accessed in the human brain. I will then turn to the specific political implications of this idea. A synapse is a small gap between neurons, the cells comprising most of the tissue in the brain; almost everything the brain does is accomplished by patterns of connectivity among these cells (LeDoux 2001). Groups of neurons topographically organized in the brain are responsible for different functions, such as homeostatic regulation, language acquisition and use, or motor skills (Damasio 1994). As the brain develops in the womb and early childhood, neurons begin to segregate and specialize. Patterns of neural activity over time cause the transformation from the “uncommitted, immature, initial connections of the young brain to the mature and very specific connectivity of the adult” (LeDoux 2001). A general rule governing this process is “cells that fire together, wire together”, meaning that stimuli simultaneously exciting particular neurons strengthen the synaptic connections between those cells (LeDoux 2001). As the brain learns over time, information is retained in different memory systems. The two broad classes McGill Journal of Political Studies 2010


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of long-term memory are explicit (or declarative) and implicit (or nondeclarative) memory (LeDoux 2001). Explicit memory contains information that can be consciously accessed, such as facts or experiences, whereas implicit memory stores information like learned skills or conditioning (for example, playing a musical instrument or coordinated motor movements). These types of memory systems involve different regions of the brain. Studies of patients with brain lesions and other trauma have demonstrated that these systems are relatively distinct, and that damage to one type of memory may not necessarily affect the other; the relevance of this distinction is that it illustrates that many aspects of our behavior are controlled by “brain systems that store and use information implicitly, that is, without our awareness of their operation” (LeDoux 2001). Despite intuitions to the contrary, much of our behavior is reactive as opposed to consciously reflective. These implicit systems of neural associations in brain tissue influence our perception and reactions, linking previous experience with current behavioral probabilities (Churchland 2001). But how are these associations formed and accessed in practice? In order to answer this question, I draw on the work of neurologist Antonio Damasio. In Descartes’ Error, Damasio argues for a re-evaluation of the emotion/reason and mind/body dualisms characterizing much philosophical and cognitive scholarship. The book begins with case studies of brain injuries resulting in the impediment of specific types of personal and social reasoning, and then theorizes that a relationship between the body and brain forms the physical basis of a subjective self capable of ethical reasoning (Damasio 1994). While I cannot do justice here to the full complexity of his account, I would like to emphasize two of the main theoretical themes in order to establish what I propose as the shared neurobiological basis of morality. The first is that emotions are best understood as the combination of perceived affective body states juxtaposed against complex cognitive imagery. The second is that moral decision-making is a distinct kind of personal and social reasoning process partially contingent on emotions. These two themes will provide the shared neurobiological construct that is necessary but not sufficient to demonstrate my thesis about political persuasion. All of a person’s information about his or her external material environment is received through sensory apparatuses and converted into neural images in different regions of the brain (Damasio 1994). These images are not permanently formed and stored, but approximations of them can be reconstructed. Sensory data creates ‘dispositional representations,’ or groups of neural ensembles that form perceptual images of external stimuli and recalled images constructed from past sensory data (Damasio 1994). While data from each of the sensory modalities (visual, auditory, somatic, taste and olfactory) are initially processed in different regions of the brain, there appear to be ‘convergence zones’ in the brain, regions which are capable of integrating information across modalities and creating representations independent of the sensory system through which the data was originally received. Convergence zones “allow mental representations to go beyond perceptions and become conceptions – they make possible abstract representations that are independent of the concrete stimulus” (LeDoux 2002). In addition to external sensory perception, healthy individuals have some constant faint sense of their own body state, which Damasio calls a “background feeling” (1994). There is a distinction between the affective sensations of being angry/sad versus tired/awake, and it is this difference that helps illuminate the concept of background feeling. In moments devoid of reactions to external sensory stimuli or internal perceptions of particular bodily demands/responses, there is a subtle but persistent awareness of body state: “a background feeling corresponds instead to the body state prevailing between emotions,” which is related to the concept of a mood, but distinct from it (Damasio 1994). A mood is often characterized as ‘good’ or ‘bad’, whereas a background feeling can be described as an ongoing baseline of somatic sensation received by the brain independently of any particu-

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lar evaluation1. It is the deviation from this background feeling that potentially invites conscious reflection. This deviation can be initiated externally to the individual by occurrent sensory stimuli or internally as an affective reaction to a particular thought, but both stimuli and sensation are processed in the brain. Damasio distinguishes between two types of emotions: primary and secondary. Primary emotions occur in the evolutionarily older parts of the brain such as the amygdala and anterior cingulate, which are intimately linked to unconscious biological regulatory processes (Damasio 1994). Damasio postulates that these brain areas are the locations of ‘instincts’ or ‘drives’; they contain neural ensembles programmed to “respond with an emotion [like fear or anger], in a pre-organized fashion, when certain features of stimuli in the world or in how our bodies are perceived, alone or in combination” such as some kinds of motion (like slithering reptilian motion) or pain (1994). A conscious evaluation of the object is not necessary, would not have been possible in a brain containing only these neurological structures and would not have been desirable if survival was contingent on a quick response. Secondary emotions arise in the evolutionarily newer brain structures such as the prefrontal and somato sensory cortices, sites of possible convergence zones. This type of emotion occurs “once we begin experiencing feelings and forming systematic connections between categories of objects and situations, on the one hand, and primary emotions, on the other” (Damasio 1994). Explicit conscious consideration of the affective sensations evoked by primary emotional systems allows for more control in deciding between behavioral options, allowing us to determine when a directly instinctual response would be counter-productive. The content of a secondary emotion involves perception of a trigger (either concrete sensory stimuli or an imagined reconstruction), an affective bodily sensation, and subsequent cognitive reflection on the body’s reaction. Primary emotions are sensations such as anger, fear, happiness or sadness, whereas secondary emotions are more varied and often make reference to social relations, such as shame, embarrassment or vindication. (Damasio 1994.) Secondary emotions initially arise when individuals become capable of juxtaposing affective sensations in the body against neural representations of objects in the material environment. This allows individuals to “begin forming systematic connections between categories of objects and situations in the world and instincts that more closely regulate our bodily functions” (Tarnopolsky 2010). The primary emotions are ‘early’ or ‘child’ emotions, while the secondary emotions are ‘adult’ emotions. This is a form of knowledge acquired through learning, connecting the older and newer, the simpler and more complex structures of the brain as a result of associating deviations from background feeling with the objects that triggered those deviations (Tarnopolsky 2010). It is the creation of ‘appetites’ or ‘aversions’ through the bodily affective sensations of ‘pleasant/unpleasant’ or ‘pleasure/ pain’ being associated with cognitive representations of particular objects as triggers. Damasio calls this association a “somatic marker” (1994). By detailing case studies of particular brain injuries, Damasio convincingly argues that individuals with damage to brain regions responsible for creating and accessing somatic markers become impaired in a particular type of reasoning. Specifically, these individuals become unable to adhere to interpersonal norms of behaviour or to form complex personal goals, even while other modes of reasoning and faculties of perception and action remain intact2. The ability to rank between different ends and determine the most effective means in goal-oriented behavior was damaged, as were social skills like the capacity to restrain anger or conform to workplace standards. This was the case even when the patient otherwise retained a largely intact neuropsychological profile and did not display significant defects in attention or working memory. The impairments to this particular type of personal/ social reasoning were closely linked with impairments to emotion/feeling systems (Damasio 1994). 1 2

This explanation deviates slightly from what Damasio offers (144) but helps clarify the notion. Ibid, examples on 11, 57-61.

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It is this capacity to a) regulate interpersonal behaviour according to learned rules and b) to engage in long term preference formation, ranking and attempted actualization that I define as ‘morality’ or ‘moral reasoning’. The caveat of ‘attempted actualization’ is important because the individuals in these case studies are incapable of making and/or adhering these kinds of decisions “even when they can enumerate all the possible courses of action with clarity, can access the social knowledge and norms of behaviour that ought to constrain these actions, and can understand the consequences that would issue from any particular course of action” (Tarnopolsky 2010). This speculative knowledge is insufficient for moral action. In the first step of moral-decision making, an object (real or imagined) is connected with the sensation of desire/aversion and a somatic marker is created. The next step is the evaluation of that desire/aversion against some implicit or explicit standard of ‘good’ or ‘bad’ in order to rank behavioural options. In other words, individuals evaluate whether acting on their desires is ‘appropriate or inappropriate’ (interpersonal rules) or whether these desires constructively contribute to ‘happiness’ or result in ‘unhappiness’ (complex personal goals). We are not just instinctive creatures – the capacity for moral reasoning means that we have ‘desires about desires’. The creation of desires and aversions directed towards specific objects is a necessary but not sufficient condition for the evaluation of and compliance with intersubjective moral norms. The reason why damage to the systems that process body signals and affective sensations impedes the capacity for moral reasoning is that normal subjective consciousness arises (at least in part) from the ongoing communication between the brain and body proper (Tarnopolsky 2010). The relationship is continuous, dynamic and deeply integrated. The patients whose brain injuries destroyed the neural sites linking their perception of current body states with complex cognitive imagery can no longer form: … an appropriate theory about their persons, or about their person’s social role in the perspective of the past and future. And what they cannot construct for themselves, they also cannot generate for others. They are bereft of a theory of their own mind and of the minds of those with whom they interact (Tarnopolsky 2010, 58, emphasis added). Moral impediment arises because they can no longer connect an action with an affect either currently experienced or theoretically anticipated. These individuals can no longer have ‘appetites’ or ‘aversions’ properly understood, because they cannot juxtapose occurrent or likely deviations from background feeling against cognitive representations of ‘objects or objectives’ in the material world. Without the connection to the material environment provided by ongoing representations of body states, they cannot make purposive decisions about the way to manipulate or interact with that external objective world. The other major role of somatic markers in moral reasoning is in limiting the number of behavioural choices consciously considered. Contrary to Neo-Kantian theories, where decision-making proceeds as dispassionate deliberation from premises to conclusions or actions, a neurobiological theory of morality implies that the process is guided by secondary emotions (Damasio 1994). By previous association with negative affective sensations and/or failure, somatic markers allow us to immediately reject some courses of action and to choose from fewer behavioural alternatives. This does not mean that cost/benefit or deductive processes are not involved in moral decision-making, but that these processes come into play “only after the automated step drastically reduces the number of options” (Damasio 1994, 173). Somatic markers increase the accuracy and efficiency of the decision process, and their absence impedes it.

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These brain systems and the related capacity to create and access somatic markers form the neurobiological capacity for moral-decision making. This physiological apparatus is generally the same in each individual, but differences in acquired associations and initial brain structure manifests as variety in moral character (Churchland 2001). Additionally, it should be made explicitly clear that the moral norms against which appetites/aversions are evaluated are socially constructed and not innately dictated. Humans have an instinctual primary emotional apparatus serving as the foundation for a more nuanced suprainstinctual apparatus arising to cope with complex social formations. Humans are “an organism that comes to life designed with automatic survival mechanisms, and to which education and acculturation add a set of socially permissible and desirable decision-making strategies” enhancing survival and improving quality of life (Damasio 1994, 126). The ability to perform tasks fundamental to survival, like maintaining bodily health or genetic reproduction, become less directly instinctual and more consciously mediated as social complexity increases. The capacity to make these kinds of complex personal and social decisions arises from this brain-body connection mediated by secondary emotions. At this point, I have defined moral decision-making as the individual capacity to a) regulate interpersonal behaviour according to learned rules and b) to engage in long term preference formation, ranking and attempted actualization. I highlighted Damasio’s clinical studies showing that damage to the neural sites capable of integrating complex cognitive imagery with bodily affective sensation resulted in impediments to this kind of ethical decision-making. I argued that secondary emotions—understood as having a dynamic cognitive-affective structure linking different brain systems—were necessary for the learning and adherence to moral norms. To prove my thesis that shared neurobiological structure of morality allows for the exercise of political power through persuasion, I must articulate a) how this individual decision making structure relates to collective ethical processes and b) how that relates to political persuasion. Reasonable Rhetoric: Ethos, Pathos & Logos in the Multitude The first step in effective individual moral decision-making occurs when secondary emotions link affective bodily sensations with cognitive representations of objects and objectives to form appetites/aversions. This is primarily a solitary process. However, the subsequent subjective evaluation of the appropriateness of these particular appetites/aversions occurs against an external social standard including beliefs about the “ways in which people ought to behave or interact” (Tarnopolsky 2010, 325-6). This social evaluation necessarily makes reference to interactions with other individuals and to conditions in the shared material environment in order to rank behavioural options. As Christina Tarnopolsky writes: “Damasio’s somatic marker hypothesis illustrates another important way in which emotions work to connect the mind and the body, so that our perceptions of the external world, and our cognition of the moral and political norms governing our social world come to be inscribed in the body in the form of dispositional knowledge” (2001, 325). The next question is how this process occurs in unitary beings in a way that allows for collective social integration and action. Neurologist Paul Churchland argues that social interaction teaches us sets of ‘prototypical categories’ for sensory and behavioural classification. These are categories such as ‘morally blameworthy vs morally praiseworthy’ and ‘morally significant vs morally insignificant. Moral learning consists in “the gradual generation of these internal perceptual and behavioral prototypes… [requiring] exposure to, or practice of, various examples of the perceptual or motor categories at issue” (Churchland 2001, 81). Through iterated interaction with the material environment and social structure, individuals learn a set of prototypical categories that condition their moral perception and behavioural choices through the construction of implicit memory. In this view, moral character is

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strongly conditioned by the accumulation of daily sensory inputs, their largely reactive but occasionally reflective processing, and their association with subsequent behavioural outputs. A crucial point is that not only does individual variation occur within groups, but prototypical categories vary between communities. While the neurobiological apparatus and the process required to train that physiological system remains the same, the socially-endorsed moral prototypes vary. As Churchland writes: Such major differences in moral consciousness typically reflect differences in substantive economic circumstances between cultures, in the peculiar threats to social order with which they have to deal, in the technologies they command, the metaphysical beliefs they happen to hold, and other accidents of history (2001, 92). Moral diversity is to be expected as a result of different patterns of social relations occurring in populations inhabiting distinct environments at different times. This moral diversity is partially expressed through the conditioned emotional responses of individuals arising from repeated interaction with that material environment and its social order (Tarnopolsky 2010). The range of conventionally-endorsed behavioural options is finite. Standards of ‘appropriate’ interpersonal behaviour and ‘prevailing’ individual and group preference rankings exist embedded within shared moral language and practices (Churchland 2001). These are articulated with varying degrees of explicitness. As an individual enters into society, ‘the good’ is already defined for and by other individuals, and the language she learns to express or consider that ‘good’ is itself value-laden. There will be conventions about the objects or situations ‘legitimately’ evoking shame or compassion: some hierarchical social structures will produce individuals who “don’t actually feel much compassion for a poor beggar on the street… or a person who is being drawn and quartered” (Tarnopolsky 2010, 326). There will also be conventions privileging certain desires or appetites as ‘appropriate’ and others as ‘inappropriate (consider the indiscriminate hedonism of imperialistic Athens versus the Puritanism of 17th century England). Additionally, there are indistinct terms and unspecified value tradeoffs, such as the contested definitions and weight assigned to terms like ‘liberty’ or ‘equality’ in contemporary democracies. Healthy autonomous individuals have some choice in how they interact with these conventionallyendorsed behavioural options, in part by conscious reflection on their (sometimes ambiguous) content, but there will always be social pressure to conform, as well as a shared material environment limiting the possible range of a person’s options. What are the political implications of this claim? In the final part of this discussion, I turn to Aristotle’s account of rhetoric to demonstrate how this shared neurobiological structure enables the exercise of political power through persuasion. By ‘persuasion’ I mean using speech without physical coercion to influence individuals to voluntarily undertake or refrain from action, or to assent to a particular belief or interpretative framework. Going back to classical philosophers helps illuminate the role of emotions in public life, because they had “a deep understanding of the passions as ways of experiencing the world” at both the individual and collective levels (Kingston 2008, 113). Aristotle and Plato thought that “passions must be understood through their motivational causes in the world, rather than through internalized dynamics… [because] the moral worth of the cause or object of the passion determines the moral worth of the passionate feeling itself” (Kingston 2008, 113). The motivating appetite/aversion becomes ‘moral’ as a result of its object, not as a result of any intrinsic quality of the sensation itself. Tarnopolsky makes the parallel between the ancients and the neurobiological account explicit:

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“Like Damasio, Plato felt that the emotions were not simply involved in motivating individuals to contest and/or transform themselves in accordance with the norms of their society, but rather than they were intricately involved in registering, justifying and transforming the very substantive content of the norms themselves” (2010, 327). Transformation of collective moral norms influencing individual preference formation rarely occurs effectively through physical coercion, so is more amenable to persuasion. How does this occur? According to Aristotle, the art of rhetoric is not to persuade, but “the power of perceiving in every thing that which is capable of producing persuasion” (Aristotle, 1.2.1355b26-27). This interest in rhetoric “stems from an awareness of the central importance of speech in shaping our perceptions and feelings with regards to persons and events in the world around us” (Kingston 2008, 114). All three rhetorical proofs—ethos (character), pathos (emotion) and logos (‘logical’ demonstration)—occur concurrently through language (Abizadeh 2002). The intersubjective nature of speech shapes our subjective interpretations of the material world. This influences the cognitive interpretation of affective sensation and helps structure expectations of future affects: shared language influences beliefs about the connection between affect and object, and about which affects ought to motivate purposive individual behaviour. In “Passions of the Wise,” Arash Abizadeh makes the exegetical claim that there is a structural parallel between Aristotle’s account of individual moral decision-making and using rhetoric to persuade the collective. Aristotle highlighted a fundamental indeterminacy in abstract normative rules, whether organized as laws or operating as ethical conventions. Practical philosophy can never be fully codified for a number of reasons, one of which is that it lacks “the passionate element” located in the individual qua agent necessary to render a determinant judgment in a particular situation (Abizadeh 2002, 271). He argues that the structural similarity arises in part from the need for the skillful rhetorician to understand which variables are ethically relevant to the crowd in a similar way that the wise individual must understand the ethically relevant features of a particular situation. The connection between persuading the crowd and making good ethical choices is virtue. (Abizadeh 2002.) Though Aristotle lists particular kinds of virtue valued in his society, his more abstract account of virtue precedes this. Virtue is “a power, as it appears of imparting and preserving good; and a power of procuring many and great benefits, and of imparting all things about all” (Aristotle, 1.9.1366a36-37). Virtue is power created by the appearance of knowing the good, and the means of creating and maintaining the good. Aristotle has his own ethical standard to which the virtuous must conform, but independent of that standard he argues that the skillful rhetorician must perceive what is ethically relevant to that particular group in order to persuade (Abizadeh 2002). The rhetorician uses the power of virtue to elicit voluntary submission through language. Effective political persuasion occurs through moral appeal, but the ranking of objects and objectives as morally relevant is distinct between communities (Kingston 2008). However, what is shared between communities is the collective experience of passionate feeling towards some sets of objects and objectives being characterized as ‘morality’ (Kingston 2008). Why are moral appeals politically persuasive? Aristotle is very clear that it is not because they successfully demonstrate ‘truth’. The kind of logos that is a rhetorical proof is distinct from strict logical demonstration (Abizadeh 2002). Even beyond this, rhetoric is the tool that is used to persuade individuals on subjects “respecting which [they] have no art,” individuals who are incapable of deducing conclusions from a vast array of data, and those who cannot follow a long train of syllogistic reasoning (Aristotle, 1.1.1357a3-5). Aristotle writes: “I call rhetorical sullogismos an enthymeme, a rhetorical induction a paradigm. And all [speakers] produce logical persuasion by means of paradigms or enthymemes and by nothing other than these” (quoted in Abizadeh 2002, 274).

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Rhetoricians use the deductive and inductive forms of logical demonstration, but these pertain to probabilities or to what is common and not to truth objectively understood (Aristotle). Enthymemes and paradigms are persuasive because they are constructed using moral premises that are largely shared by the crowd; they use common beliefs about which objects and objectives comprise the good (Aristotle). Earlier, I defined morality as the ability to a) regulate interpersonal behaviour according to learned rules and b) to engage in preference ranking, formation and attempted actualization. This definition was chosen because it functions as a definition for moral decision-making at the individual and group levels. A unitary individual must make decisions about the way she behaves with other individuals and which complex preferences she attempts to actualize in the material world, like education or employment goals. The group must make decisions (or allocate decision-making authority to some entity) in order to regulate interpersonal behaviour through political institutions like law, and to coordinate the collective activity of autonomous individuals towards some ranking of social goals or values. These social goals are the kinds of categorical prototypes described earlier: which normative ideals inspire obedience? Which appetites/aversions are privileged, and which are viewed as destructive or debased? What are the appropriate or inappropriate objects of emotions? A similar individual/group parallel can be drawn using Aristotle’s three rhetorical proofs. In order to persuade, the rhetorician must use logos [speech/enthymemes/paradigms] to demonstrate knowledge of the ethos [character] and pathos [emotions] of the group. However, in persuading a group, the rhetorician is using language to appeal to a collection of discrete, autonomous and unitary beings. Each individual directs her actions or beliefs as a result of language, voluntarily adopts obligations limiting her autonomy, but not because she has been logically persuaded. It is the common neurobiological structure of morality that allows for power through persuasion. The ethos of a group, the common moral character of its members, is formulated by the group’s shared material environment combined with intersubjective norms. The material environment includes the kinds of features mentioned earlier which lead to diversity in prototypical categories: modes of economic organization, types of technology, existing political structures, degrees of material security and resource endowments (Churchland 2001). Intersubjective norms manifest as a concrete hierarchy of prototypical categories, or shared ideational constructs of moral interpretation and preference rankings embedded in language and socialization activities. These comprise the immediate conventional range of preferences: the common objects of the good. Each individual contemplates, evaluates and structures her appetites/aversions using this shared language and looking to these common material conditions. The pathos is not a ‘group feeling’ but the affective sensation simultaneously evoked in unitary individuals by moral language/imagery referencing these goods. This language connects reason and emotion because the physiological apparatus for moral decision-making possessed by each individual requires secondary emotions not just to internalize norms but also to properly function. Emotion allows individuals to connect an idea with an affect, either currently experienced or theoretically anticipated (Damasio 1994). Emotion allows their appetites/ aversions to be connected to the theoretical consequences of actions, allowing for the effective ranking of behavioural preferences. Being able to rank options for purposive behaviour at the personal level is a necessary condition for doing the same at the social level, and the cognitive-affective neurobiological apparatus used for personal moral decision-making is the same apparatus used for social ethical decision-making.

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Conclusion Essentially, persuasion is moral, and morality is passionate. If I am correct, there are several implications of this claim for contemporary political theory. At a minimum, the Neo-Kantian fixation with creating dispassionate political deliberation becomes entirely unrealistic. Political reasoning is moral reasoning, and moral reasoning requires emotions. Certainly, some individuals are capable of making largely dispassionate analytical decisions about politics3. But to infer from this that effective political action at the collective level is, can, or should be strictly dispassionate is to commit a fallacy of composition. The concept of a shared neurobiological structure for moral decision-making implies that politics will always involve emotions, because persuading individuals to voluntarily submit their wills requires referencing goods about which they feel passionately. The most obvious alternative is physical coercion. The second implication may be the reinforcement of the idea that rhetoric has a legitimate place in democratic discourse. Affective rhetorical language need not be coercive or seen in explicit tension with reason (Abizadeh 2007). Acknowledging that political decision-making necessarily references emotions conditioned by moral character could allow us to enrich “the critical resources for identifying ‘distorted communication’” (Abizadeh 2007, 466). A neurobiology of morality could invite critical reflection about communication using other sensory modalities (such as sight) or place emphasis on the act of public reflection on initial emotional responses, as opposed to excluding those emotional responses from the sphere of legitimate public reason. In either case, contemporary neurological research definitely invites criticism of the reason/emotion and philosophy/rhetoric binaries which have been long present in political and moral theory. In this paper, I argued that the shared neurobiological structure of morality enabled the exercise of political persuasion. I described the physiological apparatus in discrete individuals, showed how this subjective construct becomes intersubjective through social learning, and used Aristotle’s account of rhetoric to explain how political persuasion acts on this neurological structure. Works Cited Abizadeh, Arash. “On the philosophic/rhetoric binaries. Or, is Habermasian discourse motivationally impotent?” Philosophy & Social Criticism 33 no 4 (2007): 445-472. Abizadeh, Arash. “Passions of the Wise: Phronesis, Rhetoric, and Aristotle’s Passionate Practical Deliberation.” The Review of Metaphysics 56 no 2 (2002): 267-296. Aristotle. The Rhetoric, Poetic, and Nichomachean ethics of Aristotle. Translated by Thomas Taylor in 1881. England: The Prometheus Trust, 2002. Churchland, Paul. “Towards a Cognitive Neurobiology of the Moral Virtues.” In The Foundations of Cognitive Science, edited by Joao Branquinho. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2001: 77-98. Damasio, Antonio. Descartes’ Error: emotion, reason and the human brain. New York: Penguin Books, 1994. Damasio, Antonio. “Reflections on the Neurobiology of Emotion and Feeling.” In The Foundations of CognitiveScience, edited by Joao Branquinho, 99-108. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2001. Kingston, Rebecca. “The Political Relevance of the Emotions from Descartes to Smith.” In Bringing the Passions Back in: the emotions in political philosophy, edited by Rebecca Kingston & Leonard Ferry, 108-125. Vancouver: UBC Press, 2008. 3

Mainly–and possibly exclusively–those who study politics in an analytic, dispassionate fashion.

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LeDoux, Joseph. Synaptic Self. New York: Viking Penguin, 2002. Tarnopolsky, Christina. Untitled book manuscript forthcoming, 313-355. New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2010.

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Strategic Reform in Jordan Shayna Goldman Since the economic crisis of 1989, the Hashemite monarchy of Jordan has touted itself as a reformist regime. Beginning with the late King Husayn, large scale reform measures have been proposed in the economic, political and social spheres. This reformist agenda has been further supported by the current King Abdullah II, who explained upon accession to the throne that “economic reform must be accompanied by… freedom of expression and… legislative reform” (King Abdullah II 2009, 75). However, consistent with his father’s legacy, King Abdullah II’s push for economic reform failed to include a concurrent push for political liberalization and social reform (Satloff 2005). Economic reform began during the late 1980’s as a way to increase stability in the Hashemite regime. It has been largely successful in areas such as debt reduction, facilitation of private sector business and adjustment of social spending. Political reform, however, has seen fewer successes. Rather than being an earnest goal of the regime, it was offered as quid pro quo for economic reform. The limitations of political reform are demonstrated by the new but non progressive National Charter, weak political parties, corrupt elections and unsuccessful regional government. Finally, social reform has seen the least amount of success in terms of women’s rights, human rights, media freedom and civil associations. Despite claims of widespread reform on behalf of the Jordanian monarchy, economic reform remains the only sphere in which there has been substantial progress. This is arguably because it serves to consolidate and protect monarchical rule. The Hashemite regime has an omnipotent presence in all aspects of Jordanian society and as a result has the legal ability to enforce changes to that society as it sees fit. If reform does not occur it is likely not because the Monarch was unable to make it happen, but rather it is the result of a conscious decision made by the regime. This dominant position is ensured for the regime in many ways within Jordan. Firstly, the King appoints the Royal Court, which ensures that the King and his closest advisors are the center of political power (Salibi 1998). The King signs and approves all laws and has a veto over legislation that can only be overridden by a two-thirds majority of both houses of the legislature. This override is unlikely to happen since the King appoints the Upper House, has the power to suspend Parliament and issue laws by royal decree without popular support. Thus, barriers to reform are many, and change in Jordan will likely succeed only with monarchical support and will fail without it. Economic Reform Economic reform in Jordan has seen high levels of progress since the state’s involvement with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) began in the late 1980s. The importance of this development has been reaffirmed by King Abdullah’s outward commitment to economic reform (Fenn 2002). With international assistance, progress has been made in areas of deficit reduction, reform of the business sector, and social services. However, the structural fiscal rigidities that led to the financial crisis of 1989 are still apparent and provide the answers for why this reform process is yet to be completed (Salibi 1998). Jordan entered a severe economic crisis in 1989, which was spurred by high levels of debt, inflation and the return of expatriate workers (Wiktorowicz 1999). Economic reform in Jordan has been aimed at stabilizing the economy and moving away from a state-dominated economic model (Alissa 2007). Economic reform is McGill Journal of Political Studies 2010


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temporally divisible into three separate and distinct phases. The first phase occurred between 1989 and 1992 and was the product of the Stand-By Agreement with the IMF, which provided $275 million in aid for the purpose of controlling the deficit, reducing inflation, increasing economic growth and rebuilding the central banks’ reserve levels (Alissa 2007). These actions led to riots over the removal of fuel subsidies. However, being loath to reduce the state role in the economy, the monarchy instead offered the public limited political liberalization as a quid pro quo (Dassa Kaya et al. 2008). The second phase of economic reform occurred between 1992 and 1999 and continued the process of economic stabilization through the signing of a new Stand-By Agreement. Further implementation of austerity measures, such as the reduction of food subsidies, led to bread riots but was still enforced by Jordan’s government. Finally, the current phase of reform began in 1999 and continues to the present. This period has been marked by the ascension of King Abdullah II and a more diligent reform effort in deficit reduction, privatization and increased convergence of the Jordanian economy with the global economy. Deficit reduction commenced with austerity plans required by the IMF in 1989. These austerity measures were aimed at reducing economic imbalances of wealth and expenditures and was supported by a US$150 million industrial and trade adjustment loan from the IMF; a second IMF program was signed in 1996 and began the reform of the taxation and banking systems, while cutting subsidies to industries (“Structural Adjustment in Jordan” 1997). Import bans were replaced by tariffs, which had a more positive effect on government revenues. Finally, austerity measures combined with higher government revenues to reduce Jordan’s fiscal imbalance so that overall, and with the support of the West, the country saw an average of six per cent growth annually in the 1990s (“Structural Adjustment in Jordan” 1997). The external account deficit was reduced from twenty per cent of GDP to three per cent, and the external debt proportion was reduced by half (“IMF Approves an Augmentation of the EFF for Jordan” 1997). King Abdullah II has continued the deficit reduction measures initiated by the previous king. For example, the tax system, general sales tax, and tax administration have been remodelled to facilitate reforms that increase state wealth. In the new millennium, the economy has continued to have low inflation rates and a strengthened balance of payments position. With the international support of the IMF, deficit reduction in Jordan has been a success (“IMF Approves US$113 Million Stand-By Credit for Jordan” 2002). A second important goal of economic reform has been to facilitate private business in Jordan. Steps toward this end began during the first phase of reform, with liberalization of the financial sector and loosening control over deposit and lending rates to increase capital inflow (“Structural Adjustment in Jordan” 1997). At this time, Jordanian investment laws were modified to simplify licensing, which had the effect of doubling the amount of businesses from 1987 to 1992 (“Structural Adjustment in Jordan” 1997). Five months after King Abdullah II’s ascension to the throne, he met with twenty-five young businessmen for advice on how to further facilitate private sector growth (Dolan 2002). King Abdullah II’s reform efforts led to Jordan’s membership in the Free Trade Organization, a free trade agreement with the United States, new intellectual property laws and newly privatized state industries. The latter included a telecommunications company, railways, the Arab potash company, and a phosphate mines company (Choucair-Vizoso 2008). Furthermore, Abdullah II also took measures to broaden ownership and transparency in the banking system (“Jordan—Letter of Intent” 2003). Assisted by aid from the United States to the tune of $75 million, he supported the creation of ASEZ, a liberalized, low-tax, duty-free, private business-friendly environment with a target of $6 billion in profit from business and tourism (Fenn 2002). Increased private enterprises in Jordan served to benefit the monarchy in terms of increased capital flow

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within the state. Privatization of state-owned enterprises was self-serving, as ownership was an economic burden on the state; it also served a second purpose of patronage, enhancing the economic opportunities of key regime supporters, as seen in the initial licensing of the telecommunication sector (Heydeman 2007). Further economic reform has targeted extravagant social spending. During the 1990s, the government replaced food subsidies with a program of rationed commodities for the poor (“IMF Approves US$113 Million Stand-By Credit for Jordan” 2002). This measure was part of a larger plan to restructure social spending. The Social and Economic Transformation Spending Plan on health, education and transfers to the poor was financed largely by foreign aid (“IMF Approves US$113 Million Stand-By Credit for Jordan” 2002). The pension system was overhauled in 2003 to reduce government liabilities by thirty per cent between 2003 and 2008 (Heydeman 2007); this was achieved by increasing the retirement age of all military personnel and eliminating the “four year rule” that promoted personnel upon retirement, had they served for more than four years in their final position (“Jordan—Letter of Intent” 2003). Further, the government implemented a five year increase in the retirement age of civil servants. Both of these measures served to reduce state expenditure on pensions. Ultimately, the various types of restructuring in social spending not only reduced state expenditures but also increased the flow of capital into Jordan. Opposition to the reduction of benefits for the poor and pension benefits for military and civil servants was not able to deter the monarchy from these program reductions, as the existing excessive spending could lead to the regime to flounder. The resulting increase in state revenue would be redistributed as patronage, thus reaffirming the monarchy’s control over society (Heydeman 2007). Economic reform in Jordan is yet to be completed, but it has made significant progress since 1989; since it has heightened the monarchy’s control over society and the stability of the regime, it can be considered a success for the state’s government. The importance of the regime’s resulting gain in power was perceived as such a strong benefit that limited political liberalization was offered to allay opposition to these economic reform measures. Political Reform Political liberalization was initiated to appease traditional regime supporters who were aggrieved by economic reforms. However, while some reform has occurred, it has only been extended to select areas which have the ability to strengthen the monarchy’s stability. The overall weakness of Jordan’s supposed movement toward a liberal democratic state can be explained by examining the initial reasons for reform, the National Charter, political parties and elections, regional governments and recent monarchical backpedalling on the liberalization process. Political liberalization was pursued through a top-down process in the late 1980s as a way to consolidate the regime1. Prior to the late King Husayn’s 1989 reform package, political parties were banned, regime opponents were harassed and elections were plagued by fraud (Brynen 1995). During this same decade Jordan found itself in a financial crisis caused by the failure of the rentier system and the much protested austerity measures (Brynen 1995). Importantly, protests over diesel fuel came from the Kingdom’s previously loyal supporters. This led the late King Husayn to determine that to maintain support from society he would need to offer limited political reforms in exchange for continued political support—in essence, reform would serve as a tactical defence move (Dassa Kaya et al. 2008). Liberalization was designed to strengthen the political base of the monarchy, but not to actually transfer power from it to an elected body (Choucair-Vizoso 2008). It was during this period that 1 Due to space limitations, for the purpose of this paper, political liberalization will be used to refer to both political opening and increased public influence over policy.

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Parliament was reinstated, parties were allowed to compete electorally, and a new National Charter was enacted. Constitutional legacy in Jordan is one where the constitution serves to enhance the power of the Hashemites. The constitutions written in both 1946 and 1952 have supported the final authority of the monarch (ChoucairVizoso 2008). During the commencement of political reforms in the 1990s, the National Charter was drafted by a Royal Commission appointed by the King; within the document, one finds provisions that support liberal and democratic principles. However, these provisions were qualified so as to be restrictively consistent with national security (Choucair-Vizoso 2008). Furthermore, the omnipotent presence of the monarchy in society was reaffirmed in the opening provision of the Charter, which states that “the system of government in the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan is parliamentary, monarchic, and hereditary” (“The National Charter: Chapter One” 1990). Analysis of this statement shows the dominant position of monarchical rule over parliamentary rule in the many repetitions of the word “monarchy” and its synonyms. By framing these provisions as such, this document has served to reaffirm the monarchical presence in Jordan rather than to challenge it. Therefore the Charter ensures a limited role for citizens in policy formation, as power remains firmly and almost exclusively in the hands of the monarchy. After two decades of absent Parliament between 1968 and 1989, reform initiated by King Husayn led to the first elections the country had seen in twenty years. However, Jordan’s electoral law was changed in 1993 after the striking success of the Islamist candidates in the 1989 election. The new legislation changed the electoral process to a system of “one person, one vote,” a change which had the ability to stunt the growth of political parties, in particular the Islamic Action Front (IAF) (Ryan 2003, 130). In a system where each person receives only one vote, people tend to vote for tribal or local candidates, who are also more often conservative leaders and supportive of the regime (Heydeman 2007). Therefore this voting system served to increase monarchical stability by increasing the likelihood of pro-regime legislative majorities. The monarch also engaged in severe gerrymandering of voting districts which favoured those which have traditionally supported the monarchy. For example, Irbid is a district with a population of 390,000 which was allocated nine seats; meanwhile, the district of Amman, which has a similar population and has traditionally supported Islamist candidates, was allocated only three seats (Wiktorowicz 1999). Dissatisfaction with the electoral system on behalf of the opposition ultimately led to a boycott of the 1997 elections (Ryan 2003). However, despite later popular lobbying efforts, the weakness of parties has not been rectified under King Abdullah II. This was clearly evidenced in the 2003 elections, in which only 33 seats were won by political parties as opposed to local or tribal candidates, out of a total of 110 seats (Clark and Young 2008). Not only are Jordan’s parties weak and poorly represented, but while parties and elections do exist, there has been no fundamental transfer of power to elected officials, and popular political participation has been stunted (Brynen 1995). Specifically, in 2005 King Abdullah II launched an initiative to decentralize authority in the kingdom by creating regional governments. He argued that this would serve as an important step to increasing political participation by way of political activity at the grassroots level (Satloff 2005). These municipal assemblies would be delegated power over financial activity in their own region. While this is theoretically an effective way to increase political participation at the local level, the motives for such a decentralization of power must be addressed. Parliament was increasingly becoming a threatening and adversarial institution due to its strong Islamist voice. The decentralization of power allowed the King to reduce the power of Parliament, which had traditionally performed the aforementioned fiscal function. Therefore power has been taken from Parliament, and not from the monarchy, to be allocated to regional bodies. King Abdullah

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II’s reform, though progressive, continues to serve the interests of the Hashemites by reducing the power of an institution dominated by opponents of the regime. As a result of regional political instability, political liberalization has been further reversed in recent years by King Abdullah II. The second Palestinian Intifada that occurred in 2000, along with the terrorist attacks of September 11th 2001, served to limit political reform effort (Dassa Kaya et al. 2008). Parliament was dissolved between 2001 and 2003, during which time King Abdullah II did not call an election for fear that hatred of the West and of Israel would lead to the establishment of a radical Parliament (Dolan 2002). Furthermore, the worsening Arab-Israeli conflict served to increase the dominance of conservative monarchical security forces, at the expense of more reformist institutions. The promotion of the security measures can be seen in the new counter-terrorism law of 2006 that expanded the power of the intelligence service and the secret police (Choucair-Vizoso 2008). The backpedalling described above reinforces the conclusion that political reform has been used as a defensive tool of the monarchy. When liberalization was seen to be leading to a threat against the regime, political rights were curtailed in response. Upon examining the combined reasons for liberalization, the National Charter’s weak protection of popular political rights, the weakness of political parties, the corrupt electoral process, and the reason for the introduction of regional governments, it becomes evident that there has not been significant movement towards a liberal and democratic regime in Jordan. The few reforms that have succeeded in this area are indebted to the Hashemites for their support, which was provided only because these liberal seemingly changes would further entrench the position and power of the monarch. Social Reform Social reform in Jordan has been publicly identified as a priority since the initiation of reform by the late King Husayn and its continuation by King Abdullah II. An analysis of Jordan’s social reforms can be undertaken by looking at four predominant categories: women’s rights, human rights, media freedom and civil associations. Little significant progress has been made in any of these categories for fear that social reform would serve to either challenge or undermine the monarchy’s position in Jordanian society. Women’s rights issues in Jordan are divisible into two prongs: civil rights and legal protections. Civil rights refer to legal gender inequality, while legal protection refers to the notorious official facilitation of honour crimes through penal code 340. Despite the fact that legal equality is at least nominally enshrined in the Jordanian Constitution, women lack many civil rights enjoyed by their male counterparts. As such, following political liberalization in 1989, women’s groups began working to eliminate legal inequality. At the same time, Crown Prince Hassan began an examination of Jordan’s Personal Status Law (PSL—the law that dictates different rules for groups of people including women and members of other religions or nationalities), but his draft legislation to amend the law never reached Parliament and was officially shelved in 1996 (Clark and Young 2008). During the suspension of Parliament in 2001, amendments to the PSL were issued as royal decrees; these raised the marriage age from 15 to 16, required shariah court judges to inform wives of a husband’s polygamy, and allowed women to divorce their husbands (Clark and Young 2008). However, after Parliament’s approval to send the proposed PSL amendments to a committee of the lower house for review, the returned legislation was not adopted by Parliament in 2004. Prominent female IAF MP Husimi argued against the amendments because of its potential to lead to the “destruction of hundreds of families” (Clark and Young 2008, 347). Furthermore, the conservative lower house perceived the King’s amendments to be a reflection of his own Western values and as being incompatible with

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Jordan’s political, social, and cultural circumstances. The protection of honour crimes through penal code 340 has become a legal provision of notorious repute. It has been ten years since the emergence of a campaign to end honour crimes, which collected 15,000 signatures in its first year (Nanes 2003). After a 15 minute CNN report in 1998 that lead to international criticism of Jordan, the monarchy took over the campaign to end honour crimes. King Abdullah II organized a very limited rally to show his support of the repeal of penal code 340. Cabinet’s approval of the amendment was likely due to the belief that this was a symbolic monarchical gesture and would not be passed by Parliament—which, in fact, it was not (Nanes 2003). King Abdullah II now had the ability to claim that he had done his best, but that the decision was out of his control, thus projecting any potential blame onto elected officials. Under the Constitution, the Monarch does have the ability to veto any parliamentary decision and proclaim legislation by decree, something which both Kings have done in the past. The monarchy could have forced amendments to the PSL and penal code 340. However, the monarchy decided to maintain a facade of reform in order to avoid severely upsetting its key conservative supporters in Parliament. This balance is the best way for the monarchy to sustain itself: the facade facilitates high levels of economic aid without alienating domestic regime supporters. Human rights is another social category on which Jordan severely lags. King Abdullah II established a Royal Commission for Human Rights in 2000 to ensure compliance with international standards of human rights (Clark and Young 2008); however, recent security threats, including the 2005 hotel bombings and the 2006 Hamas electoral victory in Palestine, have the led the government to pass strong anti-terrorism laws that violate human rights. Contrary to the UN recommendations, torture in Jordanian prisons remains an ongoing practice—especially when dealing with opponents of the regime (“Torture and Impunity in Jordan’s Prison” 2003). In response to the damaging UN report, King Abdullah II again attempted reform when he called on the government to reform inmate treatment. However, despite the King’s directives and Maj. Gen. Muhammad Aitan’s 2007 statement declaring inmate torture was unacceptable, it still exists (“Torture and Impunity in Jordan’s Prison” 2003): as recently as 2009, Islamists prisoners in Juwaida were denied water because they were participating in a hunger strike, a punishment characterized as cruel and degrading by the UN (“Jordan: Prison Reform Promises Broken” 2009). The above failings are inconsistent with King Abdullah II’s proclamation of reform, and the King has shown once again that security and monarchical survival remain his main priority. Furthermore, the lack of enforcement of human rights protection in prisons is used specifically to punish Islamist opponents of the regime, thus sending the message that opposition to the regime is not tolerated in Jordan. While Jordan has declared itself a home for free media in the Middle East, its press remains constrained by legal restrictions, redlines and self-censorship. After the implementation of the second IMF austerity program in 1996, King Husayn responded to criticism by restricting what he perceived as reckless media in 1997 (Ryan 2003). His amendment to that end to the 1993 Press and Publication Act was soon challenged by the country’s news weeklies and was eventually found to be unconstitutional; despite this, however, in 2001 the media was further restricted by penal code amendments that issued fines and prison sentences for any press publications that published libellous information that could destabilize the country (Choucair-Vizoso 2008). Furthermore, selfcensorship is common out of fear of persecution. A journalist for the al-Arab al-Yawn was brutally beaten in 1999 for advocating democratic reform in Jordan (Ryan 2003). Censorship is further ensured by state ownership of the two leading dailies: Ra’y and al-Dustur (Wiktorowicz 1999).

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The laws passed by the late King Husaynand by King Abdullah II are directly contrary to Jordan’s portrayal of itself as a liberal regime. The facade Jordan attempts to promote serves the purpose of maintaining a positive relationship with its international allies, on whom it depends for financial support. However, in reality the constraints on the media serve to prevent a free press from criticizing the monarchy, as this could lead to increased dissent toward the regime. In a recent speech to the World Economic Forum, King Abdullah II emphasized the importance of “developing and promoting civil society” (“Shutting Out the Critics” 2007). “Civil society” in this respect can be explained as organizations that balance state power. However, King Abdullah II has not yet diverged from his father’s repressive policies. While political liberalization was initiated to maintain stability, political participation was allowed only through state-supported institutions. For example, Law 60, which was passed in 1953 and requires all public meetings to obtain regime permission, has yet to be repealed (Wiktorowicz 1999).; furthermore, grassroots groups continue to be tightly controlled by the state through Law 33, which restricts the formation of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) (Clark and Young 2008). In 1997, the progressive Ba’th opposition group led by Fu’ad Dubor applied to hold a rally in Irib in protest of the foreign policy of the United States, an application which was denied by the regime. Soon after, in response to the likely action the United States would take against in Iraq in 1998, the regime prohibited opposition demonstrations altogether. Protesters were met with violent police resistance and political activity was suppressed by the Mukhabarat. As recently as 2007, the Jordanian cabinet proposed to further restrict charitable groups by granting the government new abilities to deny NGOs the ability to operate (“Shutting Out the Critics” 2007). The groups that are denied registration or the right to rally are generally groups that have traditionally been opponents of the regime. The regime overpowers potential oppositional NGOs by turning them into Royal NGOs (RONGOs). By doing this, the monarchy maintains control over these groups’ agendas by virtue of royal patronage and funding (Clark and Young 2008). In contrast, groups such as the Cancer Society, which are not opponents to the regime, have not been either restricted or overwhelmed by regime support so as to be unable to operate without it (Wiktorowicz 1999). Ultimately, and consistently with King Husayn’s legacy, King Abdullah II has continued to suppress civil activity of regime criticism and opposition that could threaten regime stability. Conclusion Both the late King Husayn and King Abdullah II have not lived up to the reformist agenda they set for Jordan. Economic reform, though not completed, has been the only sphere that has seen extensive progress. Progress has been seen in debt reduction, increased activity in the private sector and reforming inefficient social spending. Reforms in these areas have succeeded, but in reality these economic changes served to increase the monarchy’s control over wealth while alleviating it of burdensome crown corporations, all while reinforcing patronage links. Political reforms have seen considerably less progress. The limited number of successful reforms in all fields occurred out of necessity and in many cases as quid pro quo for crucial economic alterations. Despite limited successes, the new National Charter, weak parties, corrupt elections and the dynamics of regional governments all point to a regime where the monarch remains at the pinnacle of political influence. Maintaining only selectively reformed institutions serves to reinforce the monarchical role in society. Finally, social reform has seen the least progress of all spheres; because reforms in the areas of women’s civil rights and legal protections, human rights, free media and civil associations could potentially provide new means and new reasons for regime opposition, they have been severely restricted. Neither monarch pushed reforms in these areas despite having the ability to

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do so, for fear that they would unnecessarily undermine regime survival and provide incentive for popular support of regime change. Recently King Abdullah II dissolved Parliament once more, as it was viewed by the greater Jordanian population as being inefficient and not reform-minded. This move was once again pursued in order to enhance the King’s standing with his citizens. It is hoped that King Abdullah II will move to reform the electoral system before calling a new election, but in light of his past history this type of action seems unlikely to occur.

Works Cited Alissa, Sufyan. “Rethinking Economic Reform in Jordan: Confronting Socioeconomic Realities.” Carnegie Middle East Center, 2007. Barron, Owen. “A Tightrope Act: Jordan’s Turmoil After Gaza.” Harvard International Review (2009): 12-13. Brynen, Rex. “The Politics of Monarchical Liberalism.” In Political Liberalization & Democratization in the Arab World, ed. Baghat Korany, Rex Brynen and Paul Noble, 71-100. Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc, 1995. Choucair-Vizoso, Julia. “Illusive Reform: Jordan’s Stubborn Stability in Egypt.” In Beyond the Facade: Political Reform in the Arab World, ed. Marina Ottaway and Julia Choucair-Vizoso, 45-70. Washington: United Book Press, 2008. Clark, Janine A. & Amy E. Young. “Islamism and Family Law Reform in Morocco and Jordan.” Mediterranean Politics, 13.3 (2008): 333-352. Dassa Kaya, Dalia, Frederic Wehrey, Audra K. Grant and Dale Stahl. “Jordan.” In More Freedom, Less Terror? Liberalization and Political Violence in the Arab World, 59-80. Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 2008. Dolan, Kerry A. “Monarch on a Mission.” Forbes 170.4 (2002): 98-100. Fenn, John. “Bridging the Economic Gulf.” Middle East 326 (2002): 52-53. Heydeman, Steven. “Upgrading Authoritarianism in the Arab World.” The Saban Center for Middle East Policy at the Brookings Institute, 2007. “IMF Approves an Augmentation of the EFF for Jordan.” 1997. International Monetary Fund. http://www.imf. org/external/np/sec/pr/1997/pr9708.htm “IMF Approves US$113 Million Stand-By Credit for Jordan.” 2002. International Monetary Fund. http://www. imf.org/external/np/sec/pr/2002/pr0231.htm “Jordan – Letter of intent, Memorandum of Economic and Financial Policies, and Technical Memorandum of Understanding.” 2003. International Monetary Fund. http://www.imf.org/external/NP/LOI/2003/jor/01/ “Jordan: Prison Reform Promises Broken.” 2009. Human Rights Watch. http://www.hwr.org/en/news/2009/08/21/ jordan-prison-reform-promises-broken King Abdullah II. “Prospects for Moving Forward.” The Washington Quarterly, 23.4 (2009): 73-76. Nanes, Stefanie Eileen. “Fighting Honor Crimes: Evidence of Civil Society in Jordan.” Middle East Journal, 57.1 (2003): 112-130. Ryan, Curtis. “Political Liberalization and Monarchical Succession in Jordan.” Israeli Affairs, 9.3 (2003): 129140.

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Salibi, Kamal. The modern history of Jordan. New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1998. Satloff, Robert. “A Reform Initiative in Jordan: Trying to Keep Pace with Iraqi and Palestinian Elections.” The Washington Institute for Near East Policy. 2005. “Shutting Out the Critics.” Human Rights Watch. 19.10 (2007). “Structural Adjustment in Jordan – Independent Evaluation Group.” 1997. The World Bank Group. http://inweb90.worldbank.org.oed.oeddoclib.nsf/docUNIDViewForJavaSearch/68FD “The National Charter.” 1990. Embassy of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan. http://www.jordanembassyus.org/ new/aboutjordan/nationalcharter.shtml “Torture and Impunity in Jordan’s Prison.” 2003. Human Rights Watch. http//.www.hwr.org/en/reports/2008/10/08/ torture-and-impunity-jordan-s-prisons?print Wiktorowicz, Quintan. “The Limits of Democracy in the Middle East: The Case of Jordan.” Middle East Journal, 53 no. 4 (1999): 607-620.

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A Crisis in the Shadows: the Failure of HIV Prevention in Canada Sean Stefanik Overview For a health care system designed to promote the highest possible standard of well-being, Canada’s response to the HIV/AIDS pandemic leaves much to be desired. To their credit, provincial governments do provide publically-funded access to the antiretroviral combination therapies necessary to prevent the onset of deadly opportunistic infections. HIV is no longer the death sentence it once was. However, as most epidemiologists would argue, treatment is only one part of the puzzle. Canada’s focus on this area has left a glaring policy gap when it comes to prevention. An estimated 58,000 Canadians were living with HIV at the end of 2005—this represents a 16% increase from the 50,000 cases that existed just three years earlier (Public Health Agency of Canada 2007). In Ontario alone, over 34,000 people have been infected with HIV, with the number of new infections increasing at an average annual rate of 6.7% between 2001 and 2006 (Remis 2008). The issue of rising HIV prevalence presents a clear problem in three respects. First, despite the fact that HIV is now a chronic condition rather than a terminal one, it still meaningfully impacts an individual’s quality of life. Stigma and discrimination often lead to isolation from friends and family, and periodic bouts of illness make it difficult to maintain a steady job (“HIV/AIDS Backgrounder”). Even for those who can effectively access HIV treatment regimens—not always an easy task for people in rural communities or Aboriginals living on reserves—a plethora of side effects, including nausea, vomiting, bone loss and changes in metabolism, become everyday realities (“Treatment of HIV Infection” 2007). The standard of care in Canada, referred to as highly active antiretroviral therapy (HAART), also requires that a patient take numerous pills at regularly scheduled intervals during the day. Missing just one dose can cause both a rapid increase in viral load, thus increasing the risk of transmissibility, as well as the development of drug resistance (“What is Treatment Adherence?” 2008). HIV may be treatable in most cases, but advances in medicine do not make prevention any less necessary. Furthermore, higher rates of HIV are a problem at the public health policy level. While advances in treatment are clearly beneficial for improving the prognosis for HIV-positive individuals, they come at a great financial cost. In a 2006 study published in The Medical News that examined treatment costs in the United States, the estimated cost of medication per patient was roughly $15,000 per year, and more than $36,000 per year for people in the latter stages of their infection. Assuming a relatively comparable price tag in Canada, the financial burden of providing a lifetime supply of antiretrovirals to an increasingly large number of people is proving to be quite high. Moreover, any possibility of eradication, the ultimate aim of most epidemiologists and health experts, is nonexistent without a comprehensive prevention strategy. Both these factors make Canada’s rising HIV prevalence a serious problem for health authorities. Finally, new HIV infections are disproportionately affecting groups that are already marginalized in society, particularly Aboriginals, gay men and sex workers. In 2002, for example, Aboriginals comprised only 3.3% of the Canadian population, yet they represented 14% of new infections (Abrahams 2006). Men who have sex with men (MSM), meanwhile, have accounted for 68% of positive tests since HIV testing began in 1985 McGill Journal of Political Studies 2010


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(Public Health Agency of Canada 2007). Insofar as the Canadian government is concerned with promoting more equitable social outcomes and reducing disparities between various communities, addressing the growing rate of HIV infections among these communities is critical to that mission. HIV prevention first emerged on the political agenda in the early 1980s as a result of mobilization of the gay community through volunteer organizations such as AIDS Vancouver and the AIDS Committee of Toronto. Unfortunately, both the federal and provincial governments were slow to respond. This only started to change with a series of widely publicized demonstrations at the fifth International AIDS Conference in Montreal in 1989, where Federal Minister of Health Perrin Beatty publicly admitted that Canada had no strategy for combating AIDS (Duffin 1994). Increased mobilization and public health concerns among voters, in conjunction with emerging research that gave policymakers a clearer picture of the virus, made HIV/AIDS policy an important issue, pushing governments into action. Localized outbreaks of the epidemic also kept the issue in the spotlight. This was particularly evident in Vancouver, where HIV incidence among injecting drug users (IDUs) was the highest in the western hemisphere by the late 1990s. This outbreak prompted numerous changes in health policy, most notably with the introduction of North America’s first safe injection site (Strathdee 2005). More recently, the emergence of a wide body of evidence suggesting that HIV is on the rise has renewed calls for a focus on prevention. A wide array of non-governmental organizations, most importantly the HIV/AIDS Legal Network, has also been helpful at keeping the issue on the political agenda through groups’ effective lobbying and mobilization efforts. There are two essential elements to this problem. First, advancements in treatment and misperceptions of the virus have propagated more risky sexual behavior. Many continue to believe that HIV can be cured, and are thus willing to take more risks than they otherwise would. The risk of contracting HIV no longer presents the strong incentive for practicing safe sex that it once did. More importantly, at the policy level, government responses have been formulated based on political viability rather than efficacy. While over $110 million has been committed to vaccine initiatives, substantially less money is available for more reliable prevention strategies targeted at the high risk groups discussed earlier (“Canada’s New Government…” 2007). Prevention programs, where they do exist, have been far too broad. The federal government’s five stated areas of action, including strategies of “communications and social marketing” and “global engagement,” do little to target sex workers, IDUs, and other individuals that are actually in need of programming (“Federal Initiative…” 2007). Moreover, the few politically viable prevention campaigns that are in place have actively harmed prevention efforts. Current Canadian law, for instance, requires HIV-positive individuals to inform their partner of their status (“Criminal Law and HIV” 2008). While palatable to voters, this has the unfortunate impact of discouraging people from being tested (as you cannot be charged if you were unaware of your HIV status), contradicting public health’s message that the burden of prevention should be on both partners. This fuels even more stigma against people with HIV. Various groups have also criticized the law for violating rights to privacy, equality, and security of the person (“Position Paper...” 2008). Better prevention policy is clearly necessary. Policy Proposals Given the need for prevention strategy to focus on specific at-risk groups, this paper will examine two policy proposals intended to prevent HIV transmission among injecting drug users: mandatory minimum sentences for drug crimes and needle and syringe programs. IDUs, despite being a statistically small proportion of the general population, are one of the most common avenues through which the HIV virus is propagated. Between 2005 and 2006, the reported number of new AIDS cases attributed to IDUs had increased to over 30%. Moreover,

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IDUs were responsible for roughly 20% of new HIV infections every year between 2003 and 2006 (Public Health Agency of Canada 2007). Transmission occurs relatively easily through needle or syringe sharing as a result of blood residue that remains present on previously used injection paraphernalia (Batties 1994). Apart from needle sharing, studies have also concluded that there is “a positive relationship between substance use and high risk sex.” (Batties 1994, 97). Many scientists would argue that IDUs are a particularly necessary risk group to target, given, as these studies suggest, that they also transmit the virus to their sexual partners more often. The first proposal being considered in Canada is the use of mandatory minimum sentences for drug crimes, as outlined in Bill C-15. Under this legislation, the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act (CDSA) would be amended to impose mandatory jail time for both selling drugs and possession of drugs with the intent of trafficking (“Government Re-Introduced Legislation…” 2009). Selling relatively minor amounts of heroine, for instance, would result in a two-year prison sentence (Stone 2009). This bill was passed in the House of Commons by a vote of 195 to 54 in June 2009, and is currently being debated in the Senate, which seemed poised to vote on the issue prior to the recent prorogation (“Vote Details (40-2 Vote No. 82)”). The aims of this strategy are multi-faceted. First, it is important to note that this legislation was tabled for a wide variety of reasons, not all of which relate directly to health policy. Drug crime itself is a serious concern for all levels of government; curbing the production and consumption of illegal substances is a legitimate goal completely independent of HIV strategy. Bill C-15 is largely an attempt to address this aim. This paper, however, will focus on the goals and impacts of the legislation as it pertains specifically to HIV prevention and public health policy. In this respect, the main goal of this policy is to eliminate drug use as an avenue for HIV transmission. Severe penalties for selling and distributing narcotics are intended to deter drug dealers from continuing their activities. Criminals have a better picture of the consequences they face should they get caught, which can only occur with standardized minimum sentence lengths. Proponents then argue that many dealers will no longer be willing to take the risk of distributing drugs to the population. With a reduced supply of drugs available on the streets, supporters of the bill claim that fewer people will be able to continue indulging their addictions. Less drug use overall results in lower rates of HIV transmission among IDUs. This approach is favored by a wide array of political actors, including both the Conservative Party and the Liberal Party. In his speech introducing the bill to the Senate, Conservative Senator John D. Wallace illuminates the “tough on crime” consensus that supports this legislation: “Canadians want the government to take action against serious drug crimes. This government believes that it is time to ensure that those who commit serious drug offences be dealt with seriously and that appropriate penalties be imposed on these offenders” (“Debates - Issue 46 - June 16, 2009”). Most Canadians also seem to support a coercive approach to deterring drug use. According to the 2007 National Justice Survey, 72% of Canadians considered more serious penalties to be the most effective response in addressing the problem of illegal drugs, while harm reduction was surveyed to be the least effective (“2007 National Justice Survey…”). Most of the support among federal politicians derives from the reality that mandatory minimums are a politically viable strategy. Locking up drug dealers—even if it is not effective at combating the problem—is a good way to win votes, as the National Justice Survey suggests. The three other federal parties, the Bloc Québécois, the NDP and the Green Party, are all opposed to this measure. According to NDP MP Libby Davies, “…mandatory minimum sentencing regimes for drug offences are ineffective. This is all about window-dressing for the Conservatives’ crime agenda. They want to impress people with their tough-on-crime approach” (Pablo 2009). HIV advocacy groups, in particular, have voiced strong opposition to the plan. According to the HIV/AIDS Legal Network, “policy-makers should be reallocating funds

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from largely ineffective policing interventions towards addiction treatment strategies” (“Mandatory Minimum Sentences…” 2006). The Canadian AIDS Society has expressed similar concerns, arguing that substance abuse needs to be treated in the paradigm of health policy rather than criminal law in order to curb HIV transmission (Doolittle-Romas 2009). A number of legal organizations, including the Barreau de Quebec, are also in opposition to the bill (“40th Parliament…” 2009). Needle and syringe programs (NSPs), on the other hand, fall within the category of harm reduction. Rather than attempting to dissuade behavior that will exist at some level regardless of its illegality, the aim of this type of policy is to make illicit behavior as safe as possible, reducing the likelihood of HIV transmission. Broadly speaking, the HIV/AIDS Legal Network defines NSPs as: “any program that provides sterile injection equipment to people who inject drugs, whether in exchange for used injection equipment or not” (Klein 2007, 7). According to supporters of these programs, drug users are far less likely to share needles or use dirty needles when clean ones are easily accessible. Since HIV transmission occurs through the use of shared needles or syringes, NSPs are hypothetically successful at preventing—or at the very minimum, reducing—new infections among injecting drug users. In contrast to the criminalization strategy, the goal of NSPs is not to completely eliminate illicit drugs. Rather, they attempt to target the specific transmission mechanism in order to achieve the ultimate aim of improved prevention. As of 2001, over 200 NSPs existed in Canada; however, their status varies significantly by province. While local health boards in Ontario are required by law to provide NSPs, private organizations are the only source of funds for these organizations in PEI (Klein 2007). Rural communities often have little access to these programs, and urban areas are largely underserved. Studies suggest that only 5% of the demand for clean needles is being met in Ontario, with similarly low numbers for other areas in Canada (Klein 2007). Advocates of this prevention strategy are calling for a vast expansion of NSPs in order to make clean needles accessible to drug addicts in all areas of the country. A wide array of social groups support this policy, including most HIV/AIDS advocacy groups and a significant number of epidemiologists. Municipal governments, on the other hand, often express objections to these programs due to widespread “not in my backyard” sentiments (Klein 2007, 34). Many residents believe that the programs will draw drug users and sex workers to their neighborhoods. Law enforcement agencies have been similarly skeptical of NSPs: the 2005 Canadian Association of Chiefs of Police conference released a statement condemning such programs, claiming: “harm reduction policies mislead people into thinking that they can use drugs ‘safely’ and ‘responsibly,’ as opposed to encouraging them not to use drugs at all (“Resolutions Adopted…” 2005). NSPs are currently a very contentious issue in Canadian political discourse. Policy Analysis & Recommendation Mandatory minimum sentences would only constitute a viable option if they actually reduced the absolute number of individuals who use drugs. In this respect, proponents view the arguments discussed earlier as a compelling case for criminal sanctions acting as effective deterrents. Unfortunately, the evidence suggests that this is not true. In the United States, where minimum sentences have been in place for quite some time, there is an estimated number of 100,000 more non-violent drug offenders in US prisons than the entire prison population of the European Union (“Mandatory Minimum Sentences…” 2006). Despite this emphasis on punishment, the drug problem in the United States has not disappeared, and HIV transmission rates continue to be an issue. Advocates of this policy fail to recognize that drug addicts will often stop at nothing to sustain their addictions. Given that

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many addicts shoplift and commit other crimes in pursuit of drugs, it seems unreasonable to believe that mandatory minimums would provide a stronger deterrent than the one that already exists. In contrast to NSPs, however, this solution is much more politically viable, as demonstrated by the public opinion survey discussed earlier. It exerts no strain on provincial health plans since it uses criminal law rather than health policy as its vehicle for attempting to enhance prevention. In this respect, direct costs to the public health system are negligible. Drug addicts and dealers are often unsympathetic figures in the public consciousness, so most individuals have little concern with locking them up in prisons for longer periods of time. Many NSPs, in contrast, have been compromised by a lack of support and coordination. For instance, in April 2003, Vancouver police executed a crackdown in the downtown eastside, effectively deterring drug addicts from accessing a syringe exchange site (Klein 2007). Tensions between NSPs, police organizations, and the public present a serious barrier to the success of these programs, an issue that does not exist with mandatory minimums. Despite being much more politically contentious, however, NSPs offer a better solution to the problem. According to the World Health Organization, another proponent of these programs, NSPs are still resoundingly effective. In a 2002 study of 103 cities, those with sterile injection equipment provision programs saw the HIV infection rate decline by an average of 18.6% annually, while those without any programs experienced an increase of 8.1% (“Effectiveness of Sterile…” 2004). When masses of drug injectors began turning up in Scottish hospitals with AIDS in the mid-1980s, Scotland became the first country to distribute needles to injectors. Seven years later, HIV prevalence among IDUs had decreased from 55% to 20%. Other countries, including Australia, England and the Netherlands, experienced similar successes (Pisani 2008). In the absence of such programs, many drug addicts have no other access to clean needles, since pharmacists regularly refuse to sell syringes to people they suspect of injecting illegal drugs (Klein 2007). Consequently, sharing needles or reusing dirty ones are the only options to sustain addiction, which dramatically increases the risk of HIV infection. NSPs are not just an effective means of distributing clean needles and syringes, but for many addicts, they are the only way to access these materials. Advocates of mandatory minimums also fail to recognize that addiction is a health problem that requires a health policy solution. No criminal sanction can completely eliminate illegal drug use, meaning that some form of safety net needs to be in place to mitigate its harms. NSPs can fill this void. In addition to minimizing the risk of HIV transmission through the provision of clean injection equipment, they can also serve as effective access points to counseling, addition treatment programs, HIV testing, and other forms of social support. Since most addicts are highly unlikely to voluntarily seek the assistance of a medical professional until they hit “rock bottom,” NSPs are a good way of getting these individuals in touch with health officials much earlier in their addiction cycle. A number of studies have confirmed this logic, suggesting that: “drug addicts participating in needle exchanges are more likely to enter rehabilitation programs” (Rosenberg 2009). As a result, NSPs are actually more effective at achieving the primary goal of mandatory minimum sentencing: reducing the absolute number of people on drugs. Criminal sanctions, on the other hand, simply deter addicts from seeking help by creating an increased fear of prosecution. Law enforcement officials are not completely incorrect in their objections to these programs, however. NSPs do seem to contradict drug laws, and, at least at face value, undermine the “just say no” message of drug abstinence. Mandatory minimums, however, are consistent with existing policy and do nothing to encourage more people to use drugs. But these claims are tenuous at best. First, there are no studies that have conclusively demonstrated that NSPs actually contribute to increased drug usage. In fact, studies by the Centre for Addition and Mental Health (CAMH) indicated that needle exchange programs do not increase injection drug use (“CBC News

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Indepth: Drugs” 2004). The most effective deterrents to heroin or cocaine experimentation—negative health impacts, social stigma, illegality, and the risk of addiction—remain in place. Mandatory minimums may be more consistent with existing law, but better health outcomes are a more important priority. It is entirely possible to promote anti-drug messages in schools while simultaneously working to provide better health outcomes to people who are already addicted. After all, addicts who contract HIV through shared needles represent a public health threat to everyone they have sexual encounters with. Additionally, needle exchange programs that require addicts to return used needles help reduce the number of syringes discarded in public spaces. Both of these public health advantages outweigh any inconsistencies with the law that may exist. Moreover, NSPs are based on a preventative model of health care that may benefit provincial health plans in the future. In addition to the cost estimates of HIV medication discussed earlier, some studies have suggested that the total cost of treating an HIV/AIDS patient over his or her lifetime is in the proximity of $1.3 million. Given these expenditures, preventing new HIV infections is incredibly effective at reducing costs to the public system in the future. These savings significantly outweigh the minimal expenses necessary to establish and operate NSPs across the country. Mandatory minimums, on the other hand, result in excessive prison costs necessary to incarcerate a large number of drug offenders. Since the average cost of incarceration for a male prisoner in Canada is nearly $88,000 per year, mandatory minimums will cost society a significant amount of money while providing little in terms of results (Pablo 2009). NSPs actually offer the possibility of cost savings in the long run, making them a better option from a financial standpoint. The barriers to NSP success, as discussed earlier, can also be overcome by effective program design and implementation. First, public opinion in regards to such programs is actually quite malleable. In an American study of 14 polls conducted between 1897 and 2000, support ranged from 29% to 66% (Vernick 2003). The HIV/ AIDS Legal Network outlines a number of strategies that can be used to foster community support. These include emphasizing the provision of ancillary services (HIV testing, referrals to drug treatment programs, etc.), administering NSPs through publicly accountable medical officers of health, and encouraging community interaction through founding committees that give local residents a seat at the table (Klein 2007). Not only can implementation of these strategies make NSPs more effective service providers, but they could also generate the same degree of public support that exists for mandatory minimum sentencing. As a result, effective program design and implementation can make public support and political viability a reality for this policy. Conclusion Needle and syringe programs are a necessary step in addressing Canada’s problematic HIV prevention strategy. Injecting drug users are a particularly effective at-risk group to target since, unlike with sexual transmission, there is an identifiable and cost-effective solution available. Nevertheless, IDUs still represent only a quarter of new HIV infections. Broader HIV prevention can only be effective with additional programming targeted specifically towards sex workers, Aboriginals, men who have sex with men, and other high risk communities. While there is still much more to be accomplished, there are just as many obstacles in the way. Many of the political viability concerns surrounding NSPs are even more of a roadblock for addressing HIV among sex workers. In addition, the remoteness of many Aboriginal communities presents additional challenges. However, from this study, it is clear that effective solutions can be made politically viable if given the opportunity. While mandatory minimums may be a popular solution to deal with the HIV epidemic, it remains a scientifically unproven strategy that, in all likelihood, only serves to deter addicts from seeking help. Needle and

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syringe programs, in contrast, are much more coherent strategies that accept the reality of drug abuse and attempt to prevent even greater harm from occurring. The unfortunate reality is that HIV incidence is a growing problem in Canada; yet, as this paper has argued, health policy experts are in a much better position to address it than the coercive force of the law, even if it is politically popular to imprison the drug dealers and addicts responsible for transmitting the virus.

Works Cited “2007 National Justice Survey: Tackling Crime and Public Confidence.” 2008. Department of Justice. http:// www.justice.gc.ca/eng/pi/rs/rep-rap/2007/rr07_4/index.html “40th Parliament, 2nd Session - Edited Hansard No. 034.” 2009. House of Commons. http://www2.parl.gc.ca/ HousePublications/Publication.aspx?Mode=1&Pub=hansard&DocId=3778578&File=0&Language=E#I nt-2679702 “A Brief History of HIV/AIDS in Canada.” 2007. Public Health Agency of Canada. http://www.phac-aspc.gc.ca/ aids-sida/info/1-eng.php Abrahams, Bethina. “AIDS and Canadian Aboriginals: The Impact of AIDS on Aboriginal Communities in Canada.” 14 Aug. 2006. http://aidshiv.suite101.com/article.cfm/aids_and_canadian_aboriginals. Battjes, Robert J., Zili Sloboda, and William C. Grace, eds. The Context of HIV Risk Among Drug Users and Their Sexual Partners. Rockville, MD: US Department of Health and Human Services, 1994. “Canada’s New Government and Gates Foundation announce support for HIV/AIDS vaccine research.” 2007. Office of the Prime Minister. http://www.pm.gc.ca/eng/media.asp?id=1544 “CBC News Indepth: Drugs.” 2004. Canadian Broadcasting Corporation. http://www.cbc.ca/news/background/ drugs/needleexchange.html “Criminal Law and HIV.” 2008. Canadian HIV/AIDS Legal Network. www.aidslaw.ca/publications/interfaces/ downloadFile.php?ref=1318 “Debates - Issue 46 - June 16, 2009.” Parliament of Canada - Parlement du Canada. http://www.parl.gc.ca/40/2/ parlbus/chambus/senate/deb-e/046db_2009-06-16-e.htm?Language=E&Parl=40&Ses=2#89 Doolittle-Romas, Monique. “Mandatory Minimum Sentences for Drug Offenses: A Step in the Wrong Direction.” 2009. Canadian AIDS Society. http://www.cdnaids.ca/web/backgrnd.nsf/pages/cas-gen-0144 Duffin, Jacalyn. “AIDS, Memory and the History of Medicine: Musings on the Canadian Response.” Genitourin Medicine 70 (1994): 64-69. “Effectiveness of Sterile Needle and Syringe Programming in Reducing HIV/AIDS among Injecting Drug Users.” 2004. World Health Organization. http://www.who.int/hiv/pub/idu/pubidu/en/ “Federal Initiative to Address HIV/AIDS in Canada.” 2007. Public Health Agency of Canada. http://www.phacaspc.gc.ca/aids-sida/fi-if/index-eng.php#role “Government Re-Introduces Legislation to Fight Serious Drug Crime.” 2009. Department of Justice. http://www. justice.gc.ca/eng/news-nouv/nr-cp/2009/doc_32338.html “HAART is very cost-effective.” The Medical News, Mar. 2006. http://www.news-medical.net/ news/2006/03/01/16298.aspx “HIV/AIDS Backgrounder: People living with HIV/AIDS.” AIDS Committee of Toronto. http://www.actoronto.

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org/home.nsf/pages/phabackground “HIV/AIDS Epi Updates, November 2007.” 2007. Surveillance and Risk Assessment Division, Centre for Infectious Disease Prevention and Control, Public Health Agency of Canada. Klein, Alana. Sticking Points: Barriers to Access to Needle and Syringe Programs in Canada. Toronto: Canadian HIV/AIDS Legal Network, 2007. “Mandatory Minimum Sentences for Drug Offices: Why Everyone Loses.” Canadian HIV/AIDS Legal Network. 2006. http://www.aidslaw.ca/publications/publicationsdocEN.php?ref=72 Pablo, Carlito. “Bill C-15 Could Fill Canadian Prisons With Drug Offenders.” Straight.com, 26 Mar. 2009. http:// www.straight.com/article-209473/bill-c15-could-fill-prisons Pisani, Elizabeth. The Wisdom of Whores: Bureaucrats, Brothels, and the Business of AIDS. Toronto: Penguin Canada, 2008. “Position Paper on the Criminalization of Non-Discosure.” 2008. Ontario Working Group on Criminal Law and HIV Exposure. www.aidslex.org/site_documents/CR-0029E.pdf Remis, Robert S. “Report on HIV/AIDS in Ontario.” 2008. University of Toronto. http://www.actoronto.org/ home.nsf/pages/hivaidsstatsont “Resolutions Adopted at the 100th Annual Conference.” 2005. Canadian Association of Chiefs of Police. http:// www.cacp.ca/media/resolutions/efiles/38/Final_English2.pdf Rosenberg, Tina. “The Needle Nexus.” The New York Times, 17 Nov. 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/11/22/ magazine/22FOB-idealab-t.html?_r=2 Stone, Laura. “Mandatory Drug Sentences Will Increase Parole Board Workload, Senators Hear.” 2009. Canada. com. http://www.canada.com/news/Mandatory+drug+sentences+will+increase+parole+board+workload +senators+hear/2242910/story.html Strathdee, Steffanie. “Targeting HIV Interventions to the Most at Risk - Hindsight is 20/20.” International Journal of Epidemiology 34 (2005): 152-58. http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/15649963 “Treatment of HIV Infection.” 2007. National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases. US Department of Health and Human Services. http://www.niaid.nih.gov/factsheets/treat-hiv.htm Vernick, J.S. et al., “Public Opinion About Syringe Exchange Programs in the USA: An Analysis of National Surveys.” International Journal of Drug Policy 14 (2003): 431-435. “Vote Details (40-2 Vote No. 82).” House of Commons. http://www2.parl.gc.ca/HouseChamberBusiness/ChamberVoteDetail.aspx?Language=E&Mode=1&Parl=40&Ses=2&Vote=82 “What is Treatment Adherence?” 2008. The Body: The Complete HIV/AIDS Resource. http://www.thebody.com/ content/art50167.html

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The Eigth Amendment Concerning Life Imprisonment of Juveniles without Parole Julie Beauchamp There exist divergences of political philosophies in the United States’ political institutions. Such differences are not unique to Congress or to state legislatures, but are also present in the judicial philosophies of Supreme Court judges. The Court’s far-reaching impact renders such interpretations subject to controversies. Proponents of the living constitution doctrine argue that the Constitution is not a static document and that although the wording remains the same over the years, its meaning should reflect the changing values of American society. Furthermore, the Eighth Amendment has certainly evolved over time, and it appears that it will continue to do so. Although the Court has often decided cases on the Eighth Amendment regarding capital punishment, the Court is currently considering the possibility that strict sentences for minors, in certain instances, are a possible violation of the Constitution. The Supreme Court recently heard arguments in Graham v. Florida and Sullivan v. Florida, both of which involve challenges to life sentences in prisons. Following oral arguments in these cases, the Court should rule that life imprisonment of juvenile offenders without parole for committing non-homicidal crimes is a violation of the Eighth Amendment, which is applicable to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment. In order to support this position, I will first introduce the basic facts regarding the petitioners and the evolved meaning of the Eighth Amendment according to the Court’s jurisprudence since the beginning of the 20th century. Then, I will reiterate the Court’s main holding regarding juvenile sentences in Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005). Subsequently, I will address the proportionality component of the Eighth Amendment and the evolving standards of decency, and finally, I will mention the remedies available to the Court. Presentation of the Cases Terrance Jamar Graham was sentenced to life without parole in 2006 after he took part in an armed home invasion when he was 17. He was on a three-year probation and a twelve-month sentence for being convicted of an armed robbery at the time of his arrest. He also admitted of having carried out other robberies to the police. The trial judge for the home invasion case sent Graham to prison for life for violating the terms of his probation. The petitioner was 19 years old at the time of his sentencing, and subsequently, he appealed to the Florida First District Court of Appeal on the basis that his sentence was disproportionate and violated international norms. The Court of Appeal rejected his claims of constitutional violations and upheld his sentence, judging that it was not “grossly disproportionate” according to Supreme Court standards, and finding no “per se ban on the sentencing of juveniles to life imprisonment” (Cornell University Law School, “Graham v. Florida; Sullivan v. Florida”). The Florida Supreme Court refused review. The U.S. Supreme Court granted a writ of certiorari on May 4, 2009, and oral arguments were heard on November 9, 2009. Joe Harris Sullivan was arrested at the age of 13 in 1989, with two older friends of 15 and 17, and was charged as an adult on two counts of sexual battery, two counts of burglary of a dwelling, and one count of grand theft in violation of Florida law (Cornell University Law School). Sullivan admitted to the burglary but denied he had committed the rape. The victim in this case had not seen her attacker’s face. After a one-day trial, McGill Journal of Political Studies 2010


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the petitioner was convicted and sentenced to life imprisonment with no possibility for parole in the circuit court in Escambia County. On appeal, the First District Court of Appeal affirmed the conviction without issuing an opinion. The Florida Supreme Court the dismissed review without opinion as well. After the Supreme Court decided Roper v. Simmons (2005), the petitioner filed a motion for post-conviction relief, arguing that under Roper his sentence was unconstitutional. In 2007, the trial court dismissed the motion, concluding that the petitioner’s invocation of Roper was “meritless,” citing Florida jurisprudence which declined to extend Roper. The Florida First District Court of Appeal summarily affirmed without an opinion, denied rehearing, and prevented the Florida Supreme Court from reviewing the case by denying certification. On May 4, 2009, a petition for certiorari was granted by the Supreme Court and oral arguments were heard on November 9, 2009. Terrance Graham and Joe Sullivan are among the 111 offenders worldwide currently sentenced to life without parole for the commission of non-homicidal crimes, who were children under 18 at the time of the crime. All these cases are in the United States: 77 are in Florida and the remaining are in six other states: Louisiana, Iowa, Mississippi, California, Nebraska and South Carolina (U.S. Supreme Court, “Oral argument Sullivan v. Florida” 2009). Some states even impose mandatory life imprisonment without parole sentences upon conviction of certain crimes in adult court; for example, in Vermont, ten-year-olds are eligible for life imprisonment without parole (Van Zyl Smit 2002). In the 1990s, partly in response to public desire for “tough-on-crime” sentences, a trend developed in which states made it easier to try juveniles in adult courts. Between 1992 and 1997, 45 states enacted laws facilitating the transfer of juvenile offenders from the juvenile justice system to the criminal justice system, with juveniles consequently receiving adult sentences (U.S. Department of Justice 2006). Certain offences committed by a juvenile above a certain age lead automatically to trial in an adult court. In the cases discussed here, both petitioners were tried as adults even though they were minors. The Expanded Meaning of the Eighth Amendment The Eighth Amendment of the Bill of Rights declares: “Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted” (U.S. Constitution). The Framers of the Constitution did not offer any specifics on what cruel and unusual punishment entailed; instead, they chose to make the Constitution vague so that it could be adapted to a changing society. A literal reading of the Bill of Rights would render the Constitution outdated, as it would mean that an eighteenth century document would be the supreme law of the land of a twenty-first century society. The Eighth Amendment has never been interpreted as a static concept. As the Court held in Trop v. Dulles 356 U.S. 86 (1958), this amendment must be interpreted “according to its text, by considering history, tradition, and precedent, and with due regard for its purpose and function in the constitutional design.” As Justice Stevens argued in his concurring opinion in Roper, if the meaning of the Eighth Amendment had been fixed when it was drafted, there would be virtually no restriction against the execution of a 7-year-old (Roper v. Simmons 2005); however, the Court has come to interpret the Eighth Amendment to include changing standards of decency which forbid any such interpretation. Judges give meaning to the words of the Eighth Amendment according to modern standards. Indeed, this Amendment “must draw its meaning from the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society” (Gregg v. Georgia 1976). Moreover, the Eighth Amendment was not designed uniquely to address solely those acts of cruelty that were practiced when the Framers wrote the Constitution. According to Fellman, “a constitution is concerned with future evils, and not merely with those of the past” (38). McGill Journal of Political Studies 2010


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Extensive jurisprudence on the Eighth Amendment supports the Court’s holding in the present cases, with the main precedent being Roper, where capital punishment for youth was declared to be unconstitutional. Juvenile Sentencing and Roper In Roper, the Court found capital punishment for juvenile offenders to be unconstitutional because of a variety of evidence pointing to a lack of maturity and responsibility in youth, as well as due to a societal consensus. The same logic applies to Graham and Sullivan. Justice Kennedy, writing for the Court, mentioned three main differences between adults and juvenile offenders which illustrate why the latter cannot be considered among the worst offenders. First, as affirmed in Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815 (1988), “a lack of maturity and an underdeveloped sense of responsibility are found in youth more often than in adults and are more understandable among the young. These qualities often result in impetuous and ill-considered actions and decisions.” Teenagers simply do not have the same maturity as adults and cannot be held to the same level of accountability. States have long since come to recognize that juveniles have not fully matured: in practically all states, for example, minors are not allowed to marry without parental consent, serve on juries, or vote. Secondly, juveniles are more susceptible to negative influences and outside pressures, including peer pressure. The final difference lies in the character of the minor. It is not as well formed as that of an adult, and personality traits of juveniles are more transitory and less fixed (Roper v. Simmons 2005). The Court expressed in Belloti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622 (1979) that during childhood and adolescence, which are considered to be a person’s formative years, minors often lack the experience, perspective, and judgment expected of adults. In addition, less education and intelligence make juveniles less capable of fully understanding the consequences of their actions (Thompson v. Oklahoma 1988). Therefore, these characteristics diminish youths’ burden of responsibility for an act. No matter how heinous a minor’s crime is, therefore, the preceding court decisions make it difficult to conclude that it shows evidence of a youth whose character is irreparable—because his or her character is assumed to not yet be fully defined. The idea that children have a greater chance of being rehabilitated and reintegrated into society has been studied and proven true: in its 2006 report, the Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention concluded that many juvenile offenders do not continue illegal behaviours as they become adults. For example, most who committed an assault in their later juvenile years did not commit any in the early adult years. The report also mentions that approximately two-thirds of juveniles who reported committing specific offenses at the age of 16 and 17 did not report doing so at ages 18 or 19 (U.S. Department of Justice 2006). The Supreme Court cannot ignore such empirical evidence, as it is sufficient evidence to accept the potential for juvenile offenders to be rehabilitated. If the Court follows the legal principle of stare decisis, meaning the common law tradition to respect legal precedents—Roper being the precedent in the present instance, and being applicable due to its many similarities to the cases currently being tried—the Court cannot uphold the sentences in Graham and Sullivan. Proportionality Test of the Eighth Amendment The Court first articulated the notion of a proportionate sentence in Weems v. United States 217 U.S. 349 (1910), in which it found that “it is a precept of justice that punishment for crime should be graduated and proportioned to offense.” All punishments excessive in terms of length and severity to the offence are unconstitutional. The Court applied a strict proportionality test under this ruling for the first time in Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977), when Justice White, writing for the Court, mentioned that the Eighth Amendment prohibits “punishments

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that are grossly disproportionate to the crime” (Stanford v. Kentucky 1989). Furthermore, the Court established that a punishment is considered to be excessive and unconstitutional if it “makes no measurable contribution to acceptable goals of punishment” (Coker v. Georgia 1977). The imprisonment for life of the aforementioned teenagers is therefore disproportionate, particularly because in adult prison, they do not have access to rehabilitation programs that minors would normally be subject to. In his dissent in Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361 (1989), Justice Brennan identified two crucial components of the Eighth Amendment. One was that the punishment given to an offender not be disproportionate. The Court re-affirmed its proportionality analysis in Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277 (1983), where, based on prior jurisprudence on the Eighth Amendment, it set out guidelines for a proportionality test: (a) (i) the gravity of the offense and the harshness of the penalty; (ii) the sentences imposed on other criminals in the same jurisdiction; (iii) the sentences imposed for commission of the same crime in other jurisdictions; (b) comparisons can be made in light of the harm caused or threatened to the victim or to society, and the culpability of the offender. (c) courts are also able to compare different sentences (Solem v. Helm 1983). In both Graham and Sullivan the sentences are too strict according to these criteria. In both cases, although much harm was caused to the victims, the crimes did not result in the deaths of the victims, which illustrates the disproportionality of the life sentences. Furthermore, it is often the case that juveniles are given harsher sentences than adults for relatively similar crimes; indeed, Sullivan’s lawyer, Bryan A. Stevenson, raised an important point when he questioned how Sullivan’s imprisonment for life without parole for a non-homicidal crime could be constitutional when a man in Florida who had been convicted of murder was sentenced to life imprisonment with parole after twenty-five years. As Justice Frankfurter mentioned in his concurring opinion in Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951), a First Amendment case: “We may not require the legislature to select the least severe penalty possible so long as the penalty selected is not cruelly inhumane or disproportionate to the crime involved.” Age is another important factor to consider when assessing whether the punishment is proportionate to a juvenile’s crime. The differences between adults and minors previously mentioned cannot be ignored, as minors do not have the same degree of culpability as they often do not think through the act they are about to commit. Justice O’Connor wrote in her concurring opinion in California v. Brown, 479 U.S. 538 (1987) that a punishment “should be directly related to the personal culpability of the criminal defendant.” In Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. ___ (2008), Justice Kennedy wrote for the Court: “we held in Roper and Atkins that the execution of juveniles and mentally retarded persons are punishments violative of the Eighth Amendment because the offender had a diminished personal responsibility for the crime.” Hence, juveniles should not be given adult sentences or harsher sentences because their degree of culpability is lesser and is caused by a lack of maturity and responsibility, which are associated with younger age. In sum, the sentences handed out to the aforementioned petitioners were excessive considering their ages when the crimes had been committed. As the Supreme Court of Nevada held in Naovarath v. State, 779 P.2d 944, 947 (1989), “to hand out such sentences to juveniles is a denial of hope, an assessment that good behavior and character improvement are immaterial […] that a juvenile offender will remain in prison for the rest of his days.” Moreover, life imprisonment without parole for juvenile offenders not convicted of murder is considered McGill Journal of Political Studies 2010


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to be disproportionate as there is a consensus in society that murder is different and should be given harsher sentences. Only the most terrible crimes deserve the worst sentences, and life imprisonment without parole is among the worst possible sentences a criminal could receive. The second component underlying the Eighth Amendment as set out by Justice Brennan in Stanford is that a punishment must make “a contribution to acceptable goals of punishment” (1989). Proponents of life sentences argue that they serve two main purposes: punishment of the defendant for egregious conducts, and deterrence of the defendant or others from engaging in similar behaviour in the future. Furthermore, the State of Florida argues it life sentences are the legislative response to a growing problem of juvenile crime. The efficacy of life imprisonment to deter juveniles from committing such actions is questionable, however, because it appears that while juveniles might be less guilty than adults, juveniles are also less susceptible to deterrence; they are less likely to understand the significance of a life sentence without parole. Again, as Justice Kennedy pointed out, retribution is not proportional if the “law’s most severe penalty is imposed on one whose culpability or blameworthiness is diminished, to a substantial degree, by reason of youth and immaturity” (Roper v. Simmons 2005). In Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972), Justice Marshall went so far as to reject retribution as a permissible goal of punishment in order to preserve the integrity of Eighth Amendment. It is ultimately clear, then, that any claim of a compelling state interest by Florida to protect its citizens from dangerous criminals is beyond reach in the cases of Graham and Sullivan, as harsh sentences for juveniles are mostly ineffective according to empirical evidence accepted by the Court. Evolving Standards of Decency The Court first mentioned in Weems that cruel and unusual punishments were prone to changes and would acquire meaning as public opinion became enlightened by a humane justice (1910). The term “evolving standards of decency” was mentioned in Trop v. Dulles (1958), where the Court held that a punishment which used to be acceptable could now be deemed unconstitutional according to changing opinions within society. To determine whether specific sentences are in line with current standards of decency, they should be examined in light of shared societal notions and of the Court’s commitment to the proportionality component of the Eighth Amendment as revealed in Coker (Radin 1978). The question in the present case is whether sentencing juveniles to life without parole for non-homicidal crimes is accepted in American society. In Thompson vs. Oklahoma, the court overturned the death sentence of a minor, with Justice Stevens mentioning such evolving standards of decency by stating that “numerous U.S. jurisdictions and all industrialized Western nations had banned the execution of minors under 16 years of age” (1988). The Court further ruled the death penalty for juveniles and the mentally retarded in Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002) to be unconstitutional because of evolving standards of decency. Although there is no clear consensus regarding life imprisonment without parole for juveniles for nonhomicidal crimes as there was for capital punishment for juveniles, the sentence is very rarely used, which in turn shows a growing trend against such strict sentences. Alaska, Kansas, Kentucky, Maine, New Mexico, New York, West Virginia and the District of Columbia all prohibit life imprisonments without parole sentences for juveniles when the life of the victim was not taken. Also, New Jersey and Utah permit such sentences but have no juveniles currently serving them. The Court has repeatedly argued that when a practice is rarely used it is unusual, and hence, shows a societal consensus against it. Indeed, in Thompson, the Court stated that whether an action can be considered unusual depends on the frequency of its occurrence or the magnitude of its acceptance (1988). Justice

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Brennan reaffirmed this argument in his dissent in Stanford. Juvenile offenders are currently serving life sentences in six states, with Florida having more than the majority of minors who received such sentences. Thus, six states out of fifty do not represent a majority and illustrate the existence a divided opinion within American society—one which, on balance, is opposed to this type of sentencing for juveniles. In addition, while life imprisonment for juvenile offenders for the commitment of non-homicidal crimes is still an option in a majority of states, this is slowly but consistently changing (Atkins v. Virginia 2002). Joe Sullivan was one of only two children aged 13 years who have ever been sentenced to life without parole for a non-homicide, and Sullivan was the last to receive this sentence. The Court argued in Kennedy that evolving standards of decency “that mark the progress of a maturing society counsel us to be most hesitant before interpreting the Eighth Amendment to allow the extension of the death penalty, a hesitation that has special force where no life was taken in the commission of the crime” (2008). In Stanford, Justice Brennan talked about a consensus throughout the world that the death penalty for juveniles is unacceptable. The same argument is applicable for life sentences without parole for juveniles for non-homicidal crimes. United States is the only country in the world to allow such sentences. The Court has often referred to the laws of other countries and to international authorities as instructions on its interpretation of the Eighth Amendment; such references to international standards were mentioned in Atkins. America’s allies recognize that children have to be protected because they are still developing physically, mentally, and emotionally (Parker, Human Rights, Amnesty 2005). Furthermore, life imprisonment without parole of juveniles is a violation of Article 37 of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child (which prohibits this punishment for people below the age of 18) (Schabas, Sax and Alen 2006). Although the Convention has not been ratified by the United States, is followed by every other country in the world except Somalia, so there is no uncertainty as to where the rest of the world stands on the matter. To borrow Justice Kennedy’s expression in Roper, the United States now stands alone in a world that has turned its face against life imprisonment for juveniles under 18 (2005). Remedy by the Court Punishments for juvenile offenders are extremely severe in the United States. The Supreme Court does not question that minors must be held accountable for their actions, but has thus far exhibited the belief that life imprisonment without parole for juveniles is excessive, particularly for non-homicide cases. Furthermore, because of the fundamental differences discussed earlier, it becomes clear that juvenile offenders should not be judged and given the same punishments as adults. In civil cases, there is recognition of the immaturity and irresponsibility of children by state and federal laws. However, for criminal cases, in 42 states and under federal law the commission of a serious crime by children under 18—indeed, in some states by children as young as ten years of age— transforms them instantly into adults for criminal justice purposes (Parker, Human Rights, Amnesty 2005). The capacity of youth to be reintegrated into society is not but must be taken into consideration in such cases, notably because the character traits of the defendants not yet fixed. During oral arguments, Chief Justice Roberts suggested a case-by-case review of each offence by a juvenile at the trial court level which would consider the offender’s age. The proportionality of the crime would be taken into consideration to determine the conviction, and life sentences without parole would not be completely excluded and might still be handed out if a crime were considered truly horrible. If the Court were to adopt this

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remedy, however, this type of sentencing would remain arbitrary1, and would not be sufficient to assure protection against unusual imprisonment (Parker, Human Rights, Amnesty 2005). Some fellow justices seemed to question the protection of juvenile offenders who are almost 18, even though under the law in a majority of states, they are still considered to be children and are entitled to protection by the courts. Therefore, the Court should establish a categorical rule, as it has done in Roper, by adopting Justice Ginsburg’s suggestion of not giving a full sentence before a minor reaches the age of majority. The Court should at the very least mandate short sentences and then have the teenagers be re-evaluated when such sentences come to an end. As mentioned by Justice Kennedy, American parole systems have proven to be effective, particularly for youth, and states do have the capacity to make accurate judgments about the potential of successfully rehabilitating a juvenile convict. The Court acknowledges that some juveniles might have more maturity and might willingly commit heinous crimes. However, to distinguish between an immature and irresponsible teenager and one whose action reflects his or her irreparably corrupted character is difficult. In Roper, the Court decided that “if trained psychiatrists […] refrain, despite diagnostic expertise, from assessing any juvenile under 18 as having antisocial personality disorder, we conclude that States should refrain from asking jurors to issue a far graver condemnation” (2005). The Court may then face the question of where to set a threshold to define a juvenile. According to congressional and state standards, the Court should fix the age standard at 18; those 18 years and older are judged by society to be adults, as is proven by the fact that they are granted the right to vote. Under this definition, then, life sentences without parole for juvenile offenders convicted of non-homicidal crimes must be abolished; the Convention on the Rights of the Child is clear on the matter: “even children who have infringed the law must be treated in a way that will promote their reintegration into society so that they can assume a constructive role in it” (Van Zyl Smit 2002). Those currently serving life sentences that had been handed out for crimes committed when the convicted were minors should have their cases reviewed by courts for a reassessment and new sentencing that allows for the possibility of parole (Parker, Human Rights, Amnesty 2005). To conclude, minors are different from adults, and U.S. courts should take that into consideration. Youth do not have the same maturity as adults, are not as responsible, and do not fully weigh the consequences of their actions when they commit a crime, which reduces their culpability. Furthermore, youth like Graham and Sullivan should not be permanently imprisoned when they have greater potential for rehabilitation than do most adults. Their life sentences are excessive under the proportionality standards the Court has come to incorporate under the Eighth Amendment, especially because their crimes did not result in the deaths of their victims. Furthermore, as demonstrated by the low number of states that currently have minors serving life sentences without parole, the Court clearly recognizes a societal consensus against this kind of punishment. The United States is now an “international anomaly” (Human Rights Watch 2008), as it is the only country to allow this type of treatment of its youth. According a 2008 report by Human Rights Watch, there are still 2,484 persons in American prisons serving sentences of life without parole for crimes committed when they were under the age of 18 (2008). However, with the cases it is considering, the U.S. Supreme Court opens today a new chapter in its Eighth Amendment jurisprudence and the Court now has an opportunity to rectify past misjudgments and give American youth the protection they deserve. 1 Furthermore, the Court notes that most of the time these sentences are imposed unevenly. Indeed, according to Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International, the estimated rate nationwide at which black youth receive life imprisonment without parole sentences (6.6 per 10,000) is ten times greater than the rate for white youth (0.6 per 10,000).

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Works Cited Jurisprudence Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349 (1910) Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951) Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86 (1958) Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972) Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977) Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622 (1979) Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277 (1983) California v. Brown, 479 U.S. 538 (1987) Thomson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815 (1988) Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361 (1989) Naovarath v. State, 779 P.2d 944, 947 (Nev. 1989) Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002) Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005) Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. ___ (2008)

Secondary Sources

“Bill of Rights.” U.S. Constitution. http://www.archives.gov/exhibits/charters/bill_of_rights_transcript.html. Cornell University Law School, “Graham v. Florida (08-7412); Sullivan v. Florida (08-7621),” http://topics.law. cornell.edu/supct/cert/08-7412. Fellman, David. “Cruel and Unusual Punishments.” The Journal of Politics 19, no. 1 (1957): 34-45. Human Rights Watch. “The Rest of Their Lives: Life without Parole for Youth Offenders in the United States in 2008,” http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/us1005execsum.pdf. “Juvenile offenders and victims: 2006 national report.” U.S. Department of Justice. Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention. http://ojjdp. ncjrs.gov/ojstatbb/nr2006/downloads/NR2006.pdf Parker, Alison, Watch Human Rights, and International Amnesty. The Rest of Their Lives : Life without Parole for Child Offenders in the United States Life without Parole for Child Offenders in the United States. New York, N.Y. : [London]: Human Rights Watch; Amnesty International, 2005. Radin, Margaret Jane. “The Jurisprudence of Death: Evolving Standards for the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause.” University of Pennsylvania Law Review 126, no. 5 (1978): 989-1064. Schabas, William, Helmut Sax, and André Alen. Article 37 : Prohibition of Torture, Death Penalty, Life Imprisonment and Deprivation of Liberty Article Thirty-Seven. Leiden; Boston: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2006. U.S. Supreme Court. “Oral argument Graham v. Florida,” November 9, 2009. http://www.supremecourtus.gov/ oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/08-7412.pdf

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U.S. Supreme Court. “Oral argument Sullivan v. Florida,� November 9, 2009. http://www.supremecourtus.gov/ oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/08-7621.pdf Van Zyl Smit, Dirk. Taking Life Imprisonment Seriously in National and International Law. The Hague; New York: Kluwer Law International, 2002.

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The Two-Nation Theory: an Evaluation of Its Application to Sri Lanka Kartiga Thavaraj The two-nation theory as inherent to the Muslims of British India is most often spoken of in association with the partition of India and creation of Pakistan. However, it is possible, and indeed relevant, to export concepts of the two-nation theory to another South Asian country—Sri Lanka. This essay will examine the theoretical underpinnings of the two-nation theory and the potential for its application to Sri Lanka, especially in light of its present ethnic troubles. The two-nation theory will first be explained in reference to the ideologies behind the theory, and its practical application in British India. Its relevance in Sri Lanka will then be examined, including variations in usage of the theory between Pakistan and Sri Lanka. In sum, this essay will discuss the significance of and, ultimately, need for incorporation of principles of the two-nation theory in order to better comprehend and address Sri Lanka’s ethnic troubles. The two-nation theory was first used by Muhammad Ali Jinnah and the Muslim League in British India to exemplify the idea that two separate “nations” lived within India: one Hindu and one Muslim. Its basis was that Hindus and Muslims are two distinct racial and cultural groups, and that “not only religion but whole modes of life and attitude separated these two groups of people” (Burki 1999, 1). Because of these vast differences, Jinnah argued, the state and its majority population should recognize the needs and respect the rights of the Muslim “nation” within India. The theory as first used by Jinnah mainly employed religion as a “nationizing” factor. However, the broader premise behind the two-nation theory embodies the idea that any distinct “nation” in a country needs to be recognized, and that the linguistic, religious and cultural differences of a distinct group, or “nation,” within a country need to be embraced by the state in order for two or more “nations” to coexist harmoniously. It is also important to note that although the outcome of the two-nation theory and the campaign for Muslim self-determination ended in the creation of Pakistan, Jinnah campaigned for Hindu-Muslim unity—with the stipulation that Muslims receive some autonomy to lead their lives according to political, social and religious culture—for more than two decades. It was only when sentiments arose that Muslims would not be safe in a Hindu-dominated India that the Lahore Resolution was written to demand the creation of Pakistan (Burki 1999). In this respect, the two-nation theory does not necessarily assert that dissimilar groups cannot coexist peacefully, but rather stands as a symbol of recognizing differences between “nations” within a state and thereby the need for constitutional and social accommodation of all. While the two-nation theory is inherent to Pakistan, the theory of “two nations” carries interesting implications for Sri Lanka and can prove useful in a Sri Lankan context. Two distinct groups have always existed in Sri Lanka: the Sinhalese and the Tamils. These two groups boast different languages, religions, ancestry, customs, literature and territorial boundaries: Tamils, the minority, speak Tamil, come from a Dravidian ancestry, are mainly Hindu and Christian and inhabit the northern and eastern parts of Sri Lanka; the Sinhalese majority speak Sinhala, are mainly Buddhist, are of an Aryan ancestry and hail from the central and southern regions of the country. In this light, it is undoubtedly relevant to identify both groups as distinct “nations” that must each be afforded cultural, linguistic and territorial rights. McGill Journal of Political Studies 2010


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Unfortunately, there has historically been a suppression of the Tamil minority’s rights by the SinhaleseBuddhist majority. The Sinhalese government has a long history of ostracizing the Tamil people through various means, including the Sinhala Only Bill of 1956 (which gave Sinhala status as the only official state language), the state sponsored anti-Tamil riots of 1958, 1977 and 1983, and the proclamation of Buddhism as the only official state religion. Given this discrimination, the agitation for political, social, and cultural rights by the Tamils followed a similar path to that of the Muslims of British India ever since Sri Lanka’s independence in 1948. For many years the Tamils campaigned for basic constitutional amendments, a federal system and other forms of regional autonomy. However, after decades of oppression and Sinhala dominance where no rights were relinquished by the incumbent Sinhalese majority governments, the idea of a separate state, Tamil Eelam, was called for in the Vattukottai Resolution of 1976 (Tamil United Front). Given the lack of acceptance of the rights of Tamils as a “nation” by the Sri Lankan government, it became evident that the only way for Tamils to remain within Sri Lanka was for their equality as citizens of Sri Lanka to be recognized through constitutional amendments to incorporate forms of self-determination that enable the Tamils to practice their language and culture. There exist many levels of comparison that distinguish the use of the two-nation theory in Pakistan and its persuasiveness within a Sri Lankan context. Firstly, the idea of distinct “nations” is a fundamental premise of the two-nation theory. When Jinnah defined the Muslim “nation”, he focused pointedly on religion and seemed to not take heed of the vast cultural, linguistic and socio-economic differences between, for example, the Muslims of Bengal and the Muslims of Punjab (an oversight which led to the eventual secession of Bangladesh) (Burki 1999). In Sri Lanka, however, the identities of the Sinhalese and Tamils recognize strict linguistic, religious, ancestral, territorial and customary divisions. It is not implausible then to suggest that the differences between the Sinhalese and the Tamils in Sri Lanka outweigh the differences between the Hindus and Muslims of British India. In this manner, perhaps a critique of the two-nation theory is exemplified by Sri Lanka—that the definition of a “nation” should be more encompassing than religion alone. At the very least, the case of Sri Lanka proves that if the two-nation theory were accepted as conceivable in British India to distinguish the Muslims, it certainly should be accepted in Sri Lanka to afford the Tamils political and linguistic rights. Given this definition of “nationhood,” it is necessary to suggest that partition itself has also long been a criticism of the two-nation theory. Especially where the eventual secession of Bangladesh is concerned, arguments are made that a “homogenous nation” does not always guarantee unity. However, three counter-arguments can be proposed. The first is one made by Shaukat Qadir, who states that the two-nation theory would only have been disproved had East Pakistan (Bangladesh) reunited with India (Qadir 2009)—since reunification would have indicated that Muslims were happier living under the subjugation of Hindus than on their own. The second argument, as aforementioned, proposes that the makeup of a “nation” of Tamils within Sri Lanka is broader and more encompassing than that of the Muslims in British India. The third and strongest argument, however, is that if any distinct ethnic group’s needs for equality are met within a country, there is no need for drastic measures such as secession; these measures only become necessary when one “nation” within a country infringes upon another “nation’s” rights. Even after the Government of India Act of 1935, had the Indian National Congress been willing to “assuage Muslim fear in the minority provinces,” the Muslim League may never have gone on a separatist route (Burki 1999, 7). The Muslim League had fought for the safeguarding of their cultural, social and political rights as Muslims within one India polity, and it was only when League members perceived that they could not gain these rights that they became attracted to the idea of Pakistan (Pandey 2001). In the same manner, Tamils in Sri Lanka have campaigned for many years for their political, linguistic and cultural rights within Sri Lanka, and yet not

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only have these rights never been afforded to them, but they have also suffered overt abuse by successive SinhalaBuddhist nationalist governments. Therefore, it seems ironic to speculate that perhaps Tamils in Sri Lanka have more reasons to espouse the two-nation theory, even though they have not even been granted constitutional “nationhood” on the island, let alone a separate state. Although the two-nation theory itself denotes the need for accommodation of other “nations,” the Sri Lankan government’s role in pushing Tamils towards agitating for a separate state—by discriminating against them by virtue of their being a different “nation”—is an additional mark of the strength of the two-nation theory within Sri Lanka. As a self-recognized Sinhala-Buddhist land, successive nationalist Sri Lankan governments have made very few advances since independence to accommodate any other “nations” that inhabit the island, even though they recognize that they do exist. Indeed, during the debate on the “Sinhala-Only” Bill in 1956, Dr. Colvin R. De Silva of the Lanka Sama Samaja Party asked, “Do you want one nation with two languages or two nations with one language?” (“A Short History of the Lanka Sama Samaja Party”). This comment both explicitly recognized the existence of another “nation” on the island, and yet at the same time established that the Sinhalese government would try to assimilate and suppress this distinct group. Yet the two-nation theory and, indeed, fundamental human rights values, demonstrate that in a country with two distinct groups, one group cannot live under the domination and suppression of the other. Here, not only is the significance of the two-nation theory exhibited, but so is the great need for its acceptance in Sri Lanka so that the strong presence of the distinct “nation” of Tamils may live as Tamils, allowed to determine their own language, cultural practices, and social norms without discrimination. In evaluating these concepts, it is clear that the two-nation theory, as a theoretical model of acceptance of linguistic, political and cultural rights of all those who inhabit a country, is present very strongly (indeed, perhaps more strongly than in Pakistan) in a Sri Lankan context. The Muslims of British India, feeling discrimination by virtue of being Muslim, seceded for fear of how they would be treated under Hindu supremacy. In Sri Lanka, however, the concept of the Tamil “nation” ostracizes the Tamil people not just through religion, but through multiple factors such as language, culture, territory and ancestry; to this day, the Sri Lankan state has the Tamils living as second-class citizens, even employing explicit human rights abuses to dominate them. Thus, there exists a combination of the theoretical validity of the two-nation theory, coupled with the tangible abuses suffered by the Tamils at the hands of the Sinhala-Buddhist government due to a lack of constitutional, political and social rights for the Tamil nation. Given this, the Tamils in Sri Lanka clearly have a reason to demand proper cultural recognition and linguistic status within the island as stipulated by the two-nation theory, and to campaign for self-determination— to remain a “nation” within a nation—or to campaign even for secession if they do not achieve constitutional and social equality within Sri Lanka.

Works Cited Britannica, Encyclopaedia. “Sir Sayyid Ahmad Khan.” 2009. Encyclopædia Britannica. http://www.britannica. com/EBchecked/topic/10149/Sir-Sayyid-Ahmad-Khan. (accessed November 17, 2009). Burki, Shahid J. PAKISTAN: Fifty Years of Nationhood. 3 ed. United States of America: Westview Press, 1999. Goonewardene, Leslie. “A Short History of the Lanka Sama Samaja Party.” http://www.marxists.org/history/etol/ writers/goonewardene/1960/lssp.htm (accessed November 11, 2009).

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Pandey, Gyanendra. Remembering Partition: Violence, Nationalism, and History in India. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001. Pararajasingham, Joseph. “Interview byTamilNet.” 2004. http://www.tamilnet.com/art.html?artid=11500&catid=13 (accessed November 05, 2009). Qadir, Shaukat. “Shamed in Gojra” Daily Times, 2009, http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default. asp?page=2009?8?7story_7-8-2009_pg3_5. (accessed November 13, 2009). Tamil United Front, “Vattukottai Resolution, of May 1976.” http://www.tamilunitedfront.org/articles/Vattukottai. html (accessed November 03, 2009).

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Female Suicide Terrorism: Empowerment or Subordination? Stacey Waterman Suicide terrorism can trace its roots as far back as the 11th century; however, it was only recently that suicide bombers become the undeniable “weapon of choice” for terrorist organizations (Zedaris 2004, 1). Within the growth of suicide attacks from 3% of all terrorist attacks in the 1980s to more than 25% in 2000 lies the increasing use of female suicide terrorists (FSTs) (Pape 2003). Furthermore, in recent years, Palestinian FSTs have carried out the largest number of attacks, which has been attributed to the increased acceptance of women in important political parties such as the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) and Islamist groups such as Hamas (Zedaris 2004). While such recruitment of women might be interpreted as a positive indicator of a wider Palestinian trend towards gender equality, female involvement in suicide terrorism has not translated into an improved status for women in Palestinian politics. Terrorist groups that endorse suicide bombing against Israelis aim to recruit women in order to increase their own legitimacy, which is simplified by the fact that women are ostracized from traditional avenues of political participation in Palestine, and thus turn to FST to gain recognition in society. Palestinian women are merely used “to satisfy the agenda of various opposition groups within the occupied territories” (Victor 2003, 197). This paper will argue that the increased prevalence of FSTs is a continuation of the subordination of women as opposed to their emancipation, which political development practitioners hoping to promote gender parity should take into consideration. For the purposes of this paper, the dominant international gender paradigm, the Gender and Development (GAD) framework, will be used. The goal of the GAD approach is gender equity: the equivalence in life outcomes for women and men, through a redistribution of power and resources. This is achieved through female empowerment: a transformative process of gender power relations by individuals or groups that develop awareness of women’s subordination and build their capacity to challenge it. (Reeves & Baden 2000.) Theory of Empowerment While this paper acknowledges Gurr’s assertion that conflict, here expressed through suicide terrorism, is considered a negative and destabilizing factor in the overall development of a country, the focus of this paper is on the development of women’s political status and gender power parity (1970). This paper will address whether or not the increased participation of women in suicide terrorism is indicative of a movement towards this parity. Studies show that when the role of a woman diminishes in any political struggle, it signals that the role of women in general throughout society diminishes (Victor 2003). Is the converse of this statement true? There is a theoretically sound basis that the increased recruitment of FSTs leads to eventual gender equity. The increased participation of women in terrorist organizations is akin to participation in the political domain, a public sphere, which is generally beyond the scope of traditional women’s roles (such as being an obedient wife, daughter, and mother). This participation can lead to a greater awareness of female collective unity, power, and independence to challenge societal norms. With greater opportunities outside of the private sphere to which they are ordinarily relegated, women have enhanced political consciousness along with their new McGill Journal of Political Studies 2010


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potential as political actors. Women become discontent to play the roles of the “passive observer” or the “supportive nurturer,” and strive to prove to their own societies that they are no less capable than their male counterparts of being vital contributors to a political movement (Bloom 2005, 58). In particular, violence plays an important role in the ideological structure of patriarchy because the notion of ‘combat’ has a central role in the concept of ‘manhood’ and in the justification of the superiority of men in the social order (Stinson 2009). When women appropriate the role of FSTs, they are usurping traditional male roles, theoretically weakening the patriarchal nature of these political organizations and of society. There are, however, certain conditions that must be fulfilled for the rising number of FSTs to have a transformative effect on their societies. Firstly, women should be recruited on the basis of their dedication to the cause, be able to hold positions of power and have decision-making responsibilities, and be part of the organization’s ultimate objective of gender equality. (Stinson 2009). Militant women could then follow a double trajectory: proving their valid contributions to society while concurrently reconstructing the normative ideals of it. (Bloom 2005, 58) In the Palestinian context, women have always been allowed to actively participate in the resistance against the occupation: they write and circulate leaflets, join in demonstrations and protests, hoist flags, donate blood, and violate Israeli curfews and closures (Victor 2003). Such actions led to a feeling of empowerment among Palestinian women which in turn pushed some females to take on more militant roles; for instance, one of the earliest FSTs in Palestinian society, Leila Khaled, attempted to highjack an Israeli flight to London in 1970. In the process, she “shattered a million and one taboos overnight and she revolutionized the thinking of hundreds of other angry young women around the world” (Bloom 2005, 58). According to Khaled, “violence was a way of leveling the patriarchal society through revolutionary zeal” (Bloom 2005, 58). The Palestinian Historical Context In reality, unlike in theoretical argument, there are generally many societal barriers that keep feminism and nationalism mutually exclusive (Stinson 2009). In the Palestinian territories, the growing independence of women was met by a widespread backlash, where radical Islamist groups like Hamas were supported by the more moderate PLO leadership in curtailing female participation in Intifada demonstrations in 1988—for example, Hamas issued a formal edict stating that women were not allowed out in public without being properly covered (Victor 2003). It was not until the second Intifada (2002-present) that the PLO reversed its stance. On January 27th, 2002, Wafa Idris, a 17-year old girl from the West Bank, killed an Israeli man and injured 100 others in Jerusalem and became the organization’s first woman kamikaze. Following this attack, Yasser Arafat, leader of the PLO and the Palestinian Authority (PA), gave a speech in which he not only welcomed women to fight against the Israeli occupation, but also noted that they were expected to participate in armed struggle: “Woman and man are equal… you are my army of roses that will crush Israeli tanks” (Victor 2003, 18). Idris’ act and Arafat’s speech reverberated throughout the West Bank and Gaza, creating a generation of girls who wanted to become shahida: the feminized version of the Arabic word for martyr, which until that day had only existed in the masculine form. A cult of female martyrdom was born. Organizations’ Motivations Behind Recruitment Palestinian terrorist organizations are rational and calculating political actors, whose leaders form and mobilize the community through their “critical interpretive role” of religion (Deneulin and Bano 2009, 69). Their

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choice to recruit women is politically and strategically advantageous for their own ends. These leaders have couched national liberation so firmly in Islam as to blur the differences between nationalism and religiosity (Zedalis 2004, 10). Issues of gender have been so highly integrated into politics that this integration has led to a high degree of co-option of feminist objectives by political actors, as opposed to the needed transformation of actual political agendas (Tomalin 2007). These co-opted domains are made to serve very different political ends from the empowerment of women. (White 2009). The PLO and Hamas have framed their use of FSTs in terms of a historical Islamic equality of genders, when in fact this justification is only a recent phenomenon in order to fulfill these groups’ strategic needs. In essence, in 2002, Arafat saw that popular support was turning away from the PLO toward Hamas. To gain back some of the legitimacy that Hamas had gained due to their aggressive policy of suicide bombings, the PLO adopted an even more sensational weapon with which the Islamists could not compete: the recruitment of women and young girls. Sheik Ahmed Yassin, the founder and leader of Hamas, initially denounced the use of FSTs because it broke with religious law (White 2009); however, this position was quickly reversed to meet popular opinion, and on January 14th, 2004, Hamas cooperated with the PLO in the deployment of their first FST: Reem Riyashi, a mother of two from Gaza, who killed four Israeli soldiers at the Erez crossing (Bloom 2005). “The strictly hierarchical nature of religious terrorist groups with a highly disciplined structure and obedient cadre means not only that main clerical leaders command full control over political as well as military activities of the organizations, but also the strategies of terrorism are unleashed in accordance with general political directives and agendas” (Zedalis 2009, 11). By extolling the virtues of self-sacrifice, the PLO and Hamas have created a culture of female martyrdom. The PLO routinely turns terrorists into heroes and role models, “naming schools, sporting events, streets, and even poetry collections for terrorists” (Marcus and Crook 2006). Death as a martyr becomes the highest honour that anyone can achieve and is romanticized and idealized. Female Motivations for Participation The actual living conditions of the general Palestinian people in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip are abysmal, so it is a natural conclusion that “those who adhere to a religion and who live it radically might be tempted to resort to political violence, especially as they face situations in which others do not hesitate to use violence against them” (Deneulin and Bano 2009, 68). However, the Israeli occupation is not the sole motivating factor in the participation of women in suicide terrorism, or else all Palestinian women would be joining these organizations. In fact, FSTs are generally politically conscious individuals that join grassroots movements, as opposed to stereotypical murderers or religious cult members (Robert Paper of the University of Chicago in Bloom 2005). Therefore, the occupation is not the sole rationale that motivates women to become FSTs. There is a second justification for FSTs: they are generally women who have been disgraced and ostracized by a society governed by patriarchal customs and discriminatory laws (Amnesty International 2005, 4). With no options for escape through traditional political participation, women turn to FSTs to achieve honour, recognition, and independent control over their own lives. Gender Inequity within Terrorist Organizations According to the empowerment theory, groups like Hamas and the PLO emancipate women because they are usurping male gender roles; however, in the Palestinian context, this proves not to be the case. These orga-

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nizations are heavily male-dominated. Women need male permission to be recruited into these groups, meaning that they are participating in rather than challenging the patriarchal structure (Stinson 2009). Since the liberation war, women have therefore been unable to exact any lasting societal change, because their involvement has not actually been interpreted as a change in women’s status by the male political leadership (Stinson 2009). This same leadership also very carefully limits the membership of women in its organizations: all women, without exception, undergo a very careful screening process and must fulfill certain conditions before they are allowed to join. For example, the PLO and Hamas have imposed limitations on female recruitment, such as only recruiting women who have been directly or indirectly wounded by Israeli soldiers (in the Shawaq al-Aqsa suicide branch of the PLO’s military unit), or women who have produced at least one son and one daughter before becoming a FST (in Hamas) (Victor 2003). The screening of applicants is very stringent because women are considered “less equipped psychologically and physically to carry out a mission” (Victor 2003, 198). Finally, within Hamas, the family of a male suicide bomber receives US$400 per month whereas the family of a FST will receive only US$200 per month (O’Rourke 2009). Naturally, these conditions reveal the patriarchally-determined role of women, rather than a wider social acceptance of gender equity. In light of these realities, what strategies then should GAD practitioners pursue concerning Palestinian terrorist organizations? Strategies for Political Development Anyone seeking to improve gender parity in Palestine must first recognize the potential of “spiritual capital” to transform religion and to empower women (Tomalin 2007, 6). Inherent in this outlook is recognition that it is not Islam in itself that leads to the subordination of women, but that certain interpretations of Islam, coopted by political elites for their own purposes, are the root of gender inequality. This is reflected in the public’s awareness: men and women are more likely to blame the Israeli occupation and traditions and norms, over Islamic movements, as reasons why women do not have full rights (Tomalin 2007). Furthermore, correlates within Islam can be found for values expressed in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which in turn can be used as a vehicle for changing attitudes (Tomalin 2007). FSTs struggle for basic human rights and freedoms in a society bound by numerous cultural restraints, but this does not indicate a desire to topple religion. Despite the constraints Islam appears to impose upon them, FSTs work within their parameters to make their mark, become independent, and become exceptions to the rule of female subordination (Victor 2003). It is for this reason that they sacrifice themselves to their nation as a means to regain “their status and image in society” (Israeli Security Sources 2003). Due to the traditional linkage between religion and individual behaviour, and because of the importance of religion to every facet of daily life in the occupied territories, it is necessary to “synchronize the moral basis of society with the development process [so] religion can be a positive impulse” (Deneulin and Bano 2009, 39). According to the above assertion, participatory processes should be used in the development process, including incorporating the voice of all women concerned in the proposed political project (Kroessin 2008). “What development practitioners conceive as valuable actions or desirable social change might not always be in tune with the views of religious believers” (Deneulin and Bano 2009, 26). This is especially true of women in Muslim societies, where Western feminism can be seen as contradictory to Islamic beliefs. Secular, universal values that are based on Western women’s experience might “fail to resonate with the worldviews that shape social ethics” in Muslim populations (Tomalin 2007, 17). However, participatory processes will help prevent a hostile response on

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the ground. For example, an editorial from the Jordanian newspaper Al-Dustour criticized Western policies in the region, claiming: “Wasn’t it the west that kept demanding that the eastern woman become equal to the man? Well, this is how we understand equality—this is how the martyr Wafa Idris understood equality” (Bloom 2005, 62). To further illustrate, there is a high degree of support for women’s political rights in some parts of Palestine, but in areas of property relations between genders or the re-distribution of power within the family, there is a radical drop in support (UNDP-POGAR 2007). There is also the consideration that many Palestinian FSTs cite a desire to return to traditional religious practices. Palestinian media opinion polls also show that “the desire to seek revenge is greater among women than men. For example, 96% of female university students expressed support for suicide attacks” (from Al-Ayyam “The Eighth Day” Supplement, Feb 7 2002. In Itamar 2002). According to O’Rourke, policies that promote gender parity might increase the rates of female recruitment into terrorist groups, as these women are “deeply committed to their communities,” and terrorist groups offer a return to perceived proper versions of Islam (2009, 4). Thus, most movements have a strong anti-West character. Terrorist organizations such as the PLO and Hamas do act as participatory structures that aim for the betterment of Palestinian society, albeit through misguided means; as such, due to their popularity and their general suspicion of Western influences, it is imperative that GAD policies are not framed in opposition to Islam, but rather work at addressing strategic interests of women so they can address the patriarchy resulting from the interpretations of the religion (Tomalin 2007). Collective action is needed to overthrow the patriarchies of the Hamas and the PLO. GAD theories endorse the use of awareness-building educative measures to increase possibilities for organized female action. However, it is crucial to recognize that the oppressed are not necessarily passive or ignorant of their forms of oppression; they just might be unable to take the risk of overt collective action (Kroessin 2008). This is evident in the case of Palestinian FSTs: despite their traditional Islamic-nationalist rationale for self-recruitment, these women also cite their subordination to men as a motivating factor. Due to the heavy use of religious rhetoric by political parties, oppressive gender-based conditions likely outweigh religious justifications for becoming an FST. Palestinians are aware of these manifestations of patriarchy: while 88% of men and 80% of women think that women have some rights, 76% of men and 66% of women think that women do not have real noticeable rights in Palestinian politics. (The Palestinian Human Rights Monitoring Group 2006). Nevertheless, due to this relatively high level of awareness, PLO programs that have focused on strengthening education at all levels in order to increase awareness of gender inequity are misguided. (Hind Khoury, Minister of Jerusalem Affairs in UNDP 2009). Moreover, women empowerment activists’ educational level is inconsistent in its correlation to actual levels of public participation (Nasser and Barghooti 2008). From these results, while women do seem aware of their subordinate position in society, educational achievement does not seem to have a great influence on gender equity in politics. GAD practitioners should therefore focus on improving the gender sensitivity of existing political structures, and promote the voices of other parties to increase the possibilities of women’s resistance. For example, as one means of defying the patriarchal status quo, former women’s resistance movements have involved themselves in general non-compliance and poor participation in “participatory” schemes imposed from above (Kroessin 2008). The PLO and Hamas are able to recruit women because there is no other way for females to escape their social exclusion. Despite the fact that women comprise almost half of voters in Palestine and enjoy the ability to vote, their representation in government remains limited (UNDP-POGAR 2007): only 12.9% of parliament members are female, along with 7.4% of ambassadors, 11.2% of judges, and 8.4% of labour union members (Zidan 2009). Nonetheless, some positive GAD advances have been made: the “quota” of women in Palestine’s National

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Council increased from 2% in 1964 to 7.5% in 1996 (The Palestinian Human Rights Monitoring Group 2006); and the Palestinian government created the Ministry for Women’s Affairs in 2004 to theoretically help mainstream GAD considerations throughout the government (UNDP 2005). However, this growth has been within the institutions of the patriarchal PLO. The increased political profile of gender has translated very little into actual improvement in women’s empowerment on the ground (See: Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics 2004). Developmental practitioners should work to increase the profile of peaceful activities and organizations (specifically those not associated with terrorist organizations) through which women can participate in the struggle against the Israeli occupation. These groups could enjoy similar legitimacy that the former groups exploit, and could make terrorist branches look less appealing to hopeless women (Bloom 2005). For instance, alternate groups like left-wing political parties such as the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) party also coordinate active resistance movements against Israel, but do not support the use of FSTs. Also, these alternate political groups might prove more effective in societal transformation than women’s groups, which are limited by a lack of resources and by cultural resistance to social change. Women’s groups and NGOs within the Palestinian territories have implemented projects to raise awareness, promote reforms, and lobby for changes in personal status laws (Amnesty International 2005). However, the recent Intifada was a major setback. In the face of the external aggression, GAD efforts were diverted to focus on practical daily survival and pushed longer-term plans for legislative and social reforms inwards. The Intifada even led to a resurgence of conservative values (Amnesty International 2005): a series of recent priorities outlined by the Palestinian Authority (PA) included only five out of 24 initiatives that addressed strategic female interests, most of which involved simply meeting with various NGOs in order to create training curriculum for awarenessbuilding. (UN Economic and Social Council 2004). Although one 2004 initiative between the UNDP, the PA, and the Ministry of Women’s Affairs did focus on institutional reform (aiming to develop a three-year action plan to promote gender-sensitive structures, programmes, and policies, in consultation with women’s groups, NGOs, ministries, and experts), follow up data concerning the success of this plan could not be found (UN Economic and Social Council 2004). There is an evident lack of statistical information on gender indicators in the Palestinian context, both on the part of the Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics and on the part of the UN. One of the goals of the World Bank’s poverty alleviation plan in the Palestinian territories specifically addresses this scarcity of information; it urges development agencies to petition national and international institutions to increase the availability of data, research, and statistics according to gender monitoring and the evaluation of gender indicators (World Bank 2006). Conclusion The increased participation of Palestinian women in political terrorism activities with organizations such as the PLO and Hamas have not transformed their role from passive observers within society to active participants in the struggle against the Israeli occupation. The rationale behind the choice to become a FST is a “fatal cocktail” of religious doctrine, nationalistic fervour, economic and social deprivation, and the hardships of a people living under an occupying force (Victor 2003, 115). While theoretically and rhetorically the rise of FSTs is indicative of the Palestinian society’s acceptance of a wider role for women in the public sphere, evidence has proven that women have simply been co-opted by the aforementioned groups to fulfill aims other than gender parity. Women are enticed to join these groups because of their subordination in Palestinian society not only due to the Israeli occupation, but also due to the patriarchal structure that promotes a diminished role for females in society and has

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placed a number of important constraints upon them. The actual process of recruitment into these organizations reflects their patriarchal structures; women are not allowed to hold decision making or participatory roles that could reform these groups’ structure to make them more egalitarian. As such, strategic GAD initiatives should be addressed within a Muslim framework in order to begin a transformation in norms and values. In all, the rise of FSTs is not a temporary phenomenon that will disappear when Israeli defenses catch up, but is indicative of the wider marginalization of women and the necessity to create other sources of political expression, which could combine and contribute to a cultural evolution that may hopefully create the proper conditions for women’s empowerment and eventual emancipation (Broadwell 2006).

Works Cited Al-Ayyam, “The Eighth Day” In Marcus, Itamar. “Special Report # 39: Palestinian Culture and Society Study #6: Encouraging Women Terrorists.” Palestinian Media Watch. http://www.pmw.org.il/specrep-39.html. Amnesty International. “Israel and the Occupied Territories: Conflict, occupation and patriarchy: Women carry the burden.” AI Index: MDE 15/016/2005. London: Peter Benneson House: London, 2005. Bloom, Mia. “Mother. Daughter. Sister. Bomber.” Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, Vol. 61, 6, (November/December 2005): 55-62. http://thebulletin.metapress.com/content/t52xq81673464kj5/fulltext.pdf (accessed December 3, 2009). Broadwell, Paula. “The growing role of women in terrorism.” The Boston Globe, December 12, 2006. http:// www.boston.com/news/globe/editorial_opinion/oped/articles/2006/12/12/the_growing_role_of_women_ in_terrorism/ (accessed December 1, 2009). Deneulin, Severine and Masooda Bano. Religion in Development: Rewriting the secular script. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009. Gurr, Ted Robert. “Explanations of Political Violence.” In Why Men Rebel, by Ted Gurr, 3-17. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1970. Israeli Security Sources. “The Role of Palestinian Women in Suicide Terrorism.” The Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs. January 30 2003. http://www.mfa.gov.il/mfa/mfaarchive/2000_2009/2003/1/the%20role%20 of%20palestinian%20women%20in%20suicide%20terrorism (accessed December 2, 2009). Kroessin, Mohammed Ralf. “Concepts of Development in ‘Islam’: A Review of Contemporary Literature and Practice.” Working Paper 20. Religions and Development Research Programme. University of Birmingham, 2008 http://www.rad.bham.ac.uk/files/resourcesmodule/@random454f80f60b3f4/1229939956_ working_paper_20___web_file.pdf (accessed December 3, 2009). Marcus, Itamar. “Special Report # 39: Palestinian Culture and Society Study #6: Encouraging Women Terrorists.” Palestinian Media Watch. http://www.pmw.org.il/specrep-39.html (accessed December 2, 2009). Marcus, Itamar and Barbara Crook. “Palestinian women terrorists glorified as heroines and role models.” Palestinian Media Watch, December 14 2006. http://www.likud.nl/extr424.html (accessed December 1, 2009). Nasser, Randa and Fidaa Barghooti. Palestinian Women Activists: How Empowered are the Empowered? Paper presented at the annual meeting for the American Sociological Association, July 31 2008, in Boston, Massachusetts. http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p242809_index.html (accessed December 1, 2009). O’Rourke, Lindsey. Why do Women Become Suicide Terrorists? Paper presented at ISA’s 49th annual conven-

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tion, Bridging Multiple Divides, March 26 2008, in San Francisco, CA. http://www.allacademic.com/ meta/p253402_index.html (accessed December 2, 2009). Palestinian Human Rights Monitoring Group. “Impact of Islamism on Women’s Rights in the Palestinian Society.” The Palestinian Human Rights Monitor, 2006. http://www.phrmg.org/Impact%20of%20Islamism%20 on%20Women.pdf (accessed December 3, 2009). Pape, Robert A. “Dying to Kill Us.” The New York Times, September 22, 2003. http://www.nytimes.com/2003/09/22/ opinion/dying-to-kill-us.html?pagewanted=1 (accessed February 16, 2010). Reeves, Hazel and Sally Baden. “Gender and Development: Concepts and Definitions” Report No. 55. For the Department of International Development DFID. Bridge Development-Gender Institute of Development Studies. Brighton: University of Sussex, February 2000. Stinson, Kate. “Freedom Fighters: Women Terrorists and the Battle for Female Liberation.” Paper presented at the annual meeting of the International Studies Association, March 5, 2009, in Honolulu, Hawaii. http:// www.allacademic.com/meta/p69982_index.html (accessed December 3, 2009). Tomalin, Emma. “Gender Studies Approaches to the Relationships between Religion and Development.” Working Paper 8. Religions and Development Research Programme, University of Leeds, 2007. http://www. rad.bham.ac.uk/files/resourcesmodule/@random454f80f60b3f4/1202734475_WP8.pdf (accessed December 2, 2009). UN Economic and Social Council. “Situation of and assistance to Palestinian women.” Commission on the Status of Women, 49th session, E/CN.6/2005/4: December 10, 2004. UNDP. “Empowering Women.” Focus, Vol.4: 2005. http://www.undp.ps/en/newsroom/publications/pdf/ focus/05v4.pdf (accessed December 1, 2009). UNDP. “Human Development Report 2009: Human development index trends.” Human Development Reports. http://hdrstats.undp.org/en/indicators/84.html (accessed December 3, 2009). UNDP-POGAR. “Gender and Citizenship: Palestine: Women in Public Life.” Last updated: March 26 2007. http://gender.pogar.org/countries/country.asp?cid=14 (accessed December 3, 2009) Victor, Barbara. Army of Roses: Inside the World of Palestinian Women Suicide Bombers. Rodale: Emmaus, PA, 2003. White, Sarah C. “Domains of Contestation: Women’s Empowerment and Islam in Bangladesh.” Working Paper 36. Religions and Development Research Programme, University of Bath, 2009. http://www.rad.bham. ac.uk/files/resourcesmodule/@random454f80f60b3f4/1256811199_working_paper_36___complete_ file_for_web.pdf (accessed December 1, 2009). World Bank. “Action Plan- Palestinian Territories- Poverty Alleviation.” Last updated: March 22 2006 http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTMNAREGTOPGENDER/Resources/FrameworksforactionplanPalest.pdf. (accessed December 2, 2009). Zedalis, Debra D. “Female Suicide Bombers.” U.S. Army War College Strategic Studies Institute: Carlisle, PA, June 2004. http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/PUB408.pdf (last accessed February 16, 2010). Zidan, Enaia. “Gender Perspective within official Palestinian Statistics: Population, Housing, and Establishment Census, 2007.” Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics. For the Global Forum on Gender Statistics, ESA/ STAT/AC.168/30, January 26-28 2009 in Accra, Ghana. http://unstats.un.org/unsd/demographic/meetings/wshops/Ghana_Jan2009/Doc30.pdf (accessed December 1, 2009).

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L’implication de la Russie dans la Grande Guerre: Le Japon et l’Allemagne étaient-ils des boucs émissaires? Eléna Choquette « Détourner l’attention des masses laborieuses des crises politiques intérieures de la Russie, de l’Allemagne, de l’Angleterre et des autres pays, diviser les ouvriers et les duper par le mensonge nationaliste, et décimer leur avant-garde pour affaiblir le mouvement révolutionnaire du prolétariat : tel est le seul contenu réel, telle est la véritable signification de la guerre actuelle. » (Lénine 1915) Signé par le Comité Central du Parti ouvrier socialdémocrate de Russie, cette déclaration de Lénine a peu de valeur en terme de théorie politique. Elle formule néanmoins l’hypothèse que l’implication de la Russie dans la Grande Guerre, sans parler des autres pays européens, en soit une de diversion ; elle pourrait se réduire à la volonté d’autocratie russe d’amoindrir l’importance des guerres intestines du pays. Puisque l’interprétation de l’hypothèse de la diversion dans le déclenchement d’une guerre est « usually abusive and partisan » et que sa «supporting evidence comes from biased sources rather than from the statements of those men who reputedly decided to go to war for the sake of internal unity » (Blainey 1971, 77), l’objectif de ce travail est de présenter académiquement et théoriquement la vraisemblance d’un tel argument ainsi que, de façon plus générale, comprendre le lien organique entre les révolutions russes de 1905 et de 1917 respectivement avec les guerres russo-japonaise et mondiale de 1914. L’essai sera divisé en quatre parties. Tout d’abord, le contenu de la théorie de la diversion des guerres internationales sera présenté. Une discussion sur sa plausibilité dans le contexte de la guerre russo-japonaise de 1905 s’ensuivra et, dans de plus amples détails, celle de l’implication de la Russie dans le conflit mondial. Finalement, quelques variantes de l’hypothèse de la diversion seront présentées pour mieux cadrer les cas à l’étude, soit ceux de la Russie entre les années 1904 et 1905, et entre les années 1914 et 1917. La théorie de la diversion Deux variables feront l’objet de cet essai : le niveau d’instabilité civile de la Russie et le déclenchement d’une guerre externe. Sera d’abord envisagé une relation causale entre ces deux données, en les considérant comme étant respectivement indépendante et dépendante. La théorie de la diversion -ou du bouc émissaire- prévoit ainsi que la Russie Impériale se soit engagée dans la Grande Guerre pour faire diversion, en rejetant le blâme sur l’agression par l’Allemagne, pour rallier les groupes idéologiquement divergents autour de l’autorité du Tsar, Nicolas II. En d’autres mots, la théorie prévoit définir l’entrée en guerre de la Russie comme une initiative autocrate en conséquence à la guerre civile. La mécanique causale théorique qui puisse soutenir une telle relation entre les deux variables s’esquisse de cette façon : l’élite dirigeante (qu’il s’agisse de la noblesse aristocrate, ou du gouvernement parlementaire), tiraillée par des divisions significatives à l’interne, cherche à stabiliser son gouvernement en trouvant « an enemy against whom the subjects can make common cause. » (Levy 1993, 259) Et puisque, comme le soutient le sociologue Dahrendorf, « it appears to be a general law that human groups react to external pressure by increased internal coherence » (Levy 1993, 261) il semble stratégique, pour un gouvernement, de recourir au McGill Journal of Political Studies 2010


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conflit extérieur pour amoindrir l’importance de ses luttes intérieures. De façon générale, la diversion prévue par la théorie se définit par « [the involvement of the political elites in] adventurous foreign policies, or even […] war, in order to distract popular attention away from internal social and economic problems and consolidate their own domestic political support» (Levy 1993, 259). Conformément au format qu’impose le cas de l’implication de la Russie dans le premier conflit mondial, la théorie de la diversion est mieux expliquée par la définition plus précise qu’en donne Mayer: It would seem that in these as in other prerevolutionary eras, the spectre of revolution precipitated an active counter-revolutionary response among vulnerable status groups- the landed aristocracy, the petty nobility, the petite-bourgeoisie, the artisans, and the bypasses entrepreneurs. In fact, there may well be a certain parallelism between the attitudes and actions of such crises strata in domestic politics and the attitudes and actions of foreign-policy actors who consider their nation’s international power and prestige to be declining. In both instances the threatened parties are particularly prone to force a pre-emptive showdown –armed repression or insurrection at home or preventive war abroad –with the resolve of thereby arresting or reversing the course of history, which they claim to be turning against them. (Mayer 1969, 314) Cette théorie n’est pas née des accusations de Lénine ; plusieurs auteurs en ont définit les mécanismes causaux et la plausibilité, et ce, bien avant lui. En fait, « [the belief that a troubled nation often wages war in the hope that a glorious foreign adventure will allay unrest at home] is embodied in one of the most popular explanations of war » (Blainey 1971, 72). Elle semble d’autant plus justifiable qu’elle puisse expliquer plusieurs conjonctures: la théorie de la diversion « is very adaptable and can be remoulded to fit diverse preconceptions of wars» (Blainey 1971, 75). Elle a notamment alimenté, outre les théoriciens de la science politique, les académiciens qui portraient la guerre d’un point de vue psychologique, anthropologique et sociologique. Empiriquement parlant, il semble qu,il s’agisse également d’une théorie vraisemblable. Le lien entre les luttes civiles et la guerre internationale semble être observé de façon suffisamment fréquente pour être éclairant : « The interconnection of domestic politics and foreign policy is exceptionally intense under prerevolutionary and revolutionary conditions » (Mayer 1969, 308). En effet, des troubles civils qui ont précédés les guerres mondiales entre 1815 et 1939, « au moins 26 d’entre 31 présentent [de tels] liens causaux » (Blainey 1971, 74). Finalement, sa plausibilité inhérente, en conjonction avec le soutien de nombreux cas historiques, a mené à son acceptation par plusieurs politicologues (Levy 1993). La guerre russo-japonaise Il s’agit d’abord de voir en quoi la théorie de la diversion peut expliquer le déclenchement de la guerre russo-japonaise. L’instabilité interne ressentie par le gouvernement russe de l’époque s’explique d’abord par les problèmes relatifs à l’agriculture, fondement de toute l’économie nationale. La pénurie de terres que les paysans et ouvriers accusent d’être la source de tous les maux, sera également l’objet de « tous les projets de réforme agraire » (Milioukov 1933, 1043). Qui plus est, en poursuivant par-dessus tout l’industrialisation rapide du pays, le gouvernement néglige ou lèse les intérêts des masses agricoles. Les ouvriers n’en sont pas forcément mieux : ils « souffrent autant que les paysans ; mal payés, mal

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protégés, en dépit de la loi contre l’exploitation patronale, ils vont fournir aux révolutionnaires les troupes qui, jusqu’alors, leur ont toujours manqué » (Milioukov 1933, 1052). Aux problèmes industriels s’ajoutent ceux de l’éducation. En 1901, « non seulement les étudiants maintiennent leurs revendications universitaires, mais leur agitation prend un caractère politique de plus en plus marqué » (Milioukov 1933, 1052). Ces problèmes se compliquent d’une lourde contribution exigée de tous les paysans et d’un fort mécontentement envers le régime politique. En effet, par la politique ultraréactionnaire, le nouveau ministre de l’intérieur, Sipjagin, « pousse à la révolution la partie de la population, qui, jusqu’alors, était restée en dehors de l’agitation : les paysans, les zemstvo et les minorités nationales » (Milioukov 1933, 1052). De façon générale, on demande la convocation d’une Assemblée élue au suffrage universel et le droit pour chaque nationalité de disposer d’eux-mêmes. Plausibilité de la théorie de la diversion dans le contexte de la guerre russo-japonaise Selon la théorie du bouc émissaire, l’opportunité de la guerre avec le Japon représentait en quelque sorte la dernière chance pour le Tsar « to overcome [inner] antagonisms, or else to break up definitely » (Levy 1993, 260). Cette théorie est d’autant plus plausible que le ministre de l’Intérieur, Plehve en vient explicitement à souhaiter une guerre extérieure pour en finir avec les opposants de l’intérieur. : « Pour arrêter la révolution », dit-il au général Kuropatkin, « il nous faut une petite guerre victorieuse. » Confiants de vaincre facilement le Japon qui fait quelque 2 pourcent de l’intégralité de son territoire, le Tsar n’hésite pas à déclarer la guerre, le 8 février 1904, que Plehve désire. Elle l’obligera, en fin de compte, à capituler devant les revendications populaires qu’il voulait étouffer (Milioukov 1933 et Blainey 1971). Finalement, quoique Plehve compte « sur la guerre contre le Japon pour briser l’opposition intérieures, les défaites extérieures ne font que hâter la révolution, » déjà engagée (Milioukov 933, 1048). En somme, le déroulement des politiques intérieures et extérieures de la Russie d’entre 1900 et 1905 suggère une application relativement fidèle de la théorie de la diversion. Il s’agit maintenant de comprendre en quoi son application est également plausible dans le contexte du déclenchement de la guerre mondiale. La grande guerre Quoique les syndicats aient été légalisés en 1906, ils avaient connu peu d’avancement, notamment en raison de l’hostilité du gouvernement et des capitalistes à leur égard. Essentiellement à partir de 1912, les tumultes internes s’intensifient alors à l’intérieur des frontières russes, et ce, d’abord parmi les travailleurs : « in the working-class districts, barricade-building and violence recalled the events of 1905 » (Westwood 1993, 205). D’ailleurs, « up to about 1912 there were comparatively few strikes but then the brutal treatment of the strikers in the Lena goldfields (170 were killed) sparked off a wave of strikes which cumulated in the St Petersburg general strike of 1914 » (Stephenson 1969, 219). Effectivement, la période suivant les événements de la Léna, est caractérisée par un accroissement soudain de l’ampleur de l’agitation ouvrière autrement dit par l’augmentation du nombre de grèves, de grévistes et de journées de travail perdues dans tous les types de conflit sociaux dans l’industrie1. (Haimson 1994, 2) Généralement, les travailleurs revendiquaient des améliorations substantielles en termes de salaires, d’heures travaillées et de logement. Aux luttes syndicales, s’ajoutait la critique acerbe dont le gouvernement autocrate faisait l’objet. En effet, 1 L’article d’Haimson et de Brian vise également à montrer que les vagues de grèves, dans l’industrie de la Russie Impériale, déclenchées respectivement en 1905, 1912 et 1915, ont une nature et un dynamisme analogues.

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les débats de la Douma2 créaient un climat politique orageux, […] toujours plus alourdi par les dénonciations de la part des députés tant libéraux que radicaux des actes répressifs du régime tsariste, […]. Ces prises de position étaient largement répercutées non seulement par la presse ouvrière, mais encore par les différents journaux modérés et libéraux de la capitale, dont l’ardeur militantes ait elle-même relayée par les sentiments d’opposition exprimés notamment dans l’intelligentsia. De ces divers côtés, le mouvement ouvrier de la capitale devint, dès le tout début de la vague de grèves de 1912-1914, l’objet d’une attention dont le degré, même dans d’autres grands centres urbains, fut sans pareil (Haimson 1994, 10). Somme toute, la période prérévolutionnaire de 1912-1914 positionne le Tsar et les libéraux russes en quelque sorte de la même façon qu’en 1907. « In spite of some progress towards understanding during the Stolypin3 years, the two sides were still divided by mistrust, contempt and even hatred. » (Stephenson 1969, 221) Quoique le recours à une guerre extérieure, en 1904 n’ait pas enrayé l’imminence d’une révolution qui se fera une année plus tard, « there is some evidence that Nicolas and a few of his advisers believed that foreign war was necessary in 1914 in order to regain control over the revolutionary forces in Russia » (Stephenson 1969, 221). La Russie impériale s’engage ainsi dans la guerre peu après que, le « 1er août, à 7heures du soir, le comte de Pourtalès se présente chez Sazonov dans un état d’extrême agitation et lui transmet la déclaration de guerre de l’Allemagne » (Milioukov 1993, 1192). L’opinion publique supporte généralement la décision du gouvernement russe, d’autant plus que l’empereur publie, le lendemain de la déclaration de guerre contre l’Allemagne, un manifeste où il exprime le vœu « qu’en cette terrible année d’épreuves les discordes intestines soient oubliées, que l’alliance du Tsar avec son peuple soit raffermie, et que la Russie, tout entière unie, repousse l’agression téméraire de l’ennemi » (Milioukov 1993, 1198, 1247). Malgré l’appel impérial à l’ « oubli des discordes intestines », l’opinion publique se positionne rapidement contre leur contribution militaire russe à la guerre mondiale. À l’union sacrée « succède peu à peu un sentiment d’indignation de plus en plus vif contre l’insouciance criminelle du gouvernement, […]. Le mécontentement gagne tous les milieux » (Milioukov 1993, 1247). Loin de renforcer la cohésion, la guerre creuse l’abîme entre le pays entier et le pouvoir. Ce dernier n’inspire plus confiance auprès de la population civile, notamment en raison du coût de la vie qui augmente, des privations qui se succèdent, des famines qui se font plus cruelles, et des conditions générales d’existence devenues plus difficiles. « Pour les autorités tsaristes, ligne à suivre était : « jusqu’à la victoire, pas de politique ». Pour la société [...], au contraire, l’expérience de la guerre montrait, plus que jamais, la nécessité d’un changement radical de régime politique » (Werth 2004, 194). Les civils russes rêvaient notamment4 à un ministère responsable de la Chambre basse, et à la paix séparée pour leur pays « qui s’épuise à la Guerre » (Milioukov 1933, 1229). C’est 2 Conseil consultatif de Nicolas II de la Russie Impériale. 3 Piotr Stolypin était le troisième Premier ministre de la Russie impériale. 4 Werth écrit en page 196 de son essai que : « Le bolchévisme de tranchées qui émergea dans la seconde moitié de 1917 était fondé sur trois exigences majeures : la terre, la liberté, la paix. La terre, [...], c’est-à-dire le partage de toutes les grandes propriétés et la redistribution, sous l’égide de la communauté paysanne, des terres « à ceux qui les travaillent ». La liberté, c’est-à-dire le rejet de toute contrainte étatique, de toute instituions autre que celle issue de la communauté paysanne elle-même. [...] la paix immédiate, une revendication exclusivement défendue par les bolchéviks. »

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finalement le 3 mars 1918 qu’est signéela paix par quatre délégués du gouvernement bolchévik. Plausibilité de la théorie de la diversion dans le contexte russe de la Grande Guerre Il n’est pas forcément surprenant de la part des historiens de supposer que les leaders politiques de la Russie impériale aient souhaité l’accalmie de leur gouvernement à travers leur déclaration de guerre à l’Allemagne : « the search for a scapegoat may have influenced Russia’s decision to mobilize her army in July 1914 » (Blainey 1971, 79). C’est d’ailleurs l’idée soutenue par le Parti ouvrier social-démocrate de Russie que la Première Guerre mondiale soit, en fait, une tentative de la part des classes impérialistes de tenter de dévier l’attention des masses ouvrières des crises politiques russes5. Afin de faire diversion, selon les prédictions de la théorie, l’élite dirigeante justifie l’hostilité de sa politique étrangère ou son engagement dans une guerre extérieure, en rendant un autre pays responsable du déclenchement du conflit (d’où la variante de la dénomination de la théorie, c’est-à-dire « théorie du bouc émissaire »). Dans le cas de l’engagement russe durant le premier conflit mondial, à la fois les états-majors et les acteurs gouvernementaux principaux rejettent le blâme de l’agression de la Russie Impériale sur l’adversaire, soit l’Allemagne et l’Autriche-Hongrie. En ce qui a trait d’abord aux états-majors, Milioukov écrit qu’ils étaient, à la veille de la déclaration de la guerre, « préoccupés de prendre au plus vite les mesures nécessaires : […] ils affirment que c’est l’adversaire qui a recouru, le premier, avant tout ordre officiel, aux mesures préalables de mobilisation » (Milioukov 1933, 1256). Non seulement auraient-ils ainsi désigné l’Allemagne comme bouc émissaire, mais l’élite dirigeante aussi. Il est impératif de rappeler que le Tsar, les partis politiques et certaines organisations sociales ont publié, quelques jours suivant la déclaration de la guerre, leur volonté de profiter d’une agression extérieure afin d‘oublier leurs divergences intérieures. La décision de la Russie autocrate de 1904 de couper ses relations diplomatiques avec le Japon semble correspondre aux prévisions de la théorie de la diversion. En ce sens elle cherche à gagner une guerre rapide pour augmenter la cohésion mutilée de ses politiques internes. De la même façon, la Russie impériale, en s’engageant dans le premier conflit mondial, semble ainsi s’être comportée comme le prévoit la théorie du bouc émissaire. Elle est entrée en guerre contre l’Allemagne pour rasseoir son autorité sur le peuple russe. Pourtant, à deux reprises, c’est-à-dire à la suite du conflit russo-japonais et du conflit mondial initié en 1914, l’autocratie russe n’a pas bercé ses guerres intestines. Le premier conflit s’est terminé avec le début de la Révolution russe de 1905. De plus, l’engagement au sein du dernier a pris fin pour mieux faire place à la Révolution russe de 1917. La théorie de la diversion est-elle capable d’expliquer l’intensification, contrairement à la diminution, des hostilités intérieures? Les développements de la théorie de la diversion En effet, l’hypothèse théorique du bouc émissaire suggère qu’un « internal conflict at time t will generate an increase in external conflict at time t + m, which in turn reduces internal conflict at time t + n, (n > m) » (Levy 1993, 268). Pourtant, les deux conflits internationaux étudiés dans le présent essai ne se conforment pas à ce modèle mathématique, en ce sens que la dernière composante de la formule (« which in turn reduces internal conflict at time t+n ») brille par son absence. Plusieurs explications peuvent pallier à ce manque et plusieurs d’entre elles sont suggérées dans la critique de Jack Levy. Elles seront étudiées de la plus plausible à la moins 5 Levy écrit, en page les 260 de son papier intitulé The Diversionary Theory of War: A Critique, que les marxistes-léninistes « argue more generally that imperialism and war are instruments by which the capitalist class secures its political position and guarantees its economic interest against revolutionary forces internal to the state. »

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vraisemblable dans le cas des deux conflits. L’existence de conditions minimales Une des explications avancées par l’article de Levy, explicite l’existence de conditions sans lesquelles la théorie semble tenir avec moins d’exactitude. Il y est d’abord expliqué que le conflit extérieur n’augmente la cohésion intérieure de la population concernée par les tumultes qu’à la condition que : (i) cette population ait un niveau minimum initial de cohésion ; (ii) cette population se perçoive véritablement comme en étant une et perçoive la préservation de sa nature comme valable, et que; (iii) cette population considère que la menace extérieure en soit une contre l’intégralité de ses membres. Finalement, en l’absence de ces conditions minimales, il est plus probable que le conflit extérieur exacerbera les conflits internes, « perhaps to the point of disintegration, rather than moderate it » (Levy 1993, 261). Quoique, dans les deux cas la condition (iii) soit remplie, les deux autres ne le sont pas. En effet, dans un conflit comme dans l’autre, la totalité de la population russe concernée par l’engagement de la Russie Impériale n’est pas du tout cohésive. D’une part, la population civile crie à l’atteinte de ses besoins fondamentaux, alors que, de l’autre, on légifère à coup de politiques réactionnaires pour conserver le monopole du pouvoir étatique. Pas plus cohésive, d’ailleurs, qu’elle ne conçoit le statut quo comme étant désirable. Comme mentionné précédemment, la société civile met généralement de l’avant, la nécessité d’un changement radical de régime politique. La forme de la relation causale Quoique la présente étude comme plusieurs autres assume une relation linéaire entre les variables indépendantes et dépendantes, « much of the theoretical literature on group cohesion suggests that the relationship is neither linear not even monotonically increasing » (Levy 1993, 273). Plutôt, il est plausible que la force avec laquelle l’élite dirigeante utilise le modèle théorique du bouc émissaire soit mieux représentée par une fonction non-linéaire du niveau d’instabilité interne. Les plus grandes probabilité d’usage se trouveraient lors des moments d’instabilité moyenne, et une plus faible lors des moments très forts ou très faibles d’instabilité intérieurE. De la même façon, Blainey soutient que « under conditions of open civil war, states are more likely to seek external peace rather than war so that they can turn their full attention toward their internal problems. […] Serious internal problems weaken the state militarily and reduce the chance of victory in an external war » (Levy 1993, 273). Dans le cas de la Russie, pourtant, les périodes préalables au déclenchement d’une guerre extérieure ne se définissent pas de « guerre civile ouverte » . Il n’en reste pas moins que les hostilités entre les groupes à idéologie divergente se fassent quasi-ouvertement la guerre. C’est la raison pour laquelle ce développement de la théorie de la diversion s’avère être pertinente pour les périodes ici étudiées. La perception tordue dans le calcul des risques relatifs à la guerre « The greater the internal threat, the less elite have to lose from risky measures and the more likely they are to gamble. […] The misperceptions include not only the overestimation of one’s military capabilities relative to those of the adversary, but also the underestimation of the political pressure and will for war in would-be enemy nations, » estime Levy en page 74. Dans le cas précis de la Russie, la menace intérieure était substantielle : les paysans et les ouvriers, essentiellement, voulaient une constitution démocratique, et l’abolition des pouvoirs

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législatif, exécutif, judicaire et administratif du Tsar et de sa famille. La somme de ces prérogatives étant en jeu, il est à tout le moins vraisemblable que l’élite dirigeante ait choisi de jouer le tout pour le tout. L’inversion de la dynamique causale La théorie de la diversion assume une extériorisation des troubles internes. Cependant, elle serait également possible d’explorer la valeur théorique d’une relation de variables assumant l’intériorisation de conflits externes. Pour le premier cas, ceci voudrait signifier que « the Russo-Japanese War threw Russia into revolutionary turmoil » (Mayer 1969, 316) et pour le deuxième, que la guerre mondiale ait exacerbé les luttes intestines pour les mener à un niveau tel qu’elles entraînent la révolution russe de 1917. Pourtant, puisque les périodes précédant ces conflits mondiaux portent un caractère prérévolutionnaire, on ne peut en faire théoriquement abstraction. Ces périodes sont déjà porteuses de la graine révolutionnaire et le conflit mondial ne fera qu’en exacerber les traits. La présence d’un antécédent à la relation théorique : la menace externe Selon Blainey, la présence d’un antécédent comme celui d’une menace internationale à la relation hypothétique entre l’agitation civile et les affaires externes belliqueuses bouleversent la vraisemblance de la théorie de la diversion. Par exemple, dans le cas de la guerre civile et du conflit international de l’Île de Crête, la menace extérieure pesant sur la société civile a mené à son instabilité, ce qui a éventuellement débouché sur une guerre internationale (Blainey 1971, 87). Ce n’est pourtant pas le cas de la Russie puisque dans les deux cas à l’étude, n’eut été la politique étrangère agressive de la Russie, aucune menace n’aurait pesé sur la société nationale. En conclusion La structure théorique énoncée par l’hypothèse de la diversion semble relativement bien expliquer l’implication de la Russie impériale dans le conflit de 1905 avec les Japonais et dans le conflit mondial de 1914. À tout le moins, en ce qui a trait aux tumultes internes qui secouaient la monarchie de l’époque, ces deux conjonctures conflictuelles présentent une chronologie analogue. L’étude de leurs mécanismes s’avérait ainsi d’autant plus pertinente. L’étude détaillée des deux périodes circonscrites suggère une réalisation relativement fidèle de la structure théorique. Particulièrement, en ce qui se rapporte à la volonté de l’élite dirigeante d’assurer une meilleure cohésion de ceux qu’elle représente en rendant responsable une nation étrangère d’un malheur qui l’écrase. Si certains ajustements peuvent être apportés à la théorie pour qu’elle saisisse les subtilités du cas russe6, elle ne s’en avère pas moins juste. Néanmoins, l’inversion de la logique causale et l’ajout d’une variable antécédente ajouteraient ni en exactitude théorique, ni en pratique à tout le moins dans les cas étudiés dans le cadre du présent essai. Il serait intéressant de questionner la logique inhérente à la relation hypothétique en ce qui a trait notamment au type de régime qui serait le plus enclin à stabiliser ses activités internes par l’investissement belliqueux à l’extérieur. Si, dans le cas de la Russie monarchique, autocrate et impérialiste, la théorie se confirme, il n’en peutêtre pas aussi vrai pour un État républicain et pleinement démocratique redevable envers ceux qu’il représente.

6 C’est-à-dire en explicitant certaines conditions minimales, en la définissant pour qu’elle apparaisse curvilinéaire, en incluant les problèmes de perceptions tordues, etc.

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Works Cited Blainey, Geoffrey. «The Scapegoat theory of International War.” Historical Studies, Vol. 15 (1971): 72-87. Haimson, Léopold et Éric Brian. « Les grèves ouvrières en Russie impériale pendant la Première Guerre mondiale et le déclenchement de la révolution de février 1917. » Le Mouvement social, Vol 169 (1994): 9-44. Lénine, Vladimir. « La guerre et la social-démocratie russe. » Lénine, œuvres complètes, Volume 21 : Août 1914Décembre 1915. http://www.marxists.org/francais/lenin/works/1914/11/vil19141101a.htm (consulté le 22 novembre 2009). Levy, Jack. «The Diversionary Theory of War, A Critique. » Handbook of War Studies (1993): 259-88. Mayer, A. J. «Domestic Causes and Purposes of War in Europe, 1870-1956. » The Responsibility of power; historical essays in honour of Hajo Holborn. Garden City NY: Doubleday, 1969. Milioukov, Paul. Histoire de Russie, Tome III: Réformes, Réactions, Révolutions. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1933. Stephenson, Graham. History of Russia, 1812-1945. London: Macmilllan, 1969. Werth, Nicolas. « La société et la guerre dans les espaces russe et soviétique, 1914-1946. » Histoire, économie et société Vol. 23 (2004): 191–214. Westwood, J. N. Endurance and Endeavour: Russian History 1812-1992. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993.

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Secularization and the Rise of Queer Politics in Uruguay Quinn Albaugh In the past three years, Uruguay’s Frente Amplio (Broad Front) has passed significant social reforms affecting the country’s queer1 population. In December 2007, Uruguay’s legislature became the first in Latin America to approve civil unions for “same-sex” couples—although Uruguay still lacks marriage rights (BBCb 2009). Similarly, in September 2009, Uruguay became the first country to provide adoption rights to same-sex couples (BBCa 2009). Finally, in October 2009, Uruguay enacted a provision allowing transsexuals to “legally register a change in name or gender” (BBCc 2009). No other country in Latin American has made similar reforms; why has Uruguay made these changes when other countries in the region have not? This is a particularly pressing question given that Uruguay, along with Latin America more generally, has been locked in contention over these issues in recent years (Htun 2009). In addition, any resolution will certainly affect the queer minority in the region for years to come. Since Uruguay is the first state to make such changes within the region, any explanation of its case is also relevant to anyone who seeks similar changes in other Latin American countries. The hierarchy of the Catholic Church is the traditionally dominant—even “hegemonic”—religious power in Latin America (Hagopian 2009). The church has opposed the aforementioned reforms, which contradict its theology; however, the Catholic Church has lost influence in Uruguay in recent years due the rise of secularization. Norris and Inglehart identify this phenomenon as a decline in religiosity caused by rising “human security,” which includes human development, economic equality, education and literacy, affluence and income, healthcare and social welfare (Norris and Inglehart 2004, 150). Uruguay has displayed a number of these trends, including a decline in a decline in religiosity, as evidenced by lower identifications with the Catholic Church, lower rates in church attendance, and a rise in “human security.” These trends are part of a larger process of secularization that has shifted other values, including those regarding social issues, such as what rights queer people should have. This accounts for how and why the Frente Amplio has been able to enact these reforms. Though the presence of a left-wing party also has affected the adoption of these reforms, the primary explanation of why Uruguay was the first country in the region to make such reforms is the rise of secularization within Uruguay in particular. To address this issue, this paper will outline Norris and Inglehart’s account of secularization and connect this account to the case of Uruguay. It will proceed to examine data from the 2000 World Values survey regarding religiosity in Uruguay, including affiliation with religious groups, church attendance and identification as “religious” regardless of church attendance. It will connect the evidenced lower rates of religiosity with a shift

1 In this case, queer refers to a commonly-used umbrella term for people who deviate from social norms regarding gender and sexuality. This includes people commonly identified as “gay” or “homosexual” or “transsexual” or “same-sex couples.” Queer has other meanings, including a sense of being a rejection of socially-assigned identities. This sense is not the one used here. For some discussion of these meanings, see Sally O’Driscoll, “Outlaw Readings: Beyond Queer Theory, Signs 22:1 (1996): 30-51.

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in social values taking place in Uruguay, including those regarding “sexual orientation.”1 Then, it will place this data within the context of secularization as explained by increasing human security, using data from the United Nations Development Program’s (UNDP) Human Development Index (HDI) and the World Institute for Development Economics Research of the United Nations University’s (WIDER-UNU) Gini coefficients. In examining religiosity, social values and human security, this paper will use a comparative methodology, comparing Uruguay to other countries in Latin America. It will then address the recent rise of left-wing governments throughout Latin America as a contributing factor and explain why secularization in particular explains why Uruguay has enacted pro-queer reforms, while other states in Latin America have not. Finally, this analysis will it will consider the counter-argument that Uruguay’s distinct history has decreased the role of Catholicism. Theoretical Framework: Norris and Inglehart’s Secularization Theory “The seminal social thinkers of the nineteenth century—Auguste Comte, Herbert Spencer, Émile Durkheim, Max Weber, Karl Marx, and Sigmund Freud—all believe[d] that religion would gradually fade in importance and cease to be significant with the advent of industrial society” (Norris and Inglehart 2004, 3). This particular version of the secularization thesis has generally fallen out of favour largely because “it is obvious that religion has not disappeared from the world, nor does it seem likely to do so” (Norris and Inglehart 2004, 4). In response, some have challenged whether secularization is taking place worldwide at all. Some have also argued that secularization is not taking place specifically in Latin America due to the rise Protestantism within the region (Hagopian 2009); indeed, Patterson argues that Latin America is currently undergoing a “Neo-reformation” because of this (Patterson 2005). In contrast, Norris and Inglehart argue that secularization is still taking place and that “the importance of religiosity persists most strongly among vulnerable populations especially those living in poorer nations, facing personal survival-threatening risks” (Patterson 2005, 4). Under this conception of secularization, “human security” affects religiosity. In order to apply this secularization theory, one must examine religiosity, social values and human security. Uruguay’s Lower Rates of Religiosity Uruguay’s decline in religiosity demonstrates a rise in secularization. Previously, “the church enjoyed a near monopoly on religious belief and practice: more than nine out of every ten Latin Americans called themselves Catholic” (Hagopian 2009, 1). However, at least in Uruguay, this “monopoly” has since fallen: a plurality of Uruguayan respondents to the 2000 World Values Survey, 47.9 percent, identified with no religious denomination; in contrast, only 40.6 percent professed Roman Catholicism (Hagopian 2009). Similarly, only 23 percent of Uruguayan respondents to the survey consider religion “very important” in their lives, only 23 percent of the Uruguayan respondents attend religious services “once a month or more,” and only 55 percent of respondents from Uruguay self-identified as “religious” regardless of church attendance (Inglehart et al 2004). In these respects, Uruguay differs significantly from other Latin American respondents to the survey, which include Chile, El Salvador, the Dominican Republic, Venezuela, Brazil, Mexico, Argentina, Peru and Colombia. The next least Catholic country is Chile, which still has a majority of Catholics at 54.1 percent; the remaining countries range from El Salvador, at 58.9 percent Catholic, to Colombia, at 84 percent Catholic (Hagopian 2009). These other respondent countries show similarly higher rates with regard to the other factors examined above (Inglehart et al 2004). 2 In this case, “sexual orientation” applies to queer people generally, including transsexuals whose difference may actually be one of “gender” or “gender identity,” since, popularly, “gender and sexuality are seen as connected.” See Sally O’Driscoll, “Outlaw Readings: Beyond Queer Theory, Signs 22:1 (1996): 30-51.

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Uruguay’s Shifting Values on Social Issues Lower rates of religiosity also correlate with other value shifts that occur under secularization, including those regarding social issues. Uruguay exemplifies this—for example, only 46 percent of Uruguayans considered “homosexuality” as “never justifiable” (Inglehart et al 2004). The theory of value shifts applies to more social issues than just “homosexuality,” however: for instance, 21 percent of Uruguayan respondents to the 2004 World Values survey agreed with the statement “marriage is an out-dated institution,” which is slightly higher than the world generally (Inglehart et al 2004). All of these beliefs run against Catholic teaching, and, just as with levels of religiosity, they contrast with other Latin American countries. Out of Latin American respondents to the Survey, only Chile and Argentina had lower rates of considering “homosexuality” as “never justifiable”, while the remaining seven countries all showed higher rates (Inglehart et al 2009). However, it is possible to explain why Argentina and Chile have not yet made the same moves due to their higher levels of religiosity, particularly with regard to Catholicism. “Homosexual partnerships are reviled by the ecclesiastical hierarchy” (Htun 2009, 335); as a result, Catholic bishops can exercise considerable sway over politicians in these matters, particularly in an accountable democratic system (Htun 2009). “Human Security”: The Basis for Secularization in Uruguay Under Norris and Inglehart’s secularization paradigm, “human security” plays a significant role in determining religiosity. Uruguay has higher levels of “human security” than other Latin American countries in several respects, as shown by the UNDP’s HDI and a comparison of Gini coefficients among countries in the region. The HDI considers four factors: life expectancy at birth, adult literacy rates, combined gross enrollment ratio (referring to enrollment in schools) and GDP per capita adjusted for purchasing power parity and presented in United States dollars (USD). According to the UNDP, only two countries in Latin America rank higher in terms of the HDI: Chile and Argentina. This data suggests that, if the HDI alone showed human security, then Chile and Argentina should have experienced a greater decline in religiosity than Uruguay and, as a result, should have enacted reforms that affect their queer populations before Uruguay. However, it is important to examine the bases of these numbers further, particularly for the human development index. In two of the four aspects it considers, literacy and enrollment, Uruguay is near the top of Latin America, although Cuba ranks higher. However, Cuba’s per capita GDP adjusted for purchasing power parity in USD is significantly lower than Uruguay’s, falling over 30 places behind it, which makes it significantly lower in human security. Furthermore, Uruguay is significantly higher than both Argentina and Chile in terms of enrollment and literacy. The reason Uruguay falls lower on the index as a whole is its lower GDP per capita. Education is a notable part of human security; as a result, Uruguay’s higher rankings in that area help explain why it has progressed further in secularization, despite its lower HDI. An examination of the Gini coefficient—a measure of income inequality, in which a lower number indicates greater a greater level of income equality—in these countries shows that Uruguay has, in some respects, higher levels of human security. In 2005, the most recent year the WIDER-UNU program collected data for it, Uruguay had a Gini coefficient of 45.0. In comparison, Argentina had a 50.1 in the same year, while Chile had a 54.6 in 2003, the most recent year the WIDER-UNU program provides data for that country. Uruguay, as a result, has significantly lower conditions of income inequality, despite its lower GDP per capita adjusted for purchasing power parity in USD. Uruguay’s Gini coefficient is also lower than that of the other countries mentioned in the 2000 World Values Survey. Income equality is another important contributor to human security, so Uruguay’s

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relatively higher rates of income equality help explain how that country has become more secular than other countries in the region. However, these higher conditions of human security are not necessarily all recent developments. In 1940, observers noted that Uruguay had higher rates of literacy than other parts of Latin America (Espinoza 1940). This suggests that the process of secularization may have been going on in Uruguay for several decades. Uruguay’s higher levels of human security have decreased the demand for religion as a way to help people through adversity. In turn, these lower rates of religiosity come with greater acceptance of queer people. Since Uruguay has higher rates of human security than most of Latin America, it has developed secularization to a greater degree, which in turn has increased acceptance of queerness. Shifts in human security, in short, have produced the secularization that has allowed the Frente Amplio to enact pro-queer reforms in Uruguay, when other states in Latin America have not so far done the same. The Broader Trend towards Leftism in Latin America Cleary argues that the series of leftist victories in Latin America beginning in Venezuela, then spreading to Chile and other countries, represents “a regional trend rather than a series of isolated events” that is likely to be an enduring influence on politics throughout Latin America (2006, 36). This rise of leftism in Latin America generally within the past decade or so has not spared Uruguay: the Frente Amplio is a coalition of left-wing parties that first came to power in Uruguay in 2005. The Blanco and Colorado parties had dominated the country since its establishment as a republic (Canel 2004); the rise of the Frente Amplio broke this pattern. This trend has affected the shift within Uruguay towards providing rights for its queer population, though not to the same extent as secularization has. The Frente Amplio, as their moves on civil unions, adoption and legal gender changes show, has assumed positions that favour providing rights for queer people. Their recent reforms would most likely not have taken place under the Blanco (or National) party which, as The New York Times reported on September 9, 2009, voted against such changes. The Colorado party was also unlikely to make such changes, since it faced slim chances of winning an election due to its past leadership during an economic crisis (Canel 2004). Though some might argue that the rise of the Frente Amplio, as part of a wider Latin American political trend towards leftism, played the central role in establishing these social reforms, the rule of Frente Amplio alone cannot explain Uruguay’s distinctness on these issues. This does not mean that the coming of the Frente Amplio to power has not been a factor in the enactment of these policies; indeed, these reforms likely would not have taken place at all without a friendly political party in power. However, the rise of leftism does not in itself offer an explanation of why these changes have occurred in Uruguay but not in other countries in the region because many other leftist governments in Latin America have not enacted similar reforms. In order to address this problem, an account of Uruguay’s shifting social values is necessary; secularization provides such an account. Counter-Argument: The Historical Background At least one notable counter-argument to the human security/secularization approach presents itself: the idea that the distinctly weaker role of the Catholic Church in Uruguay is a product of internal historical factors. Fitzgibbon argues that Uruguay’s history explains its religious distinctness rather than any process of secularization, identifying three characteristics that separate Uruguay from the rest of the region: the lateness of Spanish colonization of that country, which occurred after the colonizers had lost “religious fervor”; an influx of immigrants who were either “non-Catholic or nominally Catholic” during Uruguay’s revolutionary period; and later

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immigration from Catholic countries that included social classes which displayed less of an allegiance to the Church (Fitzgibbon 1953, 21-22). According to this argument, Uruguay’s history of strong separation between church and state also contributed to a decline in the authority of the Catholic Church (Fitzgibbon 1953). However, observing that these historical factors have pushed Uruguay away from the Church does not in itself necessarily explain why this has happened. For example, it may be true that immigrants with little or no affiliation with the Catholic Church moved Uruguayan society away from Catholic hegemony; however, this observation requires an account of why the immigrants changed Uruguay rather than the other way around. This argument requires a deeper account of why Uruguay has historically lacked a place for a strong Catholic Church; secularization, in contrast, provides the explanatory power to justify why Uruguay did not assimilate those immigrants towards loyalty to the Church. Furthermore, Fitzgibbon’s account of Uruguayan exceptionalism does not offer any other explanatory power for the rest of Latin America, which is a weakness in comparison to the secularization approach. Conclusions and Further Research Uruguay’s decline in religiosity and correlated value shift on social issues distinguishes it from other countries in Latin America. Such cultural change explains why Uruguay has enacted civil unions, provided adoption rights and established legal gender changes when no other country in Latin America has done so as of yet. Uruguay’s higher levels of human security relative to other countries in the region explain how these social changes have happened within the framework of Norris and Inglehart’s secularization theory. This analysis has several implications for the various actors in Latin American countries concerned with the rise of queer politics. For the Catholic Church, it suggests that the way to prevent these changes is to somehow increase religiosity among the people of Latin America; however, it also indicates that such attempts may not be successful if the citizens of Latin American countries continue to experience further developments in human security, which would likely make the Church less relevant. For queer advocates, it provides some potential strategies for producing the conditions in which pro-queer reforms can occur. One such strategy is working to increase human security, which should eventually produce effects that will make such reforms possible; another is to attempt to persuade people to abandon their religiosity, although this may polarize societies on religious/ non-religious lines. This argument also offers some predictive value of how queer politics will continue to develop in Latin America. Chile and Argentina, which have higher HDIs than Uruguay and relatively high levels of human security, are likely to be the next countries in the region to make such changes. Indeed, Buenos Aires and Rio Negro in Argentina have already “approved same-sex civil unions,” and those two countries also displayed more permissive values towards queer people (Htun 2009, 348). Furthermore, this argument suggests that Uruguay is likely to continue to see continued moves in such a direction, due to the recent election of another Frente Amplio president (Barrionuevo 2009). Finally, this theory suggests avenues for further research. One could examine the argument that secularization as a result of increased human security causes shifts in social values in other Latin American countries, or broaden it to cover the region as a whole. Similarly, gathering data on religiosity and social values in countries other than those covered in the World Values Surveys would be helpful in analyzing processes of secularization in those countries. Finally, there is the possibility for an extension of this thesis beyond Latin America. All of these could potentially expand this view on secularization as the basis for pro-queer reforms.

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Works Cited Barrionuevo, Alexei. “Leftist Wins Uruguay Presidential Vote.” New York Times, November 29, 2009. http:// www.nytimes.com/2009/11/30/world/americas/30uruguay.html (accessed 2 December 2009). Canel, Eduardo. “Uruguay’s Tilt Left?” NACLA Report on the Americas, 38:2 (2004): 13-14. Cleary, Matthew R. “Explaining the Left’s Resurgence.” Journal of Democracy 17:4 (2006): 35-49. Espinoza, J. Manuel. “The Role of Catholic Culture in Uruguay.” The Catholic Historical Review, 26:1 (1940): 1-15. Fitzgibbon, Russell H. “The Political Impact on Religious Development in Uruguay.” Church History, 22:1 (1953): 21-32. Hagopian, Frances. “Introduction: The New Landscape.” In Religious Pluralism, Democracy andt h e C a t h o l i c Church in Latin America, ed. Frances Hagopian, 1-64. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 2009. Htun, Mala. “Life, Liberty and Family Values: Church and State in the Struggle over Latin America’s Social Agenda.” In Religious Pluralism, Democracy and the Catholic Church in Latin America, ed. Frances Hagopian, 335-364. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 2009. “Human Development Report 2009.” United Nations Development Programme. http://hdr.undp.org/en/ (accessed 3 December 2009). Inglehart, Ronald et al. Human Beliefs and Values. Mexico: Programas Educativos, 2004. Norris, Pippa and Ronald Inglehart. Sacred and Secular: Religion and Politics Worldwide. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004. O’Driscoll, Sally. “Outlaw Readings: Beyond Queer Theory.” Signs, 22:1 (1996): 30-51. Patterson, Eric. Latin America’s Neo-Reformation: Religion’s Influence on Contemporary Politics. New York: Routledge, 2005. Reuters. “Lawmakers in Uruguay Vote to Allow Gay Couples to Adopt.” New York Times, September 9, 2009. http://www.nytimes.com (accessed 3 December 2009). “Uruguay allows same-sex adoption.” BBCa, September 9, 2009. http://news.bbc.co.uk (accessed 26 November 2009). “Uruguay approves gay civil unions.” BBCb, December 19, 2007. http://news.bbc.co.uk (accessed 26 November 2009). “Uruguay approves sex change bill.” BBCc, October 13, 2009. http://news.bbc.co.uk (accessed 26 November 2009). “World Income Inequality Database.” World Institute for Development Economics Research of the United Nations University. http://www.wider.unu.edu/ (accessed 2 December 2009).

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Examining John Locke’s Defense of European Colonization of America Timothy Apedaile In his Second Treatise of Government (1689), John Locke advances a theory of property that seems to defend the European appropriation of American land, and thus the American colonial project as a whole. Locke’s reliance on the power of reasoning and his insistence on the use of empirically verifiable sources of evidence would suggest an infallible argument; however, it is the purpose of this paper to critically assess his theory of property in its application to the European appropriation of American lands. In so doing, this paper will engage the internal logic of Locke’s argument by granting his assumption that the Aboriginal peoples of the New World existed in a state of nature1. Despite this generous concession, this paper will argue that, rather than affirming his defence of European appropriation of American lands, Locke’s theory of property undermines the legitimacy of such actions and renders this position untenable. To support this assertion, this paper will first present the tenets of Locke’s theory of property as it was envisaged for Europe, before discussing, in a second part, its application to seventeenth century America. Finally, historical evidence will be examined that highlights inescapable inconsistencies within the logic of Locke’s theory as it is applied to the European colonial project. In The Second Treatise of Government, Locke defines “property” as a person’s “life, liberty and estate” (Locke, §87: 304)2. This broad definition underlies much of Locke’s liberal theory; however, it is the last constituent of property—‘estate’—that is of specific interest here, as it is this notion that Locke refers to in outlining the means of legitimate appropriation of property. In this theory of property as seen in terms of ‘estate,’ Locke’s first and most fundamental assumption is that the earth was given to Man by God. Accordingly, he argues, everything that exists on earth belongs to “mankind in common,” and as a necessary result, the conventional means of legitimately individuating property from the commons requires the consent of all mankind (Locke, §25: 273-74). However, Locke endeavours to show “how men might come to have property in several parts of that which God gave to mankind in common, and that “without any express compact of all the commoners,” that is, without having to rely on this unanimous consent (Locke, §25: 274). To achieve this natural means of appropriation, Locke qualifies his original claim that all property exists in common with the caveat that “every man has a property in his own person” (Locke, §27: 274). Consequently, “the labour of his body, and the work of his hands,” Locke contends, “are properly his” (Locke, §27: 274). Thus, every man has a private property by virtue of owning his person and, as a result, any labour that is performed 1 The very use of the Rawlsian notion of “peoples,” in referring to the Aboriginals of the time, hints at the flaws in this assumption. The vantage point gained by the passage of time makes it hard to deny that seventeenth century Native Americans lived in perfectly legitimate, albeit un-European, forms of political society. This paper cannot engage this line of argument in refuting Locke’s defence of colonialism due to space constraints; however, for further inquiry into the political structures of the indigenous populations (specifically the Iroquois peoples), and the implications this may have had regarding the legitimacy of the colonial project, see Lewis H. Morgan, League of the Iroquois (1851), (New York: Corinth Books, Inc., 1962), and G. Peter Jemison, and Anna M. Schein, eds., Treaty of Canandaigua 1794 (Santa Fe, NM: Clear Light Publishers, 2000). 2 All references to Locke refer to the same edition: John Locke, “Second Treatise of Government” in John Locke: Political Writings, ed. David Wootton (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, Inc., 2003). For fluidity, only the paragraph and page numbers will be given in-text.

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by his person is similarly his own. From this premise, Locke argues that that which a man removes from the commons has been mixed with his labour and therefore becomes his “private right,” or “property” (Locke, §27-28: 274-75). While Locke uses items such as acorns and apples to illustrate this point, he makes clear that the same principle applies with reference to “the earth itself,” thus demonstrating how Man can come to own not just what he can gather from nature, but portions of land as well (Locke, §32: 276). Locke qualifies his above theory of property individuation with two provisos so as to forestall certain obvious objections: first, one can only amass “as much as any one can make use of to any advantage of life before it spoils,” (Locke, §31: 276) and second, one can only legitimately claim ownership of property so long as there is “enough and as good left in common for others” (Locke, §27: 274). In this manner, Locke argues that the legitimacy of natural appropriation is necessarily bound by a man’s respect of these two (individually necessary, and jointly sufficient) conditions. Thus, a transgression of either proviso illegitimates the appropriation in question and forces a return to a reliance on conventional appropriation through unanimous consent. Locke’s theory of property described above legitimates appropriation from the commons within a ‘state of nature’—that is, a “state of perfect freedom” in which Man exists “without asking leave, or depending upon the will of any other man” (Locke, §4: 262). In the European context, the state of nature had long ago been exited, if it had ever truly existed outside the bounds of a hypothetical thought experiment. However, Locke contends that there were areas of the world in which such a condition still existed—namely, America in the seventeenth century. Native Americans were, for Locke, a perfect example of a group living without political obligation and thus within a state of nature, as he implies when he states: “in the beginning all the world was America” (Locke, §49: 285). Assuming this assertion to be correct, it remains to be seen whether Locke is consistent in interpreting the conclusions of his theory. If Locke’s theory of property is applied to America, Native Americans—as with any individuals living in a state of nature—would be able to legitimately appropriate property from the commons by mixing their labour with it. This Locke confirms when he states: “this law of reason makes the deer that Indian’s who hath killed it” (Locke, §30: 275), and again when he refers to the hunter-gatherer traditions of the “wild Indian” to illustrate natural property appropriation as it may have been practised by Europeans in the sate of nature centuries before (Locke, §26: 274). It follows from these claims that Locke recognized that Native Americans had the same right to individuate property as the Europeans, provided that they too abided by Locke’s two provisos. In reaching this conclusion, Locke avoids making the stronger claim that Native Americans owned the land off which they lived. He bolsters this denial of proprietorship by denying the existence of a Native political framework and the institutions, such as currency, that such a framework necessarily entails (Cf. Locke, §36-51: 279-286)1. This allowed the Europeans to treat America as a manifestation of the “commons,” from which they too could legitimately appropriate property. However, a legitimate framework for appropriation does not necessarily legitimize the manner in which property is appropriated in practice. Regardless of the location in which the Europeans found themselves, natu3 The logic behind this assertion is too lengthy to be outlined here; however, a quotation may help to clarify the matter. In his chapter “Of Property,” Locke states: “In some parts of the world (where the increase of people and stock, with the use of money, had made land scarce, and so of some value), the several [political] communities … by compact and agreement, settled the property which labour and industry began. … Yet there are still great tracts of ground to be found [i.e. America] which (the inhabitants thereof not having joined with the rest of mankind in the consent of the use of their common money) lie waste, and are more than the people who dwell on it do or can make use of, and so still lie in common. Tho’ this can scarce happen amongst that part of mankind that have consented to the use of money” (Locke, §45: 283-84).

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ral appropriation is forever bound by the respect of its two provisos. In the case of the colonial appropriation of American lands, it is in no way obvious that Europeans left “enough and as good” in the commons for the Native Americans who depended on this source of subsistence. Timothy Shannon’s contribution to the historical understanding of this issue, entitled Iroquois Diplomacy on the Early American Frontier, supports this conclusion. Shannon notes that as early as the 1650s—fully four decades prior to the publication of Locke’s treatise— “abusive, land-hungry colonists” were entering Native communities and “encourag[ing]” them “to resettle on reserves” (Shannon 2008, 36-37; 182-183. Emphasis in original). The latter would, of course, be the precursor to the system of reservations—still in use today—that Native Americans, “dispossessed of their original homelands,” would be given in recompense by the European settlers (Shannon 2008, 28)2. It may be argued that the actions of the European colonizers, in placing the Native Americans on reserves, while perhaps morally questionable, were legitimate under Locke’s depiction of property appropriation. This objection would necessarily argue that the reservation lands given to the Natives, though limited, were “enough and as good” for their subsistence. This, however, is guilty of an overly narrow interpretation of what is “good.” Indeed, placing Native populations on arbitrary parcels of land necessarily forced them to abandon many traditional cultural and spiritual practices that were intrinsically tied to the lands on which their ancestors had lived for centuries. While the land designated by the boundaries of a reserve may provide its inhabitants with “enough” of the means necessary for subsistence, the arbitrary and artificial nature of such a practice is, in itself, enough to refute the argument that it is “as good” in any meaningful sense of the word. Thus, the loss of irreplaceable heritage and the psychological duress created by the institutionalized subjugation of a people combine to challenge the notion that reservations were “as good” as the lands which Europeans had appropriated. This refutes the claim that Europe’s appropriation of land in America was legitimate according to Locke’s theory because the necessary sufficiency proviso is not met. As a consequence, Locke’s defence of colonialism is undermined internally by the application of empirically verifiable colonial practices consistently to all aspects of his theory of property. It may further be objected that this argument refutes Locke’s theory only semantically, by insisting on a meaning of “good” that was not intended by Locke when he outlined his provisos. However, this objection is trivial upon reflection. The fact that Locke does not acknowledge the full meaning of a term that is crucial to his theory in no way negates the appropriateness of insisting on (the implications of) its correct usage. Rather, it weakens the theory upon which the term was premised. Indeed, Locke himself could not deny this criticism as it is based in the very empiricist tradition to which he subscribed. Locke’s theory of property’s failed defence of European colonization in America in no way undermines his theory as a whole—it merely constrains its applicability. This distinction is significant as it highlights an important caveat of Western political thought in general: what can be deduced based on the behavioural observations of one people cannot necessarily be applied to another. Though it remains only partially acknowledged, this truth is underscored by the legacy of conflict and tension that has riddled post-colonial Africa, as well as the deluge of socio-psychological issues that exists still today among North America’s Native populations. In an era of expanding capacities for interstate interference, the importance of this lesson should not be understated.

4 Shannon here is speaking specifically of the Iroquois; however, his conclusions are universally appropriate. It must further be noted that the “reserves” Shannon speaks of were initially created to isolate religious converts; however, he makes clear that, over time, the system came to be applied indiscriminately.

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Works Cited Jemison, G. Peter, and Anna M. Schein, eds. Treaty of Canandaigua 1794. Santa Fe, NM: Clear Light Publishers, 2000. Locke, John. “Second Treatise of Government.” John Locke: Political Writings, ed. David Wootton. 261-387. Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, Inc., 2003. Morgan, Lewis H. League of the Iroquois. 1851. New York: Corinth Books, Inc., 1962. Shannon, Timothy J. Iroquois Diplomacy on the Early American Frontier. New York: Penguin Group Inc., 2008.

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The Politics of Federalism and Canada’s Climate Change Policy

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The Politics of Federalism and Canada’s Climate Change Policy Emma Hautecoeur Since November 2009, Canadians have expressed growing concern about Canada’s climate policy. Simultaneously, the country’s international credibility has been plummeting. Recent surveys and polls have indicated a growing embarrassment across the country—even in oil-rich Alberta. The current government’s inaction and lack of leadership on climate change and environmental issues have brought shame home and abroad. Receiving a “Fossil Award” (a satirical but dishonorable award) on the concluding day of the UN climate talks in Barcelona has only further contributed to the perception that Canada has failed miserably in its commitment to Kyoto. The need for substantive and concrete progress on key issues makes an ambitious deal a particular imperative in the follow-up to UN Climate Conference in Copenhagen in December 2009. Concern, knowledge of best practices, and institutional frameworks add up to action. In Canada, one could argue that concern and knowledge of best practices are two first conditions that have already been fulfilled. Canada has a fair share of the world’s technology and information capital to meet the second condition. In trying to explain the dependent variable of action/inaction in climate change politics, one should look at the institutional framework of Canadian federalism as the independent variable. In this essay, it will be demonstrated that competing federal and provincial roles and responsibilities decrease the likelihood of implementation of international environmental treaties, and will use the Kyoto Protocol as a case study. The first section of this analysis will examine the constitutional, legal, and ideological precedents in environmental policy-making that existed prior to the Kyoto Protocol. In this section I will also show that the constitutional division of power fails to assign responsibility for climate change regulations. In turn the legal system has greatly contributed to shifting the balance towards greater centralization, while the ideological currents of the politics of federalism in the 1990s have fostered a considerable devolution of powers. Secondly, it will be argued that the resulting structure of climate change policymaking has led to policies that reflect the lowest common denominator. The federal government—a mediator stuck between the provinces and the international sphere—has not been able to reconcile the commitment made at Kyoto with the diverse interests of the provinces. Since implementation relies on intergovernmental relations, vertically and horizontally heterogeneous in Canada, both levels of government have deferred from efficient regulatory mechanisms. The last section of this paper then evaluates the weight of other factors implied by the Kyoto arrangement that impede its implementation. Those factors are external but paramount to Canadian federalism, and their effect would be mitigated if greater centralization were achieved. Lastly, the claim for provincial leadership in climate change action and the claim for a carbon tax will be assessed. The expected result is that a successful implementation of an effective environmental assessment, a regulatory scheme and a compliance mechanism are correlated to a concentration of these roles and responsibilities in the hands of the federal government of Canada. As environmental policy-making was not an issue at the time the former three Provinces of Canada formed one Dominion, the British and North America Act (BNA Act) of 1867 does not explicitly confer constitutional responsibility for environmental policy field to either level of government. As has often been the case in McGill Journal of Political Studies 2010


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constitutional federalism in Canada, the Courts have inherited the role of assigning such responsibility to the federal government, the incentive being to articulate a unified Canadian foreign policy. The judiciary aimed at two major objectives: the assignment of a responsibility that was nonexistent in the constitution and the creation of a balance between the ability of the federal government to create a unified foreign policy and its implication in provincial jurisdiction (Smith 2006). In the 1930s the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council (JCPC) asserted the federal role in treaty-making, on the interpretation of section 132 of the BNA Act that such agreements were done on behalf of the British Empire. As the country grew increasingly independent from Westminster, the provinces used the legal system to limit that power and ensure the protection of their exclusive jurisdiction. The Constitution Act of 1982 realigned responsibilities as follow: “Provinces legislate in the area of the environment based on their constitutional responsibilities for such things as local works and undertakings, property and civil rights, and the management of natural resources […] federal environmental legislation is based on varying combinations of the federal trade and commerce power, federal responsibility for the fishery and the conduct of international relations” (Farfard 1997, 205). So defined, the federal mandate remained considerably limited. Environmental policy is one of the areas where the provinces have exercised their jurisdictional authority the most. The involvement of the provinces in climate change policy and the reassertion of the federal government on the international scene were motivated by the same reason: the protection and projection of their respective political, jurisdictional and economic interests (Smith 2006). The constitutional assignment of roles and responsibilities in environmental policy-making has traditionally limited the federal mandate, but the particular issue of climate change allows the federal government to consult the Courts in realigning these roles and responsibilities. The late 1980s set the stage for the second wave of environmental policy-making in Canada. There was a worldwide-shared belief that climate change is a global problem that requires global engagement. Climate change officially entered the Canadian diplomatic agenda when the Toronto Conference was held in 1988; this was the first meaningful meeting that brought scientists and politicians around the same table to negotiate a reduction in CO2 emissions. The Conference resulted in a mutually agreed upon solution, but one of differentiated responsibility: action was to be undertaken by developed countries only. Although multilateralism was already an inherent part of Canadian foreign policy, it was mandatory for the nation to reaffirm its position as an energy-efficient leader and international champion of climate change regulation, in response to both international and domestic pressures. The government in place, as well the ones to come, recognized the opportunity to capitalize on public concern for environmental issues (Harrison 1996). These incentives resulted in the commitment from the Mulroney government at the Earth Summit in Rio in 1992. The government hoped to use the international agreement to bring the provincial interests on its side, because it could not integrate them without risking its leadership position (Smith 1998). “The federal government has constantly protected its prerogative to speak for Canada” (Smith 1998, 10). More recently, the consultation of the provinces has acquired the status of convention. Yet the international framework did not challenge the right of provinces to develop their own resources. As global warming reminded Western Canada of the considerable droughts that had happened in the 1930s, the battle to implement environmental policies competed with the expensive energy development projects that were taking place in the West. With the emergence of a global climate change crisis, the federal role became more intricate; it had to mitigate conflicting international and domestic interests. As these events were shaping the political regime of environmental policy-making in Canada, the courts were tailoring the respective roles of the two levels of government and establishing their respective jurisdiction more accurately. The legal system permanently altered the balance of power in the implementation of interna-

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tional environmental agreements. As seen earlier, the treaty-making power of the federal government could not be used to preempt provincial jurisdiction; “if the legislation necessary to implement a treaty obligation would normally fall under provincial legislation, then Ottawa must request such legislation from all ten provinces” (Holland 1993, 48). Meanwhile, federal government crafted a new strategy using the residual power under the peace, order and good government (POGG) to legislate prior to treaty commitments. In fact, the POGG power has formed the constitutional framework for a number of federal environmental statutes. In the 1988 Crown Zellerbach case, the federal government used international studies to show that toxic substances emissions were an issue of national concern because it fulfilled the “singleness, distinctiveness and indivisibility” test; in the case, the majority won the federal regulatory scheme to control the pollution of coastal waters under the Ocean Dumping Control Act (Harrison 1996, 46). Considering that precedent, it would be possible for the federal government today to resort to the courts to file greenhouse gas emissions as a matter of national concern and thus possibly render provincial legislation on this matter unconstitutional. Yet even upon a favorable ruling from the courts, the federal government would not impede the provinces’ power to indirectly regulate on the greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions by legislating in areas like land use, transportation, and forestry. Assignment of the power to legislate on GHG emissions would not significantly offset the fundamental division of power. Moreover, the unwillingness of some provinces to limit their GHG emissions has adverse consequences beyond their boundaries. It would thus fulfill the “inability” (of the provinces) test and confirm the authority of the federal government. For example, another landmark court case for environmental policymaking in Canada is the Oldman River Dam case. Here, the Court upheld the federal government’s authority to conduct an environmental assessment (EA) of a major irrigation dam constructed by the Government of Alberta. This decision affirmed the centrality of EA in the debate about environmental protection and sustainable development in Canada. In his study of the federal jurisdiction after Oldman, Steven A. Kennett concludes that EA must be closely linked to the heads of federal jurisdiction. “Limited investigation is however, incompatible with the holistic assessment which is a major objective of EA as part of a decision-making process” (Kennett 1993,198). Therefore, because federal jurisdiction is restricted as opposed to comprehensive, it might require negotiation with the provinces to achieve joint EA. Kennett suggests that “the appropriate response to this constitutional constraint in intergovernmental cooperation to establish joint and impartial EA, […] requires an innovative approach to institutional arrangements at the political level” (Kennett 1993, 197-203). Case law calls for a rearrangement of the political structure that could counteract the current legislative fragmentation, license a federal regulatory scheme, and establish joint environmental assessment. By shifting Ottawa’s traditional role, Crown Zellerbach allowed for the passing of the Canadian Environmental Protection Act (CEPA). CEPA Part II arguably provides a basis for the federal government to regulate GHG emissions because they are treated as a distinct topic, “distinct from local air pollution, toxic pollution or regional pollution” (Rolfe 1998, 352). Under the Toxic Substances Management Policy, it specifies the policy objective of “virtual elimination of releases to the environment of toxic substances that are persistent and bioaccumulative and are present in the environment primarily due to human activity” (CEPA Environmental Registry 1999). The case Regina v. Hydro Québec questioned the constitutionality of federal regulation of toxic substances under CEPA Part II. The policy directions sustained by the majority under criminal law appeal in effect gives latitude to the federal government in order to implement GHG emissions reductions but does not specify how it ought to prevent unilateral provincial moves. Chris Rolfe explains that one of the most problematic ambiguities of

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the CEPA is that “if some provinces take sufficient action to reduce greenhouse gases emissions but others do not, it is not clear whether or not the federal government can regulate provincial sources (which account for the vast majority of emissions) in the provinces that have taken sufficient action. Thus it is not clear whether the federal government could intervene to establish a national program” (Rolfe 1998, 352). Attributing the power to regulate to one level of government does not hamper the other level’s power to implement higher standards. Meanwhile this overlap was challenged by the Canadian Council of Ministers of the Environment (CCME), which launched its New Harmonization Initiative in 1995. This initiative was anchored in the larger trend of cooperative federalism. Its main objectives were to homogenize environmental policy in Canada with a cooperative approach to implementation, elimination of overlap and delineation of respective roles. The Standing Committee on Environment and Sustainable Development reported that there was, in effect, insufficient overlap and duplication of policies and that a “significant devolution of federal environmental protection powers to the provinces and territories might engender weaker environmental protection in Canada” (Standing Committee on Environment and Sustainable Development 1997, 6). The Committee was wary of the fact that the system of funding and transfers proposed hinged on the very abstract terms of devolution mentioned in the accord (Standing Committee on Environment and Sustainable Development 1997). The divisiveness of bureaucracies on the harmonization issue shows that a devolutionary scheme is not a self-evident solution. On the one hand the federal government could remain dependent on provincial interests and follow collaborative management guidelines for establishing energy efficiency and emission standards while letting the provinces be free agents of implementation. On the other hand, it could dig deeper in its various POGG, trade & commerce and criminal powers to unilaterally implement a national program. As the next part of this essay will highlight, Ottawa has followed the first path. The focus on overlap fundamentally held back environmental policymaking in the 1990s. Overlap can actually be a way of eliminating loopholes in climate change regulation, but only if its effects can be effectively and explicitly overseen by one entity of governance, most likely the most central one. Ensuring the transparency of provincial and federal programs and the efficiency of equivalency agreements could effectively shift the focus to more pertinent policy challenges. In the fall of 1997, federal/provincial discussions began to heat up in advance of the Kyoto summit; yet they had begun well before that in Rio. The politicians believed they needed to go further in their commitment to stabilization they had made in 1992. The Canadian pre-negotiation took place in Calgary and the conclusion was to commit to a 3% cut compared to 1990 emissions. At Kyoto, Al Gore and others pressed Canada to go further and to commit to reduce its GHG emissions by 6% by 2012, doubling the target the national consensus had determined. The Western industry lobbies slowed down Jean Chrétien’s enthusiasm; they pressed him to follow the American example and to not ratify the Protocol. However, by 2002, international pressures thwarted the domestic effort and two years later Chrétien finally ratified the Kyoto Protocol. However, Chrétien’s most trusted advisor Eddie Goldenberg warned the Prime Minister that the Kyoto targets could not be met; today, it is official that they will not be (Page 2008). In signing and ratifying, Ottawa not only bypassed the “national consensus” condition that was in place at the time of Kyoto, it also bound itself to a commitment it knew it would not honor— although it arguably could have. This was the case because Canada’s domestic political reality did not match the perceptions of international spectators; moreover, the Canadian public was concerned but not deeply committed to the issue at the time. To this day, the electorate still does not hold either provincial or federal governments accountable for their inaction on climate change, and there has not been one single response as to how Canada’s

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Kyoto commitment could be implemented. The government’s elite accommodation pattern has offered the appearance of motion without the hard decisions and tough enforcement that would be necessary for successful action (Paehlke 2008). The Functioning of Canadian Federalism The Canadian political regime functions by tripartite bargaining. Industry and environmental interests groups lobby the provincial government. Federalism then presupposes provincial-federal negotiations. Finally, by signing international agreements, the nation engages in a cooperative diplomatic relations with other nations. What is curious, however, is that in the United States—the most notable non-member of the Kyoto Protocol—a significant number of states have been very productive in meeting the Kyoto targets. Although the structure of Canadian federalism is arguably more decentralized than its American counterpart, fewer provinces have shown similar leadership in climate-change policy development. The previous section has shown that Canada has a particular history of constitutional deference to the provinces in natural resource management and has recently had to cope with trends that support far-reaching devolution (Rabe 2007). Between signature and ratification of the Kyoto Protocol, the provinces have been relatively stagnant in policy development. It is only recently, because of the frustration with ratification and subsequent inaction, that some sense of leadership has infused provincial governments. The most virulent leadership arose from the fiercest opponent of the federal unilateral move in Kyoto, the Alberta government, which has crafted a made-in-Alberta response to the Kyoto regulatory demands that reflects Western grievances on the federal management of natural resources, the latter dating back to the birth of Confederation. Due to Alberta’s vested interest in continuing the development of its tar sands, its provincial actions on climate change have remained considerably weaker than is necessary to meet Kyoto standards. Institutionalization of collective action is the only solution when it comes to moving forward as a nation. However, the federal government has not been willing to consider the differentiated commitment from the provinces, which in turn has slowed implementation of environmental policy. Denise Scheberle identifies two characteristics that qualify intergovernmental relationship in federal systems. The first one is trust: “high levels of trust are evident within relationships where actors share goals, respect the actions of one another, allow flexibility, and support individuals within the program.” The second characteristic is the extent of the involvement of oversight personnel, which “may include formal or informal communication between federal and state staffs, the frequency and the nature of oversight activities, provision of funding, sharing of resources, giving of advice and personal and other contacts among actors” (Scheberle 2004. 20-21). Canadian federalism suffers from the “Cooperative but autonomous: High trust with low involvement” syndrome. Programs operate in quasi-isolation; both levels of government have significant respect for each other’s role; and the oversight is achieved without full consultation (Scheberle 2004). This best describes Ottawa’s relationship with the Western provinces from the ratification of Kyoto to this day. Another model illustrates best the heterogeneous interprovincial relationships: coming apart and contentious: low trust and high involvement. Some provinces are highly involved in independently developing policies to approximate the Kyoto targets; this is the case of Manitoba, Québec, British Columbia—the last two having implemented carbon taxes in 2007-2008—and more recently Ontario. However, these participants are “highly frustrated with what they view as the unnecessary attention on the part of the other participants to administrative detail, program review, or organizational outputs” (Scheberle 2004, 23)—for example the refusal of Alberta to

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participate in an interprovincial trading program. What is problematic for Canada is that the success of implementation of international treaties hinges on intergovernmental relationships: Working relationships do not exist in a vacuum. Rather, they are an integral part of the context of policy implementation. In turn, the rate and nature of policy implementation creates the environment in which the federal-state working relationships are established. (Scheberle 2004, 38) Furthermore, the consultation process and national round tables are a melting pot of multi-stakeholder opinions. They represent the federal government’s modest attempt to be responsive to multiple interests. However, because the government response is fragmented, enforcement is weak. In the context of federalism, players are more likely to come apart than to pull together, which challenges the doctrines of collaborative federalism that have been dominant since the issue of climate change became salient. Because of the resulting non-coordinated policies resulting from executive federalism, the Federal government sold the Canada Wide Harmonization Accord in 1998 to all of the provinces except for Québec. A careful reading of Turning the Corner, the regulatory framework of 2007, shows that the federal government’s position has not really changed since 1998. Instead it has notably made itself more comfortable in the backseat and has passively watched the provinces pursue what each of them sees as the Canadian environmental vision. After signature, “Canada continued its pre-Kyoto pattern of national consultation processes, round tables, and stakeholder consultations in which provinces continued to be prominent participants, alongside industry, environmental groups, and other advocates for various positions” (Rabe 2007, 435). Turning the Corner shows that the Ottawa has not learned from the failure of the past institutionalized federal/provincial collaboration. It still views cooperative and non-coercive measures as the only solution to conflicting interests and horizontal imbalance between the provinces. The regulatory framework emulates the Comprehensive Air Quality Management Framework signed by the same committee of ministers in 1993: The federal, provincial and territorial governments have initiated a cooperative process to work through the regulatory issues, through the Environmental Protection and Planning Committee of the CCME. Some provinces have indicated an interest in negotiating equivalency agreements with the federal government. (Environment Canada 2008, 5) Notice that the framework says that only “some of the provinces,” rather than all of them, have indicated an interest in negotiating equivalency agreements. No clear-minded individual can affirm that the central government is not aware of the disparities in the provinces’ commitments. Yet the success of a functional, national program hinging on the devolution of legislative power to the provinces presupposes homogeneity in the resources available to them and therefore the degree to which they are willing to legislate. Such a program might improve accountability, but it does not reflect the reality of Canadian federalism. For example, some provinces’ strategies seemed to have been to prepare defection from a National Plan on Climate change rather than developing their own GHG reduction strategies (Rabe 2007). Furthermore, there has been no change in the political structure of environmental policy-making since the beginning of the 1980s, which in part explains the inability of the federal government to undertake the role that has been defined for it by its international engagement. The nature of the Kyoto agreement itself has also made it easier for Canada to avoid a drastic change in

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behavior and to abstain making the sacrifices necessary to meet its targets. International agreements such as Kyoto are legally binding against international law; however, international law does not possess an executive body to make it enforceable. Therefore such agreements are diplomatic efforts that try to design compliance mechanisms that would somehow replace a fictitious global government. Consistent with international relations—which have mutated to include economic sanctions and trade incentives as fundamental tools in security politics—Kyoto is based on market-based mechanisms. Emission trading, or the ability for low-emitters to sell their reductions, permits high emitters like Canada to minimize the domestic cost of controlling their own emissions. Without trading, the nations would have to meet their obligations within their borders. Similarly, joint implementation (JI) and the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM), which are also in place, facilitate the chore of the most well off. “Enforcement is a perennial problem of international law, but emission trading offers an elegant solution” (Victor 2004, 18). These mechanisms are extremely vague and flexible—the rules of the game have yet to be negotiated. As David G. Victor pointed out in 2004, the Kyoto Protocol can be described as a diplomatic effort gone wrong: The Kyoto framework is based on a fundamentally wrong assumption that is best to slow global warming by setting strict targets and timetables for regulating the quantity of greenhouse gases emitted. Regulating emission quantities is problematic because emissions are determined by factors such as technological change and economic growth that policy makers are unable to control and anticipate perfectly. If governments had control over all the factors that affect emissions then they could calibrate national behavior perfectly and comply within sensible targets, but in democratic market-based countries public administrators are neither omniscient nor omnipotent. The same logic obliges countries to adopt national trading systems that link with the international system. (Victor 2004, 11) The way the Canadian government has proposed to implement its commitment locally is based on voluntary regulation from the provincial governments and on voluntary GHG emission trading targeting of only the largest emitters in certain sectors of industry. Another significant aspect of the federal strategy is its emphasis on carbon capture and storage (CSS) technology, a means of mitigating the effect of carbon dioxide on global warming rather than preventing emissions (and a strategy which is at the core of the Alberta action plan). In turn, the provinces have been compelled to concentrate their resources on intergovernmental lobbying rather than on sustainable development of their industries in order to prevent those industries’ emissions from being limited. The economic strength of the resource owners coupled with their very efficient organizational development has permitted them to exercise considerable leverage on the provincial governments. Obviously the central government has not shifted from its energy enthusiasm and has not realigned its preference for non-coercive regulations, which it defends as a means to promote nation-wide economic development. The Canadian federalist system thus exacerbates the clientelist aspect of environmental policies (Holland 1996). The Sierra Club reports that after the release of the regulatory framework in April 2007, both environmentalists and industry requested consultation on some of the regulations, and a meeting was arranged. Whether the claim (for a price on carbon) that was put forward was valid or not, it was never really considered. The federal government did not shift or revise its framework (Sierra Club Canada 2008). This event seems to reflect a major problem of communication, another by-product of federalism and multi-stakeholder consultation devices. The Kyoto Protocol Implementation Act of 2007 is not really innovative and reiterates the old incentives for volun-

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tary initiative, the market-based approach and the cooperation doctrine. Once the Act comes into force, every year thereafter until 2013, the Environment Minister shall prepare and submit a Climate Change Plan “including measures respecting the regulated emission limits and performance standards; market-based mechanisms such as emissions trading or offsets; spending or fiscal measures or incentives; a just transition for workers affected by greenhouse gas emission reductions; and cooperative measures or agreements with provinces, territories or other governments” (Canadian Legal Information Institute 2009, 5). Without making a judgment about the efficiency of the bureaucrats’ work, it has become apparent that although a centralized regulation in climate change plays a key role, the federal government has no sense of urgency about the imminent deadline and the inherent danger of the issue. The year 2012 is looming, and Canada would soon be faced with the allegation of being an outlaw state if it had not already decided to work with the US on a long-term cooperation agreement, renegotiate targets, and extend the two states’ timeframes in Copenhagen in December 2009. It has already changed its baseline year to 2006 in Turning the Corner, setting the goal of reductions by 20% by 2020, thus expanding its “right to emit.” The great leadership that a few Canadian Prime Ministers wished to show in previous international agreements on climate change has dissipated. The fact that Canada has made very little effort in meeting its targets has had a significant impact on its reputation abroad, however: the rest of the world no longer sees Canada as the leader of environmental internationalism. Recently, an article in The Guardian reported that “prominent campaigners, politicians and scientist have called for Canada to be suspended from the Commonwealth over its climate change policy” (Carrington 2009). “More important, the failure to implement the measures set out in protocols reflects the political dilemma posed by the concept of sovereignty” (McKenzie 2002, 243). Sovereignty is understood as the “formal recognition of sources of international authority in joint decision-making” (McKenzie 2002, 242). Since one could argue that Canada has no significant internal authority on environmental issues, it is not liable to exercise its external authority, and thus its sovereignty in international joint decision-making. Neo-realists argue that until problems associated with the Canadian division of power are solved through institutional change, traditional treaty-making will not lead to collective environmental protection (McKenzie 2002). The media in Canada said that Ottawa would wait for its neighbor’s first move in the Conference of the Parties (COP-15) on climate change in Copenhagen. This statement highlighted another reality of climate change negotiations; GHG management is tied to international trade agreements. Or so is Ottawa happy to believe. “While trade, particularly free trade, implies a withdrawal from markets by government, environmental measures often call for increased state intervention” (McKenzie 2002, 249). Free trade is therefore widely thought to undermine environmental efforts. Because free trade is based on reciprocity and non-discrimination, it is hard for Canada not to consider the fact that the United States, its main trade partner, is not subject to the same legally binding targets. Canada thus fears that regulating production and consumption by putting a price on carbon will undermine its industries’ competitiveness on the market. Furthermore, the presence of foreign (in particular American) multinationals in local industries ties the two neighbors’ economies together; for example, the Alberta tar sands are the United States’ number one foreign oil resource. The integration of the Canadian and American economies weakens the internal integration of the Canadian economy, which in turn puts strain on the homogenization of environmental policy (Panish 1977); in addition, the regional specialization of the economy in Canada therefore results in lowest common denominator economic policies and reflectively, environmental policies—if the policy bar is raised higher, provinces will opt out. Finally, there have been instances where the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) has served as a tool in the hands of foreign investors to challenge government environmen-

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tal regulatory action. NAFTA’s environmental side-agreement is the North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation (NAAEC). The supremacy of NAAEC’s provisional regulatory system—least restrictive unless conventional empirical evidence of environmental danger has been found—is antagonistic to Kyoto’s imperative for action being based on a certain amount of precautionary evidence (Hornsby, Summerlee and Woodside 2007). Thus, free trade adds another layer of complexity for the implementation of environmental policy. In its 2008 Report Card, Sierra Club Canada advocated for provincial leadership in GHG regulations. The organization argued that while provinces like Manitoba, Québec, and British Columbia, as well as states like California, are promoting ambitious regulations, comprehensive programs for sustainable development, and setting high standards, Ottawa is lagging with its lowest common denominator national standard. Québec, for instance, has unilaterally initiated its own action plan with moves that target Québec’s jurisdictional domains–energy production, transportation, agriculture, and health (Québec at Copenhagen 2008). Furthermore, subnational units have developed paradiplomatic international agreements, parallel to that of nations, at the Federated States and Regions Summit on Climate Change, while Ottawa has stalled on coordinating centralized action (Sierra Club Canada 2008); as such, independent action is seen to be more realistic and successful. However, another environmental think tank, the Pembina Institute, takes a stance opposite to that of the Sierra Club; it prescribes a centralization of environmental policies. The organization argues that implementation of proposed policies should be the condition for transfers of carbon pricing revenue to the provinces. Although both of these arguments seem equally plausible, the first one is flawed due to one Canadian characteristic: its concentrated oil resource located in the Alberta tar sands, which prevents Alberta from creating strong environmental policy provincially. Alberta has extraordinary stakes in climate change policymaking and is the province that is the most likely to exert any influence on Ottawa: it is the one that has triggered the energy security doctrine. Since the conventional oil resources of the world will soon reach their peak, Alberta is currently sitting on a black gold mine that is expected to power up the Canadian economy for years to come. “Alberta’s efforts were focused not only on its citizens and elected members of Parliament but also a national audience” (Paehlke 2008, 283). And in “elected members of parliament” Paehlke is most likely referring to Stephen Harper, who is the champion of the “Canada as the global energy powerhouse” discourse. At present, the United States is the most privileged client on the oil market; Alberta’s tar sands project is not intended to redistribute energy to the rest of Canada, itself highly dependent on foreign oil (Nikiforuk 2009). However, since sustainable development has proven itself to be more economically viable than going along with the status quo, and since the predictable volatility of petrodollars will discourage consumers and businesses from relying on this resource in the near future, Canada will most likely be stuck with its oil and a major ecological crisis. Yet the federal government is currently aiming at nothing less than the rapid expansion of the oil industry and has prepared no plan for the future. Meanwhile, Alberta produces 30% of Canada’s GHG emissions although it only has half of that percentage in population. Its “dirty oil” is in fact an ecological nightmare, as tar sands oil is the fastest growing greenhouse gas emitter (three times that of conventional oil) and requires between an average of four units of water to produce one unit of oil (thus highly contributing to the depletion of water in Canada) (Clarke 2008). The facts therefore speak for themselves; the trade-off between oil revenue and environmental degradation is unacceptable. With a provincial player that has such strong leverage, Canada cannot afford to let the provinces run the climate change game by themselves:

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Negotiating separate provincial emission caps or negotiating a formula that determines provincial emission caps may place strains on national unity as each province has different perceived challenges posed by population growth, current levels of carbon intensity or reliance on renewable energy. Moreover, even if a national program of interlocked provincial emission trading programs can be initially negotiated, changes to the program necessary to meet national commitments may prove impossible to negotiate. (Rolfe 1998: 382) Most of the media, the concerned public, think-tanks, scientists, scholars, and some industry associations believe that environmental change is conditioned by a price on carbon. A federal carbon tax would offer a comprehensive framework where both production and consumption would be induced to behavioral change. It would fall within the area jurisdiction of the federal government, and it could reinvest its revenue in transfers to the provinces that offer sustainable development propositions according to equivalency agreements. This last point entails that the federal government would have a conditional, explicit and detailed criteria on how carbon control revenues ought to be spent. Furthermore, while Québec and British Columbia have already implemented provincial carbon taxes, the interlocking of federal and provincial taxing programs would add layer of complexity and permit a revenue neutral strategy, thus exacerbating the current horizontal imbalance. A federal carbon tax would also avoid the sort of free-rider problem that is symptomatic of both the poorest and most affluent provinces (Courchene 2008). The only problem that remains is the issue of competitiveness on the free market. Indeed, the federal Minister of Environment, Jim Prentice, has stated that he will stand for the integration of carbon price with the US: “It makes no sense to have a price on carbon, which is one of the fundamental drivers of our economy, and try to price it differently in Canada than the United States. It will not work” (CBC News: November 13, 2009). Unilateral carbon tax moves from the provinces might be better then cap and trade initiatives, yet a comprehensive federal carbon tax is an imperative when considering the depth of the structural problem. Conclusion This analysis has shown a correlation between the centralization of the institutional framework in climate change policy and effective action in this policy area. The findings reveal that, indeed, the federal government’s role is to enforce an environmental assessment, an explicit and detailed regulatory scheme and a compliance mechanism that will induce behavioral change in both production and consumption. It should also set-up a transfer system conditional on equivalency and a Canadian fund for sustainable development. Furthermore, its ideological role is to rally all the provinces to a national consensus that will facilitate the country’s negotiations abroad. The model also prescribes that the legal regime should be compelled to set a precedent by affirming the federal jurisdictional responsibility in the area. Although structural change is essential in fulfilling those predictions, centralization of power amplifies the outcomes of personality and party politics. Therefore the role of the electorate in holding governments to account according to their respective roles and responsibilities is also an imperative in climate change policymaking. Since Canada’s greenhouse emissions remain on a rapid growth trajectory—and this will not change until the tar sands development is curbed—the federal government is actively violating its own statute. There is an evident urgency for a change of course in Canadian leadership on climate change policymaking.

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Works Cited Canada. Environment Canada. “Turning the Corner: Regulatory Framework for Industrial Greenhouse Gas Emission.” 2008. http://www.ec.gc.ca/doc/virage-corner/2008-03/pdf/COM-541_Framework.pdf (accessed November 17, 2009). Canada. Environment Canada. Canadian Environmental Protection Act, 1999 (CEPA 1999). Current to March, 2006. http://www.ec.gc.ca/CEPARegistry/the_act/ (accessed November 17, 2009). “Canada-U.S. Carbon Strategy must match: Minister.” CBC News, Nov.13, 2009. http://www.cbc.ca/canada/ calgary/story/2009/11/13/edmonton-prentice-greenhouse-gas-carbon.html (accessed on November 29, 2009). Canadian Legal Information Institute. Kyoto Protocol Implementation Act, S.C. 2007, c. 30. Ottawa: CanLII, June 22, 2007. http://www.canlii.org/en/ca/laws/stat/sc-2007-c-30/latest/sc-2007-c-30.html (accessed November 23, 2009). Carrington, Damian. “Scientist target Canada over Climate Change.” The Guardian, November 26, 2009. http:// www.guardian.co.uk/environment/2009/nov/26/canada-criticised-over-climate-change (accessed November 29, 2009). Clarke, Tony. Tar Sands Showdown: Canada and the Politics of Oil in an Age of Climate Change. West Coast Environmental Law Research Foundation. Toronto: James Lorimier & Company, 2008. Courchene, Thomas J. Climate Change, Competitiveness and Environmental Federalism: The Case for Carbon Tax. Background Document for an address to Canada 2020 Speakers Series. 2008. http://www.canada2020. ca/files/Canada_2020_Courchene_Paper.pdf (accessed November 15, 2009). Farfard, Patrick. “Green Harmonization: The Success and Failure of Recent Environmental Intergovernmental Relations.” In Canada: the State of the Federation 1997: Non-Constitutional Renewal. ed. Harvey Lazar. Kingston. 203-227. Institute of Intergovernmental Relations, Queen’s University: 1997. Harrison, Kathryn. Passing the Buck: Federalism and Canadian Environmental Policy. Vancouver: UBC Press, 1996. Holland, Kenneth M. “FEDERALISM and the ENVIRONMENT: Environmental Policymaking in Australia, Canada, and the United States.” In Contributions in Political Science, no. 368. Eds. Kenneth M. Holland, F. L. Morton, and Brian Galligan. Westport: Greenwood Press, 1996. Hornsby, David J., Alastair J.S. Summerlee, and Kenneth B. Woodside. “NAFTA’s Shadow hangs over Kyoto Implementation.” Canadian Public Policy, 33.3, 285-298.Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2007. Kennett, Steven A. “Federal Environmental Jurisdiction after Oldman (Case Comment).” McGill Law Journal, 38 (1993); 180-203. http://heinonline.org/HOL/Page?handle=hein.journals/mcgil38&div=14&collection=jo urnals&g_sent=1 (accessed November 10, 2009). McKenzie, Judith I. Environmental Politics in Canada: Managing the Commons into the 21st Century. Toronto: Oxford University Press, 2002. National Round Table on the Environment and the Economy. 2009. “Response of the National Round Table on the Environment and the Economy to its Obligations under the Kyoto Protocol Implementation Act.” NRTEE http://ec.gc.ca/doc/trnee-nrtee/2009/eng/Table-of-Contents- KPIA-NRTEE-Response-2009-eng.html (accessed November 17, 2009).

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Nikiforuk, Andrew. “Are we giving ice up for oil?” WWF-Canada Speaking Tour on Oil and Ice. Montreal: Conference at McGill University, Friday November 20th, 2009, 7-8:30pm, Adams Auditorium. Paehlke, Robert. “Some like it Cold: the politics of climate change in Canada. Toronto: Between the Lines. ———. Global Politics Comes to Fort McMurray: Energy and Climate Change in Canada.” In Environmental Challenges and Opportunities: Local-Global Perspectives on Canadian Issues. Eds. Christopher D. Gore and Peter J. Stoett, 283-303. Toronto: Emond Montgomery Publications Limited, 2009.. Page, Bob. “Climate Change, Carbon Pricing and Environmental Federalism: Setting the Context.” Background Paper for a Presentation to the Conference Carbon Pricing And Environmental Federalism Kingston: Institute of Intergovernmental Relations, Queen’s University, 2008, 1-19. http://www.queensu.ca/iigr/conf/ EnviroConference2008/Materials/PagePaper.pdf (accessed November 18, 2009). Panitch, Leo. The Canadian State: Political Economy and Political Power. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1977. Québec. Ministry of Sustainable Development, Environment and Parks. “Québec and Climate Change: a challenge for the future. 2006-2012 Action Plan.” 2008. http://Québecatcopenhagen.gouv.qc.ca/en/pdf/climate_change_action_plan_20062012/climate_change_action_plan_20062012.pdf (accessed November 22, 2009). Rabe, Barry G. “Beyond Kyoto: Climate Change Policy in Multilevel Governance System Governance.” An International Journal of Policy, Administration, and Institutions, 20.3 (2007): 423-444. Rolfe, Chris. Turning down the heat: Emissions trading and canadian implementation of the Kyoto Protocol. Vancouver: West Coast Environmental Law Research Foundation, 1998. Scheberle, Denise. Federalism and Environmental Policy: Trust and the Politics of Implementation. 2nd ed. Washington: Georgetown University Press, 2004. Smith, Heather A. Canadian Federalism and Environmental Policymaking: the Case of Climate Change. Working Paper (5). Kingston: Queen’s University, 1998(5)1-19. http://www.queensu.ca/iigr/working/ Archive/1998/1998-5HeatherSmith.pdf (accessed November 24, 2009). Smith, Kristin. “International Treaties and Canadian Federalism: the Case of Climate Change Policy.” Federalism-E, 6 (2006): 283-303. Standing Committee on Environment And Sustainable Development. “Harmonization and Environmental Protection: An Analysis of the Harmonization Initiative of the Canadian Council of Ministers on the Environment.” Committee Report to the House of Commons, 1997. http://www2.parl.gc.ca/HousePublications/ Publication.aspx?DocId=1031507&Language=E&Mode= (accessed November 11, 2009) Victor, David G. The Collapse of the Kyoto Protocol and the Struggle to Slow Global Warming. Council on Foreign Relations. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004.

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The Aid to End Aid-Dependency: Cape Verde and the Millennium Challenge Account Molly Krishtalka Abstract The Millennium Challenge Account (MCA), a new aid program created by the Bush administration and run by the Millennium Challenge Corporation, an independent US government corporation, promises to change the way aid is distributed and used through new selectivity criteria, a reliance on receiving-country-initiated project proposals, and an emphasis on sustainable and efficient projects. The US$110 million MCA Compact with Cape Verde, implemented in October 2005, focuses its energies on three projects: watershed management and agriculture support; infrastructure; and private sector development. By the time the Compact expires in October 2010, it hopes to wean the Cape Verdean economy off foreign aid and instead to create an environment in which sustainable private sector led growth can occur. This paper will assess: (1) the extent of implementation of the Compact by examining the motives of both parties and the respective histories of Cape Verde and the Millennium Challenge Account in the context of Stokke’s conditional aid theory; and (2) the success of the Compact by examining economic, political and financial indicators for Cape Verde, finding that the Compact failed, in terms of both its three projects and of ending Cape Verde’s dependence on foreign aid. Development, as an academic discipline, is still so new that some do not consider it at discipline at all. As such, major questions in development revolve around what development should and should not be, as well as what it is and is not. International development began after the Marshall Plan, as Western nations gave grants, loans, and technical assistance to countries in the global South in the hopes of spurring economic development. Since their early beginnings beginnings, development practices have evolved to now include policy conditionality, cap and trade programs, and trade deals in the repertoire of tools. Now, development continues to evolve, as specialists like Dambisa Moyo question the positive effects of foreign aid at all. In her first book, Moyo argues that foreign aid, rather than helping to resolve the problems facing African countries, actually brings about many of these problems and is responsible for their resilience. She therefore believes that poverty reduction and economic development will occur not simply through aid but instead through improved access and use of capital and markets. The Millennium Challenge Corporation, an American foreign aid program that aims to reduce aid-dependency in developing countries by encouraging private sector-led growth, appears as the forerunner to Moyo’s line of thinking, as it was initiated nearly seven years before her book was published. Rather than imposing foreign aid and norms on developing countries, the MCC invites certain developing countries to submit project proposals to be funded by the MCC. Once approved, the developing country is fully in charge of the implementation of the projects, with the MCC serving only to disburse funds and monitor the project’s progress. In the case of Cape Verde, the approved projects were all ones that Moyo would likely have endorsed, as they focused on improving access to markets and capital, strengthening the economy, and promoting private sector-led growth.

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After an examination of the MCC Compact with Cape Verde, however, it becomes clear that the program, despite succeeding in partially implementing some of the approved projects, did exactly what Moyo argued foreign aid programs do: it left Cape Verde even more dependent on foreign aid, and with unfinished and unfunded projects. This examination does not cast doubt on Moyo’s theories, as the failures of the Compact are unrelated to the substantive content of the projects themselves. What it does cast doubt on, however, is the usefulness of the Millennium Challenge Corporation as a foreign aid program attempting to reduce aid-dependency. Using Stokke’s theory of the implementation of conditional aid arrangements as a foundation, it is clear that while the successes of the Compact are due to the Cape Verdean proposals, and the failures of the Compact are due to the Millennium Challenge Corporation, the true tragedy of the situation is that Cape Verde will ultimately be responsible for fixing the failures, and the United States will not. Stokke’s theory on aid conditionality discusses five factors that determine the extent of implementation of the conditional aid program. The first factor, the domestic position of the recipient government and its power base, addresses the ability of the government to retain the loyalty of its prime power base during the implementation process. The second factor, the recipient government’s ability to use this occasion of external intervention to strengthen its domestic position, deals with the reaction of the recipient government to the externally imposed policy conditions and aid monies. Not only is outside intervention usually not welcome, but conditional aid programs are even less welcome due to the sovereignty implications and the forced reforms. The third factor, the extent of the recipient country’s dependency on aid and the relative importance of the aid at stake in relation to the total aid received and the recipient country’s gross national product, involves the ability of the recipient and donor countries to both resist and exert power. The recipient country’s level of aid dependency affects its ability to exert control over the aid program, as does its size. Similarly, large donor countries generally have more success in exerting power over the recipient countries than small donor countries. The fourth factor, the magnitude and relative importance of the bilateral relations between the donor and recipient countries, looks at the role that large and complicated relations play in the maintenance of the conditional aid program. A long and intricate historical relationship between the two countries will make the donor country less willing to enforce the conditions, but it will also make the recipient more willing to respond positively to the conditions. The last factor looks at the role of unilateral actions as opposed to internationally coordinated actions in achieving policy reforms. Unilateral action has a greater chance of achieving the results the donor country wants; however, multilateral action has a greater chance of achieving policy reforms at all, due to the added pressure from multiple countries or aid agencies. (Stokke 2004.) Before applying this theory to the Millennium Challenge Corporation Compact with Cape Verde, it is necessary to briefly outline the relevant histories of both Cape Verde and the Millennium Challenge Corporation. Cape Verde is comprised of an archipelago of semi-arid islands in the Atlantic Ocean, off the coast of Senegal. Rainfall is low and fluctuating, and thus “water is an extremely scarce commodity” (Haagsma 2009, 40). Thus, Cape Verde relies on a mix of rain-fed crops, irrigated crops, and imported food, with food imports making of 70% of all food in the country (Robson 1994). Due to the harsh conditions on the archipelago, many Cape Verdeans immigrate to the West, sending remittances back to their families. In turn, these remittances help to fund Cape Verde’s massive food imports, along with considerable foreign aid. Other large components of Cape Verde’s economy include tourism and maritime trade—Cape Verde’s warm climate, clean beaches, and low crime rates endear it to European tourists (Lobban 1998). Its strategic location amidst the major Atlantic shipping lanes has made it a common refueling and repair spot for ships traveling to South America or Africa (Lobban 1998).

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When looking at Cape Verde’s history, two key players are especially apparent: the Cape Verdean government and foreign aid. After its independence from Portugal in 1975, the newly-established government of Cape Verde made economic development a priority, with sequential national development plans and large aid relationships with Western countries. The first national development plan sought to modernize Cape Verde’s transportation infrastructure, renovate its two largest ports, and stimulate the growth of industry (Foy 1988). The second plan, implemented in 1986, was “designed to consolidate the gains made during the first period and shift the emphasis more positively towards growth and away from the two-pronged dependence on aid and foreign remittances” (Foy 1988, 124). This plan was accompanied by considerable privatization measures and subsequent influxes of foreign direct investment, all serving to stimulate the necessary economic growth (Robson 1994). Surprisingly, throughout the Cold War, Cape Verde steadfastly refused to align itself with one of the major power blocs, choosing instead to maintain its independence and use its strategic position as “a precious bargaining chip” in its foreign policy (Foy 1988, 133). It dealt with a range of pariah states and all the major power blocs, resulting in Cuban, South African, Angolan, and Soviet aircraft often docking side by side at the Sal airport, with each paying a hefty landing fee to Cape Verde (Foy 1988). By using foreign policy to address the country’s economic needs, the government of Cape Verde increased the archipelago’s strategic value as a stop-over point and raised national revenues, all without creating a single foreign military base on the islands (Foy 1988). It made “friends” without creating enemies, using its strategic location and no-questions-asked attitude to “encourage suitors from all the Great Powers and their allies, none of whom [wanted to see Cape Verde] fall into unfriendly hands” (Foy 1988, 187). Essentially, the government “rendered it cheaper, both in financial and political terms, for foreign nations to support its development plans, rather than to attempt any form of conquest” (Foy 1988, 187). Soon after the end of the second national development plan, Cape Verde experienced a peaceful transition into a pluralist democracy, a surprising turn of events in a region “where one-party states, military rule, and civil war are not uncommon” (Lobban 1998, 8). Due to its peaceful plural democracy as well as its aforementioned geostrategic importance, Cape Verde became “a prime target for the international donor community,” at times receiving as much as 30% of its GDP from foreign aid (Rich 2009, 224; Foy 1988). While the initial aid was given for the aforementioned reasons, subsequent aid packages were approved due to the stunning success of the first aid packages. As Cape Verde is a small country (both in terms of GDP and population) with an honest government, “donor nations have often seen a conspicuous and tangible effect from their aid,” causing the public opinion on aid to Cape Verde to rise, and resulting in even more aid committed to the state (Lobban 1998, 132). Major donors include Japan, the OPEC Fund for International Development, the World Bank, China, the Arab Bank for Economic Development, Portugal, the Economic Community of West African States Bank of Investment and Development, the United Kingdom, the European Union, Luxembourg, and the United States of America, with donor funds responsible for a range of projects, including the construction of a fishing harbour, a water and sanitation project, the Parliament building, the international airport in Praia, multiple health centres and hospitals, and two secondary schools (The Economist Intelligence Unit, 1996-2009). The form and amount of aid varies, ranging from US$20 million in interest-free loans to US$530,000 grants given every year for fifteen years (The Economist Intelligence Unit, 1996-2009). Donor motives range from placation of the large numbers of Cape Verdean migrants living in the donor country, to access to completed infrastructure for the donor’s own benefit, to good faith support for a poor country with a good record of economic governance in its poverty-reduction strategies (The Economist Intelligence Unit, 1996-2009). To date, the largest aid program in Cape Verde is the Millennium Challenge Corporation Compact with Cape Verde, a bilateral aid arrangement between the United States of

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America and Cape Verde that, by 2010, will have granted over US$110 million to support agricultural, infrastructural, and financial projects in Cape Verde (Buss and Gardner 2007). To understand both the magnitude and the meaning of this program, it is necessary to place the program in the context of American foreign aid policy. The Marshall Plan, implemented immediately following the end of World War II, marked the beginning of American foreign aid. It was thought that promoting economic development would “create stability and reduce the attraction to Communist ideology” and also negate the need for Soviet aid, thus blocking “Soviet diplomatic links and military advances” (Tarnoff and Nowels 2006, 4). Aid was almost entirely driven by security imperatives, with secondary goals such as controlling population growth, and promoting health, education, and American trade interests appearing only once the security needs had been satisfied (Stokke 2004). Both the Soviet and the American power blocs directed aid at strategically important non-aligned governments; however, before the Vietnam War, the United States was “the most generous aid giver, not only in absolute terms, but in relative terms as well” (Stokke 2004, 5). During and after the Vietnam War, both public and congressional opinion turned against American foreign aid, resulting in a drop of American foreign aid as a percentage of American GDP from 2% to 0.25% (Tarnoff and Nowels 2006, 19). With the end of the Cold War and the fall of the Communist bloc, the security rationale for American foreign aid disappeared; aid to the global South required new justifications. With security concerns no longer as imperative, the United States could pursue other objectives, including the promotion of Western values and norms related to governance and human rights, sustainable development, and humanitarian relief (Stokke 2004). The Clinton administration drastically expanded the role of USAID, relying on it for nearly all of the foreign aid projects (Tarnoff and Nowels 2006). The combination of a lack of public support for foreign aid and Clinton’s deficit-reduction policies caused American foreign aid commitments to drop to their lowest levels ever, falling to 0.16% of GDP (Lancaster and Van Dusen 2005; Tarnoff and Nowels 2006). The Bush administration, then, created a drastic shift in American foreign aid policy, both in terms of the aid objectives and amounts. The 9/11 terrorist attacks and the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan led many American “policy circles to link foreign aid, foreign policy, and national security” (Picard and Groelsma 2007, 11). The 2002 National Security Strategy “elevated global development to join defence [sic] and diplomacy as one of the three pillars of the war on terror;” now “investing in development was a strategic necessity as well as a moral imperative” (Mawdsley 2009, 487-488). According to the Bush administration, development issues such as poverty and poor governance allowed terrorism, disease, illegal drug activity, and conflict to spring up, thus threatening American national security and constituting moral and strategic imperatives for American intervention (Mawdsley 2009). Bush’s foreign aid policy focused on five core goals: transformational development, strengthening fragile states, humanitarian relief, promoting American geostrategic interests, and solving global and international ills (Tarnoff and Nowels 2006). This doctrine was modified slightly by the 2006 National Security Strategy, which replaced development with “democracy/freedom,” and called for “a world of democratic, well-governed states that can meet the needs of their citizens and conduct themselves responsibly in the international system” (Lancaster and Van Dusen 2005, 49). In terms of aid amounts, American foreign aid increased during the Bush administration, averaging 0.2% of GDP (Tarnoff and Nowels 2006). It was in this era of the redefinition of American foreign aid policy that the Millennium Challenge Corporation was created. Though the concept had been mentioned as early as 1970, the program did not become a reality until 2002, when it was highlighted in the 2002 National Security Strategy and formally announced by Bush at the Monterrey Conference (Picard and Groelsma 2007). The aid program itself, the MCA, is run by an

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independent government corporation, the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC), and chaired by the Secretary of State (Lancaster and Van Dusen 2005). The governing board includes the Secretary of the Treasury, a USAID representative, a trade representative, and four private individuals representing stakeholders (Lancaster and Van Dusen 2005). With a proposed budget of US$5 billion per year, the program was intended to “deliver greater development assistance…to nations that govern justly, invest in their people, and encourage economic freedom” (Mawdsley 2009, 488). By giving aid to the best-performing developing countries—countries that had already met prescribed conditions—the Bush administration hoped to make American foreign aid more effective in encouraging good governance and economic growth and in reducing poverty. Bush envisioned the program as providing funds to governments that were “already fulfilling a number of the conditions regarded as essential for aid effectiveness (that is, supporting free markets, good governance, and low levels of corruption),” so that they could implement their planned development programs (Lancaster and Van Dusen 2005, 43). In order to receive funds from the MCC, countries must pass a competitive qualification and selection process. To qualify, a country must score above the median in half the indicators in each qualification category— promoting economic freedom, ruling justly, and investing in people—in addition to scoring above the median on the corruption indicator, having national income fall beneath a set level, and being eligible for World Bank funding (Mawdsley 2009). The medians for each indicator are obtained using outside data from e.g., the World Bank, Freedom House, the World Health Organization, and national governments (Mawdsley 2009). Qualifying countries must present a specific proposal to the MCC, detailing the projects to be accomplished, measurable objectives, clear timetables, and division of funds. The countries must have “[consulted] broadly with non-governmental organizations, private businesses, and other representatives of civil society,” and the proposal must have a high likelihood of success (Carbone 2009, 537). Once approved, the Compacts last for three to five years; the recipient countries are responsible for the majority of the work, with the MCC only monitoring the implementation of the Compact, the progress towards the targets, and fiscal accountability (Mawdsley 2009). The MCC Compact with Cape Verde, signed and implemented in 2005, was one of the first approved Compacts. On the Cape Verdean side, the Compact was motivated by the government’s desire to acquire more funds to continue its national development plans. The political leadership realized that Cape Verde’s stable political system, relatively high human development, and low levels of corruption gave it a competitive edge. On the American side, Cape Verde’s geostrategic importance, its determined non-alignment, and the presence of more than 300,000 Cape Verdean immigrants in the United States gave the American government good reasons to support the country’s development (Foy 1988). Additionally, Cape Verde’s small size and positive history with foreign aid promised that the project would be successful, thus improving American public opinion of foreign aid and allowing the American government to grant more aid. Amounting to US$110,078,488 over a five-year period, the Compact’s three projects were watershed management and agricultural support, transportation infrastructure development, and private sector development (Buss and Gardner 2007). The Compact allocated US$10.8 million for the watershed management and agricultural support project, which aimed to increase agricultural productivity and improve water management by constructing reservoirs, improving watersheds, shifting from rain-fed agriculture to irrigated agriculture, and promoting pest control and agricultural credit programs (United States of America, Congressional Notification 2005). Long term, the project hoped to more than double farmers’ household incomes, directly aiding roughly 900 people and creating US$10 million in benefits (MCC: Cape Verde 2006). The infrastructural development project was allocated US$78.8 million to rehabilitate five major roads, build four bridges, and upgrade the Praia port (Cape Verde Economic Rate

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of Return Spreadsheets). Long term, the project aimed to directly aid 384,465 people and create US$138 million in benefits (MCC: Cape Verde 2006). The private sector development project was allocated US$7.2 million to improve the investment climate and reform the financial sector (Cape Verde Economic Rate of Return Spreadsheets); the expected results of expanded access to the primary market for government securities, encouraging the growth of microfinance institutions, and increasing the liquid liabilities offered by Cape Verdean banks to private enterprises (United States of America, Congressional Notification). The long-term goal of the project was to directly aid 900 people and create US$2 million in benefits (Cape Verde Economic Rate of Return Spreadsheets). The Compact also allocated US$13.3 million for the program management, oversight, monitoring, and evaluation, including the implementation of a transparent e-procurement system (United States of America, 2005). Before assessing the success of the Compact based on MCC and external data, it is important to first determine the degree of implementation of the Compact using Stokke’s five factors as guidelines for assessment. As previously stated, Stokke argues that the domestic position of the recipient government, the role of external intervention vis-à-vis the domestic situation, the extent of the recipient country’s dependence on aid, the magnitude and importance of the relations between the donor and recipient countries, and the use of unilateral as opposed to multilateral action determine if the conditional aid program will be implemented, and if so, the extent to which it will be implemented (2004). In terms of the first factor, Cape Verde has a strong and stable democratic government. Not only does Cape Verdean civil society support the country’s democracy, but it has also been intimately involved in the MCC proposal and subsequent MCA-CV Compact. This broad-based civil societal support further strengthens the domestic position of the Cape Verdean government, thus reducing barriers to Cape Verdean implementation of the Compact. Looking now at the second factor, the role of foreign aid as an external intervention and the way in which the government deals with this intervention, Cape Verde is able to portray the MCA-CV Compact positively. Due to the Cape Verdean “ownership” inherent in the Compact proposal and approval process, as well as the Cape Verdean government’s large role in the actual in-country implementation of the Compact, the aid is seen not as an external intervention, but rather as an external response to a domestic request. As a result, rather than implying superiority or infringing on Cape Verdean sovereignty, the Compact reinforces the agency of the Cape Verdean government in promoting the economic development of Cape Verde. In terms of the third factor, the recipient country’s aid dependency and the importance of the aid at stake, Cape Verde is extremely aid-dependent and the MCA-CV Compact represents Cape Verde’s largest single aid commitment to date. Despite this, based on Cape Verde’s history of recurring, successful foreign aid outcomes, as well as other ongoing aid-funded projects, the MCA-CV Compact aid is likely replaceable. Thus, while Cape Verde’s extreme dependence on aid and the magnitude of the MCA-CV Compact aid would indicate that Cape Verde is essentially powerless to negotiate the terms and implementation of the Compact, the relative ease with which Cape Verde regularly obtains foreign aid indicates that Cape Verde has significant control over the terms and implementation of the Compact. The fourth factor is considerably less murky than the third. The United States and Cape Verde have a strong long-term relationship, in terms of aid, and the large Cape Verdean diaspora community residing in the United States strengthens it. On the Cape Verdean side, the presence of the diaspora community and the importance of migrant remittances give Cape Verde incentives to fully implement its side of the Compact, so as to not induce the withholding of remittances (Foy 1988). On the American side, Cape Verde’s geostrategic importance

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offers strategic value to continued relations. The diaspora community plays an equally important role, acting as a vocal and voting ethnic group with strong interests in the economic development of Cape Verde. For these reasons, the United States is less likely to take action on conditions not met, mismanagement of funds, or improper implementation. Lastly, as the MCA-CV is a bilateral aid relationship, with the United States as the sole donor, the implemented program will most likely have the results desired by the United States. Additionally, the program will not face issues of donors reducing support or pulling out, as there is but one sole donor. However, as the United States is the sole donor, the program has a lower chance of being implemented at all, compared to if it had been done multilaterally. Thus, the program is less likely to be implemented fully, but should it be implemented, it will likely have the results desired by the United States. In sum, Stokke’s theory is inconclusive. Whereas the first two factors support a full implementation of the Compact, the third factor is inconclusive, the fourth factor indicates that the Compact will be fully implemented but that there will be no ramifications for failure to meet the conditions or improper implementation, and the fifth factor indicates that should the Compact be implemented, it will likely be implemented fully as per the original conditions and terms set out by the United States. Thus, according to Stokke’s theory, a full implementation of the Compact is likely, but the terms and conditions under which the Compact will be implemented are unclear and subject to change. By the end of the first year of aid delivery, US$7.5 million had been disbursed via the Compact. The transparent e-procurement system was fully operational, the construction and supervision contracts for the five roads were signed, and the consultants for the Praia port expansion were selected. Additionally, the contracts for the four bridges were signed, and the procurement for the bridge projects was complete. In terms of the other two projects, the Cape Verdean central bank proposed a law facilitating the development of microfinance institutions, and the state received a considerable amount of technical assistance from the U.S. Department of Agriculture and the U.S. Geological Survey in support of the watershed management and agricultural support project (United States of America, 2006). However, at this point, one year into the Compact, Cape Verde no longer met the initial MCC qualification criteria, falling below the medians in the Economic Freedom category (Graph 1). It had also dropped slightly in the Investing in People category, though still above the median in more than 50% of those indicators (Graph 1). The MCC provides in such cases that consultations will be held with the recipient country to help it regain its original qualifying position; however, I could not find any evidence that these consultations were held with Cape Verde (MCC: Cape Verde). In terms of percentile rankings, although Cape Verde has not fallen below the medians in indicators such as Political Stability, Voice and Accountability, and Government Effectiveness, it has recently dropped in all three indicators to below its 2004 levels (Graph 2). GDP and merchandise imports have increased with steady upward trends (Graph 3). While merchandise exports did not experience a similar rise, net inflows of foreign direct investment more than tripled, likely due both to the consultants and contracts for the Compact as well as the Compact itself, as its existence in Cape Verde makes Cape Verde more attractive to potential investors (Graph 3). Oddly, aid per capita fell nearly US$60 (Table 1). Given that the total population of Cape Verde was increasing at a similar rate as in previous years, this indicates a reduction in total aid flows to Cape Verde (Table 1). This may be attributable to the pre-set end of aid agreements in 2005, but might also indicate that the introduction of the MCA-CV compact caused other donors to withdraw their aid, thus making Cape Verde even more dependent on the MCC funds.

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At the end of 2007, progress was delayed on the infrastructural and private sector development projects. Due to social and environmental questions concerning the road rehabilitation on the island of Santiago, only one road had been started. The questions arose due to faults in the preliminary project designs that were drafted and approved under a World Bank project. The port consultant did not begin work until February of 2007, thus delaying procurements until the second quarter of 2008 and rescheduling the finalization of contracts and the start of work to the end of 2008. In terms of the private sector development project, the Cape Verdean Parliament approved a new microfinance law and the partnership to mobilize investments was finally implemented, submitting action plans at the end of the year. The delays in this project were due to the consultative process with stakeholders that is inherent to the MCC Compacts. The watershed management and agricultural support project was more successful, accomplishing the signing of contracts for the water capture infrastructure and setting up an inspection and certification system to ensure quality. However, the project was also forced to alter its plans after the MCC decided not to fund wells for environmental reasons. The e-procurement system was deemed effective after a year of use, and Parliament passed a new procurement law effective January 2008. (Annual Supplement to the Quarterly Progress Report 2007.) At the end of 2007, the MCC assessed the progress made during the first two years of the Compact. It determined that implementation was delayed due to the slow establishment of a management unit, the late finalization of the project designs, and the high mobility of the MCC staff working in Cape Verde. Additionally, the partnership between the MCC and the in-country Millennium Challenge Account-Cape Verde (MCA-CV) was not always efficient, the decision-making process was murky, procurement took longer than expected, and the project activities were not sufficiently adapted to the country reality. In order to address these problems, the MCC switched its focus for 2008 onwards to the physical implementation of Compacts, as opposed to procedures and compliance (Annual Supplement to the Quarterly Progress Report 2007). Cape Verde continued its fall beneath the medians for the MCC indicators during 2007, losing more indicators from the Investing in People category (Graph 1). Despite this, there is no information demonstrating that talks were held to help Cape Verde increase its scores on these indicators. In terms of its percentile rankings, Cape Verde recovered from the sharp falls in Political Stability, Voice and Accountability, and Government Effectiveness, now surpassing its 2004 percentile ranks for these and other indicators (Graph 2). GDP and merchandise imports continued to increase; however, merchandise exports and foreign direct investment remained close to their 2006 levels (Graph 3). In terms of aid flows, aid per capita increased roughly US$35, corresponding to the overall increase in official development assistance evident (Table 1, Graph 4). Additionally, the rate of population growth fell to 1%, also affecting the increase in aid per capita (Table 1). At the end of 2008, the watershed management and agricultural support was the only project of the three to have made considerable positive progress: 21 corrections dikes, 32 small dikes, and 8 reservoirs had been built, resulting in 350m3/day of water available for spring water mobilization systems and more erosion control. The infrastructural development project was less successful, determining that it was not feasible to finish all five roads with Compact funding, and that the roads that would be finished could not be completed within the Compact timeline. As a result, two roads were cut from the project, and work began on the first two roads in February 2008. Work on the bridges on the island of Santo Antao started late in April 2008 due to delays with the final designs; the bridges on the island of Paul were rescheduled to start in December 2008 for the same reason. Due to the depreciation of the American dollar against the euro and the Cape Verdean escudo, the port project exceeded its budget, now requiring US$125 million as opposed to the US$42 million budgeted for the project. The project commenced

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in September 2008 despite these budgetary issues. In terms of the private sector development project, the MCC approved two of the three plans—tourism development and private credit development—and the MCA-CV steering committee recommended focusing solely on the credit plan, significantly reducing the scope of the private sector development project. As a result, the other two plans were dropped, and their budgets were reallocated to the port project. The financial sector reform project was suffering due to poor contractor performance, and the microfinance institutions support plan entered its second phase. However, the complementary transparency initiative was going well, reporting that one could now register a firm in less than 24 hours in the capital city, Praia. (Brito 2008.) In 2008, Cape Verde reached its lowest point yet on the MCC indicators, falling below the median on more than half the indicators in the Economic Freedom and Investing in People categories (Graph 1). Although Control of Corruption and Ruling Justly remained in good condition, the percentile ranking indicates that Cape Verde was entering a decline on the Political Stability, Government Effectiveness, and Rule of Law indicators, factors that ought to influence the Ruling Justly category (Graph 1, Graph 2). Again, there was no information available that indicated that the MCC was taking steps towards correcting this failure of Cape Verde to meet the prescribed conditions. Due to the time needed to gather and sort data, data is not available for GDP, foreign direct investment, merchandise exports, merchandise imports, official development assistance, and total external debt stocks for the year 2008 onwards. However, based on the trends up to the end of 2007, it is likely that GDP, merchandise imports, official development assistance, and foreign direct investment rose and that merchandise exports remained somewhat constant (Graph 3, Graph 4). Figures are also not available for aid per capita from 2008 onwards, for the same logistical reason. It is difficult to predict how aid per capita will have changed in 2008 onwards, as there are no clear trends up until the end of the available data (Table 1). The most recent MCA-CV status report was published in September 2009, thirteen months before the intended end of the Compact. According to this status report, US$51,619,691, or just more than half of the total funds committed, had been disbursed to date. The water-capturing infrastructures on the island of Santo Antao were completed, and the water distribution system was scheduled to be completed before the next rainy season. Additionally, the project had organized training programs on community water management to continue the project’s effectiveness past the Contract’s end date. A road on the island of Santiago was completed in June 2009, and 15.6 km were completed on the second road. Additionally, 70% of the bridgework on the island on Santo Antao was completed. Despite the continual shortage of funds, work on the Praia port was progressing steadily. The financial sector reform project was not doing quite as badly as in 2008, and the microfinance support program continued on schedule. Additionally, the e-procurement system continued to work successfully, and the Cape Verdean government finalized a strategy to extend the program beyond the Compact with other foreign aid. (Cape Verde Compact Progress 2009.) The status report also looked at the time each project took for preparation and construction/activity. The watershed management and agricultural support project used years one and two for preparation and years three, four, and five for construction or other activities. The roads and bridges section of the infrastructural development project needed only one year of preparation, devoting the other four to construction. In contrast, the port project required three years for preparation, leaving only two years for construction. The investment climate project used years one through three for preparation, leaving two years to implement its plan. The financial reform project required two years for preparation, devoting the remaining three to tangible activity. The transparency initiative used the first two years for preparation and the second two for implementation, realizing its goals before the end

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of the Compact. (Cape Verde Compact Progress 2009) 2009 marked a slight improvement in Cape Verde’s placement above the medians on the MCC indicators (Graph 1). Although Cape Verde still remained beneath the median on more than half the Economic Freedom indicators and the Investing in People indicators, it rose slightly to be above the median on 40% of the Investing in People indicators (Graph 1). The percentile rankings are not available from 2009 onwards; however, based on the overall trend, it seems likely that Political Stability, Rule of Law, and Government Effectiveness will continue to fall and Control of Corruption and Voice and Accountability will continue to rise (Graph 2). Just as in 2008, no data is available for 2009 for GDP, imports, exports, foreign direct investment, official development assistance, total external debt, aid per capita, or population growth (Graph 3, Graph 4, Table 1). On the whole, the Compact has thus far been implemented as Stokke’s theory predicted it would be. At its current rate of progress, the Compact should be fully implemented by October 2010, but not in the original form envisioned by the Compact. Program cuts, budgetary issues, unpredicted delays, and an MCC focus on procedures have all led to radical changes in the current Compact, and will likely lead to more changes before the end of 2010. While the constant process of consultation and communication between the MCC, the MCA-CV, and the Cape Verdean civil society and government has allowed the Compact to quickly adapt to changing circumstances, the failures of this process have caused roads to be cancelled, investment development plans to be scrapped, and the port project to massively exceed its budget. As Stokke’s theory predicted, the United States did not take action when Cape Verde lost its MCC eligibility by falling beneath the medians on the indicators, and the intimate involvement of the United States in the Compact process has ensured that the implemented projects are, and will be, exactly what the United States wants to be implemented. However, the Compact on the whole has not been, and will not be, implemented as fully as it would have been had it been done multilaterally: only a little more than half of the committed funds have been disbursed with a year to go before the Compact expiration. Cape Verde’s current and future benefits from the Compact are few and far between. Not one of the three projects has been, or will be, implemented fully as envisioned in Cape Verde’s approved Compact, and in all cases substantial changes were made to the Compact unilaterally by the MCC, thus removing Cape Verde’s agency to control its own development. Moreover, the project delays and budgetary issues, while not entirely the fault of the MCC, put added pressure on Cape Verde, which must now revise its plan to take over the Compact to include additional funds that must be acquired elsewhere, which must fund additional work that will not be finished with the expiration of the Compact. Unlike the MCC, which is no longer responsible for the Compact after its expiration, Cape Verde must deal with and finish the Compact, regardless of the state the Compact is left in by the MCC. Far from freeing Cape Verde from dependence on aid, the unfinished Compact will increase Cape Verde’s aid dependency, as it will be forced to find another donor country to fund the remainder of the projects, in the process accepting any unilateral changes the donor wants to make to the projects. Aside from a sudden jump in foreign direct investment, the trends in the available data suggest that the Compact has not yet had a significant effect on Cape Verde’s economy. This does not mean that the Compact will not impart economic benefits upon Cape Verde, as many of the benefits are intended to occur in the long term. This just means that the full impact of the Compact cannot be determined at this date. Although it is impossible to deem the Compact a success for Cape Verde, it is clearly a success for the United States. Not only has the United States curried favor with the Cape Verdean diaspora in the United States, but it will also see American public opinion of foreign aid rise, as the MCA-CV projects will have some successes to show for their efforts. In turn, this will allow the United States to increase funding to the MCC, thus allowing

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for more Compacts and creating more American spheres of influence around the world. Additionally, the United States, through its unilateral aid program, has been able to exert considerable influence over the economic and financial development of a geostrategically important country. When Cape Verde submitted a proposal to the MCC and subsequently signed the MCA-CV Compact, it did so in accordance with its historical policy of using any and all means to advance its economic development. The Compact was a way to fund projects that the Cape Verdean government deemed important, but did not have the financial capabilities to implement. While the Compact is, to some extent, funding some projects that the Cape Verdean government deemed important, this is due to the MCC also considering these projects important. Rather than imparting agency and self-sufficiency unto Cape Verde, the Compact—once in its implementation phase— gave all agency to the MCC, leaving Cape Verde to pick up the delayed and unfinished projects once the Compact expires. While both Cape Verde and the United States have and will continue to reap benefits from the Compact, that the aid arrangement benefits the donor country more than the recipient calls into question the rationale behind the aid arrangement itself. An aid arrangement which benefits the donor more so than the recipient, which leaves behind unfulfilled financial and work obligations on one side and unmet policy conditions on the other, and which burdens the recipient country with an unexpected budget deficit and lack of complete projects is hardly an aid arrangement worth implementing.

Graphs and Tables Graph 1: Percentage of MCC indicators of which Cape Verde surpassed the median

*No data available before 2004 or for 2005 Source: MCC: Cape Verde

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Graph 2: Cape Verde’s percentile ranking on the Worldwide Governance Indicators

*No data available before 1996, for 1997, or 1999 Source: Worldwide Governance Indicators Graph 3: Cape Verde’s GDP, foreign direct investment, merchandise imports, and merchandise exports

Sources: World Development Indicators Online, Economist Intelligence Unit, UN Data Graph 4: Cape Verde’s GDP, official development assistance, and total external debt stocks

Sources: UN Data, World Development Indicators Online

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Table 1: Comparison of Aid Flows per Capita with Total Population for Cape Verde

*Aid per capita in current US$ Source: World Development Indicators Online

Works Cited “Annual Supplement to the Quarterly Progress Report 2007.” Rep. Praia: Millennium Challenge Account--Cape Verde, 2007. Millennium Challenge Account-Home. Millennium Challenge Account--Cape Verde, 31 Oct. 2007. http://www.mca.cv/ Apodaca, Clair, and Michael Stohl. “United States Human Rights Policy and Foreign Assistance.” International Studies Quarterly 43.1 (1999): 185-98. Brito, Laurent. “2008 Annual Supplemental Report.” Rep. Praia: Millennium Challenge Account--Cape Verde, 2008. http://www.mca.cv/ Buss, Terry F., and Adam Gardner. “The Millennium Challenge Account: An Early Appraisal.” In Foreign Aid and Foreign Policy: Lessons for the Next Half-Century. Ed. Louis A. Picard, Terry F. Buss, and Robert Groelsma. M E Sharpe Inc: 2007, 329-55. “Cape Verde and Millennium Challenge Corporation: Building a Dynamic Partnership for Poverty Reduction through Economic Growth.” Washington, D.C.: Millennium Challenge Corporation, 2005. http://www. mcc.gov/bm.tags/cape-verde/ “Cape Verde Compact Progress.” Compact Implementation Status Report. Washington, D.C.: Millennium Challenge Corporation, 2009. http://www.mcc.gov/bm.tags/cape-verde/ “Cape Verde Financial Sector Reform.” Economic Rate of Return Spreadsheets. The Millennium Challenge Corporation. http://www.mcc.gov/mcc/panda/activities/err/err-countries/err-capeverde.shtml “Cape Verde Port of Praia Project.” Economic Rate of Return Spreadsheets. The Millennium Challenge Corporation. http://www.mcc.gov/mcc/panda/activities/err/err-countries/err-capeverde.shtml “Cape Verde: Roads and Bridges.” Economic Rate of Return Spreadsheets. The Millennium Challenge Corporation. Web. http://www.mcc.gov/mcc/panda/activities/err/err-countries/err-capeverde.shtml “Cape Verde Watershed and Agricultural Support Project.” Economic Rate of Return Spreadsheets. The Millennium Challenge Corporation. http://www.mcc.gov/mcc/panda/activities/err/err-countries/err-capeverde. shtml Carbone, Maurizio. “The Millennium Challenge Account: A Marginal Revolution in US Foreign Aid Policy?” Review of African Political Economy 31.101 (2004): 536-42. “Congressional Notification.” Washington, D.C.: Millennium Challenge Corporation, 2005. http://www.mcc.gov/

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mcc/countries/capeverde/cv-documents/index.shtml Country Report: Cape Verde. Rep. The Economist Intelligence Unit,. 2003. http://www.eiu.com/index.asp?rf=0 ___________________________. 2004. http://www.eiu.com/index.asp?rf=0 ___________________________. 2005. http://www.eiu.com/index.asp?rf=0 ___________________________. 2006. http://www.eiu.com/index.asp?rf=0 ___________________________. 2007. http://www.eiu.com/index.asp?rf=0 ___________________________. 2008. http://www.eiu.com/index.asp?rf=0 ___________________________. 2009. http://www.eiu.com/index.asp?rf=0 Country Report: Congo (Brazzaville), Sao Tome and Principe, Guinea Bissau, Cape Verde. Rep. The Economist Intelligence Unit, 1996. http://www.eiu.com/index.asp?rf=0 ___________________________. 1997. http://www.eiu.com/index.asp?rf=0 ___________________________. 1998. http://www.eiu.com/index.asp?rf=0 ___________________________. 1999. http://www.eiu.com/index.asp?rf=0 ___________________________. 2000. http://www.eiu.com/index.asp?rf=0 ___________________________. 2001. <http://www.eiu.com/index.asp?rf=0 ___________________________. 2002. http://www.eiu.com/index.asp?rf=0 Foy, Colm. Cape Verde: politics, economics, and society. London; New York: Pinter Publishers, 1988. Haagsma, Ben. “Traditional Water Management and State Intervention: The Case of Santo Antao, Cape Verde.” Mountain Research and Development, 15.1 (1995): 39-56. Lancaster, Carol, and Ann Van Dusen. Organizing U.S. Foreign Aid: Confronting the Challenges of the Twentyfirst Century. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 2005. Lobban, Richard A. Cape Verde Crioulo Colony to Independent Nation (Nations of the Modern World). New York: Westview, 1998. Mawdsley, Emma. “The millennium challenge account: Neo-liberalism, poverty and security.” Review of International Political Economy 14.3 (2007): 487-509. “MCA-Cape Verde First Year Accomplishments.” Washington, D.C.: Millennium Challenge Corporation, 2006. MCC: Cape Verde Documents. The Millennium Challenge Corporation. http://www.mcc.gov/bm.tags/ cape-verde/ “MCC: Cape Verde.” The Millennium Challenge Corporation. http://www.mcc.gov/mcc/countries/capeverde/index.shtml Moyo, Dambisa. Dead Aid: Why Aid is Not Working and How There is a Better Way for Africa. FSG Adult, 2009. Picard, Louis A., and Robert Groelsma. “U.S. Foreign Aid Priorities: Goals for the Twenty-First Century.” In Foreign Aid and Foreign Policy: Lessons for the Next Half-Century. Ed. Robert Groelsma and Terry F. Buss, 3-26. London: M E Sharpe Inc, 2007. Rich, Timothy S. “Island Microstates and Political Contention: An Exploratory Analysis of Cape Verde and Comoros.” African and Asian Studies 7 (2008): 217-33. Robson, Paul. “Community Development in Cape Verde.” Review of African Political Economy 21.59 (1994): 96-104. Stokke, Olav. “Aid and Political Conditionality: Core Issues and State of the Art.” In Aid and Political Conditionality. Ed. Olav Stokke, 1-87. London: Frank Cass Publications, 2004.

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Tarnoff, Curt, and Larry Nowels. “Foreign Aid: An Introductory Overview of US Programs and Policy.” In Foreign Aid: Control, Corrupt, Contain? Ed. Andrew Bealinger, 1-40. Nova Science, 2006. “UN Data.” United Nations Statistics Divison. http://data.un.org/ “World Development Indicators Online.” The World Bank Group. http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/DATASTATISTICS/0,,contentMDK:20398986~menuPK:64133163~pagePK:64133150~piPK:641 33175~theSitePK:239419,00.html “Worldwide Governance Indicators.” The World Bank Group. http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index. asp

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About the Contributors Quinn Albaugh is a U3 Honours Political Science student. Her research interests include electoral behaviour, public opinion, and queer politics. Timothy Apedaile is in his third year at McGill, pursuing an Honours degree in Political Science (focusing on political theory) and a minor in Philosophy. He is particularly interested in issues of sovereignty, especially as it applies to Canada’s North. Julie Beauchamp is a U3 Political Science major specializing in American politics, specifically domestic politics within the presidency, Congress, and the Supreme Court. She will be starting a master’s degree in Political Science in the fall. Éléna Choquette is a U2 student pursuing a Joint Honours in Philosophy and Political Science. She is interested in political theory, particularly when it relates to ethical questions. Shayna Goldman is a U2 student with a major in Political Science and minor in Anthropology. Her focus is in Canadian politics, and she has a special interest in Canadian constitutional issues. Emma Hautecoeur is pursuing an Honours degree in Political Science and Philosophy. . Her frequent travels in Ireland and France have stimulated specific research interests in the fields of European intergovernmental policies, EU relations with Russia, Europeanization and nationalism. Molly Krishtalka is currently completing her Bachelor of Arts in Honours International Development Studies with a minor in Hispanic Languages. Her academic interests include Arctic sovereignty, environmental security, and ethnic politics and conflict. After graduation, she plans to pursue a degree in law. Alexandra Swann is a recent graduate in political science and environmental studies, who hopes to continue in political science graduate work. Her research interests include virtue ethics, the history of political philosophy, and the domestic determinants of environmental regime compliance. Sean Stefanik is in his third year at McGill, pursuing a joint Honours degree in Political Science and History. He will be working with an HIV/AIDS-related NGO in Kenya this summer, investigating the relationship between civil society organizations and the state in formulating public health policy. Kartiga Thavaraj is a U1 student at McGill University, currently pursuing a Major in Political Science, with a double Minor in International Development Studies and French. He is interested in foreign policy, international relations, and Canadian and South Asian politics. Stacey Waterman is a U3 student pursuing a major in International Development Studies with minors in Political Science and Economics. She is particularly interested in economic development and social work, with a regional focus on the Middle East.

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About the Editors Olga Redko is in her third year, pursuing an Honours bachelorâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s degree in Political Science with a double minor in English Literature and French. Her research interests include political participation, voter behaviour, and the effects of media on politics. Seyoung Choe is in her first year at McGill, majoring in Political Science and minoring in History and East Asian Cultural Studies. She is interested in Canadian government and political theory, and hopes to pursue a career in diplomacy or medical law. Glenn Gibson is in her third year of a Political Science major and a double minor in Economics and International Development Studies. Being particularly interested in African comparative politics and foreign policy, she is currently doing research about the impact of oil on Nigerian policy and governance. Nicole McLaren is a fourth year Political Science major from Rochester, NY. Her research interests include comparative government in developing countries, particularly work pertaining to social capital and civil society in Latin America. Daniel St. Germaine is a fourth year Political Science and Drama & Theatre student. His academic and research interests include political participation, democracy and institutions, as well as Canadian theatre and performance art. Daniel is a previous editor of the McGill Journal of Political Studies. Ă&#x2030;dith Drouin Rousseau is a first year Political Science student with minors in Philosophy and Communications. She hopes to pursue a career in journalism.

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McGill Journal of Political Studies 2010