Page 1

ISSN 2294-1274


Volume 2 - Issue 4, April 2012

ON THE WAY TO ‘GLOBAL ZERO’? Is the global nuclear non-proliferation regime successful? “I state clearly and with conviction America’s commitment to seek the peace and security of a world without nuclear weapons.” With these words of his April 2009 Prague speech, US President Obama turned the goal of a nuclear ‘global zero’ into an official worldwide endeavor. Yet while the leadership change in North Korea brought small signs of détente, the Iranian nuclear program fully continues to the annoyance of the international





proliferation regime seems to have lost much of its momentum of three years ago.

The Iranian nuclear program is currently the most worrying issue to the global nuclear nonproliferation regime (Photo: AFP).

It is at this point that NATO, despite being occupied by other operations and projects, should lead the way by responsibly handling the issue of its own nuclear arsenal. The Alliance should therefore use the opportunity of its upcoming Chicago Summit and the adoption of the Deterrence and Defense Posture Review to further clarify its strategy towards “creating the conditions for a world without nuclear weapons,” as declared in the 2010 Strategic Concept. Although

Contents: Global Pulse: Beyond the ‘Blue Line’ Laura Hobeiche looks at the ongoing, yet often forgotten Lebanese-Israeli conflict from a peace research angle. She dedicates her article to the ‘Blue Line’, demarcated by the UN, and the resulting dispute about the Shebaa Farms, which includes Syria as a highly important stakeholder in the conflict.

NATO cannot decide to change its nuclear pos-

The EU regime for export control of dual-use items. Trade interests and rising security concerns within the nuclear non-proliferation agenda

ture over night, a clear and open debate at the

Ekaterina Chirkova presents an in-depth analysis of the EU’s efforts in terms of export control

North Atlantic Council would bring new drive to

of dual-use items as part of its nuclear non-proliferation policy. She pleads for new ways for the

an issue that will then mainly have to be tackled

EU to find answers to the current imbalance of trade interests and security concerns. One of

by the US and Russia.— Florian Bauernfeind

them could be a stronger cooperation with NATO.

Atlantic Voices, Volume 2, Issue 4


GLOBAL PULSE The transatlantic partnership was forged in war two generations ago and maintained for decades under the looming threat of renewed conflict. With the Alliance now at a crossroads, its future depends on the active engagement of its members’ young citizens. Committed to this endeavor, YATA is proud to partner with Atlantic Voices and help bring the opinions, analysis, and commentary of young Atlanticists to the forefront of international debate. By presenting security, economic, and diplomatic issues through the eyes of future policy and decision makers, Global Pulse aims to build a bridge between the challenges of today and the solutions of tomorrow.

Beyond the ‘Blue Line’ By Laura Hobeiche Johan Galtung, the father of peace studies, often distinguishes

during the negotiations of the infamous May 17 Agreement of

between ‘negative peace’ and ‘positive peace’. The former refers

1983, in which the US attempted to enforce peace between Is-

to the absence of violence. When, for example, a ceasefire is en-

rael and Lebanon during the Lebanese civil war, Syria was not on

acted, a negative peace follows; it is negative because something

board with the discussions, and pointblank blocked the agree-

undesirable stopped happening (for example, the violence

ment, by refusing to remove its troops from Lebanese soil (at the

stopped or the oppression ended). Positive peace on the other

time, Lebanon was under both Israeli and Syrian military occupa-

hand, is filled with positive content such as the restoration of


political relationships, the creation of social systems that serve

Today, Syrian troops no longer occupy Lebanon, but Syria

the needs of the whole population, and the constructive resolu-

maintains relevance and influence through its backing of Hezbol-

tion of conflict. The


lah, the Shiaa militant-political party Lebanese-Israeli

which receives financial and political

conflict has frequently been addressed

support from Tehran and Damascus,

through repetitive military or ‘band-

and whose raison d'être is the ‘final

aid’ approaches, which have not only

departure of Israel’ and expulsion of

consistently failed to find an enduring

‘any imperialist power’ from Leba-

solution to the decades-long conflict,

non. Although Israeli troops did

but which also closely align with the

withdraw from Lebanon in 2000,

concept of negative peace. This per-

they retreated behind the ‘Blue

haps explains the consistent failure of those approaches. As NATO and the

Overlooking the disputed Shebaa farms area and beyond to Mount Miron (Photo: F. Cunningham)

Line’, newly demarcated by the UN, which divided the two coun-

EU show increasing concern for instability in the Mediterranean

tries. However, in drawing this line, the United Nations placed a

region, tackling the Lebanese-Israeli conflict becomes of pressing

region called the Shebaa Farms - a sliver of land between Lebanon

importance to European security.

and Syria - outside of Lebanon and within the Syrian Golan

To begin with, it is impossible to discuss this conflict without

Heights, which are currently occupied by Israel. This tiny piece of

mention of Syria. In fact, if there is any lesson to be learned from

occupied territory continues to be a point of heated contention,

past failed agreements, it is that any notion of an enduring peace

because Lebanon believes that it owns the Shebaa Farms and Syria

agreement between Lebanon and Israel must include Syria as

acknowledges those claims. The UN, however, has ruled that it

well, because of the long-standing influence of Damascus on

belongs to Syria, thus Israel maintains that it will only withdraw

Lebanese economic, social and political affairs. For example,

from the area via negotiations with Syria. Given these circum-

Atlantic Voices, Volume 2, Issue 4


stances, renewed Lebanese peace talks with Israel cannot suc-

tactical doctrine, (3) exchanging military attachés from all three

ceed without a unanimous Israel-Lebanon-Syria agreement.

services (land, sea, air), (4) setting up demilitarized zones in

The resolution of the territorial dispute is also central to long

agricultural areas like the Shebaa Farms, (5) establishing joint

-term regional stability for another reason: Hezbollah, whose

patrols in strategic areas near the southern sections of the blue

existence Israel views as a threat to its own national security,

line, with or without third party participation such as the UNI-

should disarm prior to any sustainable peace agreement, as the

FIL military forces, (6) reaching an agreement regarding accept-

existence of militant arms undermines the Lebanese govern-

able and unacceptable military activities, especially in sensitive

ment’s authority and ability to make trustworthy policy commit-

border areas, and (7) establishing direct ‘hot line’ communica-

ments vis-à-vis Israel or the interna-

tions systems between heads of

tional community. However, Hez-

state, chiefs of military forces

bollah refuses to give up its weapons

(defense ministers), general staffs,

unless the Shebaa Farms are fully

and units in contact across a bor-

‘freed’ and returned to Lebanon.


In fact, in August 2008 Leba-

Beyond the military, an emphasis

non's cabinet, headed by former

on people-to-people contacts and



grassroots cooperation is essential.

unanimously approved a draft policy

For instance, the exchange of dip-

statement that secures Hezbollah's

lomats and volunteers with excel-



existence as an armed organization An Israeli tank patrols the Shebaa Farms area (Photo: military- lent interpersonal skills to age local knowledge of the other and guarantees its right to "liberate or recover occupied lands", thus officially legitimizing the

country’s culture, by nationally funded artistic and cultural ac-

party’s political relevance on a governmental level. Unfortu-

tivities, could take place. Furthermore, grassroots operations

nately, this development coupled with the veto power that Hez-

like short visits by children, and longer visits (6–12 months) by

bollah now possesses within the Lebanese cabinet suggests that

secondary and tertiary students for educational purposes, would

even if the occupied territories are no longer contested, and

reduce ‘fear of the unknown’ and allow individuals of a younger

Hezbollah agrees to give up its arms under greater international

generation to build transnational bonds. The EU could incorpo-

pressure, the group’s increasing influence and public support

rate such programs within its Neighborhood Policy through ex-

(within the country) poses as a potential threat to future peaceful

isting EU-Mediterranean projects that fund educational initia-

relations between Israel and Lebanon. This danger is particularly

tives. In addition, joint human rights NGOs, environmental

real because Hezbollah makes no secret of its fanatic anti-Zionist

affairs organizations and humanitarian brigades naturally build up

sentiments. In parallel, Israel is perpetually preoccupied with

trust networks. These can pave the way forward to deeper diplo-

maintaining its own ‘security’ and does not take any verbal or

matic relations and economic cooperation, such as trade agree-

physical threats lightly - however weak or unsubstantiated they

ments and the pooling and sharing of disputed natural resources

may be. Thus, the two countries are locked in a cycle of mistrust

like fresh water and natural gas in the Mediterranean.

and fear.

Thus, through a combination of tri-lateral negotiation (Syria-

Consequently, ‘confidence and security building measures’

Israel-Lebanon), military cooperation, mutual investment in

are necessary to reduce the tension, which would otherwise

public diplomacy projects and economic collaboration, a positive

continue to grow and probably result in renewed conflict. Israel

peace for Israel and Lebanon no longer seems unattainable.

and Lebanon may begin with small steps such as information exchange and verification, especially regarding armed forces and

Laura Hobeiche is a Masters student at the American University in

military equipment. For example: (1) providing prior notifica-

Washington D.C., where she is completing her MA in Strategic Commu-

tion of unit locations and naval or aircraft operations near sensi-

nication and International Relations. She has worked in Beirut, Abu

tive and border areas, (2) information-exchange concerning new

Dhabi and Brussels, and obtained her BA in Business Administration

equipment and arms, and the major elements of strategic and

from the American University of Beirut, Lebanon.

Atlantic Voices, Volume 2, Issue 4


The EU regime for export control of dual-use items: Trade interests and rising security concerns within the non-proliferation agenda by Ekaterina Chirkova


favorable export control conditions of the fully harmonized EU regime for export control of dual-use items.

he dual-use items export control system refers

This article will discuss the European export control re-

to the combination of mechanisms and meas-

gime as part of the EU non-proliferation policy. Starting with

ures that aim at restricting the illicit trade in

a review of the EU policy and its developments, I defined the

dual-use items. Those embrace all goods, including the soft-

main trends and challenges of the European export control

ware and technologies, which could be used for both civilian

system and proposed certain policy recommendations to

and military purposes. International, national and sub-

tackle these challenges.

national bodies are responsible for the coordination and the implementation of the respective regimes.

Overview of the EU non-proliferation policy

Today, the regime represents a complex system and fun-

The EU non-proliferation policy (NPP) can be seen from

damental element in the international Weapons of Mass De-

different points of view. While many declarations, common

struction (WMD) non-proliferation regime. It can be divided

positions and strategies have been drafted and adopted, there

in three compo-

is an obvious lack

nents: multilateral

of real results.



This might have


been the result of


tional export con-


trol regime (as the

and inconsistency

EU regime for the




control of exports



of dual-use items)

oped within the

and national ex-




In 2003, the EU

Given the strate-

adopted the Euro-

gic relevance of


sensitive goods, it


is imperative to


seek more


Security (ESS) clearly

US President Barack Obama laid out his goal of a ‘Global Zero’ in terms of nuclear weapons within effiidentified the prohis groundbreaking speech in Prague in April 2009. (Photo: STRINGER/AFP/Getty Images)

cient export con-



trol systems, especially in view of intensified threats to the

WMD among the key threats. This was complemented with

EU member states and their allies caused by the loopholes in

the adoption of the EU Strategy against the proliferation of

the international non-proliferation regimes.

WMD based on the “Action Plan for the Implementation of

However, in the context of the economic crisis and new

the Basic Principles for an EU Strategy against Proliferation of

challenges, countries are more and more seeking for an in-

Weapons of Mass Destruction”, which had been adopted by

crease in technological and industrial cooperation. The EU

the European Council at Thessaloniki earlier the same year.

member states, the majority of whom are also NATO mem-

This 2003 action plan had called for a leading role of the

bers, are committed to pool and share capabilities through

EU in the export control regime. To achieve this goal, “four

such cooperation. This goal can be achieved only by creating

points were listed as immediate actions required: (a) establishing single global control list and clarify EU's position in

Atlantic Voices, Volume 2, Issue 4


the global regime; (b) supporting new member states of EU

These documents as well as a dozen of other actions to

to improve export control administration and strengthening

support multilateral regimes and institutions aiming at tack-

the role of the Commission; (c) improving the implementa-

ling non-proliferation and disarmament issues represent the

tion of ‘catch-all’ provisions; (d) strengthening the informa-

basis for the EU non-proliferation policy.

tion sharing scheme on concerned countries, users and their procurement methods.”1 Moreover, it gave to the Commission a responsibility to assist in such developments in new

Non-proliferation clause In 2003, a new important instrument of the EU non-

member states and to



help them to imple-

was introduced, a

ment the EU regula-



clause’, which was

Thus, this action

also linked to the EU

plan can be seen as a

export control pol-

step forward towards

icy. It was decided

a more unified ap-


proach to the com-

should be inserted in

mon export control


with the leading role


of the EU. However,

third countries. The

the following devel-

model clause condi-

opments in the EU export control regime

Dual-use goods are products and technologies normally used for civilian purposes but which may have military applications. (Photo: European Commission)

disprove this argu-

this future

clause mixed with

tions that “the parties agree to cooperate and to contrib-

ment, demonstrating that the final decision anyway rests with

ute to countering the proliferation of weapons of mass de-

the EU member states.

struction and their means of delivery by […] the establish-

The European Strategy against the proliferation of WMD,

ment of an effective system of national export controls, con-

adopted in December 2003, defined the following main prin-

trolling exports as well as transit of WMD-related goods,

ciples: effective multilateralism, stable international and re-

including a WMD end-use control on dual-use technologies

gional environment, close cooperation with the United States

and containing effective sanctions for breaches of export con-

and other key partners as well as the development of the nec-

trols.”2 As for 2009, this clause has been included in EU Part-

essary structures within the EU. The EU non-proliferation

nership and Association Agreements with more than 90

strategy went on to mention the specific instruments available

states. Some of them asked for the EU’s support in the imple-

in this respect: multilateral treaties and verification mecha-

mentation of the clause, especially in export controls.3 There-

nisms, national and internationally-coordinated export con-

fore, the non-proliferation policy represents an important

trols, cooperative threat reduction programs, political and

issue in the EU political dialogue with third countries.

economic levers (including trade and development policies), interdiction of illegal procurement activities and, as a last resort, coercive measures in accordance with the UN Charter. Accord-

The non-proliferation policy represents an important issue in the EU political dialogue with third countries.

ingly, the strategy stated that the EU

EU contribution to the international nonproliferation regime As an international actor, the EU contributes with an amount of more than 20 million Euros to the Nuclear Secu-

would increase its allocations for the cooperative threat re-

rity Fund of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA),

duction programs in the light of the budget cycle 2007-2013.

and is therefore the IAEA’s largest donor. It also provides significant financial assistance for the implementation of the

Atlantic Voices, Volume 2, Issue 4


United Nations Security Council (UNSC) Resolution 1540

The implementation of these controls has been a state

which was adopted in April 2004. The resolution represents

competence. The international community was not involved

one of the first steps towards imposing binding obligations on

in their activities for a long time because it didn’t have competences for it. However, the interna-

the UN members with regard to the strengthening of their non-proliferation commitments and actions. One of its priorities was an effective export control regime.

The control on sensitive goods is closely linked to national interests and sovereignty.

The Commission’s assistance pro-

tional export control regimes had a significant impact on the formation of the international community’s export control system and not only because of the member states’ obligations. These

grams to create capacities for the control of dual-use export

regimes are legally non-binding agreements and more about

in third countries are progressively expanding the geographic

cooperation and the political good will of its members. But

scope of their activity. They cover now different partners,

they developed control guidelines and practices as well as

from South-East Europe, China, Morocco, Ukraine to the

mechanisms for cooperation and information-exchange which

United Arab Emirates. These programs include assessment

represented a model for the EU export control regime. Cer-

and study visits, seminars, workshops, training courses and

tain elements including the control lists were even incorpo-

sponsored participation in related EU activities. Further ac-

rated in the EU regulations.

tions are planned with the resources provided by the EU Instrument for Stability, established in 2006, which, however,

The evolution of the EU export control regime

is still limited accounting 2.1 billion Euros (six times less than

Traditionally, the control on sensitive goods trade is closely

other main instruments).

linked to national interests and sovereignty. The first cooperation initiative to control the proliferation of dual-use items



refers to the West-

control regimes

ern allies during the

Before the adoption


of the EU dual-use

they sought a way to

regulation the mem-

restrict the export of

ber states had already

those goods to the

pursued their export

Soviet ‘camp’. The

control policy in line

establishment of the

with their obligations


under the interna-

proliferation regime

tional treaties and

with the adoption of



the Treaty on the



Non-Proliferation of





Zangger Committee,




(NPT) on 12 June

export control regimes include the


Within the European Union, the EU Commission is responsible for the export control of dualuse items. (Photo: ageukblog)




question of mecha-

the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), the Missiles Technology

nisms for the implementation of some of its provisions. Arti-

Control Regime (MTCR), the Wassenaar Arrangement and

cle III.2 of the NPT stated that “each state party to the Treaty

the Australia Group. Within these frameworks, special lists of

undertakes not to provide: (a) source of special fissionable

controlled items were developed, and principles and rules for

material, or (b) equipment or material especially designed or

the export of these items were established.

prepared for the processing, use or production of special fis-

Atlantic Voices, Volume 2, Issue 4


sionable material, to any non-nuclear-weapon state for peace-

field. Moreover, the new regulation included the Community

ful purposes, unless the source or special fissionable material

General Export Authorization (CGEA) which provided the

shall be subject to the safeguards required by this article.” For

list of ‘safe’ countries of destination of exports of dual-use

this purpose the first informal regime was established and called Zangger Committee. Moreover, the first list of controlled items, the so-called ‘trigger list’, was worked out.

goods which don’t need special li-

The loopholes of the export control regime caused the continuation of the illicit trade in dual-use items from European countries.

censes. They included the US, Canada, Australia, Japan, New Zealand, Norway and Switzerland, which ratified treaties related to the non-proliferation of WMD and cooperate within interna-

Dual-use items are “items, including software and technology, which can be used for both civil

tional export control regimes. The Commission was granted

and military purposes, and shall include all goods which can

the authority to issue the CGEAs. The major purpose of this

be used for both non-explosive uses and assisting in any way

Council initiative was to reduce the administrative burden

in the manufacture of nuclear weapons or other nuclear ex-

and delays which licensing-procedures involve for both ex-

plosive devices.” The trade in such goods enables the compa-

porters and licensing authorities. However, transit trade and

nies and states involved in it not only to make a significant

transshipment of dual-use goods were still not covered by the

profit but also to obtain certain strategic benefits.



The process of development of the Community export

The loopholes and a certain vagueness of the export con-

control regime started in 1991 with the completion of the

trol regime and its regulations caused the continuation of the

European Single Market as it required the harmonization of

illicit trade in dual-use items from European countries. The

the national export control policies. The main purpose of this

Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI)

regime was to insure the free movement of dual-use items

provides an example, among others, with a German com-

within the Union. As to the export in third countries, another

pany, convicted of attempting to export 22 tonnes of alumin-

reason for such a development was the appearance of several

ium tubes to North Korea, in defiance of a catch-all warning

scandals with illicit transfers of dual-use goods involving

in 2004.

European companies since the 1980s. One of the most fa-

In December 2008, the “new lines for action by the Euro-

mous scandals was caused by a German company in 1989,

pean Union in combating the proliferation of weapons of mass

which was accused of being involved in the construction of a

destruction and their delivery systems” were adopted by the

chemical weapons plant in Libya. As a result, Germany estab-

Council with a particular relevance to EU export controls. It

lished stricter national laws and export regulations than most

was stated that it was necessary to “ensure that sensitive dual-

of the other European countries. The first Community regulation was adopted in 1994 under the EU’s Common Commercial Policy (CCP). But the implementation of the regulations

Intense debates on the importance of nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament issues took place in the European Parliament as well.

and rules as well as their enforcement

use goods are not inadvertently exported from the EU to undesirable end -users.” Intense debates on the importance of nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament issues took place in the European Parliament as well. The Par-

and punitive measures were left under the full responsibility

liament indicated, for instance, that the budget allocations to

of the member states. Moreover, the development of the

the CFSP for 2007-2013 were insufficient to make the EU a

Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) posed many

global player and to achieve the ambitious goals in this area.

questions about the nature of the EU export control policy because of its security significance.

After several amendments to the first versions of the regulation, it was replaced integrally by the new Council

In 1999, the EU member states decided to replace the

Regulation (EC) 428/2009. For the first time, the regulation

regulation with a single Council regulation, finally giving to

included provisions not only about the export control but also

the Commission its exclusive competence in initiatives in this

the control of transfer, brokering and transit of dual-use

Atlantic Voices, Volume 2, Issue 4


items. Special attention was given to the harmonization of the

Finally, the regulation obliged the member states to guar-

EU regulation with international commitments and obliga-

antee the proper application of the export control and the

tions of the member states, such as updating the common list

effective and proportionate sanctioning of its violation.

of dual-use items and increasing the effectiveness of the ex-

The EU also adopted several regulations concerning the export of dual-use items for specific

port control regime. The regulation represents an obligation for all EU member states, its implementation



being the responsibility of national authorities. It makes it possible for

The need for further reforms of the EU export control regime was recognized, but their nature had not been clearly identified.

the member states to choose their

cases. Through those regulations, the EU implemented the relevant UNSC Resolutions (such as the ones on Iran and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea) and prohibits export, transfer and brokering of goods, equipment and

own level of national export control strength. This is also

technology as well as technical support (even by telephone or

called ‘non-undercut principle’ because other member states

electronic media) that could contribute to the programs re-

using less stringent controls can’t undercut their policies.

lated to nuclear weapons, other WMD or ballistic missiles.

This provision also obliged the member states to notify to

The need for further reforms of the EU export control

each other the details of exporters and items. Thus, it re-

regime was recognized, but their nature had not been clearly

duced the possibility of export of a prohibited item to one

identified. In June 2011, a green paper was issued by the

member state from another with a less strict export control

European Commission within the process of the revision of

system. But it didn’t eliminate it because member states were still able to issue a license to the exporter who was refused by other member states. As the EU export control regime of dual-use goods created a free market of such goods inside the Union, all member states can be potential suppliers for these goods to a third country. Some control

instruments were



from the previous regulation with expanded applications. The catch-all clause allowed

Resolutions of the UN Security Council, concerning above all Iran and North Korea, are being implemented through the EU’s policy on the export of dual-use items. (Photo: White House)

EU member states’ governments to require exporters to ask for authorization for ex-

the 2009 regulation under its article 25. The main goal of the

porting items which are not listed in the regulation to coun-

paper was to develop a common approach for further Euro-

tries where arms embargos by resolutions of the UNSC or the

pean export control developments. However, there is no

Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE)

clear message about trade facilitation or further harmoniza-

are in force. The new ‘suspicion clause’ made these actions

tion and security measures. The document represented a

possible for the member states even without any embargo

framework for dialogue with the industry.

context. Atlantic Voices, Volume 2, Issue 4


Conclusions and policy recommendations

• The dialogue between the EU institutions and the

Summarizing the developments of the EU export control

business community should be improved. Formal and

regulations, the following observations could be made:

informal contacts between industry and national authori-

The established EU regime for export control of dual-use

ties as well as EU officials should be more regular and

items is complex and controversial. First of all, the difficult

productive. The experience of the recent green paper

balance between the EU’s exclusive competence in this area

issued by the Commission shows a lack of follow-up con-

according to the CCP and member states' prerogatives to

cerning the dialogue initiative between the Commission

have a final say retrospectively has resulted in the rather slow development of the EU export control regime. The regulations enable the member states to choose their own level of na-

and the business community, as well as

The established EU regime for export control of dual-use items is complex and controversial.

a lack of communication between the Commission and other European institutions on these issues. • Information-exchange


risk assessment should be improved.

tional export control strength: A member state is still able to issue a license to the exporter who was

Reliable and relevant information without delay are a key

refused by other member states. As the EU export control

component for crisis prevention. Therefore, it is neces-

regime for dual-use goods created a free market of such goods

sary to conduct permanent controls of the exports as well

inside the Union, all member states can be potential suppliers

as risk assessments. The newly established European Ex-

of these goods for third countries.

ternal Action Service (EEAS) could improve the informa-

Furthermore, this 'dual-competences' system caused the situation where relevant proposals and amendments to im-

tion-exchange and security threat assessment at the EU level.

prove the regime are only partly implemented in the short-

• The Commission should play an important role in

term perspective. Certain important EU proposals are still

strengthening member states’ efforts to improve the

only discussed or even blocked, e.g. the right of the Commis-

knowledge about the functioning of export con-

sion to update the list of controlled items in accordance with

trol mechanisms, their regulations and updates,

the international non-proliferation regimes decisions has been

thereby eliminating potential shortcomings and weak-

subject of negotiations for years.

nesses of the system.

As a result, the disharmonized and fragmental system

• The EU should better use its coordination agencies, which

causes a lack of information-exchange, coherence and pro-

are important for the export control regime activities,

gress in the area of export control. The direct cooperation

such as investigations and law enforcement. Rele-

and information-exchange among the competent national

vant agencies include the European Police Office

authorities of the member states concerns only exports and

(Europol), the European Crime Prevention Network


(EUCPN), the European Policy College (CEPOL), and

The EU will have to find a genuine answer to respond to

the European Police Chiefs Task Force (PCTF). More-

this imbalance between trade interests and security concerns

over, the EEAS could offer a great contribution to the

and to gain a better role regarding export control reforms

export control development, strengthening the EU’s

towards a further harmonization of the regime. However, for

voice in the international arena.

this purpose, the Commission should prove itself not only

• The EU should intensify and improve its cooperation

business-friendly, but fulfill the role of a responsible and con-

with the security organizations, in particular

sistent policy actor, leading in the export control develop-

NATO. NATO is an essential security partner of the EU,

ment. Its regulations should represent an adequate, clear and

as the two organizations share a majority of members and

coherent answer to the current security threats and market

common values. NATO can play an important role in the

demands. In this context, the following policy recommenda-

proliferation risk assessment and information-exchange

tions can be considered:

with the EU. Moreover, NATO’s new Strategic Concept,

Atlantic Voices, Volume 2, Issue 4


the comprehensive agenda adopted in 2010, emphasizes the importance of full cooperation of its members in capa-

About the author

bility development, in order to minimize duplication and maximize cost-effectiveness, including defense-related

Ekaterina Chirkova

industrial cooperation. Such interaction should not be

Ekaterina Chirkova is a PhD candidate in Political Science at

negatively influenced by the regulatory framework and

Liege University, Belgium, and a Schuman Fellow at the Euro-

requires a collective approach to relevant policies. Thus, a

pean Parliament (DG External Relations - Policy Department).

harmonized European system of dual-use export control would also facilitate industrial cooperation with the EU’s allies. All of these activities should represent a sustainable basis for further harmonization of the EU regime for export control of dual-use items. This would reduce security concerns while benefiting European dual-use industry by cutting the administrative costs, uncertainties and at the same time promoting technological cooperation.


Suzuki, Kazuto, “Between Trade and Security: EU’s Export

Control Regime and Its Global Role”, Paper for EUSA Tenth Biennial International Conference, 17-19 May 2007, Montreal, Canada. 2

For example, see: European Union, “Commission Proposal

2004/0176 for a decision of the Council and of the Commission on the conclusion of a Partnership and Cooperation Agreement between the European Community and the European Atomic Energy Community and their Member States, of the one part, and the Republic of Tajikistan, of the other part”, COM(2004) 521 final, Brussels, 26 July 2004. 3

E.g., African states during the renewal of the Cotonou

Agreement. 4

European Union, “Council Regulation (EC) 428/2009 set-

ting up a Community regime for the control of exports, transfer, brokering and transit of dual-use items”, OL L 134/1, Brussels, 5 May 2009.

The views expressed in this article are entirely those of the author. They do not necessarily represent the views of the Atlantic Treaty Association, its members, affiliates or staff.

Atlantic Voices, Volume 2, Issue 4


Atlantic Voices, Volume 2, Issue 4


ATA Programs

Atlantic Voices is the monthly publication of the Atlantic Treaty Association. It aims to inform the debate on key issues that affect the North

Parallel to the Bratislava Globsec Forum in April 2012, the

Atlantic Treaty Organization, its goals and its future. The work pub-

ATA, the Atlantic Council and the Slovak Atlantic Commission

lished in Atlantic Voices is written by young professionals and researchers.

hosted the 2012 Bratislava Young Atlanticist Summit. This event featured members of the dynamic Young Atlanticist Work-

The Atlantic Treaty Association (ATA) is an international non-

ing Group, a network of next generation leaders and outstanding

governmental organization based in Brussels working to facilitate global

professionals. The Bratislava Young Atlanticist Summit set the

networks and the sharing of knowledge on transatlantic cooperation and

stage for the second meeting of young leaders at the Chicago

security. By convening political, diplomatic and military leaders with

Young Atlanticist Summit, on the sidelines of the official NATO

academics, media representatives and young professionals, the ATA


promotes the values set forth in the North Atlantic Treaty: Democracy, Freedom, Liberty, Peace, Security and Rule of Law. The ATA membership extends to 37 countries from North America to the Caucasus throughout Europe. In 1996, the Youth Atlantic Treaty Association (YATA) was created to specifially include the successor generation in our work. Since 1954, the ATA has advanced the public’s knowledge and understanding of the importance of joint efforts to transatlantic security, through its international programs, such as the Central and South Eastern European Security Forum, the Ukraine Dialogue and its Educational Platform.

Atlantic Voices is always seeking new material. If you are a young

In 2011, the ATA adopted a new set of strategic goals that reflects the

researcher, subject expert or professional and feel you have a valu-

constantly evolving dynamics of international cooperation. These goals

able contribution to make to the debate, then please get in touch.


We are looking for papers, essays, and book reviews on issues

of importance to the NATO Alliance. For details of how to submit your work please see our website.

international security issues.

Further enquiries can also be directed to the ATA Secretariat at the address listed below.

the establishment of new and competitive programs on

the development of research initiatives and security-related events for its members.

the expansion of ATA’s international network of experts to countries in Northern Africa and Asia.

Editor: Florian Bauernfeind

The ATA is realizing these goals through new programs, more policy activism and greater emphasis on joint research initiatives.

All images published in this issue of Atlantic Voices are the property of NATO, reproduced with NATO’s permission, unless otherwise stated. Images should not be reproduced without permission from sources listed, and remain the sole property of those sources.

These programs will also aid in the establishment of a network of international policy experts and professionals engaged in a dialogue with NATO.

Atlantic Voices - Vol. 2 no. 4  

Laura Hobeiche looks at the ongoing, yet often forgotten Lebanese-Israeli conflict from a peace research angle. Ekaterina Chirkova presents...

Atlantic Voices - Vol. 2 no. 4  

Laura Hobeiche looks at the ongoing, yet often forgotten Lebanese-Israeli conflict from a peace research angle. Ekaterina Chirkova presents...