Volume 1-Number 2, October2011
ATLANTIC ATLANTIC TREATY TREATY ASSOCIATION ASSOCIATION
NATO and North Africa: Operations and Opportunities Atlantic Voices is the monthly publication of the Atlantic Treaty Association. It aims to inform the debate on key issues that affect the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, its goals and its future. The work published in Atlantic Voices is written by young professionals and researchers. This issue, examines NATO’s role in North Africa in the wake of the “Arab
Libyans celebrating the end of the Gaddafi regime at Martyrs Square in Tripoli
Spring”, what operations NATO has un-
dertaken, what can be learned from these, and what opportunities lie ahead in the future for NATO’s engagement with North Africa and the new governments of the region.
NATO After Libya: Lessons and prospects Examining Operation UNIFIED PROTECTOR in light of NATO’s “New Strategic Concept” , Mikko Patokallio examines whether NATO operations over the North African state vindicate the concept or not. In the final assessment the overall effects of NATO operations and successes in Libya are determined, and the impact on the future of the Alliance considered.
We hope you find the following pages both informative and thought provoking, As part of our goal in promoting and informing the public debate upon these topics, Atlantic Voices is happy to accept responses to the issue and articles we have selected.
In Quest for a Renewed Partnership: What role for NATO, EU and OSCE after the Tunisian elections Hana Missaouui and Andrea Fronti explore the recent elections in Tunisia and what the lasting effects of the results may be. Can Democracy be achieved? What are the consequences of an “Islamist” victory? How can NATO respond and engage with post election Tunisia? Are all important questions examined by this piece.
ATA Special Report: 57th General Assembly in Tirana A Special Report outlining the success of the 57th General Assembly of the Atlantic Treaty Association.
Atlantic Voices Volume 1 Issue 2
ATA Activities and Events The Altantic Commission of the Netherlands Presents their New Publication : Russia, our Distant Neighbour: The burden of conventional beliefs
In Russia, our Distant Neighbour Hugo Klijn sets out to examine some Western conventional beliefs about the world’s biggest country, one which has had such a profound impact on European history ever since Peter the Great supervised its rise to prominence. For more information and order forms: visit their website www.atlcom.nl Author: Hugo Klijn Pages: 132 Published: 2011 ISBN: 978-90-73329-00-3 Price: € 15,00 + (P&P)
ATA Ministerial Debriefings The Atlantic Treaty Association is proud to bring to you our Ministerial Debriefing sessions. Bringing together NATO officials and key national representatives the debriefings aim to give you an insight into the Policy decisions and directions at the heart of NATO. Organised after each NATO Ministerial Meeting, the Debriefings offer a unique opportunity to understand and question officials and representatives after their key discussions. The Debriefing sessions will run throughout 2011 and 2012, for more information, or to find out how you can attend the next session, please contact the ATA secretariat More information on each debriefing will be made available through the ATA Website
About the Authors Mikko Patokallio
Hana K Missaoui & Andrea Frontini
Mikko Patokallio is independent analyst specializing Middle East foreign and security policy. He has a Masters Degree in International Relations from the London School of Economics. Mikko Patokallio has lived and travelled extensively throughout the Middle East region.
Hana K. Missaoui holds both a B.A. in Law and Public Administration and an M.A. in Public International and European Law at the University Paul Cézanne of Aix-enProvence, France. She is also a Ph.D. candidate in Public Law at the same University. Andrea Frontini holds both a B.A. and an M.A. in International Affairs and Diplomacy at the University of Trieste, Italy, and a Postgraduate Degree in International Relations and International Protection of Human Rights at the Italian Society for the International Organization (SIOI) of Rome, Italy.
Atlantic Voices Volume 1 Issue 2
NATO After Libya: Lessons and Prospects by Mikko Patokallio
what a post-Gaddafi Libya will look like. Now, with
Editors Note: This article was written in September 2011, before
NATO's military role winding down, it is proper that
the final collapse of the Gaddafi Regime.
NATO follows up with this ”comprehensive approach” and
hands over responsibility for the post-conflict situation to fter the capture of Tripoli, the successful
those better equipped in dealing with them, namely the
conclusion of the war in Libya seems
The Libyan rebels, and the
Yet all is not perfect. Militarily, although NATO's air
National Transitional Council (NTC), are, of course, those
campaign was successful it leaves much to be desired in the
with the greatest cause to rejoice, but similar joy must be
future. Despite earlier doubts, in retrospect it is clear that
felt in the hallways at the North Atlantic Treaty
the air campaign was the right tool for the occasion: it
Organization (NATO). After the prolonged, divisive and
proved sufficient to tip the balance of arms in favor of the
inconclusive war in Afghanistan, the relatively quick and
rebel forces, while avoiding the significant negative
painless victory in Libya is just the kind of confidence-
externalities of ground involvement. Fortunately, damage
boosting operation the Alliance needed.
to infrastructure and civilian casualties were quite limited.
although there are many reasons to celebrate there are also
Yet this brief campaign exposed the limits of NATO's
many reasons to be concerned over NATO's military and
expeditionary capabilities. Simply put, European military
political performance in Libya.
The conflict in Libya
capabilities failed to meet the demands of even such a
carries important lessons for the Alliance. These lessons
limited campaign. The United States was essential in
are all the more important as Libya is the first instance of
ensuring the initial conditions for a no-fly zone, and in
the new Strategic Concept being applied and the first
providing logistical support for European countries to
tentative steps towards a post-Afghanistan NATO.
maintain it. Libya underscores the lesson that European
Above all, NATO's intervention in Libya has vindicated the merits of a limited approach set out by NATO's New Strategic
namely, that NATO focus
militaries need to do a great deal more to develop their
Although the military shortcomings are serious, it is
Above all, NATO's intervention in Libya has vindicated the merits of a limited approach ...
forces,” and work in
the political ones which are the most dangerous. The steps leading up to the NATO intervention, especially the process of garnering support, were far from ideal. Even within the Alliance, debate over Libya was rancorous, with noted German and
partnership with international organizations and local and
Turkish abstentions balancing Anglo-French enthusiasm for
regional parties. By and large, NATO has followed this
line in Libya.
In Libya, NATO assumed a clearly
members, only 14 committed military assets alongside a
delineated military role. Importantly, the legitimacy to
motley set of allies ranging from Sweden to Qatar. If Af-
intervene was secured through a United Nations Security
ghanistan and Iraq are viewed as cases of America 'going
Council mandate with Arab League support, and very
solo' at the expense of NATO, then Libya is a dangerous
limited Arab participation.
NATO largely avoided
French counterpart to this. By recognizing the NTC as
involvement in the political aspects of Libya's conflict,
Libya's legitimate government well before any other
leaving that to the Libya Contact Group (albeit whose
NATO member, and providing arms and training to the
membership significantly overlaps NATO's) – especially in
rebels France forced NATO's own position on the conflict.
Atlantic Voices Volume 1 Issue 2
It is concerning that of 28 Alliance
While having leading nations and abstentions in operations
legitimacy of intervention has been questioned before –
is by no means a bad thing, this kind of unilateralism
Kosovo being a pointed example. Similarly, the disparities
provokes conflict within the Alliance. Ranks closed once
in military performance between NATO members are
victory seemed secure but this is not the sort of unity that
present in Afghanistan. Unfortunately in this regard, Libya
NATO should aspire for.
is disappointingly similar to previous Alliance operations.
Undeniably, the ultimate form of NATO involvement long
NATO was right to intervene in prevent mass
In many ways it is significant that NATO – rather
original rationale of protecting
Nonetheless, there is reason for cautious optimism.
...the Middle East is an area that is more likely to unify Alliance interests than an Afghanistan-like ”out-of-area” operation.
than the European Union, the United Nations, or an ad hoc force - v (The Arab League or the African Union were non-starters in this case). On one level it reflects the considered inability of these other organizations to perform in the same space, but it
Libya, and in this respect siding with the National
also reflects a conscious elevation of NATO's role in the
Transitional Council was not the wrong choice, but doing
so certainly stretched NATO's mandate to the extreme.
The Middle East is – for geographical necessity if noth-
The deficiencies of NATO's legitimacy in intervening on
ing else – an area of growing importance for NATO. Since
should not lightly be brushed aside. It is deeply concerning
the 1990s, NATO has had a role in the Middle East, largely
how easily the initial UN-mandated no-fly zone mutated
conducted through the mostly dormant talk shops of the
into NATO becoming the ”insurgent's air arm.” This has
Mediterranean Partnership and the Istanbul Cooperation
serious implications for the legitimacy of NATO
Council. More ambitious peacekeeping roles have been
involvement in future missions, regionally and globally.
repeatedly proposed for NATO in Lebanon and the Israeli-
Regionally, it risks casting the Alliance as a partisan
Palestinian conflict. These cases aside, Libya is the first
intervener on behalf of certain regional interests.
'proper' operation in the Middle East – the limited NATO
Globally, it makes veto-wielding countries like Russia and
Training Mission in Iraq excepted.
China less likely to support interventions in the future.
To some extent, the Middle East is an area that is more
To some extent, these military and political
likely to unify Alliance interests than an Afghanistan-like
shortcomings are not particularly new. Alliance unity has
”out-of-area” operation. Western countries have a long, if
Atlantic Voices Volume 1 Issue 2
not entirely harmonious, history of cooperating on foreign
policy issues in the Middle East. Especially during the past
Ultimately, what does Libya herald for NATO? Cau-
decade Western foreign policy in the region has been
tious optimism, perhaps. NATO's new Strategic Concept
tremendously active and involved various fora – EUPOL
sought to point towards a post-Afghanistan NATO – Libya
COPPS, EUBAM, UNIFIL. The decision to adopt NATO
represents the first tentative steps in that direction.
as the institutional framework for Western foreign policy
reinforces the notion that NATO should adopt a more
towards Libya is all the more significant given this
limited approach to intervention in the future. NATO's
success in Libya lies in being a selective, but necessary mis-
While potential clearly exists, caution is in order, as illconsidered
sion. Given NATO's chronic military and political
shortcomings, Libya is just the kind of combination of 'high
consequences. Those urging NATO to adopt similar ro-
reward/low risk' type of mission where NATO can make a
bust roles in, for instance, peacekeeping in the Middle
difference. However, in future operations, NATO's artic-
East, should beware the risks of entanglement. Libya was
ulation for its necessity and its political objectives must be
mercifully short – the history of Western peacekeeping in
Lebanon is instructive of a case that isn't.
intervening á la Libya in Syria blatantly neglects the significant differences between the two cases, in particular the absence of those factors that allowed NATO to successfully intervene in Libya: legitimacy and capability. To play a successful and useful role in the Middle East, NATO must be careful to distance itself both from the West's colonial past and the dictatorial regimes of the present; any NATO role in the Middle East must be based on international norms and partnership. Democracy and human rights are the core values of NATO. It is not for NATO to advance these values, but these values should be shared partners.
other organizations – such as the EU and the UN – are undoubtedly
...NATO's articulation for its necessity and its political objectives must be clearer.
better suited for civilian crisis management, and post-civil war reconciliation and reconstruction: nation-building is something NATO should steer clear of.
However, NATO can play
productive roles in other small-scale activities.
example, one potential area where NATO might play a positive role is in improving civilian-military relations. Following the end of the Cold War, NATO helped former communist states restructure their militaries; now in post-
The views expressed in this article are entirely those of the author. They
revolutionary Middle Eastern countries a similar ”low-key”
do not necessarily represent the views of the Atlantic Treaty Association,
approach with tangible impact and importance are more
it’s members, affiliates or staff.
Atlantic Voices Volume 1 Issue 2
In Quest for a Renewed Partnership: What role for NATO, EU and OSCE after the Tunisian elections? by Hana K Missaoui and Andrea Frontini
n October 23rd 2011, for the first time in their history, Tunisians went to the polls to elect an assembly in charge of drafting
a new Constitution and wielding full legislative powers. This is undoubtedly a milestone in Tunisia’s history, which has been accelerated since January 14th, by the ousting of Ben Ali and his clan. It is indeed a momentum Tunisians seem willing to keep for further shaping their own democracy. The elections for the National Constituent Assembly were originally scheduled for last July1. The High Commission for the Protection of the Objectives of the Revolu-
Source: United Nations Development Programme/Noeman Al Sayyad
tion, Political Reform and Democratic Transition, the ad
Islamic Republic of Iran and an outspoken critic of its cur-
hoc legislative assembly in charge of defining the legal
rent regime, warned Tunisians not to make “the same mis-
framework for the elections, eventually decided to post-
takes as we did,” and encouraged Mr. Gannoushi “not to
pone them, as the numerous parties taking part in the elec-
replace a dictatorship with another”2.
tions did not have enough time to prepare and reach voters.
The victory of Ennahdha did not come without consequences for Tunisia’s internal debate as well. As a matter
The Islamic party Ennahdha (“Reborn”) and its previously
Ghannoushi, obtained 41.47% of the 217 seats (i.e. 91 seats out
of fact, the past few days have seen Tunisian professors and students demonstrating against the social unrest
Many Tunisian secularists and Westerners do not see this victory as a good sign...
of 217) in the National
generated by the victory of an Islamist party, and demanding the respect of their rights. Cases of violence and intimidations against Western-like dressed women were reported as well. Such events seem to remind Tunisians of a famous statement
Constituent Assembly. This victory is seen with a lot of
made several years ago by the founder of modern Tunisia,
circumspection in the vast majority of both media and gov-
Habib Bourguiba,: “it will be only and solely the children
ernments in Europe and North America. In fact, while the
of Tunisia who will destroy it”. Whether Tunisians will
United Stated welcomed the process of the elections and
have to expect such an aftermath for the mother country of
its winner, France eventually commented the results by
the Arab Spring still remains to be seen3.
stating that they it will be extremely attentive to the re-
Meanwhile, what seems noteworthy is the undeniable
spect of human rights by Ennahdha. Many Tunisian secu-
and often unconfessed anxiety of the West vis-à-vis the
larists and Westerners do not see this victory as a good
recent political developments in Tunisia. Such a reaction is
sign, neither for their people, nor for the peace in the re-
partially explainable in the light of the West’s secular tra-
gion. Others, like Ebrahim Yazdi, a former founder of the
dition and the political sensitivity Islam has gained during
Atlantic Voices Volume 1 Issue 2
the last decade. However, such an attitude perilously tends
Islamist party has been able to deploy a remarkable amount
to occult the specificities of Tunisia’s history as well as the
of human and financial resources, pushing relevant societal
long-standing frustrations experienced by its society during
figures such as imams, civil servants and teachers to play an
the past regime4, possibly leading to misinterpretations of
important role in spreading its presence amongst Tunisi-
societal dynamics and, consequently, to erroneous analysis
ans. However, some observers highlighted unfair practices,
such as the financing of weddings or the purchase of ani-
However, in the specific case of Tunisia, some legitimate concerns remain that, despite Ennahdha’s repeated statement of adherence to the principles of democracy, pluralism and human rights, the leading Islamist party will actually take advantage of this victory in order to push forward a
mals for religious cele-
Such an attitude could indeed endanger Tunisia’s peaceful transition to a fully democratic regime...
political agenda based on a radical interpretation of Islam. Such an attitude could indeed endanger Tunisia’s
brations as well as influencing the vote of illiterates in the country. Such behaviours might indeed result in a potential political vulnerabil-
ity for Enhahda in the next months to come.
peaceful transition to a fully democratic regime, while
Fourthly, the party gained sympathies amongst wide
exacerbating relations with regional and extra-regional
fringes of the Tunisian population, as it has been persecut-
partners. Nonetheless, some elements at the very basis of
ed, first during the regime of Bourguiba, then by the one
Ennadha’s victory need to be highlighted for a more realis-
of Ben Ali. Members of the party were even executed,
tic perspective on its actual power in the country .
while others, like Mr. Gannoushi, were forced to exile.
First and foremost, the huge majority of Tunisians are
This has thus made possible for Enhahda to present itself as
part of a rural population and live far from the biggest
a truly combatant and libertarian force, which undoubtedly
urban areas. These relevant components of the country’s
presents some similarities with the history of the Iranian
society always felt deeply neglected by Ben Ali’s regime,
Islamic movement under the Pahlavi regime. Nonetheless,
which was considered by many as an evilly “pro-Western”
such a narrative seems also instrumental in hiding some
and debauched one. Therefore, for some Tunisians, the
gloomy aspects of the Islamist resistance in Tunisia, such as
choice of Ennahdha is a symbol of radical opposition.
the vitriol burning of women and former members of secu-
Secondly, the majority of Tunisians who live abroad voted Ennahdha, too. This result struck many Tunisians in
rity forces as well as the recent discovery of terrorist plans against the former regime.
their home country, as they could not understand why
Fifthly and finally, the defeat of secularist parties such
secularized Tunisians gave their favour to a religious move-
as the Parti Démocratique Progressiste (PDP), a political
ment. Actually, if one takes a closer look at the quality of
force that was initially considered by some as the main
the Tunisian diaspora, an important part of them belong to
expression of the revolutionary movement in the country,
the working class. Some observers thus argue that, in
has been a real surprise for many observers. However,
countries such as France or Belgium, most Tunisians voted
such a débacle seems to be mostly explained as a conse-
for Ennahdha because of a growing Islamophobia taking
quence of some strategic errors made by the PDP leader-
place in Europe. As a matter of fact, choosing Ennadhda
ship. In fact, not only did the head of the party, Mr.
was a way for Tunisians abroad to affirm their identity,
Chebbi, take part in an ad interim government made up of
and, eventually, to prove that conjugating Islam and de-
former members of Ben Ali’s party right after the fall of
mocracy is not oxymora’s statement.
the regime (thus affecting the trust of many Tunisians), but
Thirdly, Ennahdha has proved to be the most devel-
he and his party fellows also behaved in a way that made
oped and well-organized political force in Tunisia. As a
PDP perceived as an elitist and “over-Westernized” politi-
matter of fact, as soon as it entered the competition, the
cal force by large sectors of the population. Moreover, the
Atlantic Voices Volume 1 Issue 2
fact that Mr. Chebbi himself remained in Tunisia during
other domains7. Firstly, the country was indirectly in-
the regime of Ben Ali was largely considered as a sign of
volved in the political and military crisis in neighboring
disguised condescension (though allegations of political
Libya. Though such developments might indeed make Tu-
cowardice were also addressed to Mr. Gannoushi for his
nisia an essential hub for managing the post-war recon-
past exile in Europe). Others leaders of non-Islamist
struction of that country, they also have posed crucial chal-
movements, such as Mr. Marzouki (CPR) or Mr. Ben
lenges for its own stability, in particular the sporadic at-
Jafaar (Ettakatol) were criticized. As a consequence, the triumph of the Enhahda movement can also be considered
tacks from Kaddafi’s former loyalist forces on the
...the challenges facing the emerging Tunisian leadership are not merely political...
borders and a deep humanitarian emergency due to thousands of refugees fleeing Libya. The end of the Libyan crisis has paved the way to a progressive normalization, but such events revealed a striking
as a major result of the
unpreparedness by the Tunisian ad interim authori-
tactical errors made by
ties which will demand a prompt updating in their
the secularist parties. Moreover, the current situation of-
emergency response capabilities.
fers wide scope for the non-Islamic parties to gather in a
Secondly, the pre-electoral period has also been charac-
large coalition aimed at counter Ennahdha’s influence
terized by occasional acts of violence throughout the coun-
within the National Constituent Assembly. This seems
try, including clashes between rival political factions, re-
even more relevant if one considers that Tunisia’s new
venges against former members of the fallen regime as well
constitutional charter will have to deal with many reli-
as social sanctions of allegedly immoral customs, especially
giously sensitive issues, starting from the possible defini-
against women. Such developments actually highlight the
tion of Islam as the country’s official religion to the reform
risk of an underneath social unrest which, if politically
of its European-styled code civil.
charged, might turn into a major destabilizing factor.
Future evolutions in Tunisian politics are likely to be
Thirdly, the economic outlook, though rather promis-
characterized by an intense debate within the wide spec-
ing in terms of unexploited productivity and openness to
trum of political forces composing the National Constitu-
foreign investments, remains hampered by a series of con-
ent Assembly. Whatever the result may be, there is now
crete obstacles including widespread corruption, unbal-
an important mandate to fulfill. The Assembly has one year
anced regional development, overdependence on tourism
or so to draft a constitution for the new democratic Tuni-
and deep infrastructural gaps. In a transitional phase such
sia. The functioning of the Assembly immediately appeared
as the one taking place in Tunisia, a well functioning mar-
complex, as Ettakatol, one of the first three winners of the
ket economy, though accompanied by the introduction of
elections, initially refused to enter into a governing coali-
some social safety valves, can create more opportunities
tion with Ennahdha. Other worrisome disagreements
for the society, especially for the young generation who
started to emerge about the duration of the mandate of the
gave a crucial contribution to the outbreak of the Arab
Assembly itself, which had still remained unquestioned
Spring. In this view, removing the obstacles to develop-
during the electoral campaign. Should the current mandate
ment-oriented economic reforms would be essential to
be extended to the unusual length of two or three years, it
ensure long-term social and political stability.
is questionable whether this will actually reflect Tunisians’ quest for democracy6. If not, a new season of political and
Tunisia and the Euro-Atlantic Community: To-
social unrest is not to be excluded a priori.
wards Truly Interlocking Institutions?
In addition to this, it is also noteworthy that the challenges facing the emerging Tunisian leadership are not
As we have tried to highlight briefly in this paper, the
merely political, but they rather involve a wide range of
ongoing transition in Tunisia poses a significant challenge
Atlantic Voices Volume 1 Issue 2
to the international community and, more specifically, to
tion in Europe (OSCE) seems crucial and must be devel-
the role of the Euro-Atlantic institutions in the region.
oped on the basis of the underlying principle of interlock-
More generally, the so-called “Arab Spring” represents
ing institutions. As a matter of fact, the three organizations
an unparalleled opportunity for the entire Mediterranean
represent the main regional actors which have proved able
region, which has long been characterized by authoritarian
to develop a series of structured partnership initiatives in
regimes, underdevelopment and conflicts. Nonetheless, its
the Mediterranean, thus witnessing, though with very dif-
mid-term perspectives remain uncertain and might still
ferent results, the traditional interest of their member
result in a serious threat to the stability of the political and
countries in enhancing stability and development in an area
security landscape of the area. As a matter of fact, on the
which remains affected by a wide range of threats and chal-
one hand, the “domino effect” that some have been pre-
dicting from the very beginning of the Jasmine Revolution
In this view, the three organizations might offer Tunisia
has not yet taken place: on the contrary, the region still
a package of assistance measures which should be imple-
seems beset by the prevailing of largely undemocratic sys-
mented by an ad hoc inter-institutional agreement aimed at
tems and methods . On the other hand, both Tunisia and
coordinating existing capabilities and avoiding dangerous
Egypt are now marked by a delicate transitional phase in
duplications. Such an agreement should task the EU with
which ad interim governments have to face growing expec-
the management of ad hoc humanitarian and development
tations and requests from the heterogeneous political and
aids, in cooperation with on-site NGOs and UN bodies as
social movements which have taken part in the upheavals.
well as of financing instruments in the economic and infra-
In such a complex transition, the way remains open for
structural fields, on the basis of the existing thematic volets
either populist or radical leaders to gain consensus, both
of the Union for the Mediterranean.
weakening an already fragile statehood and exposing the
The same agreement should also give NATO the op-
regional landscape to the risks of fragmentation and politi-
portunity to contribute to the enhancement of Tunisia’s
cal rivalry .
security landscape, starting from the assistance to the
In such a rapidly changing context, transition in Tunisia
country’s defense and security forces in the priority areas
nonetheless represents a promising case study on a twofold
of border security and the fight against transnational ter-
level. From an internal point of view, the country is char-
rorism. Moreover, a further contribution could come from
acterized by a vibrant political setting, with a rising civil society and a cultural tradition of modernism and tolerance, despite the many uncertainties of this post-elections period. From an international point of view, a fully democratic Tunisia would
NATO to the operation-
...mid-term perspectives remain uncertain and might still result in a serious threat ...
certainly be a reliable partner for the stabilization
al, structural and doctrinal modernization of Tunisia’s defense and security forces, while reinforcing
of the area, especially in the light of the relevant ongoing
Tunisia political relations within the wider framework of
shifts in the geopolitical regional balance, which deeply
the Mediterranean Dialogue.
affect both the interests and the values of the Euro-Atlantic institutions.
Finally, a key contribution could come from OSCE in the field of good governance (notably in corruption
To this end, the international community should in-
fighting), gender equality and education. Such an initiative
clude the enhancement of Tunisia’s security, stability and
could be in fact developed on the basis of the existing
development among the objectives of its political agenda.
OSCE Mediterranean partnership programs and take ad-
In this view, the role which could be played by the North
vantage of the expertise gained by the organization else-
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the European Un-
where in the world. Moreover, such an involvement might
ion (EU) and the Organization for Security and Coopera-
represent a crucial opportunity for OSCE to gain a new
Atlantic Voices Volume 1 Issue 2
momentum after the rather deluding outcome of the Astana Summit in late 2010. Such a process would finally allow the re-launching of the international role of Tunisia by making it a factor of stabilization and dialogue for the whole region. Moreover, not only would national democratic and transparent institutions represent a further guarantee of internal stability and a viable model for neighboring countries,
Mahjoub, A., « Les Défis de la Transition Démocratique en Tunisie », EUISS, June 2011, http:// www.iss.europa.eu/fileadmin/euiss/documents/ ISS_Reports/Les_d%C3%A9fis_de_la_transition_d% C3%A9mocratique_en_Tunisie.pdf; 1
Bessis, S., « Tunisie, Une Transition Tumultueuse », Politique Internationale, Spring 2011;
...a culturally sensitive and longlasting engagement ... in the country remains vital ...
Labidi, K., « La Longue Descente aux Enfers de la Tunisie », Le Monde Diplomatique, March 2006, http://www.monde-diplomatique.fr/2006/03/ LABIDI/13253; 3
Tunisia with other regional and extra-regional players.
Gantin, K. and Seddik,O ., «Révolte du « Peuple des Mines en Tunisie », Le Monde Diplomatique , July 2008, http://www.mondediplomatique.fr/2008/07/GANTIN/16061;
Finally, this cooperation could even provide NATO, EU
would also secure the peaceful interaction of
and OSCE with a relevant pattern for future assistance and reconstruction initiatives outside the Mediterranean region, due to the growing need to combine common security concerns and fiscal restraint in major Western coun-
Ferjani, M.-C., « Bilan Préliminaire des Elections Tunisiennes du 23 Octobre », Kapitalis, November 2011, http://kapitalis.com/afkar/68-tribune/6707-bilanpreliminaire-des-elections-tunisiennes-du-23octobre.html;
on the future decisions taken by the Tunisian ad interim
Guellali, A., « Pathways and Pitfalls for Tunisia’s New Constituent Assembly», Human Rights Watch, October 2011, http://www.hrw.org/news/2011/10/17/ pathways-and-pitfalls-tunisia-s-new-constituent-assembly;
government in the foreign policy domain. In this regard, it
tries. Such a promising perspective will nonetheless depend
is noteworthy that virtually no room was devoted to these issues during the electoral campaign. Moreover, the influence of Ennahdha within the new governmental coalition will surely have an impact on the way Tunisia will behave on the international scene, especially in its relations with the West.
Frontini, A. and Missaoui, H.K., « NATO and EU Partnerships in the Mediterranean. The Case of Tunisia», Italia n A tla ntic C ommittee, Summ er 2011, www.comitatoatlantico.it; Caracciolo, L., “La Primavera Finita”, La Repubblica, July 2011, http://temi.repubblica.it/limes/la-primaverafinita/7025; 8
gagement of the three Organizations in the country re-
Aliboni, R., « Ipoteca Islamista su Egitto e Tunisia », Affari Internazionali, October 2011, http:// www.affarinternazionali.it/articolo.asp?ID=1882;
mains vital and should be developed through a progressive
Nonetheless, a culturally sensitive and long-lasting en-
and flexible approach, possibly starting with renewed public diplomacy initiatives as well as enhanced parliamentary exchanges within the relevant bodies of each Organization.
Luciolli, F. W., « Lybia and the Challenges of International Organizations », Longitude, March 2011, http:// www.comitatoatlantico.it/en/component/zoo/item/ lybia-and-the-future-of-international-organizations
The views expressed in this article are entirely those of the author. They do not necessarily represent the views of the Atlantic Treaty Association, it’s members, affiliates or staff.
Atlantic Voices Volume 1 Issue 2
ATA Special Report: 57th General Assembly in Tirana
he Atlantic Treaty Association successfully held its 57th General Assembly “Tackling new Security Challenges with Partners” in Tirana, Albania this November 14th to 16th. Experts and civil society representatives from 35 countries gathered for a three day seminar where the most pressing issues for transatlantic security and cooperation were discussed with political, diplomatic and military representatives. In attendance at the General Assembly was Ambassador Kolinda Grabar-Kitarovic, Assistant Secretary General for Public Diplomacy at NATO. Ambassador Grabar-Kiratovic outlined the priorities for NATO’s public diplomacy efforts in anticipation of the upcoming Chicago Summit. Key to this was that: “NATO’s public diplomacy should emphasize the enduring relevance of the transatlantic link and illustrate that Europe and America are effective and steadfast partners in global security.” 57th General Assembly underway in Tirana, Albania.
The Albanian Prime Minister, Dr. Sali Berisha, also
addressed General Assembly. The main body of the Assembly saw five panels of experts assembled, each to discuss and debate a particular issue. These panels were titled: “Beyond Afghanistan - the future of the International Coalition”; “NATO and EU Strategic Dialogue”; “Modern Societies and Cyber Threats”; “The Future of Partnerships in the Mediterranean and Middle East”; “The Future of Atlanticism - NGO perspectives”. All of the panels spoke at length on their topics, some of the key points raised included:
Underlining that the problems facing ISAF in Afghanistan cannot be resolved through purely military mechanisms, and in addition to this many of the civil problems, including corruption and narcotic production, require Afghan generated resolutions.
There needs to be greater collaboration than competition both within NATO, utilizing concepts like “smart defence”, and externally, particularly with partners such as the EU.
That the fight against Cyber Threats can work alongside better privacy protection for citizens.
That the democratic revolutions in the Arab world may not bring about “liberal” democracies as exist in the West, and that these governments will present new challenges.
NATO must determine a new “Master Text” which defines its beliefs and values, this text must be a unifying force that the whole Alliance can unite behind.
The newly elected YATA Executive Board address the 57th General Assembly of the ATA
The General Assembly also witnessed the election of a new Youth Atlantic Treaty Association Executive Board, tasked with shaping the activities of the YATA over the coming year.
Atlantic Voices Volume 1 Issue 2
Atlantic Voices is always seeking new material. If you are a
The Atlantic Treaty Association (ATA) is an international non-
young researcher, subject expert or professional and feel you have
governmental organization based in Brussels working to facilitate
a valuable contribution to make to the debate, then please get in
global networks and the sharing of knowledge on transatlantic
cooperation and security. By convening political, diplomatic and
We are looking for papers, essays, and book reviews on issues of importance to the NATO Alliance.
military leaders with academics, media representatives and young professionals, the ATA promotes the values set forth in the North
For details of how to submit your work please see our website.
Atlantic Treaty: Democracy, Freedom, Liberty, Peace, Security
Further enquiries can also be directed to the ATA Secretariat at the
and Rule of Law. The ATA membership extends to 39 countries
address listed below.
from North America to the Caucasus throughout Europe. In 1996 the Youth Atlantic Treaty Association was created to specifially include to the successor generation in our work. Since 1954, the ATA has advanced the public’s knowledge and understanding of the importance of joint efforts to transatlantic security, through its international programs, such as the Central and South Eastern European Security Forum, the Ukraine Dialogue and its Educational Platform. In 2011 the ATA adopted a new set of strategic goals that reflects the constantly evolving dynamics of international cooperation. These goal include:
The establishment of new and competitive programs on international security issues.
The development of research initiatives and security releted events for its Members.
The expansion of ATA international network of experts to countries in Northern Africa and Asia. The ATA is realizing these goals through new programs, more
All Images published in this issue of Atlantic Voices are the property of
policy activism and greater emphasis on joint research initiatives.
NATO, reproduced with NATO’s permission, unless otherwise stated.
These programs will also aid in the establishment of a network
Images should not be reproduced without permission from sources listed,
of international policy experts and professionals engaged in a
and remain the sole property of those sources.
dialogue with NATO.
Published on Nov 29, 2011
The second issue of the Atlantic Treaty Association's publication Atlantic Voices. This issue examines NATO relationships with North-Africa...