Page 1

Volume 1-Number 1, October2011

ATLANTIC TREATY ASSOCIATION

Emerging NATO-EU Partnerships on New Security Challenges Atlantic Voices is the monthly publication of the Atlantic Treaty Association. It aims to inform the debate on key issues that affect the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, its goals and its future. The work published in Atlantic Voices is written by young professionals and researchers. This issue, “Emerging NATO-EU Partnerships on New Security Challenges” aims to examine some of the areas in which NATO-EU Cooperation is required or undertaken in order to tackle emerging security threats that face the Atlantic Alliance. The articles contained in this issue explore issues related to NATO-EU cooperation, what is occurring at the moment, and whether this should be improved or built upon in the future. We hope you find the following pages both informative and thought provoking, As part of our goal in promoting and informing the public debate upon these topics, Atlantic Voices is happy to accept responses to the issue and articles we have selected.

Atlantic Voices Volume I Number 1

NATO-EU partnership: NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen meets Baroness Ashton, High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy in 2009 (© NATO )

Contents:

Jihad on the High Seas? Pirates, Profit, and the Islamist Connection James Bridger examines the issue of Piracy in the horn of Africa. His article looks at how the massive profits derived from Somali Piracy are actually spent, examining whether these are helping to fuel Somalia’s on -going civil war, and in particular whether the proceeds are funding the Islamist factions. Having explored these questions the article then goes on to make policy recommendations for NATO-EU in how to best tackle this issue and why it is so important.

Intensifying a Results Based Partnership: EU Member State Engagement in NATO Centres of Excellence Paul Pryce looks at NATO’s “Centres of Excellence”, exploring how these centres provide a basis for NATO-EU cooperation. The article makes particular reference to the NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence in Tallinn, Estonia, Paul also explores the opportunities for private and public partnerships to cooperate within a NATOEU framework on key security issues. 1


ATA Activities and Events

Starting this November the ATA is holding a series of monthly conferences on “New Security Challenges”. The conferences will bring together leading experts to discuss recent technical developments and policy implications in the fields of:  Unmanned Areal Vehicles  Maritime Piracy  Space Policy  Missile Defence  Cyber Defence  Arctic Policy More information, including dates and programmes will be available via the ATA website

The Transatlantic Research Award The Transatlantic Research Award aims to extend the debate on transatlantic security to global stakeholders. This program aims at involving future leaders and communicators in exercises aimed at generating cooperation, shared strategies and strategic thinking. The ATA will select ten individuals from universities in Brazil, Russia, India, China, Mexico, South Korea, South Africa, Australia and Japan and provide them with a one week training and education trip to Euro-Atlantic Institutions. More information will be made available through the ATA Website

About the Authors James Bridger

Paul Pryce

James Bridger is senior research analyst working with

Paul Pryce holds a Master of Arts in International Rela-

the Atlantic Council of Canada, focusing on issues of

tions from Tallinn University (Estonia). A former Canadi-

Transatlantic maritime security.

an Forces member, he now works on a number of human rights advocacy projects with the International Federation of Liberal Youth.

Atlantic Voices Volume I Issue 1

2


Jihad on the High Seas? Pirates, Profit, and the Islamist Connection by James Bridger

S

and is thus able to provide the pirate gangs with secure omali pirates took in approximately $US 415 bases in which they are largely in control of their own afmillion in ransom payments over the last two fairs. A UN report based on information gathered years - an enormous sum, partic- It is a vicious cycle that piracy perpet- from the pirate-infested Puntland village of Eyl revealed a rough breakdown of the ransom spoils ularly for a country uates the very conditions that allow it (see Table 1). where the average flourish - violence, corruption and inyearly income is roughThese figures are worrying, because they indicate 1 ly $600 . The issue of stability. how diffuse the pirate economy has become. Hishow this money is torically, piracy has thrived when the apparent ecospent, though poorly nomic benefit makes the crime tolerable to the local comunderstood, has grave implications for the entire region. munity. This being said, the “trickle down effect” that piFor those committed to achieving stability in the Horn of rate profits have on the local economy is a contested subAfrica, the greatest worry is that pirate funds are finding ject. The industry has reportedly brought many new jobs their way into the hands of violent Islamist insurgents. to the impoverished communities - from kiosks selling Though this has been espoused by both local and foreign food and drinks to the pirates, to catering companies estabofficials, equating pirates with terrorists is an over simplifilished to feed hostages. It has also been noted however, cation that fails to take into account the intricacies of the that the influx of cash has resulted in massive inflation in ever-shifting strategic alliances within Somalia. That said, a pirate towns. The pirate market has driven up the price of partnership of convenience between pirate gangs and Isbasic goods and wealthy corsairs have reportedly bought up lamist militias has emerged in recent years and the manner the best real estate4. in which it may evolve is far from clear. A close examination of the way the pirates’ profits are distributed is thereThough much of the income generated by the pirate fore essential to a more nuanced understanding of the role gangs is divided amongst themselves and investors, protecpiracy plays in regional destabilization. With both NATO tion payments are also made to local warlords. These large Figure 1: Distribution of Ransom Spoils in Eyl2 regular injections of cash undoubtedly help finance conflicts within the country. With Somalia under an arms emRole in Piracy Operation Share of Ransom bargo since the beginning of the Civil War in 1992, many Spoils of the weapons that drive the conflict are acquired across Pirates involved in the hijacking 30% the Strait of Bab el-Mandeb, in Yemen. As they already posses the maritime capacities to do so, transporting weapOn-land militias 10% ons from Yemen to Somalia represents a logical alternate source of revenue for pirate gangs. When guns reach the Local elders and officials 10% markets of Mogadishu and other cites, they sell for some of the cheapest prices in Africa - AK-47s often retailing for Financiers 20% $100 or less depending on how heavy the fighting is at the time4. Sponsors 30% and the EU committing billions of dollars a year to counter -piracy efforts, the policy implications should be of great concern. When tabulating how ransom profits are spent, a distinction needs to be made between the piracy epicenters of the northern Puntland region - in which the pirates, protected by clan-based political networks, are more independent - and the pirate ports of south and central Somalia which have recently come under the sway of Islamist militias. The autonomous region of Puntland has been spared much of the violence that characterizes southern Somalia Atlantic Voices Volume I Issue 1

Some wealthier pirate gangs are now becoming significant actors in Somalia’s Civil War, using ransom profits to build their own small armies. The New York Times reports that one such group in central Somalia now has an infantry division of several hundred men, 80 heavy machine guns, and a small fleet of trucks mounted with antiaircraft guns5. Infusing both hard currency and weapons into one of the world’s most volatile states is bound to have destabilizing effects. Better-armed and funded warlords and militias can have nothing but a negative impact on the fragile reconciliation process currently underway in Somalia. It is a vicious cycle that piracy perpetuates the very conditions that allow it flourish - violence, corruption and instability. 3


Figure 2 – Al-Shabaab’s Share of Ransom Spoils in Haradhere6 Ship Captured

Date of Release

Total Ransom Paid

Payment Made to al-Shabaab

MV Izumi

February 25, 2011

$4.5 million

$200,000

MV Rak Africana

March 8, 2011

$2 million

$80,000

4%

MV York

March 9, 2011

$4.5 million

$100,000

2.2%

Beluga Nomination

April 13, 2011

$5.5 million

$600,000

11%

MV Asphalt Venture

April 15, 2011

$3.6 million

$66,000

2%

Worrying as the Puntland situation may be, the greater danger is that Somalia’s Southern pirates have begun cooperating with the Islamist militias that now hold political sway in the region, the most powerful of which is alShabaab (“the Youth”). Unlike other factions fighting in Somalia, al-Shabaab - having pledged loyalty to al-Qaeda’s ideology - has had a more internationalist outlook in their choice of targets. Seeking to expel foreign influences from the country, they have attacked African Union troops, journalists, and humanitarian workers. Most recently, alShabaab has garnered notoriety for their refusal to allow “infidel” food aid into Somalia’s famine-ravished regions. Expanding the scope of their operations, the group has also begun to launch raids across the Kenyan border and has claimed responsibility for the World Cup bombings in Uganda that left 74 dead.

Al-Shabaab’s Percentage of Total Ransom 4%

Somalia’s major pirate gangs and Islamist groups originally maintained separate “spheres of influence,” however the ebbing tide of the country’s civil war has pushed them into closer contact. Victories against pro-government militias have seen al-Shabaab spread its influence northward, while international naval efforts in the Gulf of Aden have forced the pirate gangs to operate further south. The southern al-Shabaab - controlled city of Kismayu, for example, has witnessed a recent rise in the number of pirates launching raids from the port9. An early report of collusion came from Canada’s Integrated Threat Assessment Centre, which noted in 2009 that al-Shabaab was engaged in a “relationship of convenience” with certain pirate gangs, providing “weapons, combat training and local protection” in exchange for a share of ransom spoils10. There were also indications that the Islamist group - through cooperation with central Somalia’s pirates - has been developing a primitive maritime capacity in order to bring both weapons and foreign jihadists into the country11. Though fears of “maritime Jihadists” were stoked when Somali piracy exploded on to the world scene in 2008-2009, a UN special report concluded that there was “no proof of an operational relationship” between the pirate gangs and al-Shabaab12.

Determining the nature of the relationship between Somalia’s pirate gangs and insurgent groups is a difficult endeavor, especially given that the country is regarded as an information ‘black hole’ by Western analysts. Certain reports indicate that there is a cooperative association between pirates and Islamists, while others portray a more antagonistic relationship. In theory at least, the two have Pirate-Islamist relations took a turn however, when in little in common. “Pirates,” Martin Murphy writes, “are May 2010, radical insurgents overran local forces interested in living off and seized the pirate hub of Haradhere in central the world not changing Somalia. The group - Hizbul Islam - had originally it, compared to terror...the greater danger is that Somalia’s vowed to shut down piracy in the town, but reportists who are seeking a Southern pirates have begun cooperat- edly reached an agreement with the pirates under world that fits their 7 which their crime would be allowed to continue in own distorted views.” ing with the Islamist militias ... exchange for a share of the profits13. Just seven Though their motives months later, Hizbul Islam collapsed and Haradhere differ, there are several fell into the hands of al-Shabaab. Once again, those precedents of terrorist groups cooperating with or cowho had previously decreed piracy to be a haram opting criminal organizations - including pirates - to serve (forbidden) and punishable offence now saw it as a lucratheir own ends. Murphy notes that these types of relationtive source of income - desperately needed as a decline in ships begin with simple acts of cooperation that are benefiexternal funding had caused al-Shabaab to become “starved cial to both parties. Drug smuggling, for example, is an of financial support.”14 area where the interests of terrorist groups and criminal organizations have often converged. Examples include the After seizing Haradhere and detaining a number of piFARC in Columbia, the United Wa State Army in Burma rate gang leaders, it was initially reported that al-Shabaab and the Taliban in Afghanistan. The MNLF, an Islamist had settled a multi-million dollar deal to receive 20% of all insurgency in the Philippines, co-opted local pirates to future ransom spoils15. However, it appears that payments assist them in the hijacking of several ships in an effort to to the militia have been made in a much more ad hoc shipproselytize and secure ransom payments to fund their acby-ship basis. A Reuters investigation that corroborated tivities8. information provided by pirates, Shabaab militants, and Atlantic Voices Volume I Issue 1

4


Haradhere residents found that the Islamists’ ransom cut bilization efforts will need to be better coordinated in orranged from a low of 2% to a high of 11%16. A compoundder to meet the twin challenges of piracy and Islamist ining of the data provided from five transactions reveals that surgency. Intelligence sharing and cooperative operations al-Shabaab was only receiving an average ransom cut of between coalition naval forces - particularly those of 4.7%. Thus aside from the payment of “docking fees” and NATO and the EU - and their land-based allies - namely impromptu ransom shares, there is little evidence to sugAfrican Union troops and local authorities in the autonogest a cooperative partnership between the two factions. mous regions of Somaliland and Puntland - will be crucial While this source of income allows al-Shabaab to continue in the fight to push back al-Shabaab and dismantle pirate to fund its campaign of terror in Somalia, they have bases. Local capacity gained no further operational advantage from the building in Puntland is arrangement. The relationship between the Islamist essential in this regard ...cooperative operations between militia and Haradhere’s pirates, Murphy concludes, coalition naval forces - particularly those as it is both the counis one of extortion, not collusion17. try’s piracy epicenter of NATO and the EU…will be crucial in and a barrier to the the fight to push back al-Shabaab and While one must be cautious about equating northward expansion of piracy with terrorism, the upside is that internadismantle pirate bases. al-Shabaab. tional efforts to establish maritime security around the Horn of Africa will serve to protect against Though the institutions both. As terrorism expert Brian Michael Jenkins notes are weak, rudimentary security structures exist in the re“whatever means [are used] to suppress piracy will have a gion and interviews with pirates indicate that they do fear ‘knock-on’ effect of making the operating environment the authorities and actively try to hide from them20. What more difficult for terrorists.”18 A secure and regulated mais required then, is a joint support program to equip, train rine environment will prevent not only piracy, but the and (perhaps most importantly) fund a reformed Puntland smuggling of weapons and foreign jihadists as well. Alsecurity sector comprised of an army, police force and Shabaab, already weakened by military and economic setcoastguard. This long-term solution should be financially backs, could be further financially asphyxiated through a attractive to the international community, as it is calculatconcerted effort to attack its piracy related income. A reed that the cost of keeping one frigate at sea for six months newed effort to target this financing is urgently needed as could pay the wages of 100,00021 local police for the same ransom payments are dramatically increasing, rising from period. Due to their interconnectedness, prudent counteran average of $150,000 per ship in 2005, to a whopping piracy policy is vital to counter-terrorism efforts in the $5.4 million in 201019. While coalition naval patrols will Horn of Africa. If properly applied, both Somalia and the remain an integral part of this strategy for the foreseeable wider world will continue to reap the benefits long after future, it is well understood that the ultimate solution lies the bandits have been driven from the sea. ashore. As Somalia’s onshore and maritime security environments become increasingly intertwined, international sta-

Atlantic Voices Volume I Issue 1

5


Notes Oceans Beyond Piracy. “The Economic Cost of Maritime Piracy.” One Earth Future. (December 2010) p.10 . Available from <http://oceansbeyondpiracy.org/sites/default/files/ documents_old/ The_Economic_Cost_of_Piracy_Full_Report.pdf> 2 Harper, Mary. “Following the Somali piracy money trial.” BBC World New., 24 May 2009. <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/ hi/africa/8061535.stm> 3 Oceans Beyond Piracy. “The Economic Cost of Maritime Piracy.” p.23. 4 Dickinson, Elizabeth. "Arming Somalia." Foreign Policy. 10 September 2009. Available from <http:// www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2009/09/10/ arming_somalia? 5 Lough, Richard. “Piracy ransom cash ends up with Somali militants.” Reuters. 6 July 2011. Available from <http:// uk.reuters.com/article/2011/07/06/uk-somalia-piracyidUKTRE7652AW20110706> 6 Murphy, Martin N. Small boats, Weak states, Dirty Money: Piracy and Maritime Terrorism in the Modern World. (London: Hurst & Company, 2009)p.410 7 Murphy, Martin N. Somalia: The New Barbary? Piracy and Islam in the Horn of Africa. (London: Hurst and Company, 2011) p.139. 8 Murphy, Martin N. Contemporary Piracy and Maritime Terrorism: The Threat to International Security. (New York: Routledge, 2007) p.77. 9 Lough. “Piracy ransom cash ends up with Somali militants.” 10 Bell, Stewart. “Somali militants training pirates.” The National Post. 3 December 2009. Available from <http:// www.hiiraan.com/comments2-news-2009-decsomali_militants_training_pirates.aspx> 11 Pham, Peter. "Somali Pirates Undeterred by Naval Buildup, but Risks Heightened." World Defense Review. 2 April 2009. Available from <http://worlddefensereview.com/ pham040209.shtml> 12 Cited in Lough. “Piracy ransom cash ends up with Somali militants.” 13 Gettleman, Jeffrey. “In Somali Civil War, Both Sides Embrace Pirates.” The New York Times. 1 Sep 2010. Available from <http://www.nytimes.com/2010/09/02/world/ africa/02pirates.html> 14 Charbonneau, Louis. “Somalia militants weakened, could regroup: U.N.” Reuter.10 August 2011. Available from <http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/08/10/us-somaliaun-idUSTRE77962S20110810> 15 Reuters. “Somali rebels agree ransom deal with pirate leaders.” 22 February 2011. Available from <http://in.reuters.com/ article/2011/02/22/somalia-piracyidINLDE71L03020110222> 16 Lough. “Piracy ransom cash ends up with Somali militants.” 17 Lough. “Piracy ransom cash ends up with Somali militants.” 18 Murphy, Martin N. Small boats, Weak states, Dirty Money p.410. 19 Oceans Beyond Piracy. “The Economic Cost of Maritime Piracy.” p.9. 20 Hansen, Stig Jarle. “Piracy in the greater Gulf of Aden” Myths, Misconceptions and Remedies.” Norwegian Institute for Urban and Regional Research (October 2009) p.57. 21 Hansen, Stig Jarle. “Piracy in the greater Gulf of Aden” p.61. 1

Atlantic Voices Volume I Issue 1

The views expressed in this article are entirely those of the author. They do not necessarily represent the views of the Atlantic Treaty Association, it’s members, affiliates or staff. 6


Intensifying a Results-Based Partnership: EU Member State Engagement in NATO Centres of Excellence by Paul Pryce

W

ith the European Union seeking an increasingly active role in international affairs, and with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization looking to define its role beyond the International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan, there has been much debate as to whether an EU-NATO partnership is possible and what form it could take. There is certainly a significant degree of overlap in the memberships of the two organizations. 21 of the 27 EU Member States are counted among NATO’s 28 Member States. More specifically, Austria, Cyprus, Finland, Ireland, Malta, and Sweden are not NATO members, though all but Cyprus are parties to the Partnership for Peace. Despite this overlap, a formal and intensive partnership between two very important European security structures remains elusive. Joint efforts by the EU and NATO in the Western Balkans in previous years “…indicate that the organizations are working together to promote long-term conflict prevention, even though most joint initiatives are operational.”1 With the beginnings of a more direct partnership residing with practical, results-based initiatives at this time, one potential means for generating further political will behind EU-NATO partnership would be engaging non-NATO EU Member States in the work of the NATO Centres of Excellence.

traditional NATO command structure, offering them considerable freedom in determining their respective research priorities. In fact, the principal decision-making body of each COE is a Steering Committee made up of representatives of the Host Nation and Sponsoring Nations. The Host Nation is, as the name suggests, the country where the COE is located. The Sponsoring Nations are all those NATO member states which are signatories to the agreements specific to that COE and which contribute personnel and funding for the operational budget.

According to NATO, “Centres of Excellence (COEs) are nationally or multiIt is worth noting that the vast majority of Host nationally funded insti...one potential means for generating Nations are EU Member States. Of the NATO actutions that train and further political will behind EU-NATO credited COEs, only three are not located on the educate leaders and partnership would be … NATO Centres territory of EU Member States: Cold Weather Opspecialists from NATO erations in Bodø, Norway; Combined Joint Operamember and partner of Excellence. tions from the Sea in Norfolk, Virginia in the Unitcountries…” and assist ed States; and Defence Against Terrorism in Ankain expanding the Allira, Turkey. All three of the COEs currently in developance’s capacity to operate in varying environments under ment are also located on the territory of EU Member diverse conditions2. Many of these COEs take the form of States. Within NATO, there are certainly more EU Memresearch hubs, with experts spending time not just training ber States than non-members. But the degree to which EU personnel from NATO and its partner countries but also Member States play host to COEs is also disproportionate working on policy and technological solutions to specific to their number. challenges currently facing the Alliance. There are currently 16 NATO accredited COEs in operation. Three additional COEs are currently in development. These are coordinated by Alliance Command Transformation (ACT) in Norfolk, Virginia in the United States of America. As these COEs obtain direction from ACT, they remain officially NATO bodies but are outside the

Atlantic Voices Volume I Issue 1

Figures 1 and 2 demonstrate the varying levels of participation in the COEs among NATO Member States and the non-NATO EU Member States. As is shown, Germany and the Netherlands are both Host Nations to more than one COE. Romania and Hungary are also counted among the Sponsoring Nations for a considerable number of

7


Figure 1: NATO Member State Involvement in Centres of Excellence NATO Member State

COEs

Albania Belgium

MilENG, C2, JAP, NMW (Host)

Bulgaria

DAT

Canada

MilENG, JAP, CJOS

Croatia Czech Republic

MilENG, JAP, JCBRN (Host), MilMED, EOD

Denmark

MilENG, CMC

Estonia

CCD (Host)

France

MilENG, C-IED, JAP, MilMED, EOD

Germany Greece

MilENG (Host), CCD, DAT, CMC, C2, CSW (Host), C-IED, JAP (Host), JCBRN, MilMED, NMW, CJOS MilENG, CSW, HUMINT, JAP, JCBRN, CJOS

Hungary

CCD, DAT, CMC, C-IED, HUMINT, JAP, JCBRN, MilMED (Host), EOD

Iceland Italy

MilENG, CCD, JAP, JCBRN, MilMED, NMW, CJOS

Latvia

CCD, CMC

Lithuania

CCD

Luxembourg Netherlands Norway

MilENG, DAT, CMC (Host), C2 (Host), CSW, C-IED, JAP, MilMED, NMW, CJOS MilENG, C2, JAP, CJOS

Poland

MilENG, CMC, CSW, HUMINT, JAP, JCBRN

Portugal

C-IED, JAP, CJOS

Romania

MilENG, DAT, C-IED, HUMINT (Host), JAP, JCBRN, MilMED, EOD, CJOS

Slovakia

CCD, C2, HUMINT, JCBRN, EOD (Host)

Slovenia

CMC, HUMINT, JCBRN

Spain

CCD, C2, C-IED (Host), JAP, CJOS

Turkey

MilENG, DAT (Host), C2, CSW, HUMINT, JAP, CJOS

United Kingdom

MilENG, DAT, JAP, JCBRN, CJOS

United States

MilENG, CCD, DAT, C2, CSW, C-IED, JAP, JCBRN, NMW, CJOS (Host)

MilENG: Military Engineering

CJOS: Combined Joint Operations from the Sea

CCD: Cooperative Cyber Defence

JAP: Joint Air Power

DAT: Defence Against Terrorism

HUMINT: Human Intelligence

CMC: Civil-Military Cooperation

JCBRN: The Joint CBRN Defence Centre of Excellence

C2: Command & Control

MilMED: Military Medical

CSW: Confined and Shallow Waters

EOD: Explosive Ordnance Disposal

C-IED: Counter Improvised Explosive Devices

NMW: Naval Mine Warfare

Atlantic Voices Volume I Issue 1

8


COEs, as are the non-EU NATO Member States Turkey and the United States of America. Unfortunately, as of this writing, information could not be found as to which countries are counted among the Sponsoring Nations of the Cold Weather Operations COE or the Analysis and Simulation Centre for Air Operations. Therefore, these COEs have not been included in Figures 1 and 2.

Canadian officials should endeavour to identify several overarching policy priorities, determine which COEs are already working in these areas, and become a Sponsoring Nation of these same COEs. Alternatively, there might be an area not yet covered by existing COEs which would be an opportune basis for Canada to develop a COE of its own, becoming a Host Nation itself and matching Norway’s level of commitment to the research and knowledge dynamic of the Alliance.

As evidenced by Figure 2, non-NATO EU Member States have remained almost completely disRegarding the outreach of the COEs and NATO engaged from the work ... more ambitious efforts to engage non- itself, it is also important to note that the COEs are of the COEs. The sole NATO countries … would be an excel- not strictly intended as collaboration only between exception has been that national governments. For example, according to lent starting point for expanding the of Finland, which is the website of the Cooperative Cyber Defence NATO-EU partnership counted as a Sponsoring COE, “…the Centre can establish cooperative relaNation of the COE for tions with non-NATO nations, universities, reOperations in Confined search institutions, and business as contributing and Shallow Waters, based in Kiel, Germany. The participarticipants.”5 Accordingly, there is significant potential pation of Finland in the work of the CSW COE should not for public-private partnerships to be formed. COEs can necessarily be taken as a testament to outreach efforts by not only serve as a clearinghouses of information and best NATO or by that particular COE. Rather, the Finnish Napractices, but can serve as a matchmaker between private vy has had a demonstrably strong interest in operations in institutions with expertise in one specialized area and naconfined and shallow waters. For example, in September tional militaries which have a need for these same exper2010, Finland played host to Northern Coasts 10. Northtise. ern Coasts is a large-scale multinational naval training exEven so, private institutions can benefit significantly ercise that takes place in one part of the Baltic Sea or anfrom engagement with COEs in practical aspects other other each year. It is intended “…to improve the interopthan access to the COE’s network of contacts. An illustraerability between participating units and countries with tive example could involve a private firm that specializes in main emphasis on maritime operations in confined and Internet security. By becoming a contributing partner to shallow waters.”3 the Cooperative Cyber Defence COE in Tallinn, Estonia, The CSW COE also routinely provides support for that private firm would have the opportunity to collaborate Northern Coasts. For example, at the 2010 edition hosted with NATO-related experts. Aside from the obvious beneby Finland, the CSW COE made contributions that fofits that would come with this increased access to inforcused on three areas of training: high speed boat operations mation and ideas, there would potentially be some inin confined and shallow waters, force protection in an ancreased marketability to the firm in question and its prodchorage or harbour environment, and surface-to-surface ucts. Reliability is important to consumers seeking to purmissile deployment in confined and shallow waters4. chase Internet security-related products, and the credibilThrough this involvement, the CSW COE has been able to ity of a NATO COE specializing in cyber defence imparts impart its expertise to military personnel of non-NATO an increased sense of reliability to those same products. EU Member States that are not Sponsoring Nations, since Of course, this capacity for engagement with aspects these countries may be participating in the training exercisbeyond the public sector need not apply only to for-profit es. At Northern Coasts 10, this was the case for Swedish personnel. Figure 2: Non-NATO EU Member State InNonetheless, more ambitious efforts to engage nonNATO countries as contributing partners with one or more COEs are required and would be an excellent starting point for expanding the NATO-EU partnership. At the same time, some NATO Member States could contribute to increased interest among non-NATO EU Member States by increasing their own involvement in the work of COEs. Whereas the United States and Turkey are actively engaged in a significant number of COEs, Canada only contributes to a very select few. Norway’s lack of participation in many COEs is off-set by that country’s status as the Host Nation of the Cold Weather Operations COE. Atlantic Voices Volume I Issue 1

volvement in Centres of Excellence Non-NATO EU Member State

COEs

Austria Cyprus Finland

CSW

Ireland Malta Sweden

9


enterprise. A post-secondary institution, such as a universied by the 16 currently NATO accredited COEs, there is ty research institute specializing in cyber security, could immense potential for Austria, Cyprus, Ireland, and Malta also become a contributing partner of the CCD COE. – not to mention Finland and Sweden – to be engaged Even partnerships between COEs themselves have taken more actively in the research work of the COEs. place and have produced considerable results. In close cooperation with the Combined Joint Operations from the Notes Sea COE, the COE on Operations in Confined and Shal1 low Waters organizes an annual Maritime Security ConferStewart, Emma J. The European Union and Conflict Prevenence. The next such tion: Policy Evolution and Outcome. (2006). Piscataway, conference, set to take New Jersey: Transaction. p.216 place in June 2012 in ...private institutions can benefit signifi- 2NATO. (2011). Centres of Excellence. Available from: Halifax, Canada, will cantly from engagement with COEs in <http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/ include seminars on practical aspects other than access to the topics_68372.htm> timely issues, such as 3 the employment of UnCOE’s network of contacts. Finnish Ministry of Defence. (2010, September 9). manned Aerial Vehicles Northern Coasts 10. Available from: <http:// in coastal areas or harwww.puolustusvoimat.fi/wcm/Erikoissivustot/ bour protection6. noco2010/English/Overview/> More specific to private-public partnerships in the context of COEs, there has already been some exciting progress made in this regard. For example, the aforementioned CCD COE hosts the annual International Conference on Cyber Conflict. In June 2011, the third edition of this conference was held in Tallinn, with 380 experts from around the world in attendance. These attendees included academics and private IT professionals. The Conference was supported with financing from the EU Regional Development Fund, but the CCD COE also obtained agreements from two private sector co-sponsors: the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, and RSA NetWitness7. In short, public-private and NATO-EU partnerships were being explored on a very practical, results-based manner through the 2011 International Conference on Cyber Conflict, with a NATO COE coordinating the event, the EU financially supporting it, and two private organizations co-sponsoring it. Initiatives like the International Conference on Cyber Conflict in Tallinn or the upcoming Maritime Security Conference in Halifax are important first steps in engaging diverse partners in the work of NATO COEs. However, if these research centres are to reach their full potential in generating political will for a lasting NATO-EU partnership, more intensive efforts are required on the part of all relevant parties – NATO, ACT, Host Nations, Sponsoring Nations, and the COEs themselves – to involve nonNATO EU Member States and private/civic organizations as contributing partners. The Finnish Navy identified building its operational capabilities in confined and shallow waters as a strategic priority and, perhaps as a result of its previous experience collaborating with the CSW COE through the Northern Coasts exercises, determined that a closer relationship with that COE as a contributing partner was a logical pooling of resources. In time, perhaps the Swedish Navy will come to a similar conclusion. But with the diverse array of expertise and specializations represent-

Atlantic Voices Volume I Issue 1

COE CSW. (2011). Northern Coasts 2010. Available from: <http://www.coecsw.org/programm-of-work/trials/31northern-coasts-2010.html> 4

CCD COE. (2011). Terms of Participation. Available from: <http://www.ccdcoe.org/44.html> 5

COE CSW. (2011). Upcoming Events – Maritime Security Conference 2012. Available from: <http://www.coecsw.org/ events/upcoming-events.html> 6

CCD COE. (2011). 3rd International Conference on Cyber Conflict. Available from: <http://www.ccdcoe.org/ICCC/> 7

The views expressed in this article are entirely those of the author. They do not necessarily represent the views of the Atlantic Treaty Association, it’s members, affiliates or staff. 10


Atlantic Voices Volume I Issue 1

11


Atlantic Voices is always seeking new material. If you

The Atlantic Treaty Association (ATA) is an international non-

are a young researcher, subject expert or professional and

governmental organization based in Brussels working to

feel you have a valuable contribution to make to the de-

facilitate global networks and the sharing of knowledge on

bate, then please get in touch.

transatlantic cooperation and security. By convening political,

We are looking for papers, essays, and book reviews on issues of importance to the NATO Alliance.

diplomatic and military leaders with academics, media representatives and young professionals, the ATA promotes the

For details of how to submit your work please see our

values set forth in the North Atlantic Treaty: Democracy,

website. Further enquiries can also be directed to the ATA

Freedom, Liberty, Peace, Security and Rule of Law. The ATA

Secretariat at the address listed below.

membership extends to 39 countries from North America to the Caucasus throughout Europe. In 1996 the Youth Atlantic Treaty Association was created to specifially include to the successor generation in our work. Since 1954, the ATA has advanced the public’s knowledge and understanding of the importance of joint efforts to transatlantic security, through its international programs, such as the Central and South Eastern European Security Forum, the Ukraine Dialogue and its Educational Platform. In 2011 the ATA adopted a new set of strategic goals that reflects the constantly evolving dynamics of international cooperation. These goal include: 

The establishment of new and competitive programs on international security issues.

The development of research initiatives and security releted events for its Members.

The expansion of ATA international network of experts to countries in Northern Africa and Asia.

The ATA is realizing these goals through new programs, more policy activism and greater emphasis on joint research initiatives. These programs will also aid in the establishment of a network All Images published in this issue of Atlantic Voices are the property of NATO,

of international policy experts and professionals engaged in a

reproduced with NATO’s permission.

dialogue with NATO.

ATLANTIC TREATY ASSOCIATION ASSOCIATION DU TRAITÉ ATLANTIQUE ATA Secretariat Rue des Petits Carmes, 20 1000 Bruxelles secretariat@ata-sec.org www.ata-sec.org Atlantic Voices Volume I Issue 1

12

Atlantic Voices - Vol. 1 no. 1  

The first issue of the Atlantic Treaty Association's new publication Atlantic Voices. This issue focuses upon NATO-EU partnerships in relati...

Read more
Read more
Similar to
Popular now
Just for you