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AmĂŠricas The Johns Hopkins Journal of Latin American Studies 2012 Volume 3

Published By The Johns Hopkins University Program in Latin American Studies Baltimore, Maryland


Américas, the Johns Hopkins Journal of Latin American Studies was established in 2005 by students and faculty at the Johns Hopkins University under the endorsement of the Program in Latin American Studies. Our mission is to provide a multi-disciplinary forum for students, scholars and policy-makers from all over the world to present and discuss articles pertaining to Latin America, its issues and its diaspora.

Américas’ editorial board is revised every year with the purpose of guaranteeing a journal of the highest quality. Américas’ criteria for article selection are: innovation of the topic, strength of the argument and supportive data and bibliography.

Our websited is available at http://www.americasjhu.org Américas, the Johns Hopkins Journal of Latin American Stuides Published By The Johns Hopkins Univeristy Program in Latin American Studies Homewood Campus 3400 N. Charles St. Baltimore United States


Table of Contents Acknowledgment and Journal Staff

1

Letter From The Editor-In-Chief

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Socioeconomic Modernisation and Democratisation: Explaining Elite Choices in Colombia and Spain. Nicol谩s Robinson Andrade

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Rejecting The Bomb: Conflicting Conclusions from Argentina and Brazil Philippe Mauger

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Learning From the Global South: The Case of the Huichol People Within the Context of Indigenous Anti-Mining Movements in Latin America Eva Valladares Ant贸n

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The Complexity of Venezuelan Politics and the Upcoming Elections of November 2012 Steve Ellner

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Ricardo Flores Mag贸n: Construction and Critique of His Liberation Utopia Rogelio Laguna

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Neoliberalism in Colombia: Where is the Contention? Fabio Palacio

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Public Local Innovative Practices in Latin America: An Analysis of InternetDatabases of 11 Awards for Local Innovative Practices Erick G. Palomares

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ACKNOWLEDGMENT The Editorial Board of Américas thanks the Program in Latin American Studies for its annual support.

2012 Journal Staff Editor-in-Chief

Hugo Cervantes

Executive Editor

Charlotte James

Faculty Board

Eduardo González Franklin W. Knight Gibrán Ramírez Reyes Mónica López-González

Chief of Public Relations

Jossie Flor Sapunar Amanda Levine Isabella Perales Isabella Ciuffetelli

Public Relations Team

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Editors

Lisa Smith Christine Fiedler Tristan Mohabir Kessie Alexandre

Copy Editing Team

Cathleen Harris Courtney Sender Samantha Choos Edward Galvez

Layout Editors

Elina Shapsay Leiberh Díaz Ricardo Linares

Américas Journal of Latin American Studies


Letter From The Editor-In-Chief

Letter From The Editor-In-Chief With the era of dictatorships and neoliberal policies in the past, Latin Americans seem to be taking their destinies back in their own hands. Over the course of the past two decades, a significant amount of people has engaged in opening up and creating spaces of participation. In a region where democracy has been long overdue, this task is and has not been easy to carry out. In this vein, there is enough reason to show optimism on the progress made. Brazil, for instance, has emerged with a protagonistic role in the hemisphere as product of its achievements with regards to public health and poverty alleviation. Furthermore, the consolidation of the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC) a couple of months ago emphasizes the potential that Latin American countries have to make their cultural similarities and common past a force to solve the arising regional challenges. Nevertheless the worst mistake we could fall into would be the one of excessive self-congratulation. Despite the advances that have taken place in Latin America, many issues are still pending, and those are the ones we attempt to deal with at Américas. In the opening chapter, Nicolás Robinson opens up this year’s edition with a debate on the process of democratisation. By comparing the cases of Colombia and Spain, Robinson challenges certain assumptions within academia with regards to democracy. In evaluating the role of causes versus causers, Robinson’s ponderation is worth considering. This topic takes a special connotation if we look at Fabio Palacio’s essay, which focuses on Colombia as well and tries to answer the question of why to the light of neoliberal policies, the comtempt showed by citizens was lower than in other Latin American countries. In considering the different complexities democracy has brought about, there are a couple of cases worth analyising. In the first one, Steve Ellner discusses what the result of the 2012 elections will mean to the path democracy has taken in Venezuela under the leadership of Hugo Chávez. In the second one, Eva Valladares highlights that even in a country with a relative stable democracy like Mexico, the treatment to the rights of a particular indigenous population are still in question, and for this end she proposes a series of case studies from South America to improve the situation. Additionally, two interesting theorical essays are present in this year’s edition. The first one is a challenge to the neorealist theory of international relations with regards to Argentina and Brazil. Written by Phillippe Mauger, this essay attempts to prove different flaws the authors sees in the approach of such popular theory in explaning the behaviour of the largest South American nations in their defence decisions. In turn, Rogelio Laguna provides us with a thoughtful essay of the role that Mexican philosopher Ricardo Flores Magón had in the genesis of the Revolution of 1910, particularly with regards to the issue of utopian thinking.

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Letter From The Editor-In-Chief

This journal finalises with an interesting essay by Erick Palomares. After an exhaustive investigation of the awards granted by several international institutions to social innovations at the municipal level, Palomares is able to draw interesting trends that can be useful for any Latin American mayor that reads this journal and is interested in implementing new projects for the benefit of his/her community. Overall, we at Américas are very happy with the quality and diversity in the topics chosen by the authors and with the conclusions they have reached. I want to make use of this brief space to thank them for cooperating with our editors and copy editors in the process of making their entries reach the potential they have. Finally, I would like to thank everyone in the Américas editorial board. It’s been an intense process and everyone’s initiative and support has been vital in the realisation of this project. I am sure that with the effort put in this endeavour, the number and interest from students, scholars and policy-makers from all over the world will continue to grow and the future editions of Américas will continue to be of the liking of those who read it. In this vein, dear reader, I hope your time spent in Américas will be fruitful.

Truly yours,

Hugo Cervantes ‘12 Editor-In-Chief

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Socioeconomic Modernisation and Democratisation: Explaining Elite Choices in Colombia and Spain Nicolás Robinson Andrade Huntington has famously argued that democracies are created by causers, and not causes. However, his definition of democracy is too narrow to understand the consolidation of democracy in Latin America. Indeed, his interpretation does not fully explain why some countries have undergone democratisation with much more success than others. This paper shows how the role of elites in transitions to democracy is limited. Using the examples of Colombia and Spain, it argues that socioeconomic development is of paramount importance, ensuring adequate conditions for liberal democracy to flourish. At the beginning of the twentieth century, relatively few countries in the world were democratic. However, during the twentieth century, democracy “seemed to take on the character of an almost irresistible global tide,”1 along with definitions and theories which attempted to explain and predict it. Still today, media and collective memory often associate many transitions to democracy with prominent individuals, such as King Juan Carlos and Adolfo Suárez in Spain. But how accurate is this connection between key actors and democratisation? This question is part of a wider argument on what factors influence or cause “democratisation,” defined as “political changes moving in a democratic direction.”2 The requirements necessary for successful democratisation depend largely on theoretical approach used in the analysis. Therefore, this paper begins analysing the important role of agency in democratisation through a transition approach, using Colombia and Spain as case studies. It then uses the modernisation and structural approaches3 to emphasise the role of structure, analysing economic prosperity (as a pre-condition for democratisation), and the effect of economic prosperity on class structures (as creating favourable conditions for democratisation). Hence, it argues that even though ‘causers’ are important in creating democracies, the decisions of agents are taken within certain structures, and cannot be pointed to as the sole drivers of democratisation. This theoretical convergence is drawn from Potter’s4 statement, “democratisation in any country is so complex and multi-faceted that no one theoretical approach captures this complexity and explains it satisfactorily,” as well as Whitehead’s argument that “we should

Nicolás Robinson Andrade is a student of the Latin American Centre (LAC) at the University of Oxford. He holds a degree in Politics with International Relations from the University of Bath, and has worked and travelled extensively in the Americas. 2012 - Volume 3

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Nicolás Robinson Andrade be guided not so much by the logical rigour of one approach or another . . . as by its capacity to illuminate historical experiences.”5 To analyse Huntington’s argument that democracies are created by ‘causers’ and not ‘causes,’ one must begin by adopting a definition of democracy. The Schumpeterian definition argues that democracy is “the institutional arrangement for arriving at political decisions in which individuals acquire the power to decide by means of a competitive struggle for the people’s vote.”6 This procedural view was later supported by Huntington7, who believed “elections, open, free, and fair are the essence of democracy.” For the purpose of analysis, however, these definitions contain important weaknesses. First, they imply a clear break between authoritarian regimes and democratic ones. Second, they neglect the importance of socioeconomic indicators. This essay, therefore, makes use of Heywood’s8 broader definition of liberal democracy: “[It] balances the principle of limited government against the idea of popular consent,” offering constitutional government based on legal rules, civil liberties, competition between political parties, healthy civil society, and a capitalist economy. On the one hand, when viewed through the lens of the transition approach, the role of agency has been very important in democratisation. The transition approach argues that “the route to liberal democracy is determined fundamentally by the agency of elite initiatives and actions”9 and “not by trends but by people.”10 This essay uses the definition that elites are “the top position holders in the largest or most resource-rich political, governmental, economic, military, professional, communications and cultural organisations and movements in society.” 11 The slow road to democracy in Colombia has led to widespread academic disagreement on what type of democracy Colombia actually is, or even whether it is one at all. Huntington categorises Colombia as a second wave democracy12, of the second-try pattern13. Elites represented themselves in the Colombian political arena through a strong Conservative-Liberal partisan divide. Since the Spanish conquest of America—though not necessarily because of it14—the structure of Colombian society existed in a way that entrenched elite preferences,15 and favoured their clientelist relationships with political parties.16 As Higley & Burton note,17 “the elite simply divided into Liberal and Conservative factions, cemented by clientelism and ideology,” The Conservatives characterised themselves by their support for economic protectionism, a strong bond between church and state, and a powerful centralised state, whilst the Liberals advocated more free-trade policies, separation of church and state, and federalism.18 The period of civil unrest known as La Violencia ushered in a military government in 1953, after which General Rojas Pinilla governed the country between 1953 and 1957. Colombia’s long transition to liberal democracy began in 1957, though the democracy was limited until 1974 in that it only allowed alternation between the two main parties. One can apply O’Donnell’s “four-player game”19 model to Colombian democratisation during the 1958 transition from military rule. On the side of the regime, the military government was divided into military standpatters and softliners who favoured liberalisation. The liberal and

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Social Modernisation and Democratisation conservative parties, acting as a Maximalist group, joined to remove the military from power. However, some factions of the conservative party were supportive of an important role for the military in Colombia, hence acting as de facto minimalists.20 The death of general Franco in 1975 in Spain led to the coronation of King Juan Carlos, and the appointment of Adolfo Suárez as Prime Minister from 1976 to1981, spurring Spain’s “Third Wave”21 transition to democracy. Categorised by Huntington as part of the third wave of democracy,22 Spain’s transition came from within the regime, maintaining most of the state apparatus and thus causing a transformation through reforma pactada instead of a clean break with the past, or ruptura. In terms of O’Donnell’s four-player game,23 one side of the negotiations comprised the regime, made up mainly of standpatters (the military and established aristocracy) and softliners (Union of the Democratic Center, UCD). On the side of the opposition, one found the maximalists (Communist Party, PCE) and the minimalists (Socialist Party, PSOE). The main actors in this transition were King Juan Carlos, Prime Minister Adolfo Suárez, the leader of the PSOE Felipe González and Lieutenant-General Gutierrez Miranda, Chief of Staff of the Army. First, elites helped to create compromises at individual levels during transitions. Had the negotiations been conducted at a more public level, these compromises were likely to have been rejected by their followers.24 In 1957, former Colombian presidents Laureano Gómez (Conservative) and Alberto Camargo (Liberal) met to agree upon the Benidorm and Sitges Pacts. These established on paper a reconciliation between liberals and conservatives, whilst partisan rivalries were still very strong in Colombia. In fact, Gómez and Camargo were bitter rivals and yet these agreements initiated the transition from military rule to a “National Front” government. This agreement arranged a consociational democracy whereby liberals and conservatives alternated in power, and shared congressional seats and government posts equally.25 This settlement was organised secretly in Spain, and bypassed the partisan rivalries of Colombia to spark a transition to democracy after the Rojas government. The Spanish transition, which occurred after 36 years of authoritarian rule, was decribed by Gunther26 as “the very model of an elite settlement.” Here, Suárez and Juan Carlos played a crucial role in the transition, partly due to their “backward legitimacy”:27 Their Francoist past granted them the respect of standpatters like the military and the established aristocracy, whilst their newly acquired reformist credentials earned them the ability to entice the opposition. The negotiations during this reforma pactada that were negotiated by elites culminated in significant achievements for democratisation. The 1976 political reform laws effectively replaced the Francoist ‘Cortes’ with a bicameral legislative body elected through secret ballot, and were approved by UCD and the opposition. After this, Suárez was again key in legalising all political parties, and gaining the respect from bitter opponents of Francoism like Felipe González. He had met the top-ranking officers in the army and told them he could not legalise the Communist Party due to its demands, yet he manouvered the PCE into a compromise whereby it would accept a monarchy, announcing the legalisation 2012 - Volume 3

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Nicolás Robinson Andrade during the Easter weekend (when military officers would be on holiday).28 The Moncloa Pact (1977) further united opposition and the regime to face economic difficulties with austerity.29 Finally, the 1978 Constitution was approved in an ‘elite settlement,’30 whereby all major players relinquished rights in favour of a compromise and received legitimacy through referendum on 6th December of that year. These elite agreements moved Spain along the path of liberal democracy, by establishing election procedures, separation of powers, pluralism and competition in political parties, and extensive civil rights in the constitution. Furthermore, elites’ ability to negotiate these conditions without causing civil unrest or a sense of illegitimacy was important to avoiding a violent transition and gaining the support of the dominant elements of the armed forces.31 Second, elites in both countries were key in transforming collective memory of civil war into a positive factor for consolidation of democracy. Collective memory is the crucial factor of analysis, as it “impregnates the entire institutional fabric which is created during [a period of political change], leaving a mark on daily political practices once the new regime has been established.”32 Violence in Colombia has historically been a central theme of politics and domestic affairs, beginning with a civil war from 1898 to 1902, another (La Violencia) from 19481953, and a long period of violence and militarisation from the 1960s until the present day. These periods of violence, however, have also witnessed important democratising actions by elites. La Violencia sparked the aforementioned 1957 political pacts amongst elites, which generated a partially-democratic alternative to General Rojas in 1958. Despite lacking a transition to complete liberal democratic status, these reforms in the long term steered Colombia away from the fate of a long-term military regime—a fate suffered by most of its regional neighbours. The 1980s saw an explosion of drug-related violence. Homicide rates skyrocketed33 and human rights violations received impunity even when performed by state forces.34 In this tumultuous period, president Virgilio Barco (1986 – 1990) used the popular support for change to back Constitutional reform guided by liberal-democratic values.35 This move toward liberal-democratic values continued under Cesar Gaviria’s insistence (1990 – 1994), with liberalization of the economy and the new constitution of 1991. This document granted independence to the judiciary and included an important list of citizen rights and procedures for citizen participation, advancing the Colombian consolidation.36 It also established the base for the shift from consociational politics to a liberal democratic competitive party system. The positive results of this shift can be seen in recent elections, where the Green party candidate was runner-up in the Presidential elections and a former M-19 guerrilla member secured the position of Mayor of Bogota.37 The most important conflict in the Spanish case is the Civil War fought between 1936 and 1939 which resulted in Nationalist victory, and the instalment of Franco’s authoritarian regime. The Civil War left thousands of casualties on both sides (many of them buried anonymously in mass graves), which helped to keep alive the partisan tensions from the war. Franco’s death could have opened this Pandora’s box, potentially re-opening the scars of the

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Social Modernisation and Democratisation past, and consolidating rivalry instead of democratisation. Instead, a tacit agreement took place amongst the elites to subdue the voices of the past, both within society and at a policy level.38 This can be seen in the aforementioned political and agreements signed between 1975 and 1978. The mass public can also be included within Huntington’s reference to “causers.” The mass public is often the main source of opposition to authoritarianism, helping to create a democratic culture and developing independently of the state and its institutions. Civil society according to Walzer39 refers to “the space of uncoerced human association and the set of relational networks—formed for the sake of family, faith, interests, and ideology—that fill this space.” Hampered by the development of violent conflict and drug trafficking, civil society has had a slow growth in Colombia during the period of consolidation. To a limited extent, this civil society showed remarkable resistance in promoting the pluralism of a liberal democracy. However, political exclusion during the military and National Front governments led much civil dissent to manifest itself through armed insurgency groups like the M19 and FARC. This hampered consolidation, as it created an atmosphere of fear amongst associational groups and led powerful non-state actors to exist in a form that was incompatible with the pluralism of liberal democracy.40 Civil society in Spain during the transition was relatively weak, due in part to the years of dictatorship.41 However, mass mobilisation affected transition and consolidation. While King Juan Carlos played a key role in defeating the coup d’état which ocurred in Spain42 on the 23rd of February 1981, the coup attempt gave way to one of the largest citizen demonstrations in the history of Spain, supporting democratic transition. Additionally, workers movements showed their strength, causing 14 million hours of work lost during strikes in 1974-1975.43 Again in 1977, large strikes supported the legalisation of political organisations and the deconstruction of the Francoist institutional framework.44 Additionally, a multiplicity of civil society groups flourished after the transition,45 helping to cement the consolidation of democracy. In short, elites and mass movements were key factors of analysis in the transition and consolidation of Colombia and Spain. On the other hand, however, different approaches can highlight the importance of structural factors. Why is Colombia, for instance, with its liberal democratic constitution and regular elections, unable to consolidate its democracy? A multiplicity of structural reasons could point to why one country achieves liberal democratic status faster than another. Diamond’s research46 would point to Colombian political culture as a burden to democratisation. Many others, like Youngers & Rosin47 find the setbacks of Colombian democratisation in the toxic, all-encompassing effects of the drugs trade. Whitehead48 argues the Spanish transition was encouraged by “contagion through proximity”—in relation to external actors Portugal and Greece—and that the incentive of entering the European Community promoted democratisation49 This paper, however, concentrates primarily on domestic economic factors, which it sees as key to understanding the structures affecting successful democratisation. It combines 2012 - Volume 3

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Nicolás Robinson Andrade Lipset’s Modernisation approach (1960) with Moore’s focus on class Structure (1966).50 Hence, it argues that democratisation “is related to a country’s socioeconomic development or level of modernisation,”51 and to the structural class relations that this creates. Lipset’s approach uses correlations between different quantitative variables to compare levels of socioeconomic development and use them to explain democratisation. But, as Potter notes,52 “establishing correlation is not the same as establishing that democracy is caused by socioeconomic development.” The structural approach, therefore, adds to the analysis by pointing to “interrelationships of certain structures of power—economic, social, political— as they gradually change through history.53” First, economic development leads to the creation of a large middle class, which is helpful in transition. Increased income and economic security lead lower-earning sectors of society towards “longer term perspectives and a more . . . gradualist view of politics,”54 which rejects extremist groups and helps to consolidates liberal democratic values.55 During the transition period, “basic human needs” were denounced as unmet by the World Bank in Colombia,56 where GDP per capita in 1975 was USD$510.00. Displaying the third highest income gap in the world has meant that a large proportion of Colombians—45 percent lived in poverty in 200957—have traditionally been unable to secure tangible benefits from the economic development.58 This has not created a large middle class, and has kept very low levels of citizen satisfaction with democracy59 and political parties.60 Spanish GDP between 1960 and 1980 nearly tripled, as Spain grew at an average of 5.1 percent between 1950 and 1975,61 yielding a GDP per capita of USD$2,487.62 In light of this, the middle class in Spain grew from an estimated 27 percent of the population in 1950 to 42 percent in 1981.63 Spain now consistently ranks in the list of countries with the highest satisfaction with democracy in the EU.64 Linking economic variables to levels of consolidation, Colombian GDP-per-capita reached USD$9,600 in 2009,65 while the Spanish equivalent stood at USD$ 29,600.66 While Spain has experienced staggering levels of socioeconomic development since its transition to democracy, Colombia’s growth has spread very unequally. This inequality, as Wilkinson & Pickett argue,67 has a profound effect on the levels of socio-economic development, and hence, according to Lipset’s (1960) argument, on how well democracy becomes embedded in society. The percentage of the population living in cities was also used by Lipset as an indicator of development influencing democratisation,68 since urban populations often have better access to facilities like education and health. Between 1960 and 1970, the percentage of Colombians living in cities rose from only 48 percent,69 to a relatively low 58 percent.70 Furthermore, this 58 percent was only educated formally for an average of 5.48 years, the remaining 42 percent of rural Colombians only receiving formal education for 2.66 years.71 Rural populations have also suffered greatly from the volatility of prices for agricultural goods such as coffee,72 which has kept millions of rural families in a state of underdevelopment. In contrast, rural exodus had pushed the urban Spanish population to a much higher 75 percent by 1980.73 Percentages of workers employed in agriculture fell from

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Social Modernisation and Democratisation approximately 50 percent in 1950, to 40 percent in 1960, and only 17 percent in 1980, showing a clear economic modernisation.74 In short, non-elite variables such as “socioeconomic modernisation, . . . substantial literacy and affluence” played a role in reducing class tensions and creating societal conditions that favoured democratisation.75 Lipset’s modernisation approach has shown that socioeconomic factors can affect democratisation. A structural viewpoint, focusing on “long term processes of historical change,” can be used to further analyse the role of structure. As Moore theorised,76 certain structural interconnections could lead a state toward, or away from, liberal democracy. Though some of these factors relate to elites, their infuence is viewed not as “causers,”77 but as members of a structural class system. First, Rueschemeyer et al.78 found in their research that large landlords were traditionally the strongest opponents of democratisation, especially when powerful and with close ties to the state apparatus. Their research also found that the lack of a right-wing party, which can protect the status of the elites, is likely to hinder democratisation. As Hartlyn & Dugas point out,79 Colombian elites during the transition and long period of consolidation of democracy continued to own vast expanses of territory (haciendas), and channel their demands through a patron-client relationship with politicians.80 Colossal fortunes created in the drug trade have had a similar effect, corrupting democratically elected officials and institutional practices at all levels. The strong socioeconomic growth in the decades before the Spanish transition, however, diversified the ownership of land in rural areas, bringing “an increasing secularisation and urbanisation” to rural towns, and decreasing the number of large estates.81 In Colombia, the rise of liberalism gradually challenged the ability of the conservative party to protect the interest of these established classes,82 which had maintained a political hegemony from 1866 to 1930.83 This problem was less acute in Spain, since the transition was achieved swiftly and UCD remained a strong player throughout. Second, a state where the military and police are dominant within the state apparatus is unlikely to support successful democratisation, a condition worsened when “massive economic and military aid strengthens the state unduly in relation to the balance of class forces.84” This statement holds strong explanatory potential in Colombia. The country has been militarised for decades under the threat of the FARC, ELN, EPN, and M-19 guerrillas, which were created as civil resistance groups during the years of the National Front. The AUC, a paramilitary self-defense group, was born “out of an alliance between landowners, drug traffickers, and army officers,”85 adding to the plethora of armed units roaming the territory. This traditionally justified an important role for the military within the state. For instance, the penal code directed many civilian cases to military tribunals, where members of the military are traditionally judged differently from civilians and often receive impunity for crimes. This, along with the violence it engenders, means the state is unable to enforce the rule of law and civil liberties in its territory. Therefore, the democracy suffers from political violence and kidnapping and assassination of civilians, politicians, and government officials, 2012 - Volume 3

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Nicolás Robinson Andrade all deeply antagonistic to liberal democratic values. The massive economic and military aid provided by the United States in its counterinsurgency, counter-narcotics, and counter-terrorism operations has bolstered the state excessively over civil, or class forces. In particular Plan Colombia, initiated in 1999, has channeled USD$7 billion in aid, 80% of which has been military86. In contrast, the Spanish military, civil guard, and police maintained the monopoly of force within their state, and did not see illegitimacy or a threat to subversion in the figure of Suárez.87 The dominant factions were able to negotiate concessions with the government, such as non-prosecution for actions during the Franco years, in exchange for non-intervention with the transition. In order to lay the bricks for consolidation, police and military’s direct influence over politics was removed during the transition, and military courts lost jurisdiction over civil matters in the 1978 Constitution88. The US ambassador to Madrid (1975 – 1978) stated the “the US didn’t do a great deal” 89 during the transition, suggesting less influence in bolstering the regime in relation to class forces than in Colombia. The United States already held contracts for military bases to control oil trade through the Mediterranean (following the Yom Kippur War), and did not perceive an internal enemy in Spain as it did in Colombia.90 In conclusion, one can say that causers play a key role in planting the seed of liberal democracies. In the case of Colombia and Spain, this role is especially important in burying partisan rivalries from the past, and creating consensus at times of uncertainty amongst powerful players. This effect was most successfully achieved in Spain. On the other hand, the role of elites cannot be understood in a historical vacuum, but rather must be understood as the product of certain structures. The assumption of the modernisation and structural approaches help to elucidate this argument, showing how factors beyond the elites’ control, such as socioeconomic development and its effect on class structures, led to the construction of vastly different democratic outcomes in Spain versus Colombia. Spain’s structural context seems to have been more conducive to democratisation than that of Colombia, which has been unable to fully defend the provisions of a liberal democracy.

v 1 S., Huntington. The Third Wave: Democratization in the late twentieth century (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991), 21. 2 D., Potter. ‘Framework for Analysis: Explaining Democratization’. In: Potter, D., Goldblatt, D., Kiloh, M., Lewis, P., Democratization. (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1997), 6. 3 Potter, Democratization, 23. 4 Potter, Democratization, 23. 5 L., Whitehead. ‘Three International Dimensions of Democratisation’. In: Whitehead, L., The International Dimensions of Democratisation: Europe and the Americas. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996a), 4.

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Social Modernisation and Democratisation 6 J., Schumpeter. Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy (London: Allen and Unwin, 1976), 269. 7 Huntington, Democratization, 9. 8 A., Heywood. Key Concepts in Politics (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2000), 169. 9 Potter, Democratization, 18. 10 Huntington, The Third Wave, 107. 11 Field et al., ‘National Elite Configurations and Transition to Democracy’. In: E. Etzioni-Halevy, ed. Classes and elites in Democracy and Democratization: a Collection of Readings. New York: Garland Publishers, 1997), 175. 12 Huntington, The Third Wave, 40. 13 Huntington, The Third Wave, 42. 14 J., Martz. The Politics of Clientelism: Democracy & The State in Colombia. (New Jersey: Transaction Publishers, 1997), 8. 15 R., Dix. ‘Consociational Democracy: The case of Colombia’. Comparative Politics, Vol 12 (1980): 305. 16 J., Peeler. ‘Elite Settlements and Democratic Consolidation: Colombia, Costa Rica, and Venezuela’. In: J., Higley, R., Gunther. Elites and Consolidation in Latin America and Southern Europe. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 81. 17 J., Higley, M., Burton. Elite Foundations of Liberal Democracy. (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2006), 86. 18 J., Hartlyn, J., Dugas. Colombia: the politics of violence and democratic transformation. In: Diamond, L, Democracy in Developing Countries: Latin America (2nd Ed). (London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1999), 254. 19 G., O’Donnell, P., Schmitter. Transitions from Authoritarian Rule Vol. 4: Tentative Conclusions about Uncertain Democracies. (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986), 15. 20 M. Meucci. ‘Elite agreements and transition toward democracy in Venezuela and Colombia.’ Politea, Vol 29, (2006):200. 21 Huntington, The Third Wave, 1. 22 Huntington, The Third Wave, 135. 23 Huntington, The Third Wave, 122. 24 Huntington, The Third Wave, 167. 25 Higley & Burton, Elite Foundations of Liberal Democracy, 76. 26 Gunther, R., 1992. Spain: The very model of the modern elite settlement. In J.Higley & R. Gunther, ed. Elites and Democratic Consolidation in Latin America and Southern Europe. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 48. 27 Huntington, The Third Wave, 157. 28 Hartlyn & Dugas, Colombia, 50. 29 Haggard, S., Webb, S. Voting for Reform: Democracy, Political Liberalisation and Economic Adjustment (a World Bank Publication) (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994), 95. 30 Gunther, Spain, 61. 2012 - Volume 3

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Nicolás Robinson Andrade 31 Huntington, The Third Wave, 139. 32 P., Aguilar, P. Memory and Amnesia: The Role of the Spanish Civil War in the Transition to Democracy (New York: Berhghan Books, 2002), 10. 33 F., Safford, M., Palacios. Colombia: Fragmented Land, Divided Society. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), 360. 34 M., Palacios. Between Legitimacy and Violence: A History of Colombia, 1875-2002. (Duke University Press: London, 2006), 198. 35 Hartlyn & Dugas, Colombia, 251. 36 Hartlyn & Dugas, Colombia, 251. 37 El Pais, 2011. Historico: Petro Alcalde [Online]. Available from http://www.elpais. com.co/elpais/blogs/como-llegamos-esto/historico-petro-alcalde Accesed 5 Jan 2012. 38 Aguilar, Memory and Amnesia, 10. 39 Potter, Democratization, 4. 40 Heywood, Key Concepts, 169. 41 Aguilar, Memory and Amnesia, 10. 42 23F- La Película, 2011. Film. Directed by Chema de la Peña. Spain: LaZonaFilms, TVE. 43 J., Maravall, The Transition to Democracy in Spain. (London: Palgrave MacMillan, 1982), 11. 44 Maravall, Transition to Democracy, 14. 45 Aguilar, Memory and Amnesia, 10. 46 L., Diamond, L. Political Culture and Democracy in Developing Countries (textbook edition). (London: Lynne Rienner, 1994). 47 C., Youngers, E., Rosin, 2005. Drugs and Democracy in Latin America: The Impact of US Policy. (London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2005), 15. 48 Whitehead, Dimensions of Democratisation, 1996a, 3. 49 L., Whitehead. Democracy by Convergence: Southern Europe. In: Whitehead, L., The International Dimensions of Democratisation: Europe and the Americas. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996b), 261. 50 Potter, Democratization, 19. 51 Potter, Democratization, 11. 52 Potter, Democratization, 12. 53 Potter, Democratization, 18. 54 S., Lipset. Some Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic Development and Political Legitimacy. The American Political Science Review, Vol. 53, (1959): 83. 55 S., Lipset. Political Man. (London: Heinemann Publishers, 1960.), 51. 56 D., Morawetz, D.,. Twenty-five Years of Economic Development: 1950 to 1975. (Washington D.C: World Bank, 1977), 8. 57 World Bank, 2011. Colombia - Country Brief [online]. Available from: http://web. worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/COUNTRIES/LACEXT/COLOMBIAEXTN /0,,contentMDK:22254365~pagePK:1497618~piPK:217854~theSitePK:324946,00.html [Accessed 18.10.2011] 58 UNDP (United Nations Development Project), 2011. Human Development Report

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Social Modernisation and Democratisation Colombia 2011: Inequality and Sustainability, A better future for everyone (My translation from Spanish) [Online] Available from http://www.nacionesunidas.org.co/img_uplo ad/61626461626434343535373737353535/2011/capitulo1_por_que_sostenibilidad_y_ equidad.pdf Accessed 10 Jan 2012. PAGE 21!!!!!!!!!! 59 Economist, 2010. The Latinobar贸metro Poll: The Democratic Routine [Online] Available from http://www.economist.com/node/17627929 Accessed 10 Jan 2012. 60 National Democratic Institute for International Affairs, 2010. Colombia: Political Context [Online]. Available from http:// www.ndi.org/colombia (Accessed 26 October 2011). 61 Morawetz, Economic Development, 13. 62 Morawetz, Economic Development, 79. 63 Giles, M., Lancaster, T., 1989. Political Transition, Social Development, and Legal Mobilization in Spain. The American Political Science Review, Vol. 83, No. 3, 817. 64 J., Magone. Contemporary Spanish Politics. (London: Routledge, 2004), 44. 65 CIA, 2009a. Central Intelligence Agency Factbook - Colombia [Online]. Available from https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/co.html Accessed 4 Jan 2011. 66 CIA, 2009b. Central Intelligence Agency Factbook - Spain [Online]. Available from https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/sp.html Accessed 4 Jan 2011. 67 Wilkinson, R., Pickett, K., 2009. The Spirit Level: Why more equal societies almost always do better. London: Allen Lane. 68 Lipset, Political Man, 52. 69 Hartlyn & Dugas, Colombia, 270. 70 ECLAC Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean, 1999. Demographic Bulletin no. 63 [Online] Available from http://www.eclac.org/celade/ publica/bol63/BD6311.html Accessed 4 Jan 2011. 71 National Planning Department, 2002. Historical Statistics of Colombia [Online]. Available from http://www.dnp.gov.co/EstudiosEconomicos/Estad%C3%ADsticasHist贸 ricasdeColombia.aspx Accesed 4 Jan 2011. 72 Holmes, J., Gutierrez de Pineres, S., Curtin, K., 2006. Drugs, Violence, and Development in Colombia: A Department-Level Analysis. Latin American Politics& Society, 48(3), pp.157-184. 73 California-State University, 2000. Urban-Rural Population Distribution: Spain [Online]. Available from http://www.csudh.edu/global_options/375Students-sp96/spain/URB. RURALPOP.HTML, Accessed 4 Jan 2011. 74 Giles & Lancaster, Political Transition, 817. 75 Gunther, Spain, 43. 76 Potter, Democratization, 19. 77 Huntington, The Third Wave, 107. 78 Potter, Democratization, 20. 79 Hartlyn & Dugas, Colombia, 293. 80 Meucci, Elite Agreements, 205. 2012 - Volume 3

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Nicolás Robinson Andrade 81 Aguilar, Memory and Amnesia, 153. 82 Hartlyn, J., Gunther, R., 1992. Elites and Consolidation in Latin America and Southern Europe. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 91. 83 Hartlyn & Dugas, Colombia, 255. 84 Potter, Democratization, 22. 85 Livingstone, G., 2003, Inside Colombia, Drugs, Democracy and War. (London: Latin American Bureau, 2003), 14. 86 BBC, 2010. What future for US-backed Plan Colombia? [Online]. Available from http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/10208937 (Accessed 25 October 2011). 87 Huntington, The Third Wave, 139. 88 Giles & Lancaster, Political Transition, 820. 89 Powell, C., 1996. International Aspects of Democratisation: The case of Spain. In: Whitehead, L., The International Dimensions of Democratisation: Europe and the Americas. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), 289. 90 Powell, International Aspects of Democratisation, 287. 23F- La Película, 2011. Film. Directed by Chema de la Peña. Spain: LaZonaFilms, TVE. Aguilar, P., 2002. Memory and Amnesia: The Role of the Spanish Civil War in the Transition to Democracy. New York: Berhghan Books. BBC, 2010. What future for US-backed Plan Colombia? [Online]. Available from http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/10208937 (Accessed 25 October 2011). California-State University, 2000. Urban-Rural Population Distribution: Spain [Online]. Available from http://www.csudh.edu/global_options/375Students-sp96/spain/ URB.RURALPOP.HTML, Accessed 4 Jan 2011. CIA, 2009a. Central Intelligence Agency Factbook - Colombia [Online]. Available from https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/co.html Accessed 4 Jan 2011. CIA, 2009b. Central Intelligence Agency Factbook - Spain [Online]. Available from https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/sp.html Accessed 4 Jan 2011. Diamond, L., 1994. Political Culture and Democracy in Developing Countries (textbook edition). London: Lynne Rienner. Dix, R., 1980. Consociational Democracy: The case of Colombia. Comparative Politics, Vol 12(3), pp. 303-321. ECLAC Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean, 1999. Demographic Bulletin no. 63 [Online] Available from http://www.eclac.org/celade/ publica/bol63/BD6311.html Accessed 4 Jan 2011. Economist, 2010. The Latinobarómetro Poll: The Democratic Routine [Online] Available from http://www.economist.com/node/17627929 Accessed 10 Jan 2012.

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Social Modernisation and Democratisation El Pais, 2011. Historico: Petro Alcalde [Online]. Available from http://www.elpais. com.co/elpais/blogs/como-llegamos-esto/historico-petro-alcalde Accesed 5 Jan 2012. Field, G., Higley, J., Burton, M., 1997. National Elite Configurations and Transition to Democracy. In: E. Etzioni-Halevy, ed. Classes and elites in Democracy and Democratization: a Collection of Readings. New York: Garland Publishers. Giles, M., Lancaster, T., 1989. Political Transition, Social Development, and Legal Mobilization in Spain. The American Political Science Review, Vol. 83, No. 3, pp. 817-833 Gunther, R., 1992. Spain: The very model of the modern elite settlement. In J.Higley & R. Gunther, ed. Elites and Democratic Consolidation in Latin America and Southern Europe. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press Haggard, S., Webb, S., 1994. Voting for Reform: Democracy, Political Liberalisation and Economic Adjustment (a World Bank Publication). Oxford: Oxford University Press. Hartlyn, J., Dugas, J., 1999. Colombia: the politics of violence and democratic transformation. In: Diamond, L, Democracy in Developing Countries: Latin America (2nd Ed). London: Lynne Rienner Publishers. Hartlyn, J., Gunther, R., 1992. Elites and Consolidation in Latin America and Southern Europe. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Heywood, A., 2000. Key Concepts in Politics. London: Palgrave Macmillan. Higley, J., Burton, M., 2006. Elite Foundations of Liberal Democracy. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield. Holmes, J., Gutierrez de Pineres, S., Curtin, K., 2006. Drugs, Violence, and Development in Colombia: A Department-Level Analysis. Latin American Politics& Society, 48(3), pp.157-184. Lipset, S.M, 1959. Some Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic Development and Political Legitimacy. The American Political Science Review, Vol. 53, No. 1, pp. 69-105. Lipset, S.M., 1960. Political Man. London: Heinemann Publishers. Livingstone, G., 2003, Inside Colombia, Drugs, Democracy and War. London: Latin American Bureau. Magone, J., 2004. Contemporary Spanish Politics. London: Routledge. Maravall, J. 1982 The Transition to Democracy in Spain. London: Palgrave MacMillan. Martz, J., 1997. The Politics of Clientelism: Democracy & The State in Colombia. New Jersey: Transaction Publishers. Meucci, M., 2006. Elite agreements and transition toward democracy in Venezuela and Colombia. Politea, Vol 29 (37), pp. 195-228. Morawetz, D., 1977. Twenty-five Years of Economic Development: 1950 to 1975. Washington D.C: World Bank. National Democratic Institute for International Affairs, 2010. Colombia: Political Context [Online]. Available from http:// www.ndi.org/colombia (Accessed 26 October 2011). National Planning Department, 2002. Historical Statistics of Colombia [Online]. 2012 - Volume 3

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Nicolás Robinson Andrade Available from http://www.dnp.gov.co/EstudiosEconomicos/Estad%C3%ADsticasHistó ricasdeColombia.aspx Accesed 4 Jan 2011. O’Donnell, G., Schmitter, P., 1986. Transitions from Authoritarian Rule Vol. 4: Tentative Conclusions about Uncertain Democracies. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press. Palacios, M., 2006. Between Legitimacy and Violence: A History of Colombia, 1875-2002. Duke University Press: London. Peeler, J., 1992. Elite Settlements and Democratic Consolidation: Colombia, Costa Rica, and Venezuela. In: Higley, J., Gunther, R. Elites and Consolidation in Latin America and Southern Europe. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Potter, D., 1997. Framework for Analysis: Explaining Democratization. In: Potter, D., Goldblatt, D., Kiloh, M., Lewis, P., 1997. Democratization. Cambridge: Polity Press. Safford, F., Palacios, M., 2002. Colombia: Fragmented Land, Divided Society. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Schumpeter. 1976. Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy. London: Allen and Unwin. Powell, C., 1996. International Aspects of Democratisation: The case of Spain. In: Whitehead, L., The International Dimensions of Democratisation: Europe and the Americas. Oxford: Oxford University Press. UNDP (United Nations Development Project), 2011. Human Development Report Colombia 2011: Inequality and Sustainability, A better future for everyone (My translation from Spanish) [Online] Available from http://www.nacionesunidas.org. co/img_upload/61626461626434343535373737353535/2011/capitulo1_por_que_ sostenibilidad_y_equidad.pdf Accessed 10 Jan 2012. Whitehead, L., 1996a. Three International Dimensions of Democratisation. In: Whitehead, L., The International Dimensions of Democratisation: Europe and the Americas. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Whitehead, L., 1996b. Democracy by Convergence: Southern Europe. In: Whitehead, L., The International Dimensions of Democratisation: Europe and the Americas. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Wilkinson, R., Pickett, K., 2009. The Spirit Level: Why more equal societies almost always do better. London: Allen Lane. World Bank, 2011. Colombia - Country Brief [online]. Available from: http:// web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/COUNTRIES/LACEXT/COLOMBIAE XTN/0,,contentMDK:22254365~pagePK:1497618~piPK:217854~theSitePK:324946,00. html [Accessed 18.10.2011] Youngers, C., Rosin, E., 2005. Drugs and Democracy in Latin America: The Impact of US Policy. London: Lynne Rienner Publishers.

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Rejecting The Bomb: Conflicting Conclusions from Argentina and Brazil Philippe Mauger The reasons behind the Argentinian and Brazilian decisions to start and abandon their nuclear weapons programs are explored and compared with Neorealist predictions. It is argued that Neorealist theory is unable to explain these case studies: it incorrectly identifies the security threats of the two countries, it disregards the enormous role played by the overthrow of the military regimes in the decision to forgo nuclear weapons, and it overlooks key economic factors.

Both Argentina and Brazil had nuclear weapons programs, but abandoned them, and both countries successfully developed plutonium reprocessing capabilities on a pilot scale.1 Argentina’s program started in 1976 and ended in 1990;2 Brazil’s began in 1978 and ended in 1990.3 Today, Fritz W. Ermarth, former Chairman for the National Intelligence Council of the Central Intelligence Agency, includes Latin America alongside Europe in his list of “low risk areas” in terms of proliferation activities and security risks.4 Given that nuclear proliferation is one of the top security risks for the United States, and considering the current efforts to convince North Korea to renounce its nuclear weapons program, the reasons for these drastic policy changes in Argentina and Brazil deserve critical attention.5 Yet, several studies of the Brazilian and Argentinean programs are quick to abstract the Latin American example, conflating these non-proliferation successes with the dismantling of the West German and Taiwan programs. These studies conclude that nuclear programs are started as a means of solving rational international security concerns and are terminated if, and only if, these concerns are assuaged, in line with the Neorealist theory of international relations.6 To what extent is Neorealism right in focusing only on the security balance between Argentina and Brazil? As will be shown, Neorealism fails to explain the situation in the following ways: it incorrectly identifies the security threats of the regimes involved; it ignores several key structural reasons why nuclear weapons were attractive to the military governments; it disregards the enormous role played by the overthrow of the military regime in the decision to forgo nuclear weapons; and it overlooks the economic constraints caused by the ballooning foreign debt. Neorealism, as developed by the preeminent theorist Kenneth Waltz, argues that states are the only important actors; moreover, they are rational and seek to maximize their relative power.7 Neorealism therefore conceptualizes the state as a single black box, unaf-

Philippe Mauger is a third-year student from France majoring in International Studies at Johns Hopkins University. His topical focus is on non-proliferation.

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Rejecting The Bomb fected by internal conditions and pursuing a rational foreign strategy based on accumulation and retention of relative power against other states.8 According to the Neorealist theory of international relations, countries develop nuclear weapons only if they are faced with a dire external security risk. However, the oft-argued Brazil-Argentina rivalry completely ignores the fact that both countries had not fought a war since 1828,9 and that the countries’ leaders were collaborating to maintain power. Indeed, Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Paraguay, and Uruguay were cooperating under Operation Condor from 1976 onwards to provide joint internal security and assassinate dissidents.10 The largest security threat for Argentina and Brazil was internal, as the generals obtained legitimacy by rooting out “communist insurgents.”11 During this period, around 30,000 people in Argentina alone were tortured and killed in 340 secret detention facilities.12 E. Bradford Burns and Julie A. Charlip declare: “Like the Brazilian generals,” the Argentine junta “worried about national security.” The pressing concerns for the ruling “military-business alliance” were guerrilla kidnappings of foreign businessmen, strikes, and “violence at factories.”13 Moreover, Argentina’s generals worried that protracted military action in Central America would make their rule “a mercenary to imperialism,” which they feared could unite Peronists and cause civil unrest challenging their hold on power.14 Hal Klepak and Donald Neill, authors of a Canadian government report on the subject, maintain that “the Latin American strategic context was one of low threat perception on all sides,” and note “the obvious Argentine acceptance of Brazilian predominance regionally.”15 Furthermore, under a traditional Neorealist analysis, Argentina’s defeat during the 1982 Falklands War, which greatly diminished its military, should have been a strong incentive to build a nuclear weapon in order to recover.16 More specifically, in 1977 Argentina suggested that Brazil cooperate on their nuclear programs against Western efforts to hamper the latter’s advances, even though Argentina had a head start on Brazil’s program.17 This was not simply governmental rhetoric: in 1980, Argentina supplied zirconium to Brazil’s plant in Resende for its reactor fuel, and received enriched uranium in return.18 There was also cooperation on one major energy project without a military capability: Argentina made several concessions such that by 1979 the joint Brazilian-Paraguay hydroelectric complex at Itaipú was under construction.19 Therefore, the Neorealist security model does not correspond with the actual Latin American situation in which Brazil and Argentina pursued nuclear weapons development at a time of low external threat, and even, albeit limited, cooperation. Another serious challenge for the Neorealist theory, the change in the internal government structures had a great impact on the decision to discontinue the nuclear weapons programs, even though there were no changes in the external security calculus. The preeminent political theorist Scott Sagan, under the “domestic politics model,” argues that nuclear weapons are bound to “serve the parochial bureaucratic or political interests of at least some individual actors within the state,” such as those in charge of nuclear energy and those in the military most likely to receive funding. For instance, branches of the air force and the navy closely tied with missile, bomber, and submarine development have substantial gains to make from nuclear weapons development.20 If a large governmental change were to com2012 - Volume 3

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Philippe Mauger pletely discredit these people, as was the case in Argentina, or seriously challenge them by democratic politics, as in Brazil, the nuclear ambitions of these countries would likely halt.21 Indeed, Klepak and Neill’s report states: “Nationalist opinion and the armed forces wanted them so when those currents were dominant, such programmes made progress.”22 It continues, stating that: “democracy, and the return to democratic rule first in Argentina and then in Brazil, was crucial for the abandoning of nuclear weapons ambitions initially by Buenos Aires and then by Brasilia.”23 It is hardly surprising that both Argentina and Brazil’s military governments invested enormous funds— 4% to 6% of GDP for Argentina and 2.6% of GDP for Brazil—24 into their armed forces to maintain their hold on power (albeit more so, or at least more visibly so, in Argentina).25 National defense was ideologically linked with the economy, as both military dictatorships argued that “domestic unrest and subversion” jeopardized a strong economy, which threatened the country’s security.26 The military had to be well-armed in order to root out these internal enemies, as the argument went.27 Given that nuclear weapons have tremendous military power and were seen as a status symbol indicating great power28—every member of the Security Council at the U.N. had and still has the bomb29—it is no surprise that it was an appealing option to a regime that relied extensively on economic growth and outward symbols of national grandeur to justify its rule.30 Brazil and Argentina were involved in gargantuan construction projects that were essential to support their ideologies: notably the aforementioned Itaipú hydroelectric dam and the Yacyretá hydroelectric dam on the Argentina-Paraguay border.31 This drive to provide ever increasing amounts of electricity to sustain industrialization was justification enough to buy nuclear reactors.32 The state used these mega-projects to justify brutal military rule, employing them as a propagandist example of what could be achieved under a military regime. Moreover, just as these projects were used as internal symbols, the military regimes were well aware of the status this would convey on the international scene.33 Sagan traces this idea back in time, stating that “the belief that nuclear power and nuclear weapons were deeply linked to a state’s position in the international system was present as early as 1951.” The source of the belief, Sagan argues, is France, which is important specifically because Argentina had for a long time considered itself a European nation in terms of ideas and norms.34 The generals could draw from history to confirm this: Chinese nuclear weapons development had emerged in part due to a desire to be finally recognized by the United States, to gain U.N. Security Council membership, and to be treated by the Soviet Union as an equal power rather than as a pawn.35 In addition to the case of China, the sudden attention and prestige that India’s and Pakistan’s nuclear detonations brought them further impressed this notion upon the generals. As such, the first blocks had fallen in the “proliferation domino” set.36 Those that point to a rivalry between Argentina and Brazil as the main reason for development of nuclear weapons overlook the possibility that this rivalry was actually caused by—and was not the cause of—the nuclear development race in order to become the first, and possibly the only, nuclear power in the region. This would

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Rejecting The Bomb have given the victor immediate primacy, perhaps even hegemony, in Latin America. Furthermore, there is evidence that the decision to renounce nuclear weapons was taken in part to project a strong, positive image on the world stage—particularly one that could be used to bargain for much needed economic aid. Sagan has outlined what he calls the “norms model” theory, in opposition to Neorealism. The former postulates that Brazil and Argentina had to adapt their hard-line positions because of international normative pressure: the governments opted to publically renounce their weapons programs in exchange for a very positive image on the world stage, which increased both countries’ ability to act as agents of peace in the world, attract investors internally, and give credence to their ideology of peace and progress at home.37 More specifically, this was done in 1994 and 1995 by putting into effect the Tlatelolco Treaty of 1967, debarring the “testing, use, manufacture, production, or acquisition by any means as well as the receipt, storage, installation, deployment, and any form of possession of any nuclear weapons.” Argentina had signed it but did not ratify it until 1994; Brazil signed it and ratified it from the start but with so many caveats that the treaty was not enforceable until 1995.38 Furthermore, the roles played by the Non-Proliferation-Treaty and the International Atomic Energy Agency need to be addressed. Under Neorealist theory, when there are only two actors, there is no way for both of them to win in relative power at the same time. Therefore these treaties should have had no effect on the overarching security calculus of the region.39 Yet, Ambassador George Bunn declares: “Without the NPT, I believe that 30-40 countries would now have nuclear weapons,” including Argentina and Brazil in his list.40 Ratification of these treaties was the key to re-establishing working relations with the United States, which was increasingly necessary given that the economies of both countries were in shambles. Klepak and Neill’s Canadian report states that “Menem could see the advantages, some would say the vital need, to move to placate the United States on both these issues,” and that “Argentine economic weakness, as well as its political isolation, placed the United States in an exceptionally favorable position to finally influence events on these matters after decades of a virtual impossibility to do so.”41 U.S. pressures against Brazil were similarly potent, because ever since Brazil’s involvement alongside allied troops in World War II, there had been “close cooperation between the armed forces along with acceptance of North American views of global ideological conflict.”42 In the case of Argentina, there was also a crucial need to re-establish diplomatic relations with Great Britain, which had once been the main Argentinean ally before the disastrous Falklands War. Moreover, the Dirty War, and the humiliating loss during the Falklands War, had totally discredited the military in Argentina as an institution, allowing the new civilian government to drastically cut funds with full popular support.43 Indeed, somewhat under Alfonsín and definitely during Menem’s presidency, The Argentine government yielded dominance to Brazil, making collaboration with them a major priority.44 As such, the international system had a strong normative effect on Argentina and Brazil, which in part led to their decisions to abandon their nuclear programs. This is intimately tied to the final argument against Neorealism in this case; that is, that economic weakness was the driving force that prevented the Argentina and Brazil 2012 - Volume 3

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Philippe Mauger from obtaining a nuclear weapon. After all, the convincing aspect of the “norms model” is that a good international image translates into strong economic benefits at a time of crisis. By 1983, two years before the final collapse of military rule in Brazil and the year in which the Argentine junta lost power,45 the Brazilian debt was a staggering 58,068 million US dollars and the Argentinean debt was 24,593 million US dollars.46 This represented 29.3% and 32.1% of the countries’ GDP respectively.47 The percentage of Argentinean inflation was in the thousands, which “ruined the middle classes,” “sapped the energy of the public,” and “destroyed confidence.”48 Comparatively, the price tag for a nuclear weapons program, from development to completion, is estimated at 10 billion U.S. dollars.49 As such, the abandonment of the nuclear weapons program was not so much born out of abstract politics as out of economic necessity. Indeed, the Klepak and Neill’s Canadian report notes that “funds for the nuclear programme were hit early and hard.”50 In general, Argentinean and Brazilian austerity measures called for severe budget cuts to their militaries; during the early 1990s, Argentina’s military expenditure was around 1.5% of its GDP,51 down from an average of between 4% and 6% during the military dictatorships,52 while Brazil’s was around 2.1%,53 down from an average of 2.6%.54 Wendy Hunter, an expert on Brazilian civilmilitary relations, points out: “Since 1985, with the exception of one year (1990), the military’s share of the budget has undergone a steady contraction.”55 It is very likely that these budget cuts were simply incompatible with the aforementioned cost of a nuclear weapon. To conclude, Neorealism fails to explain why Argentina and Brazil relinquished their nuclear weapons programs. It incorrectly identifies the security threats of the regimes involved, it ignores the economic constraints caused by the ballooning foreign debt, and it cannot account for the large role that the overthrow of the military regime had on this decision. As can be seen, Argentina and Brazil were not faced with serious external security threats during this time, and were even cooperating militarily to some degree. They developed such weapons because they would have strongly reinforced their ideology, and therefore their hold on power. Enormous economic pressure led to a large cut in the states’ budgets under the Washington Consensus (1989),56 a cut that affected the military budgets deeply. Given that nuclear weapons are tremendously expensive and that their abandonment was a condition of US economic aid, Argentina and Brazil could ill afford them at that time. Finally, the switch from military to democratic rule resulted in deep cuts in the military budgets because of internal political reasons as well as the mutual desire for rapprochement between Argentina and Brazil.

v The author would like to thank Dr. Magda von der Heydt for her kind support and guidance. This paper was completed during the professor’s 2011 Political Sociology of Latin America course at the Johns Hopkins University.

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Rejecting The Bomb 1 Kathleen C. Bailey, Doomsday Weapons in the Hands of Many: The Arms Control Challenge of the ‘90s (Illinois: University of Illinois Press, 1991), 12. 2 Dong-Joon Jo and Eric Gartzke, “Codebook and Data Notes for ‘Determinants of Nuclear Weapons Proliferation: a Quantitative Model’”, September 2006. Full article published in Journal of Conflict Resolution (February 2006). Retrieved: <http://dss.ucsd. edu/~egartzke/data/jo_gartzke_0207_codebk_0906.pdf> 3 Ibid. 4 Fritz W. Ermarth, Proliferation Stability and Instability: Conditioning Factors (Boston: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1995), 74. 5 Jasper Becker, Rogue Regime: Kim Jong Il and the Looming Threat of North Korea (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005), 258. 6 Scott D. Sagan, “Why Do States Build Nuclear Weapons? Three Models in Search of a Bomb,” International Security, Vol. 21, No. 3, (Winter, 1996-1997): 55; Kenneth Waltz, “The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: More May be Better,” Adelphi Papers, No. 171, (1981). 7 Kenneth Waltz, Man, the State, and War: a Theoretical Analysis (New York: Columbia University Press, 2001), 191-192, 238. 8 Ibid., 160. 9 Sagan, “Why do States Build Nuclear Weapons?,” 61. 10 Julie A. Charlip and E. Bradford Burns, Latin America: An Interpretative History (New York: Prentice Hall, 2011), 281. 11 David Pion-Berlin, “The Fall of Military Rule in Argentina: 1976-1983,” Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs, Vol. 27, No. 2, (Summer 1985): 55. 12 Charlip and Burns, Latin America: An Interpretive History, 278. 13 Ibid., 277-278. 14 David Rock, Argentina, 1516-1982: From Spanish Colonization to the Falklands War (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985), 375. 15 Hal Klepak and Donald Neill, “Are There Lessons for India and Pakistan From the Argentine-Brazilian Nuclear Rivalry?,” International Security Research and Outreach Programme International Security Bureau (Ottawa: Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, July 2000): 39. 16 Sagan, “Why do States Build Nuclear Weapons?,” 71. 17 Klepak and Neill, “Are There Lessons,” 11. 18 Ibid. 19 Ibid.; Sidney Weintraub, Annette Hester, Veronica R. Prado, Luis Alberto Moreno, Energy Cooperation in the Western Hemisphere: Benefits and Impediments (Washington: CSIS, 2007), 424. 20 Sagan, “Why do States Build Nuclear Weapons?,” 63-64. 21 Ibid., 71. 22 Klepak and Neill, “Are There Lessons,” 39. 23 Ibid., 37. 24 World Bank, Argentina: From Insolvency to Growth (Washington: World Bank Publications, 1993), 93-94 (As reported by the CIA. Reports vary widely, because much of the funds were secretly allocated).; 2012 - Volume 3

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Philippe Mauger Rémy Herrera, Statistics on Military Expenditure in Developing Countries: Concepts, Methodological Problems and Sources (Paris: OECD Publishing, 1994), 58. 25 David M. Shawm-Baird, Ideas and Armaments: Military Ideologies in the Making of Brazil Arms Industries (Lanham: University Press of America, 1997), 148. 26 Charlip and Burns, Latin America: An Interpretive History, 276. 27 Ibid. 28 Richard A. Falk, Samuel S. Kim, Saul H. Mendlovitz, Disarmament and Economic Development (Piscataway: Transaction Publishers, 1966), 240. 29 John B. Rhinelander and Adam M. Scheinman, At the Nuclear Crossroads: Choices About Nuclear Weapons and Extension of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (Lanham: University Press of America, 1995), 52. 30 Ibid. 31 Ibid., 273. 32 Hartmut Krugmann, “The German-Brazilian Nuclear Deal,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Vol. 37, No. 2, (February 1981), 32. 33 Ibid. 34 Sagan, “Why do States Build Nuclear Weapons?,” 78. 35 A. L. Hsieh, 3, 7, 12, 18. 36 George Perkovich, India’s Nuclear Bomb: The Impact on Global Proliferation (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002), 418. 37 Sagan, “Why do States Build Nuclear Weapons?,” 73. 38 Alva Myrdal, The Game of Disarmament: How the United States and Russia Run the Arms Race (New York: Pantheon Books, 1976), 200. 39 See Appendix A. 40 Joseph Cirincione, Bomb Scare: The History and Future of Nuclear Weapons (New York: Columbia University Press, 2008), 34. 41 Hal Klepak, Donald Neill, 13. 42 Wilber Albert Chaffee, “Brazil,” Politics of Latin America: The Power Game (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012), 400-401. 43 Hal Klepak, Donald Neill, 5, 10. 44 Ibid, 12. 45 Brian Loveman, For la Patria: Politics and the Armed Forces in Latin America (Wilmington: SR Books, 1999), 275. 46 John Walton, “Debt, Protest, and the State in Latin America,” Power and Popular Protest: Latin American Social Movements, ed. Susan Eckstein, (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 2001), 304. 47 Ibid. 48 Klepak and Neill, “Are There Lessons,” 12. 49 Muthiah Alagappa, The Long Shadow: Nuclear Weapons and Security in 21st Century Asia (Singapore: NUS Press, 2009), 418. 50 Klepak and Neill, “Are There Lessons,” 12. 51 Terence Roehrig, The Prosecution of Former Military Leaders in Newly Democratic Nations: the Cases of Argentina, Greece, and South Korea (Jefferson, N.C.: McFarland, 2002), 64.

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Rejecting The Bomb 52 Ibid.; World Bank, 93-94. 53 David Pion-Berlin, Through Corridors of Power: Institutions and Civil-Military Relations in Argentina (University Park: Penn State Press, 1997), 118. 54 Herrera, Statistics on Military Expenditure, 58. 55 Wendy Hunter, Eroding Military Influence in Brazil: Politicians Against Soldiers (Chapel Hill: UNC Press Books, 1997), 105. 56 John Williamson, “What Should The World Bank Think About the Washington Consensus?,” World Bank Research Observer, Vol. 15, No. 2, (2000): 251-252. Alagappa, Muthiah. The Long Shadow: Nuclear Weapons and Security in 21st Century Asia. Singapore: NUS Press, 2009. Bailey, Kathleen C. Doomsday Weapons in the Hands of Many: The Arms Control Challenge of the ‘90s. Illinois: University of Illinois Press, 1991. Becker, Jasper. Rogue Regime: Kim Jong Il and the Looming Threat of North Korea. New York: Oxford University Press, 2005. Carlsnaes, Walter, Risse, Thomas, and Beth A. Simmons. Handbook of International Relations. London: SAGE Publications, 2005. Chaffee, Wilber Albert. “Brazil,” 397-493. In Politics of Latin America: The Power Game, edited by Harry E. Vanden and Gary Prevost. New York: Oxford University Press, 2012. Charlip, Julie A., and E. Bradford Burns. Latin America: An Interpretative History. New York: Prentice Hall, 2011. Cirincione, Joseph. Bomb Scare: The History and Future of Nuclear Weapons. New York: Columbia University Press, 2008. Ermarth, Fritz W. Proliferation Stability and Instability: Conditioning Factors. Boston: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1995. Gintis, Herbert. Game Theory Evolving: A Problem-Centered Introduction to Modeling Strategic Interaction. New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2009. Herrera, Rémy. Statistics on Military Expenditure in Developing Countries: Concepts, Methodological Problems and Sources. Paris: OECD Publishing, 1994. Hunter, Wendy. Eroding Military Influence in Brazil: Politicians Against Soldiers. Chapel Hill: UNC Press Books, 1997. Jo, Dong-Joon, and Eric Gartzke. “Codebook and Data Notes for ‘Determinants of Nuclear Weapons Proliferation: a Quantitative Model’”, September 2006. Full article published in Journal of Conflict Resolution (February 2006). Retrieved: <http://dss.ucsd. edu/~egartzke/data/jo_gartzke_0207_codebk_0906.pdf> Klepak, Hal, and Donald Neill. “Are There Lessons for India and Pakistan From the Argentine-Brazilian Nuclear Rivalry?,” International Security Research and Outreach Programme International Security Bureau. Ottawa: Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, July 2000. Krugmann, Hartmut. “The German-Brazilian Nuclear Deal,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Vol. 37, No. 2 (February 1981): 32-36. Loveman, Brian. For la Patria: Politics and the Armed Forces in Latin America, 2012 - Volume 3

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Philippe Mauger Wilmington: SR Books, 1999. Myrdal, Alva. The Game of Disarmament: How the United States and Russia Run the Arms Race. New York: Pantheon Books, 1976. Perkovich, George. India’s Nuclear Bomb: The Impact on Global Proliferation. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002. Pion-Berlin, David. “The Fall of Military Rule in Argentina: 1976-1983,” Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs, Vol. 27, No. 2 (Summer 1985): 55-76. ———. Through Corridors of Power: Institutions and Civil-Military Relations in Argentina. University Park: Penn State Press, 1997. Rhinelander, John B., and Adam M. Scheinman. At the Nuclear Crossroads: Choices About Nuclear Weapons and Extension of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Lanham: University Press of America, 1995. Falk, Richard A., Samuel S. Kim, and Saul H. Mendlovitz. Disarmament and Economic Development. Piscataway: Transaction Publishers, 1966. Robinson, E. Arthur, and Daniel Ullman. Mathematics and Politics. Unpublished, version 7/10/08, chapter 15, p. 1. Rock, David. Argentina, 1516-1982: From Spanish Colonization to the Falklands War. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985. Roehrig, Terence. The Prosecution of Former Military Leaders in Newly Democratic Nations: the Cases of Argentina, Greece, and South Korea. Jefferson, N.C.: McFarland, 2002. Sagan, Scott D. “Why Do States Build Nuclear Weapons? Three Models in Search of a Bomb,” International Security, Vol. 21, No. 3, (Winter 1996-1997): 54-86. Shawm-Baird, David M. Ideas and Armaments: Military Ideologies in the Making of Brazil Arms Industries. Lanham: University Press of America, 1997. Walton, John, “Debt, Protest, and the State in Latin America,” In Power and Popular Protest: Latin American Social Movements, edited by Susan Eckstein. Los Angeles: University of California Press, 2001. Waltz, Kenneth. “The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: More May be Better,” Adelphi Papers, No. 171, (1981). ———. Man, the State, and War: a Theoretical Analysis. New York: Columbia University Press, 2001. Weintraub, Sidney, Annette Hester, Veronica R. Prado, and Luis Alberto Moreno. Energy Cooperation in the Western Hemisphere: Benefits and Impediments. Washington: CSIS, 2007. Williamson, John. “What Should The World Bank Think About the Washington Consensus?,” The World Bank Research Observer Vol. 15, No. 2, (August 2000): 251-264. World Bank, Argentina: From Insolvency to Growth. Washington: World Bank Publications, 1993.

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Rejecting The Bomb Appendix A: Shared assumptions make game theory a perfect tool to analyze Neorealism.1 Indeed, Game theory posits that all actors are rational and profit-maximizing, much like Neorealism.1 The classic cooperation dilemma in game theory is often used to model arms races in Neorealist international relations theory. If both countries develop the bomb, they will have used enormous funds that could have been put into their conventional forces for no relative power gain. They will have obtained an absolute increase in power, but no gains in relative power, which under Neorealism theory is worthless.2 Hence, both Argentina and Brazil get the payoff 0 for such a situation. If Argentina develops nuclear weapons, but Brazil does not, then Argentina will now have an advantage over Brazil, so Argentina is given the payoff 1, Brazil the payoff -1; and vice-versa if Brazil obtains the bomb but Argentina does not. Finally if both develop conventional weapons only, neither gain in relative power, as such, both are given the payoff 0.

Argentina Atomic bomb Conventional only

Brazil Atomic bomb 0,0 -1,1

Conventional only 1,-1 0,0

But it becomes clear that this has a Saddlepoint for Atomic Bomb, Atomic Bomb, as 0 > -1, 1 > 0 for Argentina, and 0 > -1, 1 > 0 for Brazil. In other words, Atomic Bomb is a dominating row for Argentina and Atomic Bomb is a dominating column for Brazil. Playing a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium such as this one when one is present is optimal.3 This is Neorealismâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s conclusion: that such security dilemmas lead to an arms race. For a Neorealist, this explains why Argentina and Brazil developed nuclear weapons program. Note that these payoffs are what each country is assumed to believe and are not absolute truths regarding nuclear weaponâ&#x20AC;&#x201D;it does not matter whether an atomic bomb would really be more useful than conventional arms under Neorealism, as long as both countries believe this would be the case.

1 David A. Lake and R. Powell, eds., Strategic Choice and International Relations (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999): 6, quoted in Carlsnaes, Risse, and Simmons, Handbook of International Relations (London: SAGE Publications, 2005), 188. 1 Herbert Gintis, Game Theory Evolving: A Problem-Centered Introduction to Modeling Strategic Interaction (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2009), 18, 30. 2 Waltz, Man, the State, and War, 161. 3 Robinson and Ullman, Mathematics and Politics (Unpublished, version 7/10/08), chapter 15, p. 2012 - Volume 3

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Learning From the Global South: The Case of the Huichol People Within the Context of Indigenous Anti-Mining Movements in Latin America Eva Valladares Antón This research looks at the struggle of the Huichol community, an indigenous community in Western Mexico. The goal is to show the impact of the concessions that the Mexican government granted to carry out mining operations in the Huichol territory. Through the evaluation of two case studies in Ecuador and Peru that are analogous to the Huichol struggle, this paper aims to empower the Huichol people in their fight to stop mining operations in the desert of Wirikuta. The objective is to to provide them with the essential knowledge of the legal and civil pathways they might take in order to fight for the right to their lands and to preserve their lifestyle. Treat the Earth well: it was not given to you by your parents, it was loaned to you by your children. We do not inherit the Earth from our Ancestors, we borrow it from our Children. Ancient Proverb For the Wixarika community Thousands of pilgrims walk to Mecca, Santiago de Compostela and Lourdes every year, among many other spiritual journeys across the world. The equivalent of those sacred places for the Huicholes, an indigenous population in western Mexico, is Wirikuta. It is almost unimaginable that if gold were found in Makkah, Galicia, or the Hautes-Pyrénées, then the sanctuaries located there would be demolished. Nevertheless, that seems to be a plausible situation, despite Wirikuta’s centennial spirituality and legal status as a preserved area. In August 2010, the Mexican government granted 22 concessions to First Majestic Silver Corp, a Canadian mining company, to exploit silver in an area that includes 70 percent of the Wirikuta sanctuary.

Eva Valladares was born in Madrid, Spain. She is a third-year student at Colby College, where she majors in Anthropology and International Studies. Her interests are human rights, environmental anthropology and the Latin American region. 2012 - Volume 3

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Eva Valladares Antón First and foremost, this is the chronicle of a struggle: the struggle of the Huichol indigenous community; and of an incipient environmentalist movement that aims at preserving its land not to exploit it, but to preserve it. Through the evaluation of two case studies in Ecuador and Peru that are analogous to the Huichol struggle, this paper aims to empower the Huichol people in their fight to stop mining operations in the desert of Wirikuta. My aim is to give them hope through the actions taken by other communities, and to provide them with the essential knowledge of the legal and civil pathways they might take in order to fight for the right to their lands and to preserve their lifestyle. Los Huicholes The word “Huichol” is a distortion of an indigenous ancestral name that was modified during the colonial period and is now used to refer to this community. However, Huicholes refer to themselves as “Wixárika,” a term whose origin is unknown. Both terms will be used interchangeably throughout this paper. The Huichol people are located over the Sierra Madre Occidental, a mountain range in western Mexico. According to the last census executed in 2000, a population between 10,000 and 15,000 Huichol Indians live scattered over 4107 square kilometers in the states of Jalisco, Nayarit, Zacatecas, and Durango. The Huicholes live mostly in isolation, and since the Sierra Madre is only accessible by airplane, the execution of a census difficult. After the Mexican Revolution, some Huicholes moved to the coast in an attempt to escape military action. This scattering of the Huichol population resulted in the current tendency to live in ranchos, which eliminated the centralized communities they used to share before the Mexican Revolution . For the purpose of this paper, explaining the religious and spiritual experience of Huicholes is essential in order to understand the implications of allowing mining operations that affect the everyday life of Wixaritari. Contemporary Huicholes cluster around ceremonial centers and villages, known as ranchos. The Wixaritari believe that the organization of the environment was instituted by sacred ancestors: Great Grandmother Germination, Grandfather Fire, Father Sun, and Kaoyomari, the world organizer. The Huicholes are one of the few indigenous groups that have maintained their religious beliefs and rituals almost intact, something relatively uncommon in Mexico, where native and Catholic beliefs have at times amalgamated. Through their spirituality, the Huicholes have created their own imagination of the outside world. One of the most renowned traditions among Huicholes is the annual pilgrimage to a highland desert known as Wirikuta. This pilgrimage takes place between September and February. For it, the pilgrims must be cleansed of their sins. One way to do this is explained by a Huichol member: “As we advance towards Wirikuta, we clean our minds and souls since it is the only way to face the hikuri [peyote].” The peyote is a hallucinogenic cactus that in the Wixárika culture is the instrument that allows Huicholes to communicate with their deities and ancestors. Huicholes do several offerings before ‘hunting’ the peyote and ingesting it. After consumption, they enter

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Learning From the Global South into close contact with their ancestors. In 1994, Wirikuta was declared a “Site of Cultural and Historical Heritage and Ecological Conservation Area.” In 2001, UNESCO proclaimed Wirikuta a Sacred Natural Site. The Threat to Wirikuta Not only the UNESCO but also the very State of San Luis Potosi where Wirikuta is located has recognized the land covered by the pilgrimage to Wirikuta. Despite being under legal protection, the federal government has granted 22 concessions to a Canadian mining company named First Majestic Silver Corporation. Most of the mining activities will take place within the protected area, destroying the way of life of the Huichol people, exploiting their sacred areas, contaminating water sources, and affecting the rich biodiversity of the region. In November 2009, this company purchased these concessions that allow them to operate in 80 percent of the Wirikuta Reserve. These concessions include half of the Huichol Holy Mountain, the towns of Real del Catorce and La Luz, as well as 11 small villages. This company managed to get a permit that allows exploration and extraction. The company plans to use a system of open pit exploration and cyanide-leaching processes. Cyanide requires 0.2 grams to kill a person and is inherently dangerous to the environment and the communities that live close to mining operations. If the mining operations were begun, cyanide would be used daily in order to extract gold and silver. Moreover, the waste would be released into rivers or lakes or dissolved through the soil. Therefore, the local water supply would be at risk, both due to the massive amounts of water that the company would require and the toxic wastes that would be released into the river or throughout the soil. Because of the detrimental environmental impacts of the proposed mining project, the Huichol people and inhabitants of Real del Catorce and the affected villages are working to enforce the existing laws that should be protecting these lands. Article 10 of the Mining Law in Mexico states that “the exploration and exploitation of the minerals and substances in article 4—which includes both silver and gold . . . can only be accomplished by people with Mexican nationality.” Moreover, Articles 27, 37, and 38 oblige corporations to protect the environment and the ecological equilibrium. Despite being protected by the law, Huicholes are menaced by these concessions that the Mexican government has granted to First Majestic Silver Corp. As a result, the Huichol people have the right to protest the failure to comply with the law and the abuses committed by the multinational corporation. Upon this conclusion, I offer strategies that Huicholes should add to their protests in Mexico City through the examination of two case studies. Law as the path to grassroots resistance in Ecuador The discourse of indigenous and human rights has functioned as a key framework in indigenous struggles across the world. As stated in Article 29 of the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, “Indigenous peoples have the right to 2012 - Volume 3

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Eva Valladares Antón the conservation and protection of the environment and the productive capacity of their lands or territories and resources. States shall establish and implement assistance programs for indigenous peoples for such conservation and protection, without discrimination.” Inspired by this article, this essay also denounces the violation of this right and proposes ways by which the Huicholes can urge the Mexican government to protect them. Despite the fact that the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples is not legally binding, it encourages cooperation between governments and indigenous peoples. In order for the Huicholes to survive, they must obtain the support of the Mexican government in obstructing mining operations within the indigenous region. In the northern region of Ecuador, there is a small village, Junín, trying to resist mining operations. For this purpose, the inhabitants of Junín have created a grassroots organization named Defensa Y Conservacion Ecologica de Intag (DECOIN). This highly marginalized community provides an example of how current social movements create alternative development projects that reject mining. The arrival of state and corporate engineers to examine the possibility of mining exploration in this area alarmed community members, who researched the consequences of mining in other countries and discovered that these operations resulted in environmental destruction, poverty, and social disintegration. For this reason, they formed DECOIN in 1995, which, with the help of Acción Ecológica, raised international awareness for this ecological issue. DECOIN, along with Acción Ecológica, developed educational workshops that instructed community members on the threats of mining. Additionally, DECOIN organized a trip to Peru in 1996 to show community members the negative effects of an operative mine. DECOIN also confronted the World Bank by initiating a claim against PRODEMINCA, a project that was designed to provide a geological survey of Ecuador. The local ecologists won the claim, a victory that demonstrates the power of grassroots organizations to change power structures. Moreover, this case suggests the development of alternative economics with subsistence farming, shade grown coffee production, fish farming, and ecotourism as the economic activities sustaining the locals. Moreover, community members have been able to form alliances with leading figures in the indigenous political party who support them in the struggle against mining. Through an overview of the strategies that the locals of Junín took in order to stop mining—workshops, trips, political alliances, and new economic activities—I attempt to inspire the Huicholes to import these types of activities into their struggle against multinational corporations. By implementing new economic, political, and educational actions, the Huicholes could improve their chances to be heard by both multinational corporations and the Mexican government. These types of actions are crucial to the Huichol cause. Although the Huichol community has already attempted to stop mining operations by marching in Mexico City and writing to the Mexican government, it is important for them to take grassroots action to resist mining. These new modes of organization create a new role for civil society: Grassroots organizations together with international NGOs could play a major role in resisting mining operations in Wirikuta.

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Learning From the Global South Peru: strategic organization and direct peaceful action Here, I consider the case of the social movement that emerged as a response to the Brazilian mining company Miski Mayo, which operates as a subsidiary of Vale do Rio Doce. Miski Mayo acquired concessions to exploit gold and copper in the province of San Marcos in 2004. This concession granted the company the right to extract resources from croplands and pastures. At the same time, peasants worried about the effects on water supplies and pollution of the water systems. The peasants responded with the rebirth of the rondas campesinas, which consisted of night-watch patrols created during the 1980s in an effort to eradicate disputes in the villages. By early 2007, the rondas campesinas were widespread and influential in discouraging the company from starting its operations. This method of organization among the local communities bolstered the creation of the Frente de Defensa de La Cuenca del Rio Cajamarquino, which served as a way to mobilize the community members. Through this organization, peasants organized a march to the mining operation in order to conduct an “inspección ocular” (in-person inspection). This inspection led to the regional government’s promise to meet at the office in Cajamarca but, since this meeting failed to address the peasants’ concerns, they initiated a mass protest outside of the drilling site during the second “inspección ocular.” The Ministry of Energy and Mines and the regional government responded with action, since the political pressure from a large number of peasants was very high. Finally, the regional government agreed that the heavy equipment from Miski Mayo had to be removed. However, the company refused to suspend its operations in the area, which motivated a hunger march from the Condebamba Valley to Cajamarca. The local community then organized an inter-provincial strike that paralyzed commercial activities and transportation. These actions built momentum within the movement, and state bureaucracies started to take action; in October 2007, negotiating tables were initiated by the government and the peasants to talk directly to the representatives of Miski Mayo, the regional government and the Ministry of Energy and Mines. Moreover, the local communities utilized the intervention of parliamentarians and lawyers, who did not want to profit from the case, to continue the struggle, alleging violations of the Peruvian Constitution and other legal documents. Support came from both inside and outside the state apparatus. Another hunger march followed in 2009, and ended with a mass demonstration in San Marcos. The protester issued an ultimatum to the company: if it did not abandon the site by the May 10, 2009, an indefinite blockade would be initiated. As a result of this provocation, the company moved out of San Marcos. By giving this overview of the social movement initiated in the Peruvian Andes, I attempt to provide the Huicholes with similar experiences that could be useful to their resistance actions. Political pressure on the regional and federal governments is a very important tool that they should use. Through non-violence resistance methods such as blockades and hunger strikes, the Huicholes should be able to gain the attention of the Mexican government and the media. Moreover, by building connections in different governmental levels, 2012 - Volume 3

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Eva Valladares Antón with influential and knowledgeable individuals such as lawyers, the Wixárika community increases its chances to be heard. Further considerations This study aims to empower the Huichol community with the possible actions that can lead them to a change in the power structures that prevent them from being successful in the defense of their rights, as a community that wants to protect its land and environment. The Gramscian notion of hegemony includes the supremacy of one social class over the others, which results in political and economic control by the higher strata in society. The outcome in Gramsci’s world was a hegemonic culture in which the values of the bourgeoisie maintained the status quo of the richest sections of society. In Mexico, the hegemonic discourse is used as an instrument for the domination of indigenous communities by the ruling classes and multinational companies. The Mexican government has exercised its power to grant concessions beneficial to the ruling class yet detrimental to the Huichol community. However, power is not a static object; it can be changed through direct action. In order to change the power structure that leaves indigenous communities out of the decision-making process, it is essential to challenge the hegemonic position of the Mexican state and multinational corporations Through the case studies in Ecuador and Peru, the Huicholes should be able to observe the significance of grassroots social movements that promote change in power structures for the benefit of indigenous communities and the environment. Mining is a destructive and profitable sector that can lead to the destruction of water supplies, biodiversity, pastureland and forests. Since capital accumulation seems to go beyond the limits of the environment, the Huichol case should be seen as one among many situations where governments, along with multinational corporations, aim to benefit monetarily from common properties and resources, while avoiding responsibility for the harm produced to both the environment and the society. For this reason, the Huichol struggle is not only a fight against mining, but a challenge to the neoliberal policies that harm the natural environment. In social movements involving environmental concerns, civil society is an essential actor in building resistance in historically marginalized communities. The participation of society in alliance with grassroots organizations obstructs the aspirations and economic activities of elites, governments, and corporations. This reality turns out to be a challenge to the neoliberal model in which mining corporations operate. There are paths that the Huicholes can take in order to stop their oppression by the force of neoliberalism in Mexico, and civil society is certainly a potential ally of the Huichol movement. Conclusion Pilgrims walk toward a specific place. During the journey, a paradoxical combination of exhaustion and hope leads to a realization moment in which they reckon themselves some-

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Learning From the Global South how wiser, stronger. This patience, wisdom and strength that the Huicholes have acquired through centuries is the basis on which they should navigate a world that values matter over the spirit. Eduardo Galeano once noted that the purpose of utopia was to walk, to keep on walking. This time the Huicholes must walk with precaution and attention. I hope they will find the initiatives outlined above useful in standing up for their rights. With a lot of work and bit of luck, the Huichol community will someday enjoy this pilgrimage to Wirikuta without the menace of any mining corporation.

v 1 Myerhoff, Barbara G. Peyote Hunt: The Sacred Journey of the Huichol Indians. Ithaca, New York: Cornell UP, 1974. 53. 2 Ibid., 53. 3 Zingg, Robert M. 2004. Huichol Mythology. Ed. Tucson: University of Arizona. xv. 4 Ibid., xxx. 5 Ibid., xxx. 6 Harmon, David, and Mercedes Otegui Acha. 2003. “The Wixárika/Huichol Sacred Natural Site in the Chihuahuan Desert, San Luis Potosi, Mexico” in The Full Value of Parks: From Economics to the Intangible. Rowman & Littlefield Publishers. 398. 7 Ibid., 302. 8 Ibid., 303. 9 State Environmental Resource Center. 2004. Banning Cyanide Use in Mining - Frequently Asked Questions. [Online] Available from http://www.serconline.org/mining/faq. html (Accesed 22 Jan. 2012). 10 Cámara de Diputados del H. Congreso de la Unión Secretaría General. 2006. Ley Minera [Online] Available from http://www.diputados.gob.mx/LeyesBiblio/pdf/151.pdf (Accessed 20 January 2012). 11 UN General Assembly. 2007. “United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples : resolution adopted by the General Assembly,” Available from: http://www. unhcr.org/refworld/docid/471355a82.html (accessed 23 January 2012). 12 Kuecker, G. D. 2008 “Fighting for the forests revisited: grassroots resistance to mining in Northern Ecuador” in Latin American Social Movements in the Twenty-first Century: Resistance, Power, and Democracy. Rowman and Littlefield Publishers. 13 Ibid., 106. 14 Ibid., 111. 15 Taylor, L. 2011. “Environmentalism and Social Protest: The Contemporary Antimining Mobilization in the Province of San Marcos and the Condebamba Valley, Peru”. Journal of Agrarian Change, 11:428. 16 Ibid., 430. 17 Visual inspection. 2012 - Volume 3

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Eva Valladares Antón 18 Taylor, Environmentalism and Social Protest, 437. 19 Femia, Joseph. 1975. “Hegemony And Consciousness In The Thought Of Antonio Gramsci”. Political Studies 23.1 (1975): 29. 20 Galeano, Eduardo. Las palabras andantes. Buenos Aires, Rep. Argentina: Catálogos Editora, 1993. p. 239. Cámara de Diputados del H. Congreso de la Unión Secretaría General. 2006. Ley Minera [Online] Available from http://www.diputados.gob.mx/LeyesBiblio/pdf/151.pdf (Accessed 20 January 2012). Femia, Joseph. 1975. “Hegemony And Consciousness In The Thought Of Antonio Gramsci”. Political Studies 23.1 (1975): 29-48. Galeano, Eduardo. Las palabras andantes. Buenos Aires, Rep. Argentina: Catálogos Editora, 1993. Harmon, David, and Mercedes Otegui Acha. 2003. “The Wixárika/Huichol Sacred Natural Site in the Chihuahuan Desert, San Luis Potosi, Mexico” in The Full Value of Parks: From Economics to the Intangible. Rowman & Littlefield Publishers. 2003. Kuecker, G. D.. “Fighting for the forests revisited: grassroots resistance to mining in Northern Ecuador” in Latin American Social Movements in the Twenty-first Century: Resistance, Power, and Democracy. Rowman and Littlefield Publishers. 2008. Liverman, D. M., and Vilas, S. 2006. “Neoliberalism and the environment in Latin America”. Annual Review of Environment and Resources. 31:327–6. Myerhoff, Barbara G. Peyote Hunt: The Sacred Journey of the Huichol Indians. Ithaca, New York: Cornell UP, 1974. State Environmental Resource Center. 2004. Banning Cyanide Use in Mining Frequently Asked Questions. [Online] Available from http://www.serconline.org/mining/ faq.html [Accesed 22 Jan. 2012]. Taylor, L. 2011. “Environmentalism and Social Protest: The Contemporary Antimining Mobilization in the Province of San Marcos and the Condebamba Valley, Peru”. Journal of Agrarian Change, 11:420-39. UN General Assembly. 2007. “United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples : resolution / adopted by the General Assembly,” Available from: http:// www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/471355a82.html [accessed 23 January 2012]. Zingg, Robert M. 2004. Huichol Mythology. Ed. Tucson: University of Arizona.

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The Complexity of Venezuelan Politics and the Upcoming Elections of November 2012 Steve Ellner The outcome of Venezuela’s presidential election in October, 2012 will have great implications for Latin America due to the radical brand of change that includes widespread expropriations and ongoing mobilization at different levels. The social base of the movement that supports president Hugo Chávez is the unincorporated sectors of the population that have interests and political visions different from those of the organized working class. The complexity of the challenges facing the movement stems from the pacific and gradual strategy for change, along with the internal divisions within the movement that is a reflection of social heterogeneity. The Venezuelan opposition candidate Henrique Capriles has devised a strategy to distance himself from the dominant parties of the past, but has failed to develop an economic and social program that differentiates himself from past policies.

Political leaders and observers have centered much attention on Venezuelan electoral politics, and for good reason. There is a lot at stake because the elections that are coming up in October put to test a new model. It’s clear that the new model that’s been developed in Venezuela has downsides. It’s had downsides, but also some attractive aspects. And I think that the reason why these elections are so important, politically and ideologically speaking, for Latin America and beyond, is that the main argument against far-reaching change in Latin America, structural change, is an argument that goes back three decades to Margaret Thatcher and the outset of globalization, when the argument known as “TINA,” There Is No Alternative,” was first articulated. With the collapse of the USSR in 1991, I think it became the most important and convincing argument against the possibility of far-reaching structural change in the continent. The argument basically was as follows: “Sure, the current established system has its failures, but there’s no alternative, so let’s make the best of a mixed situation because there’s nothing else we can do.” Chávez comes to power in ’98, and once he starts to implement structural changes (I would say, after the Constitution that was

Steve Ellner earned his Ph.D. in Latin American history at the University of New Mexico in 1980 and has taught at the Universidad de Oriente in Puerto La Cruz, Venezuela since 1977. He is the author of Venezuela’s Movimiento al Socialismo: From Guerrilla Defeat to Electoral Politics (1988); Organized Labor in Venezuela, l958-l991 (l993); and Rethinking Venezuelan Politics: Class, Polarization and the Chávez Phenomenon. (Lynne Rienner, 2008).

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The Complexity of Venezuelan Politics drafted and approved in 1999) by 2001, with the radical reforms that were passed dealing with agrarian reform and oil policy, the prediction was that this was going to fail in short order because the system just wasn’t viable. This prediction led into the debate over the so-called “two lefts” in Latin America, a debate developed by Jorge Castañeda, the ex-foreign minister of Mexico, in his book “Leftovers,” which basically states there are two possibilities for change in Latin America. One is change led by a moderate or social democratic left that is represented by Lula, and the other is a socialist or populist left (and indeed populism and socialism are conflated)—that is, the left represented by Chávez in Venezuela. The basic argument of those who adhere to the “two left” thesis is that the Chávez model is all about rhetoric, discourse, and style, which appeals to some and turns off others, particularly much of the middle class, but that there is really no substance to the model, which is underpinned by oil money. Without oil the system wouldn’t function. I think much is at stake now if this model proves to be politically viable. If Chávez is reelected this year, then it will tend to demonstrate that the model is politically and even economically viable. The implicit and sometimes explicit response of Venezuelans belonging to the opposition when asked how is it that Chávez has remained in power for as long as he has, is that the people just don’t know better. But I don’t think that’s a convincing argument. The thesis that charismatic populist leaders like Perón were able to reach power because the so-called masses had recently arrived to the cities from the countryside and lacked political direction and experience didn’t hold by the 80s and 90s. By then the people who lived in the cities were descendants of people who arrived from the countryside with much more political knowledge and experience than past generations of migrants. Some populists such as Alejandro Toledo reach power because they promise everything under the sun, but if they can’t deliver, their days in power are numbered, so I don’t think that the argument that equates populism with demagoguery is valid. Furthermore, Castañeda’s viewpoint of the two lefts has been questioned recently by several books­­­­—such as the one recently published by Johns Hopkins edited by Steven Levitsky and Kenneth Roberts, as well as one edited by Maxwell Cameron and Eric Hershberg—that demonstrate that it is simplistic and therefore flawed. Within both the moderate left and the populist left there are important differences. In the case of Bolivia, for instance, robust social movements were instrumental in bringing Morales to power, whereas in Venezuela the social movement tradition is considerably weaker and Chávez didn’t really owe his triumph in 1998 to them—perhaps to spontaneous demonstrations, but not to a solidified social structure as in Bolivia. I think that there is more at stake in Venezuela at this point than in Bolivia, Ecuador, and Nicaragua for a number of reasons. First, Chávez has been in power for more than thirteen years while Morales and Correa came to power in 2006. So, Chávez has been in power for twice as long. But more important, Chávez’s policies are much more radical structurally speaking than what is taking place in Ecuador and Bolivia. In the case of Venezuela, there have been widespread expropriations since 2007. When Chávez was reelected in 2006 he nationalized a number of strategic industries—electricity, telecommunications, cement and steel, along with advancing along the process referred to as the “renationalization of oil.” 2012 - Volume 3

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Steve Ellner Widespread expropriation doesn’t really have a counterpart in Bolivia or Ecuador. There’s another difference that is important to point out. In Bolivia and Ecuador, vibrant social movements have been very critical of the government, so much so in Ecuador that Correa has stated that his greatest challenge doesn’t come from the oligarchy anymore, but rather from the so-called ultra-left. There is a degree of disunity on the left and among social groups that originally supported Correa. The same is true, to a lesser extent, in the case of Bolivia. Morales faced resistance from the beginning from Felipe Quispe, who ran against him and had a more radical program in terms of the nationalization of hydrocarbons and coca policy. In the case of Venezuela, Chávez has been much more successful at maintaining leftist unity by appealing to different segments of the population with the same message that is interpreted differently. He has succeeded in unifying these forces, but the unity is incomplete, because the message is interpreted differently. That means there are different expectations, and sooner or later there may be more open confrontation. There is unity around Chávez at the same time that there is disunity and bitterness between different groups that support the government. The situation in Venezuela is quite complex. It is complex both internally in terms of the different currents within the Chavista movement, as well as the types of resistance that the Chávez government faces from those opposed to it. At the same time, the opposition has succeeded in unifying after having chosen a candidate, Henrique Capriles for the October presidential elections. There is a big distance between the discourse of Capriles and what his party, Primero Justicia, really stands for. The distance between the opposition and the Chávez government is such that a middle ground isn’t politically feasible because you have two extreme positions. Capriles claims that he is against the extreme polarization and that he had nothing to do with it in the first place. Chávez was partly responsible, and so was the rest of the opposition, which consists of old-time politicians. Since Capriles’ party, Primero Justicia, is young, and Capriles himself is young, the argument is that he played no part in bringing about the polarization. That message struck a responsive chord with Venezuelans and helped him win the primaries by a large majority of votes. He also denies that he stands for extreme positions and claims he identifies with Lula, so he’s supposedly a moderate willing to accept the good aspects of Chávez’s policies. Thus, if elected, he will not assume intransigent positions. But there is one flaw in his claim to being a moderate. The big issue in Venezuela that the opposition isn’t really dealing with is an economic one. Specifically, the denationalization of the economy in the 1980s and 1990s was the most important development, at least economically, in the country. Sector after sector of the economy was taken over not by national capital, but foreign capital. This process was not debated at the time. And the opposition, specifically Primero Justicia, isn’t dealing with that issue now. There’s no indication as to whether the opposition will go back to the situation as it was in the 1990s and allow industries again to be bought out by foreign capital. Indeed, Primero Justicia, on the ideological spectrum, is more to the right than the other parties that belong to the opposition, specifically Acción Democrática, Venezuela’s largest political party. AD was a radical populist party that moved to the center over the course of several decades, and

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The Complexity of Venezuelan Politics it has to this day an ambivalent position on the issue of privatization. Primero Justicia and Capriles are much more favorable to privatization. October represents a showdown between two extremes positions, one favoring socialism and the other a model that may resemble the neoliberal model of the 1990s. The term “neoliberal” has become pejorative and nobody is using it, but the discourse would indicate that opposition to regulation, expropriation, and a strong state sector would lead in the direction of laissez-faire type policies known as neoliberalism. The key term that I’d like to emphasize with regard to the Chávez government and the challenges it faces is “complexity.” With reference to the diverse sectors that support it, each one has different interests and visions that at times conflict. Another aspect of the complexity is that the government is supporting changes within the context of democracy and electoral politics. This is different from the socialist model of the past. The orthodox, Marxist movements that came to power in the twentieth century spoke of the working class, the proletariat, as the key agent for socialist transformation. Marx emphasized that production is the center of society, and the proletariat is at the center of production. The Communists who came to power may have had internal divisions, just as all movements do, but they had a common denominator, namely belief in the working class as the key agent of change. Twenty-first century socialism doesn’t have that common denominator. There are different sectors of the population that have different interests, and specifically I would refer to three sectors in particular. One is the proletariat, the workers in the formal economy who work for companies that are fairly large. The second is the middle sector. The middle class as a whole is opposed to Chávez, but many Chavistas, including the movement’s leaders, come from the middle class. They are students, university graduates, and others who live in middle class communities. The third sector, which up until recently Chávez prioritized, and still does to a certain extent, is what I call the “unincorporated” sectors of the population, the sectors that have been traditionally shunted aside culturally, politically, and economically. Those people who work for the informal economy I would call unincorporated. They don’t have unions and they’re not protected by labor legislation. The semi-incorporated sector is made up of workers in the formal economy who work for small companies and thus also lack union representation. The unincorporated and semi-incorporated sectors have interests that are quite different from those of the working class in the formal economy. I believe that the thrust of the Chavista programs really is designed to prepare the unincorporated and semiincorporated sectors of the population. I think the thinking on the part of the Chavistas is that these sectors are politically astute, but they lack the organizational skills that are necessary to create a viable political movement that fights for change. Twentieth-century orthodox socialists did not worry about these shortcomings because the key social force was the working class which had discipline and organizational experience as a result of membership in unions. Now if the majority of the population belongs to the informal, unincorporated or semi-incorporated sectors (and according to the statistics it does), then it is necessary to prepare the population. But that does not happen overnight. The flagship social program under Chávez is the community council program dating back to 2006. The councils are novel experiences for Venezuela and, I think, for 2012 - Volume 3

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Steve Ellner all of Latin America. In Venezuela previously, going back to the early 1980s, there was a proliferation of community councils that were called the Asociaciones de Vecinos, but that movement was basically an interest group that pressured local governments to carry out public works projects in their communities. The community councils under Chávez are completely different. They hold assemblies that decide on priority projects and then submit a proposal to the municipal, statewide, or national government. If the project is approved, then in many cases the money goes directly to the community councils. The community council then has two options: they can either pay a firm to carry out the public works project, in which case its members can monitor the work, or can carry out the project on its own, which is encouraged especially when the project is relatively simple, like paving sidewalks. For those belonging to the unincorporated-semi-incorporated sectors and completely lacking in organizational experience and administrative skills, this is a very important experience. Most important, it provides a sense of empowerment. But on the other hand, the programs, at least in the short run, are not cost effective. The government could do a lot more with the money available by paying a construction company to carry out the same project, even if the firm is owned by someone belonging to the opposition. These companies have the capital, experience, and technology and in addition a name to protect in order to get future contracts. There is less enthusiasm for these programs among some members of the middle and working classes. The orthodox Marxists in the trade union movement say that the emphasis should be placed on industrialization. From a Marxist perspective, the working class, not the marginalized or “unincorporated” sectors, is the key agent for change and industrialization will lead to an increase in its size. There are three different visions within Chavismo that correspond to the marginalized, working class, and middle sectors, thus demonstrating the correlation between ideology and social formations. The marginalized sectors embrace change based on empowerment and community programs that are geographically-based as opposed to production-based, which is a Marxist approach centered on working class demands and worker participation in the decision making of state companies. The slogan of worker participation and worker control has pitted the working class leaders against the middle class, specifically state managers. There is a lot of resistance among state managers to the application of worker control and co-management known as cogestión. This issue arises in the strategic sectors of the economy, specifically oil, and dates back to the period after the defeat of the general strike in 2003 when the workers called for an Asamblea Constituyente Petrolea, a constituent assembly of the oil industry. Oil worker activists argued that the general strike was defeated due to the political maturity and the commitment of the oil workers to the revolutionary cause. The workers demonstrated that they could run the industry without management at a time when most of management supported the general strike. Nevertheless, the thesis of worker co-management was defeated within the industry and it is now generally accepted that the oil company PDVSAS should be exempt from the plans for worker management. This is another example of a debate going on that pits two social sectors of the Chavista movement against each other: the middle sector that identifies with the state

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The Complexity of Venezuelan Politics managers and the worker contingent of Chavismo that supports worker input in decision making. To make the situation even more complicated, the Chavista worker movement itself is divided and there is one faction that has just formed its own confederation that feels that the worker movement should not put forward excessive demands at this moment and that political criteria should prevail. They argue that loyalty to Chávez is more important than such banners as worker input in decision making. Thus debate is taking place within the workers’ movement and between the workers’ movement and the middle-sector Chavistas who basically state that worker input in decision making is a precarious arrangement and in any case should not be applied to the oil industry for strategic reasons. Furthermore, middlesector Chavistas argue that the workers are conflating worker input in decision making and bread-and-butter demands. In essence, worker control is really a cover and the real intention is to achieve unrealistic economic demands. There are two dimensions to the complexity facing Chavismo. One is internal, that is, the different and at times conflicting interests and visions within the Chavista movement. The second dimension is the democratic road to socialism, which is much more complex than the forceful seizure of power, beginning with the Soviet revolution of 1917. With regard to democratic socialism, some observers say that Chávez is neither a socialist nor a democrat and that his real intention is to impose a dictatorship, some even going so far as to compare him with Hitler or Mussolini, as Donald Rumsfeld did a while back. Of course, no one is inside of Chávez’s head, so there’s no way of knowing what he plans on doing or would like to do. Any leader can change radically, but he (or she) pays a price if the movement is not prepared. If he bases his appeal on a given strategy and then discards it to go down a different road, he is going to face internal resistance from those who feel deceived. And that would certainly be the case if Chávez just decided to forget about electoral democracy and established a dictatorship. In addition to that there is no case in history in which a leader is in power for 13, almost 14, years, is elected and reelected, wins numerous other elections and then, after 13 or 14 years of electoral democracy, he assumes absolute power. That’s never happened before. Hitler (if you want to talk about Hitler as Rumsfeld did), came to power in 1933 and within a number of months he was jailing and assassinating people within his movement he didn’t trust, such as Gregor Strasser and Ernst Roehm. And the Nuremberg laws were passed in 1935. So there’s really no comparison. The democratic electoral road to socialism is a lot more complicated than the forceful seizure of power, which is the path followed by the orthodox communists who reached power in the twentieth century. In the case of Venezuela, this complexity is clearly demonstrated in the case of the expropriations beginning in 2007 and in more accelerated form over the more recent past. The opposition claims that when Chávez began to expropriate it was part of his master plan—after all Chávez had announced at the World Social Forum in Porto Alegre, Brazil in 2005 that he was a socialist. Some opposition leaders such as Teodoro Petkoff claimed that the expropriations are designed to weaken the opportunities for the anti-Chavistas to control the workers’ movement, so there is a political objective, namely control of organized labor by the Chavistas. I believe that although some of the expropriations obey long-term objectives, the process was more complex and did not for the most part form part of a preconceived plan. 2012 - Volume 3

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Steve Ellner In general, the democratic road to socialism provides those opposed to far-reaching change spaces to carry out resistance, a resistance that is legal, semi-legal and in some cases illegal, a dynamic quite different from the Soviet Union in 1917, China in 1949, and Cuba in 1959. In Venezuela, a tug of war between the government and the opposition, and an escalation of conflicts in the absence of a master plan, led in directions that were not always predictable. Specifically, once Chávez decided not to make concessions over the regulation of prices implemented in the wake of the general strike in February 2003, expropriations became increasingly likely. He could have negotiated with the private sector over prices as previous governments had done, but he decided not to. Back in 2002 and 2003, when the general strike generated an upward pressure on prices, in accordance with the law of supply and demand, Chávez established price controls on a number of basic commodities. The reaction of the business sector was to try to get around the controls, which meant a black market in some cases, smuggling in others. For instance, coffee, believe it or not, was smuggled from Venezuela to Colombia. Although Venezuelan coffee is of high quality, the country is not as – omit “as” much of a coffee exporter as is Colombia. Basically smugglers bought coffee at artificially low state-set prices and then sold it at market-valued prices in Colombia for a superprofit. That’s exactly what happened in the case of coffee and a number of other products. The government reacted by placing greater controls through the consumer organization that is now called INDAPAVIS. More recently a law on consumer protection was promulgated in which a new oversight body was created with a wider capacity to monitor prices and enforce legislation. In short, there has been a tug of war and an escalation of confrontation between the state and private industry in which the inevitable result was expropriation. Two factors that are sometimes difficult to separate explain the problem of shortages that has beset Venezuela since the general strike of 2002-2003. One is political in that it is designed to create discontent and undermine government popularity. The most acute shortages after the general strike were in the months leading up to the referendum over a constitutional reform of 69 articles that was defeated in December 2007. The shortages undoubtedly had a lot do to with that outcome. There is also an economic motivation in that commercial interests benefit, including big companies as well as individual entrepeneurs. Both groups benefit by buying regulated products such as cement, steel rods, and food at artificially low prices and then selling on the black market or illegally transporting the product to neighboring Colombia and thus receiving a super-profit. There are other motivations as well. The expropriations of strategic industries such as steel and telecommunications represent a nationalistic banner dating back to the 1930s and ‘40s. Even the conservative parties of today like AD and COPEI supported this when they incorporated it in the Constitution of 1961. So there are a number of motivations but the only way to understand the widespread nature of expropriations is to place it in a broader context. To summarize, I believe that the complexity of the process in Venezuela contrasts in fundamental ways with the forceful seizure of power, which was the generally accepted leftist strategy for achieving socialism up until recently, when most Latin American leftists believed it would eventually happen that way. Marx himself said as much in the last paragraph of the Communist Manifesto, which explicitly affirmed that the seizure of power by force was the

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The Complexity of Venezuelan Politics only way to bring about socialism or communism. A change has taken place in the thinking of leftists in Venezuelan and Latin America. I would say that deep down inside, most of them are probably unsure whether this is going to work. What happens in the presidential elections in October will help determine whether the peaceful road to socialism becomes a convincing and attractive point of reference in Venezuela and throughout the continent.

v The author of this article gave a conference with the same title in April of 2012 at the Johns Hopkins University. This is a transcription edited for AmĂŠricas by the author.

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Ricardo Flores Magón: Construction and Critique of His Liberation Utopia Rogelio Laguna

This article is an approach to Ricardo Flores Magon´s political thought. In the first place I establish how Magon´s thought is connected with the Philosophy of Liberation and insist on the importance of reading history in a new way. In the second part of this essay I explain the Utopia in the Magonist perspective and how it is built in order to conclude with a critique to Magón from Franz Hinkelammert.

Flores Magón: a Thinker of Liberation The official history of Mexico remembers Francisco I. Madero as the central character of the Mexican Revolution. In his historical representation, Madero stands as the manifestation of the beginning of a democratic regime that opposed the centrality and imposition of the Porfiriato. Madero seemed to be an embodiment of a “new” democratic political power. As a tribute to Madero’s importance, Mexico commemorates the Mexican Revolution on November 20. On this date in 1910, Madero proclaimed the Plan of San Luis, a proclamation credited by Mexican history as the beginning of the revolutionary movement. This official history, however, reads as incomplete, providing a partial and selective account of the Mexican Revolution. In its glorification of the figure of Madero, it delegates those who facilitated the movement to supporting roles, at times ignoring them entirely. These actors contributed not only through their involvement in the beginning stages of the armed insurgency, but also as creators of the cultural revolution, without which the Mexican Revolution itself would not have been possible. A key figure in the latter, Ricardo Flores Flores Magón (1873-1922) was very important in the formation of a revolutionarily potent cultural environment. Not only did Flores Magón help to provide the basic ideological framework of the Mexican Revolution as chair and founding member of the group responsible for the Mexican Liberal Party program,1 but he also aided in the awakening of political consciouness as founder of various newspapers aimed at the rural population. Despite his political relevance, Flores Magón’s historical legacy does not occupy the

Rogelio Laguna obtained his B.A. in Philosophy from the National Autonomous University of Mexico in 2012. He is also managing editor of RevistaMilMesetas.com and author of “Segunda navegación” (2008) and “¿Quién es la noche?” (2009). His webpage is http://www.rogeliolaguna.com/

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Rogelio Laguna space of the revolutionary “heroes,” and occasionally merits no mention other than reference to his work as a journalist. Flores Magón’s absence from historical accounts, however, is not difficult to understand. As has been noted, history—especially when positioned in an official context—often does not tell the entire story and instead recounts the past from a politically loaded perspective. Enrique Dussel expounds upon this point, stating that it is often the dominating power that writes history from a standpoint that ignores or “erases” that which invites an emancipation of the oppressed.2 In other words, historical narrations serve as a means of political control that maintains a status quo in which the poor remain poor, perpetually oppressed by their dominators; as such, power structures are able to avoid threats against themselves and remain intact. The important role history plays in the identity of a people and its political actions allows history to function as an object of control. Consequently, the absence of a historical memory, as well as the assimilation of an altered one, provides an opportunity to dominate people. As such, Dussell proposes that the search for a people’s liberation must include the recovery and revision of their history, in particular the passages that remind them of their capacity and right to transform reality.3 According to Dussell, it is necessary, in the face of overly simplified historical narratives that delegate events as either “good” or “bad,” to write a history from and for the liberation of a people, a history that critically remembers everything deliberately ignored and appropriated by official histories. In this project, our aim is to remember the system of thought of Ricardo Flores Flores Magón, inserting it as a cornerstone of Mexican liberation history. The Magonist Utopia In 1903, before the armed struggle began, Flores Magón announced the “death” of the Constitution in a newspaper. Steadfastly he wrote: The Constitution is dead. . . . But, why continue to hide the obscure reality? Why should we drown in our throat the cry of our honest opinion, like cowardly courtiers? . . .when Justice has been thrown out of the temple by nefarious merchants and when an unprecedented theocracy stands with cynicism on the tomb of the Constitution. . .4 Let us emphasize two things from above. First, it is neither in academia nor in political circles where this thinker makes such a proclamation. Rather, he uses the tools and language of journalism to raise criticism, speaking not to the few to whom it is addressed, but to the general population: the laborers, workers, students and all those involved in the unfair and classist Porfirio Díaz regime. Franz Hinkelammert says that Flores Magón’s texts have the “spirit of awakening effervescence, of spreading enthusiasm. These are ‘hot’ books that are trying to drag humanity toward its new destination.”5 Flores Magón calls the people to self-awareness. Revolutions have many voices: leaders, heroes, martyrs, villains. Some are rallying cries for the struggle, others try to stop any

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Ricardo Flores Magón thoughts of rebellion. Faced with all these voices, the people stand on the margins of the main actors. The people wait their turn to take action, wait for someone to plant the seeds of conviction, since the political isolation in which they find themselves has prevented them from figuring out which path they should take. As John Locke observes in his “Second Treatise on Government,” the people endure hunger and injustice before taking up arms, and come to violence only when their situation is truly unbearable.6 Dussel notes that “the people, before their fight, are ignored, they don’t exist. They are mere things available to the powerful.”7 The people, from this perspective, need someone to remind them of their power, so they can find the true motor and force of social change. The Magonist claim that “the Constitution is dead” is a reminder to the people that the civil pact, which was intended to ensure justice, freedom, and social equality, has expired and, worse, that the people were betrayed by this pact from the beginning.8 Another aspect of the phrase “the Constitution is dead” opens itself to the field of political philosophy. At the same time that Flores Magón announces the death of the Mexican Constitution of 1857, he also makes a strong criticism of a non-local political system. Flores Magón questions whether constitutional order can do justice to the people or if it is merely a way to maintain an already established political and economic hierarchy for the benefit of a few. Flores Magón sees the injustice of the constitutional order. He notes that the political order is corrupt and disjointed. He protests against those responsible for this situation and complains about those who oppress and humiliate the people, while simultaneously indicating that the only path worth following is life. He urges the people to “come to life. Yesterday heaven was the aim of the people: now it is the land.”9 In affirming life, Flores Magón proclaims himself against all metaphysics. He recognizes that the heavens, the immortality of the soul, and divinity do not provide the foundations of human life, and as such, should not be pursued with devotion. Flores Magón seeks to achieve not an unobtainable utopia, but a concrete reality, the here and now that requires a stand and fight: We revolutionaries are not pursing chimera; we are pursuing reality. The peoples nowadays are not taking up arms to impose on others their special Gods or their religions. The Gods are rotting in the holy books. The religions are fading away in the shadow of indifference.10 The land guides Magonist thought. It is the livelihood of the peasants, disputed and treasured as if it were the only thing that mattered. As Flores Magón believes that truth is contained in the land, he calls for a struggle, separated from gods and dogmas, sustained by a nostalgia that remains when everything else is lost, a nostalgia identified in another time as “nostalgia for the land” by the Spanish philosopher María Zambrano.11 Although our thinker aims to defend the right to life, it is not life in and of itself that interests him, but rather a dignified life, a life that functions as a possibility of truthfully affirming individual and communal existence. He explains that “to live, for mankind, does not mean to vegetate. To live means to be free and happy. We all, therefore, have the right 2012 - Volume 3

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Rogelio Laguna to freedom and happiness.”12 Flores Magón argues that the right to life has yet to be conquered, as it remains ignored and forgotten in the formation of the state. He warns that the “French Revolution won the right to think, but it did not win the right to live, and to the conquest of the latter right the intelligent of all countries and races today address themselves.”13 Flores Magón himself sees that it is neither ideals of justice nor the state, the supreme symbol of reason for Modern thought, for which the people must fight. In place of transcendent ideas, the struggle must be realized in the immanence, as a way to defend land, food, and labor. Only in that way can struggle achieve a transformation of the social order. Flores Magón urges the death of metaphysics in political thought. He claims that “social inequality died in theory when metaphysics died in the revolution of thought. It is necessary that it also die in practice.”14 Flores Magón remembers over and over again that “we do not fight for abstractions, but for material realities. We want land for everyone, bread for everyone.”15 Happiness for all can only be achieved through liberty and equality.16 It is useless to proclaim social equality and rights in the law, when in practice there are only a few, the rich, who enjoy the shelter of the law. Flores Magón points to the people who have experienced centuries of domination, subject to the deception of the laws. He notes that even those who live in political misery, the absence of capitals, and cultural poverty nevertheless rise from their position of social exclusion: Poor as we are, we can lift a people. . . we are the mob rebelling against the yoke, the mob of Spartacus, the mob that proclaims Münzer equality, Camille Desmoulins’ mob that crushes the Bastille, the mob that burns Granaditas with Hidalgo, we are the mob that with Juárez sustains the Reforma.17 Flores Magón remembers in his writings that people have the right to claim liberty and happiness. He considers it time for the people to affirm themselves, without the fatherly figure of the state guiding them, without heroes herding them.18 “The people no longer expect the word of God engraved on a couple of tablets to descend from some Sinai.”19 And when the people realize their own power to liberate themselves from injustice, then: In the dark pigsties, where those who make happiness for those above are piled up and rot, a ray of hope comes in. In the furrows the pawn ponders. In the womb of the land the miner repeats the phrase of his comrades in chains. Heard everywhere is the panting breath of those who will rebel. In the dark, a thousand nervous hands caress the gun and a thousand impatient breasts consider centuries the days left until this man’s cry is heard: rebellion!20 The cry of men, claims Flores Magón, is the cry of Luzbel, who rebels against God and his hierarchical order. It is the cry of the fallen angels, of a group of people who want for themselves that which no state can provide, as every political order is sustained by injustice, on account of a social contract that asks the people to surrender their power and obey.

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Ricardo Flores Magón Against the assertion that the state is the pinnacle of human rationality, Flores Magón points out that man does not affirm himself only by reason. He needs life and flowers; he needs to break with the prudish disciplines and the persecutory morals that load chains and burn stakes. The path, according to Flores Magón, is a simple and anarchic life. Rebellion aims to re-humanize those faces that “misery and pain have made ugly.”21 Rebellion transforms the face of humanity, touches it with the sacred fire of struggle and encourages it to regain vitality. As such, the revolutionaries continue forward, even into the abyss. So says Flores Magón: “The abyss does not stop: water is more beautiful falling over a cliff. If we die, we will die like the sun: emanating light. . . . No more peace. . . better death than this nefarious peace.”22 The struggle of Flores Magón is against the state. He questions its ability to guarantee justice and liberty to those it governs, doubting both its capacity and its interests. Flores Magón believes that his doubts are exemplified by the process that ended with the 1857 Mexican Constitution, the acquisition of which stole the lives of hundreds of thousands of workers. Flores Magón points to the irony of the situation, claiming that although it was the sacrifice of countless workers and peasants who won the Constitution, its enactment benefitted only the capital, authority, and clergy. The Constitution betrayed, in short, all those who fought for it. If the Constitution of 1857 did not benefit the working class, that was because it was not written for the emancipation of the working class, but to legalize the theft committed by the employing class and strengthen its authority. . . . The leaders encouraged the proletariat to take up arms for a Constitution, telling them that the Constitution would make them free and happy, and the proletariat fought on the side of good to. . .fasten their chains, since with victory came the legalization of individual property, which is the basis of all tyrannies, exploitation, and all imposition.23 Flores Magón thus believes that as long as a constitution affirms private property, it cannot sustain social equality, liberty, and justice. It instead guarantees to a select few the acquisition and protection of their capital, and goes so far as to grant the authority, prestige, and moral force that allow that few to be obeyed and feared.24 Flores Magón observes that the Constitution and the laws that emanate from it have not fulfilled the expectations of the people, regardless of the differences between liberal and conservative regimes: Ask the poor if they ate more bread on account of their work during the simple democracy of Benito Juárez than under the Empire of Maximiliano or the dictatorship of Santa-Anna, and they will tell you that for the worker, bread has been scant under all the government reformations and that, furthermore, liberty was just as scant under the Empire as it was under the Dictatorship.25 Flores Magón continues to demand that the government grant food, clothes, and shel2012 - Volume 3

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Rogelio Laguna ter. He contests that the Constitution is and will continue to be a lie as long as it remains without laws that guarantee the right to a dignified life, to the essential goods for human life. The poor cannot enjoy the privileges that are conceded to the citizens in the political orders, who vote for leaders who will maintain the law and thus a political order that serves as the basis of social inequality because it aims to protect the property of the rich: Behind capital and the struggle of everyone against everybody lies the root of the problem: private property. Private property, as an institution, empowers the subjugation and enslavement of man. . . How has private property emerged? It has not always existed. Originally [says Flores Magón] the land belonged to everyone.26 The land belongs to everyone, says Flores Magón, and he identifies as the aim of his struggle a regime in which men wrest for their economic freedom, taking possession of the land, machinery, and transport goods, because such rights are and should be essential to mankind. He pursues a regime that is not based on the individual, but on the solidarity of the community. The solution to social problems, he claims, is to waive any law and any government, because under them liberty and spontaneity are subjected and oppressed. Critique of Utopia The Magonist utopia, however, is not free of philosophical difficulties. Franz Hinkelammert addresses Flores Magón in his “Critique of Utopian Reason” and analyzes the anarchist ideal. The main problem for Hinkelammer is that in anarchist utopia a bipolar analysis is made, in which the state and freedom are opposed in an absolute way.27 This bipolarity is repeated in terms of a present subdued reality and a future of liberation: “Ultimately it is bipolarity between life and death. Present death and future life.”28 In the anarchist utopia of Flores Magón, the main problem is the passage from the present reality into a future prosperity. As the future is conceptualized without any kind of institutional mediation, due to the fact that institutions are against liberty and the naturalness of the individual, the anarchist is unable to rationalize the transition to that future in mediated terms. How can we get to the future? “Between the present and the futures lies an abyss without any institutional bridge,” says Hinkelammert,29 there is no clear organizational form. In other words, according to Hinkelammert, Flores Magón seems to have no concept of the construction of the future, no concept of praxis. “It supposes rather that there is a big spontaneous force easily mobilized in people, a force that is fettered by the property and state institutions, of capital and authority.”30 Such force would be liberated with the abolition of capital and state to give birth to a new society. However, would this be enough for the birth of a new social order? Hinkelammert continues his critique of anarchist thought, claiming that while it proclaims absolute liberty, it proclaims at the same time that sentence of Saint Just: No freedom for the enemies of freedom. That is to say, while the anarchist seeks a stunning image of liberty, he at the same time returns to the absolutism against which he proclaims

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Ricardo Flores Magón himself. As such it does not seem like the proclamation of a new regime, but the reversal of the regime against which he fights: With its [Flores Magón’s] rejection of an institutional mediation of the passage towards a society and with its insistence on direct action, it only achieves to reverse the polarization and the Manichaeism of the bourgeois society against which it arises.31 Hinkelammert observes that anarchist utopia, like any utopia, moves between the realms of the possible and the impossible. The problem is that utopias need to build an impossible other against which they can construct the only possible path. According to capitalist thought, for example, socialism is what is impossible, and it is the only way to social welfare; for socialism, conversely, the only way is its own, and what is impossible is capitalism. Anarchism does not stray far from this model, and in cancelling the state it stands as the only option. As such, it leads to theoretical absolutism, in which there is no room for other possibilities, even it seems to proclaim the end of history, because there can´t be any other path. Utopia, when it is not autocritical, says Hinkelammert, disguises the impossible as possible and leads to a Manichaean dualism. Such dualism ends up threatening what is possible in reality. Although he does not reject the Magonist utopia, Hinkelammert believes it should be accepted within a political realism. This context affirms neither the abolition of the state nor of capital blindly, but rather allows these ideas to enter the utopian ideal as regulative and not absolute. The utopia is a source of ideas of good life, a reference point for judgment, a reflection of sense. To accomplish that, utopia must never become an end to be asymptotically performed [...] The utopia describes goals that are impossible to achieve, even if the whole humanity resolved to do it.32 Conclusion: Towards Life The critique by Hinkelammert highlights the important issues in the Magonist formulation, and thus avoids the effervescence of a radical reading produced by an unmediated reception of Magonist thought. Against this critic we should say, however, that even in the radicalism of the Magonist stance, it is necessary to recognize a reflection on liberty. Flores Magón presents a liberty that calls for spontaneity and human creation to rise against private property and the state, entities characterized more often as repressors of the spontaneity of thought and action. Another virtue of Magonist anarchism is that it does not fail to denounce the injustices that have arisen since the establishment of political orders, the primacy of capital, and private property. In other words, he denounces the emergence of the multiple mediations that prevent the people’s development and their immediate participation in politics. We do not believe that Flores Magón’s though lacks praxis, as Hinkelammert says. If it is true that Magon does not seek to create new institutions, as they are mediations of 2012 - Volume 3

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Rogelio Laguna life, then it would be the solidarity of a community that would lead to this new social state. This is a point that Hinkelammert’s critique of anarchist utopia does not take into account. What Hinkelammert does see is that Flores Magón’s thought is not merely arbitrary; Flores Magón offers another possible order that comes from the concrete life of a human being, not from institutionalization. Therefore, the Magonist utopia manifests as a liberation process that realizes itself indefinitely, an “infinite progress of abstraction, towards perfect spontaneity,” says Hinkelammert.33 As such, present reality exists as an order of slavery, controlled by capital, and liberty is something to achieve and claim. Anarchist liberty seeks the way in which each individual can decide what he wants in the margins of communal solidarity, without the pressures of the state or the market. In Flores Magón’s conception of the world, “no one prohibits anything to anyone, yet no one is lacking anything. A person lives where he likes to live, and there he also finds the job he likes, and necessities can be satisfied according to the views of each person.”34 This is a society of living as opposed to a society of owning. Ricardo Flores Magón seeks to save everyday life in his utopia, reminding us that the land is what is valuable, and that our own temporal and concrete lives are subjugated through power. Magonist utopia opposes dominant power and allows us to conceptualize a history in which the people are able to defeat the injustices of capitalism and domination. It provides that, as poor, oppressed, and colonized as we are, we can still erect a new social and economic reality.

v [Translation into English by Oscar Zoletto] 1 The Program of the Partido Liberal Mexicano was written in Saint Louis, Missouri on July 1, 1906, by a commission led by Flores Magón as Chairman, Juan Sarabia as Vice Chairman, Antonio I. Villareal as Secretary, Enrique Flores Magón as Treasurer, and Librado Rivera, Manuel Sarabia, and Rosalío Bustamante as members. The Program’s main demands included the reduction of the presidential term from six to four years, the suppression of conscription, the multiplication of schools, compulsory education until age 14, the establishment of eight-hour work days and minimum wages, protection for the indigenous, the prohibition of child labor, the abolition of the tiendas de raya, and the formulation of bonds with the Latin American nations. 2 Enrique Dussel, Ética de la liberación, en la edad de la globalización y de la exclusión, 4th ed. (Madrid: Trotta, 2002), chapter 1. 3 Enrique Dussel makes explicit the importance of history to the project of liberation in his dialogue with Paul Ricoeur in 1993: “The discovery of the misery of my people, perceived since my childhood in the desert country, brought me from Europe to Israel. I discovered, as indicated by the Mexican philosopher Leopoldo Zea in his book America in History, that ‘Latin America is outside history.’ It was necessary, from its poverty, to find it a place in

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Ricardo Flores Magón world history, discovering its hidden being.” (Garcia Ruiz, 2003: 24). 4 Ricardo Flores Magón, “Discurso filosófico contemporáneo (anarquista y antisocialista),” in Pensamiento filosófico mexicano del siglo XIX y primeros años del siglo XX. Tomo 3, eds. María del Carmen Rovira and Arturo Almaguer (Mexico: Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México, 2001), 431. 5 Franz Hinkelammert, Crítica de la razón utópica, 2nd ed. (Bilbao: Desclée de Brouwer, 2002), chapter 4. 6 John Locke, “Of the Dissolution of Government,” In Second Treatise of Government, ed. C.B. McPherson (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing, 1980), chapter 19. 7 Enrique Dussel, 20 tesis de política (Mexico: Siglo XXI- Centro de cooperación regional para la educación de adultos en América Latina y el Caribe, 2006), 95. 8 Dussel describes: “The people then become ‘consciousness-for-itself.’ They reconstruct the memory of their deeds, forgotten and hidden facts in the history of the winners. . . . It is the consciousness of the peasant class, the indigenous peoples, feminists, anti-racists, of the marginalized. . . of all those ghosts that roam in the externality of the system. Consciousness of being people [pueblo]. “(Dussel, 2006: 96-97). 9 Flores Magón, “Discurso filosófico contemporáneo,” 432. 10 Ibid. 11 “Nostalgia de la tierra,” Revista Los Cuatro Vientos, Madrid, España. Abril de 1933. 12 Flores Magón, “Discurso filosófico contemporáneo,” 432. 13 Ibid. 14 Ibid. 15 Ibid. 16 Hinkelammert puts special emphasis on this relationship that Flores Magón formulates between freedom and happiness, because “to be free we must be happy. Where there is no happiness, there can be no freedom” (Hinkelammert, 2002: 184). 17 Flores Magón, “Discurso filosófico contemporáneo,” 432-433. 18 Cfr. “The power is owned always and exclusively by the political community, the people. It has it always even when it is weak, harassed, intimidated, in such way that it cannot express itself ” (Dussel, 2006: 96-97). 19 Flores Magón, “Discurso filosófico contemporáneo,” 433. 20 Ibid. 21 Ibid., 434. 22 Ibid. 23 Ibid., 440. 24 This last point that Flores Magón denounces is pointed out too by Gilles Deleuze in Presentación de Sacher Masoch (1973) referring to the Marquis de Sade. Deleuze explains that Sade is clear that any kind of law is a second nature, always linked to the requirements of conservation that take away sovereignty form individuals. Law is a hoax; through it power is not delegated but usurped in the complicity of slaves and masters. “No one is tyrannized but through the law” (p. 88). Tyrants appear in law or taking advantage from it, not in anarchy. The tyrant is the one who speaks the language of the law and needs its shelter. 25 Flores Magón, “Discurso filosófico contemporáneo,” 440. 2012 - Volume 3

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Rogelio Laguna 26 Hinkelammert, Crítica de la razón utópica, 186. 27 Hinkelammert criticizes the notion of “utopia” itself. This is exemplified by the tension between the utopia formulated by Marx and the capitalist utopia: “Marx showed that capitalist society is impossible and incompatible with the conditions of human survival and of nature. Therefore, as the only viable alternative to capitalism there is a society that is called socialism. . . determined all action to a social order and a determinate ethics, declared as the ‘only alternative’. . . . The new bourgeois theory reverses this argument and says that socialism is impossible. . . capitalism then seems to be the only society that is today possible” (Hinkelammert, 2002: 220). 28 Hinkelammert, Crítica de la razón utópica, 193. 29 Ibid., 202. 30 Ibid.. 31 Ibid. 32 Ibid., Introduction. 33 Ibid., 211. 34 Ibid. Dussel, Enrique. 20 tesis de política. Mexico: Siglo XXI- Centro de cooperación regional para la educación de adultos en América Latina y el Caribe, 2006. . Ética de la liberación en la edad de la globalización y de la exclusion. 4th ed. Madrid: Trotta, 2002. Deleuze, Gilles. Presentación de Sacher-Masoch. El frío y el cruel. Madrid: Taurus, 1973. Flores Magón, Ricardo. “Discurso filosófico contemporáneo (anarquista y antisocialista),” In Pensamiento filosófico mexicano del siglo XIX y primeros años del siglo XX. Tomo 3, edited by María del Carmen Rovira and Arturo Almaguer, 429-451. Mexico: Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México, 2001. ____. La revolución mexicana. 2nd ed. Mexico: Editores Mexicanos Unidos, 1995. García Ruiz, Pedro Enrique. Filosofía de la liberación. Una aproximación al pensamiento de Enrique Dussel. Mexico: Driada, 2003. Garciadiego, Javier, comp. La revolución mexicana. Crónica, documentos, planes y testimonios. Mexico: Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México, 2008. Hinkelammert, Franz. Crítica de la razón utópica. 2nd ed. Bilbao: Desclée de Brouwer, 2002. Locke, John. Second Treatise of Government, edited, with an Introduction, by C.B. McPherson, Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing, 1980. Zambrano, María “Nostalgia de la tierra,” Revista Los Cuatro Vientos, no. 2 (April 1933):108-113.

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Neoliberalism in Colombia: Where is the Contention? Fabio Palacio This paper focuses on the political turn to the left in Latin American politics at the turn of the 20th century. Drawing from Eduardo Silva’s book Challenging Neoliberalism in Latin America (2009), the author attempts to explain why Colombia has been an exception to the regional trend of surging political support for candidates of the Left. Taking a historical view on Colombia’s political development, the paper proposes that the presence of violent guerrilla groups and the absence of adequate associational space are the main constraining factors for leftist anti-neoliberal mobilization in the country. On April 9, 1948, the Colombian Presidential candidate Jorge Eliécer Gaitán Ayala was assassinated as he was leaving his Bogota office. Gaitan, the leader of the Liberal party, had risen to the center of Colombian politics through his opposition to the oligarchic control of Colombian society. His stances on progressive legislation such as vast land reform had earned him staunch support from the working classes and marginalized groups in Colombia. Upon his assassination, Gaitan’s supporters attempted to overthrow conservative control throughout the country and the Liberal party withdrew from Colombian politics. However, the Conservative Party leader Laureano Gomez took office in 1950 and was able to establish military control over urban sites. In the meantime the Liberal party organized into guerrilla groups that would contest the government’s control of rural Colombia. From this state of affairs erupted the period known as La Violencia, which would last until 1958. This period is characterized by the long-lasting battle in the rural lands between the state and guerrilla groups. During the period of La Violencia, Colombia’s political arena was fragmented into a series of small guerrilla groups and two main parties—Liberals and Conservatives (known as Frente Nacional, The National Front). This period gave birth to the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia and the Ejercito de Liberacion National (FARC and the ELN) which would become powerful leftist guerrilla groups in Colombia. Moreover, in response to the emergence of these groups, right-wing paramilitary groups were born; these groups would eventually become some of the most violent armed factions in the country. Colombia has yet to outlive the consequences of La Violencia, as the armed conflict ravaging its land and people is still in full effect to this day.

Fabio Palacio is a senior-year student in Sociology and International Studies at The Johns Hopkins University. His research interests are in world-systems theory and social unrest. He now resides in New Jersey but previously lived in Colombia

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Neoliberalism in Colombia Nevertheless, as Jean-Pierre Minaudier asserts, Colombia’s extensive political violence did not totally halt economic development. Through the 1980s the country saw formidable economic growth while maintaining low foreign debt. However, beginning in the early 1980s, Colombian president Belisario Betancur started exploring the possibility of using foreign loans for development in an environment of decreasing global demand for Colombian products. In so doing, he committed the Colombian state to following International Monetary Fund (IMF) guidelines and, in turn, began the neoliberal era in Colombia. By the Vargas administration beginning in 1986, Colombia was regularly receiving foreign loans and neoliberal policies were being implemented extensively. However, by the Gaviria administration, beginning in 1990, neoliberal policies began to have detrimental effects on various sectors of the economy and on the social sphere as well. Surprisingly, over the next two decades Colombia experienced almost no anti-neoliberal movements. In fact, the two largest political mobilizations were protests against the FARC. Many countries in Latin America experienced a rise of the political Left during the 1990s and 2000s (e.g. Evo Morales in Bolivia; Lula da Silva in Brazil; Hugo Chavez in Venezuela). Colombia, however, has seen no such phenomenon and the current president, Juan Manuel Santos, is a conservative. Many scholars, such as Eduardo Silva, see the rise of the Left as a response to neoliberalism and to the plight that neoliberalism brought to those countries where it was implemented. Thus, it is interesting to ask why Colombia never had such a response even though its experience with neoliberalism has also been one of hardship. Looking back at Colombia’s history, the preexistence of sharp (and violent) social and political tensions leading to the radicalization of both left- and right-wing groups made vast, cohesive, political anti-neoliberal movements almost impossible. This essay will seek to explicate the Colombian exception through Eduardo Silva’s 2009 thesis that the violent mobilization of leftist groups such as the FARC and the ELN stifled political “framing” necessary for leftists to amass a strong counter-neoliberal movement in Latin American countries. The first part of the essay will consider whether neoliberalism in Colombia has taken on a different form than in other Latin American countries, which might explain why Colombia has not seen a shift to the Left in response to neoliberalism. Having concluded that neoliberalism in Colombia has had the same damaging effects on society as it has in the countries named above, this paper will then explore an alternate explanation for Colombia’s lack of Leftist mobilization. Neoliberalism in Colombia In order to carry out this analysis, it is important to examine the actual consequences of neoliberal implementation in Colombia. In this process one must differentiate among the particular policies that make up neoliberalism. As Andy Baker shows, particular policies can amass different levels of support (or contention) depending on their effects on the population. Thus, in an effort to capture the negative effects of neoliberalism in Colombia, this paper will discuss three main neoliberal policies and how they took form in Colombian economic and social life. These policies are: fiscal austerity; trade and capital liberalization; and privatization. These policies or structural adjustments are preconditions for indebted 2012 - Volume 3

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Fabio Palacio states to receive loans from international banks like the IMF and the World Bank. The first structural adjustment to examine in the Colombian context is fiscal austerity. Fiscal austerity represents the policy decision to reduce state expenditures; this includes anything from public works projects to welfare. In the Colombian case, “one should not count on the state to diminish the number of people excluded from the economy or to redistribute wealth” (my translation) . Minaudier highlights the effects of reduced government spending by showing that there are no unemployment benefits, and that public services are ineffective. Public transportation, energy, hospitals and public schools are all underperforming at the height of neoliberal policies. These problems affect the population disproportionally as the lower class is the segment most likely relying on such public services while the wealthy can afford private sources for these services. Furthermore, inadequacies in infrastructure and transportation hurt businesses, particularly small agricultural enterprises. As Forrest Hylton points out, many farmers have turned to coca farming simply because narco-traffickers are willing to buy the product in their towns, so they do not need to pay for high transport costs. In effect, the lack of government spending has actually helped the drug traffickers. We will see that drug traffickers are actually the most ardent supporters of the neoliberal policies in Colombia. According to what Eduardo Silva calls the Polanyi double movement , such widely disconcerting policies would create prime situations for mass mobilization in their opposition, something that is yet to be seen in Colombia. Trade liberalization includes the eradication of import tariffs and production subsidies, the end of capital controls, and the allowance of foreign investment—the opening of the economy. Trade liberalization opens once-protected companies to competition from foreign (and often more advanced and productive) companies. Leslie Gill asserts that these policies “harmed domestic industry and agriculture by making them more vulnerable to competition from powerful global corporations, and they wiped out tens of thousands of jobs.” Minaudier further states that the “textile, automobile, mechanic, and airplane companies” particularly suffered from exposure to foreign competition. Foreign competition hurt not only large business owners, but also the workers who lose jobs once their companies are forced to close. Trade liberalization can also take the form of so-called free trade agreements. These agreements establish certain rules of commerce between the signing countries, and usually this includes the suspension of protective measures such as tariffs and subsidies of local products. Proposed Free Trade Agreements between Colombia and the U.S. will actually maintain a relation of Colombian dependency on the American “core.” Jasmin Hristov cites the agricultural clauses of the FTA in saying that the United States would amass benefits worth up to $600 million while Colombia would gain no more than $100 million. Moreover, intellectual property owned by the advanced foreign corporations would not be shared with Colombian enterprises for twenty to thirty years. In addition to this example, proposed FTA’s with Canada “would mean a continuation of the trend of primary-sector exports [for Colombia] . . . which translates into increased dependency on food imports and reduced food security.” Trade liberalization also moved more farmers into the coca-growing business because their food and cash crops were more expensive than untariffed imports, while coca’s inelastic demand would keep it profitable. By highlighting the unfavorable terms of

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Neoliberalism in Colombia free trade agreements and the destabilization of rural supply chains, one can see that the neoliberal policies of free trade serve to continue the dependent relation of Colombia to the developed countries. This fact echoes dependency theorists’ (such as Hans Singer and Raul Presbich) claims that the core countries actively work to maintain their dominant position over the underdeveloped periphery, thereby propagating the process of underdevelopment. Dependency theorists maintain that neoliberal policy actually serves as a way for wealthy nations to block attempts by the lower income countries to close the global wealth gap. Limiting other nations in such a way cripples their ability to empower and develop. In accordance with Silva, we would expect such situations of frustration to lead to national unrest by delegitimizing the state’s policy decisions. As part of trade liberalization efforts, labor militancy and power are constricted either through legislation or strategic weakening. In Colombia, in efforts to help domestic companies lower costs, labor’s rights have been eroded and unionization has consequentially dropped significantly (Sinaltrainal, a large Colombian union, has lost nearly half of its membership ). Not only has labor lost power, unions have also become ever more vulnerable to violence and threats from paramilitaries and other pro-business entities. Once again, this policy seems to affect large business owners, workers, and farmers. An immediate question arises: why were these groups unable to mobilize against neoliberalism? In addition to these neoliberal policies, privatization was also implemented widely in Colombia in what was supposed to be an attempt to streamline production. Privatization is the movement from state-owned enterprises to private firms. That is, services that were once provided by the state are provided by privately owned companies. This movement usually results in the increase of prices, because state-owned enterprises are not as concerned with achieving high profit margins as they are with providing the service that is needed by the country. Also, privatization leads to unemployment, as companies that once were not running at full efficiency (or the highest level of productivity) but hired many workers seek to cut costs by laying off workers in efforts to maximize profits. In Colombia, upon the start of neoliberal structural adjustments in 1991, “the government accelerated its sales of banks, industrial and commercial enterprises, and public services.” Yet in 2003, another IMF loan pushed for even more privatization. The state was obliged to privatize “one of the country’s largest banks (BANCAFE).” President Uribe also privatized TELECOM, a telecommunications company, after first closing it completely. This privatization led to the transformation of the TELECOM workforce into non-unionized temporary workers—once again emphasizing the state’s support of neoliberalism over its workers. The effects of neoliberalism are thus wide-reaching but also particularly damaging to the working classes of Colombia. Jasmin Hristov concludes that “as a result of the implementation of privatization and austerity measures, there have been drastic cuts in publicsector salaries and stable employment, reduction in the access of the low-income population to basic services such as health and education, deterioration in working conditions, and increasing attacks on labor unions.” We see here that the weakest members in society are thus keenly vulnerable to the effects of the “free market.” These effects are manifested in the social plight that Histrov attempts to summarize. Neoliberal policies have had more than just negative effects on labor. Hristov points 2012 - Volume 3

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Fabio Palacio out that almost twenty-five percent of the population “cannot afford one nutritious meal per day . . . sixty-five percent are unable to satisfy basic subsistence needs . . . Furthermore, there has been a notable decline in school attendance, literacy, and life expectancy as well as access to child care and education.” Moreover, the inequality of incomes between the richest and poorest ten percent has doubled over the course of the 1990s (from 40 to 1 in 1990, to 80 to 1 in 2000). Although the Gross Domestic Product has been growing consistently during the neoliberal era, “the amelioration of quality of life has only visibly affected a small minority.” The social plight caused by neoliberalism is pervasive in Colombia as it was in the remainder of Latin America. Why, then, has anti-neoliberal contention been nonexistent and why has there been no rise of the left? The Colombian Left Silva’s explanation for the rise of the left is clearly tied to the Polanyi double movement, which he refers to throughout his book Challenging Neoliberalism in Latin America. This double movement holds that when free market reforms are introduced into a society, they generate a protectionist counter-movement within the people. As Silva writes, neoliberalism created “social tensions that inevitably led individuals and society to seek protection from the market’s destructive power.” Silva states that when people are exposed to the dangers of a market society, they will relate to and vote for ideologies that provide for welfare and other forms of protection by the state. That is to say that Silva sees the rise of the left as an ideological shift brought about by collective action and existing and prolonged economic, social, and political turmoil. Silva would expect that Colombia’s people, many of whom are regularly excluded from the mainstream economy, would seek protection from the state. However, during the 1990s, voters continued to vote for pro-neoliberal candidates and, today, conservative pro-neoliberal Juan Manuel Santos enjoys a formidable 70% approval rating. Examining Silva’s thesis, however, one can find the answer to the original question. Silva formulates five conditions that need to be satisfied for anti-neoliberal contention to lead to the rise of the left. These conditions include: (1) the existence of grievances (economic and social plight); (2) adequate associational space (e.g. constitutionally protected freedom of assembly); (3) collective action alliances (and framing); (4) movements avoiding violence; and (5) recurring economic crises. In the Colombian case, the second and fourth conditions are most gravely violated. There is not an established political space for antineoliberal contention to be manifested, and there is a significant presence of violent leftist resistance groups. The violation of the two conditions mentioned can be traced back to the period of La Violencia and the resulting factions that emerged from it. First, leftist guerrilla groups such as the FARC and ELN made leftist movements easy to market as a common enemy to Colombian society; the military’s inability to fight against these groups effectively, moreover, led to the rise of paramilitary groups. Second, paramilitary groups then actively destroyed grassroots movements, unions, and any others suspected of sympathizing with leftist guerrilla movements. Thirdly, this ever-present state of war has been used by the state and elite-

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Neoliberalism in Colombia controlled media to reframe leftist mobilization as destabilizing and naturally violent. Moreover, the existence of the FARC divides leftist movements in Colombia. Paramilitary groups are products of the period of La Violencia that violate the second condition in Silva’s thesis. As they target all potential FARC sympathizers, they effectively constrict associational space in Colombia. This space can be violently destroyed by these groups because they fight to maintain the state-supported order. In particular, the amount of killings of union leaders and participants and the pro-business state’s push for non-unionized labor has weakened unions and overall labor power in Colombia. This is a strong blow to the counter-neoliberal movement, as Silva believes that unions, along with social movements and political parties, are potentially powerful agents of this contention. Lesley Gill points out a troubling fact when she states that “the right-wing government of Alvaro Uribe Vélez . . . demonstrates more willingness to negotiate with illegal paramilitary organizations than with legitimate labor unions.” Gill highlights the specific example of the American Coca-Cola Company, which does little to protect its workers from paramilitary intimidation. As explained earlier, union power has been eroded by neoliberal policy. Additionally, the presence of violent guerrilla groups has been shown to permit paramilitary groups to intimidate progressive groups and activists as possible FARC sympathizers. Both of these phenomena serve to restrict associational space because the public does not have protected organizational institutions (unions) around which support can be mobilized. Moreover, as will be displayed below, the state has shown little commitment to protecting individuals’ free political thought and organization. As discussed earlier, the neoliberal policies of the late 20th century have affected the workers of Colombia disproportionally. These workers could be organized under unions that would amass political power as they did in Argentina and Venezuela. However, if union leaders are killed while at work or if workers who try to negotiate for better conditions automatically lose their jobs and are labeled communist sympathizers, the unions can never reach the level of support needed to create actual political movements. This is especially problematic because being labeled a communist sympathizer can lead one to be detained by the state or, even worse, killed by paramilitaries. The state’s permissiveness of this culture further destroys associational space that could be utilized by leftist movements. There is also significant evidence pointing to the fact that paramilitary groups that indiscriminately kill “subversives” have the support of the state. For example, in the confessions of Salvatore Mancuso, it is revealed that before participating in the Massacre at El Salado in February 2000, the Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia (AUC) received the cellular phone number of a General Quiñónez “so that if anything happened [they] could get in touch with him.” This demonstrates that the paramilitaries had protection from the state to carry out a massacre that killed 100 innocent civilians. Another example of the military-paramilitary alliance is highlighted by Forrest Hylton when he explains that in the 1970s paramilitary groups were created by the military so they could “reduce the level of human rights violations attributable to the Colombian police and armed forces, while wiping out ‘the subversion.’” These same groups that today terrorize civilians throughout the country were strategically created to mask the atrocities of the anti-leftist movement. These groups did not unite until the mid-1990s, but the perceived support they receive from the 2012 - Volume 3

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Fabio Palacio state makes them much more formidable threats to leftist movements. We see here how the long history of violence in Colombia has worked to create an environment of fear and precariousness for progressive groups, which neoliberalism only enhances. This environment is particularly beneficial for the wealthiest classes and the state, both of whom benefit from the neoliberal order in Colombia. The preceding examples depict the simple image of hard power serving to weaken or prevent the rise of left-sympathizing anti-neoliberal movements. Although Silva does not particularly discuss this issue in his book, this hard power advance serves to explain why grassroots movements, unions, and social movements could not gain support in Colombia. The effective propagation of fear in Colombian citizens has stifled any real push for collective action that could be perceived as “subversive.” This threat of violence against organization is a prime example of a violation of Silva’s second condition. There is no adequate associational space for anti-establishment groups to establish themselves and organize against the neoliberal project. Although there might be discontent within the consciousness of Colombian society, this discontent has no political space where it can be manifested. The existence of leftist guerrilla groups also halts the rise of leftist counter-neoliberal movements. The reason for this is that these groups effectively divide the leftist anti-neoliberal contention into violent and non-violent groups. Eduardo Silva discusses this phenomenon in terms of the Shining Path in Peru, and it can be applied here to the Colombian case. Silva explains that the Shining Path’s “intolerance of reformism, and emphasis on armed conflict and indiscriminate violence inhibited the development of an anti-neoliberal episode of contention in Peru.” The same exact phrase could be used in reference to the FARC and ELN in Colombia. The FARC has had opportunities to demobilize with favorable terms, particularly during the Pastrana administration, but FARC’s intolerance of reform repeatedly sabotaged any negotiations. If the FARC was willing to change its policies and “frame” them so that they could be compatible with typical grassroots movements, it could consolidate support and create mass collective action movements as Silva described in his other case studies. Yet the FARC’s preoccupation with violence, assassination, and kidnappings makes it impossible for the organization to receive any kind of support from non-radicalized leftists. This divisive attribute prevents potential supporters from seeing the value of the FARC’s ideology (particularly its anti-neoliberal ideas) without being distracted by its criminal activities. A more widespread effect of FARC violence, however, is that it has effectively tabooed leftist ideology within the country. It is apparent that there is a very strong level of discontent in response to the killings, kidnappings, and other criminal methods that the FARC employs to further its goals . When the FARC practices these methods, indiscriminate violence and chaos are linked with leftist ideology and, in fact, it has been the Colombian government’s prerogative to name the revolutionary factions in accordance with American foreign policy. For example, before the fall of the Soviet Union, the insurgency was called “communist insurgency” and during the Bush administration it were referred to as a terrorist organization. This tactic makes Colombians feel that the FARC—and its beliefs—should be an enemy to their country. Moreover, the media does what it can to present the FARC as an “organization

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Neoliberalism in Colombia of dangerous, irrational, and violent drug traffickers.” This then removes the actual ideology from the FARC entity and creates an image of mindless killing machines. Again, this image is linked to the ideology that the FARC does represent—the Left. As was stated in the Political Risk Assessment Journal, “one should not forget that for decades Colombians have associated leftist movements with the FARC/ELN.” It is understandable then that the Colombian populace would refuse to give support to any movement remotely linked to such an organization, which has no reason behind its actions. What we see here then is the systematic delegitimization of an entire ideological platform through the actions of those who have been made to represent it. With the media and the state successfully linking FARC activity with anti-establishment or leftist thought, political mobilization from this base is seen as dangerous. The social stigma surrounding the left as well as the clear political divide within the left in Colombia makes its mobilization ever more difficult. Colombia’s violent history has unfortunately persisted to this day. It prevents the existence of a stable political arena, propagating human rights violations and, consequentially, allowing its people to be exploited by a faulty series of policies that are not challenged due to the social (and potentially physical and legal) sanctions that would be linked with such contention. For example, as long as union leaders, who represent the classes most hurt by neoliberalism, are regularly killed by paramilitary groups, labor’s ability to exercise its political power is severely thwarted. Neoliberalism in Colombia has proved to accentuate social tensions due to heightened inequality, increase the activity of narco-traffickers, and leave the lower classes to be ravaged by the “free” market. Eduardo Silva seems to be correct here in his assertion that as long as there is an active violent leftist movement, cohesive counterneoliberal action will not be possible. Today, democracy is impeded by political and social repression and violence is perpetuated in the countryside. Unfortunately, these truths can be rationalized by the state as side-effects of the ongoing anti-guerrilla movement. Until Colombia can free itself from the arms of La Violencia, human rights violations, faulty political processes, and the neoliberal project will continue to thrive.

v 1 Minaudier, Jean Pierre. Histoire De La Colombie: De La Conquête à Nos Jours. (Paris: L’Harmattan, 1997) p. 298. 2 Silva, Eduardo, Challenging Neoliberalism in Latin America (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2009) p. 40. 3 Baker, Andy. The Market and the Masses in Latin America: Policy Reform and Consumption in Liberalizing Economies. (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2009). 4 Minaudier, Jean Pierre. Histoire De La Colombie: De La Conquête à Nos Jours. (Paris: L’Harmattan, 1997) p. 316. 5 Hylton, Forrest Evil Hour in Colombia (London, 2006) p. 85. 6 Silva, 31. 7 Gill, Lesley, LABOR AND HUMAN RIGHTS: ‘The Real Thing’ in Colombia. (American University, 2004) p. 2. 2012 - Volume 3

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Fabio Palacio 8 Minaudier, Jean Pierre. Histoire De La Colombie: De La Conquête à Nos Jours. (Paris: L’Harmattan, 1997) p. 295. 9 Hristov, Jasmin, Blood and Capital: the Paramilitarization of Colombia (Athens: Ohio UP, 2009) p. 19. 10 Hylton, Forrest Evil Hour in Colombia (London, 2006) p. 83. 11 Gill, Lesley, LABOR AND HUMAN RIGHTS: ‘The Real Thing’ in Colombia. (American University, 2004) p. 2. 12 Baker, Andy. The Market and the Masses in Latin America: Policy Reform and Consumption in Liberalizing Economies. (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2009), p. 14. 13 Ibid., 110. 14 Hristov, Jasmin, Blood and Capital: the Paramilitarization of Colombia (Athens: Ohio UP, 2009) p. 17. 15 Ibid., 17. 16 Ibid., 17. 17 Ibid., 20. 18 Minaudier, Jean Pierre. Histoire De La Colombie: De La Conquête à Nos Jours. (Paris: L’Harmattan, 1997) p. 298. 19 Silva, Eduardo, Challenging Neoliberalism in Latin America (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2009) p. 40. 20 Ibid., 46-52. 21 Ibid., 21. 22 Gill, Lesley, LABOR AND HUMAN RIGHTS: ‘The Real Thing’ in Colombia. (American University, 2004) p.4. 23 Ibid., 3-4. 24 Breaking the Grip: Obstacles to Justice for Paramilitary Mafias in Colombia. (New York, NY: Human Rights Watch, 2008) p. 13. 25 Hylton, Forrest Evil Hour in Colombia (London, 2006) p. 94. 26 Silva, Eduardo, Challenging Neoliberalism in Latin America (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2009) p. 244. 27 Ibid., p. 3. 28 “Colombians in Huge Farc Protest.” BBC News. BBC, 02 Apr. 2008. 29 Hristov, Jasmin, Blood and Capital: the Paramilitarization of Colombia (Athens: Ohio UP, 2009) p.43-44. 30 Ibid., 46. 31 “Uribe’s Third Time May Not Be a Charm.” (Political Risk Assessment, 2009) p. 3. Baker, Andy. The Market and the Masses in Latin America: Policy Reform and Consumption in Liberalizing Economies. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2009. Print. Breaking the Grip?: Obstacles to Justice for Paramilitary Mafias in Colombia. New York, NY: Human Rights Watch, 2008. Print. "Colombians in Huge Farc Protest." BBC News. BBC, 02 Apr. 2008. Web. 24 Apr. 2012. <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/7225824.stm>.

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Neoliberalism in Colombia Gill, Lesley. LABOR AND HUMAN RIGHTS: ‘The Real Thing’ in Colombia. Thesis. American University, 2004. Print. Giraldo, Javier. Colombia: the Genocidal Democracy. Monroe, Me: Common Courage, 1996. Print. Hristov, Jasmin. Blood and Capital: the Paramilitarization of Colombia. Athens: Ohio UP, 2009. Print. Hylton, Forrest. Evil Hour in Colombia. London [u.a.: Verso-Verl., 2006. Print. Kline, Harvey F. Colombia: Democracy under Assault. Boulder: Westview, 1995. Print. Minaudier, Jean Pierre. Histoire De La Colombie: De La Conquête à Nos Jours. Paris: L'Harmattan, 1997. Print. Silva, Eduardo. Challenging Neoliberalism in Latin America. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2009. Print. "Uribe's Third Time May Not Be a Charm." Political Risk Assessment (2009): 3-4. Web. 4 Apr. 2010.

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Public Local Innovative Practices in Latin America: An Analysis of Internet Databases of 11 Awards for Social Innovations Erick G. Palomares This article presents reflections concerning a study of 511 local innovative practices, recognized by 11 awards for social innovation in Latin America. It aims to offer a perspective regarding the kinds of solutions available in the databases of each award. This analysis attempts to answer the following question: What type of information would Latin American “alcaldes” find in these databases if they decided to replicate an innovation within their own municipality? The investigation is situated from the perspective of decision-makers as an intellectual exercise that recognizes, or questions, the type of information offered by these practices so that they can be replicated.

Public Local Innovative Practices in Latin America: An Analysis of Internet Databases of 11 Awards for Social Innovations. Over the course of the last decade, international institutions and academic centers have documented a series of local social innovations in Latin America through various incentives encompassed by the concept of “award”. This article presents reflections concerning a study of 511 local innovative practices, recognized by 11 awards for social innovation in Latin America. It aims to offer a perspective regarding the kinds of solutions available in the databases of each award. This analysis is based on information from internet databases and attempts to answer the following question: What type of information would Latin American “alcaldes” (mayors) find in these databases if they decided to replicate an innovation within their own municipality? The investigation is approached from the perspective of decision makers as an intellectual exercise that recognizes, or questions, the type of information offered by these practices so that they can be replicated. Furthermore, this paper offers the results from the first part of my doctoral investi-

Erick G. Palomares is a Ph. D. candidate in Government and Public Administration at the Instituto Universitario de Investigación Ortega y Gasset, Complutense University in Madrid, Spain. He holds a Master Degree in Development, Innovation and Change, from the University of Bologna, Italy, and a BA Cum Laude in International Relations from the Instituto Tecnológico y de Estudios Superiores de Occidente (ITESO), in Guadalajara, Mexico. 2012 - Volume 3

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Erick G. Palomares gation currently underway that has identified, from within all of the innovations, which has had either local government participation since its inception or has counted on government participation as a fundamental part of the process. This was done considering that the awards can also be granted to civil society initiatives as well as private enterprises, distinction that would help innovative mayors who seek to replicate the experiences undertaken. Introduction: Statement of the Problem This paper assumes the following: that local government agrees with and aspires to realize its international commitment to the Millennium Development Goals; that the mayors are interested in making use of their resources as a means to advance these goals; that the mayors and their cabinets are interested in innovating and modifying the status quo; and that civil society and the private sector will help facilitate the completion of these innovations. Finally, although no less important, this paper assumes that the mayors, besides having access to the Internet and awards databases, count on their own analytical abilities and patience to consider the alternatives being offered. The questions of this investigation are founded within this ideal situation as the awards and subsequent transfer of recognized innovations suggest. Today, as a result of the internet, governments, civil society, and private initiatives can count on the extensive array of innovative experiences that have been evaluated, reported, as well as recommended by prestigious institutions. These innovate experiences are presented as alternative realities that can be implemented in different contexts. As such, society and the government can innovate within their own environment through the implementation of the information that appears on the web. It would thus seem that the problem of access to the information has been solved, and that the only remaining question requiring resolution would be: how to choose from so many options? I consider this question as the one that should be addressed in academic debates regarding positive practices and local innovative practices. According to the rhetoric of the government and public administration, the awarded experiences resolve various stages of the “proceso de elaboración de las políticas públicas” (Public policy process-making). The definition of the problem appears to be resolved by a combination of Millennium Development Goals and themes recognized by the awards. These themes and objectives also seem to already be attached to indicators involved in the process of their evaluation. The design of the politics is provided by the descriptions, costs, actors, and courses of action found within the internet databases. Consequently, the only duty that remains for political actors is to decide among all of the options, and then to implement the innovative practices they select. As a result, it is important to discuss the question of how one can choose from among the array of awarded innovative practices, which can then be replicated in other contexts. Awards of Social Innovative practice in Latin America The analysis considers 20 awarded experiences of the “Dubai International Award

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Public Local Innovative Practices In Latin America for Best Practices to Improve the Living Environment,” given by UN-Habitat and the government of Dubai; 26 of the award “Experiencias en Innovacón Social” (Experiences in Social Innovation) given by the Comisión Económica para América Latina y el Caribe (CEPAL) with the support of the Kellog Foundation; and 465 of national awards, all of them could be find at the “Observatorio Latinoamericano de la Innovación Pública Local,” (Latin American Observatory on Local Public Innovation) which included nine different programs from six different Latin American countries: Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Peru, and Mexico. Programs from the Latin American Observatory on Local Public Innovation Number of Innovative Practices in Databases El Ágora, Nodo Cono Sur del Foro Iberoamericano de Buenas 23 Prácticas, Argentina Banco de Experiencias Locales (BEL), Argentina 47 Programa Gestión Pública y Ciudadanía, Brazil 175 Premio ITAÚ-UNICEF, Brazil 7 Premio Innovación y Ciudadanía, Chile 74 El Programa Territorio, Chile 20 Foro Nacional por Colombia, Colombia 37 Premio Gobierno y Gestión Local, Mexico 52 Premio Participación y Gestión Loca, Peru 30 TOTAL 465 What these awards have in common is that they all work to disseminate the awarded experiences by generating internet databases. The logic behind this activity is to offer information regarding the awarded experiences that can be accessed by other actors who can decide which of the experiences they would like to replicate and can then implement their decision within their separate context. This article adopts this logic to observe the hypothetical scenario in which a Latin American mayor accesses these internet databases and attempts to select an innovative practice from the wide variety offered. Therefore, the first step is examining the classifications by theme in order to recognize what kind of problems the mayor can resolve through the use of these databases. Considering the complex elaborative process of public policy and the traditional debate surrounding the “definition of the problems” in the study and elaboration of public policy, the proposal to thematically classify awards of innovative experiences requires the assumption that the problem is already defined, that the solution is ideal for this defined problem, and that, therefore, what remains is the political implementation of the solution. In order to organize the information, and make it posible to observe the type of solution that these databases offer to innovative mayors who seek to replicate the innovative experiences, this paper presents an analysis of each “award”, one by one, pointing out the themes, and as well as innovative practice in which the local government was an active and decisive actor. 2012 - Volume 3

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Erick G. Palomares Dubai International Award for the Best Practices to Improve the Living Environment The Dubai International Award for the Best Practices to Improve the Living Environment was established in November, 1995, during the International Conference of United Nations in Dubai, and forms a part of the Program of the Best Practices. Twenty Latin American experiences have received the award and appear in the Database of Best Practices, which offers the possibility of a filter for “local authority.” If a search is conducted through this filter, of the 20 award experiences, only three are indicated in the results: 1. Democratization of municipality administration towards a sustainable and equitable development Cotacachi (Ecuador). 2000 2. Gender and Citizenship in the Integrated Program for Social Inclusion of Santo Andre. (Brazil). 2002 3. Heartfelt Houses- The pilot Project: Housing Consolidation and Environmental Recovery of the “Juan Bobo” stream basin area. (Colombia) 2008 Nevertheless, in the development of my doctoral investigation, and through the revision of the descriptive contents of the 17 experiences not identified by the filtered search, it is possible to recognize at least six other experiences in which the local government has participated as a determinant and active actor during the majority of the process. As such, I suggest that the list should consist of nine experiences in total, organized as follows: 1. Urban Agriculture Program (Argentina) 2004 2. Gender and Citizenship in the Integrated Program for Social Inclusion of Santo Andre (Brazil) 2002 3. Human Development in Communities at Aurá (Brazil) 2004 4. Tomorrow’s seeds project (Brazil) 2004 5. Urban Subcenters for Citizen Life in the Low Income Areas of Medellín (Colombia) 1998 6. Heartfelt Houses- The Pilot Project: Housing Consolidation and Environmental Recovery of the “Juan Bobo” Stream Basin Area. (Colombia) 2008 7. Democratization of Municipal Management, Cotacachi Canton (Ecuador) 2000 8. Transfer of Appropriate Technologies for the Provisioning, Management and Disposal of Water in a Tzotzil Indigenous Community in the Municipality of Zinacanta: Chiapas (Mexico) 2010 9. Sustainable Solid Waste Management Program (Peru) 2006 The themes offered in the databases of the award of UN-Habitat and the government of Dubai, however, demonstrate differences when compared with the information found in the award databases of the Foro Iberoamericano y del Caribe sobre Mejores Prácticas (Iberoamerican and Caribbean Forum for Better Practices) Despite being the same practices and themes, the division and allocation that they make are different. Below

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Public Local Innovative Practices In Latin America is a table that summarizes the differences, demonstrating the cases to which the themes for the Foro Iberoamericano do not apply, as well as the relationship between total practices and those of local governments. UN Habitat-Dubai

Data Base Local Gov. Iberoamerican Data Base Local Forum Gov. Architecture and Urban 0 0 Architecture and 0 0 Design Urban Design Children and Youth 1 1 Children and Youth 0 0 Civic Engagement and 9 4 Civic Engagement and 3 2 Cultural Vitality Cultural Vitality Climate Change 0 0 NO 0 0 Disaster and Emergency 0 0 Disaster and 0 0 Emergency Economic Development 3 0 NO 0 0 Environmental Management 3 2 Environmental 2 2 Management Gender Equality and Social 3 1 Gender Equality and 1 0 Inclusion Social Inclusion HIV-AIDS 0 0 NO 0 0 Housing 3 0 Housing 3 1 Housing and Human Rights 2 1 NO 0 0 Infrastructure, 3 1 Infrastructure, 3 1 Communications, Communications, Transportation Transportation Land use Management 2 2 Land use Management 3 2 Older Persons 0 0 Older Persons 0 0 Poverty Reduction 6 3 Poverty Reduction 7 3 Production and 1 1 Production and 1 1 Consumption Patterns Consumption Patterns Resilient Communities 1 1 NO 0 0 Social Services 8 4 Social Services 4 1 Technical and International 0 0 NO 0 0 Cooperation Technology, Tools and 2 1 Technology, Tools and 1 0 Methods Methods Urban and Regional 2 0 Urban and Regional 3 0 Planning Planning Urban Governance 7 3 Urban Governance 3 1 Use of Information 0 0 Use of Information 1 1 in Decision Making in Decision Making Water and Sanitation 1 1 NO 0 0

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Erick G. Palomares Experiences in Social Innovation: CEPAL—Kellogg Foundation The contest began in 2004 as a part of the project Experiencias en innovación social en América Latina y el Caribe, (Experiences in Social Innovation in Latin America and the Caribbean) developed by the Comisión Económica para America Latina y el Caribe de las Naciones Unidas (United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean), with the support of the Kellog Foundation. The project aimed to “identify, analyze, and spread novel initiatives of social development that provide that advancement of the Millennium Development Goals.” It featured 72 experiences, between the awarded and the finalists, that appeared in the database of the award given by CEPAL and the Kellogg Foundation . Of the 26 that received the award, nine are social innovative practices in which the local government participated actively from the very beginning: Country Brazil

Program Community Health Actions in the Tapajós National Forest Brazil “Four-Leaf Clover”: Strategy to reduce maternal and infant mortality Brazil Maringá Social Observatory Bolivia Family Housing for Students Costa Rica Comprehensive Health Coverage for High-Mobility Indigenous Population Ecuador Administration and treatment of wastewater Haiti Milk in Abundance Paraguay Community health program: Health is everyone’s responsability Peru Community defenders: a community response to family violence

Cycle 2004-2005

Place 5

2006-2007

1

2008-2009 2006-2007 2008-2009

1 2 3

2006-2007 2004-2005 2005-2006

3 1 4

2005-2006

1

This award draws attention to the question regarding the themes that have been awarded. Eight categories of competition were established as a part of the contest. Nevertheless, of the eight categories recognized by the CEPAL and Kellogg Foundation award, there is one that does not include any social innovation practice in its database: 3. nutrition and nutritive health. The following table demonstrates the eight categories as they relate to support from the local governmen

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Public Local Innovative Practices In Latin America THEMES CEPAL-KELLOGG Health Education Nutrition/Food Sovereignty Youth Programs Income Generation Social Responsibility of Business Volunteerism Rural/Agricultural Development

Total

Local Government

7 10 0 8 10 6 9 8

5 2 0 1 3 2 3 2

Another interesting filter offered by this database, is related to the Millennium Development Goals (MDG). There are social innovations that contribute to complete one or more of the eight MDG.. This is, above all else, important if we consider that the resolution of the General Assembly of the United Nations (A/RES/S-25/2) recommended the implementation of â&#x20AC;&#x153;best practicesâ&#x20AC;? as one of the key instruments to advance the completion of the MDG1. The number of practices in relation to the MDG appears on the following table: Development Goals Objective 1: Eradicate extreme poverty and hunger Objective 2: Achieve universal primary education Objective 3: Promote gender equality and female autonomy Objective 4: Reduce infant mortality of children under 5 Objective 5: Improve maternal health Objective 6: Combat HIV/AIDS, malaria, and other diseases Objective 7: Guarantee environmental sustainability Objective 8: Develop a global partnership for development

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Total in Databases (Awards and Finalists)

Total Awards

Local Government

44

21

7

23

8

2

36

17

5

19

8

8

16

8

8

9

6

5

13

7

2

1

1

1

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Erick G. Palomares Observatorio Latinoamericano de la Innovación Pública Local El Observatorio Latinoamericano de la Innovación Pública Local (Latin American Observatory on Local Public Innovation) defines itself as “ a group of programs that promote innovation and compile information about management experiences in various fields in Latin America.”2 It is composed of nine programs from six distinct countries, and as has already been mentioned, its database offers a total of 465 experiences. It is important to also to mention that four of these nine programs form part of the “Liason Group for Innovation in Governance and Public Action.” The “Liason Group” is composed of ten awards given around the world. Four3 of these awards given in Latin America are coordinated by the “Ash Institute for Democratic Governance and Innovation” of the John F Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University. Of the 465 experiences that the database offers, there are 270 that correspond with local governments. These are distributed by program in the following table: Program El Ágora, Nodo Cono Sur del Foro Iberoamericano de Buenas Prácticas, Argentina Banco de Experiencias Locales (BEL), Argentina Programa Gestión Pública y Ciudadanía, Brasil Premio ITAÚ-UNICEF, Brasil Premio Innovación y Ciudadanía, Chile El Programa Territorio Chile Foro Nacional por Colombia Premio Gobierno y Gestión Local, México Premio Participación y Gestión Loca, Perú

Database

Local Government

23

3

47 175 7 74 20 37 52 30

37 100 0 32 20 17 51 10

The following table refers to the themes under which these awards are classified and the experiences of the local governments: Theme Access and equality Quality Interorganizational Collaboration Efficiency Gender and Sexual Rights No Information (N-I) Participation Pluralism and/or ethnic/racial diversity Transparency and/or social control

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Total

113 34 42 46 22 31 144 17 16

Local Government 66 21 17 39 11 17 72 12 15

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Public Local Innovative Practices In Latin America Conclusions This article presented some of the results of a current investigation of more than 500 innovative practices in Latin America. The results are, for the majority, quantitative, and have been accessed via primary source, primarily through databases available on the Internet. This was stressed as a key tool offered to Latin American mayors as a means to access distinct social innovation practices. The objective of this article has been to pose this primary level of analysis regarding the information that Latin American decision makers have access to. The traditional problems of the formulation of public policy appear to have been considerably narrowed. There is no problem to define, no actions to design, and no indicators to evaluate them. Problems are defined within the paradigm of universal development adopted according to the Millennium Summit, which condenses the pressing problems of the people of the world into eight concrete objectives to be achieved, accompanied, of course, by their respective indicators to evaluate their progress: the 8th Millennium Development Goals. The Millennium Development Goals represent an alternative to the absence of clarity in governmental analyses. They attempt to overcome the definition of the problem by starting from the final objectives or goals. Awards given to social innovation practices operate in the same format; they represent solutions to the problems already categorized by their themes. The goals are recognized as universal, and they arise from the aforementioned paradigm of contemporary development. If the goals are taken as universal, there remains the daunting task of deciding among the available actions and then turning to the equally complex task of local politicians: the implementations of these innovative practices. This apparent freedom to choose from among the options of social innovative practices from a certified market of sorts offers local governments, reminiscent of the paralyzing anxiety that develops within the paradox of the choice of Renata Salecl. The perspective that local politics has its own difficulties is lost; problems such as the cabinet formation ,the politics of the bureaucracy , or the traditional themes of clientelism that traverse the literature of political parties in Latin America. After more than 10 years of “awards” it is the moment to reflect about the alternatives that are offered. We should start by questioning the adjectives, by re-interpreting the “social” innovative practices and seeing them as inherent to those promoted by the government (or perhaps hope for a government that governs according to social needs). We should orient the analysis according to the debate over what signifies the “public;” not only as a means to distinguish the innovative practices of the efforts of private initiatives, which have been forced to add “social” to many of their public campaigns, but also to reflect over the utility of these awarded innovative practices, and seek to recover the values of the “public” from the people themselves. Last but not least, it suffices to say that the mantra “trial and error” that accompanies the entire process of social innovation implies certain limitations on the part of the public administration, related with the “risks” that have the potential to assume the actors of contemporary Latin American democracies. This is another aspect that is important 2012 - Volume 3

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Erick G. Palomares to discuss and develop if one hopes to see the transformation of the databases that have been explored, from anecdotes to tools of social transformation.

v 1 To understand the trajectory of the debate, consult Aguilar Villanueva, Luis F.: “Estudio introductorio”, in Problemas públicos y agenda de gobierno, (Porrúa Grupo Editorial, Mexico, 1993), p.15-72. As well as Bardach, Eugene: “Problemas de la definición de problemas en el análisis de políticas”, in Problemas públicos y agenda de gobierno,( Porrúa Grupo Editorial, Mexico, 1993) p.219-233. 2 In agreement with the “Report of the Preparatory Committee for the United Nations Conference on Human Settlements” (UN, 1995, A/50/37), presented to the General Assembly of the United Nations, the “best practice” implies the following characteristics: 1. It has a demonstrable and tangible impact on the improvement of the quality of life of the people. 2. It is the result of an effective collaboration between the public sector, private sector, and civil society. 3. It is socially, economically, and ecologically sustainable. 3 “Latin American and the Caribbean Forum for Best Practices.” March 12, 2012 www. mejorespracticas.org. 4 “Experiences in Social Innovation. Latin America and the Caribbean”. March 22, 2012. http://www.cepal.org/dds/innovacionsocial/e/Equipo.htm 5 “Experiences in Social Innovation. Latin America and the Caribbean”. March 22, 2012. http://www.cepal,org/dds/innovacionesocial/e/concurso.htm 6 The categories are as follows:1.health; 2. education; 3. nutrition/food sovereignty; 4. youth programs; 5. income generation; 6. the social responsibility of businesses; 7. volunteerism; 8. rural/agricultural development. and were found at “Experiences in Social Innovation. Latin America and the caribbean. CEPAL-Kellogg” March 22, 2012. http:// www.cepal,org/dds/innovacionesocial/e/concurso.htm 7 see Guido, Bertucci and Adriana, Alberti, “Replicating Innovations in Governance: An Overview” in Innovations in Governance and Public Administration: Replicating what works. (Department of Economic and Social Affairs, United Nations. New York, 2006) p. 4. 8 “Latin American Observatory on Local Public Innovation”. February 24, 2012 http:// www.innovacionlocal.org/quienes.php?lang=en 9 Brazil: Public Management and Citizenship Program; Chile: Citizen Participation and Public Politics Program; Mexico: Government and Local Management Award; Peru: Participation and Local Management Program. 2 Source: “Liaison Group for Innovations in Governance and Public Action”. Brochure on the web site: http://content.knowledgeplex.org/streams/ ksg/AshInstitute/Liaison_Group_Brochure.pdf 10 Paradigm: ““realizaciones científicas universalmente reconocidas que, durante un tiempo, proporcionan modelos de problemas y soluciones a una comunidad científica.”

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Public Local Innovative Practices In Latin America (Khun, T. La estructura de las revoluciones científicas; 1975: 13) 11 Salecl, Renata, YouTube video, 33:05, posted by the Royal Society Academy July 15, 2010, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=E4_HGRjJs9A 12 See Octavio, Amorim Neto. Cabinet formation in presidencial regimes: an análisis of 10 Latin American Countries. (Working paper at the International Congress of the Latin American Studies Association. The Palmer House Hilton Hotel, Illinois, 24- 26 September, 1998); and Flavia, Freidenberg. “Partidos y gobiernos en Ecuador (1979-1998): Gobiernos anti partidos y partidos contra gobiernos”. In Manuel Alcántara; Elena M. Barahona Política, dinero e institucionalización partidista en America Latina. (Universidad Iberoamericana. Biblioteca Francisco Xavier Clavijero. México. 2003) p. 391-448 13 Peters, B. Guy The politics of bureaucracy. (Longman. New York, London, 1989) p. 182-212 Borins, Sandford. Encouraging innovation in the public sector (Journal of Intellectual Capital 2(3): 310–319. 2001) Cabrero Mendoza, Enrique, y Carrera Hernández, Ady P. Innovación local en América Latina. (Centro de Investigación y Docencia Económicas A.C. (CIDE) México, D.F. 2008) Cabrero Mendoza, Enrique “Innovar para construir mejores gobiernos locales: los retos y las estrategias” In Cabrero Mendoza, Enrique (coord.) Innovación en gobiernos locales: Un panorama de experiencias municipales en México. (Centro de Investigación y Docencia Económicas (CIDE)/Premio Gobierno y Gestión Local. México, 2002) CEPAL, CEPAL reporta bajo acceso a Internet en América Latina. (Press Bulletin, March 10, 2010. Servicio de Noticias de las Naciones Unidas. 2010) Freidenberg, Flavia. “Partidos y gobiernos en Ecuador (1979-1998): Gobiernos anti partidos y partidos contra gobiernos”. In Manuel Alcántara; Elena M. Barahona Política, dinero e institucionalización partidista en America Latina. (Universidad Iberoamericana. Biblioteca Francisco Xavier Clavijero. México. 2003) Giandomenico Majone Evidencia, argumentación y persuasión en la formulación de políticas. (Colegio nacional de ciencias políticas y administración pública A.C., Fondo de Cultura Económica. México, D.F. 1997) Guido, Bertucci and Adriana, Alberti, “Replicating Innovations in Governance: An Overview” in Innovations in Governance and Public Administration: Replicating what works. (Department of Economic and Social Affairs, United Nations. New York, 2006) Octavio, Amorim Neto. Cabinet formation in presidencial regimes: an análisis of 10 Latin American Countries. (Working paper at the International Congress of the Latinamerican Estudies Association. The Palmer House Hilton Hotel, Illinois, 24- 26 September, 1998) Peters, B. Guy The politics of bureaucracy. (Longman. New York, London, 1989) Rey de Marulanda, Nohra and Tancredi, Francisco B. De la innovación social a la política pública. Historias de éxito en América Latina y el Caribe. (Comisión Económica para América Latina y el Caribe (CEPAL) Naciones Unidas, Santiago de Chile. 2010) 2012 - Volume 3

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Erick G. Palomares Rodríguez Herrera, Adolfo and Alvarado Ugarte, Hernán. Claves para la innovación social en América Latina y el Caribe. (Comisión Económica para América Latina y el Caribe (CEPAL). Publicación de las Naciones Unidas. Santiago de Chile. 2008) Rosenblatt, Michael. “The use of innovation awards in the public sector: Individual and organizational perspective”. Innovation: management, policy & practice. Volume 13, Issue 2, August 2011; 2011) Salinas, Jorge y Ochsenius, Carlos “Innovación local en América Latina. Un recorrido por diversas experiencias latinoamericanas, estudios e investigaciones”. (Observatorio Latinoamericano de la Innovación Pública Local. 2010) Thomas S. Kuhn La estructura de las revoluciones científicas. (Fondo de Cultura Económica. México. 21St impression. 2001. Original, 1975) UNCTAD “The least developed countries report. Knowledge, technological learning and innovation for development”. (Geneva: UNCTAD. 2007)

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The Johns Hopkins Journal of Latin American Studies 2012 Volume 3

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