Journal of Eurasian Affairs, vol.5, Num.1, 2018

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Journal of Eurasian Affairs ISSN 2307-8286 Volume 5, Number 1, 2018 Founded in 2013 by International Social Movement "Eurasian Movement"

Issued biannually Editor Leonid Savin Lay-out Vyacheslav Altukhov Cover art Sergey Zhigalkin Tel. + 7 495 514 65 16 Fax +7 495 926 68 11 125375, Russian Federation, Tverskaya str.1 7, Moskva, office 605

Advisory board

Dr. Alexandr Dugin, Philosopher, Russia. Dr. Viktor Stepanyuk, Dean of the Dept. of international Relations and Political Sciences, Institute of International Relations, Moldova. Dr. Ilie Badescu, Director of the Institute of Sociology of the Romanian Academy of Sciences, Romania. Dr. Jamal Wakim, Professor of History and International Relations at Lebanese International University, Lebanon. Dr. Christof Lehmann, Editor in Chief of the nsnbc international, Denmark. Dr. Guzel Maitdinova, Director of the Centre of Geopolitical Research of the Russian-Tajik Slavonic University, Tajikistan. Dr. Mateusz Piskorski, Director of the European Centre of Geopolitical Analysis, Poland. Dr. Alberto Buela, Professor of the Technical University of Buenos Aires, Argentina. Mahmoudreza Golshanpazhooh, PhD, Executive Editor of the Iran Review, Deputy of Research at Tehran International Studies & Research Institute, and Director of Human Rights at the Center for Strategic Studies, Iran.



Leonid Savin

Head of the Administration of the International Social Movement “Eurasian Movement”, Director of the Foundation of monitoring and forecasting, Editor-in-chief of the think tank, author of several books on geopolitics, conflicts, and international relations. Moscow, Russian Federation.

In his article, “The Unipolar Moment”1, which was based on a series of lectures delivered in Washington, D.C. in September 1990, Charles Krauthammer wrote that a new world order was emerging in which the United States would be the only superpower. In the second paragraph of the article, Krauthammer introduced three main theses being discussed in the US political science community at the time: (1) the rise of multipolarity (interestingly enough, he suggests a “diminished Soviet Union/ Russia” as one future pole, thus anticipating the collapse of the Soviet Union), (2) weakened consensus on foreign policy within the US, and (3) a diminishing of the threat of war in the post-Soviet era. Krauthammer promptly dismissed these arguments as erroneous, and instead spoke of the coming triumph of a unipolar world under the undisputed dominance of the US and its Western allies. Krauthammer did, however, immediately make one reservation: “No doubt, multipolarity will come in time. In perhaps another generation or so there will be great powers coequal with the United States and the world will, in structure, resemble the preWorld War I era.” It seems that this moment has come. But for now let us refrain from making hasty statements, and first analyze on what grounds Krauthammer based his conclusions, where he was right, and on what he was mistaken. Such an excursion into the history of geopolitical thought will refresh our memory as to the methods by which Washington operates. Krauthammer presents the Persian Gulf crisis and Washington’s reaction as an example of unwavering US might: “In the gulf, without the United States leading and prodding, bribing and blackmailing, no one would have stirred. Nothing would have been done: no embargo, no ‘Desert Shield,’ no threat of force.” In other words, this was not a multilateral ­action as it might have seemed, but the exclusive concoction of the US. As Krauthammer writes further on: “It is largely for domestic reasons, therefore, that American political leaders make sure to dress unilateral action in multilateral clothing.” This is done, evidently, because American citizens need legitimacy for the sake of their faith in democracy. Yet here Krauthammer immediately follows up with a question: How long can America maintain its unipolar preeminence? To this end, light must be shed on theories of decline and imperial overstrain. Here Krauthammer introduces some figures — the United States was then spending 5.4% of GDP on defense, whereas earlier it spent nearly twice as much, and was now planning a reduction to 4% by 1995. However, Krauthammer adds that “American collapse to second-rank status will be not for foreign but for domestic reasons.” Let us take note of this. 1  Charles Krauthammer// Foreign Affairs, Vol. 70, No. 1, America and the World 1990/91 (1990/1991), pp. 23-33.

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Considering the balance between US domestic and foreign policy, Krauthammer suggests that it is “a mistake to view America’s exertions abroad as nothing but a drain on its eco­ nomy…America’s involvement abroad is in many ways an essential pillar of the American economy. The United States is, like Britain before it, a commercial, maritime, trading nation that needs an open, stable world environment in which to thrive.” Later on, he adds that America is interested in maintaining its unipolar status, but questions whether Americans support such. Here we can see mention of a dichotomy between the interests of the political elite and ordinary American taxpayers. Krauthammer himself notes that American isolationism “seems the logical, God-given foreign policy for the United States” by virtue of geography and the history of America’s founding, which is said to be have been motivated by the desire to distance itself from the intrigues and conflicts of the Old World. Krauthammer also mentions another option, which he calls a far more “sophisticated” and “serious” school of international relations which insists on national interests — realism. In this context, he argues: “International stability is never a given. It is never the norm. When achieved, it is the product of self-conscious action by the great powers, and most particularly of the greatest power, which now and for the foreseeable future is the United States. If America wants stability, it will have to create it. Communism…is quite dead. But there will constantly be new threats distur­ bing our peace.” First and foremost among these threats is posited to be the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Also notable are such concepts as “rogue states” and “failed states,” although Krauthammer speaks of only one type — “The Weapon State,” under which he mentions Iraq, North Korea, and Libya. In his opinion, in order to become a Weapon State, a country only needs to develop its own industry, and then additional interests will arise which might conflict with the interests of other countries. This point is not discussed


directly, but it is clear based on the context. Krauthammer writes: With the rise of the Weapon State, there is no alternative to confronting, deterring and, if necessary, disarming states that brandish and use weapons of mass destruction. And there is no one to do that but the United States, backed by as many allies as will join the endeavor. The alternative to such robust and difficult interventionism — the alternative to unipolarity — is not a stable, static multipolar world. It is not an eighteenth-century world in which mature powers like Europe, Russia, China, America, and Japan jockey for position in the game of nations. the alternative to unipolarity is chaos. Thus, Krauthammer recognizes that multipolarity is not only possible, but has historical precedent and, moreover, can help establish static stability (although the role of Japan in the 18th century, and indeed that of America, is up for debate). Krauthammer’s next article on the same topic appeared twelve years later under the title “The Unipolar Moment Revisited.”1 He begins with the same thesis as earlier, asking whether the US will face decline. Krauthammer argues that the third episode of American unipolarity has arrived with the threat of war posed by rogue states acquiring weapons of mass destruction. It is worth noting that this article happened to be released a year after the terrorist attack in New York and just before the invasion of Iraq (which was launched without UN sanction or the support of the US’ European partners). Krauthammer writes: “American dominance has not gone unnoticed. During the 1990s, it was mainly China and Russia that denounced unipolarity in their occasional joint communiqués. As the new century dawned it was on everyone’s lips. A French foreign minister dubbed the United States not a super­power but a hyperpower.” In other words, many countries did not take a liking to American dominance, and this was manifested against the backdrop of the bombing of Serbia and 1  Charles Krauthammer. The Unipolar Moment Revisited// The National Interest—Winter 2002/03. рр. 5-17

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the occupation of Afghanistan, which were something like demonstrative wars at a distance that showed the whole world the new forms of US power.

becomes a challenge to unipolarity, as the dominant pole inevitably comes to be diluted through international agreements, interdependences, and new norms.

If before the 9/11 terrorist attack many were pondering the possibility of an anti-hegemo­ nic alliance, then afterwards many began offering the US their support, which “accentuated” the “historical anomaly of American unipolarity.” This happened by virtue of the “American anti-terrorism ultimatum”, which was essentially a mandate for the widespread use of military force by the US. Preventative operations violated traditional doctrines of just war, which led to a crisis of unipolarity. According to Krauthammer, this unipolarity found definitive formulation in the words of Pentagon chief Donald Rumsfeld on Afghanistan and the “War on Terror”: “the mission determines the coalition.” The mission is determined by the US.

At this point, Krauthammer briefly summarizes the contention between two schools of international relations — liberalism and ­realism — with regards to “paper or power”, i.e., agreements or threats and the use of force. In passing, Krauthammer reminds the reader of the question of multipolarity and actually contradicts himself. If in his previous article he spoke rather positively of multipolarity as once incarnated and possibly on the rise again, then this time his tone has changed dramatically. He writes: “Multipolarity is inherently fluid and unpredictable. Europe practiced multipolarity for centuries and found it so unstable and bloody, culminating in 1914 in the catastrophic collapse of delicately ­balanced alliance systems, that Europe sought its permanent abolition in political and economic union. Having abjured multipolarity for the region, it is odd in the extreme to then prefer multipolarity for the world.”

Important here is Krauthammer’s admission that so-called multilateralism was merely a means of “liberal internationalism” to keep the US from falling into embarrassing situations in which other countries in disagreement with Washington’s position could “isolate” the US and make decisions themselves. If we soberly analyze both the “multilateral” approach of Madeleine Albright during the Bill Clinton administration, as well as the same rhetoric employed by Barack Obama and Hillary Clinton with her “reset”, then it is obvious that the “openness” and “interestedness” of the US has been but a cover for imposing its agenda. All of this was pursued, in Krauthammer’s words “in service to a larger vision: remaking the international system in the image of domestic civil society”, i.e., the American model. From this standpoint, the nation-state is seen as an anarchic legacy of the past. Thus, Krauthammer explains, it is important for libe­ rals to accelerate the erosion of sovereignty by means of new technologies and the unhindered movement of capital across borders. But America, as the great sovereign, must be “domesticated” by and for liberals who feel “discomfort” with US dominance. This in turn

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Prototypes of multipolarity actually existed in more places than just Europe by the 20th century. Before the arrival of European colonizers in Asia, Africa, and both Americas, similar systems existed which used special mechanisms of checks and balances that differed from European norms. Moreover, European countries developed within the paradigm of rationalism and the Enlightenment, which leaves Krauthammer’s argument unconvincing. Krauthammer can be understood, however, if we recognize the author’s Western-centric mindset and American political scientists’ propensity to justify double standards. Moreover, the nature of this shift can be explained as in the interests of many countries to develop multipolarity during this period (including not only China and Russia, but also the “left pivot” in Latin America, and the founding of the African Union in July 2002). Further on, Krauthammer unveils his message: “[the] principal aim is to maintain the stability and relative tranquility of the current


international system by enforcing, maintaining and extending the current peace. The form of realism that I am arguing for—call it the new unilateralism—is clear in its determination to self-consciously and confidently deploy American power in pursuit of those global ends.” Thus, in contrast to isolationist realism, this approach proposes that the US pursue none other than global objectives in Europe, Asia, Africa, South America, and the world ocean. But let us recall what actually happened in 2002-2003. NATO officially invited Bulgaria, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia to join its alliance; the state of Yugoslavia ceased to exist with its partition into Serbia and Montenegro; American troops occupied Afghanistan and Iraq; Israel carried out punitive operations against Palestinians; numerous terrorist attacks took place on Russian and Turkish soil; and a series of color revolutions began in the post-Soviet space following the effective testing of this new type of coup d’etat in Yugoslavia. For Krauthammer, this must all be “stability and relative tran­ quility.” Ironically, this actually might be such for the US, since all of these events took place with direct or disguised encouragement from Washington and outside of the borders of the United States (except for the terrorist attack of September 11th, 2001, which to this day remains the subject of serious debates). The maintenance of this unipolarity also means the preservation of the post-colonial legacy with its artificial division of the globe into first, second, and third worlds, entailing the merciless exploitation of the natural resources of countries incapable of effectively defending their sovereignty from transnational corporations, predatory policies of the IMF and World Bank and, of course, the US’ right to military intervention in other countries under false pretexts. As is well known, the concept of “Responsibility to Protect” was tested in Haiti in 1994 and in Yugoslavia in the early 1990’s and in 1999 to detach Kosovo and Metohija. According to Krauthammer, the US should be “advancing democracy and preserving the peace by acting as balancer of last resort”, and


“countries will cooperate with us, first, out of their own self-interest and, second, out of the need and desire to cultivate good relations with the world’s superpower.” In other words, other countries are presented with no real choice. Although Washington uses both unilateral and multilateral approaches in similar fashion to advance its interests, there is one principal difference between the two which Krauthammer discerns in the form of a question: “What do you do if, at the end of the day, the Security Council refuses to back you?” As we very well know, even after the UN Security Council blocked its resolution on Iraq, the US acted as it saw fit. Even before this entered into force (let us recall that Krauthammer’s second article was released several months before the invasion of Iraq in 2003), Krauthammer believed that the unipolar moment had already become the unipolar era. Thus, the article concludes with the following: The new unilateralism argues explicitly and unashamedly for maintaining unipolarity, for sustaining America’s unrivaled dominance for the foreseeable future. The future of the unipolar era hinges on whether America is governed by those who wish to retain, augment and use unipolarity to advance not just American but global ends, or whether America is governed by those who wish to give it up—either by allowing unipolarity to decay as they retreat to Fortress America, or by passing on the burden by gradually transferring power to multilateral institutions as heirs to American hegemony. Krauthammer therefore reiterates that unipolarity will be challenged not from without, but from within. Now let us turn to summation. Krauthammer is partially correct that the unipolar regime depended on the US political elite. The lack of clear consensus therein and the everincreasing gap between the aspirations of the American people and the corporate interests of the establishment which incessantly leans towards globalism, all yielded the phenomenon of populism and helped Donald

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Trump win elections with partially isolationist slogans. Krauthammer was incorrect in his panicking over the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. In the nearly 20 years since, the real balance in this sphere has remained virtually unchanged. Only the DPRK has increased its military-technological capabilities to a level causing panic reactions among US military and political circles. Without a doubt, another important landmark to be distinguished on this note is the decision by Russia’s leadership to deploy troops to Syria to help in the fight against terrorism. The unipolar era did not arrive. The unipolar moment lasted unfortunately long — for nearly two decades. But it was not an era. Krauthammer was right in his first article when he argued that multipolarity would arrive after one generation. Indeed, if we follow the criteria set for challenges facing the US, then according to such documents as the US National Security Strategy1 and National Defense Strategy2, the US now faces competitors in the face of certain powers familiar to us in the multipolar declarations of Russia and China. Iran and the DPRK have also openly challenged unipolarity and been assigned by Washington to the club of “rogue states.” Over the past few years, additional studies have increasingly suggested that America is losing its status as the global center of power in the face of emerging multipolarity.3 1  National Security Strategy of the United States of America, December 2017 https://www. NSS-Final-12-18-2017-0905-1.pdf 2  Summary of the National Defense Strategy. Sharpening the American Military’s Competitive Edge. pubs/2018-National-Defense-Strategy-Summary.pdf

3  See C. Richard Neu, Zhimin Mao, Ian P. Cook. Fiscal Performance and U.S. International Influence, RAND Corporation, 2013; Global Trends 2030: Alternative Worlds, a publication of the National Intelligence Council, december 2012 http://worldview.unc. edu/files/2013/10/Global-Trends-2030-ExecutiveSummary.pdf; Global Trends to 2035 Geo-politics and international power. European Parliament, September 2017 STUD/2017/603263/EPRS_STU(2017)603263_EN.pdf;

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Therefore, we can say that Krauthammer was mistaken in saying that unipolarity would be threatened from within the United States. Threats have always come from the outside and, in different conditions, whether embryonic or frozen, have anticipated appropriate opportunities to change national strategies. As a matter of course, a number of countries have seized the first opportunity to escape Washington’s control. These cases can be called different things — whether “opportunism”, “transitioning to an active anti-colonial stage”, “searching for new solutions”, or “reactions to the US’ actions” — depending on the ideological framework and school of international relations employed. What is important to understand is that unipolarity is disappearing forever. Even if globalists from the Democratic Party come to replace Trump, they will strategize how to erode sovereignty as such, including American sovereignty, and they will have to deal, first and foremost, with their taxpayers, who clearly showed their preferences by electing Trump. Moreover, given the heightened capabilities of other countries, the globalists will have to concede serious concessions and are unlikely to be able to achieve the same results that they did during the rise of the unipolar moment under Clinton or in the Obama administration’s later attempts to instate multilateralism. In one way or another, by this time faith in the US will have already been completely undermined — especially as newly declassified documents once again demonstrate to the whole world the dirty methods of the State Department and form a powerful argument in favor of severing relations with Washington — and, as former allies come to prefer new alliances, the balance of forces will change significantly in all regions across the board. We now find ourselves in the multipolar moment. Our task is to transform this multipolar moment into a multipolar era. Translated from Russian by Jafe Arnold.


DECONSTRUCTING THE “CONTEMPORAL MOMENT”: NEW HORIZONS IN THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY The contemporal moment: destruction/deconstruction It is obvious that the history of philosophy must be studied by determining a starting point beforehand. It seems a matter of course that we would automatically take such to be the contemporal moment. The contemporal moment means the “here and now”, hic et nunc. This moment acts as our starting position, as our “observatory point” from which we can survey philosophy as the history of philosophy. The history of philo­ sophy thus unfolds in our direction, towards us. This concerns both time and place: philosophy is historically situated between its “sources” (for example, the pre-Socratics) and the situation in the 21st century (in its philosophical self-reflection). As a rule, this temporal vector is more or less reflexive, hence why the main (axial) discipline in all sectors of philosophy is the history of philosophy. By virtue of fixating on this historico-philosophical vector, we acquire the possibility to be involved in this process, to consolidate our own position as that of a “philosopher” in a historico-philosophical structure. This is the nunc, the “now”, the temporal sector in which our thinking is placed, if it wants to be “philosophical.”

Alexander Dugin

Doctor of political sciences, founder of the contemporary Russian school of Geopolitics, leader of the International Social Movement "Eurasian Movement", Moscow, Russian Federation.

Hence follows the rather important conclusion that was fully drawn between Heideigger and his call for “phenomenological destruction” in Sein und Zeit [1], and Jacques Derrida who developed this thesis into the methodology of “deconstruction” [2]. The history of philosophy, according to Heidegger, is tethered in his case to ontology, to the question of being, and, thereby being an onto-history, Seynsgeshichtliche, is a continuity of stages at each of which the question of being is treated uniquely. As follows, the history of philosophy is a logical structure or a series of logical structures which can be more or less described in ontological terms which in turn determine the place and significance of a philosophy or philosophical school in the overall historico-philosophical process. Determining a philosopher or school’s place in this continuity, which has strict temporal and cultural frameworks (from the pre-Socratics to Nietzsche to Heidegger himself ), is equivalent to correctly understanding their philosophy and, accordingly, allows for the meaning of such to be revealed. This is ontological destruction — the placement of a philosopher or philosophical tendency through the revelation of the fundamental paradigm of their ontological positions (often hidden, veiled, or implicit) in a strictly notional sequence: The First Beginning (pre-Socratics) -> The End of the First Beginning (Plato and Aristotle) -> the middle — the Middle Ages (Thomas Aquinas, Duns Scotus, etc.) -> The Beginning of the End — New Time


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(modernity — Descartes, Leibniz, and up to Kant) -> The End of the End (Hegel and Nietzsche). Destruction is the placement of a philosopher into this sequence in order to reveal his place in the history of philosophy, and thus the meaning of his philosophizing. For Jacques Derrida, the history of philosophy is a text, the structure of which is determined by the intersections of semantic lines. This is a view which more or less repeats, albeit in nuanced and detailed form, Heidegger’s axial construction. Thus, for both Heidegger and Derrida, it is important to place a philosopher in the context in which the semantics of his constructs are found to represent quotations, polemics, or the overturning or reproduction of the discourses that are at disposal before and around him in the “grammatological fabric.” In this case, deconstruction is the attentive inspection of this fabric’s patterns, in which any “authorship” is conceived as no more than a locus of quotations compiled in an ordered manner. Philosophy, thus, is one field of connotation, and its history comprises changes in the predominant connotative matrices and interpretive algorithms. Between Heidegger and Derrida, we can place Michel Foucault and his epistemology. Of course, such hermeneutical models of the history of philosophy distinctly crystallized around the end of the 20th century. In the 21st century, and earlier, the “contemporal moment” was described in other terms. For Kant, it was paired with the revelation of the the structures of “transcendental reason”, for Hegel such was the “end of history” and the “objective spirit.” For Nietzsche, there was the maximization of the will to power in the figure of the Übermensch. In Marx, there was the horizon of the world proletarian revolution. In all cases, philosophy has been conceived exclusively as a teleological process — whether by those who have tried to give this teleology fixed forms, or those who, on the contrary, have understood history as the accumulation of a “quantity” of individual freedom (Stirner, Bergson or von Hayek/Popper).

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For all of these teleologies — both the naive ones of the 19th century and those 20th century theories based on critical reflection, structuralism, and phenomenological corrections (as well as the philosophy of language and psychoanalysis) — the “contemporal moment” serves as an “observatory point”, and he who stands at this observatory point and has considered the content of the moment itself and its structures (no matter who this “someone” might be — the subject, Dasein, a rhizome, a deciphering system, a “body without organs”, a hermeneutic) is the key to the history of philosophy capable of interpreting it in relation to themselves. This is very impor­ tant, since in such a perspective any preceding “contemporal moment” is conceived as a “preliminary”, “unfinished”, “incomplete” one compared to the current contemporal moment and, as follows, the nunc cannot be adequately described prius, as it does not convert into the past the “contemporality” of the present. In a certain sense, this is history as such, and the history of philosophy is the philosophical conceptualization of its structure. The French philosopher Henry Corbin used the neologism historial in order to translate the meaning of Heidegger’s expression Seynsgeshichtliche (“onto-historical”) into French. The historial is the structure of the “contemporal moment” which predetermines its content as a teleological vector whose tip points to the nunc and presumes its beginning in the embryonic formation of the Logos. In one way or another, any attempt to conceptualize the moments in the history of philosophy (of individual philosophers or their schools) beyond the historial, i.e., without deconstruction taking into account such explicit and convincing reflections (phenomenology, Heidegger, Post-Modernity), will look not simply naive, but ludicrous. In the context of the historial, any attempt to read Plato or Hegel outside of their notional sequence, which was in one way or another noted by philosophers in the last quarter of the 20th century, would mean falling into the self-deceit of unreflexive and unstructured quoting with a guaranteed loss of semantic links. If a


reading of this or that philosopher does not flow in the context of this historico-philoso­ phical grille de la lecture, i.e., without a thorough review of this observatory point where it is situated — or, in other words, on the other end of destruction/deconstruction operations — then nonsense is guaranteed. Not a single expression, not a single review, not a single intellectual procedure stands a chance at being correctly conceptualized, and instead of philosophy and the history of philosophy, we are left with the “white noise” of gloomy cognition, a simulacrum of thinking. This is first and foremost the case with the nunc, the historial, or the temporal aspect of philosophy. The matter stands somewhat differently with the spatial aspect, the hic. The topos of the present: the West as a spatial telos The contemporal moment is situated not only in a temporal sequence, but also in space, on a scale of synchronic territory. If modern philosophy has devoted enormous, if not all of its attention to the first aspect of the contemporal moment, then spatiality has been left outside of the sphere of interests. Western philosophy is wholly and completely “tempo-centric.” Consequently, in it Sein is bound to Zeit, and this bondage is absolute, as a result of which Raum, or space, is studied merely as a residual principle, as an accident. Kant placed space closer to the object; Descartes altogether identified the object with “extense” (res extensa) in contrast to the subject (res cogens). In new European philosophy, thought is the property of the subject; consequently, time is the basis of philosophy and its context. Hence the historial as a measure. It is telling that even critiques of the structuralists’ historico-philosophical understanding have by almost no means whatsoever addressed the fate of space in philosophy and philosophical self-reflection. The principle of “spatiality” has been integrated in the form of a synchronic topology intended to serve as a semantic scale for interpreting the content of time. In other words, structuralist topolo-


gy only serves the historial in the spirit of the Heideggerian sequence or Derrida’s grammatological field. But if we upset the habitual frameworks of new European philosophy and nevertheless pose the question of “where?” with regards to the observatory point, and if we fix the hicin the famous expression hic et nunc, then we have a specific civilizational concept of the West. The West in this case strictly fulfills the same teleological function as the “now.” The contemporal moment is situated in the West, and is the point towards which all the rays of possible thinking converge, thus achieving their epiphany in none other than the West. The West is the birthplace of the Logos; the Logos is itself in the “evening land”, Hesper, Abendland. This was more or less obvious for the cultural ethnocentrism of the Greeks. It was the core of the Romans’ legal and political self-consciousness, and it became the axis of ecumenism. Then it was incarnated in the concept of universal progress in modernity. It remains the main driving force of the processes of globalization. Husserl spoke of “European humanity” as a philosophical quintessence of the human as such. Heidegger directly and explicitly equa­ ted philosophy with Europe. The West is the telos of earthly space just as the present is the telos of the past. Thus, “modern” philosophy can only be Western philosophy, and just as the present is the essence of the past, so is the Western the essence of the non-Western. Between nunc and hic there is thus present a direct analogy: time (the historial, or Karl Jaspers’ axial time) convenes in the “now” and space in the “here”, interpreted as “here in the West.” And in precisely the same way that the past is conceived as the not-yetpresent, so is the non-Western (for example, the eastern) thought of as the not-yet-Western. This Western European, spatio-teleological character of the contemporal moment is conceptualized much less distinctly than the historial and the structures of the history

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of philosophy. Unlike the paramount discipline that is philosophy which deals with the deconstruction of time, spatial correctives and schematizations are the prerogative of the applied, secondary, and even barely institutionalized sciences with weakly developed philosophical apparatuses, such as geopolitics or international relations. On a more serious level, only the first attempts have been made at relati­vizing the Eurocentrism of modern philosophy as such, as with Edward Said’s introduction of the notion of “orientalism” or the more foundational but not so generalized studies of cultural, social, and structural anthropology. It is none other than the West for which the absolutization of time and radical tempo-centrism are characteristic. In reducing the historial to a structure, something constructed, and departing from the present, we automatically produce a concentric model of civilizati­onal space in which the West is situated in the center and all the rest of humanity is in the periphery. Just as attempting to read this or that philosopher in isolation from the historial (without deconstruction and, consequently, beyond the contemporal grille de la lecture) is today philosophical nonsense, the same status is held by all those attempts at substantiating the relevance of non-Western forms of philosophy — in the best cases, they can be examined as extravaganza, and in the worst as obtrusive attempts by ignoramuses to force themselves upon a scientific problem on equal terms with the opinion of a scholar. What can a not-yet-Logos tell a Logos that the Logos itself does not know? Thus we have ascertained the structure of the contemporal moment as analyzed from a temporal and spatial point of view.

Post-Modernity and distance In the structure of post-modern philosophy, the historial is subject to steadfast analysis, and at times this attention is so detailed that the spatial aspect and characteristic Eurocentrism

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of Western philosophy also come into view. Combined with an anthropological approach, this yields definite preconditions for not only recognizing the structure of the observatory point as such, but also establishing a certain distance from it. The intensive reflections of post-Heideggerian (post-modern) philosophy on the nature of time, and the first glimpses into conceptualizing the spatial situation of contemporality bring us to an entirely new horizon and radically deeper level of philosophical self-reflection. What if the very observatory point from which we survey the history of philosophy, and from departing which we engage in deconstruction, is in turn nothing more than a “philosophical construct?” In ­other words, to what extent is the very idea of the teleology of the present moment qualified, and as follows, is tempo-centrism justified? Is the historial that serves us as a reliable tool for interpreting philosophy in turn an ephemeral and non-historical paradigm projected into the present which is not cumulative-teleological (regarding content), but arbitrary or arranged in accordance with a mechanism different from the vector of “axial time?” Finally, is the West the “only place” of the Logos, the zone towards which converge the rays of consciousness, or is this only one of many spatial receptacles of thinking alongside others? Does this mean that Eurocentrism is justified at its heart, and does it not follow that we should look for other, uniquely fully-fledged and complete dialects of the Logos? These suspicions, of course, are left in the periphery of the philosophy of Post-Modernity, in the shadow of more habitual, inertial trends which, although are enriched, detailed, and introspective procedures, perpetuate the “dogmatic” vector of classical Western rationalism. Post-Modernity usually justifies and substantiates itself with routine practices of the contemporal moment, but the post-mo­ dern attitude nevertheless makes such suspicions and conjectures wholly natural. This inspires among those most of all worried about the possibility of breaking with the traditions of Western Modernity rather natural concerns: will Post-Modernity not altogether lead to the liquidation of the fulcra of the


Western European Logos as such? If distance from the contemporal moment itself might be, even if only theoretically, justifiable, then all the claims of Western European humanity to universality immediately crumble, and this means no more nor less than the collapse of the Logos. Heidegger clearly recognized this prospect and posited that, nonetheless, the West’s teleology and contemporal moment, exposed to nihilistic catastrophe, should and could be overcome only through this moment and only in the West. This proposal consisted not in retreating from the observatory point, but in deepening the bottomless of its fall in order to, in this dramatic collapse, discover the mystery of its meaning and soar up to thrust forth Another Beginning for philosophy. Heidegger deliberately interpreted the sha­ dow unleashed by Post-Modernity as a refusal of the burden of the “difficult knowledge of nihilism.” The decline of Europe, according to Heidegger, is the decline of being itself, and it should be experienced as such. In post-Heideggerian philosophy, Heidegger’s tragism and heroism were rather quickly adapted into the routine of the new methodology; the anti-technological call to recognize the bottomless nothingness of such in turn became a technology. But postmodernism, albeit vapid and dubious, perhaps even by virtue of its refusal to sink deeper into the dizzying passivity of desperate Heideggerian nihilism, and at the same time not being in any position to turn Dasein’s mode of existence into authenticity (denying the Decision, Entscheidung), nevertheless slightly opened up the possibility for a step in this direction. If the Logos of the West, as far as one can tell, did not accept the Heideggerian invitation to implode, to explode in its own night, then in the very least it dissipated into bits of postmodern miasma and prepared for the last figure of dissolution. The fixation of distance with regards to the moment of contemporality and the clear and intelligible understanding of its “arbitrariness” (in spatial and temporal senses) is already the fait accompli end of the West, its philosophical end. For those for whom the telos of the historial was the only


permissible “lifeworld”, this meant the “end of everything.” But here is where the most significant aspect manifests itself: what if the historial, with its fundamental tempocentrism and concomitant Eurocentrism, with the structure of its Logos and grating deconstruction/ontological destruction, is but one among numerous and equivalent possibilities for reasonably organizing the world? If this is so, then the finale experienced by Western philosophy is no more than an episode in a more complex and multipolar philosophical picture where there might be multiple observatory points and multiple understandings of time, space, and Logos. Post-Modernity as a whole, of course, does not gravitate in this direction, remaining as it has under the wonted hypnosis of its Eurocentric contemporality, but the distance in question here becomes an open possibility with the dissipation of the European Logos. In Post-Modernity, the structures of this Logos become so blurred and scattered, so unintelligible and weak, that breaking with their suggestiveness turns out to be an extremely easy endeavor. That the strength of this Logos’ inertia is such that the clutch of its impact on the people of the West themselves does not let up even when the nature of rationality itself withers and dissipates in front of their very eyes — that is another matter altogether. The ends no longer come together and liberation from dogma leads to liberation from the process of liberation by virtue of which the subject itself evaporates — after all, PostModernity recognizes not only God, but man himself as an “apparatus of suppression”, a “repressive machine”, and thus the freedom of man transforms into freedom from man. This is the logical result. It is a paradox, but today higher humanism means dehumanization or transhumanization. Tragedy thus imperceptibly slips into farce. Simply stepping away from the observatory point becomes a simple endeavor only for those capable of digressing from the residual hypnosis of the historial, which means that it is by no means simple. Nonetheless, the philosophical space for this has been prepared, and

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if the distance which we have been discussing is taken as the object of our heightened attention, then we can rather easily differentiate a spectrum of philosophical procedures with which we can feel out a different fulcrum or even a whole constellation of such fulcra in order to, departing from it/them, observe and subject the contemporal moment to deconstruction, thus demolishing the ponderability of temporal and spatial teleology, i.e., the Western Logos’ claims to exclusivity. Hence the proposal to move in the direction of this new distance and new fulcra, and let the dead bury their dead.

The phenomenology of philosophy as a method How can this distance be embodied in philosophical practice? Theoretically, the most principled manner is to escape the hypnosis of the contemporal moment, to calmly and with complete self-control refuse the pressure posed by both the historial (the trajectory of the history of philosophy towards the point at which we find ourselves on the scale of historical temporality) and Eurocentrism. To this end, philosophy can be seized through seve­ ral strategies: • the phenomenological • the anthropological • the Traditionalist Surely there are other ways by which to resolve this issue, but for now we limit ourselves to these three trajectories. Let us begin with phenomenology. The phenomenologist philosophers, setting before themselves the goal of clarifying the structure of the processes of logical thinking at the first stage, that preceding the engagement of properly logical (in the spirit of Aristotle) procedures of reasoning, transitioned from revealing the nature of intentionality (Brentano) to the concepts of noesis or noema and the “lifeworld” (Husserl). This line was picked up and deve­ loped in a particularly original manner by ear-

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ly Heidegger, as a result of which he arrived at Dasein. Phenomenology proposes that we focus our attention on studying the structures of thinking in their pre-logical phases, when consciousness “naively” and “uncritically” operates with its own “representations” (Vorstellungen), by substituting the objects themselves theoretically outside of the subject with the corresponding noema inhabiting consciousness. This logic is constructed upon ascertaining the obvious (evidential) ostensibility of the object, thus as a matter of course accomplishing the step of transcendentali­ zing. At the heart of this process lies phenomenality itself, on which consciousness usually does not fixate as it instantly flies above this level. However, in phenomenologists’ opinion, it is none other than this phenomenality which is the most authentic and evidential state, and all other procedures of consciousness, including rational logic, are built on top of such with a greater or lesser degree of self-reflection. Thus, in order to achieve a precise and scientifically credible tracing of the basic processes of gnosiology on which thinking, logic, philosophy and science are built, it is necessary to intentionally study the phenomenal level which affects all other stages, hiding under their complexity and thereby dimming clear representations of nature and basic trajectories of thought. The phenomenological method has been borrowed by the most diverse humanitarian disciplines from sociology to anthropology and psychology. Everywhere where it has been employed, the point has been explaining the arrangement and mechanisms of those structures on a level lesser and more primordial than that of logical thinking. Heidegger constructed his existential analytics on this basis. In the field of the history of religions, the phenomenological method was actively used by Henry Corbin, who argued that religious doctrines cannot be understood on the grounds of purely, rationally formulated theological dogma and doctrines or by ignoring the inner experience of religious life. It is precisely studying this experience, which may very well contradict our ideas about the structure


of the real, possible, and actual, that only can and should construe more complex religious systems. If we ignore this “lifeworld” of the religious person, then our understanding of religious doctrine will be superficial and completely incorrect. After all, we would miss the main and most essential foundation, that upon which such doctrine is built and whose structures it produces (whether revealing or, on the contrary, veiling them). Therefore, Corbin, who studied Islamic mysticism and Iranian Shi’ism in particular, emphasized that in order to understand religion, one must learn to live it from within. Hence why, in some passages, Corbin, himself a Protestant, wrote “we, Shiites” and believed that without such methodological identification with the sphere under study, without such immersion into the phenomenology of religious experience, no reliable judgement concerning the religion under study is possible. Franz Boas’ cultural anthropology and Claude Lévi-Strauss’ structural anthropology call for studying archaic societies in a similar manner. Archaic man lives in a phenomenal world qualitatively different from the one in which the man of European Modernity lives. They differ not only on the level of development of logical thinking (as the sociologist and ethno­logist Lucien Lévy-Bruhl tried to demonstrate), but in the profoundly different organization of the world of phenomena, including taxonomies, the allocation of basic entities, symmetries, and classifications. Lévi-Strauss argued that in archaic tribes and non-literate cultures we are dealing not with a pre-logical type of thinking, but with a different kind of logic that is no less developed than that of European people in Modernity, but is structured around different algorithms and thereby yields different results and gnosiological/ontological systems. In sociology, an analogous method was employed by Husserl’s student, Alfred Schütz, who proposed to study society by abstracting oneself from the sum of our a priori knowledge of such and any notions of the purported “objectivity” of existing (non-existing) objects of the outside world and their autonomous significance. Different societies, in Schütz’s un-


derstanding, operate with different “lifeworld” structures; as follows, they construct different phenomenological systems which at the next stage determine their views of reality, whe­ther internal, external, subjective, objective, etc. Analogous methods were applied by Harold Garfinkel, the founder of “ethnomethodology” who, like Schütz, focused his attention on the “horizons of everyday life” and “practices of everyday life.” But here is what is interesting: phenomenology as such originally took shape as a philosophical current and was only later applied to other sciences — the phenomenological method was not applied to philosophy itself. Phenomenologist philosophers themselves based their theories on the contemporal moment and, moreover, considered phenomenology to be a more precise and reflective expression of contemporality itself. In its historical movement along the path of scientific process and with its increasing refinement of the methodology of its logical thinking, at one point “European humanity” (Husserl) began developing the sphere of philosophy not in breadth (extensively), but in depth (intensively). This was largely because the expansion of reason had reached its natural borders. This deeper plunge into reason itself is not a step back on the path of singular process in raising the general level of rationality, but a step forward allowing to make those spheres which had previously evaded the arranging and authority of logical procedures into objects of rational attention. Albeit with significant corrections, Heidegger’s philosophy was built in this vein. Philosophical phenomenology, thus, is not only not equivalent to the phenomenology of philosophy, but altogether does not imply the possibility of the latter. Nevertheless, by making a reverse circle and moving through phenomenological socio­ logy, anthropology, ethnology, and the phenomenology of religion, we can try to apply the phenomenological method to philosophy itself by employing a method opposite to that of deconstruction that reveals the structure of the historial. This is an invitation to perceive this or that philosophical system outside of

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the context of the history of philosophy, outside of the context of our knowledge about the structure of time, history, reality, the subject and object, and outside of ontology, which we have erected on the basis of the contemporal moment (whether consciously or by inertia). In other words, the phenomenology of philosophy offers the possibility of authentically experiencing the phenomenological basis at the hart of a concrete philo­ sophical Logos, which is taken as a reliable contemporal moment only at a distance from the contemporal moment which constitutes the structure of our philosophical “I.” Thus, an anthropologist immerses himself in the life of an archaic tribe in order to understand its language, its senses, and beliefs from within this life itself, from the experience of being within the tribe, and not from the grounds of superficial comparison with terms, things, practices, meanings, and beliefs which he knows from his personal experience of belonging to modern Western civilization. Since Boas, and especially under the influence of Lévi-Strauss, only field studies grounded in the method of “participant observation”, empathy, and immersion in the phenomenology of the lifeworld of an archaic tribe are considered anthropologically credible. The phenomenology of philosophy should be constructed in a similar way: in order to understand how this or that philosopher thought, it is necessary to trace his thought from the lifeworld to the logical formulation of thought on the high level of logical expression. But this is possible only at a distance from the contemporal moment and its fundamental content, i.e., through the procedure of removing the philosophical identity of the phenomenologist of philo­ sophy. In Heidegger we can see attempts at such a reading of the Greek philosophers and participative immersion into their lifeworld. But the historial in Heidegger supersedes this initiative in full measure, since assig­ning the pre-Socratics to the First Beginning, and Plato and Aristotle to the end of the First Beginning, forces one to place other relevant doctrines in consciously specified semantic contexts. Heidegger sees the “Greek” and “first beginning” elements in the pre-Socratics on the basis of his reconstruction of the history

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of philosophy, that is, through performing ontological destruction. Therefore, he also anxiously discarded everything among the Greeks that seemed to him to be “non-Greek” (eastern or oriental — which is clearly evident in his Greece travel journal). In the exact same way, he takes that which does not fall under the “first beginning” among the pre-Socratics (for example, some expressions from Anaximander’s fragments in the likes of the pair of terms γένεσις and φτορά) and attributes such to later contaminations [3]. Furthermore, everything in Platonism which does not fall under his understanding of “finiteness in the First Beginning” — which encompasses no more nor less than the whole scope of “open Platonism”, such as apophatism, the super-essence of the Good in the Republic and the One in Parmenides [4] — is subject to the same censuring. In any case, the level of Heidegger’s self-reflection was so high and transparent that his understanding of the contemporal moment is unprecedented in the profundity of his generalizations of the structure of this moment, which were the most penetrating and convincing (even if their formulation involved his resorting to a certain hermeneutical censorship), and his attempts to immerse himself in Ancient Greek thought were the most successful and authentic among all analogous initiatives. The phenomenology of philosophy (unlike phenomenological philosophy) proposes that we completely opt out of hermeneutic procedures which presume some starting position (even as a basis for comparison). In clearly accounting for ourselves in the structure of the contemporal moment, in its modernist/postmodernist historial and its Eurocentrism, and in approaching a philosopher or philosophical school separated by time or space from this observatory point, we must effect a radical change in our phenomenological position; we must completely relocate ourselves to a new observatory point where the lifeworld of the person we are studying is situated and from which his ideas and contemplation came. If a philosopher says something about “eternity”, “heaven”, “immortality”, “God”, or “angels”, it


follows that such should be understood not in terms of what we know about “time”, the “atmosphere”, the “vacuum”, the “death of God”, or the “naive ridiculousness of faith in angels”, but on the grounds of how this philosopher himself understood, lived, and perceived that of which he speaks. Any discourse on eternity from a human who credibly and absolutely knows (the contemporal moment) that there is no nor can there be any “eternity”, will be perceived either as an allegory, a hyperexaggerated image, a metaphor, or as a sign without meaning, an empty set. In such a case, one lifeworld (the contemporal) is acting as a judge, prosecutor, and accuser (this is the original meaning of the Greek word διάβολος) of another lifeworld by denying it the right to defend its phenomenological grounds that are completely usurped by contemporaility. If we are capable of logically assessing the arbitrariness of such a loaded approach (explainable through the Nietzschean will to power or Heideggerian Gestell), then the distance from the contemporal moment will take shape on its own, and this means that we are breaking from it and acquiring the ability to embark on a genuine philosophical journey from one observatory point to another observatory point.

The anthropology of philosophy The case of the anthropology of philosophy is almost the same as that of anthropology. The school of philosophical anthropology of Max Scheler, Arnold Gehlen, etc., took its roots from Kant’s remarks on the anthropological essence of thinking — which can be considered a new formulation of the sophist Protagoras’ maxim that “man is the measure of all things” — a standpoint which was embedded in the language of modernity. However, philosophical anthropology, as a typical pro­duct of the contemporal moment, has nothing in common with the anthropology of philosophy. The anthropology of philosophy proceeds from the plurality of human societies and the diversity of their structures as meaningful outside of any hierarchies or subordinations. Man is a plural phenomenon, anthropology (or at least new anthropology) argues, and the socie­ties


built by him reflect this essential plurality which can be studied by comparing them, but they cannot be categorically defined on a quantitative scale of primitive/superior, developed/underdeveloped, rational/irrational, savage/civilized, childishly naive/adultly serious and rigorous. A human belonging to a “primitive” (archaic) society and a human formed in a modern, highly-differentiated society (again, the contemporal moment) are both people in a full sense, and their differen­ ces are not amenable to hierarchization into greater/lesser, higher/lower, better/worse. It cannot be said that red is “better” than yellow or that savory is “tastier” than sweet, just as it is impossible to argue that larks are “more perfect” than foxes or whales “more perfect” than sharks. Anthropology draws attention to man as a matrix of the society he creates. Once the structure of a human is different, then socie­ ties will reflect these differences and repeatedly refract them in the play of reflections, shadows, and flares. By applying this principle to philosophy — something which anthropologists and even philosophical anthropologists virtually never do — we acquire a myriad of contemporal moments containing historico-geographical (historico-cultural) positions pro­ per to different philosophers, each of which moments should be studied in their internal logic, harmony, symmetry, and by placing the position of the scholar (and his contemporal moment) in brackets. This approach is the qualification of the anthropologist who studies different (archaic) societies and is obliged for the sake of such to operate with a maximally possible pure experience of understanding culture. At the same time, he must obviously, consciously forbid himself from permitting any projections of his own culture and any hierarchizations or hastily drawn systems of correspondences. But anthropologists deal mainly with cultures that are non-literate and have poorly developed systems of rational self-reflection (Lévy-Bruhl’s principle of “mystical complicity”). Myth, ritual, symbol, sacred rite, and initiation by definition deny transparent rationalization. Hence, the open (emphatic) position of anthropologists is con-

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sidered here to be at once applicable and justified by the difficulty (or impossibility) of establishing precise correspondences between a rational set and set of para-rational (which does not mean “irrational” or “sub-rational” as were so convinced the 19th century evolutionist anthropologists before Boas and LévyStrauss). This principle has not been applied to philosophy insofar as it has been believed that transitioning to a rational system means leaving the sphere of the “para-rational” and the implicit (the mythological, symbolic, and mystical) and entering the sphere of universal self-reflection, where such anthropological operations become irrelevant. Thus, from an anthropological point of view, we are affir­ ming a “measure of things” not simply of man, but of modern Western man, and we are assigning the philosophy which has guided this modern Western man the status of a universal algorithm allowing for the interpretation of all other philosophical systems, both non-mo­ dern and non-Western. In the study of archaic cultures, such anthropological suprematism (=cultural racism) was categorically rejected for humanistic, ethical, and scientific reasons. But in the sphere of philosophy, it has been implicitly preserved intact and not subjected to any critical reflection. The modern Western philosopher measures all philosophy (ancient and non-Western as well as modern Western) proceeding from the criteria of the absolute superiority of modern Western philosophy as the cumulative telos for all other systems. At the heart of this lies a mono-polar anthropo­ logy based in implicit racism. At first glance, the impression might be had that applying anthropological methodology to philosophy takes us back to a state of naivety and contradicts the methodology of destruction/deconstruction. This is not so. Deconstruction might very well be an excellent propaedeutic for the anthropology of philosophy since it studies in detail the structure of the context in which this or that philosophical system was created or this or that philosopher thought. If we ignore deconstruction, we miss the most important point of language and the semantic structures of the grammatical field in which a particular

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philosophy is situated. But by including deconstruction as a method, we must simultaneously subject the contemporal moment itself to deconstruction, i.e., deconstruct that which produces deconstruction, which means once again standing at a distance from the observatory point. Deconstruction forbids naively reading a philosopher without indicating his context and semantic ties. This is the force and significance of deconstruction. But in establishing such context and such links, he who engages in deconstruction is in turn operating with the algorithm of the teleological historial which only allows one to order the field of a text. The historial itself is necessary for deconstruction, and the clearer it is realized, the more reliable the result of a deconstruction. But two positions are permissible to take with regards to the historial: one can be under its suggestive, interpretive influence, i.e., be under it, or one can take a certain distance in relation to it, and apply deconstructive reflection and a particular apperception to it. The second case is an invitation to stand above the historial or outside of it. By not curtailing deconstruction in favor of “new naivety”, and by in parallel with this deconstructing the one engaged in deconstructing, we reach the field of the anthropological method in philosophy. In exploring the philosophy of any philosopher and placing it in a well defined context (deconstruction), we should simultaneously perceive such as something open, excluding from our methodology everything that we know with regards to the future and the past vis-a-vis the observatory point in which the philosopher under study is situated. By knowing in advance the end of the play, we unwittingly apply this knowledge to its first acts. It is this which prevents us from genuinely enjoying the action and turns us from participants in the action into the audience or, in the best case, actors ourselves. What truly delights us is the acting of the actors who force us to forget about how the performance will end and who immerse us in the tension of the dramatic moment. Only in this moment, when we seriously begin to believe that the events in the spectacle might actually go quite differently from what we might know from having repeatedly read the script or seen the production, can we


talk about any full effect accomplished. The theater becomes what it originally was — an action, a mystery, a transformative act. This is an open theater, a play whose outcome is known neither by the director, the actors, nor, of course, the viewers. Applying this metaphor to philosophy, he who carries out deconstruction without deconstructing himself and his actions, can be likened to a person who knows the script well and, over the course of the spectacle, obsessively narrates to his neighbor what is happening and how it will end. Sometimes the skeptical and all-knowing expressions of the audience are enough to simply break the spell of theatrical magic. Such annoying companions are capable of nullifying all the drama of the production. Thus, the principle of the “open theater”, in which the content of the drama at its peak breaks away from the rigid frameworks of the script, can be applied to the open history of philosophy based on the anthropological method. If we knowingly rule out that a philosopher whom we are studying might mean something other than what we know of him in identifying his place in the paradigm of the historial, we render ourselves unfit for a real meeting with him. Yet for some reason we dare to describe this weakness of our own spirit as indicating superiority, greater universality of our position, or in accordance with the rules of ethnocentrism and cultural racism. In behaving so, we forbid ourselves from being surprised, and this means we make ourselves completely unfit for philosophy. Conversely, in applying the anthropological principle to philosophy, we immediately find ourselves in a complex, saturated, and unpredictable world where surprise can seize us at every turn. This is the open philosophy of history, which a priori recognizes the anthropological dignity of all thinkers, none of whom are considered below us, our contemporal moment, or our observatory point regardless of whether it is modern and Western or non-modern and non-Western. The most consistent representatives of postmodern philosophy are moving in this direction as long as they do not stray from this path to-


wards particularities, towards fascination with minor and obsessive details of liberation strategies which in one way or another retain an inertial connection to the arterial tendency of Modernity’s historial, that tendency which has exerted its teleological (anthropologically ra­cist) influence on Post-Modernity in proposing liberation from the details, but remaining in slavery to the overall picture.

Untergang Before moving on to Traditionalism as the third strategy for attaining distance from the contemporal moment, it is worth dwelling on how Martin Heidegger, the key figure in the clarification of the historial, understood the vector of time in its Seynsgeschichtliche dimension. Heidegger can be seen as a transitional ele­ ment between those who recognized the indispensability of the contemporal moment in the spirit of Western European philosophy, and the Traditionalists who, on the contrary, as we will see a little later, offered their version of finding the desired distance. The fact is that Heidegger, recognizing the fatality of time confronting the present and the centrality of the West as the birthplace and place of deve­ lopment of the Logos, deciphered the trajectory of time as “descent”, Untergang, “decline”, “flight of the gods”, and as the “abandonment of being” (Seinsverlassenheit). Herein lies the fundamental difference between Heidegger and the majority of philosophers of Modernity and Post-Modernity who, on the contrary and as a rule, treated history as ascent, accumulation, discovery, and movement forwards and upwards. For Heidegger, the contemporal moment is the point of Midnight towards which we are heading from the evening. He decoded the history of philosophy as a process of descent, decline, concealment, immersion, and oblivion. Thus, his philosophy is profoundly tragic, and its eschatology is paradoxical, for at the moment of maximal darkness, Dasein is supposed to remember its SeynBeing and decipher the pain of its absence as Gottesnacht, “the night of the gods”, as a call to realize Ereignis, “the Event.” Heidegger saw the telos in the moment of Midnight, in the very center of which the sacrament of

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Dasein switching its mode of existing from the inauthentic to the authentic must be accomplished. Such a dualistic attitude towards the contemporal moment as a lower threshold, intended as the point from which begins (or should begin) the return, is, however, problematic, as such is not guaranteed. The return might not begin and, at any rate, such presupposes a perspective opposite to that of the historial which inspired Heidegger’s love for Greek thought and his striving to live and think it along with the very creators of the First Beginning of philosophy. Imagining himself as the one completing Seynsgeschichte, Heidegger felt a deep yearning for those who began such. Thus, distance from the contemporal moment was conquered in parallel to phenomenological destruction, without cancelling or replacing it. The case of Heidegger is unique in many respects, but what interests us in this situation is that the Beginning of philosophy (from the first to the last phase with Plato and Aristotle) in his specific model of the historial is conceived as a philosophical chord followed by descent, Untergang, which leads to the present, and not vice versa as a “childish” and “long-overcome” phase of philosophy. In this regard, the Ancient Greeks and in particular the pre-Socratics are exalted to unattainable heights. As follows, comprehending them is possible only by degree of radically distancing ourselves from the present through the elevation, the “return”, the επιστροφή of the Neoplatonists. Heidegger distinguishes the Untergang from those who realize themselves in it and see it for what it truly is — the Untergang. One can be simply fascinated by the flow of history, and one can clearly and penetratingly realize that the movement of the historial is a fall into the abyss. Those who recognize time as falling, Heidegger calls “the descending”, the Untergehende. They, unlike all others, descend consciously, clearly perceiving their endeavor without illusions or fears, although not without horror. For them, the Untergang is

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the Untergang; they see descent as descent, while all others, not being the “descending”, the Untergehenden, can feed themselves with illusions and methodically rise to the luring and guaranteed horizon of “progress.” Such an interpretation of the historial as Untergang converges Heidegger with the Traditionalists, whose methods we will now examine.

Traditionalism The philosophy of Traditionalism [5], otherwise termed Philosophia Perennis or “perennialism”, is of colossal significance to our topic. First established and formulated by René Guénon, this philosophy, as correctly noted by René Alleau, can be considered alongside Marxism the “most revolutionary trend in modern philosophy” [6]. If we approach Traditionalism with due scrutiny, we will soon realize that this comparison with Marxism, albeit paradoxical at first glance, is absolutely justified. The Traditionalists’ appraisal of values is, in a whole number of parameters, far more radical, revolutionary, and uncompromising than the ideas of Marx (as well as those of the other “philosophers of suspicion” among whom Nietzsche and Freud are usually numbered). Of importance to us at the present moment is how Traditionalism helps establish distance with regards to the contemporal moment and, accordingly, why we have distinguished it as an independent strategy. The very structure of Traditionalist philosophy is in many respects close to that of Heidegger’s, insofar as histo­ rical time is understood as a downward movement, degradation, a path to the bottom. The Traditionalists extracted this from religious doctrines and myths (including even from the monotheistic religions), as well as from their analysis of the ontological transformations and changes in the state of the cosmos. However, unlike Heidegger, in Traditionalism the scale of degradation takes on a much more extensive scope and goes far beyond European philosophy. If for Heidegger history is the thread of the Logos stretched between the pre-Socratics and himself as an heir and


eschatological figure of German classical philosophy, then for the Traditionalists this period is thought of as only one fragment of descent, of the Untergang, amidst more general and fundamental processes. For Traditionalists, time itself is a fall, or more precisely, a downward spiral. It has ensnared not only the historical European societies known to us, but the entire destiny of mankind, including the societies of the East and those “mythical” epochs from which only the most hazy legends have remained with us (for example, the legends of Hyperborea and Atlantis). Thus, the contemporal moment is conceived by Traditionalists not as a peak or telos, but as a zone of extreme degradation, a lie, oblivion, and delusion. It is the end of the road to the abyss, the moment of reaching the bottom. Accordingly, the observatory point at which modern humanity (in the era of Modernity and Post-Modernity) stands is not the top of a mountain, but the bottom of the world pit from which nothing can be seen besides dark phantoms and unwieldy fantasies. We live in a world of philosophical hallucinations in which the worse we see, the more we flaunt our foresight. Guénon called this the “reign of quantity” and interpreted it as the critical low of spirit. Accordingly, Traditionalism completely overturns all the proportions assimilated by default by the contemporal moment: The time in which we live is an era of total poverty and ignorance. If we base ourselves on its “credibility” and “evidences”, it is impossible to correctly decipher the present, let alone the past which was related to more perfect and authentic periods of history. The West is the cultural field of accelerated degeneration and decline which surpasses other (non-Western) cultures only in the speed of its fall into the abyss. The distance in relation to the contemporal moment here is maximal: the West and Modernity are thought of as the worst, the sterile, useless, and false which cannot be taken as any kind of reference point for comprehen­ding


anything at all. Thus, modern Western philo­ sophy and its axioms are the worst possible philosophy based on ignorance, a wrong decision in its very basic intellectual operations, and completely delusional with regards to nature, the structure of time, space, man, the world, the primordial, the logic of history, the structure of matter, etc. Modern philosophy is arrogant and lofty nonsense. The only way to break through to philosophy lies in absolutely transgressing the foundational paradigms of Modernity and completely overthrowing the dogmas of modern Western culture, science, values, and political and social systems. All of the West and Modernity’s claims to superio­ rity over the past and non-Western societies are completely groundless and unfounded. The modern West is incapable of understanding even its own relatively recent history (the Middle Ages), not to mention Antiquity or the profound, genuine, authentic, and competent philosophies and systems of the East. In this operation, the observatory point of modern “Western humanity” flies away, and something directly opposite to such is taken as the starting point: Antiquity and the East, which are genuine observatory points and not simulacra. We are proposed henceforth to think against the present and against the West. Thus unfolds a completely different philosophical map on which the vector of authenticity leads not to the contemporal moment, but away from it as if from a black hole, gathering all the more meaningful and enlightening rays the further it is removed from the “center of hell.” The less Western and modern, the more genuine and authentic, the Traditionalists argue. Insofar as degradation is not limited to the West, but has much larger scale boundaries, the distance from the “black point” of reference must be constantly increased. Everything that remotely resembles “modernity” and the West, even in distant periods of history or outside of the European context, must immediately be treated with suspicion. And if we encounter anything similar in philosophy, culture, politics, society, art, etc., then we should be especially careful, for we are likely dealing with things whose trajectory is sharp and rapid fall into the abyss. The West and modernity are the essence of evil,

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lies, a dead-end, darkness, madness, violence, suffering, and death. And everything that resembles this, even remotely, by virtue of this very fact is dubious, suspicious, and most likely dangerous. If modernity denies eternity and invests being in the historial of becoming, this means that only eternity is and represents a reliable basis for understanding the nature of time. There is no vice versa. If modernity insists on space being isotropic, i.e., quantitative, then it is obvious that the truth should be the exact opposite, and the anisotropy and “natural places” of Aristotle determine the structures of “sacred geography” and the laws of climate and the elements. If modernity calls reason and corporeality the unquestionably and prime properties of man, then this is in itself sufficient reason to be sure that the body is insignificant and unbinding, nothing more than “leather garments”, and that reason is nothing more than an empty shadow that has accidentally fallen on the temporary surface from the rays of the true, divine, heavenly mind. If modernity proposes to correlate knowledge with experience, then experience as a measure of the authenticity of science should generally be excluded from consideration, for knowledge is realized through contemplation and based on intellectual intuition which grasps the eide­tic essence of things rather than their dead shells and “husks.” And so on and so forth. In other words, in Traditionalism we acquire an operational and fundamental weapon for realizing the most radical postmodernist strategy. No philosophy is capable of so fundamentally relativizing the contemporal moment and exploding the arrogant claims of Modernity and the West to universalism and the teleologicalness of their philosophy. For Traditionalists, the modern Western philosopher is a guaranteed ignoramus or senseless jester, if not a nihilist possessed by infracorporeal entities. On the other hand, René Guénon’s follower, the Italian Traditionalist Julius Evola, upon developing this line in his book Ride the Tiger [7], came to a very interesting point: if we take eternity seriously, that is, as it was

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understood and experienced by the philosophers and thinkers of traditional society, then all the content of history should also, in some sense, exist forever and simultaneously. As follows in Evola’s development of this thought, “modernity” as we know it today, what we call the “contemporal moment”, i.e., “the West + Modernity”, should have been present at previous stages as well. In other words, the modern world and Tradition can be considered not in diachronic order, in which Modernity replaces Tradition over the course of degradation and descent, but synchronically, where they coexist with one another simultaneously, even in space. Thus, the forms of Tradition, the philosophy of Tradition, and the Logos of Tradition represent Heaven, and the forms of modernity the worlds of hell, the underworld, Hades, and Tartarus. Man, as the cosmic mediator, is situated on the border between both worlds, between Tradition (above) and modernity (below). He is always straddling this border, eternally, in both the era of Tradition’s predominance, and in the periods in which modernity temporarily wins. In his eidetic, eternal dimension, man himself is this border, and the movement of his spirit, his thought, his ways and methods of philosophizing, outline the content of that which lies on either side. Through his choice of orientation, spiritual or corporeal, man constitutes the time, the epoch, the age in which he lives. Thus, residing in the “dark age”, the Kali-Yuga, is neither a fatality, a punishment, nor something arbitrary, but the Night’s testing of the grain of eternity, of the divine center that comprises the essence of man. In other words, no matter how far away the Golden Age might be, a kernel of it remains within man as hope, as opportunity, as a fulcrum, which can always be found in refusing to unconditionally and fatalistically (or unconsciously) accept the conditions of the Iron Age. Time is an illusion. The historial is no more than a sign, a metaphor that can be deciphered in different ways and appealed to freely. We ourselves choose the time in which we live. And if man is born in the modern world and in the West’s zone of influence, this means that he is included in the


profound plans of eternity, and this reflects his mission and fate. Modernity is in Tradition, and Tradition is in modernity. But in different sections of the vertical world, their proportions adjust to being polar: in Heaven (Tradition) there is only a drop of hell (the Biblical serpent that first appeared in paradise), and in hell there is a drop of Heaven. But this is enough to stretch a semantic thread of sacred history, or hiérohistoire (in Henry Corbin’s formulation) between these drops. Thus, Traditionalism offers such a radical revolution in relation to the contemporal moment, which opens up not only the possibility of establishing the desired distance in one direction, but makes available a whole world of mountain peaks consisting of possible observatory points to be sought in Antiquity and in the East, in traditional society and in religious teachings, everywhere and among all, except the modern West and its philosophers. It bears admission that such an open and substantial philosophical perspective cannot but inspire. It proposes to discover what we ourselves have closed, to dive without skepticism and distrust of religion into ancient philosophy, mythology, traditions and beliefs, both those close (European) and distant (Asian). It is tantamount to a proposal to tear off the blindfold covering our eyes which, contrary to the assurances of false doctors, are fully capable of seeing the light and contemplating a world imbued with eidetic, sagacious rays. We have thus prepared the basis for our further study into the structures and versions of the Logos. We have outlined what in our vision is the field upon which the main strategies of Noomachy, the wars of the mind, should take place. We have relativized the contemporal moment while leaving the possibility for periodically referencing it with the aim of clarifying its ontological content, its place in the overall construct of the different Logos worlds which we will explore along different axes — both vertical and horizontal, moving freely through times (eons) and spaces (layers of being). In accord with Tradition, the primordial source, the quintessence, the center of all that is the Mind, the νοuς of the Neoplatonists, the bod-


dhi of the Buddhists, the Mind is eternal and contains everything at once. This means that it also contains us who think of it, and the world that has unfolded before It (before us) in the process of thinking about it. The world exists to the extent that it is conceived by the Mind. But the Mind, containing everything in itself, also encompasses contradictions, conflicts, falls, and descent. It contains modernity as well. Therefore, upon having rejected and undermined modernity at the very outset of our study, we must also find the latter’s rightful place in it. Truth can truly judge not only truth, but also lies, as well as that which lies between truth and lie: the opinion (δoξα). Thus, the roots of war, tragedy, catastrophe, and problems must be sought within the Mind. In the Mind must be sought the meaning of the night of the gods and the secret of their flight that comprises the essence of modernity. But it is impossible to participate in the Mind and not be involved in the wars which It wages, which are waged within it. We cannot move towards the Logos and remain indifferent to its internal tensions, its splits and its amalgamations. Philosophy is a mobilization to the front of the spirit. Resolute and irrevocable. We will devote ourselves and one another to such over the course of the unfolding of our book’s subject matter. Translated from Russian by Jafe Arnold.


[1] See paragraph six, “Die Aufgabe einer Destruktion der Geschichte der Ontologie”, in Martin Heidegger, Sein und Zeit (Tübingen: Max Niemeyer Verlag, 2006), p. 19. [2] Jacques Derrida, De la grammatologie (Paris: Les Éditions de Minuit, 1967). [3] Martin Heidegger, Holzwege (Frankfurt a. M.: Vittorio Klostermann, 1972), p. 296. [4] See Aleksandr Dugin, V poiskakh temnogo Logosa (Moscow: Akademicheskii Proekt, 2013). [5] See Aleksandr Dugin, Filosofiia traditsionalizma (Moscow: Arktogeya-tsentr, 2002). [6] René Alleau, De Marx a Guénon: d’une critique «radicale» à une critique «principielle» de sociétés modernes in Les Dossiers H. René Guénon (Paris: L’Âge d’Homme), p. 193. [7] Julius Evola, Cavalcare la tigre: Orientamenti esistenziali per un’epoca di dissoluzione (Rome: Edizioni Mediterranee, 2008).

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Alexander Wolfheze

Holds a PhD from Leiden University (2011) and has extensive research experience in the fields of Semitic Studies and Cultural Anthropology. His interdisciplinary specializations are pre-modern epistemology and Traditionalist philosophy: his recent work The Sunset of Tradition (2018) applies these to the cultural history of the Modern Age. His current article series explores the metapolitical relevance of Traditionalist thought for the Identitarian and Eurasian movements.

A nation can survive its fools, and even its ambitious fools. But it cannot survive treason from within. An enemy at the gates is less formidable, for he is known and carries his banner openly. But the traitor moves amongst those within the gate freely, his sly whispers rustling through all the alleys, heard in the very halls of government itself. For the traitor appears not a traitor: he speaks in accents familiar to his victims, and he wears their face and their arguments, he appeals to the baseness that lies deep in the hearts of all men. He rots the soul of a nation, he works secretly and unknown in the night to undermine the pillars of the city, he infects the body politic so that it can no longer resist. — Marcus Tullius Cicero During the recent Golden Dawn Conference in Rotterdam Jared Taylor, the long-serving leader of the American Renaissance Foundation called German Chancellor Merkel the ‘greatest traitor of the West since Ephialtes’. Before addressing the substance of this qualification, it is appropriate to also consider its formal aspect. The words chosen by Jared Taylor depart from two elementary principles of the Western political debate: the notion of diplomatic etiquette and the notion of democratic legitimacy. The speaker implies that diplomatic etiquette no longer applies to a legitimately elected democratic leader when the democratic process results in the election of a traitor. The question arises why a cautious speaker like Jared Taylor denies the political leader of Europe’s most powerful country status and legitimacy. It is clear that the times when good citizens were lining the pavement and waved their little flags for visiting foreign statesmen are over. But many in the audience still needed some time to part with the old notions of ‘friendly heads of state’ and ‘democratic leadership. They may be helped by a wise aphorism: It is shameful when a foolish youngster fails to guard his tongue, but it is elevating when, after many years, a wise elder speaks out (Nikolás Gómez Dávila). Jared Taylor’s words came as a relief to all those that have long repressed their desperation about the fatal course that Western leaders have set for their peoples. This repressed sentiment is akin to the desperation of the passengers of flight United 93, who on ‘9/11’ finally decided to storm the cockpit. Now that the leadership of the West has turned out to be a hostile elite, it cannot come as a surprise that the peoples of the West are turning to emergency procedures. But for the young people of the West it is not enough that they feel themselves to be finally understood by an elder leader: they also need to understand the precise nature of the treason involved. To understand this, they need insight into the worldview of the Western hostile elite and into the origins of this worldview: this is the key to the Betrayal of the West. Young Western people are now only familiar with authentic Traditional identities (ethnicity, class, community, family, vocation) and authentic

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Traditional values (religious duty, national honour, governmental responsibility, civic duty, civil behaviour) in a negative sense: they can now only reconstruct these identities and values by inverting their experience of their role models (politicians, teachers, idols, fathers). Instinctively all young Western people know that they have been betrayed. Their identities — ethnicity, class, gender, vocation — have been ‘deconstructed’ in Cultural Nihilist programs of globalization, mass-immigration and feminization. Their heritage — material assets, workers’ rights, social security, education, culture — has been sacrificed to baby boomer privileges, neoli­ beral deregulation and affirmative action priorities. Their future has been fatally compromised because the baby boomer hostile elite has delegated effective power to institutions that are located beyond the reach of democracy. Economic power has been delegated to a cartel of international banks and multinational corporations, abstractly represented as ‘free market’ and ‘international competition’. Political power has been delegated to a cartel of transnational institutions, abstractly represented as ‘European Law’ and ‘internatio­ nal treaties’. Within these parameters, young Western people will never be able to come to grips with the issues that determine their future. The greatest of these issues are global climate change, technological transhumanism, ethnical replacement and social implosion. Within the present parameters of institutio­ nal power and public discourse even the most sincere attempts at reform — ‘environmental sustainability’, ‘labour market reform’, ‘regula­ ted immigration’, ‘social policy’ — are doomed to degenerate into cynical political rhetoric. For young Western people acceptance of such political marginalization equals the acceptance of a legacy of unlimited liability: it would doom them to lifelong debt slavery. The only exit from this impasse is an intellectual counter-deconstruction of the entire Cultural Nihilist discourse. Here Traditionalist doctrine offers an escape route: Traditionalist doctrine exposes the historical fallacy of the Cultural Nihilist ideology: it exposes the intellectual and psychological roots of the Betrayal of the


West. Only such a counter-deconstruction can open the way to preventing, combating and reversing the Decline of the West. The Decline of the West, dramatically realized in the great revolutions, world wars and civil wars of the 20th Century, is a function of the clashing forces of Modernity and Tradition within and between the European peoples, embodied in different states and empires at different times. Western history has now deprived these antithetical forces of much of their impetus — the postmodern socio-economic, cultural and geopolitical vacuum testifies to their ‘mutual annihilation’. For the first time after a century-long downward slide, now the possibility of an upward reversal presents itself: the vicious circle of thesis and antithesis may be broken. A cultural and intellectual space is opening up for a synthesis — a synthesis of Modernity and Tradition that Traditionalist symbolism identifies as the ‘Golden Dawn’. In theory, at least, this offers the European peoples, now facing the nadir of the Crisis of the Modern World, a possibility of re-inventing themselves and of gaining a place for themselves in the future. History will not repeat this opportunity to surmount the Betrayal of the West — it is up to the young people of the West to grasp the significance of this last chance.

1. The Eurasian project At last, it may be that Russia pronounces the final Word of the great general harmony, of the final brotherly communion of all nations... — Fyodor Dostoyevsky. The Traditionalist discourse is the oldest and most reliable weapon available to the young people of the West in their struggle to deconstruct Cultural Nihilism — which is the foundational premise of the Decline and Betrayal of the West. About this discourse more will be said shortly. Except for a theoretical (intellectual, ideological) alternative to Cultural Nihilism, however, also a practical (geopolitical, socioeconomic) alternative is needed. The theoretical discourse of Cultural Nihilism is implemented through a practical program: the thalassocratic Atlanticism based on American superpower, since 1991 better known as the

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‘New World Order’. The fall of the Soviet Union resulted in a unipolar geopolitical reality in which this New World Order was able to raise its Cultural Nihilist foundation myth to the status of a global standard discourse. Historically this new monopoly of Cultural Nihilism coincides with the intellectual closure of the Traditional School, founded by Guénon, Coomaraswamy and Schuon and ending with Hossein Nasr). This means that Traditionalist discourse has been sidelined and confined to the academic and esoteric margin. But the institutional marginalization and public near-invisibility of the Traditionalist discourse has also had a positive effect: it has cleansed it from any residue of academic political correctness and tactical dialectical compromise. Traditionalism has been reduced to its core identities: metahistorical worldview, metapolitical discourse and apolitical hermeneutics. This makes Traditionalism a stable reference point for all those that seek to dismantle the New World Order: Traditionalism can serve as a gauge and a measure: it can serve to theoretically evaluate and validate practical alternatives. During recent years the escalating crisis of Western Modernity has permanently alienated an entire generation of young Western people from the New World Order: its dominant discourse of Cultural Nihilism is increasingly experienced as totalitarian and anachronistic. This has resulted in a phenomenal growth of an ‘alternative’ and ‘identitarian’ movement, thus far undefined and uncoordinated. Thus far, the only philosophically coherent ideology that has been formulated within this movement is Archeofuturism. Thus far, this movement has failed to formulate a sustainable geopolitical strategy. Archeofuturism however, does provide a possible point of departure through its affiliation with Eurasianism. In the same manner that Cultural Nihilism is practically implemented through thalassocratic Atlanticism, Archeofuturism seeks an alternative to the New World Order by explo­ ring Eurasianism. Thus, it is worth exploring the degree to which Eurasianism provides a realistic geopolitical strategy for the rising resistance movements of the West. In this re-

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gard, Traditionalism provides a useful research model because Eurasianism incorporates many Traditionalist ideas. A Traditionalist evaluation of Eurasianism can determine to what degree it can remedy the crisis van Western Modernity and if it offers a viable alternative to the New World Order. It is important to determine to what degree Russo-centric Eurasianism is compatible with Western realities and to what degree it has geopolitical applicability to the Western peoples. For the sake of brevity, the ‘West’ will here be defined as that part of the European peoples that spend the entire 20th Century outside the cultural-historical ‘refrigerator’ of Communism and that was thus unremittingly exposed to the full force of Modernity. This ‘West’ includes the peoples of Western Europe and the overseas Anglosphere — these peoples have been hit hardest by Cultural Nihilism. The following Traditionalist evaluation of Eurasianism aims at a cultural-historical ‘diagnosis’ of the Western peoples. This diagnosis should determine whether or not the Western peoples are at all able to undergo the ‘therapy’ of Eurasianism. Every Traditionalist cultural-historical analysis is by definition holistic and in this case, it requires a multidisciplinary approach for which the required assembly of instruments is far from complete. Even so, some basic outlines are already detectable. Religiously, the Cultural Nihilist discourse of the post-war baby boom generation –reaching its absurdist extremes now that the hostile elite has discarded its mask — is a false doctrine of subhuman (satanic) origin. Sociologically, it is a sub-rational modality of habitus. Psychologically, it is an egosyntonic syndrome that excludes the possibility of objective self-analysis. Even these rudimentary outlines make it clear that is only possible to speak of true ‘betrayal’ in a retroactive sense. The terms ‘organized treason’ and ‘deliberate conspiracy’ can only apply to the very highest echelons of the global hostile elite. This does not alter the historical liability of the hostile elite as a whole, but it does give an indication of the varying degrees of penalty applicable to its constituent parts. A future


reckoning in terms of ‘lessened responsibility’ and ‘limited accountability’ will depend on the final historical balance of Cultural Nihilism, but if a minimum of Western civilization is salvaged from the wreckage, it is reasonable to expect that most of the hostile elite will end up in asylums for the insane and rehabilitation clinics rather than in prison cells or in front of firing squads. But irrespective of the manner in which the hostile elite is relegated to the dustbin of history, the question remains to what degree the Cultural Nihilist discourse has infected the masses of the European peoples. The ability of the European peoples to undergo a Eurasian ‘therapy’ ultimately depends on the degree to which they have absorbed and internalized Cultural Nihilism — and on the degree to which they have developed a natural resistance to it over the course of the last decennia. The result of the Betrayal of the West will depend on the answers to these questions. More concretely formulated, these questions are: how deep does the Betrayal of the West run — and why? First and foremost, the survival of the escalating Crisis of the Modern World — a crisis which is hitting the Western heart of Modernity first, deepest and hardest — demands a radical intellectual and existential shift. The first shift that is required is an irreversible transition from inner hyper-individualism and outer cosmopolitan universalism to inner community-identity and outer supra-national corporatism. Only on this basis can the European peoples be expected to achieve the collective will and the collective power that are required from them if they want to survive the approaching crisis of European history. The second shift that is required is a final abolition of reactionary hyper-nationalism. A hyper-nationalistic program, such as that of the Third Reich, may result in spectacular gestures, but it is doomed to failure in the face with the quantitative resources of the New World Order. Eurasianism may provide a geopolitical framework for a collective approach: it is the logical central element of a ‘boreal alliance’ of all the European peoples. For the sake of brevity here the ‘European peoples’ will be defined in semi-linguistic terms as all peoples of Indo-


European, Basque, Finno-Ugric and (North, South and East) Caucasian descent. Such a ‘boreal alliance’ obviously extends to the entire overseas Anglosphere and it finds its natural allies in the Indo-European peoples of West and Southern Asia, but it falls or stands with its geopolitical central element: Eurasianism. The realization of the Eurasian project depends entirely on the willingness and ability of the European peoples to proceed with the above-mentioned shifts. The historical Betrayal of the West is the root problem: the inner Cultural Nihilist betrayal opens the gate to the outer enemy. The Cultural Nihilist betrayal is effectuated by inner division: the stra­ tegy of divide et impera is operative within as well as between the European peoples. Within each people estates, classes, generations and genders are set up against each other through the ‘deconstruction’ of authentic identity and through the ‘competitive’ procedures of hyper-democracy. The European peoples are set up against each other through manipulated historical ‘rivalry’ and through artificial diplomatic ‘prestige’. This refined manipulation exploits the many psychohistorical traumas of the European peoples. The successful realization of the Eurasian project depends on a successful neutralization of these traumas. The unity that the Eurasian project requires of the European peoples is only possible after a transparent historical analysis and a final resolution of historical traumas, most importantly those caused by the Second World War. A collective cultural-historical Vergangenheitsbewältigung and a psychohistorical settling of accounts are basic preconditions for snuffing out the Betrayal of the West. A fully validated Eurasianism requires an honest account of the Hellstorm that 20th Century history brought over the West. The unresolved past and the unrecognized injustice of this Hellstorm mean that the old divisions between the European peoples will continue into the 21st Century. These fatal divisions are eagerly exploited by the great enemy of all European peoples: the global hostile elite of high finance, multinational corporations, Cultural Nihilist academia and Social Justice Warrior media. This global hostile elite

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has opened the gates of the West and is now inciting the non-European peoples to an ultimate all-out assault on the West. The inability to learn from the Hellstorm of 20th Century history condemns the European peoples to a repetition in the 21st Century: Hellstorm 2.0. Only learning the lessons of Hellstorm 1.0 offers them a chance to survive Hellstorm 2.0. History will not forgive the European peoples a second time.

2. Hellstorm 1.0 Scipio, when he looked upon Carthage as it was utterly perishing and in the last throes of its complete destruction, is said to have shed tears and wept openly for his enemies. — Polybius It is worth considering Jared Taylor’s qualification of German Chancellor Merkel as the ‘greatest traitor of the West since Ephialtes’ from a Traditionalist perspective. Irrespective of the questionable notion that a woman can ever objectively experience herself as a ‘traitor’, the fundamental issue at stake is the true nature of the being and work of Merkel. These can only be grasped with a proper understanding of the German Götterdämmerung of 1945: Merkel personifies the posttraumatic schizophrenia of the human residue that remained on the territory of the former German state after the dissolution of German identity. Like all ‘New Germans’ born after Stunde Null, she is existentially conditioned by the deepest caesura known in Western history. Stunde Null is the historical ‘black hole’ that separates the hyper-identitarian Third Reich from the militantly nihilistic New World Order. Whereas Merkel’s predecessor Helmut Kohl, sworn into the Hitler Jugend during the Führergeburttag at Berchtesgaden, could still barely claim the Gnade der späten Geburt, but Kohl’s Mädchen is already an entirely unsuspected product of the post-war regime. Whereas Kohl still had to cautiously steer a course between the prewar generation and the post-war occupation, Merkel is already able to proceed full steam ahead towards the final destination of the ‘Federal Republic’: ‘Anti-Germany’. The direction of this project is explicitly expressed in

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the self-destructive discourse of the hostile elite: anti-nationalist political ‘Europeanism’, anti-identitarian social ‘humanism’ and anti-traditional cultural ‘Americanism’. The final destination of the ‘Anti-Germany’ project can be deducted from statistical reality: economic tributary status (Wiedergutmachung, ‘reparations’, Euro-related sovereign debt liabilities, ‘development aid ’, ‘asylum facilities), demographic sui-genocide (negative birth rates) and enforced Umvolkung (ethnic replacement through mass immigration). This Anti-German ‘Federal Republic’ is the deepening black hole at the heart of Europe — the German Chancellor guards its psychohistorical ‘event horizon’. There is a total taboo on what existed before Stunde Null and the usurious mortgage of the past is eating up the German present as well as the German future. As in the 19th Century, so again in the 21st Century, the centerpiece of European civilization is Germany — but now in a perversely inverted manner. Bismarck’s Second Reich was Europe’s geopolitical heavy-weight, its guide in science and technology and its treasury of art and culture — now Merkel’s ‘AntiGermany’ is Europe’s geopolitical dead heart, its heart of Cultural Nihilist darkness and its open door to terror and barbarity. Against this background, it is clear that stabilization of the black hole of ‘Anti-Germany’ is the urgent task of the Eurasian project: Germany is the engine of European Cultural Nihilism and the resulting geopolitical vacuum constitutes a fatal mortgage for Europe’s present and future. Only an intrepid time travel across the event horizon of Stunde Null — a direct Vergangenheitsbewältigung — can cure the blind madness of German and European Cultural Nihilism. One of the elements that fell into the black hole of Germany’s unresolved past was the wife of Merkel’s predecessor Helmut Kohl, Hannelore Kohl: shortly before ‘9/11’, she chose eternal sleep. Her personal history symbolizes the Werdegang of Merkel’s ‘AntiGermany’: her story gives a direct account of German history that renders superfluous many shelves of censored ‘revisionist’ history books. Until the day, far off in the future, when


the assembled historians of Eurasia decide to write down the Truth nobody can know what was the true extent of the atrocities that have recently been reconstructed by writers such as Giles MacDonogh (After the Reich 2007) and Thomas Goodrich (Hellstorm 2010). But one thing is certain: they cannot be allowed to reignite the mutual cycles of hate and revenge that have drawn in the European peoples during the 20th Century. The personal history of Hannelore Kohl knows no hatred and no revenge — only silent suffering and despairing death. In the hopeless final battles of the German Götterdämmerung she was one of the hundreds of thousands of German women and girls that had to empty the bitter cup of Totaler Krieg till its last dregs — in 2001 she took the last sip of her own free will. The American air force had destroyed Leipzig and the parental house — the family is evacuated to the countryside, but is overtaken by the Red Army. Nobody has recorded how many soldiers outraged the twelve-year-old girl before she is ‘throw out of the window like a wheat bag’. Recorded posthumously was the broken life that resulted from those last hours before Stunde Null: the lifelong pain from spinal injury, the psychosomatic suffering that ended in extreme photophobia, the panic attacks around normal things such as the smell of garlic and alcohol — and the sound of the Russian language. The language of Pushkin and Tolstoy may have become unbearable because of the Soviet soldiers, but the Soviet generals let the soldiers do what they did and the Soviet politicians let them go unpunished. And then there were the German ‘men’ that ‘survived’: the German soldiers that did not fight to the death, the German generals that surrendered and the German politicians that went to parley with the enemy. After the Wende Helmut Kohl again went to parley — to redeem Hannelore’s Heimat. Nearly all European peoples suffered deeply during the 20th Century — one day this suffering may be fully quantified and qualified, but it can never be justified. The two world wars, the great revolutions, the great civil wars, the Red and the Black Terror, de decolonization wars — all their victims demand appropri-


ate remembrance and all their lessons must be learned. None of the European peoples is without reasons for hate and revenge. But the European peoples can no longer afford to sit in judgment on each other if they want to survive the coming Crisis of the Modern World: divided they will fall and only in unity can they remain standing. To resolve these hate and revenge complexes, it is useful to look at 20th Century history in a new manner. Looking back across seven decades, what can be seen is no longer an incoherent series of separate revolutions, wars and civil wars, but rather the outline of a single conflict. From a Traditionalist perspective this historical complex — the forty years between the First Russian Revolution of 1905 and the destruction of the Third German Empire in 1945 — appears as a single, comprehensive ‘European Civil War’ between the forces of Modernity and Tradition. The last phase of the conflict, otherwise knows as the ‘Second World War’, clearly shows its essential character as a civil war. In those years millions of soldiers fought on the ‘wrong side’. More than a million Soviet citizens fought against the Soviet government. More than fifty thousand Dutchmen fought for the Axis powers: between 1941 and 1945 more Dutch soldiers died on Soviet soil fighting for Germany than died during the 1940 Dutch campaign against Germany. The author belongs to the small Dutch nation: he is not able and not allowed — and does not want — to sit in judgment on the historical claims and ‘guilt’ questions of the greater European nations. He can only see parallels in Dutch history: even the small Dutch nation, supposedly peacefully prospering between its dikes and windmills, has reasons for hate and revenge. Aside from the burden of four centuries of overseas (colonial, South African) history, the Dutch nation also carries the burden of 20th Century European history. There is still latent hatred against Germany, which tried to quickly wrangle its way out of a two-front war by destroying Rotterdam (May 1940 — 900 dead) — five days of Blitzkrieg were followed by five years of terror, genocide and plunder. There is still latent resentment against America and England for the mis-

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directed bombings of Nijmegen (February 1944 — 800 dead) and Bezuidenhout (March 1945 — 500 dead). But perhaps ‘Nijmegen’ and ‘Bezuidenhout’ allow the Dutch people a degree of empathy with the German people, which during the same years suffered Allied ‘carpet bombings’ on an incomparably larger scale. If the 56 bomber planes and 67 tons of bombs of ‘Bezuidenhout’ caused 500 dead, made 20.000 homeless and rendered large parts of The Hague uninhabitable for many years, then what was the effect of 800 bomber planes and 1,8 million tons of bombs — only during the first night of the Allied campaign against Hamburg (July 1943)? The chilling numbers of the German Götterdämmerung escape human comprehension: during the Second World War, more than 67 million tons of Allied bombs were dropped on Berlin alone. Scientific analyses and statistics are useful and necessary, but they are wholly inadequate when it comes to measuring the depths of the tragic European Civil War: this measure can only be achieved by personal acts of witnessing, such as that of Hannelore Kohl.

ished terror, plunder and mass rape — this time perpetrated by an intentionally encouraged invasion of ‘refugees’. Again the acceptance, the suppression and the impunity of the rape of the nation — this time by a female leader who stands up for the perpetrators. Instead of taking a poison capsule in a bunker, Frau Merkel ends up on a ‘selfie’ with the enemy. This is the psychohistoric black hole in the heart of Europe — Solzhenitsyn’s words clarify its origin:

Because, of all the Western people, the Russian people has suffered longest and most during the ‘Western Civil War’ it is fitting to also consult a Russian witness. Alexander Solzhenitsyn, an officer in the Red Army during the Soviet invasion of East Prussia, was arrested in February 1945 on charges of ‘anti-Soviet propaganda’. During the following years of imprisonment and forced labour he wrote the long poem Prussian Nights — there he writes not only about the Russian revenge for Tannenberg, but also about the Russian war crimes that he witnessed in East Prussia. Solzhenitsyn’s witness account proves that the Russian people is its own best judge. His words, implicitly dedicated to hundreds of thousands of Hannelores, accurately mirror the images of Hellstorm 1.0 that have settled in the German psyche. Is it conceivable that these images — half-repressed, half whitewashed — unconsciously impel the German Chancellor, the childless matriarch of emasculated ‘Anti-Germany’, to the masochistic exercise of Hellstorm 2.0? Is this the self-enforced repetition of history in a perversely reversed ‘role play’? Again unpun-

3. The Fall of the West

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Zweiundzwanzig, Hoeringstrasse. It’s not been burned, just looted, rifled. A moaning, by the walls half muffled: The mother’s wounded, still alive. The little daughter’s on the mattress, Dead. How many have been on it? A platoon, a company perhaps? A girl’s been turned into a woman, A woman turned into a corpse. It’s all come down to simple phrases: Do not forget! Do not forgive! Blood for blood! A tooth for a tooth!

Vae victis! Gli uomini e le rovine (1953) is the appropriate title of Evola’s Traditionalist review of the Western Civil War. He points out the unifying factor of the converging elements of domestic revolution, civil war and international conflict: the metahistorical conflict between rising Modernity and declining Tradition, cutting straight through all the European peoples. Evola surveys the cultural-historical ruins that remain after the inevitable victory of Modernity and he warns the survivors of defeated Tradition against illusory political activism. This year sixty-five years will have passed since Evola’s review — in the meantime, the ruins of the old West have been cleared physically and the heritage of the European civilization has been psychologically covered over by a radical Modernist ‘Europe 2.0’. This ‘Europe 2.0’, implemented politically, monetarily and socially by the totalitarian EU superstate, has become the ideal laboratory of Modernity.


Here the remnants of the European peoples are subjected to the most sadomasochistically bizarre forms of vivisection: demographic sui-genocide, ecocidal hyper-consumerism, militant secularism, ochlocratic hyper-democracy, institutional matriarchy and cultural oikophobia are the most poignant results of this historically unprecedented Umwertung aller Werte. The sheer scale aside, from a macro-historical perspective there is nothing new under the sun: this is the natural winding up of the legacy of the West. The universal patterns of defeat and downfall are self-evident. The fall of Carthage in 146 BC meant that men died in battle, that the city was destroyed, that the ground was salted and that the women and children were sold as slaves. The fall of Jerusalem in 70 AD meant that its Temple was destroyed, that its walls were torn down and that its inhabitants went into exile. The Fall of the West in 1945 meant that the victors could dispose of the land, the property and the people of much of the West — this is the ancient right of the victor, still incorporated in international law through the principes of uti possidetis and ex factis ius oritur. But since that time the Fall of the West has also overtaken the ‘victors’ of 1945. For France and England, the pyrrhic victory of 1945 was merely a prelude to the final liquidation of their empire and their great power status. For Russia the dearly-bought victory of 1945 was followed by an impossible — costly, prolonged, lonely — stand-off with the global power of the Anglo-Saxon thalassocracy: the resulting economic bankruptcy was followed by the fire sale of the Soviet empire in 1991. After a short moment of euphoria, even the final remaining Western superpower, America, is now proving to be subject to the geopolitical laws of ‘imperial overreach’. In spite of all its overblown rhetoric and saber-rattling, American superpower has been fatally compromised. The overstretched American armed forces and the prohibitively expensive (inefficient, corrupt) military-industrial complex may still be able to execute short tactical interventions on behalf of the transnational interests of high finance, but the only true credibility they retain now rests solely on the all-or-nothing op-


tion of nuclear Mutual Assured Destruction. Astronomical debt and accelerated de-industrialization are sure symptoms of the implosion of American superpower. Thus, the official victors of 1945 have now effectively joined the official losers of 1945: they are now collectively subject to the historical mechanisms of the Fall of the West. The themes and symptoms of the downfall of civilizations are universal. The cults and ideologies of Western Modernity are bankrupt: Italian and German Fascism was forcibly eradicated; Russian Communism and Western European Social Democracy have abolished themselves; Anglo-Saxon Neoliberalism will die out with the baby boomers. Western property is being sold off everywhere: the Western colonial empires, including the Soviet empire, have been decolonized; the Western industries have been shipped overseas; the Western peoples have fallen into debt sla­ very through ‘budget deficit’ and ‘consumer credit’ and Western inner cities and artworks have been sold to Arab oil sheikhs and Asian business tycoons. Western women are being handed over collectively: West European girls are made available through the mechanisms of the ‘dating site’, the ‘sex industry’ and the ‘grooming gang’; Russian women are flown over to the brothels and harems of the Near and the Far East; North American women are encouraged to ‘interracial dating’ by movie stars and marketing strategists. Western knowledge and culture are canceled: education is ‘internationalized’; science is ‘valorised’; museums are ‘commercialized’; art collections are ‘privatized’. The public and ideological discourse of the European peoples is adjusted to these realities — it is calibrated to fit the final destination: the Fall of the West. This is the core functionality of Cultural Nihilism: it is a slave discourse — the self-destructive discourse of the cowards that survived the Fall of the West. Psychohistorically the Cultural Nihilist discourse can be explained by the collective post-traumatic stress syndromes of the defeated European peoples. The unmistakable symptoms can be understood as adaptive strategies at both the individual and the col-

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lective level. They vary from the standard symptoms of mental escapism (materialist focus, hedonistic consumption), cognitive dissonance (structural denial, irrational aggression) to collective ‘Stockholm Syndrome’ (Social Justice Warrior activism, oikophobic ideology) and acute masochistic depersonalization (sexual aberration, suicidal addiction). The public discourse of institutionalized schizophrenia is not merely aimed at repression the traumatic past, but also at incorporating the equally traumatic present. This public discourse underpins the authority and policies of the hostile elite: it is the cornerstone of the Betrayal of the West. A discourse of demophobia and xenophilia represses the betrayal of nation and country. A discourse of feminism and ‘gender neutrality’ represses the betrayal of women and children. The Fall of the West and the Betrayal of the West necessarily complement each other: this is the double reality that the young people of the West have to face.

4. The light of Traditionalism Ich habe über viele Jahre um Licht und Sonne gekämpft — leider vergebens. [Many years I have fought for light and sun — unfortunately to no avail.] — Hannelore Kohl Now that the Second World War is disappearing behind the event horizon of living memory, a new generation is facing the formidable challenge of deconstructing the mythological discourse of the old generation and reconstructing the censored facts. After the death of the war generation and the end of the victors’ discourse, the young people of the West are confronted with an apparently impossible dilemma. On the one hand they instinctively recognize the need to respect the sacrifices that their ancestors made for their peoples. On the other hand they rationally recognize that the net result of these sacrifices has created a world that is now past its expiry date in every respect: not only materially (economically, ecologically), but also immaterially (socio-culturally, psychologically). The young generation, heirs to globalization and eurocracy, lacks not only a protected national home but also a protective international order. The

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apparent impossibility of a realistic alternative is the most important reason for the persistence of the increasingly unbearable Brave New Babyboomer World. But a cleansing of the Augean stables of Western ideology can no longer be postponed: the ideological and political delusions of the past seven decades must now end. A cleansing of the Cultural Nihilist legacy of the baby boomers will result in a political-philosophical tabula rasa on which a new generation can write new solutions for the formidable problems it is facing. The realpolitik combination of national identity and international reality, ideologically and politically sabotaged by the baby boomer hostile elite, must have the highest priority. The survival of the Western peoples during the approaching ‘world state of emergency’ depends on their ability to unify in the face of shared challenges and shared enemies. On the one hand, young Western people are forced to re-invent their own ethnic, social, cultural and historical identities. The formation of a politically nationalist and socially conservative génération identitaire is a basic survival strategy in the poisonous aftermath of the fifty years long Cultural Nihilist ‘harrowing of hell’. Above all, a reconsideration of authentic identity requires an exact inventory account of the pathogenic legacy of the baby boomers. The toppling of the power structures of Cultural Nihilism — the neoliberal regime of high finance, the hyper-democratic dictatorship of the consumer proletariat and the anti-nationalist tyranny of the New World Order (UN, IMF, NATO, EU) — requires the deconstruction of its founding discourse. The effective elimination of these outer structures is a sine qua non for the survival of the Western peoples and for the survival of all authentic forms of identity everywhere, but this elimination can only take place after an inner transformation. On the other hand, young Western people are forced to find realistic alternative answers for the great international questions of the day. First, there is the irreversible heritage of a historically unprecedented interconnection between all peoples of the world: the precarious geopolitical balance between the nuclear


states, the vulnerable machinery of economic globalization and the delicate 24/7 information culture of the World Wide Web — these are its most sensitive elements. Added to these questions are the threats posed by escalating global climate change, technological transhumanism, ethnical replacement and social implosion. The risks inherent in these converging processes and their complex interaction demand a high degree of supranational consciousness as well as a realistic practice of international Realpolitik. Young Western people cannot afford the luxury of regressive experiments with outdated ideologies (libertarianism, communism, fascism) and unrealistic ideals (national autarky, mono-ethnic purism, social paleoconservatism). That does not mean that everything within these ideologies and ideals must be rejected out of hand because they are too extreme by the standards of contemporary political correctness — it merely means that they are not extreme enough as remedies for the approaching world crisis. The realities of the approaching world crisis are such that they require an entirely new worldview, a worldview that sublimates and surmounts all preceding ideologies and deals. This new worldview — a new meta-political discourse — can incorporate useful elements from preceding ideologies and realistic practices from preceding ideals, but what is truly required of the resulting synthesis is synergic value. An effective solution to this dilemma — the combination of recovered national identities with a new international power ba­ lance — and a fundamental acceptance of a new meta-political discourse are only possible after a correct assessment of the depth and urgency of the impending world crisis. The threats presently facing the Western peoples, separately and collectively, must be recognized for what they truly are: existential and direct — there is no longer any choice and there is no longer any time. Four specific threats are about to converge in a Hellstorm 2.0 of apocalyptic proportions: global climate change, technological transhumanism, ethnic replacement and social implosion. Western mankind is facing the ultimate test of Western


history without any protection. Without historical identity and communal solidarity, it is retreating from biological reproduction and cultural transmission — the results are fatal demographic implosion and self-hating cultural relativism. Without social and personal identity, it is withdrawing from civic duty and work ethics — the results are hyper-individualist ‘disaster capitalism’ and unrestrained hedonist materialism. Without sovereign states and ethnic solidarity, it is retreating from mili­ tary duty and political responsibility — the results are ‘open borders’ and barbarian invasions. Without religion and a natural sense of justice, it is retreating from divine and human law — the results are collective narcissism and social implosion. From a Traditionalist perspective the impending ‘age of consequences’ simply represents the historical final settlement of Western Modernity: Western humankind is approaching the terminal stage of a decades-long degenerative process. Escalating global climate change follows from de-naturalization and materialist hedonism. Escalating ethnic replacement follows from an exclusively materialist focus and a feminine anima. Escalating social chaos follows from matriarchal hyper-democracy and collective narcissism. The only way that the Western peoples can survive the existential threats of Hellstorm 2.0 is through a total mobilization of all disposable material and human resources, but these can only be effectively applied after a precise analysis of these threats. In Hellstorm 2.0 the four elements of global climate change, technological transhumanism, ethnic replacement and social implosion are intricately linked in a dynamic mechanism of biocultural feedback loops, much like a tropical cyclone is made up of the combined elements of hurricane wind, cloudburst and storm surge. A reali­ stic approach to Hellstorm 2.0 demands a thorough study of this dynamic mechanism as well as a careful calibration of policy responses. Traditionalist thought can contribute to the study of the anticipated trajectory of Hellstorm 2.0 and the preparation of appropriate countermeasures. In the same manner that a thorough meteorological analysis and

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an effective disaster plan can assist in coping with a superstorm, a Traditionalist analysis can assist in coping with Hellstorm 2.0. Every authentically Traditionalist perspective is based on transcendental reference, giving it meta-political validity. The supra-ideological transparency and the meta-historical deep perspective that Traditionalism offers can contribute to a collective, all-Western preparation for Hellstorm 2.0 — and to the defusing of those recent rivalries and those present conflicts of interests that prevent collective measures of self-defense against the greater threats of Hellstorm 2.0. A Traditionalist perspective teaches that the existential threats of climate change, transhumanism, ethnomorphosis and social atavism are the logical end results of the dynamic cultural histo­ rical mechanism of Modernity, effectuated through the bio-cultural feedback loops of materialist-technological, socio-economic and epi-genetic adaptation. It should be noted that Traditionalism explicitly rejects exclusively-materialist notions of evolutionism and determinism: this is why Traditionalism never defines authentic identities — ethnicity, caste, gender — in exclusively biological-physical terms (compare Evola’s holistic definitions of ethnicity and gender). In the final analysis, Traditionalism assumes these identities as spiritual-mental and biological-physical conditions in equal measure — this why the term bio-cultural feedback loops is used here. At a sub-intellectual level, the feedback loops of Modernity are reflected in the socio-cultural processes of hyper-individual ‘freedom’, hyper-democratic ‘equality’ and hyper-materialist ‘progress’. At an intellectual level they are reflected in the political-philo­ sophical discourse of the ‘Enlightenment’: nihilist secularism, historical materialism and cultural relativism. All conventional models of contemporary politics — above all the dominant neoliberal model — are fully embedded in this Enlightenment discourse, and thus within the immanently-referential worldview of Modernity. To think that politically-correct contemporary ideologies can offer structural solutions to the catastrophes that follow from Modernity is logically absurd. An effective

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fight with the plagues of Modernity is only possible after the deconstruction of the intellectual modalities imposed by Modernity. Traditionalism offers a transcendentally-referential worldview that is larger than Modernity and that allows its catastrophes — its symptoms — to become rationally treatable. Rational analysis and rational action, however, are only possible on the basis of authentic instinct and authentic intuition. An accurate assessment of the true depths of the approaching world crisis is therefore only possible on the basis of an accurate understanding of the meaning of Hellstorm 2.0. In this regard, Traditionalism is of inestimable value, because it is fully geared to the distillation of meta-historical meaning from historical phenomena. From a Traditionalist perspective meta-historical meaning follows directly from the degree to which macrocosmic transcendental ideals are, or are not, reflected in microcosmic immanent reality. Traditionalism offers instruments with which to measure the discrepancy between these two. The instruments of Traditionalism set standard values in all spheres of human thought and action: in religion, politics, economics, social relations, culture and art. Traditionalism proceeds from the absolute polarities that govern the human condition, symbolically expressed in binary identity oppositions: light-dark, heaven-earth, spirit-matter, soul-body, male-female. This implies that meta-historical meaning is embedded in a dual reality of (sub-human) biological evolution and devolution and (super-human) metaphysical ascent and descent. The contemporary hermeneutic value of Traditionalism rests on its ability to (partially) restore the human capacities for experience and knowledge, capacities which have been severely degraded by Modernity. By rephrasing universal polarities and binary oppositions in modern scientific terms and by projecting these terms on the historic trajectory of modern ‘progress’ Traditionalist hermeneutics can dislodge the entire Modern epistème. Thus, Traditionalist hermeneutics allow renewed access to the meta-historical meaning of the approaching world crisis: it renders it again rationally accessible to modern humankind — at least in


part. This meaning is inevitable lacking in the historical materialist categories of the Modern epistème because it resides mostly above the exclusively rationalist and utilitarian categories of Enlightenment thought. It is the task of critical thinkers to extend and supplement these categories. Classical Traditionalist concepts in this direction are René Guénon’s crise du monde moderne, Carl Schmitt’s Ausnahmezustand and Julius Evola’s regressione delle caste. Recent alternative concepts are Peter Sloterdijk’s anti-genealogische Experiment der Moderne, Guillaume Faye’s archéofuturisme en Jason Jorjani’s World State of Emergency.

5. ‘Take Shelter’ And I looked, and behold a pale horse: and the name of him that sat on it was Death, and Hell followed with him. — Revelation 6:8 From a Traditionalist perspective it is unavoidable that the full meta-historical meaning of the approaching world crisis remains intellectually inaccessible and politically elusive as long as Modernity prevails as an existential modality. In this respect, Traditionalist thought can offer a solution because within the Traditionalist epistemological framework not only scientific insights, but also artistic reflection and religious prophecy have their rightful place. In those instances that rational comprehension fails in a downward direction, modern man must rely on the enigmatic cryptomnesic and hierophanic elements that sporadically assist him in the modern arts — to the extent that his existential condition already allows him to grasp their essential meaning. An example of contemporary art with direct relevance to the Hellstorm theme is the recent movie Take Shelter (Jeff Nichols, Amerika, 2011). This movie can be interpreted as a symbolic expression of a collectively-subconscious ‘premonition’ of the approaching Hellstorm 2.0 — a ‘warning’ of what will happen when contemporary man relies exclusively on modernist interpretation and defusing strategies.


In those instances that rational comprehension fails in an upward direction, modern man must rely on the ancient prophecies that are creating increasingly sinister echoes in mo­ dern reality — to the extent that his existential condition still allows him to endure their essential meaning. By offering a synthesis of scientific insight, artistic reflection and religious prophecy the Traditionalist method offers a holistic approach to the Crisis of the Modern World: it renders the coming of Hellstorm 2.0 cultural-historically meaningful as well as psychohistorically tangible. Thus, an authentically Traditionalist analysis is valuable in an effective meta-political preparation for Hellstorm 2.0: it allows for a sharpening of intellectual analysis and a calibration of instinctive reaction. 6. ‘Helter Skelter’ And [the angel] opened the bottomless pit; and there arose a smoke out of the pit, as the smoke of a great furnace; and the sun and air were darkened by reason of the smoke of the pit. — Revelation 9:2 On 19 November 2017, in California State Prison, Corcoran, occurred the death of Charles Manson, schizophrenic-paranoid cult leader, ritual mass-murderer and self-declared prophet of Helter Skelter. For young people this Sixties’ figure may be of limited historical interest — his pop idol status faded after he had spent half century in detention and after his feats of arms had been dwarfed by ‘Jonestown’ and ‘Waco’. After the incorporation of ‘slasher’ pornification and ‘senseless violence’ in the standard discourse of the cultural mainstream, Manson’s Helter Skelter may appear somewhat outdated and puny. Still, there are unexpected ways in which Manson remains an important icon of contemporary Western Modernity. Two aspects of the life and works of Manson are especially noteworthy: first his pioneering role in Sixties’ Counter Culture — the embryonic stage of Cultural Nihilism — and second his symbolic significance. In this sense, Manson represents an archetypal expression of the institutionalized schizophrenia and the collective narcissism

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that psychohistorically underpin the discourse of Cultural Nihilism. The culminating point of Manson’s activism coincides with the high point of the Counter Culture movement (1967-69): these are the years in which the historical direction of baby boomer ideology was settled. Manson’s Helter Skelter project represents not only a logically consistent and puritanically purified application of Cultural Nihilism, but it also represents a serious attempt to realize the Christian Apocalypse. His aim, a merciless race war and the destruction of the white race, was inspired by a schizophrenic combination of radical nihilism and religious inspiration (a sublimation of American racial guilt complexes, projected on the Christian eschatological vision). His method, viz. the manipulation of interethnic libido trajectories and sadomasochistic compensation mechanisms, realizes the ultimate malignant-narcissist ‘freedom’ of Modernity. His early ‘propaganda of the deed’ places Manson in the historical avant garde of Cultural Nihilism. In the same manner that the terror of Narodnaya Volya provided the psychohistorical basis for the Red Revolution in Russia, so the Helter Skelter of Manson provides the psychohistorical basis for Hellstorm 2.0 in the West. In this regard, it is important to note that the 19th Century Russian resolution of the psychohistorical discharge of Modernity, characterized by intellectual courage and literary inspiration, is still highly relevant to a correct diagnosis of 21st Century Western realities. The radical nihilist program of Chernyshevsky’s What Is to Be Done? (1862) and Nechayev’s Catechism of a Revolutionary (1869), psychologically elaborated in Dostoyevski’s Notes from the Underground (1864) and Demons (1872), provide valuable insights in the psychohistorical dynamics of the same nihilism that feeds Hellstorm 2.0. But it is essential to note the structural inversion in the perpetrator-victim-beneficiary relation that takes place between the Russian nihilistic terror and the American Helter Skelter. During the terror of Narodnaya Volya a real intelligentsia elite (a) attacks the political exponents (b) of the traditionalist establishment to lift up (c) the repressed people (d) for the

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sake of a secular ideological program (e). But during Helter Skelter, an anti-intellectual hostile elite (a’) attacks the cultural exponents (b’) of the modern establishment to destroy (c’) the free people (d’) for the sake of a religious millenarian program (e’). The Russian nihilist terror involved a rationally coherent political program aimed at social-economic emancipation, but the American Helter Skelter involves the sub-rational and atavistic realization of oikophobic-demophobic sui-genocide. Europe is located between the extremes of the Russian-Traditionalist and AmericanModernist anti-podes, in a sliding scale from the Intermarium (the East European inner circle) to the Atlantic Rim (the West European outer circle). The different psychohistorical positions of (parts of ) Eastern and Western Europe with regard to the American-Atlantic and Russian-Eurasian antipodes is accurately reflected within the contemporary EU, which is witnessing a revolt of the moderately-modernist Visegrad block against the extreme-modernist Brussels regime. It is important to remember that the soulless of Merkel’s ‘Anti-Germany’ is located exactly at the dead center of this gravity field. An accurate prognosis of the West’s Hellstorm 2.0 can benefit from a forward projection of the psychohistorical trajectory that is implied by Manson’s Helter Skelter program. Although phrased in mythological terminology and based on visionary hallucination, Manson’s program contains a number of key concepts that can expose the psychohistorical dynamics behind the realities of contemporary Cultural Nihilism: the political program of neoliberal globalization, the totalitarian eurocracy and the neo-kalergian Umvolkung. First, there is the aim of Helter Skelter: the destruction of its own (American) people, of its own (white) race and of its own (Western) civilization. These explicit aims of Helter Skelter are mirrored in the implicit aims of the political programs of current Cultural Nihilism. Second, there is the method of Helter Skelter: genetic ‘outcrossing’ through exogamy (pattern: whites as wife-givers and non-whites as white-takers), complemented by evolutionary ‘cropping’ through


genocide (pattern: whites as φαρμακός and non-whites as invidia). Again: these explicit strategies of Helter Skelter are mirrored in the implicit strategies of current Cultural Nihilism. Examples of implicit but effective strategies aimed at the exogamic exclusion of white males are econo­mic demotion through xenophile and feminist ‘affirmative action’, social exclusion through matrifocal divorce and custody laws and cultural marginalization through matriarchal childrearing and educational practices. Examples of implicit but effective strategies at white (sui-)genocide are ethnically selective natalist policies through culture-blind abortion and child support legislation, ethnic cleansing (‘white flight’) through culture-blind tolerance of criminality and harassment and — last but not least — ethnic replacement through mass immigration. The final stage of this dual exogamic-(sui-) genocidal strategy, implemented through hyper-democratic sanction, formal legalism and pathological-altruist indoctrination, will be demographic inundation — where necessary hastened through mass murder disguised as common criminality (as in South Africa). From a Traditionalist perspective these developments are necessary effects of the downward psychohistorical dynamics of Modernity, especially of feminization. The post-mo­ dern Western public discourse is now wholly dominated by irrational and unrestrained matriarchal impulses: emotional instability, outgroup altruism, unstructured resentment and sadomasochist lasciviousness. Feminization is a cornerstone of the power of the Cultural Nihilist hostile elite: it is the basis of its Helter Skelter 2.0 project. This foundation was laid at the same time that Manson dedicated himself to his Helter Skelter 1.0 project (1967-69). These were the glory years of ‘second wave feminism’: the formative years of the baby boomer hostile elite — including its most notorious activist citizen, Hillary Clinton. Two aspects of the Helter Skelter 2.0 project are dangerous in a special manner. First, there is the emotional-subconscious and de irrational-implicit nature of its foundational


discourse. This discourse excludes rational argumentation and thus creates a totalitarian consensus, guarded by the Never Sleeping Eye of the Orwellian New World Order, enforced by hordes of rabid Social Justice Warriors and covered by the ‘international treaties’, ‘European law’ and ‘anti-discriminatory legislation’ of the Western ‘legal’ order. Second, there is the slow-motion executive practice of the Helter Skelter 2.0 project, which is a multi-generational project relying on failing inter-generational cultural reproduction. The slower this executive practice, the more certain will be its result. In the same way that the Manson Family of Biblically Elect had the illusion that they could survive Helter Skelter 1.0 in the ‘bottomless pit’, so the Cultural Nihilist hostile elite assumes has the illusion that it can weather the coming Hellstorm in the well-deserved comfort of their gated communities. But in this respect it will be sorely mistaken: quos Deus vult perdere, prius dementat. In any real race war only one thing counts: the self-defined group. In the race war that the Helter Skelter 2.0 project contributes to Hellstorm 2.0, there will be only one real sanctuary: the living citadel of the ethnic group. The question arises, however, if the Western peoples can still survive the downfall of their hostile elite in a historically recognizable form. To survive Hellstorm 2.0 the Western peoples will have to re-think the definition of what constitutes their ‘own group’ — what it still is and what it can be again. They will also have to consider the need for collective defense. The time has come for the Western peoples to consider the option of a shared Eurasian project.

7. The Eurasian citadel A new name, its roots to antiquity tracing, As great as Thermopylae, all fame embracing, A name to wipe shame away, with its plain truth Smashing to smithereens calumny’s tooth. — Ivan Vazov The preceding comparison of the Russian Narodnaya Volya and the American Helter Skelter has yielded a number of important

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Traditionalist benchmarks. These benchmarks clarify the acceleration of socio-cultural regression between mid-19th Century and mid-20th Century America: it is a regression which now threatens the existence of the entire Western world and by extension the entire modern world. But these benchmarks also clarify a cultural-historical law of ‘inhibiting progress’: the Crisis of the Modern World has hit ‘backward’ Russia earlier than ‘progressive’ America and this results in a limited historical ‘immunity’ for the Russian soul with regard to the impending Hellstorm 2.0. Here it is impor­tant to note the word soul: the body will remain susceptible to earthly destruction — And fear not them which kill the body, but are not able to kill the soul; but rather fear him which is able to destroy both soul and body in hell (Matthew 10:28). Historically, Russia was the last exile seat of the Roman Empire (the ‘Third Rome’) and the last refuge of the Orthodox religion — it is increasingly likely that it will also be the last citadel of Western civilization. The meta-historical fate of Russia is self-evident: geographically it covers the heart of the World Island and historically it has suffered the cruelest test of Modernity — faute de mieux it is the Last Katechon. Eurasianism translates this meta-historical reality into the geopoli­ tical realm. From a Traditionalist perspective Eurasianism, therefore, has the potential to be more than a mere Russian geopolitical tactic: it can be a survival strategy for Western civilization as well. In terms of simple Realpolitik Eurasianism may be beneficial for Russia, but a truly Traditionalist Eurasianism will come at a high price to Russia. A Traditionalist Eurasianism will recognize Russia’s high vocation as the Last Katechon, but this will also obligate Russia to fulfill the fullest Christian calling: self-sacrifice. If Russia accepts this vocation and if it is willing to pay this ransom, it must prepare for total war with Modernity. In this ‘Last War of the World Island’, which is also the ultimate Hellstorm of Western civilization, Russia will have to be the citadel of Western civilization. In this constellation, the Western peoples will eventually turn to Russia. Within these peoples, a Traditionalist intellectual re-armament will eventually lead to a Eurasian geopolitical orientation. This requires a radical

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shift in consciousness and an intellectual revo­ lution — the taming of Atlantic Modernity and the destruction of thalassocratic geopolitics. This new course can only be expected from a new generation: the West’s rising génération identitaire. The Eurasian Camelot must first be built in the hearts and souls of the young people of the West. It is well-known lesson of history that the sons must pay for the sins of the fathers — this also holds true here: the young people of the West are forced to drink the poisonous cup of history to its bitter dregs. From a Traditionalist perspective it is inevitable that the survivors of the fall of a civilization are caught in the historical void of degenerated old visions and immature new visions. The young people of the West are forced to surmount the bankruptcy of the Western past and to accept the debt payments of the Western future. But exis­tentially and intellectually they can fall back on the ultimate citadel of Western civilization: Traditionalism. Eurasianism is the only geopolitical project that remains compatible with Traditionalism — in theory, it can even topple the entire complex of Cultural Nihilism, thalassocratic-Atlantic Modernity and the New World Order. A Traditionalist Eurasianism is the only viable geopolitical project that may still prevent the West as a whole from committing the ritual suicide that the Helter Skelter 2.0 project of the Cultural Nihilist hostile elite has in store for them. In theory, this project offers opportunities for global and coherent strategies to cope with all aspects of this ritual suicide: ecocidal climate catastrophe, transhumanist extinction, sui-genocidal ethnomorphosis and social implosion. From a meta-historical perspective a Traditionalist Eurasianism is the only remaining option — the ‘standard argument’- of the West in a collective sense: it is the last remaining collective strategy to cope with Hellstorm 2.0 and the postmodern age of consequences. There are other options — arguments and scenarios — but these are not collective. Perhaps some of the Western peoples — or rather parts of these peoples — can still survive individually, but others cannot. Some potshards may be preserved, but the vase of Western civilization will break.


The modalities, ideas and ideologies of Western Modernity are finished. The three major political philosophies of Western Modernity — the First Political Philosophy of Liberalism, the Second Political Philosophy of Socialism and the Third Political Philosophy of Fascism — have passed under the horizon of Western history. It is conceivable that some elements of these philosophies — to the extent that have proven therir historical value — may contribute to a synthetic Fourth Political Philosophy: in that case, the countless sacrifices that the European peoples have made to Modernity will not have been entirely in vain. Examples of such elements may be: a limited free market and limited civil rights (Liberalism), a public sector and workers’ rights (Socialism) as well as organic corporatism and ecological holism (Fascism). A sped-up articulation of a Fourth Political Philosophy to cope with Hellstorm 2.0 is of the essence. It is highly unlikely that the European peoples will be granted more than a brief respite before Hellstorm 2.0 hits them with full force — one or two generations at most: this is the proverbial quiet before the storm. A Fourth Political Philosophy informed by Traditionalism can serve as the intellectual and ideological foundation for a Traditionalist Eurasianism — together they can offer a citadel in which the European peoples can weather the impending fury of Hellstorm 2.0. But a realistic assessment of the trajectory and intensity of Hellstorm 2.0 are essential when deciding on the architecture of this foundation.

8. Hellstorm 2.0 Aloft all hands, strike the top-masts and belay; Yon angry setting sun and fierce-edged clouds Declare the Typhon’s coming. Before it sweeps your decks, throw overboard The dead and dying — ne’er heed their chains Hope, Hope, fallacious Hope! Where is thy market now? — Joseph Turner Surviving the impending Hellstorm 2.0 and the resulting ‘hour of the wolf’ demands an accurate assessment of its four most dangerous elements — the ‘Four Political Realities’ of


the postmodern world. Despite the litany of diversions and assurances put out by Western governments, academia and media, it is now close to certain that the present trajectories of these four realities — global climate change, technological transhumanism, ethnical replacement, social chaos — are about to converge into a catastrophic end scena­ rio. This imminent convergence of industrial ecocide, technocatastrophe, demographic inundation and social anarchy reflects not only the old Indo-European mythological motive of the Götterdämmerung. It also reflects the old Christian eschatological motive of the Apocalypse: And the four angels were loosed, which were prepared for an hour, and a day, and a month, and a year, for to slay the third part of them (Revelation 9:15). The survival of the European ‘third part’ of humankind demands not only a thorough analysis of the Four Political Realities, but also a sincere re-evaluation of these old motives. Any Eurasianism that transcends geopolitical opportunism will have to combine this analysis and this re-evaluation. (1) Global climate change is the most elementary threat facing the European peoples — some scientific scenarios are already predicting a full-scale climate catastrophe. It is as good as certain that the confidential files of the best-informed decision-makers contain disturbing scientific data and forecast models concerning anthropogenic climate change: the content of leaked reports and whistleblower testimonies indicates that numbers and projections leave little room for complacency. At the same time, escala­ ting artistic visions of the ‘climate question’ indicate a subliminal but tangible societal unease: in 2004 The Day After Tomorrow still drew a romantic borderline at the Rio Grande, but in 2017 Geostorm already threatens with a straightforward extinction level event. It is as good as certain that neither scientists nor policymakers would benefit from publishing indigestible projections. In any case, Cultural Nihilist policy dictates that the immediate interests of the adults always prevail over the long-term interests of the children. Thus, it is quite possible that the baby boomers, in their

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role as all-consuming avant garde, have not merely initiated ‘climate change’, but that they have also deliberately instigated an authentic ‘climate apocalypse’. In this regard the life motto après nous le déluge takes on an entirely new meaning: it constitutes the baby boomer par excellence. At least those few people that still take the Book of Revelation seriously can prepare themselves — for the great consumer masses, taking refuge in secularist escapism, there will be a very rude awakening. The global reality of anthropogenic climate change demands a global response. The illusionary policy slogans of the Cultural Nihilist hostile elite — ‘climate goals’, ‘emission ceilings’, ‘green strategies’ — are long past their expiry dates. The delay tactics that the Atlantic New World Order has implemented on behalf of the ecocidal multinationals are no longer tenable. The articulation of effective climate policy is a basic task of the Eurasian alternative. In the final analysis, the functionality of national infrastructure — from the Dutch dikes to the Russian railways on the Siberian permafrost — and the efficiency of national emergency systems — including the dams that protect London, Venice, Rotterdam and St. Petersburg — depend on global climate dynamics. National security policies are already directly influenced by changing climate patterns. Even now, changing precipitation patterns are forcing British and Dutch policymakers to adopt new agricultural and urban strategies. Even now, melting pole caps are forcing American and Russian policymakers to develop new energy and defense strategies. In this regard, an effective Eurasian climate strategy can be of inestimable value: it may preserve (some of ) the boreal habitat of the European peoples. An effective push-back of outdated consumption patterns, as well as the accelerated development of new technology and infrastructure, would benefit from supra-democratic authority and supranational coordination. The geographic depth, natural resources and technological knowhow of Eurasia allow for collective strategies of unprecedented scope. The strategic depth, economic autarky and technological prowess of a collectively operating Eurasia make it likely

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that the European peoples would survive even a climate catastrophe. A collective approach to new challenges — new settlement areas, new shipping routes, new business ventures — can even lead to unsuspected growth and prosperity. From a Traditionalist perspective a Eurasian climate strategy is not only valuable as a viable alternative to the ecocidal practices of neoliberal globalization, but also as the basis for a new global ecological balance. The holistic ecological vision of Traditionalism stipulates a restoration of the original boreal biotope of the European peoples: a relatively sparsely populated region, with rich biodiversity and space for natural landscapes. In such a biotope semi-autarkic urban centers, eco-technological infrastructure and pristine nature can be combined: it will be a place where culture and nature are once again in balance. The restoration of the boreal biotope and a re-arrangement of the Eurasian space are elementary preconditions for the physical, psychological and spiritual resurrection of the European peoples: access to wide spaces and pristine nature are basic conditions for the European peoples to flourish. (2) Technological transhumanism is a much less know, but potentially equally serious threat. In the same way that global climate change constitutes an existential threat to the natural habitat of the European peoples, technological transhumanism constitutes an existential threat to their natural essence. The technological developments that stem from the materialist functionalism of Modernity are already pushing humanity across the threshold of a transhumanist future. Eugenic and reprogenetic technology is already a fact of life and moving in the direction of an ‘algenetic’ manipulation of basic biological characteristics such as phenotype, gender and intelligence. Scientific revolutions in cybernetics and bioinformatics are already creating biotechnological applications and artificial intelligence. Systematic studies of parapsychology and controlled experiments in psychotronics are already advancing ‘scientific occultism’. In combination with the escalating Cultural Nihilist deconstruction of all Traditional forms of human identity


(ethnicity, gender, age) these developments are opening the apocalyptic perspective of a technological realization of the ideological projects (‘postgenderism, ‘posthumanism’) and the narcissist ‘alternative realities’ (‘egoextension’, ‘ego-theism’) of postmodern Cultural Nihilism. The uncontrolled development of transhumanist technologies under the Cultural Nihilist regime of the New World Order poses an exis­ tential threat in the most fundamental and essential sense of the word. This threat is most acute for the European peoples because these peoples are the primary target of the Cultural Nihilist hostile elite and because, as a whole, they are most directly exposed to modern technologies. The creation of a regulating framework for these technologies is, therefore, a basic task of an alternative Eurasian order. From a Traditionalist perspective, however, a Eurasian technostrategy needs to do more than impose negatively-phrased regulating frameworks: it also needs to pursue positively-phrased policy aims. The incorporation of the holistic vision of Traditionalism would provide a Eurasian technostrategy with guidelines for research and experiment: such guidelines guarantee respect for basic notions of human dignity and for Creation as a whole. Such respect will always be lacking within a framework of secular materialism: under the continued regime of the Cultural Nihilist hostile elite it as good as certain that megalomaniac ‘sorcerer’s apprentices’ will eventually abuse modern technology. (3) Ethnic replacement presently constitutes the acutest threat to Western civilization: even if the human race as a whole survives global climate change and technological transhumanism, then still ethnic replacement will mean that the European peoples will not be among the survivors. Ethnic replacement — destruction of the European peoples and destruction — is the real aim of the Helter Skelter 2.0 project of the Cultural Nihilist hostile elite. Its underlying logic is as clear as it is ruthless. The European peoples have proven to be historically incompatible with Modernity, as it is defined by Cultural Nihilism: this is why they have to be mixed with and replaced by more mallea-


ble — less intelligent, less demanding, less self-conscious — slave peoples. The European peoples are demographically infertile under totalitarian dictatorship, they are economically unproductive in urban-hedonist stasis and they are politically unreliable in debt slavery. To the extent that the thoroughly-beaten and deeply-indoctrinated Western survivors of the 20th Century wars of annihilation and totalitarian experiments accept their fate — to the extent that they abolish themselves, mix themselves with mass-imported colonists or disappear in societal marginality — their diminishing presence may still be tolerated. From a Social Darwinist perspective their future is logically predictable: it is a future of ecological marginalization and biological extinction. From this perspective such future is, in fact, an ‘evolutionary necessity’: the ‘failed’ aberrations of the human race are being replaced by ‘better adapted’ varieties. With some luck, in the future the last remnants of the Western peoples may still be tolerated, much as the American Natives and the Australian Aborigines of today are still tolerated as shrinking cultural curiosities in remote reservations and slums, occasionally visited by a lost tourist or a bored anthropo­logist. It is much more likely, however, that the last remnants of the European peoples will be finished off by impatient and vengeful ex-colonial invaders from the Third World. Perhaps brave men may still hope for a heroic death, but there will be no Sparta to hear of their Thermopylae. But for beautiful girls there is no such hope: they will have to fully endure the sadistic revenge fantasies of the invaders. The ‘grooming gangs’ that flourish in the legal void of present-day ex-England are merely modest trial-runs for what history has in store for post-feminist European womanhood. It is ironic that the ‘best’ ethnic replacement scenario is actually the ‘Islamic scenario’. In spite of the loudly-voiced concerns of Western nationalists and populists, the Islamic scenario at least allows the European peoples the opportunity of physical survival. Mass conversion to Islam — politically opportune or otherwise — at least offers the perspective of biological survival within a basic structure of social order. The European survivors will experience

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life under a totalitarian theocracy, sustained by primitive collectivism, judicial cruelty and cultural leveling as a great setback in terms of civilization, but at least physical survival will still be an option. Much more drastic than the ‘Islamic scenario’ will be what may be termed the ‘African scenario’. A non-Islamic Umvolkung scenario is much less attractive, because it will lack all structure. In such a scenario the last Western peoples — islands of indigenous shipwreck survivors in a sea of abject barbarity — will have to survive in an ‘Africanized’ Europe. Because most Western people would not survive a year of ‘going native’ in Kinshasa or down-town Johannesburg it is necessary to briefly explain the words ‘abject barbarity’. In the ‘African scenario’ the economy will founder in falling productivity, institutional corruption and unbridled nepotism. Infrastructure will crumble under demographic overload, technological incompetency and political disinterest. Public order will crumble under failing law enforcement, ethnic violence and judicial chaos. In this scenario ‘political power’ is a contradictio in terminis: every pretended governmental authority will have to bend to the reality of hyper-democratic idiocracy. Government officials will mobilize the hunger and resentment of the demographic majority against ‘colour privilege’, a ‘privilege’ that is inevitable due to well-established ethnic differentials in labour ethics, social structure and resource planning. The mass killing of the Belgian population in Lumumba’s Congo, the legalized expropriation of the British population in Mugabe’s Zimbabwe and the politically tolerated genocide of the Afrikaner population in Zuma’s South Africa are only modest trial-runs for what awaits the European peoples in an ‘African scenario’. Before Europe lets itself be colonized by Africa it would be useful for Europeans to inform themselves about the sadistic and bestial perversions that surrounded the much-lauded ‘decolonization’ of Africa. Perhaps the most frightening answer to the question why young people in the West are not informed about these historical realities is that the malignant-narcissist hostile elite of the baby boom generation actually — consciously or unconsciously — wishes to subject their children and grandchildren to these perversions and bestialities.

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Halting and reversing the ethnic replacement must have high priority in the creation of an alternative Eurasian world order. The speed at which the Western peoples of the Atlantic littoral are being replaced is now so high that only a few decennia remain before these peoples will be minorities in their home nations. As long as the Cultural Nihilist ideology of the thalassocratic-Atlantic New World Order dominates public discourse throughout the West, any effective resistance against ethnic replacement is impossible. As long as the ‘populist’ and ‘libertarian’ patriotic resistance does not break with the political correctness discursive ‘frame’, and as long as they do not reject the hyper-democratic institutional ‘frame’, they are doomed to failure. Within the present parameters — the political practice of parliamentary democracy, the debate culture of the media cartel, the ideology of hyper-democracy — all attempts at a substantial reform of immigration policy will be futile. The ‘long march through the institutions’ is only suitable for Maoist ‘fellow travellers’: it corrupts, trivializes and vulgarizes. The only exit from this deadlock is a meta-political revolution that deconstructs the Cultural Nihilist discourse and delegitimizes the Cultural Nihilist institutions. This implies a top-down revolution, inspired by higher authority and expressed in higher identity. A Traditionalist Eurasianism can offer both: it can offer the higher authority of authentic charisma as well as the higher identity of authentic community. In concrete terms, these are: auctoritas based on a historical Ausnahmezustand and Volksgemeinschaft based on historical affiliation. A Traditionalist Eurasianist project must be aimed at a meta-political revolution that re-introduces these notions of authority and community. (4) Even if the threats of global climate change, technological transhumanism and ethnic replacement can be averted, then still the European peoples face a fourth existential threat, viz. social implosion. Cultural Nihilism, with its poisonous combination of militant secularism, neoliberal Darwinism and cultural relativism, has a fatal effect on all authentic forms of religious, ethnic, social and cultural identity.


The ‘deconstruction’ of these identities feeds the deluge of militant atheism, self-defeating oikophobia, atomizing anomie and collective narcissism that is rolling over the Western world. The visible increase of social chaos is simply the outer reflection of an invisible inner crisis of de-personification. The advance of social chaos may be greatest in America, which is the ‘guiding light’ of Western Modernity, but its symptoms are already visible throughout the entire West: hyper-democratic anarchy, ochlocratic mismanagement and idiocratic barbarism increasingly dominate the entire public space. The systematic deconstruction of all authentic forms of personal identity is externally institutionalized in matriarchic hyper-democracy, anti-nationalist legislation and xenophile ‘affirmative action’. Internally it is realized through subconscious conditioning (‘modern child rearing’), internalized cognitive dissonance (‘modern education’) and targeted subliminal manipulation (‘modern media’). The result is a self-reinforcing cycle of collective degeneration and individual psychopathology — the logical endpoint of this dynamic is social implosion. In the final analysis, it is this social pathology that is responsible for the existential threats of climate catastrophe, technological transhumanism and ethnic replacement. A healthy social organism does not destroy its own ecological niche, it does not experiment on its own vital organs and it does not tolerate parasitical hostile take-overs. From a Traditionalist perspective the coming of Hellstorm 2.0 is a necessary evil: the ultimate test of Western civi­lization has the meta-historical meaning of a purification of the Western peoples. Perverted Cultural Nihilism and degenerate Modernity must die in the collective mind of the West before the heart of the European peoples can start to beat again. This purification demands nothing less their spiritual re-birth. In this test, no exertion can be too demanding and no sacrifice can be too great. An essential teaching of the Western Tradition is the mors triumphalis: it stipulates that all those that those who commit themselves to the ultimate battle are certain of victory. A Traditionalist Eurasianism will have to practice this teaching.


A Traditionalist Europeanism will be able to direct the European peoples in the approaching inner struggle. At the heart of Traditionalism lies the sophia perennis and this Eternal Knowledge contains an irrepressible creative force: it is the power that lets the blind man again see the glorious dawn, that lets the crippled man again rise in youthful vigor, that re-ignites cold ashes into all-consuming fire. Thus, Traditionalist Eurasianism can lead the European people through Hellstorm 2.0 and guide them towards an unexpected resurrection. Provided it is led by a worthy Katechon and it is guided by Traditionalist values, Eurasianism has the power to resurrect authentic forms of identity in the European peoples: faith, ethnicity, estate, gender and vocation. This ability to reawaken the Western Tradition, still deeply buried under thick layers of theoretical treatises, political analyses and public debates, is of inestimable value. This secret fire, still deeply buried in the bosom of time, has the power to burn down the entire titanic project of Cultural Nihilistic Modernity.

9. Across the threshold of history aut viam inveniam, aut faciam In the face of the Four Political Realities of Hellstorm 2.0, young Western people could not be blamed for massively opting for escapism. But the remarkable lack of ‘communal engagement’ among post-babyboomers is essentially due to the great fire sale of all forms of community and identity by the baby boomers: the criticism of the post-babyboomers by the baby boomers is nothing more than a transparent outward projection of unsolvable inward guilt. Silently, the baby boomers are counting on the continued societal disengagement of the post-babyboomers: such disengagement is an absolute precondition for the continued existence of the Cultural Nihilist New World Order. The postmodern Western world is therefore fully geared to the propagation of escapism: except for the classic recipe of cognitive dissonance, nihilist materialism and soulless hedonism, there is now also a more accessible alternative: the virtual reality fantasy world of

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social media, gaming and infotainment. From a cultural-historical perspective these escapist facilities, plus a minimal level of material wellbeing, may be understood as a necessary ‘bribe’. The imminent self-abolishment of the historical ethnic communities of the West is a logical consequence of the baby boomers’ collective conversion to Cultural Nihilism, but the self-abolishing process can only be fully completed after the biological end of the baby boomers themselves. From a bio-evolutionary (ethnic, cultural-adaptive) perspective the baby boomers are still a product of the historical ethnic communities of the West and as long as they are alive the main pillars of these communities need to be kept standing. Only after the biological end of the baby boomers, these pillars can be finally discarded: nation-state, social hierarchy, church, academy, family. Until that time, a process of gradual reduction is necessary for the tactful and silent accomplishment of its ultimate aim. Until the final hour, the post-baby-boomers will be co-opted through a carefully calibrated combination of institutional pressure, intellectual deception and individual bribery. Thus, a significant number of post-baby-boomers have taken on the role of a Sonderkommando: they are assisting in the sui-genocidal process in return for a short respite and some small comfort. Thus, they are made to look away from the smoking chimneys, fed with the shrinking remnants of Western civilization. This ‘banality of evil’ is a universal phenomenon: absolute evil is imperceptibly transformed into a daily routine. In all young people, conditioned in collective cognitive dissonance and adjusted to the ‘inner exile’ of escapism, the econo­ mic pressure of the ‘labour market’, the social pressure of ‘political correctness’ and the psychological pressure of the ‘biological clock’ eventually complete the process. After some years of social conformity not only the energy and beauty of youth fade, but also the instinct and integrity of youth — after a few years the youthful certainty that ‘something is not right’ is inevitably lost among the many compromi­ ses by which one disqualifies himself mentally and morally.

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But young Western people should not entertain any illusion about the final destination of the self-abolishment project: the full menu of ‘palliative care’ will remain the exclusive preserve of the baby boomers. When the last baby boomer millionaire is finally disconnected from his respirator by his latest-import private nurse, the economic cake will be eaten. When the last baby boomer feminist leader finally hands over the keys of her ministerial safe to the first available ethnic replacement, the political farce ends. When the last baby boomer editor-in-chief finally turns off the light in the offices of the Lügenpresse, the last lights of Western civilization will be extinguished fo­rever. Then, finally, the Betrayal of the West will sink in — but then it will be too late. Western civilization is approaching its historical threshold and young Western people are facing a fork in the road: their choice is between the wide road straight down into the abyss, and the narrow path straight up to self-renewal. Traditionalist Eurasianism can be this narrow path. The final prospect this path will command, far above Hellstorm 2.0, is a new future and a new freedom for the peoples of the West.

10. ‘Za vashu i nashu svobodu!’ Throughout the years, the old Russian revolutionary battle cry za vashu i nashu svobodu may have been abused by ruthless ideologues and opportunistic traitors, but its content indicates very precisely what an idealistic Eurasianism may fight for: ‘for your and our freedom!’ It expresses the essence of the common struggle of all European peoples for a shared ideal. It unites two elementary principles: respect for distinct identity and loyalty in a common fight. The fact that ‘your’ comes before ‘our’ means that so much unites ‘us’, that ‘we’ are willing make reciprocal sacrifices. This battle cry summarizes and resolves the dilemma of the young people of the West: it conserves national identity, but it also announces a common struggle. It expresses the highest shared ideal of Western civilization: a confederation of related but sovereign peoples,


­ efined by shared values and common ened mies. The European peoples will only want to come together by their own sovereign choice. Only a carefully calibrated Eurasianism can their confederation be achieved. The battle cry ‘for your and our freedom’ is an invitation to many: aside from the peoples of Eurasia, it extends to the European peoples overseas — especially the nations of the overseas Anglosphere. In the final analyses, it invites all the European peoples to join a great boreal league. Beyond this great alliance, it also invites strategic alliances with the IndoEuropean peoples of the Iranian and Indian worlds: these peoples may be considered as carriers of civilizations and geopolitical stabilizers in the deep south of the world. In its widest sense, it even anticipates the restoration of the high historical calling of the European peoples as the collective Katechon of the World: protectors, lawgivers, educators and benefactors of the southern and eastern peoples. From a Traditionalist perspective, this calling is reflected in the mythical descent of the European peoples from immortal Hyperborea: their metaphysical exile on the World Island of Middle Earth implies a meta-historical leadership role with regard to all of humanity. This is the vocation of the Bringer of Evangelion, the Creator or Nomos and the Master of Techne. This notion is still preserved in the theme of ‘the white man’s burden’. In the Dark Age of Modernity this high calling has been inverted and perverted by slave-holding colonialism, thalassocratic imperialism and globalist exploitation. What the southern and eastern peoples truly resent in the European peoples, however, is not their original vocation, but their modern dege­ neracy. The southern and eastern peoples can only benefit from the European peoples’ continued adherence to their original vocation: it is the source of spiritual freedom, scientific endeavour, just laws, liberation technology and soothing medicine. From a Traditionalist perspective the Crisis of the Modern World has the meaning of a purification of the European peoples, ‘designed’ to make them return to their original vocation.


The fact that, before they can return to their original vocation, the European peoples are made to fall back on their ancient ancestral homeland in the heart of the World Island is of great symbolic significance. This historic retraite and symbolic penitence are elementary preconditions for a restoration of the European vocation. In the final analysis, however, the battle cry ‘for your and our freedom’ already points towards an exalted final aim: a global Pax Eurasiatica. From a Traditionalist perspective the final destiny of the Western peoples — either to dissolve in their psychohistoric nightmares, or to yet again witness a new Golden Dawn — entirely depends on their ability to re-affirm their own identities and interests before it is too late. From a Traditionalist perspective, howe­ver, real identities and interests are inextricably linked to an authentic vision of destiny — and there can be no authentic vision of destiny without transcendental reference. Thus, the highest Traditionalist perspective on the Eurasian project is necessarily a vision: a vision of unexpected resurrection. It is important to know that the Bolsheviks purposefully shorted the Russian battle cry za vashu i nashu svobodu: behind it can be found a longer Polish original, viz. w Imię Boga: za naszą i waszą wolność — ‘in the Name of God: for your and our freedom!’ May this incipit remind the European peoples that an authentic vision of the future can only be based on superhuman Divine Providence. May the young people of the West, wandering in the darkness of the Cultural Nihilist night, be granted the vision of a Golden Dawn. May they forget all that they have read here, if only they will remember this one thought of the and wise Solzhenitsyn: Over a half-century ago, while I was still a child, I recall hearing a number of old people offer the following explanation for the great disasters that had befallen Russia: ‘Men have forgotten God — that’s why all this has happened.’ Since then I have spent well-nigh fifty years working on the history of our revolution; in the process, I have read hundreds of books, collected hundreds of personal testimonies, and have already contributed eight volumes

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of my own toward the effort of clearing away the rubble left by that upheaval. But if I were asked today to formulate as concisely as possible the main cause of the ruinous revolution that swallowed up some sixty million of our people, I could not put it more accurately than to repeat: ‘Men have forgotten God — that’s why all this has happened.’

Summary: ten theses (1) The Betrayal of the West by its hostile elite can only be effectively countered by a fundamental deconstruction of its ideological discourse: Cultural Nihilism — and its foundational Modern (Enlightenment) epistème, characterized by nihilistic secularism, historical materialism and cultural relativism. Traditionalism triggers this deconstruction by exposing the historical shallowness of both: Traditionalism serves as a gauge and a measure. (2) The geopolitical power of the Western hostile elite, structured in a thalassocratic-Atlantic ‘New World Order’, demands a viable alternative. Through an idealistically supranational and Traditionalist orientation Eurasianism can provide such an alternative.

al void that follows the defeat of the European peoples. (5) From a psychohistorical perspective, the self-loathing discourse of Cultural Nihilism is a collective post-traumatic stress disorder, befitting peoples that are abused and held hostage. In all Western peoples the collective symptoms of schizophrenic pathology and cognitive dissonance are self-evident, but they are deepest in the people that were most profoundly defeated: the German people. The psychohistorical, cultural-historical and geopolitical void of contemporary ‘Anti-Germany’ is the ‘black hole’ of the West: this is why the history of Nazism is subject to doctrinal taboo throughout the entire West. (6) The recovery of Western national identities and Western geopolitical equilibrium depends on effective cultural-historical Vergangenheitsbewältigung and effective resolution of psychohistorical traumas. Until then, the Western patriotic opposition is reduced to ineffective ‘cosmetic nationalism’ and the Western hostile elite can continue to play off the European peoples against one another with ease.

(3) Given the emotional-subconscious and irrational-implicit nature of postmodern Cultural Nihilism the Western people can only enter into a new Eurasian configuration after a thorough cultural-historical Vergangenheitsbewältigung and a complete resolution of their psychohistorical traumas.

(7) The trajectory of Western Cultural Nihilism is aimed at self-destruction: the Helter Skelter project of Charles Manson, which coincided with the formative phase of Cultural Nihilism, may be considered an archetypal expression of the Cultural Nihilistic program of self-destruction: exogamy and sui-genocide. This program is at the root of negative indigenous demography and ethnic replacement.

(4) From a cultural-historical perspective, the self-destruction discourse of Cultural Nihilism is a slave discourse, befitting defeated and humiliated peoples. In the final analysis, the gra­ dual decline of the Three Political Philosophies of Modernity reflects the collective defeat of all European peoples: Fascism was destroyed with the fall of the Third Reich, Socialism was discredited with the dissolution of the Soviet Union and Liberalism is already foundering with the rapid decline of American hegemony. Cultural Nihilism is the spiritual and intellectu-

(8) In Russia the psychohistorical discharge of Modernity traveled a ‘premature’ trajectory: in Russia the mid-19th Century terror of Narodnaya Volya relates to the early 20th Century Red Plague in the same manner that the mid-20th Century Helter Skelter relates to early-21st Century Cultural Nihilism in the West. Thus, Russia has gained a degree of historical ‘immunity’ that allows it to fulfill the functions of the ‘Last Katechon’ — this will be the basis of an authentically Traditionalist Eurasianism.

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(9) Any Eurasianism that aims to be both Traditionalist in orientation and viable in terms of Realpolitik will have to come to terms with the Four Political Realities of the contemporary West: global climate change, technological transhumanism, ethnic replacement and social implosion. A viable Fourth Political Philosophy will have to relate to these realities in a synthetic and synergic manner. (10) Western acceptance of Traditionalist Eurasianism will depend on exorcizing Cultural Nihilist Modernity as an existential modality. This is the greatest ordeal awaiting the West’s génération identitaire, an ordeal during which it will look for the rise of a ‘Last Katechon’.


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INTERNAL CONFLICT, EXTERNAL BENEFIT 1. Once upon a time The internal situation in Spain has become well known throughout the world since mid-2017 due to the great attention in the international media to separatism in Catalonia. To put us in context, during the summer Enrique J. Refoyo of 2017 erupted the moment apparently more tense in Spanish internal Editor of the Spanish page of politics, as the Catalonian regional government intended, or to hold a think tank. referendum with which declaring independence or to declare independence unilaterally. On October 1st, 2017, a referendum was held in Catalonia (forbidden by the Spanish Constitutional Court) marked by two elements: The riots and police charges on the one hand, and on the other hand there were frauds in the vote where the voting was uncontrolled in ballot boxes and those were filled with votes even on the street, and even there was people who voted in different polling stations. Then, there were several episodes in the Spanish media with the Catalonian separatist politicians saying that they were going to declare independence unilaterally, but after they retracted, and in the end they did it behind closed doors, all to avoid the action of the Spanish judges. And on the side of the Spanish government, it seemed that the strategy was to wait and barely make movements. In the last months of 2017, several separatist politicians responsible for the declaration of independence ended up in Spanish prisons (by judicial order) or fleeing to other countries (such as Belgium or Swiss). And among all this internal mess, in the mainstream media of Spanish emerged the accusation against Russia for interfering in the Spanish internal politics to destabilize us. An accusation, like all the previous ones, based on only assumptions of internet where media reported the existence of hundreds of “bots” that became viral news about separatism in Catalonia. The key was to blame Russia for interventionist in Spain in any way, following the line of accusations of interference in elections (in the US, France, and other EU countries).

2. Problems to hide, strengths to cloud Maybe it’s because I tend to doubt appearances on political issues (especially in international affairs), it’s probably because again and again, things are not what they seem. Therefore, when all the mainstream media in Spain looked at the situation of separatism in Catalonia, and forgot other important issues in domestic and foreign policy (such as education, health, pensions, as well as Spain’s position in the world), I do not stop thinking that something is hidden and something is clouded in all this scenario, premeditatedly. On the other hand, the supposed separatism in Catalonia has had numerous absurd moments, in which the separatist

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politicians threatened to take certain actions in pursuit of independence, but later they did not take them, or pretended to take them secretly after having publicly expressed their courage and his unequivocal decision to follow a separatist course; meanwhile, the politicians of Spanish government said they were going to take actions to stop the secession but in the end these politicians were hiding behind the action of the courts, or they took actions that left the members of the Spanish government as even more useless politicians. For all this, this staging so similar to a combat of “American wrestling”, where the apparent blows are never real blows, but everything is choreography and the result of the battles is fixed in advance, makes me think that we are facing another political-media staging, another staging more, since in the last decade (2000) for example, we started with the “Ibarretxe plan”, to achieve the independence of the region of Basque Country. Interestingly, at the same time that the moment of nationalist-separatist Basque tension ended in 20042006, a new wave of nationalism-separatism began in Catalonia (which lasts until today). As a result, these last 20 years we have witnessed a constant internal Spanish problem, which is undoubtedly the result of events between 1978 and 1998, when Spain began a new democratic political stage, marked internally by the creation of two political groups: Nationalist-separatists political parties and the “constitutionalist” political parties. Each party side had its areas of influence within Spain and the system worked as long as the central government (regardless of which political party) ceded more state powers to the nationalist-separatist side, but in turn the “constitutionalist” side also made his own regional fiefdoms. Therefore, each side always tried to set up its own network of territorial spoil system, and in this way they consolida­ ted a fixed sector of voters. Let’s also look at a world map to locate Spain in the world and you will quickly see its very important geographical position. It is the door of the western Mediterranean, with exit to the


center of the Eastern Atlantic; key point of passage between Europe and Africa, and between America and Europe. With two archipelagos: Balearic Islands in the Mediterranean and Canary Islands in the Atlantic; and in addition, with two cities (Ceuta and Melilla) and diverse rocks in the north of Africa. This is undoubtedly a pivotal position in the world, which could place us in a key place of world maritime trade, and also a militarily strategic position to control (or weaken, depending on the case). Due to these geopolitical conditions, there are two US military bases in the area of the ​​ Strait of Gibraltar (naval base of Rota, and air base of Morón de la Frontera, opened in 1953, in the south of Spain). And also there is the Gibraltar Rock, occupied by the British since 1704 (this is currently a British naval base and also used by Americans). It is worth noting a relevant fact, due to the North African cities of Ceuta and Melilla are not in the protective umbrella of NATO, the Spanish government allowed the stopover of Russian military ships in the port of Ceuta, which always raised strong protests both in the British occupants of the rock, as in the Americans (even also in Catalonian separa­ tism, for example, in ERC). They thought that, it was very bad that Spain allowed the stopover of Russian warships in Ceuta. They say that this puts collective security at risk, and that makes one doubt the loyalty of Spain. But our allies in the United Kingdom and the United States do not think that it is wrong to leave Spanish North African territory out of collective protection. This is due to American and also French interests in Morocco. On the other hand, this situation seems the classic strategy of having always weakened and confronting their own “allies”, or more traditionally, “divide and rule”. Here appears a key point in the understanding of the internally debilitating events in Spain. Let’s put this hypothetical situation: If Spain were a cohesive and sovereign country, it could carry out a strong foreign policy, in the service of its own interests just as our NATO and EU partners put their interests ahead of the other partners (in spite of the discourse

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Graph made by the author over a Yandex map. In this image you can see between red circles the continental and insular Spanish territory, and the Mediterranean and Atlantic axes that surround it.

of values to which they usually allude). In this scenario, they put themselves (the United States and the United Kingdom) ahead of the welfare and collective security of the alliance that they are part of. Which should not surprise us either, this is the general tone of international relations, each country has its elite or its elites, and each one has their strategies in the world. Spain cannot have any foreign strategy of its own for two reasons: The constant existence of the internal debate (“What is Spain?”) promoted by nationalist-separatists (PNV, Bildu, PDCat, ERC, etc.) and by “leftist” parties that are absolutely anti-Spanish (Podemos, IU). The existence of “constitutionalist” parties (PP, PSOE, Ciudadanos), which claim to defend Spain but also weaken it, since they hide behind the 1978 Constitution as if Spain had not existed before, and always end up sacrificing Spain and the Spaniards by an order “from above”, or acting according to what most “calms down the markets”. Having such a weak base and always ending up in the debate: What are we?, where we go?, in this way, we could never develop a coherent and sovereign foreign policy. It should also be noted at this point, that all politicians who make up the major parties of the current

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political system, also have their personal inte­ rests (and then party interests) over any value or territory that they claim to defend. Politics in all of present-day Spain does not hold more values than personal (or party) profit. This has been very clearly seen in the case of Catalonian (and also in Basque) nationalism-separatism, whose claims a priori about identity are immediately calmed down with more financial resources or competencies from the central government. So it has happened since 1978 and the consequence is the spoil system. Thus, it has not been Russia who has intervened to weaken Spain. This was already made by our “constitutionalist” politicians over the past four decades. For example, with the delivery of education to the regional governments, each one invented its own histo­ rical narrative, accentuating certain periods or directly inventing historical facts to shape them to its current political discourse. In addition, all the regions created their own media, and this media together with the control of education are the fundamental pillars to modify and control public opinion in a territory. Basically, the central governments of the “constitutionalist” parties abandoned Spanish regions to the separatist-nationalists, and these “constitutionalists” never had a counter-story based on the history of Spain, but


they simply hid behind the legal framework of the Constitution of 1978.

3. Sovereign country, sovereign decisions Let’s put the hypothetical case that someday in Spain these internal discussions are overcome and there is a clear idea of w ​​ hat is Spain, and also the history of Spain is measured in millennia and not in decades. Where there is also a geopolitical awareness of the concrete position of Spain in the world. Then, there could be a general geopolitical culture where Spain sought its best accommodation in the world, knowing that we are a small State but with a very important geographical position. And from that base, develop our own regional strategies, as do all the other countries in the world, especially our partners in NATO and the EU. Up to this point, it would be nothing more than doing what our neighbouring partners do both in Europe and in North America. Could it bother our partners to do the same thing they do? If it bothers them, maybe it’s because they’re not our partners. For all the above-mentioned, it seems very obvious that among our current partners, we do not have many friends who consider us like an equal, but they think that we are their vassals and that we are always at their orders, even if those orders are against our own survival as a people and as a country. This is not a novelty either, because in the international arena only count the strong countries, and the weak countries finally are subjugated by political, economic, or military means. The Colonel of Engineers of the Spanish Army, Francisco Roldán y Vizcaíno, said in 1897: “It will be of little use to us to be neutral if we are not strong and we are not prepared to make ourselves respected by the belligerents”. And this is one of those historical truths that never change. Only force respects force. When a country looks at itself and asks itself at each step who it is, it cannot do anything continuous and coherent. Everything will be interrupted by your own questions, by your own doubts. This is a very important detail to understand what is beyond political theatre, both


in parliaments and in the media. Separatistnationalism is another geopolitical weapon of the great powers to internally weaken their rivals. For example, the most important nationalist-separatist parties in Catalonia (PDCat and ERC) are, in turn, the most supporters of capitalism and especially of NATO. But you can also see similar cases in other countries, such as the Kurdish case, which affects four countries: Turkey, Iran, Syria and Iraq. And the result in all four cases is a serious internal instability, which can be easily exploited by rivals of those countries like the US and Israel, to weaken or even fragment their target countries. There are also other similar cases, for example, in Pakistan with Baluchistan, in Uzbekistan with Karakalpakstan, in Russia with Chechnya and other Russian republics, in Argentina and Chile with the Mapuches, in Serbia with Kosovo (and Montenegro), etc. In all cases, in the sepa­ratist region there is always local elite who enjoys friendships and affections of Western countries such as the United States and the United Kingdom. And that elite of the separatist region always serves (at least) to weaken a geopolitical rival, and is usually accompanied by the existence of some important resource in the separatist region (apart from geographical position). In this way, we cannot forget that the existence of separatist-nationalisms, in many ca­ ses are “lead from behind”, by a rival country that seeks to weaken and destabilize internally other countries that consider targets, be it by geographic position, by natural resources, or by using them as an intermediary (proxy) in a struggle against their true objective.

4. Geopolitics of Spain, a proposition If the day comes when Spain does not debate internally about its integrity. If the day comes when politicians are at the service of the Spaniards and not at the service of markets and other foreign elites. If that day comes, then we can properly speak of a geopolitics of Spain. In this scenario, from a Spanish geopolitical perspective, we would have 4 main axes in geography and history:

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• Europe, since we are unmistakably Europe. Although I disagree with the current course of the Europe of the stateless merchants that represents the current European Union. A Europe of the future is a Europe united from its common culture, and united by its longing (towards the future) to become a world power, united, sovereign and secure. • Ibero-America, whose historical ties are still presents although from the US and the UK have always been and continue to be willing to sow hatred and discord between Spain and Ibero-America to create many weak and confronting states, which are easy to control from the capitalist elites in Washington and London. Within the framework of a united Ibero-America, and a united Europe, Spain and Portugal, would play the role of hinge between the two continents, with which our position would be even more strategic. • Mediterranean, to which by geographical evidences, Spain is also oriented and is affected by the problems that occur in this sea. Problems such as the current “refugee crisis”. Spain looks to the Atlantic and to the Mediterranean, as well as to the north and to the south — this is something we must never forget.

• Eurasia, mainly Russia and China. To those countries link us -a priori- commercial interests to create a large terrestrial economic network that connects Europe and Asia, as well as interests to diversify our sources of natural resources. And also, the idea of a multipolar world can be very useful to us, that is, a world based on multiple poles (each pole united by affinities of civilization) where there is no hegemony of a single pole over the rest. There would be a fifth axis, which it seems that Spain abandoned completely, and it is the African axis. So true is that Spain had colonies in the Gulf of Guinea as in the 1960s during the Franco regime, peacefully fulfilled its decolonization agreements there. Those places where Spanish language is still spoken in the center of Africa (Gulf of Guinea) can be a star­ ting point where Spain is present, but not to make an economic colonization similar to our European / North American partners or similar to China; it can also be a place to show that a strong Spain does not seek conflict or colonization, but unity, security and mutual welfare, without interfering in the internal politics of other countries. From this fifth axis could go out a branch or even a sixth axis: Philippines. Once was Spain and the Spanish legacy barely survives, and also are far from Spain and are currently in the midst of disputes between the

Graph made by the author over a Yandex map. In this image you can see between the red circles the continental and insular Spanish territory, and between green circles the 5 proposed geopolitical axes.

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US and China for the South China Sea, and the policies of encirclement and counter-encirclement that both great powers are performing in the area.

5. Conclusions Never rely on appearances, but compare the words with the facts. A common ploy is deception, the lure, to lead the target into a trap. In the field of international relations, are very common these stratagems of deception, with actions or statements made to confuse the target. The media are a powerful weapon of lures, since they affect the entire population that has access to this media, and in world of today, more specifically in the Spain of today, practically all Spaniards have televisions and smartphones. Likewise, in the media always is given priority to some news about others (even some are not mentioned), and there is also a framework, that is, a frame of understanding about the events that are mentioned in the media. This affects the knowledge of the target population about what happens in their environment and how they interpret these events.

without solution. It is normal, because immediately it is buried by other themes-decoy. The geographical position of Spain is also crucial to understand the importance of these internal divisions, as they will always weaken Spain’s position abroad. They will prevent us from having a sovereign policy, both internally and externally. They will prevent us from developing any idea of country and world other than the options offered by the current system. And again, it should not surprise us at all, since the importance of the motto “divide and rule” was already known from the ancient world. The dominant elites know their importance and therefore always put issues in the media that serve to confront the population, while safeguarding the interests of the ruling elites and increasing their benefits. This is something that can never be forgotten either.

The political discussions, very presents in the media, are for me a theatrical scenario, the representation of an immense work of mass distraction where people are angry and confronted by absurd and meaningless discussions of politicians who apparently are ideological rivals, but in practice are as bro­ thers: business brothers, brothers of funds in tax havens, brothers of corruption plots. This question of separatism in Catalonia has only served to distract and confront all Spaniards of Spain’s internal and external problems. Barely are mentioned other issues apart from the “separatist soap opera”, always relating it with its unexpected twists, its secondary plots. Everything as in any other television series. Currently the pension system is being discussed and the money will soon be exhausted, therefore, it shall increase the retirement age, and some people are still surprised that this important issue takes many years in debates


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João Franco

has a degree in International Relations and a post-graduation in Strategy. He is the director of Finis Mundi journal, a Portuguese language journal with focus on international affairs, geopolitics and metapolitics, and a researcher at IAEGCA, (Institute of Higher Studies in Geopolitics and Auxiliary Sciences) in Lisbon and is part of the editorial team of Revista de Geopolítica, Brazilian magazine with focus on Geopolitics. He has also done some translation work, including co-translating Alexandr Dugin’s Geopolitics of contemporary Russia into portuguese. He has published articles with several Portuguese and Brazilian magazines.

Almost entering the second decade of the twenty first century, we are on the brink of complex and powerful changes, with profound implications on the world’s political landscape. These changes have been caused by the globalization and the reactions that its spreading have caused all around the globe. The American empire does not seem likely to abdicate voluntarily of its grip on world destinies, despite the emergence of alternative powers being already on the horizon. Thus, the American government is using more and more destabilization tactics worldwide to try to delay what is inevitable. The USA still sees the Americas as its backyard and it is not willing to abdicate its influence on the neighboring countries, be it emerging powers or developing countries. Cuba’s regime survival, that seemed very unlikely when the USSR collapsed, is a reality that has its roots on the unique characteristics of the country. Having lost the supply of machinery, fuel and chemical products that came from the USSR, the Cuban regime had to improvise, converting the agriculture from conventional to organic and allowing some private entrepreneurship. Urban empty lots and gardens were also transformed to productive units of vegetables, the organoponics. The regime has survived despite the American sanctions, a usual strategy used by the USA, isolating a country to destroy it. The Bay of Pigs disaster dissuaded the USA from sponsoring another military adventure on Cuban soil and this surely help the preservation of the Cuban regime from the ‘60s until the present. We can also look at the Venezuelan regime to understand how the USA operates, many times with both open and covert subversive operations. Hugo Chávez tried to shift Venezuela from neoliberal capitalism to a socialist and patriotic regime. He wanted to reduce the poverty rate and illiteracy of the Venezuelan lower classes and create a real paradigm shift in the country. He developed a serious plan of Missions to start changing the Venezuelan society, and on the international level he sought to strengthen the ties between Venezuela and countries like Cuba, China, Russia or Iran, to create an alliance that could start contraposing the American global power. Heavily dependent on oil exports, the Venezuelan government failed to diversify the economy when oil prices were sky high, and after the death of Hugo Chávez a much more weaker and ill prepared Maduro had to deal with an opposition manipulated by foreigner powers, where we can feel the hand of CIA, and with decreasing oil prices, strangely or not orchestrated by OPEC, whose main member is Saudi Arabia, the government saw its sources of revenue diminish abruptly whilst the civil unrest

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grew. This abrupt fall of crude oil prices also affected other regional and world powers like Angola, Iran and Russia. In Brazil, the government of Lula da Silva, with some socialistic characteristics, which wanted to protect Brazilian natural resources, fell in a web of corruption and nowadays the Temer government seems to be willing to embrace neoliberal capitalism, privatizing companies and natural resources and despising the lower and middle classes. American companies have a growing presence at the Amazon basin, and in exploring the metal ore and oil resources of the Brazilian sea bed and underground. We can see that in the Americas it is business as usual, American companies and investors still have a hold of the continents richesses and know how to influence politically elections and politicians to obtain gains for themselves, whilst many citizens of those countries live in deep poverty. If the USA are still able to control the Americas, in other parts of the world the situation is not so clear. In the Middle East, we have seen the USA promoting a dubious and dangerous policy of supporting both Israel and Saudi Arabia. Israel has been suffocating for years the legitimate aspirations for a Palestinian state, whilst continues to build new settlements on Palestinian land. Israel also maintains the occupation of the Golan Heights, that is a crucial strategical point whose occupation prevents the normalization of the relations with Syria. We must also add that Israel has not hesitated in violating in recent times the sovereignty of Lebanon and Syria to attack with its air force targets perceived to be connected to Iran or to Bashar al-Assad’s government. Regarding Saudi Arabia, the USA has been supporting the Saud dynasty pretensions to domi­ nate the Sunni Middle East and counter the pretensions of any real influence from Shia Iran. These two countries are fighting proxy wars in Syria, Iraq and Yemen. In Syria the Saudis and their allies have lost ground and some divergences have emerged with Qatar, one of its major allies in the recent past. In Yemen, things are not much better for the Saudis. The Shia


Houthis, have taken more and more territorial gains, allegedly with Iranian support and also from the Lebanese Hezbollah. According to some sources, Qatar might have also supported the Houthis, hence the disagreements between Qatar and Saudi Arabia, that were able to create a near pariah status for the Gulf country, which saw several countries severe the diplomatic ties, whilst Qatar reestablished its own with Iran. The Saudi intervention was very ambitious and large scale, with tens of thousands of troops involved. It started in 2015 with the declared purpose of supporting the faction led by President Hadi on the ongoing civil war in Yemen. The intervention came as a request from the Yemeni government to its northern neighbor. The Saudi Arabia government tried to rally different Muslim countries to its intervention in Yemen, while also receiving support from NATO countries like the USA, which have sold billions in armament, but also the UK, Canada and Turkey. Djibouti, Eritrea, France and Somalia offered logistical support while UAE, Bahrain, Kuwait, Egypt, Jordan, Morocco, Senegal, Sudan, and Qatar until 2017, involved troops or aircraft. The coalition intervention started with an air strikes campaign that proved itself unable to stop the Houthis. Despite the technological advantages of the coalition, armed with some of the most powerful and modern weapons of NATO’s arsenal, the Saudis were ultimately forced to participate in a broader cease-fire, including the Yemen government, tribal militias and Al-Qaeda and subsidiary organizations, and the situation is tied. The Houthis have used ballistic missiles to target Saudi Arabian targets, namely SS-21 and Scud from Soviet era, and converting old surface-to-air SA-2 missiles to Qaher-1 surface-to-surface missiles. While trying to suffocate the emergence of Iran as a regional power, Washington is feeding the ambitions of Saudi Arabia, a dubious and impredictable regime that might escape American control as soon as the opportunity emerges. With China it is a completely different matter. China’s economy is set to get bigger that America’s economy soon, and that will have a

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profound impact in the USA’s power and influence in the world. The American workers have already suffered for years the effects of globali­ zation, with the delocalization of factories and some services to China, India and elsewhere. That loss of productive tissue will affect deeply America in the future. Not only jobs are lost, but economic influence. This is not easy to reverse on the framework of a market economy. Having been given total liberty to do whate­ ver they want, capitalist do what they please, even if that means ruining the economy of the country. Moving enormous amounts of money around the globe or speculating with various commodities is the Wall Street rollercoaster economy, that has proven to be dangerous for both citizens and governments. Taking facilities and know-how abroad is another way of undermining a country’s economy, and the USA and Europe by the way, have seen a lot of that. This emergence of China’s economy and other Asian economies like India and Vietnam comes also with costs, namely a huge increase in the consumption of fossil fuels and an immense pollution that makes Beijing or Shanghai dangerous cities to live due to health hazards. But together with the increase of its military expenditure, China seems to be preparing to create a co-prosperity sphere in the Pacific, like the one that Japan tried to create in the past century. The few things that stand in its path to regional supremacy are India and the USA and its allies in the region, Japan and South Korea. Nothing would give China more joy than to see the USA withdraw its troops from the Far East, it would be a victory for Beijing. It is not known to which extent China has influence over North Korea and can use it for a proxy war against the USA. For the time being, China is reinforcing its defensive capabilities but also developing extensively its air force and a blue waters navy, including aircraft carriers, which can allow the projection of forces far away from its territory, which is perceived as a menace by other countries at the China’s Sea shores, as Taiwan, Vietnam or the Philippines. Besides the countries that were referred that have potential to constitute poles of the future

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multipolar world, like Brazil, Iran and China, the project that is more cherished by many in Europe that are not fond of the liberal ideals propagated by the USA and the EU, is the idea of a Eurasian Union, truly a continental colossus from Lisbon to Vladivostok. Not only such a colossus would be a formidable natural fortress with enormous strategic depth, holding in its core the Heartland, the geographical pivot of world power, but by the numbers and know-how of its population it would be a glo­bal power, able to counter-balance the American power. Such continental block could have total economic autarchy due to its large extension of resources, from manpower to agriculture, from technology to raw materials and internal market. If organized according to a federal model, federal banks should be established to organize the development of settlements and economic clusters on the vast uninhabited lands behind the Urals, strengthening the positions on the southern border of the Union, and Siberia, having in mind the possible conflicting interests with other power blocks. Regarding the economy, it is clear that it must always be submitted to political power, that should intervene in strategic economic orientations and hold some services and industries that for its sensible nature or vital importance must be state owned whilst granting the citizens a fair tax system and a large degree of economic freedom. Fighting bureaucracy would be of major importance to allow entrepreneurship to flourish, since small and medium size businesses are the backbone of a country’s healthy economy. Legislation against monopolies and cartels would also be of paramount importance having in mind citizens wellbeing. A continental power this big would be also a pole to fight the destructive ideas that are imposed upon so many countries by liberal capi­ talism. Materialism and exacerbated individualism should be put aside. With a proper orientation it would be a power with its eyes on the future, whilst having in mind History, Customs and Tradition, a new rebirth of the fundamental concepts of Faith, Fatherland and Family.


POLAND’S PLACE IN EURASIA: THEORETICAL TREATMENTS OF THE “POLISH QUESTION” IN CLASSICAL AND NEO-EURASIANISM Abstract: This paper is a study in the applicability of Eurasianism as an analytical framework beyond its self-proclaimed subject of RussiaEurasia, in this case examining classical and neo-Eurasianists’ geographical, geopolitical, ethnosociological, religious, and ultimately “civilizational” perspectives on the defining contours of Polish statehood. On the basis of a textual and syncretic analysis of Eurasianist works and relevant scholars’ and analysts’ summations, it is argued that, from the point of view of Eurasianist thought, Poland is a “border-state” characterized by a profoundly dualistic dilemma that renders Poland incapable of pursuing an autonomous civilizational project. A number of alternatives proposed by Eurasianists are examined as indicative of the dilemma facing Polish geopolitical apperception.

Jafe Arnold

holds a BA in European Cultures from the University of Wroclaw (Poland) and is undertaking his Research MA in Theology and Religious Studies with a specialization in Western Esotericism at the University of Amsterdam (The Netherlands). He is Special Editor of Fort Russ News, a research fellow of the Center for Syncretic Studies, and the founding Editor-in-Chief of Eurasianist Internet Archive.

Introduction Eurasianist deliberations on Poland represent a unique case study in the application of Eurasianist thought.1 The classical Eurasianists tended to mention Poland and its relationship vis-a-vis Russia-Eurasia only in passing; Poland appears to generally fall out of the scope of Lev Gumilev’s scholarship, and in 1998, the leading neo-Eurasianist Alexander Dugin stated that he had “never concretely dealt with the case of Poland.”2 Only in the last two decades have Eurasianist thinkers devoted exclusive analyses to the Polish question, primarily of a geopolitical nature. Moreover, only a handful of Polish scholars have directly dealt with Eurasianism, and more often than not through the lens of those ideological categorizations which we have suggested are inadequate for understanding the history and nature of Eurasianism as a school of thought. Nevertheless, an extensive reading of historical and contemporary Eurasianist works reveals that the Eurasianists have offered both their own emblematic characterizations of Poland and framework for analysis which, in the very least, allow for deductive and inductive examination of the identity of the country which has so historically often been in conflict with RussiaEurasia that significant representatives of its national intelligentsia have proclaimed an existential, meta-historical antagonism between the two, a fact which the Eurasianists have commented on. In this paper, we shall present the main observations on Poland found in Eurasianist works in order to identify the crux of the Eurasianists’ “Polish question” and thereby lay the groundwork for future research. 1  This text originally appeared as part of the author’s Bachelor thesis, “Poland’s Place in Eurasia: Eurasianism as an Analytical Framework and the Polish Question” (University of Wroclaw, 2017). 2  “Aleksandr Dugin o Polsce”, 25.02.2012, Wierni Polsce, <https://wiernipolsce.> [12.02.2018]


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Poland’s geographical fate In the words of Lev Gumilev initiating his study of the civilizations of the Eurasian steppes, “let us deal with geography.”1 Any study of Eurasianist thought on Poland requires an establishment of the geographical characteristics of the space we are dealing with, a precedent set by the Eurasianists in their presentations of Russia-Eurasia. Interestingly enough, the Eurasianists never explicitly discussed the geography of Poland, but their subsequent theses on Polish identity do offer the opportunity to infer or deduce how they would characterize Poland’s geographical peculiarities, its place-development. Moreover, Polish scholars, including those dealing with Eurasianism, have discussed the question of borders between the Eurasianists’ RussiaEurasia and Poland. Just as geography is an anchor of the Eurasianists’ analyses, so is it central to the matrix out of which would eventually emerge and contest Poland. Indeed, as the BritishPolish historian Norman Davies has pointed out, the geographical situation of “Polish lands” is not only widely prevalent as a focus in Polish historiography, but is in fact a kind of paradox. On the one hand, Poland’s geographical position is often asserted to be fatalistically determinant to the point that it has been deemed “unfortunate,” “the villain of her history” which has “trapped” or “condemned” Poland to its historical experiences of partition, whereas, on the other hand, the same can be equally applied to Poland’s neighbors during different historical periods, and geography is a universal material factor.2 Intimately connected with the supposedly dramatic consequences of Poland’s geographical predicament is the very questionability of the notion of a “geography of Poland” or “Polish lands” without the assumption of a “fourth dimension,” namely, the metaphysical assertion of a Polish motherland, since, Davis writes, “it is 1  Gumilow, Lew, 2004, Śladami cywilizacji wielkiego stepu, Warszawa, Polski Instytut Wydawniczy, p. 27. 2  Davies, Norman, 2005, God’s Playground: A History of Poland Volume I: The Origins to 1795, Oxford, Oxford University Press, p. 23-24.

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impossible to identify any fixed territorial base which has been permanently, exclusively, and inalienably, Polish.”3 Yet where Davies posits that such claims are ultimately normatively irrelevant and proceeds to outline a “heartland Poland” and outlying “elastic” provinces, we have at our disposal the Eurasianists’ geographical and geosophical outline of their “continent Eurasia” whose hermeneutical whole and qualitative western boundaries allow a referential distinguishing of “Polish lands” to be attempted without falling into the trap of territorial irredentism or circular post-modern deconstructions of “borders” and “frontiers.” Thus, we shall proceed to investigate Poland’s “place” and “space” by virtue of both reference and inference, whose details will become clearer and more concrete over the course of our application of subsequent layers of Eurasianist analysis. It is worth noting in passing that the designations of “Central” and/or “Eastern” Europe to which Poland is often assigned in geographic discourse will be left for discussion to our geopolitical diagnosis where, as the Eurasianist school believes, they in fact belong. A reading of Eurasianist references to Poland indicates that the Russia-Eurasia of the classical Eurasianists’ western border ends where Poland begins. Savitsky unambiguously states that Eurasia is a “particular historical and geographical world extending from the borders of Poland,”4 and his geographical diagram of Eurasia with its ribbon-like strips and temporal zones stop more or less at modern Poland’s borders, as is the case with the East European or “Russian” Plain. In another place, he explicitly states that “Poland does not belong to the Eurasian world.”5 Trubetzkoy emphasizes in addition to historical and state traditions that Poland has no “natural” connection to Russia owing to “geographic considerations” as “Europe’s outpost in the East,” a phrase with, 3

Ibid, 24.

Savitsky, P.N., Евразийская концепция русской истории. <http://gumilevica.kulichki. net/SPN/spn11.htm> [16.02.2018] 5  Savitsky, P.N., 1928, Геополитические заметки по русской истории. <http://gumilevica.kulichki. net/SPN/spn04.htm#spn04note10>> [16.02.2018] 4


among other things, clear geographic connotations.1 Gumilev, for whom geography and climate were crucial to the formation of ethnoi, pointed to the isothermic air-boundary of Europe and Eurasia between Poland and the Baltic states, Belarus, and Ukraine.2 It is also known that the Eurasianists considered the regions of Galicia and Volynia to be “legitimate parts of Eurasia,”3 which is confirmed by the Russian Eurasianist living in interwar Poland, S.L. Wojciechowski, who wrote in 1928 that “the border between Poland and Russia is at once a line of division between two cultures — the Eurasian and Romano-German, and should therefore not be violated in either direction.”4 In the same year, the Polish diplomat Marian Uzdowski treated Eurasianism with hostility on the same grounds for claiming the “Eastern Polish borderland and Eastern Galicia.”5 Trubetzkoy also asserts that Galicia is “a natural geographic extension of Eurasian territory.”6 In another place, he claims that the “eastern borderlands of Poland”, in fact belonging to Russia-Eurasia, had been “torn away”, but that such was “a temporary phenomenon; sooner or later nature will have its way.”7 As the Polish scholar of Eurasianism, Roman Backer, has discussed, the question of Russia-Eurasia’s borders was central to interwar Polish intellectuals’ assessments of Eurasianism, the most coherent among whom all took note that Eurasianism laid no geographical or cultural claims to Poland beyond Ukraine and Belarus, 1  Trubetzkoy, N.S., 1991, The Legacy of Genghis Khan and Other Essays on Russia’s Identity, Ann Arbor, Michigan Slavic Publications, p. 163, 198. 2  Gumilow, 2004, op cit., p. 19.

Bassin, M., Glebov, S., Laruelle, M., Between Europe and Asia: The Origins, Theories, and Legacies of Russian Eurasianism, Pittsburgh, University of Pittsburgh Press, p. 73.


4  Bäcker, Roman, “Польские воззрения на концепции Евразии” in Lipanov, A.V., 2007, Россия в глазах славянского мира, Moscow, Institute of Slavic Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences, p. 315-316. 5  Bäcker, Roman, “From Rejection to Attempts at Reconciliation: Poles and the Interwar Eurasian Movement,” in Shlapentokh, Dmitry, 2007, Russia between East and West: Scholarly Debates on Eurasianism, Ledien/Boston, Brill, p. 113. 6  Trubetzkoy, 1991, op cit., p. 206. 7  Trubetzkoy, 1991, op cit., p. 163.


although even there compromises in terms of territorial and national autonomy were up for discussion alongside Eurasianists’ purported respect for the 1921 Treaty of Riga.8 Overall, it is clear that Poland is not included in the geographical frame of Russia-Eurasia, but is the latter’s neighbor, a thesis which both the classical Eurasianists and their contemporary Polish critics apparently acknowledged. Where does this leave “Polish lands”? Norman Davies writes that “the heartland provinces of predominantly Polish settlement are situated between the Odra and Vistula Rivers. It was here that one branch of the Western Slavs first established itself in the seventh and eighth centuries, and as Polanie, or ‘people of the open fields’, engendered the forebears of the nation who are now known as Poles.”9 These relatively historically stable Polish heartlands consist of: Wielkopolska, “an open country, with broad expanses of meadowland in the valleys separated by rolling tracts of forest”; Małopolska backed up against the subalpine ridge of the Carpathians and long stretches of lowland valleys between hills; Mazowsze with its “expanses of heath and scrubland” and partial forest coverage; and Kujawy which connects Mazowsze and Wielkopolska, “a flat terrain cluttered with glacial remains” and “spidery lakes.”10 Davies assigns Śląsk, Pomorze, Prusy and Mazury, Podlasie, Polesie, Wołyń, Podole, Ruś Czerwona, Ukraina, Żmudź and Aukstota, Białoruś, and Czarnoruś to the “elastic” outerlands that have drifted in and out of the orbit of the Polish heartlands, the latter six of which (minus Żmudź and Aukstota) the Eurasianists considered the western extremities of Eurasia historically (and unsuccessfully) contested by Poland-Lithuania.11 Eurasianist references to Poland seem to suggest the same identification of this core Polish “center” based on the original distribution of the Polanie before later territorial expansion which in the East culminated in the “PolishLithuanian project” counterposed to the medieval/early modern Russian-Eurasian project. 8  9  10  11

Bäcker, R., 2007, op cit., p. 114-115. Davies, op cit., p. 26. Ibid, 26-27. Savitsky, 1928, op cit.

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The ethnosociological, historical, and other dimensions of this place-development will be discussed below. Having defined Poland’s core contours, the geographical tendencies of these lands in themselves and their relation to the Eurasianists’ geographical survey of Eurasia is in order. While the “Polish lands” have distinguished natural boundaries in the North (the Baltic coast) and the South (the Carpathian and Sudety mountains), Poland is characterized by a lack of natural borders in its West and East. The rolling fields of the Polish Plains on which the country rests and derives its ethnonym are part of the narrowing of the continent into a “wedge-like shape” that “inevitably funnels movement on to the eastwest axis” along the European Plain and the “Grodno-Warsaw-Berlin Depression and the Toruń-Eberswalde Depression provide natural passageways parallel to the mountain and coastal barriers.”1 This longitudinal precept of Poland’s geography is also reflected in its lakelands, i.e., the Pomeranian and Mazurian. The run of Poland’s main rivers latitudinally from the Baltic match this east-west “movement funnel” with a north-south one. “The resultant structure of Poland is one of…a lop-sided frame in which the dominant horizontal warp, is offset by the vertical weave of the rivers” offering “every facility for movement and transit”2 and is “open to the wind,” from certain perspectives referred to as the “indefensible northern European plain.” The picture thus arises that Poland’s geographical situation is notably “open”, “transitory,” or “fluid” in terms of geographical patterns and movement across its terrain. As has been established, the Eurasianists’ attachment of immense importance to geography as a factor and value in itself anchored their thesis that Russia-Eurasia’s geography conditions a “world unto itself.” If Eurasia was marked by a “north-south and center-periphery” pattern with internal geographical expanses running east-west3 which ultimately form a hermeneutical whole, then in the case of Poland we are 1  2  3

Davies, op cit., p. 31 Ibid, 32-33. Bassin, M., Glebov, S., Laruelle, M., 2015, op cit., p. 71.

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confronted with a place on the geographic map that is open to East and West, lacking insulation from either trajectory, and whose climactic and geographical resources condition it “mid-way between that of Western Europe and that of Russia.”4 If Russia-Eurasia’s fauna, climate, soil, and flora were categorized as complementary and forming a regular, harmonious whole bearing near perfect regularity, then Poland’s natural features are not closed unto themselves in a system, but extensions of Western Europe and the outer reaches of Eurasia, and moreover are irregular in their correlation. “In the realm of vegetation, Poland is is still within the normal range of the European mainland,” meaning that its trees and bush flow “from” or “to” West or East.5 These considerations even give rise to the impression that Poland’s geographical position is “precarious” or “dependent,” which would in a purely determinist geographical perspective account for Polish territory’s rapid historical contractions, expansions, subjugation, and partition by forces descending down its plains from West and East or the routes that have run down it in ancient and early medieval times from North to South. In addition, the geographical-historical relations between Poland’s “core” and its outlying regions are tenuous, as Davies’ encapsulates in the term “elastic,” which contradicts Eurasia’s alleged center-periphery magnetism. These factors are extremely important indicators which will feature prominently in the Eurasianist geopolitical evaluation of Poland. The Eurasianists’ conviction that RussiaEurasia’s geographical features formed a unified “third continent” are thus starkly contrasted by Poland’s geographic and natural attributes which render it “middled” between East and West. This predicament of place translates into the qualitative predicament of “space,” in which Poland is fully absorbed neither by East nor West but spatially torn or, in the very least, vulnerable between the two. As we will see later on, this manifests itself in Poland being uneasily straddled between the two worlds of the Eurasianists, the “European” and the “Eurasian”, in more than a few senses. 4

Davies, op cit., 33


Davies, op cit., ibid.


Thus, through the Eurasianist lens, it can be inferred that Poland’s spatial logic would be in limbo between that of the Eurasian and European spaces, i.e., its place-development (mestorazvitie) is not qualitatively independent in its own right, but open to synthesis or clash in the matrix of the Eurasian-European border. Poland’s geography is thus slated to represent a “bridge,” a “wedge”, or a “pivot,” an objective platform open to subjective use in relation to West or East. Here it bears remembrance that the Eurasianists did not confine their geographical observations to materialist determinism, but saw geographical impulses manifesting themselves in and dialectically conditioning further meta-historical dimensions. Having determined the “soil” which “exposes the hidden meaning of events and destinies...that is intrinsically linked to history and its philosophical interpretation, as well as national identity,”1 the latter qualities can now be given content. Poland’s “very specific” yet “tragic” geographical situation “on the border between two worlds” (Dugin2), becomes especially obvious and imbued with glaring relevance in the Eurasianist analysis of Poland’s geopolitical propensities which now begs our attention and will serve further inquiry.

“Polish project” is perceived in the Eurasianists’ analyses as unstable and inherently susceptible to representing a geopolitical opponent of Russia-Eurasia as, in Trubetzkoy’s words, “the spearhead of an invasive movement by European civilization and Catholicism.”4 At first glance, this clearly situates Poland’s geopolitical identity in the “Romano-German” geopolitical camp of the classical Eurasianists and in the “Atlanticist” category of geopolitics introduced into Eurasianism by Alexander Dugin. However, a closer analysis of the relatively few direct geopolitical approaches to Poland in Eurasianist works reveals a more nuanced picture. While lending itself towards manifestation in anti-Eurasian geopolitical experiences, Poland’s “borderness” and “geopolitical duality” does not necessarily denote Romano-Germanism or Atlanticism, but is interpreted as nominally neutral and only conditionally inclined towards such as one of various scenarios geopolitically imposed upon this “bridge”, “wedge”, or “pivot” that is Poland. This is the geopolitical quality of Poland’s basic geographical situation.

Poland’s geopolitical propensities are perhaps the single most easily gleaned theme from Eurasianist references to Poland and arguably the most critical. Whereas Russia-Eurasia is postulated to represent the geopolitical tendency of Land, in its purest form as the geopolitical axiom of Heartland, Poland is seen as intrinsically geopolitically dependent, a product which Dugin classifies as “an effect of geopolitical duality” or “borderness” which bodes “that forever in history will arise the problem of Poland’s partition between East and West.”3 In the classical Eurasianists’ works, as we have seen, Poland is not identified as part of Eurasia. Rather, we will see that Poland or a

An interesting prelude to this thesis is evident in Eurasianist evaluations of the PolishLithuanian Commonwealth which once occupied significant parts of Russia-Eurasia and posed the greatest competitive threat to nascent Russian-Eurasian civilization. In a televised “guideline” specifically dedicated to Poland, Alexander Dugin posits that “Poland’s role in the geopolitics of the last few centuries has been, frankly speaking, unenviable. At one point this country, especially in the heyday of the Polish-Lithuanian Kingdom, was a fully-fledged regional hegemon.”5 Translated into geopolitical terms, recognized here is a once formidable attempt at forging an independent, Polish geopolitical pole which, Dugin proceeds to recount, “posed a serious threat” to the Russian-Eurasian project and “preserved its independence from aggressive Germanic neighbors...But in the 17th cen-

1  Laruelle, 2008, Russian Eurasianism: An Ideology of Empire, Washington D.C., Woodrow Wilson Center Press, p. 33 2  “Aleksandr Dugin o Polsce”, op cit. 3  Ibid.

Trubetzkoy, 1991, op cit., p. 206 Dugin, Aleksandr, 07.07.2016, “РАЗРУШИТЬ САНИТАРНЫЙ КОРДОН: ОБАМА В ПОЛЬШЕ”, Katehon, <> [16.02.2018]

The geopolitics of Poland


4  5

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tury, the era of truly independent and great Poland ended, and she turned into a kind of no-man’s land.”1 The classical Eurasianists also noticeably attribute to the former PolishLithuanian Commonwealth a regional-power status which had the potential to establish its own hegemonic project but, Savitsky writes, “Moscow turned out to be a suitable unifying center in the Eurasian state system. LithuaniaPoland did not turn out to be such a center.”2 The Poland-Lithuanian project’s incorporating of parts of Western Eurasia into its own pole is deemed unviable, since Poland’s RomanoGermanic heritage is seen as irreconcilable with the essence of Eurasian civilization and “the laws of sacred geography and geopolitics.”3 In a 1998 interview, Dugin asserts: “Polish-Lithuanian civilization did not want or could not define itself” [between Eurasian and European civilization], “therefore it had to disappear.”4 Obviously, this tendency can be traced back to Poland’s geographical profile. The end of the period of Poland’s historical incarnation as an independent hegemonic project in the form of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth is equated to the end of Polish geopolitical sovereignty. Dugin says: “From this time on, Poles became an object of the geopolitics of other countries.”5 The evidence that the Eurasianists saw this as inevitable given Poland’s elementary geographical precariousness is paradigmatically encapsulated in Trubetzkoy’s harkening to “nature having its way.” The partitions of Poland in the 18th century are alluded to in passing by Trubetzkoy as ultimately unfavorable for Russia6 and the end of the Russian Empire’s domination of Poland was even positively appreciated in the light of having “reinforced the Eurasian destiny of Russia.”7 Nevertheless, the partitions were seen as geopolitically inevitable insofar as the Polish-Lithuanian project attempted to estab1  2  3  4  5  6

Ibid. Savitsky, 1928, op cit. “Aleksandr Dugin o Polsce”, 25.02.2012, op cit. Ibid. Dugin, Aleksandr, 07.07.2016, op cit. Trubetzkoy, 1991, op cit., p. 206

Bassin, M., Glebov, S., Laruelle, M., 2015, op cit., p. 73


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lish an alternative and culturally alien center in Eurasia whose geopolitical extermination was “an episode typical of European dynastic politics, for it enlarged most advantageously the territories of two European powers bordering on Russia.”8 It is at this point that Eurasianist geopolitical diagnoses attribute to Poland a distinct lack of subjectivity, i.e., Poland is portrayed as an object of more often than not Atlanticist schemes. The contemporary Eurasianist Alexandr Bovdunov thus summarizes his analysis of historical and contemporary Polish foreign policy: “In basic geopolitical terms, which contrasts tellurocratic to thalassocratic approaches to domination and the opposition between the interests of Atlanticist vs. continental powers, this Polish project bears a clearly anti-Russian and therefore Atlanticist orientation.”9 The term most often employed in Eurasianist works on this matter is “cordon sanitaire,” a geostrategic wedge employed by the Atlanticist powers to contain Heartland (Russia-Eurasia) and “continental Europe”, principally Germany, a doctrine first proposed by Mackinder of the Anglo-Saxon geopolitical school.10 The Second Polish Republic and its contemporary geostrategies of “Prometheism” (attributed to Józef Piłsudski) and “Intermarium”, a project by the Polish cartographer and geographer E. Romer, today’s Poland’s role as the “Eastern Flank of NATO” and its active participation in the European Union’s Eastern Partnership are all identified by Bovudnov as pure manifestations of Atlanticism and the cordon sanitaire. Moreover, Bovdunov defines Polish discourse on “Central” and “Eastern Europe” as a political invention whose “function is to maintain the cordon sanitaire’s integrity and the perception Trubetzkoy, 1991, op cit., ibid. Bovdunov, A. 10.05.2016, “Poland: The Jagiellonian Alternative,” Katehon, < poland-jagiellonian-alternative>, [16.02.2018]. 10  Dugin, 2000, Основы геополитики: Геополитическое будущее России, Moscow, Arktogeya, p. 370. 8  9


of Russia as the ’Other’”1, in the geopolitical practice of which a “leading role in the creation of an anti-Russian bloc is assigned to... Poland.”2 Dugin calls the instrumentalization of Poland in this regard the “gap between Polish self-consciousness and the real arrangement of things [which has been] used by the Atlanticist powers” in which “Polish ambitions” rising out of imperial Polish-Lithuanian irredentism “have long since served a subsidiary function in the Great Game of an altogether different level.”3 If Poland’s naturally restricted “geopolitical duality” has been historically characterized by a tendency towards Atlanticist instrumentalization, then the question obviously begs itself: what is the converse scenario? Does duality not imply an equal flipside to the equation, i.e., a potential Eurasian Poland? Eurasianist references to Poland and subsequently enabled inferences seem to indicate two levels of analysis offering different dimensional answers to this question. In the classical approach regarding Eurasia “proper,” i.e., the RussiaEurasia of the classical Eurasianists, the practically unanimous assertion that Poland does not belong to Eurasian civilization and that Russia-Eurasia has no claims towards Poland suggests what the interwar Polish commentator on Eurasianism, Marian Zdziechowski, concluded, namely, that Eurasianism “would not be imperialist nor pro-Tsarist” and thus “Eurasianism can be co-existed with.”4 However, this theoretically possible neutrality is historically annulled by the fact that Poland has traditionally fallen into the RomanoGermanic or Atlanticist camp which is decisively antagonistic vis-a-vis Eurasia, hence Trubetzkoy’s qualification: “Poland had been Russia’s enemy primarily as the spearhead of 1  Bovdunov, A., 26.01.2016, “Central Europe Discourse and its Political Function”, Katehon,

<>, [16.02.2018]

2  Bovdunov, A., 16.02.2016, “Eastern Europe: Civilizational Speciality and Modern Geopolitical Situation”, Katehon, < eastern-europe-civilizational-specialty-andmodern-geopolitical-situation>, [16.02.2018] 3  Dugin, Aleksandr, 07.07.2016, op cit. 4  Bäcker, R., 2007, op cit., p. 315.


an invasive movement by European civilization and Catholicism.”5 However, interestingly enough, if we transcend the classical, two-dimensional geopolitical model of classical Eurasianism and immerse ourselves in the three-dimensional model of neo-Eurasianism attributed to Alexander Dugin, then we in fact find in Eurasianist analyses a variety of scenarios for Poland’s geopolitical potential in relation to Europe and Russia-Eurasia. In the two-dimensional model which pits Romano-Germanic European civilization against the civilization of Russia-Eurasia, Poland is the spearhead of the former. But in the three-dimensional model which posits a Europe that is fundamentally “continental” and shares geopolitical fate with RussiaEurasia proper in the form of “Greater Europe” (European New Right), “Eurasia as the Old World” (Dugin), or “Eurasianism in the context of the 21st century” (Savin6), then Poland’s position and possibilities on the geopolitical map are relatively more subjective. In this perspective, the “cordon sanitaire” is not only an anti-Eurasian project, but equally an anti-European project insofar as it represents part of the strategic Atlanticist subjugation of Europe and the undermining of potential geopolitical rapprochement between “Continental Europe” and Russia-Eurasia. This positions Poland, as the key pivot of the cordon sanitaire, against both of its flanks in a kind of imitation of the Polish-Lithuanian outline as re-processed through the lens of Atlanticist hegemony as opposed to a uniquely sovereign Polish project.7 Dugin’s analysis here is unambiguous: “The most effective method of thalassocracy is the ‘cordon sanitaire’, i.e., a pole of several border states hostile towards both their Eastern and Western neighbors, and directly tied to the Atlanticist pole. Poland traditionally acts in the role of this ‘cordon sanitaire…”8 Dugin deems this cordon sanitaire to be unTrubetzkoy, 1991, op cit., p. 206. Savin L., 10.10.2016, “Eurasianism in the Context of the 21st Century” <> [16.02.2018] 7  Bovdunov, 10.05.2016, op cit. 8  Dugin, 2000, op cit., pp. 369-370 5  6

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tenable and inevitably slated for partition, and thus concludes that in this scenario Poland is faced with the geopolitical choice of choosing “in which empire to be and in what roles.”1 It is on these grounds and in this context that he asserts that “Russia…is not interested in the existence of an independent Polish state in any form.”2 Alternatively, Poland’s dualism and border position can manifest itself in a positive, constructive scenario in which Poland does not serve the geopolitical function of a cordon sanitaire, but rather a bridge between RussiaEurasia and Europe with varying subjective capabilities. Ronald Lasecki, a contemporary Polish commentator on Eurasianism, suggests on the basis of an analysis of geopolitical theories of Greater Europe and Eurasian integration that Poland’s unique position within the zone of “Baltic Europe” affords it the potential of a “bridge linking East and West.”3 While Dugin criticizes this notion, concluding that in the geopolitical long-term “organizing this region in accordance with Eurasianist principles is practically impossible,” he does concede such to be an intermediary, strategic step on the way to fully-fledged Great European or Greater Eurasian integration in which “a special status is delegated to Poland.”4 According to this alternative model, Poland’s dual cultural heritage and regional interests must encourage it to “bridge the gap between the European East and European West”, “become a model for the construction of a ‘European Dugin, Aleksandr, 07.07.2016, op cit. 2  “Aleksandr Dugin o Polsce”, 25.02.2012, op cit. 3  Lasecki, R. 06.11.2013, “Europa Bałtycka, nie Europa Środkowo-Wschodnia (luźne rozważania nad geopolityką Polski i Europy)”, Geopolityka, 1

< ronald-lasecki-europa-baltycka-nie-europasrodkowo-wschodnia-luzne-rozwazania-nadgeopolityka-polski-i-europy>, 16.02.2018]

4  Dugin, A., 2000, op cit, p. 372.; Biryukov, S., 18.06.2009, “Польша и Россия: к истории разногласий”, Agenstvo Politicheskikh Novostey, < htm>>, [16.02.2018]; Kosmach, G.A., 2006, “Беларусь и Польша в идеологии и геополитических проектах российского неоевразийства”, Minsk, <> [16.02.2018]

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Europe.’”5 This can manifest itself in a regional union or federation whose interests lie in promoting dialogue between European and Eurasian unions which in turn ensures that the pendulum of Poland’s geopolitical and cultural dualism does not swing too qualitatively far in one direction or another nor antagonize neighboring Germany and Russia. In another vector briefly addressed by the contemporary Eurasianist Leonid Savin, this could manifest itself in pragmatic Polish-Russian cooperation in which “Poland could nevertheless become a valuable ally of Moscow on the political field in the European Union.”6 The contemporary Eurasianist Sergey Biryukov similarly hypothesizes in contemporary geopolitical circumstances: Through the process of European integration, in the framework of which Germany plays the role of the economic and political ‘motor,’ Poland would enter the European ‘family of nations’ as a full member while Russia, establishing close and promising partnership with the EU over the process of creating four ‘large spaces,’ would contribute to this ‘inclusion.’ In turn, this would allow Poland to be transformed from a geopolitical barrier into an ‘integration bridge’ between Europe, Germany, and Russia as strategic partners. To this end, however, all three sides must develop a balanced and constructive approach to the issue, taking into account not ideologies, but real possibilities and interests.7 For Lasecki, Savin, as well as the Polish Eurasianist8 Mateusz Piskorski, the common denominator lies in that Poland’s geopolitical sovereignty depends on its facilitation of dialogue between Russia-Eurasia and Europe 5  Lasetsky, R., 28.01.2016, “Why with Russia? Part II”, Katehon, < article/why-russia-part-ii>, [16.02.2018] 6  “Renesans eurazjatyzmu”, 22.12.2011, Xportal, <> [16.02.2018] 7  Biryukov, S., 18.06.2009, “Польша и Россия: к истории разногласий”, Agenstvo Politicheskikh Novostey, << publications/article21737.htm>>, [16.02.2018] 8  Here we employ the term “Eurasianist” to mean one who accepts Eurasianism’s characterization of Russia-Eurasia.


within the Greater Europe model and its maximal utilization of the resources and opportunities offered by the position of a regional advocate of this project.1 While for Piskorski this connotes a “pragmatization” or “economization” of Polish foreign policy to avoid the pitfalls of Poland’s dualism, for Lasecki this prospect is of cultural and civilizational necessity to curtail the distorting effects of over-emphasizing Poland’s Romano-Germanic heritage which binds it to Western Modernity and according Atlanticist geopolitical processes as crystallized in Adam Mickiewicz’s assertion of a meta-historical antagonism between the “Polish and Russian national ideas.”2 In essence, it is argued that Poland needs RussiaEurasia to rescue European geopolitical and civilizational sovereignty, in which Poland necessarily has a certain stake. On the other hand, Poland needs geopolitical cooperation between Europe and Russia-Eurasia for the sake of protecting particular “Eastern” and “Slavic” facets of its own identity which are otherwise threatened by its sole attachment to what the Eurasianists termed Romano-Germanic Europe. Accordingly, Poland’s geopolitical raison d’etre lies in the Greater Europe model in which it plays the role of a bridge, the possibility of which is conditioned by Poland’s place on the “mental map of Europe.” Lasecki writes: “We will not preserve our identity if we do not build Greater Europe. We cannot build greater Europe if the Berlin-Moscow axis does not arise.”3 This, in essence, is Poland’s “Eurasian” alternative. In what concrete form this bridge between Russia-Eurasia and Europe would be realized and what the terms of any union, federation, or bloc tying Europe and Eurasia into a single continental “great space” would be, are left to the specific ideological contours of a European analogue of Eurasianism, a

“Europeanism” or “Identitarianism”, depending on the varying emphasis of geopolitical or ethno-cultural factors.4 If geopolitical push comes to shove, however, it is clear in Eurasianist geopolitical deliberations that the “Polish problem” in the face of the cordon sanitaire would have to be solved by force, i.e., partition, or abandonment to German domination.5

1  Arnoldski, J., 04.11.2017 “Exclusive Fort Russ interview with Mateusz Piskorski”, Fort Russ, <> [16.02.2018] 2  Lasetsky, R., 27.01.2016, “Why with Russia? Part I”, Katehon, < article/why-russia-part-i>, [16.02.2018] 3  Lasecki, R., 02.10.2014, “Co Białorusini mogą dać Polsce?”, Geopolityka, <http://www.>, [16.02.2018]

The historical evolution of the Polish ethnos occupies an equally peculiar position in the Eurasianists’ remarks on Eurasia’s vulnerable western neighbor. Eurasianist works are void of any concrete discussion of the ethnosociological evolution of the Polish ethnos itself, but the passing remarks of Trubetzkoy and Dugin offer a brief summary of the Eurasianist


In the Eurasianist geopolitical analysis, Poland thus occupies a precarious position. Poland’s elementary geographical situation and corresponding geopolitical predicament exclude geopolitical sovereignty. Instead, Poland is faced with instrumentalization as a (1) wedge separating rival European and Eurasian projects or (2) obstructing European-Eurasian integration; the prospect of a (3) bridge between European and Eurasian projects with varying degrees of bargained subjectivity depending on the terms of a given scenario; or (4) dissipation into the composition of one hegemonic project or another. Present within the argumentation of each of these conceptualizations, however, are cultural and ethno-sociological factors which have thus far been relegated to mention in passing. What are the ethno-sociological and religious factors repeatedly referred to as fostering Poland’s dualism which condemn it to geopolitical objectivization? Who are these “dualist” Poles attached to Poland’s geopolitical fate? These qualifications in the Eurasianists’ analyses now demand our inquiry. While Eurasianist works contain relatively few concrete remarks or sketches in the following spheres, they do supply engaging generalizations.

The dilemma of the Polish people

4  5

Lasecki, R., 09.05.2016, op cit. Kosmach, G.A., 2006, op cit.

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interpretation of the Polish ethnos’ specific position on the ethnic and cultural map. On the one hand, the Polish ethnos is presented as having consolidated earlier than the Russian super-ethnos or Eurasian mega-ethnos, as by the 12th century having taken definite shape and a “rather developed form” with its own state and acceptance of Christianity.1 This Polish ethnos is identified by Trubetzkoy as an indistinguishable member of RomanoGermanic culture, a “province of RomanoGermanic Europe” whose intellectuals contributed monumentally to Romano-Germanic culture and science.2 Trubetzkoy emphasizes that Poland was not included in Genghis Khan’s empire3, and therefore lacked this experience that was crucial to the ethnogenetic and civilizational formation of the Eurasian people. Following the Union of Krewo in 1386, a fully-fledged “Polish model” consisting of “Catholicism, szlachectwo and państwo, European culture, the predominance of Latin in religion (Catholic masses) and the Polish language” is presented by Dugin as posing serious competition in the ethnogenetic processes of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, i.e., Western Eurasia.4 Attempts at expanding the Polish ethnos or the potential emergence of a Polish super-ethnos within the framework of the Polish-Lithuanian project were historically unsuccessful, although not without lasting effects on the ethnic consciousness and language of the Ukrainian ethnos, which is still seen as part of the greater Russian super-­ ethnos. On the other hand, Dugin emphasizes the pre-Christian, Slavic heritage of the Polish ethnos as essentially a Eurasian element or root which is in constant conflict with its Catholic and Romano-Germanic heritage: “Poland cannot in full realize its Eurasian-Slavic elements 1  Dugin, A., 2011, Этносоциология, Moscow, Akademicheskii Proekt, p. 493. 2  Trubetzkoy, 1991, op cit., pp. 88-89, 251. 3  Sarsambekova, A., 2012, “Евразийство: теория и практика (учебное пособие)”, Astana, Ministry of Science and Education of the Republic of Kazakhstan, L.N. Gumilev Eurasian National University, Institute of Eurasian Studies, p. 71. 4  Dugin, A., 2011, p. 493.

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as long as Catholicism prevents such, nor can it realize its Western-European identity when its own Slavicness, i.e., language, customs, archetypes, climate, disturbs this.”5 For Dugin, the Polish ethnos’ pre-Christian, pagan ethnic experience represents the “SlavoEurasian sources of Polishness.”6 This dualism renders the Polish ethnos just as precarious as Poland’s geopolitical situation, as the dilemma between Poland’s Slavic and RomanoGermanic facets condemns it to necessarily being attached to the Romano-Germanic or Eurasian worlds, never in full realizing its own ethnic identity. In terms of what Dugin posits to be the unavoidable question of Polish geopolitics — existing within one “empire” or another — he therefore frames Polish induction into the Eurasian project as a “welcome home” to the “common Slavic home.”7 For Lasecki, it is the “Slavic subsoil” of the Polish ethnos that is constant, and therefore accentuating the Polish ethnos’ Slavic traditions is crucial to preserving Poland’s unique ethnosociological identity between the gravitational poles of Europe and Eurasia.8 In this view, the Romano-Germanic, or “Latin” birthmarks of the Polish ethnos are variables which were ultimately metabolized by the overarching Slavic ethnic framework. Taking Lasecki’s analysis to its logical conclusion suggests that the Polish ethnos is not necessarily split or “schizophrenic” as Dugin seems to argue, but a unique syncretism or variant lending itself towards realization as an ethno-cultural bridge. The relative paucity of ethnosociological discussions of Poland in Eurasianist works, however, relegates the question of such to the realm of speculation or interpretive deduction.

The Christ


Nations: Poland’s



The role of Christianization in the Catholic tradition in the foundation of Polish statehood and identity remains the most glaring issue 5  6  7  8

“Aleksandr Dugin o Polsce”, 25.02.2012, op cit. Ibid. Dugin, A., 07.07.2016, op cit. Lasecki, 28.01.2016, op cit.


for Eurasianists and perhaps the central contradiction between Poland and the Eurasian world. As discussed elsewhere, for the Eurasianists, Catholicism represents a corrupt heresy whose proponents, Poland included, were habitually in the forefront of civilizational crusades against Russia-Eurasia, and whose values were alien to Eurasia’s rich religious traditions. Catholicism is viewed as both the metaphysical factor, the religious signboard of Romano-Germanic civilization’s aggression and as part and parcel of Modernity which pitted Europe against the rest of humanity and, ultimately, its own indigenous traditions, such as Poland’s pre-Christian, pagan traditions appreciated by Dugin. The Eurasianists identify Catholicism as a central cornerstone of Polish civilizational identity and statehood, and therefore as the metaphysical root of Poland’s non-Eurasian and often anti-Eurasian orientation. For Dugin, the Christianization of Poland in the Roman Catholic tradition and the corresponding socio-political processes therein mark the milestone through which Poland abandoned its “Slavo-Eurasian” elements and irrevocably drifted towards RomanoGermanic civilization insofar as Catholicism is understood as “the religious matrix of this pole.”1 The fact that Poland received its Christianization from neighboring Bohemia is especially telling, since the Eurasianists identify the Czechs as strictly Romano-German.2 In undergoing the socio-political processes of conversion described by Przemysław Urbańczyk3, Poland shed its primordial, ethnic Slavic identity and adopted the civilizational traditions of Romano-Germanic Europe, including the practice of salvational conversion which clashed with pagan traditions and Orthodoxy in Western Eurasia. On the Dugin, A., 12.10.2016, op cit. Trubetzkoy, N.S., 1921, “ВЕРХИ И НИЗЫ РУССКОЙ КУЛЬТУРЫ (Этническая основа русской культуры)”, <http://gumilevica.> [16.02.2018] 3  See Urbańczyk, Przemysław, “The Politics of Conversion in North Central Europe,” in Carver, Martin, 2003, The Cross Goes North: Processes of Conversion in Northern Europe, AD 300-1300, The Boydell Press, p. 15-28. 1  2


political level, this meant that Poland’s statehood did not develop along the lines of the Orthodox, Byzantine model of the “symphony of power” which the Eurasianists recognize to be a crucial part of the Eurasian tradition and an organic form of ideocracy. According to Dugin, the “Catholic Slavs chose exclusively Western political-state and legal models, copying the Franco-Anglo system.”4 Dugin elaborates in broader terms: “Catholicism is anti-Byzantinism, while Byanztinism is the full and authentic Christianity which includes not only simple dogmatic purity, but also fidelity to the socio-political and state doctrine of Christianity.”5 Specifically applied to Poland’s metaphysical relation to Eurasia, this ensures that Poland finds itself in the “sacred geographical” space of the West: “What does this have to do with sacred geography? In our understanding, the West is conceived as a territory dominated by Catholicism and Protestantism...In this context, Poland finds itself on the border between the Catholic and Orthodox worlds.”6 The most crucial elaboration of the Eurasianists in this regard thus lies in the following: Catholicism made Poland Western in spirit. Catholicism is seen not merely as a religion opposed to the Orthodox tradition and other spiritual components that make up the Eurasian whole, but as a parody of Tradition itself which laid the groundwork for European Modernity and in turn Protestantism, which is considered to be the epitome of the Western religious tradition and Atlanticism.7 In Dugin’s analysis, Catholicism is not a bastion of the resistance of Tradition to Modernity, but “a transitional stage towards this order”8 which preludes the evolution of secularism, capitalism, individualism, and liberalism which are incompatible with Eurasian civilization and 4  Dugin, A., 2002, Oсновы евразийства, Moscow, Akrtogeya, p. 747 5

Dugin, 12.10.2016, op cit.

“Aleksandr Dugin o Polsce”, 25.02.2012, op cit. 7  Dugin, A., 16.10.2016, “The Crusade Against Us,” Eurasianist Internet Archive, <https://>, [16.02.2018] 8  “Aleksandr Dugin o Polsce”, 25.02.2012, op cit. 6

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have corrupted Europe. Thus, Poland’s Catholic nature is seen as having not only connected it to Romano-Germanic civilization, but also to the degradative processes of European civilization which produced the secular, Atlanticist, existentially anti-Eurasian civilization of the “West.” This leads Dugin to assert that any genuine Eurasianist transformation of Poland would require the disassembly of the Catholic component of Polish identity, achieved by means of either a return to pre-Christian Slavic paganism or the promotion of esoteric cults, a thesis which is analogous to that of much of the European New Right.1 According to Bovdunov, Catholicism also lies at the heart of Polish geopolitical messianism and irredentism that serve principally Atlanticist ends.2 Adam Mickiewicz’s presentation of Poland as the “Christ of nations” and Andrzej Towianski’s apocalyptic messianism, as well as the works of Juliusz Słowacki and Bronisław Trentowski are seen as the epitome of emphasizing Poland’s purported role as the Catholic vanguard of European civilization. In Dugin’s comments on Towianski3 and his esoteric tract on the Polish writer Stanisław Ignacy Witkiewicz entitled “Parallel Poland, or the Insatiable Witkiewicz”, one can detect an esoteric implication that Polish apocalyptic messianism is an inverse reflection of a “parallel Poland” that indirectly confirms the Russian-Eurasian eschatological mission explored by Dugin. In typical esoteric fashion, Dugin writes: Indeed, Poland is enchanting. There one finds depths and secrets, labyrinths of horror and dungeons of passion. This Polish Poland is important and beautiful, revealed, discovered, pulled out of European-Catholic ugliness. This is the polar, bottomless, completely and utterly insane, bloody, unquenchable, unearthly Poland — tearing itself away from us and incapable of attaching itself again, alienated, See O’Meara, M., 2013, New Culture, New Right: Anti-Liberalism in Postmodern Europe, Arktos, London. 2  Bovdunov, 10.05.2016, op cit. 3  Dugin, Alexandr, [26.11.2016], Facebook post < posts/1372389752771061> [21.05.2017] 1

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and scouring the bottom of hell to find its way back…This parallel Poland genuinely interests us.4 This Poland “scouring the bottom of hell to find its way back”, ostensibly held back by its Catholic-induced “antinomies”, is proposed to “be like us, Russians, under Byzantium, and all your complexes will evaporate in two counts.”5 Asserting that “‘Poland’ is the final word of world history,” Dugin thus inversely affirms Poland as the “Christ of nations,” whose “crucifixion” and transformation is of global repercussions. In the context of Dugin’s synthesis of geopolitics and esotericism, the meaning behind this is clear: Polish messianism’s “national suicide”6 through its doomed Catholic and Romano-Germanic crusade will necessarily, “prophetically” bring about the transformation of Poland through the destruction of its present form, and by extension the resurrection of Europe and Eurasia. “This nuance is in big geopolitics,” Dugin concludes.7

Poland between Europe and Eurasia Poland’s place in Eurasianism and the Eurasianists’ civilizational map is therefore exceptionally curious and thereby demonstrative of the unique analytical qualities and assumptions of the Eurasianist school of thought. Being at once not part of RussiaEurasian civilization and deemed incapable of forging its own civilizational pole, as allegedly demonstrated in the case of the failed PolishLithuanian project, Poland is ultimately seen as a borderland. While this border’s emergent statehood is historically attributed to being part of the Romano-Germanic world, even this position itself, by virtue of peculiarly “dualistic” geographic, geopolitical, and cultural factors, is deemed untenable, since Poland’s inherent dualism prevents it from fully conforming to one bloc or another, a virtue which 4  Dugin, Aleksandr, 20.08.2011, “Параллельная Польша, или Ненасыщаемый Виткевич”, Maxpark, < content/790252>, [16.02.2018] 5  Ibid. 6  Ibid. 7  Ibid.


has ­historically lent it towards instrumentalization as a wedge or divisive pivot by external forces. This division, in the Eurasianists’ understanding of geopolitical and civilizational processes operating on Europe and Eurasia, is inevitably slated for liquidation. Poland, therefore, like any border, is subject to change, dispute, partition, and fluctuation depending on the forces operating on either side of it. In the Eurasianist analysis, the most favorable scenario for Poland in this regard is the role of a bridge facilitating the rapprochement of European and Eurasian civilization, a role which necessarily means a transformation of Polish identity itself. But does this not mean the end of Poland itself as a border, its dissipation into the convergence of two civilizations at whose crossroads it has stood to varying degrees and in different capacities as an existential raison d’etat over the course of history? The Eurasianist voices considered over the course of our study seem to suggest that this depends on the subjective choice of Poland itself. This in turn gives rise to the question of a Polish metabolization of Eurasianism engaged in discovering Poland’s place just as the Eurasianists sought to uncover that of Russia-Eurasia. This highlights not only the nature of Eurasianism as a school of thought which could theoretically be metabolized or met with an analogue on the part of other civilizations, but the extremely specific, unique, border role of Poland insofar as its choice thus directly affects the make-up and terms of the space separating, or linking, Eurasia and Europe. In the words of Dugin, “this is a genuinely dramatic situation.”1

we turned to a case study in the Eurasianists’ analysis of Poland, scouring Eurasianist works for expressions on this neighbor of the Eurasianists’ Russia-Eurasia and applying the lenses of Eurasianist analytics to conclude that Poland occupies a specifically perilous position as a “border-state” suspended in constant civilizational dilemma in the geographical, geopolitical, ethnosociological, and religionist perspectives of the Eurasianist outlook which we outlined. This research not only uncovered hitherto unstudied Eurasianist views on the “Polish question”, but also affirmed in practice our thesis that Eurasianism is best understood as a school of thought which, having its own analytical assumptions and categories, is applicable beyond the Eurasianists’ own subject, Russia-Eurasia.

Conclusion The foregoing treatise has explored Eurasianism’s perceptions of Poland’s civilizational profile. Unlike most scholars who approach Eurasianism as an ideology or veiled manifestation of this or that political motive, we have examined and operated with Eurasianism as a school of thought with its own assorted arsenal of analytical and interpretative categories. As a token of this discernment, 1

“Aleksandr Dugin o Polsce”, 25.02.2012, op cit.


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POLES — TRAITORS OR LOST SLAVIC BROTHERS? Poles are probably the only one Slaves, who do not know… what it means. Almost whole Polish history is kind of quite sad tale about looking for identity and awareness. Searching unsuccessful, because the hardest thing is to find something that is not hidden at all. Konrad Rękas

Polish journalist, geopolitical analyst, vice-chairman of Zmiana (The Change) Party, founder of the Restitution of Kresy association, former chairman of the Regional Council of the Lubelskie Voivodeship.

Involuntarily Defenders Polish early history is determined by especially two moments, two turns on historical crosswords. First of course, that was acceptance of Christianity from the West; the second one — Mongolian lack of interest in the conquest of Polish lands in the 12th century. The first decision was, unfortunately, a conscious mistake of the elites at the time, but committed in certain circumstances an external threat from the West, from the advan­ cing Germans. Paradoxically, however, born for Christianity in the 10th century, the Polish state fulfilled its role, shielding the Slavdom against Germanic pressure, because it cannot be entirely ruled out that without specific and unintentional Polish defence — the hearts of the Slavs, the Kievan Rus would endure Germanic aggression alone. For all knowing difficult history of Polish-Ruthenian struggle in the Middle Ages — I hope it is clear, that these were family conflict, even so dramatical, as intervention of Polish future King Bolesław the Brave supporting Sviatopolk I in Kiev (10-5-1019) or Ruthenian and Cuman raids on Poland in the 12th Century — did not differ much from argues and fights between descendants of Piast and Rurik themselves. But what could happen, if Western power, even only from Eastern March — stood on Ruthenian borders in the end of 10th Century/beginning of the 11th one? And we should remember, that in the 11th and 12th Century “The Drang Nach Osten” was provided not only by Marchs, as before, and by Knights Orders, as later, but by the Holly Empire itself, standing at the height of power. Were divided Kiev Rus’ able to defend, if in real Ruthenians had to wait till St. Alexander Nevsky made his fundamental geopolitical choice, letting the Slaves to achieve the first such a great historic victory over the West? So, admiring the Battle of Ice, please remember, that time to prepare to this success has been also given by these “traitors of the Slavdom”, who had won their own, small fight 276 years before… Knowing that Western Slavic states already exist — enemies of the Slavdom changed their strategy. If they had problem to beat Poles and Bohemians — they decided to change them into their way. From the shield of the Slavs, turn them into a sword aimed at the East. Our Czechs brothers were to some extent defended by the Hussite movement and the Reformation (apart from the Semitic-Western genesis of this second this second process) — but Poland was getting deeper and deeper into slavery from the Holly Empire, Popes and in modern times — from the Jesuits. In the political dimension — that was of course the question

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of strengthening the position of the Catholic Church, subordinate to the external power centre. But even more important was metapolitical, identity platform of changes. If we were just witnesses of increasing economic possession and political influences of Rome, bishops, monasteries — we could expect straight reaction, even resistance based on Slavic remembrance, the remains of pagan traditions mixed with new trends. But Catholicism in Poland he also understood the situation perfectly well and insured itself that almost all Slavic threads were removed from Polish, Catholic identity — and these, which remain — have been masked not to be associated with their roots.

Mongolian Yoke — Polish Lost Chance These processes must have occurred in a favourable international environment. Weakening in the 12th century Poland ceased to be a significant international player, becoming just the area of crossing German, Bohemian, Hungarian and Ruthenian influences. And this is a point, when Polish, Westernize and standardized historiography surrenders. We have just few, rather technical and schematic studies regarding Mongol invasion of Poland, focused on military operations, without any deeper analysis of causes and effects — especially these ones we did not achieved. Meanwhile the truth is, that Poland become target of the First Mongol Invasion (1240-1241) only as a marginal Hungarian supporter — and the greatest disaster for Poles in this era was not the Battle of Liegnitz defeat, but fact, that Batu, Baidar and Subutai did not want Poland to be part of their empire. Let’s stay for a moment and look for a coalition formed ad hoc to defend against Mongols. As we know — Hungary was main target of their invasion at 1240 and it was geopolitically compatible with interests of Western Ruthenia, which in this time faced powerful civilizational pression of Rome, carried out via Poland — and Hungary. Western alliance against Mongols included the same powers, which were interested in influence in Ruthenia: The Catholic Church, mainly German Military Orders (Knights Templar


and Teutonic Knights), but main effort, costs and sacrifices belonged to Polish Dukes and Princes (waiting vainly for Bohemian help). It’s hard to get a better quintessence of the last few centuries of Polish history! West and East chose Poland for the battlefield, naive Poles believed, that we are “crusaders — defenders of the Civilization/Christianity”, and the real geopolitics took place over heads of our ancestors. Meanwhile, as we can notice now — much cleaver (but not obvious then) Polish choice would be to stand AGAINST false and alleged allies, accepting protection the protection of the Mongolian Empire, following these Ruthenian dukes, who even had not understand how lucky their countries had been. It is enough to say, that the powers, which “helped and supported” Polish Duke Henry II the Pious to fight (and to be defeated) by Mongols — that were the same, which divided Poland among themselves among next Century: Teutonic Knights taking Pomerania, Bohemians taking supremacy over Silesia, Hungarians reaching for Polish crown (and also Galicia–Volhynia), and Catholic Church dominating political life for centuries, earning numerous privileges and becoming main creator of Polish awareness. As we understand now — there was no civilization chance to hold back Mongols from returning to the steppes. Russian historians proofed that military costs of Mongolian invasion were not especially high, the same as tiredness of warriors (used in the Western historiography to explain why Mongols stopped). Mongolian army just did not need the West, they find enough land and wealth in Ruthenia, and preferred just to consume fruits of previous victories. Like many times in next Centuries — that was Poland, which should decide: if belongs to the West or to the East. And like always — someone decided for us, and Poles lost our chance to gain geopolitical, Eurasian perspective and adopt patterns of the best-organized state of that era. These obvious benefits, (together with protection from the Western infiltration and the creation of the Church state inside the state) — have been earned by Ruthenia, growing up to Russia.

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Later history of Poland (Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth) should be warning for any Russian and not only Russian historians and writers believing, that “The Age of Tatar Rule was only range of tragedy”, not a great opportunity for development and keeping the true Slavic spirit — mixed with showing the right direction of further expansion. Of course, Grand Duchy of Lithuania and next common Polish-Lithuanian state tried to take part in these processes, but as an external power (even including some parts of Ruthenian lands) they stood on clearly weaker positions, than Moscow after St. Dmitry Donskoy. But on the other hand — Algirdas’ (Władysław) Jogaila’s and Vytautas’ attempts to intervene in affairs of Ruthenia and the Golden Horde — can be considered as almost last vision of non-Moscow, but also non-Western organisation of the doors of the Heartland. Symbolic end of this very short period — was The Battle of the Vorskla River (1399), although even after this date Polish-Lithuanian state from time to time tried to recall elements of Eurasian programme — looking at affairs of the Novgorod The Great or helping to establish The Crimea Khanat (just creating further problems for whole this part of the Continent). But these were just intuitive flashes, not geopolitical awareness. Just because this was permanently disturbed by the Western occupation of Polish minds...

Sarmatism — Polish Eurasian Spirit? We have to return to the first and main for Poles question: who we are for real? Slavs, who has forgotten what the Slavdom is, but still feel and act the same way, as our brothers. Someone has fooled us. We have fooled ourselves! We believed, that e.g. we had anticipa­ ted “modern democracy” — although it was just the Veche, perverted into the “Democracy of Nobles”. We have always tried to imitate the West, we followed its traced — always delayed, always anachronic. Poles in turmoil built gothic cathedrals, when the West was opening for the Renaissance modernity, we were indifferent when the Western Europeans were dying for the faith and ideology and became fanatics when this trend was over. We

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have always come to the party on not proper day… Poles have always wanted to be a great ethnos, but in the best times had only quite a big, but weak state. All these complexes mixed create something really abnormal, but fascinating — Polish idea of the Sarmatism. Let’s think — Slaves, who believe in the West, who have found themselves as the “Antemurale Christianitatis” (against not only the Islam, but also “the Schismatics”, the whole East in general) — they create completely new identity for the whole political nation, and that is completely opposite, to the Western conceptions! Polish nobles in the 16th, 17th and 18th Century introduced themselves as the only one and unique descendants of the ancient Sarmatians. Everything in Polish culture and awareness — art, design fashion, political philosophy — was subordinated to this vision/ideology, which gave Poland the most… Eurasian look in this age. Appearances were promising, but under the Sarmatian skin there were Jesuitism, Poland as the “Paradis Judaeorum” and only one truly Slavic feature — passivity. All these three together hunted Poland into the grave… Fighting against the Ottoman Empire and Crimea, reaching Moscow and the throne of Tsars — Poles from the 17th Century did not implement their own program — but conceptions of the Popes and others Western powers. They retained Slavic traits, they were East, because they seemed to be more effective, but they were mercenaries not their own cause. It is a tragic contradiction — Poles are not in any case the most Westernize Slavic nation, we have never approached the stadium of Slovenes, Croatians or also Czechs, but in some areas, we have been even more harmful for the vision of Eurasia. Of course, some part of Polish-Lithuanian elites felt our true roots, and from this source came conceptions of integration of the whole region (Ivan the Terrible, his son Tsar Feodor I and especially Tsar Aleksey Mikhailovich were very serious candidates for Polish-Lithuanian throne, with strong support of more conscious part of the


nobles), but the mainstream — the same as today — was more and more airy-fairy. And in the same time, we have always understood, that the West would never fully accept us, that we do not suit there, that only Eurasia could be our real home. But to gain something we had to lose something. And more specifically — our independence.

Practice, Vision, Program, Prophecy — Legacy When danger of Polish-Russian cooperation in 18th Century was to close — British and Prussian policy led together to collapse of Polish statehood. For the nation it was trauma, but at the same moment we were illuminated by kind of rejection of barriers and restrictions embarrassing Polish identity and ethnogenetic development. As a part of the Russian Empire — in 19th Century Poland contributed in exploration of Siberia the Central Asia, Polish travelers, researchers, soldiers in common, Eurasian case took a part in The Great Game. Persons like as Józef Sękowski (who wrote a prophetic motto not only for Poles: “Messieurs, il est deja temps de s’orientaliser et de se metamorphoser, cet a dire de se russifier”), Jan Prosper Witkiewicz or Bronisław Grąbczewski proofed, that not all Poles were able only to arise uprisings in interest of foreign powers. They were just individuals — someone could say. Well, first of all only outstanding individuals can understand geopolitical and identical necessity. And (what is particularly important for us now) all these efforts are legacy to which we can appeal. Especially because under the Russian rule some Poles were not only loyal participants of the great Eurasian visions and instincts, but also overworked our own programs and conceptions. From todays perspective we should focus on three examples. Polish count, romantic writer and political thinker, Henryk Rzewuski in the middle of 19th Century made a synthesis of the Sarmatian tradition and its true, Eurasian roots. Called


“Polish de Maistre” Rzewuski with whole his traditional outlook in completely different way saw fatalism of the history and the only hope for the World of order and values. “We, from divine verdicts, becoming a part of a powerful association of Russians, we bring our provincial products to the general and common treasury” — Rzewuski wrote and despite a furious attack of Polish Westernizeds continue: “In politics, the Polish question is only partial. The Slavic question is total and we can conclude it from historical experience. The unification of total Slavdom in the future is an irrefutable certainty”. From the Russian perspective the Slavophilia often disturbed Eurasian track, but for Poles realization of being part of the bigger entirety — was a huge leap of consciousness. Writing ten years after the November Uprising (provoked by London to disturb Russian in competition in the area Khiva and Bukhara), count Rzewuski saw clearly position of Poland in the great God’s plan, which for the whole World, threatened with the Revolution and the Enlightenment — should fulfil at the areas of the Heartland. As a writer — Rzewuski presented a literary vision of Polish true identity, purified from Western accretions (although with preservations of Catholic character). Influential, beloved and hated — count was not a politician, and remained on the margins of events. To write a real political program — a politician was needed. And that politician had to wait for a moment of national awaking, of course after another historical disaster, defeat of the fatal January Uprising (being British answer for expanding Russian influences in Shymkent, Turkestan, and finally Tashkent). Almost ten years after this tragedy and act of treason — Kazimierz Krzywicki (one of the closest co-workers of hero of Polish-Russian coo­ peration, Aleksander margrave Wielopolski) wrote a small book “Polska i Rossya w 1872”. Till today is the most realistic and current program of unifications of Polish-Russian efforts, creating a new quality based on common, traditional and integral foundations. This prophetical publication anticipated lability of the Austro-Hungary, German-Russian conflict and the final Russian victory, scale of the

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Russian civilization mission, but also internal threatens. What common sense was seen by Krzywicki? “Political union with the Russian nation forever, and through Russia, with the rest of the Slavdom. Civilization, and through it a moral union with Humanity. Invulnerability of conscience. Justice in rights. Respect for work, persons and property. Moral and legal raise of the family. Paternal and solicitous education of the youth. Enlightenment of the lower classes. Moralization of all social clas­ ses. Fidelity to the Monarch and Dynasty as a warranty and the basis of everything”. Quite up-to-date, with just small corrections, isn’t it? And what in exchange? “We want to be faithful, your most faithful allies in every honest work, in any field that celebrates human beings. We will not leave you in any need, we will not bind anyone against you — is it not enough for you?” — yes, in this declaration nothing should be changed even now, even after all known Polish treasons. That is a platform we all must return to. But learning from 19th Century experien­ ces — we should recognize one more conscious Pole. Adam count Gurowski was one of the greatest minds of his time, drawing attention, but also concern both — Nicholas II and Abraham Lincoln. Gurowski was this thinker, who had found the Slavic identity and its geopolitical destiny, and then… seemed to betray it. Disappointed in his hopes in Tsar, he saw the potential and future of the New World, which perfectly symbolizes ideological doubts, but also the tearing of even a few conscious Poles, not mention the rest of the nation. But was it really a treason, or just a perspicacity? Count Gurowski, former Polish radical and insurgent and the most penetrating visionary (maybe next to acting on another field Józef count Hoene-Wroński) was the only one, who first defined the essence of the Slavic spirit and Tsarist Samoderzhaviye, putting pathetic Westernize-Polish efforts in right perspective — but after that made one step more, noticing the exhaustion of the Tsars’ mission and describing the World of the future — with America and Russia constituting global order (with some of Germany’s leading participation

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in the declining Europe) — and he saw that in 1857! Not known in Poland enough (or misunderstood) Gurowski was of the most influent writers and theorists promoting vision of Russian Nation organizing Eurasian continent in cooperation with America appearing not as the new Ocean Power, but as the second, equal Continent against old, crumbling power of Europe, especially of course Britain. His World-famous works, “America and Europe” (1857) and “Russia as it is” (1854) with often published separately article “Manifest Destiny” were sometimes used as kind of a lampoon against Russia — but in real it is great conception of two nations unifying ideas of freedom and communality to ensure peace and happiness of humanity. In the 19th Century, with The Imperial Russian Navy ships supporting the North in the American harbours in 1863 — that programme seemed to be hope for the future. As we now know — the enemies also did not sleep, and the USA from the ally and geopolitical partner has changed into a deadly enemy of Eurasia and whole humanity. But global perspective of Polish-SlavicAmerican writer count Gurowski — still shows us possible way of evolution. We will not change the religion of most Poles. It is not only the Mongols that will not invade us, but even Russia would hardly be persuaded today to liberate Poland again, as many times in history despite herself. Left us only thoughts that we can reach for and creatively process. Poland seems to be still noble, so we need Rzewuski to give proper meaning this “Polish Mastership”. Poland needs a program — so someone must be Krzywicki of our time. And above all, we all need to reverse the curse of Gurowski, defeat the false American Katehon and find our geopolitical, Eurasian destiny. We cannot just get lost through all the history — and the future!


RESISTANCE, HEGEMONY AND THE WESTERN IMPERIAL LEFT’S CONTRADICTIONS IN THE SYRIAN WAR Abstract The Syrian War is the latest front in Washington’s push to dominate the globe. However, unlike its operations against Iraq and Libya, Syria backed by its allies, has successful resisted Washington-sponsored regime-change. Despite the successful resistance and the obvious case of Washington’s imperialistic ambitions against Syria, the majority of the Western Left has failed to identify this drive to remove an anti-American and anti-Zionist president from Syria and rather has sided with USbacked reactionary forces, many of whom are al-Qaeda linked. This paper will explore why Syria is, and always has been, targeted by US imperialists, the type of forces the US-backs, how this war is to isolate Iran, and who and why the Western Imperial Left support reactionary forces. The Syrian War presents a case on how the American Empire is in decline as it fails to achieve the complete destruction of the Syrian state and the overthrow of democratically elected and Russian-backed President Bashar al-Assad.

Paul Antonopoulos

is a Research Fellow at the Center for Syncretic Studies and has an MA from Western Sydney University. He is the co-author of “Syria: The Hegemonic Flashpoint Between Iran and Saudi Arabia.” His main research interests are the International Relations and Political Economy of the Middle East and Latin America, as well as Great Power Rivalry.

Introduction Imperialism is the mechanism that seeks to militarily and economically control the world. It is through the means of a Western-led capitalist system and the internationalisation of major corporations that one can assert its dominance over weaker states. Imperialism is when multinational corporations or a state, particularly from the Anglosphere, can extract raw materials such as oil and precious metals or assert an economic and military dominance over another state without being accountable to anyone or sharing the profits with the proletariat. It is not reduced to just raw materials or military dominance however, and is also the means for the United States (US) Dollar in particular to be the hegemonic currency of the globe. Those who do not fit into the paradigms of trading in US dollars or having its natural resources under Western corporate control find themselves under intense targeting as we see today in Iran, Syria and Venezuela. This was also seen in 2011 with the overthrow, sodomisation and murder of Colonel Muammar Gaddafi in Libya when he planned to scrap the US dollar and create a gold-backed pan-African currency. This was also seen in Iraq when Saddam Hussein was overthrown and executed when he stopped trading in US Dollars in favour of the Euro Dollar. It is also seen today with the intensification of the warmongering by US President Donald Trump against North Korean leader Kim Jong-Il after it was discovered in June 2017 that the country has trillions of dollars in


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unextracted minerals such as gold, iron, zinc and copper. Although Washington always uses the rhetoric of human right violations as in Iraq, Libya and North Korea as a justification for US aggression, one must question why Washington not only tolerates, but is allied to a puritanical kingdom such as Saudi Arabia that does not allow open elections and does not allow women to drive vehicles; or why the US has supported every right-wing coup in Latin America that has led to the extermination of hundreds of thousands of people, especially socialists, communists and peasants, as well as the rollback of progressive advancements. Rather, the US targeting of Iraq, Libya and North Korea is not for humanitarian reasons, but because these states have not submitted themselves into the orbit of the American Empire. However, the story of imperialism is also a story of resistance. Failed resistance such as Salvador Allende’s catastrophe to stop the US-backed Pinochet-coup in Chile in 1973, the overthrow of Saddam Hussein in 2003 by the invading US military and the murder of Gaddafi in 2011 by US-backed jihadists, are among many. However, there are moments in history that has seen successful resistance to imperialism, particularly the Castro brother’s successes in Cuba, the Vietnamese victory against the expanding American Empire and the Syrian people’s resilience in the current war. Why is Syria a target to imperialist forces? Syria is one of the few states in the world since the Vietnam War that has successfully resisted US imperialism until Washington has tired itself out and almost fully withdrawn. Although the Syrian war is still occurring, we have seen Trump scrap the CIA funding of jihadist groups in July 2017, demonstrating a slow US withdrawal from Syria. However, the most critical question we must ask is why Syria is being targeted by the American Empire to begin with? The two main tenets to this question is Syria’s role within the Axis of Resistance and its geostrategic location at the crossroads of pipeline diplomacy.

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The Axis of Resistance is a coalition between Iran, Syria and the Shi’ite Lebanese paramilitary group, Hezbollah, and has proven to be a powerful anti-imperialist, anti-Western and anti-Zionist force in the Middle East. Although commentators argue the Axis of Resistance is a Shi’ite axis because Iran is a Shi’ite theocracy, Syria is ruled by an Alawite president (Alawi Islam is an offshoot of Shi’ism), and Hezbollah is a Shi’ite militia force, this simple analysis overlooks that Iran is a multiethnic Islamic Republic while Syria is a secular Arab nationalist republic. Such forms of government would normally be at odds with each other, but because of the shared vision that the Middle East should be free from imperialistic ambitions and intervention, particularly from the US Empire, it has forced these states to be aligned with one another. However, is it justified to describe the US as an empire that is being resisted by the Axis? With the US maintaining over 800 military bases in 70 countries, and some of them illegally like in the case of Syria, it dwarfs Russia’s military presence in ten countries and China’s sole international military instalment in Djibouti in East Africa, the question must be seriously considered. Richard Immerman, in his detailed monography Empire for Liberty: A History of American Imperialism from Benjamin Franklin to Paul Wolfowitz, contends that “America is and always has been an empire”. In support of Immerman’s views, Linda Colley agrees that the US is an empire that began its empire-building with the westward expansion across the North American continent in the late 18th century. Julian Go defines “empire as a sociopolitical formation wherein a central political authority exercises unequal influence and power over the political (and in effect the sociopolitical) processes of a subordinate society, peoples, or space”. In addition, Charles Tilly argues that the core of an empire exerts “military and fiscal control” in every segment of its periphery. When considering the more than 800 US military bases dotted across the globe and


its orchestration of regime change in Latin America, Africa and the Islamic world, while applying Go’s explanation that empires exercise unequal influence and power to subordinate and Tilly’s argument that empires exert military control, the US must be considered as a modern empire but still different to those seen in the 19th and early 20th centuries. Whereas traditional subordination was only through direct military intervention as the US had done in Afghanistan and Iraq, it is not limi­ ted to these employments of domination. It also employs economic subversion as it does against Russia for example, especially when considering the sanctions and Saudi Arabia, as Washington’s main Arab ally, imposing an oil oversupply which directly targeted the Russian, Iranian and Venezuelan economies by lowering the price of oil. The overthrow of the pro-US Shah in Iran in 1979 saw a power shift that would directly challenge US hegemonic designs on the region, and most importantly, threaten its most important partner in the Middle East, the Zionist entity known as Israel. With a powerful Iran reinvigorated by a religious zeal and openly stating it wanted to export its revolution and defeat Israel in a military confrontation, the new Ayatollah’s could not be tolera­ ted by the US. Syria’s alignment to the Islamic Republic of Iran is not based on a shared religious affiliation, even if the Alawite’s are an offshoot of Shi’a Islam, but rather because both states are directly affected by the existence of Israel and US imperialism. Syria currently hosts around 600,000 Palestinian refugees and Israel has occupied the oil-rich Golan Heights since the Six-Day War in 1967 when the Zionist entity captured the territory. Iran on the other hand views itself as a leading Islamic nation and that it is the duty for all Muslims to engage in a struggle for the Palestinian cause. It is for this reason that the shared hostility with Israel and the struggle against US imperialism has forced the Axis of Resistance into existence. However, despite the threat to Israel, why is the Axis of Resistance completely intolerable to Washington’s designs on the Middle East?


The most important point comes to oil and gas, particularly pipelines. On the eve of the Syrian war, a Qatar-Turkey pipeline was proposed that would bring Qatari gas from the shared Iranian-Qatari South Pars/North Dome Gas Condensate field, to European markets with a pipeline that would pass through Syria; the proposed pipeline was rejected by Damascus, with Agence France-Presse claiming that Assad refused to sign a pipeline deal to “protect the interests of his Russian ally, which is Europe’s top supplier of natural gas”. However, from the very same gas field, but on the Iranian controlled portion, Syria has been receptive to the building of the Islamic Pipeline in the post-war period, in which the pipeline would pass through Iraq, Syria and onwards to Europe. Asia Times correspondent Pepe Escobar stated that “The Iran-Iraq-Syria pipeline — if its ever built — would solidify a predominantly Shi’ite axis through an economic, steel umbilical cord”. An axis consisting of Iran, Iraq and Syria is not through religious identity, as has already been emphasised, but through economic and geopolitical necessities. The Syrian war presents an opportunity for the US to destroy the Islamic Pipeline proposal by toppling the Iranian-sympathetic Assad in Damascus, which would further isolate Tehran. This is especially true as Syria is the only Arab state that is allied with Iran. However, not only Iranian energy is being compromised because of the difficulty in having its gas and oil reach European markets because of the chaos in Syria and Iraq, but also Syrian energy being exploited by Israel. The discovery of oil in the southern Israelioccupied Golan Heights serves as a major reason why Syria is being targeted by the imperialist powers. Genie Energy were given exclusive rights to the exploration and drilling for this oil. The Board of Advisors to Genie Energy include the 46th US Vice President, Dick Cheney; former CIA head and chairman of the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, James Woolsey; Jacob Lord Rothschild of the London banking dynasty family; and media mogul Rupert Murdoch.

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It is because of its attempted energy and security considerations that Israel assist US imperialist ambitions in the destruction of the Syrian state. The Golan Heights, which has a 20,000-strong indigenous Syrian Druze population, are now outnumbered by approximately 25,000 Israeli settlers. Although the United Nations and Washington has not recognised Israeli control over the Golan Heights, the extraction of Syrian resources serves not only to bolster Israeli and US capitalist interests, but it also weakens Syria as it loses on revenues that could be used towards state-building or re-paying its increasing foreign debt in the incoming post-war period. The Axis of Resistance poses as the only real security threat to the Israeli state in the region, and therefore the long-protracted war against Syria has the potential to weaken the coalition. Although Israel has not engaged in a direct frontal attack against Syria, it does enough to systematically target Hezbollah and preserve jihadist forces fighting against the Syrian Army near the Golan Heights. The Israeli Minister of Defense claimed in 2015 that “...On a strategic level, in other words, we are not intervening on anyone’s behalf”. Israel views the protracted war against Syria to be to its own benefit. With Washington labelling Iran and Syria as a part of the ‘Axis of Evil’, and Hezbollah designated as a terrorist organisation, it becomes clearer that American foreign policy in the Middle East is strategically geared towards completely isolating and encircling Iran. However, unlike its invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq in 2001 and 2003 respectively and on the eastern and western borders of Iran, the US has attempted to expand its neo-colonial web through proxy war and covertly sponsoring terrorist organisation. Respected left-wing scholar Michael Parenti argues that a “Third Worldization” of the United States has emerged. Effectively what is meant by this is that there has been an acceleration of impoverishment in civil society because of Washington’s interest in only serving transnational corporations. Parenti argues

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that the global American military empire is driven by the idea to secure capital expansion. With this explained, Syria’s lack of reception to the US has limited American capital expansion into the country, thus making it a direct target to US imperialism. Therefore, the main tenets for why Syria has been targeted by the American Empire is because of its anti-Zionist ideology and resistance to allowing American influence in the country. It is only because of the desire for the US to control the flow of Middle Eastern gas and oil that it has become imperative that the Syrian state is destroyed, allowing for Western corporations to control Syrian oil and for pipelines from US-friendly states to freely pass through. As seen in Libya, the US-dominated NATO did not necessarily want to govern Libya, but rather ensure that plans for a change in currency trade were halted and that Western-corporate control of the oil was achieved. The success of Washington’s Libyan Experiment was replicated in the US’ proxy war against the Syrian state. However, military and policy planners in the US failed to acknowledge that unlike an isola­ ted Libya, Syria has allies willing to intervene, as seen with Hezbollah’s troop deployment to Syria in 2012, the deployment of Iranian military advisors in 2012, and the Russian aerial intervention that began in September 2015. Libya was afforded no such help when imperialist ambitions targeted it and completely isolated the besieged state. Syria however has always been targeted by US imperialists, which is why the wave of the so-called Arab Spring finally opened the opportunity to destabilise the country. On the eve of the US invasion of Iraq in 2003, General Wesley Clark, a retired 4-star U.S. Army gene­ ral and Supreme Allied Commander of NATO during the 1999 War on Yugoslavia, revealed that he was made aware in 2002 of a plan that was set where the United States would intervene in Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, Libya, Somalia, Sudan and finally Iran. Although this did not occur within the five-year time frame that General Wesley Clarke was told, we have seen


the destabilisation of all states since 2003, with the exception of Iran, which has instead successfully resisted intense US-led sanctions against it.

The US contradiction in Syria Although the Syrian war has presented Washington with an opportunity to topple the anti-imperialist government in Damascus, it has also exposed the farce that is the USled War on Terror. Just as had happened in Libya where all measures were taken to topple Gaddafi, including financing, arming and supporting jihadist forces, the same has happened in Syria where a plethora of militant groups have received the same support as their mujahedeen colleagues in Libya. However, the most important difference is that Gaddafi was toppled and murdered in a short period time, unlike Assad who has not only survived, but strengthened since 2011, mostly due to the support it has received from Hezbollah, Iran and Russia. This was not anticipated by Washington, and the longer the Syrian war has dragged on, the more exposed US support for Al-Qaeda affiliated groups and other terrorist organisations such as ISIS has been revealed. In one example, the Al-Zinki terrorist group in 2016 beheaded a 12-year-old Palestinian child in Aleppo on the allegations that he was a pro-government fighter. This is significant as right up until 2015 this terrorist organisation was funded and armed by the CIA. In another case, in October 2017, it was revealed that Abu Khalid al-Sharqiya, a commander of the Ahrar al-Sharqiya terrorist organisation who were formerly backed by the US, was filmed raping a young teenage girl in the northern Aleppo town of Jarablus. Jarablus is currently controlled by Turkishbacked terrorist groups after they captured the town from ISIS on August 24, 2016. Although it is well known that the US has covertly supported ISIS and al-Nusra, what these two examples demonstrate is that the US were openly and directly supporting these


groups under the guise that they were mode­ rate rebels. Rather, there are two possibilities, either the US did not know who they were supporting in a crazed frenzy to support any group who were fighting the Syrian Army, or, they knew the extremist ideologies of these groups but supported them regardless and contradicted their so-called War on Terror. Evidence of US-ISIS collaboration has also been presented, with one example being the US-led coalition air raid on the Thardeh mountains on the outskirts of Deir Ezzor city in eastern Syria in September 2016 which was when coalitions jets killed 82 Syrian soldiers. Within minutes of the conclusion of the air raid, ISIS stormed Syrian Army positions, driving gover­ nment forces off the mountain peaks and losing considerable amount of territory. This led to several political commentators and mainstream media outlets to suggest that this was an example of the West placing regime change in Syria above defeating terrorism. Russian President Vladimir Putin, nearly a month after the attack, said in an interview with French television: Our American colleagues told us that this airstrike was made in error. This error cost the lives of 80 people and, also just coincidence, perhaps, ISIS took the offensive immediately afterwards. At the same time, lower down the ranks, at the operations level, one of the American military service personnel said quite frankly that they spent several days preparing this strike. How could they make an error if they were several days in preparation? The Syrian military said the airstrikes was a “serious and blatant attack on Syria and its military,” and “firm proof of the US support of ISIS,” with Russian Foreign Ministry Spokeswoman Maria Zakharova stating that after the “attack on the Syrian army, we come to the terrible conclusion that the White House is defending the Islamic State”. However, apart from the US supporting AlQaeda-linked groups in Syria, the US is also the key supporter of the Syrian Democratic

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Forces (SDF) who are led by the Kurdish People’s Protection Units (YPG). The YPG fall under the umbrella of the Turkey-based Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) who are recognised as an international terrorist organisation by Washington. This again demonstrates the contradiction of US policy in Syria where they openly support the YPG, but recognise its parent group as a terrorist organisation. The then-Defense Secretary of the United States, Ashton Carter, praised the YPG in March 2016 as having “proven to be excellent partners of ours on the ground in fighting ISIL. We are grateful for that, and we intend to continue to do that, recognizing the complexities of their regional role”. US Special Operation Forces operating illegally in Syria are often seen wearing YPG badges on their uniforms. In response, Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlut Cavusoglu blasted US troops wearing YPG patches stating that: In that case, we would recommend they use the patches of Daesh [ISIS], al-Nusra and al-Qaida when they go to other parts of Syria and of Boko Haram when they go to Africa. To those who say they don’t consider the YPG to be the same as these terrorist groups, this is our response: this is applying double standards, this is being two-faced. Turkey especially views the PKK as a terrorist organisation as it has fought against their insurgency for decades. Turkey is a key member of the US-led NATO organisation and this disagreement over the Kurds has been a major reason in deteriorating relations between the two states.

Western anti-imperialist contradiction in Syria The most confusing aspect of the Syrian conflict has been the response from most of the Western Left and anti-imperialist organisations. Whereas most post-colonial states and their respective Leftist Parties, as well as former Soviet states, have supported the Syrian government from the onset of the war, majority of Western Leftist groups, with the ex-

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ception of the small number of non-Trotskyite communist organisation, have supported reactionary militant groups in Syria. The Western Left look at the war in Syria as an internal revolution by progressive forces to overthrow a brutal dictatorship, while the majority of the Left in post-Colonial states recognise the external factors and imperial ambitions that is occurring in Syria. Whereas the Western Left mascaraed as anti-imperialist, they refuse to acknowledge imperialistic designs on Syria by the US, Israel, Turkey and Saudi Arabia. For this reason, it is only ample that they are referred to as the “Imperial Left”. As most in the Imperial Left in the West do not have historical memories of being colonised by imperial powers, they generally view the world through the paradigm of only a class struggle between Capitalists and Workers. Therefore, with the eruption of the Syrian War, they failed to acknowledge the external factors at play and believed it to be a Workers struggle against a ‘dictatorship’ that tolerated a bourgeois class. This simplistic view of not acknowledging external factors also meant the Imperial Left’s support for the overthrow of Colonel Gaddafi. It is through this simplistic mechanism that the Western Imperial Left apply their White Saviour Complex and view the post-colonial world of consisting of two types of people, dictators and victims. It is the enthusiasm for the YPG to play the part of victims that has won the hearts of the Imperial Left. The YPG are presented as resisting against extremist groups, especially ISIS, and against the so-called brutal dictatorship of Bashar Assad. By having women pose with guns and Che Guevara flags, they are presented as a progressive force with Marxist and secular values. Whereas the US was contradictory by supporting a branch of an organisation they identify as a terrorist organisation, the YPG are contradictory by presenting themselves as anti-imperialist Marxists but are a wholly reliant and allied to the US Empire. The Imperial Left ignore this contradiction and continue to support the YPG blindly.


The YPG have made it clear that they want to federalise Syria, with more extreme elements within the organisation wanting complete independence. Although the YPG claim to be tolerant of ethnic minorities, the reality has seen the murder of Assyrians in Qamishli and Arab villages be ethnically cleansed. In addition to the goals of separatism and ethnic cleansing, the Imperial Left ignore that the YPG also use child soldiers. The YPG have not even attempted to hide the fact that they use child soldiers and often publish poster displays of child martyrs. A father of a 14-year-old girl near the northern Syrian city of Qamishli revealed how his daughter went to fight with the Women’s Protection Units (YPJ), the female branch of the YPG. He states: “My daughter went to school and was taken from there by a group of YPJ. We knew nothing about her until a YPJ commander called and informed us that she had joined YPJ”. On July 5, 2015 the YPG issued a circular to commanders and heads of recruiting centres saying they were not to recruit or accept anyone under 18 and those who fail to comply will face “maximum disciplinary measures”. However, the US in its annual report on human trafficking in 2017 stated that: Despite having signed a pledge of commitment with an international organization in June 2014 to demobilize all fighters younger than 18 years old, the Kurdish People’s Protection Units (YPG) recruited and trained children as young as 12 years old in 2016. Bias cannot be questioned considering the YPG are the closest allies to the US in Syria, and their startling revelations has revealed the continuous use of child soldiers in Syria. The Imperial Left choose to ignore this gross war crime by the YPG. They also choose to ignore their implementation of ethnic cleansing. Amnesty International researchers visited 14 towns and villages in al-Hasakeh and al-Raqqa provinces in northern Syria, controlled by the YPG,


in July and August 2015 to investigate the forced displacement of residents and demolition of homes. The United Nations however countered the claim made by Amnesty International by stating that: Though allegations of ‘ethnic cleansing’ continued to be received during the period under review, the Commission found no evidence to substantiate claims that the YPG or the SDF ever targeted Arab communities on the basis of ethnicity, nor that YPG cantonal authorities systematically sought to change the demographic composition of territories under their control through the commission of violations directed against any particular ethnic group. Across northern Syria, SDF or YPG forces displaced communities in order to clear areas mined by ISIS during their withdrawal. However, the evidence is that only Arab communities were evacuated under the guise that they were going to be targeted by US-led coalition aircrafts, and Amnesty International provided satellite imagery that showed complete building blocks destroyed that were not a result of fighting against ISIS. One such satellite image showed the scale of the demolitions in Husseiniya village with 225 buildings standing in June 2014 but only 14 remaining in June 2015 — a shocking reduction of 93.8%. One eye witness stated that: “They pulled us out of our homes and began burning the home… they brought the bulldozers... They demolished home after home until the entire village was destroyed”. The towns were destroyed as the YPG believe that Arabs in this particular region are sympathetic and supporters of ISIS. This provides the pretext for the YPG to ethnically cleanse non-Kurdish villages and towns, creating a demographic shift in their favour. Once again, the Imperial Left deny these war crimes and ethnic cleansing and still see the YPG as a progressive and tolerant force, when in reality their aims are for a homogenous Kurdish state. The most confusing aspect of the Imperial Left’s support for the YPG is the contradiction of US support for the militia group. The

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Imperial Left champions themselves as a progressive movement that is anti-imperialist, however, the YPG who also portray themselves as a Marxist-Leninist group are wholly reliant on the greatest imperial power the world has ever seen, the United States. This contradiction is also overlooked by the Western Imperial Left who directly support Washington’s aggressive foreign policy against Syria.

Conclusion The Syrian War has proven to be one of the deadliest wars of this century so far. Unlike the Iraq War in 2003 where it was a direct invasion by the US, Syria has seen the Libyan model implemented against it, but fail. Assad garners the support of the majority of the people, and coupled with allies such as Hezbollah, Iran and Russia, it has ensured the survival of the Syrian state. It is not necessarily the survival of Assad that must be supported, but the survival of a secular Syrian state that has its sovereignty respected. The Syrian government provides free healthcare and education for its population, while subsidising many necessities. This is why Syria has been a model and inspiration for many post-colonial states that has seen the successes it has achieved despite constant wars with the Zionist entity, limited resources and limited manpower. Syria has not only survived, but also resisted US imperialism against it. This war has not weakened Syria, but rather strengthened national unity, support for the government, support for the army and made relations with Iran even stronger. What the US failure in Syria demonstrates is the decline of the American Empire. The American Empire has failed to subdue and isolate Iran, failed to destroy Hezbollah, failed to starve out North Korea, and in recent times failed to replace Bolivarianism in Venezuela with neoliberal pro-US forces, or make Russia compliant to its demands. As post-colonial states galvanise and increasingly reclaim their rightful sovereignty, in conjunction with the rise of Russia and China, this

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serves to only weaken the American Empire and help create a more equitable world where Western corporations are not viewed as the pinnacle of civilisation and where multipolarity is respected. The success of Syria’s survival demonstrates this changing world order, especially with a resurgent Russia and a Chinese rise that has eliminated the short-lived unipolar world that existed since the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. The survival of Syria also challenges the Imperial’s Left outlook towards post-colonial states. Whereas Stalinist and Maoist organisations recognise the necessity to support the survival of the Syrian state from the imperialist aggression against it, the Imperial Left that constitutes the majority of the Left in the West today, particularly the Trotskyites and Cliffites, support the imperialist aggression. However, when looking at Leftist organisations from post-colonial or ex-Soviet states, they all nearly unilaterally support Syria, including communist party’s in Syria, Lebanon, Turkey and other regional states. Therefore, it is only fitting to announce that after the brutal wars against Iraq and Libya in the 21st century, Syria represents a changing world order where resistance against the American Empire can be successfully achieved, with the support of the rival Great Powers (Russia and China). The Syrian success will only emboldened Hezbollah and Iran further, but more significantly, other so-called dissident states that do not fall into the paradigms of American capitalism such as North Korea and Venezuela. It is therefore unsurprising to see North Korea and Venezuela all strengthen their ties with not only Syria, but also China and Russia, rather than abandon it with the onset of the war. Although Cuba and Vietnam successfully resisted American imperialism, these were isolated cases in the 20th century, and rather, as the 21st century continues, we will continue to see the decline of the American Empire’s hegemonic unipolar global power.


Reference List: Adra, Zen. “Warning: 18+ Video. Aleppo rebels behead a child.” Al-Masdar News. July 19, 2016. https://www. Amnesty International. “SYRIA: US ALLY’S RAZING OF VILLAGES AMOUNTS TO WAR CRIMES.” October 13, 2015. syria-us-allys-razing-of-villages-amounts-to-war-crimes/ Antonopoulos, Paul. “Australian jets participated in massacre of Syrian soldiers in Deir Ezzor,” Al-Masdar News. September 18, 2016. article/australian-jets-participated-massacre-syrian-soldiers-deir-ezzor/ Antonopoulos, Paul. “BREAKING: Former US-backed militant commander filmed raping teenage girl in northern Syria.” Fort Russ News, October 1, 2017. http://www. Antonopoulos, Paul. and Drew Cottle. Syria: The Hegemonic Flashpoint Between Iran and Saudi Arabia. New Delhi: Vij, 2017. Antonopoulos, Paul. “UN report counters Amnesty International’s claim that Kurds are ethnically cleansing in Syria.” Al-Masdar News. March 15, 2017. https://mobile. Baker, Luke. “Netanyahu asks Trump to recognize Israeli sovereignty over Golan Heights.” Reuters. February 15, 2017. Bertrand, Natasha. “Turkey slams ‘unacceptable’ photos of US troops wearing Kurdish patches while they fight ISIS.” Business Insider. May 27, 2016. Chulov, Martin. “Syrian opposition group that killed child ‘was in US-vetted alliance’.” The Guardian. July 20, 2016. Cottle, Drew and Paul Antonopoulos. (2017) “The Syrian War and the Strategic Logic of US Imperialism’s Drive to Dominate the Middle East.” The Centre for Counter Hegemonic Studies, 4/17. Deeb, Sarah E. “U.S. says it might have struck Syrian troops while targeting ISIS.” Chicago Sun Times. September 17, 2016. Escobar, Pepe. “Why Qatar wants to invade Syria.” Asia Times. September 28, 2012. atimes/Middle_East/NI28Ak03.html Fishman, Alex. “Israel is up to its neck in Syria.” Ynet News. May 1, 2015.,7340,L-4652757,00.html


Fraser, Suzan and Lolita Baldor. “Turkey upset over images of US soldiers with Kurdish symbols.” AP News. May 27, 2016. Genie Oil Gas. “Strategic Advisory Board.” 2017. https:// Go, Julian. Patterns of Empire: The British and American Empires, 1688 to the Present. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011. Groh, Tyrone and James Lockhart. “Is America an Empire.” War on the Rocks. August 27, 2015. Human Rights Watch. “Syria: Kurdish Forces Violating Child Soldier Ban: Despite Promises, Children Still Fight.” July 15, 2015. syria-kurdish-forces-violating-child-soldier-ban-0 Hurriyet Daily News. “Pentagon chief praises Kurdish fighters in Syria.” March 18, 2016. Immerman, Richard H. Empire for Liberty: A History of American Imperialism from Benjamin Franklin to Paul Wolfowitz. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2010. McInnis, Verity. Women of Empire: Nineteenth-Century Army Officers’ Wives in India and the U.S. West. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 2017. Parenti, Michael. Against Empire: A Brilliant Expose of the Brutal Realities of U.S. Global Domination. San Francisco: City Lights, 1995. Paul, Ron. Pillars of Prosperity: Free Markets, Honest Money, Private Property. Auburb: Ludwig von Mises Institute, 2008. RT. “Putin: West responsible for Middle East instability and terrorism in Europe.” October 12, 2016. https://www. Sanger, David E., Eric Schmitt. and Ben Hubbard. “Trump Ends Covert Aid to Syrian Rebels Trying to Topple Assad.” The New York Times. 19 July, 2017. https://www.nytimes. com/2017/07/19/world/middleeast/cia-arming-syrian-rebels.html Segell, Glen. Axis of Evil and Rogue States: The Bush Administration, 2000-2004. London: Glen Segell, 2005. Sputnik. “De-Dollarization: The Story of Gaddafi’s GoldBacked Currency is Not Over.” March 17, 2016. https:// U.S. Department of State. “2017 Trafficking in Persons Report: Tier 3.” 2017. countries/2017/271293.htm Weller, Chris. “North Korea is sitting on a stockpile of minerals worth trillions.” Business Insider. June 19, 2017.

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Graduated of History from Durham University, which included a year in China, specializing in nomadic affairs. Contributor to Geopolitica. ru, Re-Thinking Russia, Almanach Via Evrasia among other resources. Currently a political lobbyist.

Abstract The Qing empire managed to maintain and increase its grasp of Inner Mongolia during the complex 19th century. Manchu power in the region was a good example of shrewd use of ‘soft’ policies and a respectful centre-to-periphery power dialogue, in which the parties mutually benefited from integration despite the centre outweighing the periphery in geopolitical terms. Policy makers tasked with Eurasian integration may be wise to consider the factors enabled the Qing to succeed in Inner Mongolia and consider their reapplication to diversify modern integrative policies. Inner Mongolia is an unsatisfactory proxy for Eurasian integration but makes an excellent case study. Inner Mongolia — the literally translated name of modern China’s northern-most province NeiMengGu — was a unique political environment during the Qing dynasty (1644-1911). In stark contrast to the rest of the empire, Inner Mongolia was relatively autonomous with traditional institutions of government remaining in power. It was one of the first ‘provinces’ to formally join the Manchu empire, when the Yuan dynasty seal was ceremonially handed over to the Manchu emperor Nurhaci, legitimising his suzerainty, predating Qing capture of Beijing in 1644.1 The Mongolian population was mostly nomadic in contrast to their southern neighbours. These two factors meant that Inner Mongolia retained its distinct legal status of an outlying territory — affiliated but not unified. Since then, the Manchu Qing regional priority is sinicising and integrating Inner Mongolia politically. The Mongolian nomads lived far and few between — often with under ten families living together in temporary settlements, only monasteries forming permanent structures in the steppe.2 Nomads are best defined as people who bring their animals to pasture, moving with them, instead of bringing fodder to animals.3 The concentration of nomads in Inner Mongolia enabled its use as a political barometer for the wider steppe region.4 For as long as the two contrasting lifestyles existed, they engaged in intermittent conflict caused by varying Robert James Miller, Monasteries and Cultural Change, p.3. Pevtsov, Notes, p. 81. 3  Rada and Neville Dyson-Hudson, ‘Nomadic Pastoralism’, Annual Review of Anthropology, 9 (1980), p. 18. 4  Johan Elverskog, Our great Qing: the Mongols, Buddhism and the State in Late Imperial China (Honlulu, 2006), p. 10. 1  2

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questions of land use and trade.1 And yet, the Chinese geographer Tan Qixiang noted that it was Inner Mongolia that did not change its boundaries significantly and suffered no major rebellions during the nineteenth century period of tumult — an almost unique case.2 The Inner Mongolian example shows how and how not to balance centralisation and local sovereignty, tradition and reform, which is increasingly relevant to integrative processes in Eurasia today, where too, the prospective centre outweighs the periphery in all ways and is going through a period of economic difficulty. The Inner Mongolian case can be dissected thematically — considering the source base, and then the three mechanisms of government and their implications for modern-day Eurasia. The sources informing analysis of the Inner Mongolian politics are few but sufficient. The primary sources for this period split into three distinct categories. Firstly, sources in the form of records, bulletins, edicts and law codes were produced by the Qing state in ample amounts. While hard economic and census data is lacking,3 overall records are still rich in information. These, however, remain mostly unattainable to the English-speaking historian through either language barrier or the logistics of them being kept in China without digitised copies. Primary sources from neighbouring countries also exist, but present similar problems of language and accessibility. Even contemporaries, however, lament that earlier data, such as embassy letters, has been lost to conflagration or otherwise, thus showing a general primary source deficit.4 The second category is that of archaeology, and while material culture is often referred to in many secSechin Jaghchid, Peace, Trade and War Along the Great Wall: Nomadic-Chinese Interaction Through Two Millennia (Bloomington, 1989), p. 14. 2  Tan Qixiang, The Concise China Historical Atlas (Beijing, 1991) (谭其骧, 简明中国历史地图集 (北京, 1991)), p. 70. 3  Yin-Tang Chang, The Economic Development and Prospects of Inner Mongolia (Taipei, 1971), p. 62. 4  John Badeley, Russia, Mongolia, China: being some record of the relations between them from the beginning of the XVIIth century to the death of the Tsar Alexei Mikhailovich, A.D. 1602-1676 (London, 1919), p. 249. 1


ondary sources, nomadic archaeology poses many theoretical problems of its own and remains an underdeveloped field of study.5 Due to space, weight and economic constraints, a high percentage of goods nomads used were biodegradable, heavy objects being sometimes left at camping sites, which poses a problem for nomadic archaeology leaves little material trace.6 Thirdly, there is an impressive number of contemporary travel accounts. Especially after the opening up of Qing China over the course of the nineteenth century, the volume of travel literature in regards to Inner Mongolia becomes astounding.7 The limitations of travel accounts are numerous. Most were not oriental scholars, and apart from very rare examples such as Gilmour,8 did not try to learn Mongolian or Chinese, relying instead on fellow travellers and interpreters.9 To overlay this onto personal interests and motivations, many writers glanced over important socio-political context, concentrating on the mundane they found surprising.10 Even reports from state embassies have been criticised for their blinkered nature, focusing on legitimising their work to their sovereign instead of describing the political and social phenomena they saw.11 Naturally, the historical focus falls on the rare scholar-travellers, such as Pozdneev, and corroborative efforts comparing accounts of various travellers together in order to infer the approximate state of affairs. Secondary works can be categorised into three categories also. Firstly, there has been a large body of literature written in the USSR. These formed the majority of the literature and mostly used a Marxist analytical model.12 Secondly, general histories of China do not fail to mention her northern frontiers, however, 5  Roger Cribb, Nomads in Archaeology (Cambridge, 2004), p. 83 6  Ibid., p.69. 7  Robert James Miller, ‘A Selective Survey of Literature on Mongolia’, The American Political Science Review, 46 (1952), p. 858. 8  James Gilmour, Among the Mongols (London, 1883), pp. 11-27. 9  Vladimirtsov, Mongolian Social Structure, p. 27. 10  Ibid., p. 32. 11  Badeley, Russia, Mongolia, China, p. 3. 12  Miller, ‘A Selective Survey of Literature on Mongolia’, p. 856.

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usually only in passing, probably due to there not being much “action” in the region, but that is exactly what this article is pre-occupied with. Lastly, there is a growing body of work by English-language historians concentrating on nomadic affairs. They, too, often rely on travel accounts, rare translated documents, and Soviet historiography. The volume of accessible primary sources increasing exponentially with the advent of the 19th century through the explosion of travel literature, secondary literature has broadly concentrated on this period, and thus, the article follows. The Qing employed three mechanisms of administration, and analysis of Inner Mongolian government should be split in this way. The traditional ‘fuedal’ system persisted throughout the period, and in turn answered to a ministerial body. The third layer was that of the ‘soft’ institution of the Buddhist faith. This framework functioned despite the complicated nature of the period, right up until the demise of the Qing in 1911. The clan structure of Mongolian society before its incorporation into the Manchus in the mid1600s almost mirrored the Banner system of Qing administration.1 The result was that the nomads of Inner Mongolia were organised in a pseudo-military hierarchy very similarly to the Manchus themselves.2 This eased cultural understanding. Two overall alashan groupings of tribes, subdivided into six leagues of twenty-four hoshun (Banners) in total.3 Each level had its officials and nobles, with almost all nobles claiming a lineage from the family of Genghis Khan. Subdivisions continued down to units of ten families. The hoshun were often claimed to be genealogical unities, yet ethnographic accounts are almost entirely absent.4 Over time, units of family metamorphosed into units of non-familial relations and association.5 By the nineteenth century, it was rare for Mongols to recall more than three genera1  2  3  4  5

Elliot, The Manchu Way, p. 74. Ibid., p. 74. Yin-Tang, The Economic Development, p. 6. Sneath, ‘Tribe, Ethnos, Nation’, p. 90. Ibid., p. 90.

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tions back.6 As opposed to genealogical clans, hoshun were essentially feudal dukedoms with similar powers attributed to their ‘dukes’, and being such, made maintaining their loyalty a priority for Beijing. 7 Each hoshun had its own prince/chief, or jassak. Based on a rotor system, jassaks made their way to Beijing on an annual reception with the emperor. The importance of this tradition cannot be oversta­ ted. This ceremony was supposed to actively ease cultural frictions between Mongols and Chinese.8 The annual pilgrimage was a pompous occasion, confirming imperial support and hence legitimacy of the jassaks and vice-versa. The contemporary explorer Pevtsov saw personal donations being expected from banner members for a jassak’s pilgrimage, allegedly crippling an already poor community,9 however this only reinforced the importance of the ceremony. Sending off a jassak was a pompous event, important for the whole hoshun. It asserted their autonomy, the legitimacy of their jassak and reinforced their connection to the wider imperial system — all desirable elements in a seemingly archaic ceremony. At the Qing court, the jassaks would receive remunerations and gifts,10 provide tribute in return and reassert their fealty to the emperor, voluntarily admitting their ‘subject status’.11 The jassaks gained authority through being of the status to be seen by the emperor and even to be housed within Beijing itself.12 Thus, the emperor made up for the lack of imperial government manpower in Inner Mongolia,13 by retaining a method of indirect appeasement of the region. The emperor invested precious time into long ceremonial exchan­ ges with chiefs of a poor and loosely populated region because it was worth it — the Sneath, Headless State, p. 98. Sneath, ‘Tribe, Ethnos, Nation’, p. 105. 8  Ning Chia, ‘The Lifanyuan and the Inner Asian Rituals in the Early Qing’, Late Imperial China, 14 (1993), p. 82. 9  Pevtsov, Notes, p. 105. 10  Called ‘SiLai’ meaning ‘a gift from a superior to an inferior’: Chia, ‘The Lifanyuan and the Inner Asian Rituals in the Early Qing’, p. 83 11  Campbell, Travels, p. 74. 12  Chang, The Economic Development, p. 68. 13  Mette M. High, and Jonathan Schlesinger, ‘Rulers and Rascals: The Politics of Gold in Qing Mongolian History’, Central Asian Survey, 29 (2010), p. 6. 6  7


function fulfilled was mutual legitimisation. The ceremony provided another centralising process — it set fashion. In the 19th century, if jassaks could afford it, the trend was to wear Chinese clothes, eat Chinese food and have furniture to match.1 The shifting of everyday fashion towards China, would also push the disposition of non-noble Mongols in the same direction. The pilgrimage-to-Beijing institution survived between the mid-1600s and 1910, because it set a relationship and channel for communication between regional and central ruling classes, and an ideological fashion on the ground.2 For Eurasia today, the lesson is straightforward — that integration was and can be achieved through informal, uncodified opting-in of regional mid-level elites. While modern states do not possess a feudal framework, it can be argued that local leaders still possess very high personal authority. This makes them important stakeholders, who, like the jassaks, should be brought into seeing the benefit of integration. Hosting more exclusive, regular and grand forums to which the most authoritative individuals are invited from across the sub-continent could mimic the success of the pilgrimage-to-Beijing tradition. The jassaks then answered to the Manchu provincial governors — the amban — and in turn, to the Lifan Yuan ministerial body.3 Beijing worked to reduce regional autonomy in waves, first one being traced to the early 1800s,4 and the second to the 1870s, yet regional elites remained ‘sticky’ — a useful case for what to look out for when attempting to integrate Eurasian states. Harsher command and control policies were thought to be required by the Qing state to counter foreign power encroachment and domestic dissent. However, the centralising process did not necessarily disadvantage the Mongol nobility. In some areas of Inner Mongolia, Mongol nobles found their way to eventually presiding over both settled and nomadic subjects.5 To the contrary, despite Qing efforts, the nobility 1  2  3  4  5

Campbell, Travels in Mongolia, p. 46. Ibid., p. 87. ‘Outer Territories’ administration as discussed below Heuschert, ‘Legal Pluralism in the Qing Empire’, p. 316. Ibid., p. 37.


entered into positions of influence within the Lifan Yuan administration and the Buddhist hierarchy, and the more hoshun structures receded, the more they rushed to the other two institutions of power.6 The Qing tried to expand the purview of the Lifan Yuan further attains to the Mongolian winning hand as it shows the insecurity felt by Beijing. The increasing oversight from the court did, counterintuitively, add more importance and power to local institutions in actual terms. Demarcating hoshun boundaries, preventing labour and flock movement,7 as well as setting dynasties to rule each hoshun only made their internal administrative institutions more important than before.8 This aspect of Inner Mongolian autonomy is highlighted by the Borjigid Mongol dynasty never quite obeying neo-Confucian regulation and primogeniture.9 This illustrates how ‘sticky’ regional elites can be, and that ceremonial engagement can be more effective that legalistic centralisation. Jassaks and their companions already commanded regional respect and connections, making it easier to get through the ranks of an essentially Mongol-staffed institution. 10 Various translations for the Lifan Yuan are abound in English-language histories. To summarise its function and if translated from the Chinese, the body can be called the ‘Court for Colonial Affairs’11 or using the Manchu translation, the ‘Ministry for Ruling the Outer Provinces’.12 The Lifan Yuan was a ministerial structure set up in 1638, after the Inner Mongolia Princes recognised Qing suzerainty in 1634.13 During the Qing dynasty, the Lifan Yuan was a bureaucratic body dealing with 6  James Miller, Monasteries and Cultural Change in Inner Mongolia (Wiesbaden, 1959), p. 120. 7  From 1789 onwards, as discussed in Myadar, ‘Imaginary Nomads’, p. 79. 8  Vladimirtsov, Mongolian Social Structure, p. 193. 9  Miller, Monasteries and Cultural Change, p. 105. 10  Di Cosmo, ‘Qing Colonial Administration in Inner Asia’, p. 295. 11  Nicola Di Cosmo, ‘Qing Colonial Administration in Inner Asia’, The International History Review, 20 (1998), p. 289. 12  Chia, ‘The Lifan Yuan and the Inner Asian Rituals in the Early Qing’, p, 61. 13  Miller, Monasteries and Cultural Change, p. 3.

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the administration of Tibet, Xinjiang and Inner Mongolia. It was a fully-fledged ministry in size, with separate department for each dependent territory and an additional reception/ceremony bureau for each department. Some historians like Di Cosmo say the mini­ stry resembled a traditional colonial body.1 Others like Ning wrote to the contrary — that the Lifan Yuan was a body that both protected Mongol lifestyle and facilitated trade in a mutually beneficial way.2 In the analytical frame of this article, the Lifan Yuan acts as a metaphor for supranational organisations currently growing in Eurasia. It was similar in substance — in that the Lifan Yuan was to direct harmonisation of Qing and Mongol law and to facilitate trade. The Lifan Yuan was an arm of Qing executive government but the way Qing demands were implemented was far from direct command-and-control, but preferred to bargain with the Inner Mongolia jassaks. The activities of the Lifan Yuan could be split into three parts, namely: law codification and harmonisation, a body of public diplomacy and a facilitator of trade. Note the similarity of these functions to the supranational bodies that exist across Eurasia today. Law codification was a grinding process of a sort of tug of war with existing Mongolian conventions. There is little to no evidence of promulgated written laws being used to dispense justice before the Qing.3 Some aspects were quite common sense — such as the codi­fication of the death penalty in terms of how the accused was killed, when etc. Whereas before the local law in Mongolia merely specified the crimes for which the penalty was ‘alay-a’, literally, ‘let’s kill him’.4 Other aspects were more difficult — repeat edicts forbidding Chinese-Mongol intermarriage5 and settling were issued in the years 1748, 1787 and 1800, 1808, 1823, 1824, 1826, 1  Di Cosmo, ‘Qing Colonial Administration in Inner Asia’, p. 294. 2  Chia Ning, ‘The Li-fan Yuan in the early Ch’ing Dynasty’, (PhD diss. John Hopkins University, 1992), p. II. 3  Heuschert, ‘Legal Pluralism in the Qing Empire’, p. 313. 4  Ibid., p. 316. 5  Lattimore, The Mongols of Manchuria, p. 61

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among other dates, respectively.6 The need to repeatedly redress an issue further shows the lack of actual executive power the Lifan Yuan had. Hence, a certain distance was kept with the hoshuns of Inner Mongolia, showing the initially high level of autonomy afforded by Mongolian self-government. Eurasia today too presents a haphazard patchwork of jurisdictions. The dissolution of the USSR made it so, and ongoing destabilising processes are increasing legislative confusion continuously. The goal being mutual integration, the Inner Mongolian lesson is that top down command may not be as effective as bargaining, and adaptive local policy. Increasingly as the nineteenth century went on, new Qing law were being applied in Mongolian areas by being integrated into the local statute without adaptation. The Jiaqing emperor legitimised this practice by precedent in 1817 by stating that for cases where Mongol statute did not provide a solution, the overall Qing code should be used.7 This me­ th­ od of hole-filling can be an effective integration tool across Eurasia today too, especially as new technologies demand new laws. The same was applied in the 19th century which was too, a time of technological paradigm shifts. As time went on, the formal statute to be used in Mongolia received Confucian ideolo­gical overtones. In this way, primogeniture was enforced for succession of jassaks. Perhaps the most important sign of Qing domi­nance was the eventual official sanction for Chinese migration in 1878, which jassaks were not noted to be rebelling against during that century. Gradually, the tug of war was being pulled to its side by the Qing court. The incremental nature of integration and the relative success of loophole filling legislation versus the failure of command edicts sets precedent for integrative policy — a blueprint which should be thought of when pursuing harmonisation within the Eurasian Union today. 6  Bernice Brown, ‘The Policy of the Chinese Government Toward the Mongols’, (Master’s diss., University of Chicago, 1938), p. 18. 7  Heuschert, ‘Legal Pluralism in the Qing Empire’, p. 316.


The Lifan Yuan whether through design or accident turned different classes of society towards Beijing with its policies. It eventually oversaw succession within the Mongol hoshuns. By the 19th century, before a jassak could be confirmed, his candidacy had to be considered and rubber stamped by ministry officials. This maintained by giving a formal avenue to succession disputes and gave additional legitimacy to confirmed jassaks — it was them that Beijing would communicate with. Having these powers over the jassaks, the ministry became a mechanism for feedback from the non-noble population. An illustrative example is provided by Campbell, who cites the Peking Gazette from 1878 describing how popular calls against a jassak were answered by officials and he was found guilty of borrowing money from his subjects, among other financial crimes, for which he was puni­ shed.1 Another example is that of mining policy. The jassaks were meant to be in charge of enforcing the mining ban but they did not want to stop profiting from illegal cashflow, thus Beijing was forced to react.2 The Qing centrally ordered for harsh punishments for illegal mining — something that appeased herders but hit jassak pockets. If Chinese and Mongols were to cooperate in illicit mining, the Chinese would be whipped 100 times, and the jassak fined one year of pay.3 Mining was also extremely unpopular with Mongol vigilantes sometimes killing illicit miners.4 Gilmour reported he was looked upon with suspicion by locals whenever he dug up stones out of curiosity.5 This particular policy balanced the herdsman and jassak internally against one another, with the winner being Beijing. Finding points of contention among social strata on the ground, and centrally moving towards appeasing the non-elite parts of society can thus opt-in more of the local society as stakeholders of the imperial system, this tactic functioned in Inner Mongolia, and can be a useful guide for how to watch out for op1  2  3  4  5

Campbell, Travels in Mongolia, p. 55. Lattimore, The Mongols of Manchuria, p. 78. High and Schlesinger, ‘Rulers and Rascals’, p. 8. High and Schlesinger, ‘Rulers and Rascals’, p. 4. Gilmour, Among the Mongols, p. 190.


portunities for opting in the non-elite strata of local societies in Eurasia in the present. Crucially, the Lifan Yuan governed mechanisms of trade, which allows more comparison to present-day supranational organisations, since they are formally tasked with this particular function. The Lifan Yuan oversaw the maintenance of postal stations which doubled up as caravan rest points, and while the Mongol population tried to avoid the corvee labour of manning these stations, they were crucial to the trade network of the region.6 In turn, the ministry presided over settling land rights and protecting Hoshun borders. Guard posts were set up to counter illicit mining.7 Each Hoshun was allocated land in accordance to approximate population size and settlement there was forbidden, to the disadvantage of Chinese migrants. One of the main causes of settler-nomad conflict — the boundary land which could be used both for agriculture and husbandry — was de jure settled by demarcation of borders with Beijing as arbiter and higher authority.8 The other main historical issue of nomads requiring a source of manufactured goods was alleviated through the setting up of a legal framework for trade towns (mai-mai-cheng — literally ‘sell-buy towns’)9. The cities were administered the same as settled areas of China, directly by the Lifan Yuan. Walled cities split into trading neighbourhoods and quarters were dotted along the frontier of settled lands. Trade grew in value over time, and the ensuing development of roads fuelled international export too, mostly of tea to Russia in exchange for furs.10 These towns were bustling, and their richness attracted all sorts, including merchants and criminals.11 The conservative trade policy, of basing exchange in nodes of larger logistical frameworks was effective and can be compared to the large infrastructure drives of present day. The ‘One Belt One Road’ initiaPevtsov, Notes, p. 107. High and Schlesinger, ‘Rulers and Rascals’, p. 7. 8  Ning, ‘The Li-fan Yuan in the early Ch’ing Dynasty’, p. 274. 9  High and Schlesinger, ‘Rulers and Rascals’, p. 6. 10  Michie, The Siberian Overland Route, p. 72-79. 11  Campbell, Travels in Mongolia, p. 43. 6  7

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tive parallels Qing efforts in Inner Mongolia in spirit if not in form. If these nodal framework policies were effective before, there is reason to suppose that with adaptation to the modern scale and technology of trade, they will be effective now. As discussed later, this system paralleled the Qing approach to Buddhist monasteries. The somewhat romantic picture needs to be balanced by the notably high level of abuse of power1 and corruption by officials.2 The continued lack of economic qualitative development and the persisting primary product dependency could not have been to the advantage of the Mongols, yet remained an issue without official redress throughout the period. The collusion between Lifan Yuan officials and hoshun officials in artificially suppressing the price of Mongol goods (to the profit of both parties) further resulted in impoverishing Mongol families.3 The Qing were forced by economic pressures elsewhere to even institute a state mining company ‘Mongolor’ towards the end of the period. 4 Many jassaks illegally selling land to Chinese farmers and falling into debt to Chinese banks made Inner Mongolia reach crisis point both economically and socially at the turn of the 20th century.5 That being said, such extraneous process continued to damage Inner Mongolia not as the result or intention of Qing policy but in spite of it. The context of the 19th century is one of wars and rebellion, a time of constant crisis in the Qing empire. Despite this, the two legal forms of administration discussed present several overall successful policy strategies which can be applied in part to modern Eurasian integrative processes at least metaphorically. The third mechanism by which Inner Mongolia was administered by the Qing was through the court supporting the development of the Buddhist faith. Buddhism in Inner Mongolia for the purposes of this article will be looked at as 1  W. Hazlitt, trans., Evariste Regis Huc, Travels in Tartary, Thibet and China, 1844-5-6 (London, 1852), p. 172. 2  Pevtsov, Notes, p. 105. 3  Ibid., p. 105. 4  High and Schlesinger, ‘Rulers and Rascals’, pp. 9-10. 5  Di Cosmo, ‘Qing Colonial Administration’, p. 303.

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a mechanism of administration, divested from its spiritual meanings, which while extremely important for the period and region, remain outside the purview set here. Having first entered Mongolia in the 13th century, by the period considered Buddhist monasteries, of va­ rious size, were the dominant institutions and physical feature in the steppes of Mongolia. The effect of Buddhism on Mongolia is pro­ bably the most studied aspect of Mongolian governance. In part, this must be the result of there being so many more surviving sources for the religious institution than other aspects of the area.6 Official memos from the Qing court and general impressions tend to lead historians to arguing that the Buddhist faith was a means of pacification of the Mongols by the government which, in turn, encouraged and funded the faith.7 However, as with previous factors, a mutually beneficial relationship can be observed, with impetus driving the development of Buddhism from both sides. Not least, this is confirmed by historians citing figures of as high as 65% of the male population being enrolled as Buddhist lamas during some parts of the 19th century. Such a high and exact figure is somewhat doubtful in its reliability, being traced back by Chang to a contemporary travelling missionary in turn citing ‘reliable sources’.8 No matter the real fi­ gure, the significance of the Buddhist faith was evident. The practical aspect of the growth of monasteries was the logistical framework that grew up as a result. The encouragement of this supra-regional network brought significant economic benefits and gave more ‘soft’ influence to Beijing. There thus should be no wonder that Beijing is pursuing roadworks in the region in present times too.9 Monasteries were very important as intersections on nomadic paths and as economic units. Miller, Monasteries and Cultural Change, p. 16. Ibid., p. IX, p. 136. 8  Chang, The Economic Development of Inner Mongolia, p. 66 9  Chintushig, Boldsukh, ‘Chinese state media says China can help Mongolia under one condition’, UB Post, 09/02/2017, chinese-state-media-says-china-can-help-mongoliaunder-one-condition/, date accessed: 14/02/2018 6  7


Pevtsov notes, how they saw Mongols moving from monastery to monastery and how they were the only built structures he could see in the steppe.1 Sometimes, the monasteries fulfilled the function of a trade town, sometimes of a caravanserai. Either way, they acted as nodes within the logistical framework of the steppe. Taking bit by bit from several income sources, be they jassaks, state funding or pro­ fits from assets like livestock, monasteries enjoyed a positive cumulative effect.2 Pozdneev discusses at length how monasteries grew and accumulated huge sums of wealth.3 Being centres of economic activity, necessarily makes monasteries centres of administration. The logistical reach of the monasteries and their high number essentially gave the Qing a ready method of influence over the whole of Inner Mongolia and the individual lives of Mongol families.4 The economic power of the monasteries balanced out the influence of hoshun administration in a way that mostly suited the Qing. The ‘modus operandi’ was that while secular and clergy ranks were de jure equivalent, but the clergy enjoyed significantly more social capital.5 This echoes the way the Lifan Yuan administered trade and further indicates the need for logistical nets in the Eurasian steppe. Trade can induce political integration and incentivising regional trade through facilitating logistics can stimu­ late integration. This self-feeding loop was arguably an encouragement for Qing funding for monasteries and creative of Mongol language ones parallel to traditional Tibetan institutions. 6 The Qing priority was uniting their polity, just as elements of Eurasia are in the process of integrating today. The political axioms of the region have evidently remained the same, logistical facilitation across significant distances being vital for regional integraPevtsov, Notes, p. 70. Aleksei Pozdneev, Notes on the Buddhist Monasteries of Mongolia in Relation the People of Mongolia (St. Petersburg, 1887) (Позднеев, Алексей Матвеевич, Очерки быта буддийских монастырей и буддийского духовенства в Монголии в связи с отношением сего последнего к народу (Санкт-Петербург, 1887)), p. 8. 3  Pozdneev, Notes, p. 8. 4  Miller, Monasteries and Cultural Change, p. 138. 5  Ibid., p. 102. 6  Miller, Monasteries and Cultural Change, p. 78. 1  2


tion. Thus the energy with which the People’s Republic of China is currently pursuing the grand logistical project of ‘One Belt One Road’ is unsurprising.7 Despite the difficult nature of the century, the triumvirate of hoshun, Buddhism and the Lifan Yuan managed Inner Mongolia in a way as to satisfy both the demands of Mongols and the Qing court to the maximum extent possible as dictated by extraneous factors. Not without certain excesses, the Qing ensured order in the region, and gradually worked to integrate it in a way which continued to reconcile the interested of all stakeholders, both nomadic and settled. By the end of the period, Qing aims of centralising power in Beijing were essentially achieved and Inner Mongolia was fully integrated into the political system, remaining there throughout the revolutionary tumult of the of early 20th century. Balancing local and central interests in a way that allowed the periphery to also enjoy agency within their territory furthered both Qing aims and Mongolian interest in a compatible manner. It is this arch-strategy which proved itself to be effective in terms of regional integration, and it can inform modern policies of a similar spirit or goal. The process of integration was spread out over the course of the century. It was additive in nature, in that until 1878, new statue was brought in from the centre without superseding existing local custom. The hoshun institutions persist beyond the Qing, attesting both to their relevance and to Qing pragmatism in continually supporting their jassaks.8 The Qing experience in governing nomadic peoples indicates that a legislatively soft policy, which bases itself upon working out compromises with existing institutions of statehood, is best for maintaining stability and loyalty in regions with a stereotypically opposite reputation. While serious issues and conflict areas, such as settler encroachment, remained without satisfactory resolution, the policy in place still maintained a surprising 7  Hu Weijia, ‘China’s Belt and Road initiative provides fresh opportunity for Mongolia’s crisis’, Global Times, 05/02/2017, content/1031518.shtml, date accessed: 14/02/2018 8  Ibid., p. 324.

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Map 1. Inner Mongolia during the later Qing in relation to the rest of the empire (Tan, The Concise Historical Atlas of China, p. 67-68).

Map 2. From a missionary atlas, Inner Mongolia shown in relation to the rest of Mongolia. It is the southern-most region on the white part of the map (Edward Stanford, Atlas of the Chinese Empire (London, 1908), p. 79).

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degree of cohesion in the region given the complicated situation in the rest of the Qing polity. Thus, over time, the Manchu Empire for the Mongols really did become ‘Our Great Qing’.1 The overall soft strategy is the key practice to take away from the arguably obscure Inner Mongolian example, which can in spirit be remastered for application to modern-day integration policies across Eurasia. Namely, these are: ceremonial opting in of regional elites, additive and gradual legislative harmonisation and concentration on road network development. Indeed, it is evident that best practices set out then are being used now, as is with the Chinese drive at re-creating a modern continental logistical framework. Of course, using a region as a proxy for continental policy is methodologically deficient, thus there are no policy prescriptions in the article, merely the distilled elements of the elements that made the Qing successful then and a suggestion that their inclusion in political strategies now can lead to similarly beneficial results. A practical aspect of further research could be the adaptation of the discussed best practi­ ces to policy problems of nomadic\periphery governance to present times, in areas with significant nomadic populations, such as Central Asia and the Qing experience in centralisation to modern Eurasia-wide integration initiatives. Further academic research could concentrate on comparative assessment of policies of oth­er contemporary empires faced with the same complicated task of governing autonomous regions to discern similarities and difference in approach.

1  Pozdneev, Aleksei Matveevich, Mongolia and the Mongols. Results of an expedition to Mongolia undertaken in the years 1892-1893 (Saint-Petersburg, 1896) (Позднеев, Алексей Матвеевич, Монголия и монголы. Результаты поездки в Монголию, исполненной в 1892– 1893 гг. (Санкт-Петербург, 1896)), p. 567.


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EURASIAN SECURITY: RUSSIA -UMMAH SECURE ALLIANCE World’s biggest landmass Russia geopolitically makes its “Eurasian” which stretch over two continents Asia and Europe. History is bright evident that Russia always became the state of its own world order and always be rejected the foreign forced order. From the great holy Prince Vladimir to Vladimir Putin, Russian state rhythm of Eurasian World Order remained Tayyab Baloch same. Now, the Russian leader Vladimir Putin brought back Russia on inMultimedia Journalist, Supreme ternational forums as a future superpower and also translated Eurasian Court Beat Reporter at Abb Takk Tv, World Oder into reality through expanding Russia-led multilateral instiIslamabad, Pakistan. tutional mechanism to all around the globe. In international geopolitics, Russian President Vladimir Putin has instigated spiritualities by relating Eurasian family and community system with religious roots to crush individualism and libertinism of the west. Russia has emerged victorious against the radicalization of Islam in the Muslim world as Russian army liberated Syria from Israel sponsored Islamic State. The “Land of Rus” historically considers as an emblem of civilization and trade routes. The great Prince Vladimir with his army conquered Novgorod and Kiev which he mustered up in Scandinavia during his exile from Novgorod. He established a vast empire of Kievan Rus presently consisting on the territory of Russia, Belarus, and Ukraine. The prince was an eager pagan as he erected a temple in the state capital Kiev displaying idols of six major Slavic pagan gods. Ancient Pagan religion came into contact with Western Christianity (Catholicism) during Vikings raids campaign in Western Europe. This religious encounter seems very horrible as Pagan Viking parties targeted the wealthy monastic sites, especially on the English land at the end of the eighth century AD. Today, the influence of Muslims on Viking’s age has been discovered by researchers. Researchers in Sweden have found ‘Allah’, ‘Ali’ woven into burial costumes from Viking boat graves. Ali was the cousin of Muslim Prophet Muhammad and He was given a control over spiritual aspects of Islam. Prophet Muhammad said, “Ali is from me and I am from him, and he is the Wali (spiritual master) of every believer after me.” This saying about Ali is a true reflection of the final control and command authority of knowledge and spiritual secrets of Islam. So the link between Vikings and Islam still needs a research but here it is very clear that Caliph Ali had a great influence on the Viking’s religion as they engraved Allah, Muhammad, and Ali on their funeral dresses. Ali as the commander in chief of the Prophet Muhammad defeated Jews in the battle of Khyber. While Ali was the first Muslim ruler who defeated the First Fitna of Kharijites, also today known as Wahhabis which appeared due to the crisis of leadership after the death of Prophet Muhammad. Khariji leader and the founder of fundamentalist Wahhabi sect, Abdullah ibn Wahab declared a war against Muslims as toady Wahhabism has

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proven the ideological backbone of Sunni extremism and they are behind militancy in all over Muslim World of 21th century. But now, they regained the strength with Saudi’s oil and declared a war on Muslims by attacking the shrine of Ali in Najaf. But fortunately this time, Syrian President Assad, who has a direct bloodline with Ali, almost defea­ted them with the help of Viking blood Russian President Vladimir Putin. Vikings respect the Muslim’s caliph ‘Ali’ leads us to another mystery. As after establishing the Russian Statehood, the great prince of Rus, Vladimir did not accept Islam by saying that there is sorrow in Islam. Islamic history tells us that the family of Prophet Ahl al-Bayt, (People of cloak) Ali and his sons were martyred in saving Islam on the crisis of leadership after the Prophet. Judaism was rejected as “the religion which did not even help the Jews to keep their own land.” Finally, Vladimir Christianized Russia with the mystical faith of Byzantine (Eastern Orthodox). Russia was given a liberty to all faiths by announcing Eastern Orthodox as the national religion of the state. Missionaries of Byzantine created alphabets for Slavic languages based on modified Greek script. For several generations, Russia flourished from its rich resour­ ces and trade. Crimea, which is now annexed by President Vladimir Putin with motherland Russia, is a straight sea line with Constantinople (Turkey). First Crimea was liberated by Prince Vladimir from Constantinople in 987 AD. But after accepting Byzantine Religion, Russia and Byzantine were integrated into civilization, trade, and faith. After the fall of Byzantine, the grand prince of Russia and the gatherer of Rus Lands, Ivan the great adopted a Byzantine Court of Arms (imperial double-headed eagle) for the Court of Moscow in 1467. After the dissolution of the Soviet Union, this Byzantine court of arms was restored in 1993 which was given up in Russia after the bloody Jews-led communist revolution in 1917.


According to the historians, “Moscow” the capital of modern Russia was established as a Third Rome because, after the fall of Rome and Constantinople, Moscow became the successor of Roman Empire. Before the Jewish scheme of Socialist Revolution, all Russian rulers were called ‘Tsar’ which is derived from Roman imperial title Caesar. History is witnessed that Russia remained in a struggle to get back the Constantinople from Ottoman as it was trapped by France and Britain in 1907 before the First World War. They promised to handover Istanbul (Constantinople) to Russia if they will win a war against Ottoman Empire. Russian army despite the heavy losses got a victory against Ottoman army and Moscow was ready to send forces from Crimea to Constantinople but Britain and France implanted Jewish scheme of Bolshevik revolution to drag out Russia from war and killed the Tsar and his family. An ancient multi-religion state of Russia was under attack first time by Jews. They brought communism to destroy Russian mythical faith of Eastern Orthodox. Monasteries, Churches, and Masjids were under attack. Russia was stabbed back by Jews with the help of its war allies, France and Britain. The Soviet Union handed over Eastern Ukraine, Crimea as a gift to Ukraine for preventing Russian access from the Black Sea to Mediterranean Sea. But luckily President of modern Russia, Vladimir Putin again annexed Crimea with Russia and saved multi-ethnic state. Islam has become the se­ cond religion of Russia as Volga Bulgaria, Tatars accepted Islam before the Christianization of the Russia during Viking Age. After separation from the Soviet Union, Ukraine has emerged as an independent state in the territory of Russia. It was the Dnieper River currently the people of Kiev and Eastern Ukraine got Baptism of Christianity. Today, we can see a Zionist funded and Western NATO supported war against the people of Dnieper River; Eastern Ukraine. Ukraine is the part of ancient Russia as its capital Kiev was the old capital of Kievan Rus before the establishment of Third Rome; Moscow. But unfortunately, it was the USSR, who had given an entity to

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Ukraine under a Jewish scheme. After destroying the ancient Russian statehood, they dissolved the Soviet Union. Why the USSR did this with Russia? The answer is very simple because they wanted to destroy Russian statehood and its mighty black sea naval base in Crimea as Crimean Peninsula provides Russian ships to enter the Mediterranean Sea via Bosphorus. Today, the Zionist support war on Russia can easily be seen as Russia is facing West-led series of economic sanctions after the annexation of Crimea. American led NATO forces presence on Russian borders from Baltic Sea to the Black Sea is the witnessed of war against Russia. Western puppet regime in Kiev has waged a war on Russians in Eastern Ukraine. While once Turkey threatened to block Russia’s Bosphorus access at the behest of NATO after Russian bombings on the US/Israel suppor­ ted Kharjities in Syria. But Russian vision for the Muslim world is bringing back Turkey towards Russian alliance. Muslim scholars have an opinion that Islamic State (IS) terrorists are Kharjites. Saudi Mufti Sheikh Abdul Aziz Al ash-Sheikh issued a statement in August 2014 calling IS an extension of the Kharijites who “believed that killing Muslims was not a crime, and we do not consider either of them Muslims.” The Prophet Muhammad, the Messenger of Allah (PBUH) said, “There will be division and sectarianism in my nation and people (the Kharijites) will come with beautiful words and evil deeds. They will recite the Quran but it will not pass beyond their throats. They will leave the religion as an arrow leaves its target and they will not return to it as the arrow does not return to its bow. They are the worst of the creation. Blessed are those who fight them and are killed by them. They call to the Book of Allah but they have nothing to do with it. Whoever fights them is better to Allah than them.” Currently, Russia has become the only hope for Ummah as Russian army librated Syria from the dogs of hell who are reared by Jews

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and weaponized by the USA. In fact, extre­ mist and violent organizations were crafted in the Muslim world with the Pentagon’s Jihad dogma to accomplish geopolitical objectives in Muslim populated areas of the world from Africa to Asia. To liberate Muslim popula­ ted areas from foreign rule, Islamic jihad was accelerated with the aim that Muslim world (Islamic order) would be used for the benefit of American interests. Iraq, Afghanistan, Libya became direct victims while Syria was saved by Russia. Russia was the first victim as they fueled jihad in the Caucasus Mountains to liberate Muslim populated regions of Chechnya and Daghistan from the Rome Third. Credit again goes to Russian leader Vladimir Putin who did not only understand Islam but he had chosen the mystical dimension of Islam; Sufism to defeat extremism and radicalization of Islam. Today, Russia from the Caucasus Mountains to the Mideast deserts appeared victorious against extremist and violent organizations. Now Russia has already taken Mediterranean under control as it got built-up presence of the Russian warships in the port of Tartus, Syria. The emergence of Russia’s Islamic Alliance seems a mystery but this is happening now. Russia’s presence in Syria has already formulated anti-terrorist alliance in the Muslim world. Syria, Iraq, and Iran have already with Russia while Turkey, Pakistan, and Indonesia are potential allies. While the conservative Islamic Saudi kingdom which was installed as a Wahhabi state under the British scheme in Arab (Hijaz/Najd) had also announced his own Islamic alliance. Bluntly speaking, Saudi Arabia from its birth to till date considers the supporter of Wahhabism/charities. In fact, the Zionist movement of Jews installed the Al Saud rule in Arabian Peninsula to establish the Jewish state in Palestine after the British Balfour declaration of 1917. Al Saud has fueled the war in the Mideast and terrorism in the Muslim world by acting as the puppet of Israel/Zionism. After Iraq, Libya and Yemen, now they are going to destabilize Lebanon.


Russian mystical faith and the Islamic mystical dimension of Sufism were under attack by the Zionist movement of the Jews after 1917 to till date that is destroying basic family units of the globe. Russia has introduced spiritualities foundation in geopolitics for strengthening community system. In short, Russia has appeared not only the world leader but also the ally of the Muslim Ummah against Jewish sponsored terrorism. Russian alliance with Muslim world was predicted by the Muslim Prophet Muhammad as he said, “You will make peace with the Romans (Eastern Orthodox/the Byzantines) in a secure alliance, and you and they will fight an enemy who is behind you, and you will be victorious” While Allah also says in the Holy Quran Surah Roum, “The Byzantines (Rum) have been defeated. But they, after their defeat, will overcome very soon in the nearest land. To Allah belongs the command before and after. And that day the believers will rejoice’’. Even Bible also predicated this alliance on the Armageddon, where, all nations from the North (Russia) will try to destroy Israel.


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THE FRENCH UNIVERSITY, A TEMPLE OF GENOCIDAL TROTSKYISM “Supporterons-nous que des milliers d’hommes, en ce temps, souffrent et se révoltent de notre refus de témoigner, de notre lâcheté, de notre fausse commisération?” — Maurice Bardèche This short essay is the account of a philosopher who has long been ac-

Anatoly Livry customed to analysing the political tendencies generated by the most

Philosopher, former Slavist at Paris IV-Sorbonne and professor at the University of Nice-Sophia Antipolis, doctor of French and Comparative Literature, Researcher in Slavic studies.

profound aspects of human nature. This will, however, be one of the rare occasions as a political scientist, where I intend to introduce autobiographical elements into my study. In the same way that a zoologist who is devoted to studying the behaviour of jackals, I will illustrate my thesis on the genocide perpetrated by Trotskyism in French universities throughout the world, through a personal account of the attacks I have suffered from these scavengers. These are memoirs that are unique in their own way: I am not only the only one to have seen Trotskyist rubbish in various Western universities during more than a quarter of a century, but I have also been able to collect a number of official denunciations, in which the officials softened by institutionalized French Trotskyism indulge and which, for the first time, reveal their true nature. In 2001, at the age of 28, I was invited to give courses to third-year students, in so doing becoming the youngest teacher to whom this level of responsibility was entrusted in the Slavic Studies Department of the Sorbonne Paris IV, and this without any previous experience in academic teaching. It was openly made clear to me that I had been chosen because I was Jewish and was expected to accede to everything on the path to a university professorship; in other words, I should not only to sleep with the old Israeli prostitutes elected as Sorbonne professors by their home-grown French Trotskyist pimps, join in their group slander, or join a union for the purposes of sitting in vile soviets, but above all, dedicate my entire career to the annihilation of the Slavic peoples — since this is the sole activity of those who we collectively call “Russian specialists” in the West — as well as of France, of all white peoples, and of Eurasia as a whole. Trotsky’s name was never spoken, because already there had been two generations of distance between those who had “instructed” me from the French-speaking emissary of Leïba Bronstein — that scientific nonentity Pierre Pascal who had introduced a debasement of standards, through the ideology of his master, within the French Universities. Those who had brought me to the Sorbonne were therefore the true products of this “third generation of Trotskyism” which we find in the most remote corners of the contemporary West: semi-professional old geezers, illiterate and uneducated fools, animated by a frenetic hatred of science and the French Universities which had welcomed them, these Untermenschen, so-called professors who sit on the National Council of Universities (Conseil national des universités, CNU), who hate humanity and wish for the extermination of those Slavic peoples whose language,

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civilisation and literature they are supposed to teach. This is why, not so many years ago in France, an academic figure could, despite the roaring flock of apparatchiks, access a professorial chair in order to educate the young and to endow them with culture and critical thinking. After the centralisation as instituted by the CNU in 1945, every talented scientist saw himself blocked by soft Trotskyists and particularly by invertebrates and brain-dead officials swimming in the Trotsky excrement, which had become their only professional doctrinal environment. Indeed, none of the French or Swiss “Russian specialist” teachers is really fluent in Russian1 or, if born in the Soviet Union, was forced to prostitute himself for many years in order to inherit the position of his pimp-professor who had eventually fallen into senility. The only “academic” solution for these professors is to defame and send slanderous denunciations to the French police; denunciations that they transmit as good Trotskyist apparatchiks to the Ministry of Higher Education in order to manufacture, with pen-pushers who are civil servants of the same ilk as these “Russian professors”, a collective hysteria to drive out those who enter the University driven by a passion for Russian literature. Because hysterical collectivism is the only form of existence and comprehension of the world for so-called “academic” Trotskyists. It was therefore logical that, as a Slavist having 1  In this subject, see my Russian university seminars 2012 — 2018: «Говорит ли французский функционер «русист» Режис Гейро по-русски?», «Режис Гейро, студент французского троцкиста Окутюрье: «заумь» или банальное незнание русских склонений и спряжений?», «Анализ полицейских ябед Режиса Гейро, пересланных стукачом-функционером во французское Министерство просвещения. Конфликт интересов/открытая коррупция. Как это происходит в РФ и во Франции: полиция РФ =/= CNU Франции», «Роль Центра франко-российских исследований в Москве при раскрутке научных ничтожеств из французского CNU», «Любовь Юргенсон-Райхман & Нора Букс. Макрон & Олланд. Как во Франции фабрикуется «новое», сравнительный анализ. Разбор брошюр и конференций факультета славистики Сорбонны 2000 — 2016 гг.», «Вайнштейнизация Петрограда. Стукач. Научное ничтожество. Атташе по бескультурию при французском посольстве в Москве. Переводчик плагиатора Шишкина».


received international awards in Russia2 (before the committees of various awards came under pressure from the Sorbonne and the University of Geneva), Hellenist3, theologian4, Germanist5, philosopher6, specialist in French literature7, recognised by my academic peers in Eurasia because I have been published there8, Russian man of letters who was the youngest winner of the Marc Aldanov Prize9 I would be denied even the right to seek a post as a lecturer in France, a victim of the slanders of the Trotskyite apparatchiks of the French University. I have scrupulously collected these official documents for decades in order to be 2  Prize «Серебряная литера» in 2005 for the best scientific work Набоков ницшеанец, Ст.Петербург, 2005, 235 с.: http://magazines. 3  Dr. Anatoly Livry, “Tête d’Or et Hélios Roi, la rupture du Cercle de l’Éternel Retour”, Bulletin Guillaume Budé, l’Association d’Hellénistes et de Latinistes français, in charge of publishing: Prof. Alain Billault, then director of the Faculty of Greek Studies at Paris IV- Sorbonne, Paris, 2008 — 2, pp. 167-193: http://www.persee. fr/doc/bude_0004-5527_2008_num_1_2_2310 4  Dr. Anatoly Livry, “Nietzsche et le “Juif””, Schweizerische Zeitschrift für Religions- und Kulturgeschichte — Revue suisse d’histoire religieuse et culturelle, Fribourg University, Switzerland, 2016, pp. 421-434: http://anatoly-livry.e-monsite. com/medias/files/livry-szrkg16-1.pdf 5  Dr. Anatoly Livry, “Strindberg, Lukian und die Toteninsel”, Der Europäer, Basel, Perseus Verlag, N. 8, June 2012, pp. 16-17 and 20: 6  А. Ливри, Физиология Сверхчеловека, Ст.Петербург, Aletheia, 2011, 310 с.: http://www. 7  Др. Анатолий Ливри, «Вольтер под пером Ницше: фикция или союзник в Дионисической Pеволюции?» в XVIII ВЕК КАК ЗЕРКАЛО ДРУГИХ ЭПОХ. XVIII ВЕК В ЗЕРКАЛЕ ДРУГИХ ЭПОХ. — сб. ст. / Под ред. Н.Т. Пахсарьян. — СПб.: Алетейя, 2016. — 758 с., ил. ISBN 978-5-906860-58-3, с. 495 — 502: http:// 8  Др. Анатолий Ливри, «Мандельштам и Набоков — две ницшеанские судьбы», Вестник Университета Российской Академии Образования, ВАК, Москва, 2015 — 4, c. 8-20: c2b/0da/10634593/Vestnik_2015_04.pdf 9  Анатолий Ливри, «Глаза», Новый журнал, НьюЙорк, март 2011, с. 58 — 93:

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able to demonstrate the long human decay that Pierre Pascal intended and achieved, by imposing three generations of “Russian” professors on Western Universities. For if a living Frenchman has lost four IQ points within just a few years, if one in ten adult Frenchmen is totally illiterate (according to an official survey that collects such data that has since become even more disastrous and therefore hidden from the general public1), this is the work of the backward French university executives, who were also totally uneducated in their aca­ demic2 “speciality”, a backwardness violently sought and prepared for by Pierre Pascal, a former collaborator of Trotsky in Moscow who had followed his master after his expulsion to clemency in the West. The only real activity of these grandchildren of Trotsky, who are now university literature professors, consists in the fabrication of slanderous institutional crises aimed at spreading the opprobrium onto those whom they try to keep away from the academic chair solely because of their attachment to order and beauty. By examining the documents I have collected from the Conseil national des Universités, it is easier to understand how the Soviet Trotskyists, who launched the genocides of the Slavonic forces, succeeded in bringing Stalin to the forefront of the greatest crime against humanity committed in history. Indeed, Trotsky, banished from the Soviet Union with his records in 1929, left behind, not only the Gulags he had established, but also a multitude of Trotskyist administrators who were responsible for whole waves of ethnocides, within the Soviet Union. They also exterminated each other of course, Cf. survey INSEE IVQ 2004-2005. In this subject, see Dr. Anatoly Livry, “Nabokov et l’idiocratie française” in Вісник Дніпропетровського університету імені Альфреда Нобеля, Index Copernicus, РИНЦ, 2 (12) 2016, The Magazine is inscribed by the Higher Certifying Commission on the index of leading reviewing scientific periodicals for publications of main dissertation of academic degree of Doctor and Candidate of Science, p. 32-44. Conference Act of Dr. Anatoly Livry, “France: Désastre des humanités. Catastrophe de la slavistique française”, XIVe lecture en hommage au Professeur Andreiev. Littérature XXe-XXIe siècles. Bilans et perspectives de recherche. Institute of the Academy of Education of the Russian Federation, January 23, 2016. 1  2

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but blamed their mass crimes only on Stalin, allowing them to engage in active manipulation in the West, exploiting their image as victims. This was the aim of Solzhenitsyn’s first work, collected by the French “Russian” university civil servants as set up by Pierre Pascal, the faithful servant of Trotsky before, during and following the occupation by the forces of the Third Reich and of the Vichy government, which is now scorned but to which this former collaborator of Trotsky had pledged loyalty.3 Struve4, Catteau and other charlatans according to the consensus of the Trotskyists as “Russian specialists”, having already descen­ ded into Hell, previously supported financially by a manna spilled from the American embassy in Paris, made an unrestrained claim for Solzhenitsyn, pushing him towards the Nobel Prize for one single purpose: that of clearing Trotsky and above all these new generations of Trotskyists, these neo-conservatives who passed sole responsibility of crimes or complicity in crimes against humanity on to Stalin, allowing them to infect entire Western generations with crypto-Trotskysm and the Freudian sauce (known as the “Frankfurt school” in pseudo-scientific gibberish), and even more atrociously, to repatriate Trotsky to Russia via Perestroika in the form of a promotion of ugliness, deified inculturation, cosmopolitanism, the “gender theory” aimed at advertising sodomy and thus the destruction of the normal family, which is the primordial cell of humanity. My way of teaching Solzhenitsyn’s work, my desire to inform the academic community of a repentant Solzhenitsyn at the end of his life, aspiring — at least partially — to repair the damage he created5, indicating his former 3  In this subject, see Dr. Anatoly Livry, “L’ANARCHOTROTSKISTE PIERRE PASCAL ET SON ENGEANCE”, Moscow, Géopolitica, December 1, 2017: 4  Др. Анатолий Ливри, «Микитка купчик и Вечность», Российский колокол, Москва, n° 5-6, октябрь 2016, с. 242-244. 5  Dr. Anatoly Livry, “Soljénitsyne et la République régicide”, Les Lettres et Les Arts, Cahiers suisses de critique littéraire et artistiques, Association de la revue Les Lettres et les Arts, Suisse, Vicques, 2011, pp. 70-72.


sponsor in his Two Hundred Years Together, 1795-1995 earned me the usual slander and filthy pressure from the editors of the Genevabased “very courageous anti-Stalinist resistance fighter” Nivat, this now dying “teacher” having spent his entire life defaming me,1 forbidding me from seeking a position as a lecturer in France. At the end of his life, the old Solzhenitsyn visited the Vendée monuments to the glory of the Chouannerists and clearly indicated that the French republic was the mat­rix of this terror that Trotsky spread throughout the Russian Empire. Naturally, according to the Parisian editors of the Gulag Archipelago, Solzhenitsyn would have been better off dying before this act of repentance. The fact that Solzhenitsyn made a weak attempt to dot the “i’s” drove the creatures of the Trotskyist agent Pierre Pascal (if you plan to pursue a career in French or Swiss Slavism — or seek to have them nurture you -, it is better not to affirm this fact!) to make the same slanderous attacks on Solzhenitsyn as I have suffered since 2012, from their students who are now members of the Conseil natio­ nal des universités (CNU): every effort is being made to destroy any description of Trotskyist problems which originate from a sect which has declared itself to be the incarnation of a Messiah, thirsty only for earthly power2, a sect which acts in plain view and which is now trying to install the global power it failed to establish a century ago with Leïba Bronstein, when it imposed its tyranny from Petrograd. 1  “ M. Nivat m’avait signalé son mécontentement à la parution du dossier par rapport au “voisinage” avec certains auteurs. Je trouve cela bien regrettable... “, written testimony of January 3, 2012 of the editor publishing in Switzerland my French work on Solzhenitsyn: Dr. Anatoly Livry, “Soljénitsyne et la République régicide”, Les Lettres et Les Arts, Cahiers suisses de critique littéraire et artistiques. Association de la revue Les Lettres et les Arts, Suisse, Vicques, 2011, pp. 70-72. 2  Cf. Werner Sombart, Les juifs et la vie économique, Paris, Kontre Kulture, 2018, 626 pp. This work (published in Paris for the first time at Payot, in 1923) was plagiarized and his theses were claimed with a tribal arrogance by Jacques Attali, Les Juifs, le monde et l’argent, Histoire économique du peuple juif, Paris, Fayard, 2002, 638 pp.


Conclusion. Why now draw the attention to the spiritual elites to the issue of the French Trotskyists, the ideological great-grandchildren of Pierre Pascal, who have nakedly denounced me since 2002? The war of extermination of the cosmopolitan world against peoples and their natural rights is intensifying. However, it is the French Slavists, who have forgotten their Trotskyist lineage but who never cease to endlessly repeat Trotsky’s doctrines, who have become the spearhead of this declared global ethnocide. Worse still, in the run-up to every Russian civic event — such as the presidential elections of 2018 — they strut through Russia as the embodiment of honour and independence of spirit. Moreover, these paragons of honesty are welcomed by their Muscovite publishers, such as the billionaire Prokhorov, trained by Western governments, alternately with a stick and carrot so they do not deviate from the path of carnage of the Eastern Slavs and other peoples of federal Russia: sometimes threatening imprisonment in France, or US sanctions aimed at Prokhorov himself, sometimes by decorating the siblings with the Legion of Honour. That is why the file I have on the Western hosts of the Prokhorovs in Moscow, these French university officials, is so valuable. These unique pieces not only demonstrate the nature of Pierre Pascal’s academic bastards — but above all, they reveal the true demands of Russia’s “liberals”, and how the true nature of these “models” should be seen”. As Trotsky failed to transform the Slavs of the East into white Negroes (his semi-mythic line must be recalled), his French descendants are now struggling to deport tribes from Africa in demographic turmoil to Russia, in order to forcibly mix the indigenous population, as is practised in Western Europe, notably with the committed complicity of French universities. For Trotskyism is animated by the unstoppable racial hatred of white people, which has become the modus operandi of Western universities: the University of Paris 8 organises meetings where white people are officially prohibited3; an anti-white racist 3  Jack Dion, “À Reims, un “camp d’été décolonial” interdit aux Blancs”, Marianne, Paris, August 25, 2016:

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organism, namely the Council Representing Black Associations in France (CRAN — ima­ gine the existence of a representative council of white associations in France! It would be prohibited by Republican political police immediately!) is headed by a lecturer at the University of Orléans... The National Council of French Universities (CNU) therefore approves anti-white racism because it has given an official “qualification” to this function. Similarly, a scientific study of the so-called “European” scientific community forbids a Hungarian city from becoming a cultural capital of Europe because it is the image of “... a white and Christian Europe. Everyone is happy, white and dancing in the streets.”1: the author of these lines is deprived by the European Commission of a research grant because he writes “in patriotic newspapers, which would be contrary to the European Commission’s policy of promoting interbreeding”... I could continue with the examples of this anti-white racism promo­ ­ ted by Western Universities for a long time to come. The tactics of neo-conservative globa­ lists are exactly the same as those of French university officials, members of the National Council of Universities because they conform to the Trotskyist magma: they sink into crises of collective hysteria and then present their results as the only possible outcome, as the consequence of wise reflection. However, as long as the Russian world resists this, either by setting up a barrage at Donbass or Donetsk, or by applying a policy of defending the family or traditional values, its peoples and leaders will be endlessly treated as “fascists” by these cosmopolitan misanthropes.

1  Vincze Viktor Attila, «Uniós bírálóbizottság: Székesfehérváron túl sok a fehér és kevés a migráns», Budapest , February 15, 2018: article-unios-biralobizottsag-szekesfehervarontul-sok-a-feher-es-keves-a-migrans

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SOUTH EURASIAN INTEGRATIONAL MODELS: COOPERATION VS. COMPETITION The South Eurasian Rimland is host to several integrational models that dynamically interact with one another and form a semi-unified strategic space that’s fast becoming one of the supercontinent’s centers of geopolitical gravity in the New Cold War. Andrew Korybko

is an American Moscow-based po-

International Relations is presently in the midst of a paradigm-changing litical analyst, journalist and host shift from unipolarity to multipolarity, with the resultant friction between on Sputnik Radio. these two camps and their principle drivers being described as the New Cold War. This asymmetrical conflict plays out across a wide array of multidimensional battlegrounds that include integrational organizations, financial and economic institutions, and Hybrid Wars, et al. In the sense of system-shaping potential, the US leads the unipolar bloc in being the most powerful force fighting to retain the existing order even though it concedes the necessity to implement a bare minimum of structural reforms, while China is ahead of the multipolar pack in having the greatest potential to effect concrete change to the international system through the pioneering of new trade routes. China’s One Belt One Road (OBOR) global vision of New Silk Road connectivity is the manifestation of Beijing’s grand strategy for transitioning the world to multipolarity, just as the US’ Hybrid Wars represent the most efficient model that it’s employing to disrupt, control, and/or influence these trade corridors. Similarly, the US is “Leading From Behind” through the support of its 21st-century Great Power partner of India as the ultimate proxy for impeding China’s plans, but it still faces just as equally of a daunting task in “containing China” as Beijing is facing in trying to solidify its newfound influence. At the moment, the international order is in flux, having transitioned too far from its erstwhile unipolarity but not quite having gotten to the point of representing full-blown multipolarity due to the continued military and strategic dominance that the US enjoys in spite of its recent geopolitical setbacks.

Defining The South Eurasian Rimland It’s with this contextual backdrop in mind that the author has decided to embark on a brief review of South Eurasian integrational models, as it’s this broad edge of the supercontinent which is experiencing the most dynamic change at the moment. Stretching from the Eastern Mediterranean to the Bay of Bengal, an enormous amount of political and demographic diversity can be seen in this space, thus presenting a multitude of opportunities for multifaceted interaction between its members. Up until now, however, most observers have failed to conceive of South Eurasia as a geostrategic entity, instead preferring to retain the traditional approach of separately analyzing events as uniquely relating to either the Mideast


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(West Asia), South Asia, or Southeast Asia. An incipient trend has been to explore the relationship between South Asia and one of its two bordering regions, but the idea of looking at all three of them as a part of the same strategic space has yet to catch on. Nevertheless, interesting patterns can be discerned once one analyzes all three of them together as constituting the singular

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South Eurasian Rimland, with the basis for this method being the developing interconnection between them as a result of China and India’s competitive connectivity projects of OBOR and the Japanese-assisted “Asia-Africa Growth Corridor” (AAGC, also known as the “Freedom Corridor”). The analysis will prove that Beijing and New Delhi are spearheading separate but complementary efforts to connect the South Eurasian Rimland in advancing their


respective grand strategies, with the end result being that the three superficially disconnected regions are in fact slowly but surely morphing into a unified whole. It’ll still take a few decades for this trend to fully unfold, but the general trajectory is already apparent to those who look closely enough and are aware of the various processes at play. Before continuing, the below maps show the three regions individually, and then their reconceptualization as constituting the South Eurasian Rimland: Importantly, the South Eurasian Rimland doesn’t include the geographically African portions of the Mideast, nor does it go beyond the Bay of Bengal in incorporating any ASEAN states other than Myanmar. While these two peripheries are undoubtedly linked to the South Eurasian Rimland through historical, demographic, economic, and institutional relationships, they’re technically not within the boundaries of the examined entity even though some of the studied connectivity projects are enhancing their transregional integration. The order of research will progress from West to East in drawing attention to the various integrational models and connectivity corridors that have sprung up in this space, which will altogether allow the reader


to achieve a better understanding of the relevancy behind conceptualizing these seemingly disconnected regions as being part of the same South Eurasian Rimland.

The Northern And Southern Blocs Adam Garrie from The Duran was the first person to notice that the Mideast is reorganizing itself along the lines of two geographically distinct blocs, the Northern and Southern ones. He sees Turkey, Syria, Lebanon, Iraq, and Iran as forming the first one, while the GCC, “Israel”, Egypt, Jordan, and Yemen constitute the second. Garrie’s model is useful because it simplifies the stereotypically complex geopolitics of the region into an easy-to-understand format that accurately describes the current and likely forecasted state of Mideast developments. Here’s what it looks like when displayed on a map: The Northern Bloc is a mix of Shiite and Sunni states, whereas the Southern one is distinctively Sunni-governed despite the Shiite majority in Bahrain. The state of demographic-geopolitical affairs in the North challenges the common perception that the SunniShiite split has resulted in a rigid division of the Mideast, since while this may be true to

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a large extent for the Southern Bloc, it’s not relevant when it comes to the Northern one. Something else to pay attention to is that the Northern Bloc formed as a result of Russianled anti-terrorist and peacemaking efforts in Syria, while the Southern Bloc unified based on its implicit support for “Israel”. Accordingly, the Northern Bloc is more multipolar, while the Southern one is closer to the unipolar order despite several prominent examples of its multipolar interactions with Russia and China.

past year due to the similarity of sub-state threats that they each have to confront. All three parties are focused on fighting Daesh, but Turkey and Iran are also concentrating on dealing with US-backed Kurdish terrorism while Pakistan is doing the same with Iran when it comes to Baloch terrorism. In addition, Iran is part of the Astana peace process for Syria alongside Turkey, just as it’s a party to the Moscow peace process for Afghanistan alongside Pakistan.

That said, this systemic distinction isn’t all that clear-cut and could change in the future as Moscow and Beijing cooperatively make greater inroads with the Southern Bloc, which could in theory help it become more multipolar even if it continues to engage in a rivalry with its Northern counterpart.

The three maps below show what the Multipolar CENTO looks like, the sub-state threats that it shares with Turkey and Pakistan, and Iran’s central geopolitical position vis-àvis the Syrian and Afghan conflicts:

The Multipolar CENTO It should be pointed out that Iran is actually a transregional lynchpin because it forms the central component of what the author has previously described as the Multipolar CENTO between itself, Turkey, and Pakistan. These three states used to be part of the same Cold War-era alliance against communism, but have since reentered into an unstated trilateral partnership with one another over the

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As seen from the above maps, the Multipolar CENTO is an indispensable part of the transregional geopolitical space between the Mideast and South Asia, and it also plays a crucial role in managing the Wars on Syria and Afghanistan. The next section will show how its eastern member, Pakistan, acts as the bloc’s link with China.


CPEC The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) is OBOR’s flagship project, and it also represents the first tangible overland connection that China is establishing with South Asia and the Mideast. Viewed in the context of the author’s aforementioned geopolitical concepts, CPEC ties China to the Multipolar CENTO, which itself could also be described as the


Northern Bloc+ with the inclusion of Pakistan. CPEC’s strategic utility derives from the fact that it stands to provide China with direct access to the Afro-Indian Ocean through which most of its trade traverses while pivotally avoiding the bottlenecked Strait of Malacca and contentious waters of the South China Sea. This will enable China to freely trade with the Mideast (both the Northern and Southern Blocs) and Africa without having to worry

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about the military blackmail potential of the US Navy. Placed in a cartographical perspective, CPEC and the trading opportunities that it opens up for China appear as such: The overland portion to the Multipolar CENTO will also be greatly enhanced in the event that the “Central Asian Silk Road” proposal for a high-speed railway between China and Iran — and naturally, later on towards Turkey and the EU — is ever completed. Another aspect to mention is that both Pakistan and China are on excellent terms with the Northern and Southern Blocs, which comes together in such a way as to enable the Chinese-Pakistani Strategic Partnership to “balance” between the two and therefore try to preserve regional stability in spite of the two sides’ simmering competition. With time, CPEC could become the mechanism for helping them reach a “détente” with one another, which might have the effect of integrating the Southern Bloc more solidly into the emerging Multipolar World Order.

The NSTC Iran occupies a very special geostrategic position because it isn’t just the central member of the Multipolar CENTO, simultaneously involved in the Syrian and Afghan peace pro-

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cesses, and a Central Asian Silk Road partner of China — all of which are already impressive enough as they are, both individually and when considered collectively — but is also participating in the North-South Transport Corridor (NSTC) initiative to streamline a multimodal connectivity corridor between India and Russia, which itself represents the main project of AAGC. New Delhi understands the importance of achieving overland access to the Russian and eventually European marketplaces, and the NSTC correlates with its “Link West” policy of Mideast engagement. Moreover, it also provides India with the opportunity to access Afghanistan and Central Asia in its quest to compete with China. Although it’s nowhere near completion, here’s what New Delhi envisions the NSTC to look like once it’s finished: Iran, by virtue of its geography and the overlapping competitive connectivity projects that are expected to crisscross its territory, is becoming the intersection between Chinese, Indian, and Russian interests, or framed another way, the convergence point between BRICS’ three Eurasian members. Not only that, but its future integration with China and India shows that the Islamic Republic is also a trans­ regional pivot state alongside neighboring Pakistan, which emphasizes the significance


of the Multipolar CENTO to the concept of the South Eurasian Rimland. The developing full-spectrum coordination between Turkey, Iran, and Pakistan is turning the sum of these three states into a power bloc in its own right, one which stretches across West and South Asia but also serves as the hinge for bringing together Eastern Europe, Central Asia, and ultimately East Asia, to say nothing of Pakistan’s potential to function as the Convergence of Civilizations in facilitating East AfricanChinese interactions via CPEC.

SAARC The next integrational platform to focus on is the South Asian Association of Regional Cooperation (SAARC), a moribund organization that was long on its deathbed but finally given a deathblow after India pressured most of its members to boycott the 2016 summit in Pakistan. New Delhi does indeed have very strong economic and even civilizational influence over most of the SAARC states, but it falsely believed that this would forever guarantee its Great Power hegemony in South Asia. India has been surprised, then, by the astronomical progress that China has made in recent years in developing OBOR partnerships with New Delhi’s neighbors, and the ruling BJP interpreted this through a zero-sum per-


spective that’s since given rise to a dangerous security dilemma between the two BRICS members. What India has failed to understand, however, is that the SAARC states’ self-interested longterm economic plans with China trump their short-term economic benefits from India in the present and supercede any civilizational sway that New Delhi could ever attempt to leverage against them. All of these countries, except for Bhutan and with the partial exception of Bangladesh (which is tenuously ruled by the pro-Indian and scandal-plagued Awami League), believe that pragmatic Silk Road cooperation with China can help them “balance” between the People’s Republic and India, thus providing them with a degree of strategic freedom that they hadn’t hitherto experienced after decades of being subjected to India’s hegemonic whims. New Delhi’s more “muscular” approach to regional relations since the 2014 election of Prime Minister Modi has counterproductively chased India’s SAARC partners away and into the arms of Beijing. All of this has contributed to India’s self-fulfilling prophecy of being “encircled” by China, the fear of which has been skillfully manipulated by the US to “poach” India out of the multipolar camp and turn it into a unipolar geopoliti-

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cal (but not necessarily economic-institutional) ally. China knows that it’s on the verge of “losing” India to the US, but its “Himalayan Silk Road” plans for a high-speed railroad to Nepal might indirectly help it avert a long-term crisis in relations with its neighbor, though it could also unintentionally make matters worse. To be concise, Nepal has a free trade agreement with India, and a surge of Chinese economic influence into the landlocked country could see Beijing using Kathmandu as a backdoor to the subcontinent’s marketplace. The guiding idea is for China to silently develop a complex system of economic interdependency with India that could serve to check and balance American influence on New Delhi, thus giving the BJP a reason to second-guess any aggressive actions that Washington tries to encourage it to take against Beijing out of the knowledge that China’s countermeasures could be mutually devastating. In this sense, Nepal’s Himalayan Silk Road would become the bridge for strengthening BRICS coopera­ tion between these two Great Powers and sustaining positive relations between them, though India’s zero-sum mentality might make it think of this “well-intentioned” move as an inherently hostile one designed to subvert its economy and politically subjugate it to China.

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The below map simplifies the dynamics that were mentioned in this section and illustrates the “encirclement” that some in India are perceiving from China’s OBOR partnerships with Sri Lanka, the Maldives, and especially Nepal:

The Myanmarese Crossroads Just like India has its “Link West” policy of Mideast engagement, it also has an ASEAN counterpart of “Act East”. The former is based on the NSTC, just like the latter is marked by the Trilateral Highway through Myanmar and Thailand. India appreciates the growing political role that ASEAN is poised to play in the transoceanic space between the Pacific and Afro-Indian Oceans and values its global economic weight, which is why it seeks to integrate itself with the bloc via its overland connectivity initiative. In addition, New Delhi knows that it must deliver jobs and deve­ lopment to its impoverished and chronically ­neglected Northeastern Regions, ergo another argument in favor of connecting them with ASEAN. Bangladesh’s subordinate status to India ever since the 2015 signing of the border agreement between the two also opens up the possibility that trade could traverse across the former territory of East Pakistan as opposed


being redirected through narrow the Siliguri Corridor, which could effectively streamline this transregional corridor and more directly connect it to “India proper”. Bangladesh’s de-facto incorporation into “Greater India” is therefore seen as a paramount objective by New Delhi’s BJP strategists because it would secure the Trilateral Highway and make it just as, if not more, attractive than the existing maritime routes between India and ASEAN. At the same time, however, China also wants to build the China-Myanmar Economic Corridor (CMEC) through Myanmar perpendicular to India’s Trilateral Highway and running parallel to the oil and gas pipelines that extend from the Bay of Bengal port of Kyaukphyu to the Yunnan capital of Kunming. These two pro­ jects aren’t exactly competitors with one another because they have totally different functions for each Great Power, with the highway allowing India to reconnect with its distant civilizational cousins in ASEAN while CMEC would complement CPEC in giving China a secondary non-Malacca access route to the Afro-Indian Ocean. Nevertheless, India more so than China is predisposed to view this in a zero-sum manner, seeing Myanmar not as a neighboring opportunity for expanding cooperation with its fellow BRICS partner but as a theater of competition for offsetting its rival’s transregional geostrategic pivot. The Southeast Asian state


situated between these two Great Powers could bring the two together, or, as is much more likely, might end up driving them further apart if India in any way tries to instrumentalize its relationship with Myanmar to China’s detriment. Myanmar, just like Iran on the other side of the South Asian Rimland, is at the crossroads of Chinese-Indian interests, but Naypyidaw lacks Tehran’s strength in “balancing” between all actors and is unlikely to ever play as independent of a role as the Islamic Republic in this broader region’s geopolitics.

Concluding Thoughts The research strove to prove that it’s possible to speak of the existence of the South Eurasian Rimland as a geostrategic concept, and that this semi-integrated space connects West Asia (Mideast), South Asia, and part of Southeast Asia through a variety of regional integration networks and corridors. The Northern Bloc is the most important developing entity in the Mideast, and its Turkish and Iranian anchors combine with South Asia’s Pakistan in forming the Multipolar CENTO, which is a belt of Muslim Great Powers that’s fast becoming a force to be reckoned with. Centrally positioned Iran sits at the intersection of Chinese, Indian, and Russian connectivity interests, while Pakistan provides the People’s Republic with non-Malacca overland access to the Mideast and East Africa through the CPEC project that cuts

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right through the heart of the South Eurasian Rimland. As for India, which is located near the center of this transregional space, it’s simultaneously attempting to expand its influence in both the Western and Eastern vectors through the NSTC and Trilateral Highway, envisioning itself as the core of the South Eurasian Rimland and therefore its future mainland-maritime hegemon. This correlates with the US’ hoped-for role for India as well, since Washington wants New Delhi to become the unipolar bulwark against Beijing’s New Silk Road. India is more than eager to receive American assistance as it attempts (rather clumsily) to play all sides against each other in a self-interested bid to benefit from everyone, though this exercise in “multi-alignment” has yet to produce the results that New Delhi expected and has even been counterproductive in the sense that it’s scared some of its traditional SAARC partners away.

DISCLAIMER: The author writes for this publication in a private capacity which is unrepresentative of anyone or any organization except for his own personal views. Nothing written by the author should ever be conflated with the editorial views or official positions of any other media outlet or institution.

Even so, it’s due to China and India’s somewhat overlapping connectivity projects that one can speak about the South Eurasian Rimland as ­being an slowly unifying strategic space, with the expectation being that the two BRICS competitors’ separate efforts will collectively contribute to the coalescing of this concept. Interestingly, the geopolitical situation in its Western reaches is stabilizing following the Northern Bloc’s victory against Daesh and Russia & China’s constructive diplomacy with the Southern Bloc, while the Mutually Assured Destruction between nuclear-armed Pakistan and India keeps state-to-state relations in South Asia predictable to an extent. This is unlike the situation in the Eastern part of the South Eurasian Rimland between Bangladesh, Northeastern India, and Myanmar, which is becoming more unstable as the ChineseIndian New Cold War heats up in this area, possibly making it the supercontinent’s next Hybrid War hotspot.

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