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Newsletter, Edition 3, Vol 2, April 2013

Editor’s Welcome Welcome to our June edition of the newsletter. The latest seminar in June was presented by former Australian diplomat Ann Harrap, who spoke about Australia and Africa and their opportunities for future cooperation. Ms Harrap was an engaging speaker who provided an insight into Africa’s political and economic growth, as well as the implications for Africa’s rise for Australia’s foreign interests. Earlier this month Dr Andrew Phillips (right) from the University of Queensland led a fascinating seminar on the future of order building in the Indian Ocean. The next seminar in our calendars is ‘Global Megatrends’, to be held at Harris Terrace on Thursday 11 July. Dr Stefan Hajkowicz will present a narrative about the future of the world (with a focus on Australia) over coming decades told through the lens of six megatrends – major shifts in our social, economic and environmental context. Please see our website for more details. This edition of the newsletter features some very interesting and contrasting pieces. We are also fortunate to have a Polish guest contributor, Agnieszka Batko, who was awarded a scholarship to study in Australia. She writes about the latest prospects on the Korean peninsula. We also have an insightful piece by Rhys Binney who writes about the controversial drone issue. Finally, our regular contributor, Alamelu Venkatesh, discusses cyber warfare in the information era and the implications for international security. If you have any feedback or wish to contribute, please email us at M illy Ar sic | AIIA C o un cil Mem ber S ub -ed ito r : M ar y O ve ring to n | AIIA In ter n

A new chance for the Korean Peninsula? Words: Agnieszka Batko The last two weeks have abounded in international events referring to the Korean Peninsula. This time, however, they are concerned with a possible breakthrough in relations with the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK). International political contacts remained in a complete deadlock after the United Nations Security Council Resolution 2087 applied sanctions against North Korea for its long-range rocket launch in January and, more importantly, after Pyongyang’s third nuclear test conducted in February (Ki-Hyun 2013, p. 1-2). Events that occurred in the last two weeks, therefore, raise questions about the possibility of a revival of multilateral negotiations. Firstly, political statements mentioning the need for peaceful solutions were made by the U.S President Barack Obama and Chinese President Xi Jinping, who met in California 7-8 June, to discuss issues including the North Korean regime. Prior to the meeting, the American Commander-in-Chief emphasised that the People’s Republic of China and the United States should face the challenges which the North Korean regime poses, and cooperate against nuclear development in the northern part of the Korean Peninsula. Although the leader of China did not then address directly the issue of DPRK, he devoted a lot of attention to the need for mutual respect and close cooperation between the two nations (Obama & Xi 2013).

The two leaders did agree on certain issues regarding North Korea. They acknowledged that Kin Jong Un’s regime is a threat to the United States as well as to the whole Asia-Pacific region. Moreover, as the White House national security advisor Tom Donilon confirmed, the presidents agreed that they would not accept North Korea as a state with nuclear capacity and that they would cooperate more to find a peaceful solution and achieve denuclearization (Arkin 2013). Such commitments are significant, especially from China’s side, as it was previously seen as North Korea’s protector. This view, however, is gradually changing as China supported Resolution 2087 mentioned above. In addition, President Xi expressed his dissatisfaction in February with the third nuclear attempt made by North Korea and its abandonment of the denuclearization program (Ki-Hyun 2013, p. 2). After the June meeting, it was widely reported that the Chinese leader and president Obama agreed to strengthen mutual effort against nuclear development. The second event applies to the offer made by North Korea to its neighbor in the south. Unexpectedly, a few days before the Obama-Xi summit, North Korea proposed renewal of inter-Korean talks which Seoul confirmed almost immediately (Snyder 2013). Although minister-level negotiations between the two Korean states have been held 21 times, the last time that such talks occurred was in 2007, during the presidency of Roh Moo-hyun (Yun-hyung & Jinhwan 2013).

When the offer from Pyongyang appeared a few weeks ago, the South Korean government had initially advocated for topics concerning the reopening of the Kaesong Industrial Complex. Nevertheless, North Korea proposed to discuss the reopening of tours to Mt. Keumgang and reunions of separated families as well, which Seoul also agreed to. The initial discussions preceding the relevant negotiations took place on 9th June and have already revealed difficulties in setting the agenda. Both side   s decided to give separate announcements as they could not agree on the personal issues regarding delegations and commemoration of two inter-Korean agreements: Joint Statement signed on June 15, 2000 and Joint Declaration announced on July 4, 1972 (“North and South Korea agree to hold ministerial meeting in June 12-13” 2013). With those broad working-level talks leaving many points unresolved, both sides agreed to hold negotiations from 12-13 June. However, on 11 June, when officials from the South and the North met to exchange the list of delegation members, Pyongyang opposed the South Korean choice of negotiators. North Korean officials claimed that the head of Seoul’s negotiating body, Kim Nam-sik, a vice-minister of unification, was not a minister-level official, as it was set down during the working-level meeting.

Those allegations appeared to be decisive and both sides have withdrawn their representatives and cancelled discussions before they had a chance to begin. At the moment, no other talks are scheduled, and on 15 June, the two countries held separate events commemorating arrangements achieved in the past (Tae-ho 2013). In conclusion, although negotiations haven’t even started, the fact that such a proposal was put forward by North Korea at a time of intensified denuclearization talks may be a significant sign that it is high time to once again consider multilateral negotiations. As US expert Joel Wit argues, President Obama should start being more active towards Pyongyang as “the crisis on the Korean peninsula appears to have died down, and now may be the right time to begin dialogue with the North Koreans to see whether there is a peaceful path forward” (Hyun 2013).

Referen ces : Arkin, D 2013, ‘Obama, Chinese President talk North Korea, cybersecurity at summit’, NBC News, viewed 15 June 2013, <>. Hyun, P 2013, ‘US expert Joel Wit disputes claims that N. Korea follows a predictable pattern’, The Hankyoreh , viewed June 10 2013, <>. Ki-Hyun, L 2005, North Korea’s Third Nuclear Test and the Possibility of Change in China’s Policy towards North Korea viewed 16 June 2013, <> . Obama, B & Xi, J 2013, Remarks by President Obama and President Xi Jinping of the People's Republic of China Before Bilateral Meeting, media release, viewed 15 June 2013, <>. Snyder, S. A 2013, The Obama-Xi Summit And Renewed Inter-Korean Dialogue, weblog, 10 June, viewed 11 June, 2013, <>. Tae-ho, K 2013, ‘Inter-Korean talks called off over delegation leader rank disagreements’, The Hankyoreh, viewed June 16 2013, <>. The Hankyoreh 2013, ‘North and South Korea agree to hold ministerial meeting June 12-13’, 10 June, viewed 16 July 2013, <>. Yun-hyung, G, Jin-hwan, S 2013, ‘South and North Korea agree to minister-level talks’, The Hankyoreh, viewed 9 June 2013, <

Drones, the risk of justifying unacceptab le enemy tactics and t he move towards the death of the warrior ethos in western nations Words: Rhys Binney Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s), commonly known as drones, have become a key component to most modern battle spaces and nearly all in which Western nations are involved in. This rapidly progressing trend is not, however, without its conflicting opinions and the use of drones in warfare has become highly contentious. It has become such a combative issue that in the last few years many scholars, students, professionals and military personnel seemingly roll their eyes as soon as the topic is broached. The reason for this, as far as I can tell, is simple. Those who support the use of drones have a strong argument and, like many other contentious issues within this field, can justify themselves by standing on the foundation of saving troop casualties in war; a goal which is both noble and admirable. However, those who do not support the use of drones also have strong arguments that are heavily tied to human morality.

This moral argument is supported by endless data, theorising and analysis on civilian casualties, the impact of drones on radicalising enemy combatants and the enormous risks of removing the human element from the act of taking life. Put simply, both sides have strong arguments and harsh criticisms for the opposing point of view: either as liberal pacifists who would see our troops die in their thousands, or fascist hawks who wish only to kill without having the courage to do more than press a button. In this article, I will aim to step back from these oversimplified positions and discuss two under-examined issues that should be central in the drone debate. These issues relate to the use of drones for direct action, or as I will refer to it, hunterkiller-drones. Let me clarify a couple of things before I move to these points. Firstly, the use of drones in general is simply an extension of a human trend that has existed for thousands of years: the process of distancing oneself from the act of killing another individual. In Shimkoâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s 2013 War and Human Nature he notes that there are two types of animals, those that can kill each other due to their natural weapons i.e. claws, and those that cannot easily do so. He goes on to say that the first group have developed specific

Secondly, the use of drones for the most part is entirely legitimate. As a tool for surveillance they are no more immoral than espionage; they save lives through significantly enhanced battle space awareness, and outside of the military they are used for fantastic projects such as counter-poaching in South Africa, or search and rescue in the Canadian wilds. And finally in this article, any criticism levelled at the use of hunter-killer-drones does not extend to other contested and related practices such as the use of special operations forces for targeted kill/capture missions in sovereign nations. This noted, I am vehemently in opposition to the use of drones in a hunter-killer role. I share the widespread fears regarding the rise of automation and the possibility for abuse as the killing power of drones is consolidated in the hands of a few. He illustrates this point by noting the difficulty that it would take for most people to use nothing but their physical endowments to take a life whilst their victim begged for mercy; our humanity or physical capabilities would halt most individuals. We developed weapons to make it easier and quicker to kill each other whilst putting ourselves at less risk; the sword, spear, bow and arrow, rifle, sniper rifle, fighter

As long as western forces use hunter-killer

supporters that ask questions like ‘isn’t this a

For an interesting perspective, they are

drones they will be open to criticism as

good thing in trying to eliminate violence?’ and

entertainingly delivered by fiction writer Daniel

cowards and this will be capitalised upon by

‘what use is a warrior ethos in modern

Suarez in a recent TEDx talk. Furthermore, I believe

enemies to dehumanise and justify any

developed society anyway?’ The reality is that

that hunter-killer drones play a major role in

tactics regardless of immorality. Even in

a warrior ethos at a cultural level and in the

fracturing international relationships and radicalising

Western domestic constituencies, articles,

military is the backbone of a nation’s defence.

individuals, especially in the Muslim world. And if I’m

speeches and sentiment already propagate

In the most extreme cases it is the last line of

really honest, I just cannot find a way to justify

drawing comparisons between despicable

defence; it is the will to keep fighting even in

killing another specific individual without

acts of terrorism, such as the recent knife

the face of overwhelming adversity. For

encountering any personal risk; this is an argument

attacks in London, with acts of ‘western

example, look at the Mujahedeen and years

easily picked apart when you consider other

drone terrorism’ in Arab and Muslim lands. A

later the Taliban; both were warrior cultures

Western technological advantages such as ICBM’s.

basic knowledge of terrorism will show that

shaped by the harsh Afghan lifestyle,

However, something about firing at specific targeted

these are false comparisons, although as long geography, history and honour codes like

individuals locally from a robotic platform operated

as hunter-killer drones are being used there is Pashtunwali,1 both should have been defeated

from another continent signifies a tipping point on

ample propagative leeway for this type of

and yet both fought off great powers with

humanity’s already shaky moral compass.

justification and unrest in domestic and

under-matched weapons systems. For an

enemy constituencies.

example of how the warrior ethos is infused

All of these arguments have a strong evidential basis. Conversely, there are two arguments often omitted from the mainstream anti-hunter-killer drone perspective that I wish to espouse in this article. Firstly, the use of drones in a hunter-killer role more than any other western technology provides a justification for the tactics used by enemy combatants, especially the use of IED’s, but also more pervasive tactics reliant on terror. Do not confuse this statement as a personal justification for the actions that groups like al Qaeda and the Taliban take against allied and western forces and civilians; there is nothing that makes the use of terrorism

“Once this ethos is eroded; western nations already reliant on teetering towers of technology would be even more if not unsustainably vulnerable from a strategic perspective.”

into the people and can be used as a last line of defence, observe the Chinese Maoist concept of Active Defence that used the population in an insurrection role, luring enemies in before launching aggressive counter attacks so as to deter invasion. Now think about what western nations would be like if they lost their warrior ethos. There are already major recruiting drives for armed servicemen in numerous western countries including Australia due to inadequate numbers.

More importantly, when combat distancing technology fails in some far off battle space or, god forbid, in a sovereign threat situation, what would western nations fall back on? The solution to all of these dilemmas has always been derived from a cultural and military warrior ethos. So how will this warrior ethos be destroyed? Well firstly, think about the hiring criteria of a hunter-killer-drone pilot versus a regular soldier. You are not looking for someone who wishes to test themselves in combat, face whatever fears they have or make sacrifices for their country so that others need not. A hunter-killer-drone pilot will never experience danger in their role and the excitement they get from their job will be derived from their love of country or the mission, which is no more realistic than a video game in experience but kills real people. Maybe the hunter-killer-drone pilots will just adapt to this for love of country? Unlikely; already drone pilots are suffering from PTSD due to the dislocation and stress of taking life with the press of a button. It is an unnatural action. The response will be predictable as militaries move their selection criteria’s more towards those already a little disconnected from the reality of what they’re doing, or towards those who truly are the cowards western enemies speak of; men who wish to kill but do not have the stomach to put themselves at risk. This is no doubt a morbid thought, but there is already significant remoulding within western militaries to incorporate the increasing use of hunterkiller-drones and the consequences for this remoulding could be dire. Furthermore, as the military warrior heroes begin to fade away so does their idolisation in their home nations; how do you celebrate the heroism of a person who spends eight hours a day blowing up people who he’s never seen from thousands of kilometres away?

Who would consume a book or movie where this is the idealised character? And should we celebrate those better suited to play computer games, like Call of Duty, than serve in the military? Once this ethos is eroded; western nations already reliant on teetering towers of technology would be even more if not unsustainably vulnerable from a strategic perspective. In contrast with this, there are unfortunately a huge number of reasons why the use of drones in hunter-killer roles will only increase over time in western nations. It has been shown over and again that technological advancement in the military often trumps moral, legal, ethical and, at times, common sense based objections. It must be the concerted goal of those opposed to the use of drones in such roles to use their skill sets to create norms in the moral, legislative and social arenas that control this process. Furthermore, this issue must be dealt with in isolation; tying the use of hunter-killer drones to preemptive strikes, erosion of sovereignty by special forces raids or the use of force in general only acts to weaken the argument against the use of drones in a hunter-killer role. Ironically it paints too big of a political target on one’s back… be thankful it isn’t a real one.

Cyber Warfare Information Era


capable of hacking into public and private sector computer systems and disabling the military, financial and critical infrastructure of advanced economies (Weimann, 2004).


Words: Alamelu Venkatesh Currently the greatest risk to mankind is not that of physical violence such as terrorism, but rather digital violence such as cybercrime and cyber terrorism. Terrorists are capable of using the internet and other forms of telecommunication devices for the purpose of supporting their organisational criminal activities and also towards achieving their operational goals. Since the tragic incidents in the United States on September 11 2001, every country has tightened their physical and border securities. This has encouraged extremists and terrorists to use other types of weapons including cyberspace to conduct their operations for criminal purposes. It is believed that in the recent years, cyber-criminal activities have increased dramatically and terrorist organizations have been funded partially through online credit card fraudulency. On the other hand, for the international movement of money transfers, drug trafficking and arms trafficking, terrorists and extremists are believed to be working together with cyber criminals to a large extent. Even though international communities are taking numerous steps to co-ordinate with law enforcement agencies to prevent cybercrime and cyber terrorism, computer attacks will become more prevalent in the future.

P ro ba bilities r ava ge

This is due to the fact that every nation around the globe has tightened their physical security policies and procedures in order to protect their borders from any physical terrorist attacks. This article examines in detail various concerning issues of digital violence and the key strategies that could be implemented to better protect nations against cybercrime. Cybercrime and cyberterrorism is the convergence of cyberspace and terrorism (Denning, 2000) It is an unlawful attack against computers, network systems and stored information by cyber criminals who intend to coerce individuals and governments in furtherance of political and social objectives (Denning, 2000). On the other hand, the potential threat which is posed by cybercrime and cyberterrorism is an alarming issue as cyber criminals are


te rm s


p ot ential

The roots of cyberterrorism can be traced back to the early 1990â&#x20AC;&#x2122;s (Weimann, 2004). Due to the rapid growth of internet use, there was a tremendous increase in terms of its potential damage, especially to highly networked high-tech dependent western countries such as the United States, United Kingdom and Australia. According to Weimann (2004), the combination of political, economic and psychological forces promoted the fear and potential risk of cyberterrorism. Although cyberterrorism does not necessitate a direct threat of physical violence, its psychological impacts on anxious societies are considered as powerful as terrorist bombing impacts. Therefore, the security and terrorism discussions especially after the 9/11 incidents introduced the prominence of cyberterrorism which seems to have offered non-state actors such as Al-Qaeda various opportunities to impose tremendous damage (Weimann, 2004). As mentioned by Yu (2001), cyberterrorism is

a new sort of terrorist attack by cyber criminals who aim to damage and disable computer network systems and telecommunications infrastructure. These cyber-attacks range from advanced strategic information warfare supported by hostile state actors and terrorist groups and organisations to small, amateur groups of individual hackers who happen to obtain access to ‘cyber-attack software’ available online (Yu, 2001, p.1). Furthermore, the current technological era is dependent on computer networking systems and critical infrastructure around the globe, especially in western nations, is connected through a co-operative network of computers, information systems and telecommunication structures. The potential damages that are imposed on a single point of entry are capable of destroying complete systems and wreaking havoc on the entire network which interacts with the system. Therefore, cyber-attacks on data and information systems can be as devastating as attacks on buildings and physical infrastructure (Yu, 2001). According to Rice (2009), information security has always been considered a key concern. Due to the advancement of computer networks and the increased level of cyber-criminal activities, it has now become an important issue of concern for every policymaker around the globe (Rice, 2009). I have to agree with Denning (2000) who describes cyberspace as being under constant attack, where many of those attacks are considered serious and expensive to fix. Below are some of the cyber-attack instances which were conducted in furtherance of social and political objectives (Denning, 2000): • In the year 1996, a computer hacker temporarily disabled a Massachusetts ISP (Internet Service Provider)

and was successful at damaging part of the ISP’s record keeping system. The ISP made an effort to stop the hacker from sending out racist messages around the globe under the ISP’s name. The hacker even signed off with a threat, stating, ‘You have yet to see true electronic terrorism. This is a promise’. In another incident in 1998, Sri Lankan embassies were flooded with 800 emails a day over a period of two weeks by the Tamil ethnic guerrillas and the email message read as ‘We are the Internet Black Tigers and we're doing this to disrupt your communications’. According to Sri Lankan authorities it was believed to be the first known cyber-attack by criminals against a national computer system. In 1999 during the Kosovo conflict, NATO computers were blasted with email bombs and were hit with DoS (Denial of Service) attacks by cyber criminals in or to protest NATO bombing incidents. The United States government websites were posted with messages by Chinese cyber criminals such as ‘We won't stop attacking until the war stops!’ after the Chinese Embassy was accidently bombed in Belgrade.

As Beggs and Warren (2009) describe, an extremist who has a political motive to cause damage by trying to break through a Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) system, such as by manipulating the gas pipeline and controlling gas pressure in a gas plant to cause an explosion, can be classified as a cyber terrorist. This is because civilians will be harmed and the terrorist’s motivation to effect political change would have occurred. According to the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) Head Robert Mueller, cyber criminals are manipulating cash, data and security. Terrorist organisations such as Al-Qaeda are making use of the internet for the purpose of recruiting members, motivating violence, posting ways to make bio-weapons and also organising social networks for aspiring terrorists. Currently terrorist threats are growing due to online espionage, according to the FBI, because cyber terrorists are looking for source codes, money, trade and government secrets to carry out their operations. Hackers are also making use of ‘spear phishing’ attacks, where they are capable of deceiving employees of an organisation in order to download malicious computer codes into company networks. In order to protect critical infrastructure systems, law enforcement and intelligence agencies must work together with IT professionals and identify any susceptibility (Beggs & Warren, 2009). G ov er nm en t’s o bliga tio n to co un ter th e r isk The United States and its allies such as Australia,

Canada, New Zealand and the United Kingdom have engaged in ‘Cyber Storm’ exercises in relations to cyber warfare. ‘Cyber Storm’ is a technique to explore potential vulnerabilities to various cyberattacks in a trusted environment. It is a process where its participants are divided into groups such as defenders and attackers over simulations which are capable of testing the national responsiveness to cyber-attacks on critical infrastructure such as IT systems, transportation, chemical and telecommunication systems (Pauli, 2008). In February 2006 the ‘Cyber Storm’ exercise was launched in the United States for a period of three days from 6-10 February by the Department of Homeland Security in order to test the nation’s defences against digital espionage. The simulation was targeted primarily at American security organisations but Australia, the UK, Canada and New Zealand participated in this exercise as well. This event involved nine large IT businesses, six electricity utility firms and two major airline carriers. The vendors involved in this exercise were Cisco systems, Computer Associates, CSC, Microsoft, Symantec and Verisign (Pauli, 2008). In March 2008, ‘Cyber Storm II’ was officially launched in Australia where the US, the UK, Canada and New Zealand engaged in an international hacking exercise from 11– 14 March. This ‘Cyber Storm II’ event was led by the US Department of Homeland Security and supported by various public, private and international organisations that included the FBI, the Australian

“Terrorist organisations such as Al-Qaeda are making use of the internet for the purpose of recruiting members, motivating violence, posting ways to make bioweapons and also organising social networks for aspiring terrorists.”

Federal Police, the Department of Defence, AusCert, the AG department, Telstra, Microsoft, Verizon and McAfee (Pauli, 2008). March 2008, ‘Cyber Storm II’ was officially launched in Australia where the US, the UK, Canada and New Zealand engaged in an international hacking exercise from 11– 14 March. This ‘Cyber Storm II’ event was led by the US Department of Homeland Security and supported by various public, private and international organisations that included the FBI, the Australian Federal Police, the Department of Defence, AusCert, the AG department, Telstra, Microsoft, Verizon and McAfee (Pauli, 2008). The Australian Federal government has also built a secret database in order to fight cyberterrorism in Australia. Major Australian financial institutions, telecommunications and public utilities have either handed over or are in the process of handing over sensitive data to the Australian Government in order to protect their critical infrastructure against any natural disasters and terrorist attacks. This process began in 2009 and Australia is one of the only nations with a centralised national critical infrastructure protection model. This Critical Infrastructure Protection Modelling and Assessment (CIPMA) program was launched in 2007 and received a $23.4 million funding boost in 2012 (Palma, 2010).

Im plem en tation of k ey str ate gies In addition to the above ‘Cyber Storm’ regular exercises from the government to protect critical infrastructure, some of the key strategies that could be implemented to better protect countries against cyberterrorism, as David and Sakurai (2003) state, are in the following areas: • Implementing responsible, accountable and identifiable use of the internet by employees and deny anonymity to the attackers; • A strategy for critical infrastructure protection by way of information sharing and industrial co-operation, a broad program of awareness and education among people, amendment of laws which are concerning to critical infrastructure protection and a revised program of research and development with a national organizational structure and; • Development of Cyber Intelligence (CYBERINT) Analysis Centre (CAC) in order to evaluate methods for improving the ability to detect, identify and prevent cyber terrorist attacks.

On the other hand, as Jeong-Tae and Tchanghee (2005) states, in recent years the number of intrusions and attacks against critical infrastructures and other information networks have increased. Even though there is no identified evidence to support the claim that terrorists are planning to attack critical infrastructure, cybercrime and cyberterrorism are concerning issues and a matter of vital importance to both national and international welfare and security. Therefore, it is the responsibility of every government and organisations to work as a team and take essential measures in order to meet the situation and consider effective legislation regarding cybercrime and cyberterrorism.

C on clu sion As Rice (2009) states, cyberterrorism is a real threat and not many people are prepared to prevent or detect an attack. I agree with Rice (2009) that cyber security is a community issue and therefore information technology awareness is crucial. Businesses are capable of preventing cyber-attacks and can also recover quickly in the event of an attack with the application of effective and efficient techniques (Rice, 2009).

The contemporary era is heavily dependent on communication infrastructure and the advancement of information technology is playing an effective role on individuals and society. Hence, human dependence on information technology has brought new vulnerabilities to our lives because cyber criminals and cyber terrorists are making use of information technology to pursue their malicious intentions. Furthermore, cyberterrorism cannot be avoided just by developing an information security technology alone. It is also essential for governments and businesses to continuously work together in order to narrow the technological gap regarding the information security and cyber terrorism and seek technological cooperation for the purpose of information security (JeongTae & Tchanghee, 2005). I believe it is impossible to be completely protected from any type of cyber warfare and cyber terrorist attack because, as Marszalek (2008) states, the more security a computer system has in place, the easier it can become to attack the system by cyber criminals. Regarding cyber warfare, one has to deal with information security including all computer networks and sensitive information of business and government entities which is possible by way of having comprehensive security plans for the purpose of data protection. Concerning cyberterrorism, physical infrastructures need to be protected, especially if they are considered as targets for attacks by cyber criminals. Hence, appropriate measures are required to secure these physical infrastructures which need to be in place.

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AIIA QLD Newsletter June 2013