merican Foreign Polic Y A April 2008
Americaâ€™s Achillesâ€™ Heel Foreign Policy and the Final Frontier
Freedom, Free Markets, and Democracy Princeton Student Editorials on America and its Place in the World
From the Editor
n the wake of resurgent economic populism, protectionism has once again become touted as the most significant threat to globalization. History, however, begs to differ—great power militarism, with its attendant dangers for life and property, seems its principal menace. Globalization is old. Since Europeans first sailed to Asia and the Americas, the world and its people, goods and services have increasingly been drawn together. By 1913, a rudimentary globalization was already taking place as international trade reached its zenith. Economists and politicians alike noted that a new age was dawning. And just when it was finally within reach, the world committed economic suicide. As the First World War swept across Europe, its immediate casualty was what many economists now call the “First Era of Globalization.” World War I not only destroyed the powerhouse of globalization, the European economies; it also crippled entire markets, trade routes and supply chains, dooming free trade. Only after seventy years did the percentage of world trade as a portion of GDP reach its pre-war levels. And even today, net flows of FDI are still below their levels ninety-five years ago. While protectionism is harmful, militarism is particularly pernicious. Today, all the great powers—the U.S., China, Russia, India—are dramatically expanding their military capabilities for strategic purposes. But the belief that a nation’s military force should be actively used to promote national interest implicitly assumes military force should be a serious element of strategic calculations. Relying on weapons as a strategic hedge therefore introduces instabilities into the international system—if a strategic “bluff” is called, force then becomes a necessary answer. This is especially true over the Straits of Taiwan, where military force is the ultimate hedge, and where strategists on both sides admit that conflict could plausibly lead to nuclear war. Our cover story notes that modern weapons make even smaller conflicts between great powers potentially crippling. Just as World War I brought war to the skies, so too would another great power conflict bring war to Earth’s orbit. Here, nations would seek to cripple the satellites essential to each other’s military coordination and reconnaissance. But since orbital satellites are also fundamentally responsible for the telecommunications revolution and the foundations of modern globalization, a “shooting war” in space would be ruinous, undermining the infrastructure essential to the global economy. Today, the world is not fundamentally less conflict prone then it was in the 1913. Global economic interconnectedness, after all, did not prevent World War I. Militarism remains an element of foreign policy; violence is still an oft-used tool of the international system. Despite seventy years of virtually uninterrupted growth, globalization is not inevitable. It can be undermined. Yet the largest economies today continue to assemble the largest militaries. At the same time, they may also be conjuring the forces of their own destruction.
Rush Doshi ‘11, Editor-in-Chief
American Foreign Policy is a student-written, student-run publication based at Princeton University. It was founded in the wake of September 11th to provide Princeton students with a forum to discuss the difficult problems and choices facing the United States and the world. American Foreign Policy magazine is sponsored by the Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, the Princeton Institute for International and Regional Studies, and the James Madison Program in American Ideals and Institutions. No part of this publication should be construed to promote any pending legislation or to support any candidate for office. The opinions expressed herein are those of the authors and not necessarily those of the Woodrow Wilson School, the Princeton Institute for International and Regional Studies, the James Madison Program, Princeton University, or American Foreign Policy. AFP gladly accepts letters to the editor, article proposals, and donations, which are fully tax-deductible. All correspondence may be directed to: American Foreign Policy, 5406 Frist Center, Princeton, NJ 08544 email@example.com www.princeton.edu/~afp
Staff Editor-in-Chief Rush Doshi ‘11 Publisher Manav Lalwani ‘09 Managing Editors Zhenling Lai ‘09 Adam Harris ‘10 Editors Cole Bunzel Owen Fletcher Kent Kuran Carlos Hanco Emily Norris Jessica Sheehan Zvi Smith Ahson Azmat Jon Bradshaw
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Hee Jin Cho Jon Extein Jonathan Giuffrida Brandon McGinley Catalina Valencia Brendan Carroll Ellen Choi Addie Lerner Eric Stern
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Jonathan Giuffrida ‘10, Production Manager Kelly Lack ‘10 Ellen Choi ‘11 Peck Yang ‘11
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Peter McCall Ellen Choi Shaina Li
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Editor-in-Chief Emeritus Zvi Smith ‘09 Publisher Emeritus Joel Alicea ‘10
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Anne-Marie Slaughter: Dean, Woodrow Wilson School Nolan McCarty: Acting Dean, Woodrow Wilson School Katherine Newman: Director, Princeton Institute for International and Regional Studies Robert P. George: Director, James Madison Program G. John Ikenberry: Albert G. Milbank Professor of Politics and International Affairs Bernard A. Haykel: Director, Institute for Transregional Study of the Contemporary Middle East
American Foreign Policy April 2008 Volume VII, Issue 6
CONTENTS Cover Story
America’s Achilles’ Heel
Foreign Policy and the Final Frontier Joshua Harris ‘11
Here Comes the Sun (Reprise) Dealing with North Korea
Dead Satellite An Encore for Peace Right to Remain Silenced
Zayn Siddique ‘11 7
Tara Lewis ‘11
Interview with Professor Rozman
Silence of the Liberals Human Rights and the Beijing Olympics Tara Lewis ‘11
Who Gives a Farc? We Didn’t Start the Fire!
10 Vishal Chanani ‘11
FARC(E) Venezuela’s Hollow Support of Ecuador Nick Cox ‘08
Franco Lopez ‘10
Geopolitics and Precedent The Implications of Kosovo’s Independence Cale Salih ‘10 A Civilian Power The EU as a New Type of Actor Jean Giraud ‘10
By the Numbers
19 Mohit Agrawal ‘11
Photo Sources: Tomohisa Kato/Kyodo News, Petros Giannakouris, Reinaldo D’Santiago, Marko Drobnjakovic/AP
Cover Photo: NASA/AP
America’s Achilles’ Heel
Foreign Policy and the Final Frontier
Joshua Harris ‘11
hroughout its short history, the exploration and exploitation of space has been the subject of immensely inflated expectations. Science fiction writers have routinely portrayed it as an epic and romantic endeavor, comparable to the Age of Discovery, captivating the public with images of space fleets fighting grand broadside battles with sleek precision lasers. Alas, such perceptions only mask the true but comparatively mundane value of space: as a medium for infrastructure. Both the military and the global economy have become dependent on the satellites that
occupy Earth’s orbit, and our reliance on this orbital infrastructure for security and prosperity will only grow. As the value of space continues to increase, so does the importance of adopting a proactive grand strategy to guide our military space policy. We must recognize that earth’s orbital space has become integral to our economic and national security, and ensure that it does not become our Achilles’ heel. America’s greatest vulnerability in space is the constellation of satellites that the military relies on for command, control, communications, navigation, intelligence gathering, and targeting; a
major disruption in any of these areas would severely compromise combat effectiveness. The U.S. does have reason to be concerned about an attack on these critical assets, given China’s heavy investment in anti-satellite (ASAT) capabilities and enormous technical sophistication in this area. We know they possess working laser systems that can temporarily (or permanently) disable reconnaissance satellites; indeed, China has proven the laser’s effectiveness by intentionally blinding several American satellites for a few short periods of time. More dramatically, the Chinese military successfully destroyed one of their own weather satellites while testing an ASAT missile last year. Within a decade, China will most likely have a sophisticated and flexible ASAT capability that will permit it to selectively blind, disable, or destroy our satellites. The Economist recently reported that present-day war game simulations of Sino-U.S. conflict over Taiwan often end with China “inflicting grievous losses on [our forces] by launching an early attack in space.” Nor will this capability be lim-
China’s anti-satellite weapons render the country a potential threat to America’s military and economy, which are dependent on satellite infrastructure.
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Cover Story ited to the Chinese. As the costs of procuring effective ASAT weapons fall, more powers will develop and build them. It is not hard to imagine the Iranians or North Koreans capitalizing on their ballistic missile expertise to design, manufacture, and export crude ASAT missiles within the next twenty years. While space is crucial to the military, its economic importance is perhaps even greater. The growing number of commercial and governmental satellites has become a keystone of the world’s infrastructure. A high volume of longdistance communication, internet access, and broadcasting is routed through satellites. Still more reliant are personal navigation systems and commercial logistics—including those vital to commercial shipping. Likewise, weather forecasting and climatology is almost exclusively dependent on satellite information. Space-related industry accounts for an increasing proportion of our GDP; furthermore, space technology research has resulted in many valuable spin-off applications at home. Researching, developing, producing, and even owning future satellites and other space installations will be of enormous value to the American economy and consumers. The United States has a compelling interest in preventing a shooting war in space. In addition to the risks posed to our military capabilities, the perils of such conflict are threefold. First, and most frighteningly, a large-scale conflict could disable the early warning satellites that the major nuclear powers use to track intercontinental ballistic missile launches. These satellites preserve international stability by ensuring that preemptive nuclear decapitation strikes are impossible to execute. Given the high rate of false warnings from other nuclear sensors (in 1983 alone, for instance, there were 255 false warnings) and the intense stress and fear that would be manifest during a war, the loss of these satellites would significantly increase the risk of accidental nuclear war. Second, the global economy would be severely crippled by the loss of the satellites it relies upon. The immediate effect would almost certainly be a major recession, with economic growth rates mark-
edly reduced by the infrastructure loss in the long run. Finally, the widespread destruction of satellites would strew a considerable amount of “junk” all across earth’s orbit. This would make much of near earth space unusable for decades and greatly harm our ability to conduct any type of future space mission. The most important step we can take to immediately reduce our space vulnerability is to invest in both passive and active satellite security measures. Our current satellite network is highly susceptible to attack because it is comprised of easily tracked satellites with little redundancy between them. The most promising long-
its space program and recently became only the third country to put a man in orbit. Third, the perils of war, as noted earlier, far outweigh any benefits accrued by those seeking to use space for offensive advantage. It would thus be foolish to build spacebased attack platforms, or even a spacebased ballistic missile defense shield, as some have suggested. These actions would incite others to follow suit, and ultimately turn Earth’s orbit into a legitimate military target. We would be wasting considerable resources on these weapons and increasing the risk of a space war, with its attendant consequences. Nevertheless, given the immense value of our interests in space, it would be foolish not to develop the military technology to defend our orbital assets from attack. We need to develop our own laserbased ASAT weaponry in order to extend our military strength against other technologically sophisticated powers; if they can disable our satellites without fear of a similar retaliation, we will be at a lethal disadvantage. More fundamentally, we should seek to craft a mutually advantageous “ruleset” for space exploitation that all the great powers can agree to. The world needs to recognize that military competition over space resources will be entirely counterproductive, given the enormous firepower that each side can project against the others. The world’s powers have peacefully partitioned contested resources before; we can and should establish rules for space development that satisfy the needs and wants of each power. It would be hubris to believe that we have the foresight to realize what rules ought to govern space conduct decades down the line, but given the risks involved, it would be short-sighted and reckless not to begin the process now, when our options are open and future patterns of conflict and cooperation have yet to be settled. Afp
“Military competition over space resources will be entirely counterproductive, given the enormous firepower that each side can project against the others.” term solution is to replace them with a large network of cheaper, stealthy microsatellites, which would be extremely difficult to disable. Moreover, the government must mandate that commercially operated satellites have increased redundancy and survivability. Private satellite operators will be loath to pay for the additional expense, but their services have become a vital public good that we cannot afford to leave vulnerable. In the long-term, American space policy must be predicated on three planks. First, like all areas of critical value, space will eventually become militarized, if only defensively. World powers will not be content to permit assets crucial to their economic and national security to lie vulnerable to enemy attack, for, as elsewhere, force of arms is the final law in space. Nevertheless, neither the placement of offensive weapons in space nor the destruction of satellites and other space installations is inevitable. Such actions would be both very costly and highly visible, so the potential for successful multilateral arms control is significant. Second, any policy that relies on space supremacy will be foiled, as the United States will not be able to maintain hegemony in space. China, India, and others have the will and the economic capacity to match American space prowess in the future; China, for instance, has invested substantially in
Joshua may be reached at firstname.lastname@example.org
Here Comes the Sun (Reprise) Dealing with North Korea
ew foreign policy issues have undergone as much discussion, with as little progress, as North Korean denuclearization. But perhaps it is not yet time to abandon all hope. While the North Korean regime has typically been characterized as hostile, isolationist, and erratic, it seems to be showing a genuine interest in finally putting down its nuclear arms, entering the age of globalization and rejoining the international community. One indication of the North’s interest in globalization is the establishment of the Kaesong Industrial Park, where some 23,000 North Koreans are now employed by companies from the South. The industrial park has been touted as a tangible success for South Korea’s “Sunshine Policy,” which seeks to foster peaceful cooperation between the two Koreas. North Korea’s new openness has also manifested in more novel ways, such as its receptiveness towards the “music diplomacy” practiced by the New York Philharmonic Orchestra, which is performing Arirang in Pyongyang. Indeed, North Korea has proposed talks about fielding a unified Korean team for the Beijing Olympics—a form of collaboration which has not been seen since the World Ping Pong Championships of 1991. On the political front, the International Atomic Energy Agency’s (IAEA) confirmation that the Yongbyon facilities have actually been shut down and the return of the $25 million in frozen North Korean assets were welcome developments. For a while, it seemed as if we were making the first genuine steps towards progress since the implosion of the Agreed Framework in 2002. Alas, things fell apart. During the recent talks in Geneva between Vice Foreign Minister Kim Kye Gwan and Assistant Secretary of State Christopher Hill, negotiations seem to have stalled over North Korea’s alleged
Zayn Siddique ‘11 covert uranium enrichment programs and secret transfers to Syria. This information led South Korea to question the North’s sincerity and commitment to denuclearization, and it has threatened to halt expansion of the Kaesong industrial complex—a vital lifeline for the North. There has also been a delay in building the promised light water reactors to replace the North’s graphite-moderated weapons-capable nuclear power plants. The path the Six-Party Negotiations are going down bears an uncanny resemblance to that of the failed Agreed Framework, where talks broke down amidst allegations that Pyongyang had Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU) programs. A quick examination of the history of talks between the U.S. and North Korea may offer a few lessons to avoid the pitfalls of the past and move ahead with denuclearization. The United States needs to evaluate just how critical immediate disclosure of HEU facilities is. In 2002, former Chief Negotiator James Kelly met with North Korean officials to relay America’s belief
that North Korea possessed HEU. He demanded they disclose the location and size of all stockpiles before construction of the light water reactors continued. The Koreans predictably maintained that they had none and insisted the United States offer proof to the contrary. The North Koreans grew suspicious when the U.S. was unable to substantiate its claims and withdrew from the NPT, closing their country to foreign scrutiny. The United States, by making accusations too early, indirectly lost any chance of being able to search for conclusive evidence. At the heart of the Six-Party Negotiations is the desire for a denuclearized Korea. While full disclosure and open information is important, it comes at a cost. It may not be worth risking the entire agreement over the information Secretary Hill is currently demanding, which relates more to past activities than to current capacities. In the long run, we are far more likely to elicit greater openness from North Korea if we do not make further progress contingent on immediate disclosure, but continue to develop areas of agreement. North Korea has shown itself to be very amenable to an “action for action” principle and has commensurately opened up its nation for every show of good faith by the US. We cannot afford to compromise on issues such as eliminating North Korea’s ability to process weapons-grade plutonium, but other issues, such as the HEU, are battles which can be fought another day. Another contentious issue is North
The six-party negotiations are held in hopes of denuclearizing North Korea.
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Asia Korea’s long-standing demand to be removed from the United States’ list of state sponsors of terrorism. Pyongyang believes that it is economically handicapped by being on that list, but the United States is waiting until North Korea takes more steps towards full disclosure and denuclearization first. This is an issue in which the benefits of making a concession to North Korea would far outweigh the costs. While opponents to the delisting would accuse the U.S. of ideological inconsistency and appeasement of Pyongyang, the fact of the mat-
ter is that North Korea has not been officially associated with a terrorist attack since 1987. Removing them from the list will redress this inaccuracy, and would also leave North Korea without a scapegoat for its economic woes. One of the most important lessons we can learn from the failure of the Agreed Framework is that rhetoric must be followed with action. The single most damaging event was the Republican-controlled Congress’ immediate reversal of the deal brokered by President Clinton. While they did not have the legal author-
ity to overturn the Agreed Framework, they blocked funding for the light water reactors we had promised Pyongyang. This analysis leads to a few policy prescriptions for our current situation. First, South Korea must not withdraw its support from the Kaesong Industrial Complex, which is one of the most viable and effective routes to opening up North Korea. Threatening to dry up this economic lifeline will only antagonize a regime that is already feeling the strains of poverty and hunger. Likewise, South Korea and the United States must not renege on
Compiled by Tara Lewis ‘11 "The Dalai Lama is a wolf wrapped in a habit, a monster with human face and animal's heart." Zhang Qingli, Communist Party Secretary in Tibet, March 19
“The answers are clear to me. Removing Saddam Hussein from power was the right decision, and this is a fight that America can and must win.” President George W. Bush, March 19 "The House will be more disciplined and better managed, as you know there is more respect for a woman in our country." Tariq Azim, Senator of Pakistan People’s Party, on Fehmida Mirza’s election as first Female Parliament Speaker, March 19
"Doraemon, I hope you will travel around the world as an anime ambassador to deepen people's understanding of Japan so they will become friends with Japan." Japanese Foreign Minister Masahiko Komura, to his newly appointed cat “anime ambassador,” March 19
“If Iran were to obtain nuclear weapons, it would have disastrous consequences... We have to prevent this." Angela Merkel, March 18 "It's part of our agriculture, our food and our medicine. It's sacred. The UN doesn't know our culture." Peruvian Congresswoman Hilaria Supa on the UN’s suggestion to criminalize coca, March 15
“Our missile sites and radars do not constitute a threat to Russia."
US Defense Secretary Robert Gates, March 18
“We consider that it is extremely troublesome for the existing structure of European security.” Dmitri Medvedev, President-elect of Russia, commenting on the possibility of NATO expansion including Georgia and Ukraine, March 25
“There are those who say the Iraqi Army can control Iraq without the Americans. But they are liars.” Col. Ali Omar Ali, an Iraqi battalion commander, March 20
“I must say, I’m a little envious. If I were slightly younger and not employed here, I think it would be a fantastic experience to be on the front lines of helping this young democracy succeed. It must be exciting for you … in some ways romantic, in some ways, you know, confronting danger.” President George W. Bush, in a video conference with American soldiers and civilians in Afghanistan, March 14
Asia their promised deliveries of heavy fuel oil, which North Korea desperately needs to generate electricity. Finally, it is important that the U.S. presidential candidates firmly declare their commitment to upholding the results of the Six-Party Talks. The North Korean delegation has historical reason to believe that a new administration will result in a different U.S. policy towards the North, and might choose to hedge its bets or stall until they can ascertain what the new policy is. Thus, if we are to see any real progress by the end of the year, both Democrats and Republicans must maintain a unanimous front, supporting a consistent foreign policy towards North Korea. The recommendations above are not meant to be a comprehensive list by any means. Rather, they are but a few of the areas in which we can improve our policies to avoid the pitfalls of the past.
Some might criticize this approach as giving up too much to North Korea, and link it to the appeasement of Germany
ed States need only consider the fact that Kim Jong-il would lose his leverage and risk a serious counterattack if he actually acted on his rhetoric and detonated a nuclear bomb. Ultimately, North Korea fears being left out of regional decision making and will continue to issue nuclear threats for political leverage. If we are ever to achieve a long term solution and address the North’s underlying motivations, we need to maintain a consistent policy of engagement towards them over the long term. This will reassure Pyongyang that it can continue to exercise international influence through diplomatic means, and would make the nuclear option unnecessary—which, after all, is essential to the region’s stability and safety. Afp
“Kim Jong-il is fundamentally a rational actor.” pre-World War II. The crucial difference is that (despite rumors to the contrary) Kim Jong-il is fundamentally a rational actor. His quest to acquire nuclear weapons is not a megalomaniacal power grab but rather a defensive attempt to deter more powerful states such as the United States from attacking. Unlike its regional neighbors, North Korea is an economically insignificant nation with very little political capital. Consequently, it resorts to nuclear threats as a way of grabbing attention and influence in regional decisions. Those who believe Pyongyang poses a direct nuclear threat to the Unit-
Zayn may be reached at email@example.com
AFP Interview with Professor Rozman
GILBERT ROZMAN is currently the Musgrave Professor of Sociology at Princeton University. His research concentrates on Northeast Asia—namely, China, Japan, Russia, and South Korea. He has focused specifically on Asian regionalism, as well as on the effect of national identity formation on bilateralism and foreign policy. He is on the editorial boards of China Quarterly, Asian Survey and the Journal of East Asian Studies. Recent publications include, among others, Japanese Strategic Thought toward Asia, Russian Strategic Thought toward Asia, South Korean Strategic Thought toward Asia, and Northeast Asia’s Stunted Regionalism: Bilateral Distrust in the Shadow of Globalization. Many believe that American foreign policy in Asia has suffered a series of strategic failures in the last few years, allowing the Chinese and others to pick up the pieces at our expense. Do you believe the U.S. has suffered strategic failures in Asia, and if so, what was wrong with its Asian policy? The Bush administration in 2001 believed it was going to have the most experienced group of officials that had existed for any administration in managing Asia. Unfortunately, I think, they did not understand the dynamics of Asia well. The Armitage report, which was meant as a kind of policy blueprint, had some positive elements but it was one-sided. The Rumsfeld-Cheney approach was different from the ArmitagePowell approach—the administration didn’t know how to reconcile the two. And it was wrong to ignore the need for some coordination and consistency with the Clinton approach. I think it was a contradictory strategy, but it has gotten better. I would say with Tom Christensen, Deputy Assistant Secretary, and Jim Shinn, as Assistant Secretary of Defense in charge of Asia—we have some very able people. However, we don’t have a regional strategy yet. We’ve dealt with some of the urgent situations in new ways, but there’s been a lot of change of late. The election in Taiwan,
the election of a different kind of leader in Australia, a political shift at least temporarily in Japan, a new leader in South Korea—I think we need to put these pieces together to come up with a different strategy. What do you perceive as the effect of changing leadership in South Korea, Japan, Australia and Taiwan on political realities of the region? The changing leadership increases the potential for multilateralism and for a regional strategy. With some of the previous leaders—Koizumi and Abe in Japan, Roh Moo-Hyun in South Korea—it was difficult to figure out how to put things together. I think now the potential for consensus building is considerably higher. The U.S. has to prepare for renewed triangular coordination with Japan and South Korea in the coming months, and South Korea’s new president, Lee Myung-bak, is interested in strengthening this coordination and achieving a triangular relationship between the U.S., Japan and South Korea. We should not wait for the U.S. presidential election before making some modest starts at new coordination, and groups preparing for 2009 should undertake a comprehensive strategic review of our past policies in Asia.
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Silence of the Liberals
Human Rights and the Beijing Olympics
houghts of the Olympic Games usually include images of more than 10,000 flag-toting athletes from roughly 200 countries convening in a different city every four years to win medals and set records. But in 2008, the Olympics are synonymous with thoughts of controversy, conflict, and a shifting political climate. By securing the nomination as the 2008 host of the Olympics, China has already begun to affirm itself as a major actor on the world stage. China’s power is spreading quickly,
Tara Lewis ‘11 and its political and economic spheres of influence have already expanded throughout Asia and Africa. Beijing’s foreign policy agenda includes everything from investing heavily in Sudanese oil markets— China already buys two thirds of Sudan’s oil—to building roads in Myanmar and Pakistan. In 2007 China was the world’s second-largest economy, and in 2008, the communist nation’s economic and political power seems to be growing as quickly and expansively as its burgeoning economy. China is integral to successful negotiations
There’s been talk of a containment strategy with China which involved India, Japan, South Korea, Australia and New Zealand—the democracies in the region. Do you think the U.S. will pursue containment? Is such pursuit constructive? There are different levels of reacting to a rising China. A full containment strategy seems to be closest to what we might have expected from the neo-conservative wing of the Bush Administration. That has been discredited. For one thing, no one will join us. Another, we’re much too interdependent with China for that to be productive. Third, it drives our foreign policy in the region to a dead end because it’s not sustainable—it’s too extreme. The second approach might be called the effort to hedge by creating a kind of “NATO of the East.” Even without expecting these countries to contain China, the idea is that if you can strengthen ties among them, with India on one edge and even Indonesia a target, there is a way to limit China’s rise. I think that was based also on false expectations and was more consistent with the Armitage report, which accepted China as a partner but weighed Japan far more heavily in ways that were appropriate for alliance building but inappropriate for regional strategy. We’ve already been repulsed by some of these potential partners. There have been electoral changes which now make such an alliance system more difficult, so I don’t think that is feasible anymore, if it ever was.
with the Sudanese government regarding the Darfur conflict and an important facilitator of peace between India and Pakistan. Western political leaders, of course, are cognizant of China’s new political and economic power and have recently been willing to overlook China’s human rights offenses to preserve economic stability and maintain positive relations. The willingness of global leaders to attend the Beijing Olympics reveals China’s rising influence in the international system, and perhaps, the decreasing force of universalist human rights discourse in the face of realist, economically motivated strategies. Rather than address the problem of China’s human rights violations head on, many Western leaders have surprisingly dismissed the importance of human rights in deciding whether or not China is a suitable host for the Games. Responding to calls to boycott the upcoming Olympics in Beijing, French Foreign Minister Bernard
crackdown on Tibetan protests recently, they continue to raise question marks in surrounding countries. In general, countries are interested in balancing. And if the U.S. develops a multilateralism with China included, and builds up our alliances and encourages other countries to recognize their options rather than become dependent on China, I think there’s a good chance that strategy will work. By working with other countries in the region in modest ways to build up regional structures that are inclusive and that are accepting of China, but don’t give China the leadership role it might seek, we can put pressure on China to continue evolving in a direction that is favorable to our regional interests.
The nuclear deal with India seems to be a U.S. attempt at gaining influence in India vis-à-vis China. Is there competition for India? Yes, though I think that the countries pursuing India have different, even changing, objectives. I think the U.S. shift which began under Clinton and accelerated under Bush to try to draw India closer has been a realistic understanding of the shifting great power balance. And Japan is awakening to India too. China, I think, still has some inconsistencies in its India policy. Russia is losing some of its earlier leverage and is trying to reestablish it. I’m not someone who knows India well, or specializes in that country, and I’m not sure what choices India will make except for the fact that it is too significant a country and has too much confidence in its own future to find What approach to China’s rise do you think would be more it advantageous to side with any one of these countries. India reasonable? is now recognized as a full-fledged great power, and as an acOne approach is some structuring of regional institutions tor in areas in which it was barely present. It will want to keep for purposes of hedging. I think that is reasonable, especially its options open. if one considers that China’s efforts to strengthen its position are not fully consistent with its theory of peaceful rise. The This interview is continued online at the AFP Chinese have at times alienated other countries. With the website: www.princeton.edu/~afp
GLOBAL KOSOVO declares independence from Serbia. The new state is quickly recognized by many nations, including the United States, France, UK and Germany. Others, such as Russia, China and Serbia object to the declaration.
The UNITED STATES continues to face threats of an impending financial crisis. The Federal Reserve responds with more interest rate cuts and special loans and arranges for JP Morgan to buy out the bankrupted Bear Stearns. After 49 years in power, Fidel Castro resigns from the presidency of CUBA. His brother Raul Castro succeeds Fidel, though he notes that Fidel will remain influential in government issues.
In the continuing primaries in the UNITED STATES, Sen. John McCain secures the Republican nomination. Sen. Barack Obama, who is still engaged in intense electoral competition, delivers a widely-acclaimed speech on racial issues growing out of his relationship with his pastor.
Violence continues in ISRAEL and PALESTINE, as Mahmoud Abbas stalls peace talks due to concern over civilian deaths. Osama Bin Laden issues a rare statement condemning talks and urging jihad against Israel to reclaim the holy lands.
In ECUADOR, Columbia successfully executes an unauthorized, preemptive strike on FARC leader Raul Reyes, who was hiding in Ecuadorian territory. Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez denounces the strike.
American Foreign Policy
Negotiations in KENYA come to a close with the creation of the â€œdual executive,â€? which allows the President and the Prime Minister to share executive powers. Kibaki retains the Presidency, while Odinga fills the latter post.
UPDATE Collected by Vishal Chanani ‘11 Concerns over former President Vladimir Putin’s role in RUSSIA grow. His former aide, Dmitri Medvedev, succeeds him as President but Putin remains active in the political arena and becomes Prime Minister. Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, President of IRAN, makes a state visit to IRAQ, the first in almost twenty years. Both countries are now led by Shi’ite dominated governments. Concerns over Iranian interference in Iraqi affairs persist. In Parliamentary elections in PAKISTAN, the party of Gen. Pervez Musharraf suffers heavy losses. Two opposition parties win the majority of seats within the Parliament and are set to form a coalition government.
The so-called Merchant of Death, Viktor Bout, a Russian arms-dealer suspected of supplying weapons to international terrorists, including Al-Qaeda, the Taliban, FARC and others, is arrested in THAILAND by an American-led sting operation.
Less than two weeks after the Parliament of IRAQ passes important legislation on elections, the budget, etc., the Presidency Council vetoes the package. The country remains without important measures.
In anticipation of the general election, tensions grow in ZIMBABWE. Opposition leaders accuse President Robert Mugabe of abusing power and rigging elections, criticizing him for placing police escorts in voting booths.
As the Beijing Olympics approach, tensions surface in CHINA. Protests from Tibetan monks break out in Lhasa, and are suppressed by Chinese authorities. An unknown number have been killed, prompting international criticism.
Facing continued criticism for its poor environmental record, AUSTRALIA ratifies the Kyoto Protocol, marking a break from the policies of Conservative leader John Howard. Prime Minister Kevin Rudd optimistically suggests the nation will meet its targets.
Asia Kouchner observed that “when you’re dealing in international relations with countries as important as China, obviously when you make economic decisions it’s sometimes at the expense of human rights. That’s elementary realism.” While a stark, if not cold admission of the realities of the political situation with China, Minister Kouchner’s statement is morbidly ironic. Minister Kouchner’s suggests that France can justifiably choose to support the Beijing Olympics despite qualms about human rights, forgetting that the Olympics are an ancient tradition meant to bring countries together in support of “universal moral principles.” Even President Bush, the leader of the “free world” and head of a nation that prides itself on preserving the integrity of human rights, plans to attend the 2008 Olympics and contends that the Games are about sports and not politics. Paradoxically, however, the greatest concerns of the American President and his foreign counterparts about boycotting the Beijing Olympics appear to be political. Foreign officials presumably hope that by denouncing the idea of boycotting the Games they can appease Beijing and avoid jeopardizing their economic affairs with China. Although both European and U.S. leaders are furiously attempting to separate the Olympic Games from politics, the Games are creating a political dilemma of their own. The world’s willingness to attend the 2008 Beijing Olympics reveals China’s influence in the political and economic decisions of the international community. The United States has clearly denounced the idea of boycotting the Beijing Olympics, and although European Parliament president Hans-Gert Pöttering and French President Nicolas Sarkozy have not “ruled out” a boycott of the Beijing Games, Germany and Great Britain both oppose a boycott. The United Nations, too, has remained quiet on the issue. From environmentalists to athletes to human rights activists, it seems all interested parties except for state leaders and the United Nations are protesting the 2008 Beijing Olympics. Several environmental researchers fear that Beijing’s horrendous air quality coupled with its high humidity and heat during the summer will pose a health risk to athletes. Darfur activists equate China’s oil investments in Sudan
with complaisance in the Darfur genocide. Outraged by China’s mistreatment of reporters—currently 32 journalists are imprisoned in China—and tight government media censorship, Reporters Without Borders is calling upon world leaders to boycott the Beijing Games. And Human Rights Watch outlines a host of human rights abuses—labor right violations, religious persecution, thousands of forced evictions in preparation for Olympics construction, obstruction of HIV/AIDS education and advocacy, marginalization of ethnic minorities, and the “use of the house arrest system”—which it argues the
Applauding too soon? Despite capturing the Olympic spotlight in 2008, China still has far to go in respecting human rights.
China’s largest export destination, has the ability to affect China’s export revenues. In fact, Germany has already used its position as China’s largest European trading partner in an attempt to pressure Chinese officials into submission. In response to the increasingly violent reactions of the Chinese government against Tibetan demonstrators, Berlin has halted all aid talks with Beijing. German officials have suspended transfers of development aid money until China stops the violence in Tibet. And according to Germany’s green party leader Volker Beck, “China’s economy is dependent on the transfer of technology,” a transfer over which the European Union has strong control. The EU has the economic clout needed to persuade and rebuke China when it deems necessary. Provided China’s human rights record and the upcoming Beijing Olympics, the international community has a choice to make. If world leaders opt to attend the 2008 Olympic Games this summer and disregard China’s human rights offenses, they would preserve their stable relations with China. But by attending the Games global leaders also compromise international human rights standards and the integrity of the Olympics. Afp
“The international community has a choice to make.”
Chinese government continually fails to remedy. Unlike state leaders, environmental groups and human rights advocates do not have economies to manage, but only self-assigned missions to fulfill and policies to advance. In the wake of China’s current human rights offenses, world leaders realize China’s economic power and political importance and have chosen to disregard China’s appalling human rights record rather than confront China and jeopardize important economic ties. China’s political and economic influence is powerful, but not all-powerful. Because of its increased involvement in the international economy and political system, it too remains vulnerable to other countries’ demands. The United States, as
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Tara may be reached at firstname.lastname@example.org
Venezuela’s Hollow Support of Ecuador
n March 1st, the Colombian government ordered a raid across its border with Ecuador with the intention of killing a long-term and hotly pursued officer for Farc, the left-wing rebel group hidden within Colombia’s jungles. The details of the raid are not important except for the fact that the Colombian government did not communicate or ask permission of the Ecuadorean government in advance of the incursion. Almost immediately after the raid, Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez ordered nearly 9,000 troops to the border, threatening war with Colombia and loudly denouncing the raid in international media outlets. Ecuador soon sent troops to its border with Colombia, while at the same time appealing to South American nations to condemn Colombia’s actions. The Organization of American States, a group of South and Central American nations, was convened at the request of the Ecuadorean government to resolve the issue. An agreement, still somewhat secretive, was arranged which would ease tensions by creating a council to investigate the actions taken and assign guilt. Friction between these three governments is nothing new. Historically, this action may have may have ignited a full-scale war against Colombia; indeed, for that reason, there was genuine fear of war early in this crisis. Colombia has never had easy relationships with these neighbors, especially recently, as Venezuela and Ecuador have been increasingly at odds with the pro-American, antisocialist and right-leaning Colombian government. In fact, Hugo Chavez has often made public his criticisms and lack of respect for Colombia, as well as his ideological fraternity with Farc’s criminals/smugglers/kidnappers. Peace has never been guaranteed. In fact, this may be why Colombia decided to eschew Ecuador’s consent for their raid in favor of surprise and effectiveness.
Nick Cox ‘08 I am not claiming that Colombia’s decision was correct. Both sides of this controversy are reasonable. While Colombia has increasingly found its efforts against Farc frustrating due to a porous border and Ecuador’s disinclination to aid the Colombian effort, Colombia did break international law with this raid. While the government did find a dangerous and powerful rebel whose organization was responsible for countless atrocities, it also eliminated the prospects for future cooperation. The situation was a difficult one, but ultimately Colombia’s legitimate concerns did not supersede their duty to international due process. What I am arguing is not that Colombia was right, but rather that Venezuela was wrong, having no business involving itself in this situation in the manner it did. Hugo Chavez has made his animosity toward Colombia known by openly treating Farc as a legitimate international actor despite the objections of the Colombian government and by trying to negotiate deals when he knows that his actions undermine the goals of the Colombian state. Chavez has consistently been guilty of meddling in his neighbor’s
internal affairs with even more regularity than Colombia could ever have been accused of doing, giving a notable twist of irony to the shock and horror that Chavez showed at the Colombian raid. More than simply hypocrisy defines this argument, however. Chavez’s actions after the raid were unacceptable and he manipulated the situation to his own advantage. He is no friend of Ecuador. He did not help to defend Ecuador. Chavez moved his troops to the Colombian border in a supposed move to show solidarity with Ecuador against Colombia, but in reality this did not stand up for Ecuador. This aggressive move never gave Ecuador the opportunity to react on its own terms; it had to react on Venezuela’s terms. Ecuador could not contact Colombia and try to work out a resolution to this problem privately, but was compelled to react aggressively alongside Venezuela. Hugo Chavez forced Ecuadorean President Rafael Correa to either show strength or look weak and thereby lose respect. Immediately, the situation escalated without Ecuador even contacting Chavez. He knowingly forced the issue, strategically stripping Ecuador of any choice in the matter. What followed was a circus. Hugo Chavez played the role he loves—the lone socialist, rebelling against aggressive powers and fighting for the people. Meanwhile, Ecuador half-heartedly went through the motions that Venezuela demanded. Colombia defended itself, and
Pointing fingers. Chavez accused Colombia of serving as an American puppet after it undertook a U.S.-sanctioned strike on a Farc camp in Ecuador.
Multiple Choice Monthly Franco Lopez ‘10 1. In his latest audio message, whom did Osama bin Laden accuse of helping to form a “new Crusade” against Islam? a) Nicholas Sarkozy b) Danish newspapers c) George W. Bush d) Pope Benedict XVI e) Queen Elizabeth II 2. In what region of China has there recently been an unprecedented wave of protests, culminating in dozens of casualties? a) Xinjiang b) Tibet c) Taiwan d) Inner Mongolia e) Hong Kong 3. Which country recently formed a coalition government more than nine months after its general elections? a) Belgium b) Israel c) Chile d) Portugal e) North Korea 4. During opening ceremonies for the Ghadafi National Mosque in Kampala, there erupted a six-minute fight between Presidential guards from which two countries? a) Rwanda and Burundi b) Kenya and Tanzania c) Libya and Uganda d) Somalia and Sudan e) Lebanon and South Africa 5. Leaders from both factions recently agreed to re-launch peace talks aimed at resolving which divided island’s decades-long conflict? a) Papua New Guinea b) Taiwan c) Greenland d) Jamaica e) Cyprus Answers on p. 18
finally Ecuador and Colombia were able to negotiate a settlement. Why would Chavez do this? The first reason is a classically manipulative one. Hugo Chavez has had recent trouble at home, finally losing the momentum from his electoral victories from previous years. His bid to gain even more powers for his own office and to radically change the manner in which the Venezuelan government functions failed. His coalition is showing signs of wear as his anti-imperialist rhetoric falls on the increasingly deaf ears of a bored electorate and his political power may be waning. But Chavez is no fool. He understands the source of his power, which comes from him appearing to be the voice of the people, standing up to those who would hurt them. This situation gave him the ability to regain that image and he will undoubtedly benefit from it with some short-term political gains. The international community will continually see this as a pattern in his behavior.
negotiations and discussions with Farc have involved anything more than releasing hostages. Now we know that this is patently untrue. In fact, Chavez’s government has been undermining the Colombian government by supporting the rebels who hope to overthrow it. It is unclear that any in the international community have recognized this blatant manipulation. Many in South America have been strong-armed or bribed into towing the Venezuelan line; others quite simply consider themselves allies. But many in the international community, who gained little, if anything from this situation, have also kept silent. We are witnessing a common problem unfold—as a strong and seemingly powerful leader makes noise, many leaders simply desire to ignore the situation, rather than stand up for what is right. What could any country gain from standing up against Chavez and supporting Colombia? They would be labeled as imperialists, as tyrants, as American pup-
“Chavez’s outspoken support for Ecuadorean sovereignty was not as courageous as it appeared, but was instead manipulative.” If Chavez looks like he is having political trouble again, expect more of the same: pigeon-holing his allies, undiplomatically screaming insults at enemies, spoonfeeding crises to his electorate. Chavez honestly believes that Colombia’s leaders are natural philosophical enemies, and he desperately wants to cover up what he has done to hurt them. After the Ecuadorean crisis, Colombia quietly released some information (which surprisingly did not gain more international coverage) that was recovered from the raid. Included in the rebels’ laptops and files was detailed information acknowledging Hugo Chavez’s political and financial support of Farc. I urge the reader to look up the Colombian government’s press release. Publicly, Chavez has denied that he has ever given money to the particular group of rebels and he has somewhat less specifically denied any political support for Farc. While he has publicly considered them kindred political spirits, Chavez has denied that his
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pets. America could barely help, because animosity toward the U.S. drives much of this dynamic. Chavez will keep this up until the international community finds an incentive to stop him. There is none yet, other than conscience. Chavez’s outspoken support for Ecuadorean sovereignty was not as courageous as it appeared, but was instead manipulative. His passionate support for territorial sovereignty can only been seen as a veil for his political motives. Chavez’s lies, his money and his actions, public and private, testify to his two-faced politics. Afp
Nick may be reached at email@example.com
Citizens of Kosovo celebrate their recent independence in the streets of Pristina.
Geopolitics and Precedent
The Implications of Kosovo’s Independence
ebruary 17, 2008 sent nations with secessionist minorities scurrying to shield the eyes of their minority groups from the R-rated spectacle of Kosovo’s self-declared independence. Much as they tried, Kosovo grabbed headlines as the United States and key European powers legitimized the secession by swiftly recognizing the new state. Nations desperate to prevent their own minorities from following suit now appeal to the international community with their one fear tactic left. They use the dreaded word: precedent. The word conjures up nightmares of Kosovo’s example inspiring secessionist movements from South Ossetians in Georgia to the Ainu in Japan to the Barotse in Zambia to rise up and demand independence. Though Kosovo will undeniably set a symbolic precedent and does have important effects on the strategies
Cale Salih ‘10 of similar independence movements, such a free-for-all pandemonium is unrealistic. It is clear that many of the arguments raised in support or condemnation of Kosovo’s declaration of independence have been made on the basis of strategic interest rather than moral or ideological principles. Countries such as Russia, China, Georgia, and Spain object to the secession, fearing it will (re)rouse secessionist sentiments within their own minority groups. On the other side are the United States, much of the EU, and Turkey. They recognize Kosovo’s statehood in pursuit of separate interests, whether it is U.S. hopes of potential oil profits, the EU’s desire for a firm regional ally to balance Russia and China, or Turkey’s desperate attempt to prove to the EU that it can uphold democratic principles despite its suppression of its own Kurdish minority.
Despite the influence of realpolitik on some vies of Kosovo’s secession, the nation’s declaration of independence has still managed to split the world along a new line; not one of GDP, democratic ideals or culture, but of self-determination. A nuanced perspective on the situation will evaluate how Kosovo’s self-declared independence has altered the strategic calculations of nations and secessionist movements alike. Secessionist movements often arise in response to systematic economic oppression and a historical right to autonomy. For example, Hungarians in Slovakia enjoy the same rights as ethnic Slovakians and as a result, the two groups peacefully coexist. In contrast, groups such as Tibetans and Kurds have sought autonomy as a means of escaping oppression, claiming a historical right to their respective lands. Kosovo’s independence may offer symbolic inspiration to such groups, but its example is unlikely to have a practical impact. Thus, Kosovo is more likely to set a AP precedent for movements closer in geography and circumstance. These include
Europe the Transnistrians in Moldova, NagornoKarabakh in Azerbaijan, and Abkhazians and South Ossetians in Georgia. These minorities operate with de facto independence and share a historical and cultural relationship with the Caucusus and Russia. They have all long called for independence and are arguably equally (un)prepared for it as Kosovo was. South Ossetia, in particular, has international endorsement from Russia which parallels Western support for Kosovo. Such minorities have long recognized the parallels between their cause and that of Kosovo’s, and are likely to use its example as evidence that they need not settle for insufficient and limited autonomy. In addition to inspiring secessionist movements, this episode may prompt world powers like China and Russia to retaliate against America’s support for
Kosovo over their objections. They may choose to selectively support particular self-determination movements to harm strategic U.S. interests. For example, Russia can demand the secession of Abkhazia and South Ossetia from Georgia, putting American oil interests in the region at risk. Many objections to Kosovo’s independence are inconsistent with the realities of the situation. Spanish officials, fearful of the precedent set for the secessionist Basque, have declared Kosovo’s independence illegal on the basis that it was a province, not a federal republic, and thus not allowed to secede under the Yugoslav constitution. Manuel Ortega, a Spanish MP, argued further on the BBC that the consequences of Kosovo’s independence are “an invitation to civil war.” Ortega’s argument is not especially convincing. Firstly, legality is not at issue. Secession is illegal by definition; few countries willingly give up territory. Without illegal secession, selfdetermination objectives, justified or not, would never be realized. Secondly, such a war is clearly preventable, and thus the threat is not adequate justification to deny Kosovars their right to self-determination. Once this reality is accepted, diplomatic relations to prevent the outbreak of war between the states can ensue. Moreover, Kosovo has clearly offered a hand of peace to Serbia, with extra provisions in the new constitution for the protection of Serbs in Kosovo. It is now up to Serbia to prevent violence. It has also been argued that since many minorities with equally legitimate Darko Bandic/AP claims to indepenA resident of Kosovo hangs an American flag in appreciation of dence have not yet U.S. and Western support of Kosovo’s bid for secession.
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succeeded, it would be unfair to consider the self-declared Kosovo a legally independent state. This argument, however, oversimplifies self-determination movements and ignores the unique complexities and impediments of each. Kosovo is unique, particularly given its close relationship with the international community. This goes back to 1999, when it was placed under the jurisdiction of the United Nations Mission in Kosovo and the NATO-led international peacekeeping force Kosovo Force (KFOR). Its historical association with the global community raised international awareness of Kosovo’s cause and made it harder for progressive countries such as the U.S. and most of the EU to ignore the ethnic cleansing of Kosovar Albanians in the late 1990s. NATO’s long-standing international presence in Kosovo and the widespread recognition of war crimes against ethnic Albanians won Kosovo the support of powerful nations such as the U.S. and EU. Most movements have not achieved this kind of international recognition, but their disadvantaged position is no reason to challenge the legitimacy of an independent Kosovo. Moreover, if a “fairness doctrine” is applied to the principle of self-determination, is it “fair” that nations such as Turkey, Spain, and Russia are independent and sovereign, while minorities within their states— Kurds, Basques and Chechens amongst others, respectively—are not? Kosovo faces many challenges. It is a poor country that must start afresh to integrate itself in the world economy and at the same time develop a system that protects and manages its Serbian minority. Kosovo’s neighbors, such as Serbia, Russia, and other proximate states, need to cooperate to prevent the region from again descending into ethnic violence. The pressure is now on the world’s superpowers to accept it and prevent the creation of another dependent Balkan state. Afp
Cale may be reached at firstname.lastname@example.org
A Civilian Power
The EU as a New Type of Actor
Jean Giraud ‘10
ccording to Mark Leonard, the executive director of the European Council on Foreign Relations, we’ll soon see the emergence of a “New European Century, not because Europe will run the world as an empire, but because the European way of doing things will have become the world’s.” But the European Union, unlike the U.S., lacks coherence on the international stage. After Kosovo’s declaration of independence, the EU failed to speak with one voice: countries like Slovenia, France, and Germany recognized the new self-declared state, but other countries like Spain and Romania refused to do so, fearing the potential contagion of independence claims of minorities in their own territory. Even the incentive of an easy accession to the EU did not prevent Serbia from rejecting Kosovo’s independence. Indeed, after the Iraq War, the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) of the EU seemed to be in tatters. How could 27 different nations have agreed on such divisive issues without any institutional incentive to do so? Some critics deny the EU any capacity to ever become a power on the world stage. Such criticism is accurate only if the EU is viewed as a would-be state, one expected to have a coherent foreign policy based on classical diplomatic and military definitions. Indeed, the EU cannot become a new U.S.-like superpower, simply because it is not based on the American conception of sovereignty. Rather, the EU is itself a new model challenging classical interstate relations; its influence in the world does not depend on the coordinating the foreign policies of its member states but on the Union’s intrinsic capacity to affect and alter basic international rela-
tions. Because it can never become a state, the EU cannot fit within classical definitions of power. The European project is premised on viewing states as more than mere units in an anarchical world. As The Economist noted, the EU tries to “tame the Leviathan,” to domesticate the world using law. Currently, only two levels of law are commonly acknowledged: domestic and international law. The former law is enforceable, passed by states to regulate internal affairs. The
such a political organization is therefore crucial. In EU jargon, regulations—as opposed to directives—don’t need to be transposed into internal law by the national legislator: they are directly enforceable and legally binding for states and may create rights for the citizens. Even directives may have a “direct-effect,” meaning that under certain conditions, if an EU member state doesn’t abide by an EU law, it can be taken before the European Court of Justice (ECJ) and sued by its citizens. As citizens of EU member states, these people are granted European citizenship, allowing them to elect the European Parliament and vote in local elections in all member states. The concept of shared sovereignty explains how this jus cosmopoliticum can be implemented in real life—each member state possesses a part of the European sovereignty exercised in common. This means that some member states might have to implement rules they disagree with if a qualified majority of countries passes them. Since the EU has no military means to enforce its decisions, especially those made by the ECJ, it can at best threaten economic and political sanctions. Unlike George Washington, Jose Manuel Barroso, the President of the European Commission, cannot use military force against any disobedient state partaking in a European-style Whiskey Rebellion. Notwithstanding all of these problems, the EU works. Persuasion and dialogue, though time-consuming, seem sufficient to keep the Union alive. This preference for what College of Europe professor Zaki Laïdi calls “norm over force” shapes not only the internal functioning of the EU, but also its conception of the world and of international relations. Without real military capacity, the EU tries to influence the world through legal rules and standards. According to Ian Manners, a senior researcher at the Danish Institute for International Studies, the EU is a “normative power able to shape what is normal in international relations.” Of course, this form of influence rests on the fact that the EU possesses the largest consumer market in the
“Because it can never become a state, the EU cannot fit within classical definitions of power.” latter is essentially unenforceable, and consists of conventions between states. Nevertheless, Jean-Marc Ferry, a professor of philosophy and political science at the Université Libre in Brussels, points out that the EU has created a new type of law, the Kantian jus cosmopoliticum defined as the “conditions of a universal hospitality.” These “conditions” are the European four freedoms set forth by the Treaty of Rome: free movement of goods, services, capital and persons. This cosmopolitical law aims at creating a direct relationship between the supranational entity and citizens without denying the authority of states, and therefore, without challenging international law. Unlike international law, however, the jus cosmopoliticum does not exclusively regulate interstate but also “inter-people” relations by overcoming artificial, contingent political borders. Once created by the states, cosmopolitical law can be used by the citizens against their own state to defend their rights as members of a cosmopolitical entity. The institutional framework of
world, and can therefore impose restrictions and conditions on its economic partners. Furthermore, the EU exercises influence over neighbours interested in joining or participating in the European market – compliance is a pre-
Microsoft for its lack of compliance with European competition law. Microsoft had to pay €1.7 billion and is now forced to collaborate with free software providers. In today’s globalized world, military force appears less relevant than
“The EU possesses the largest consumer market in the world, and can therefore impose restrictions and conditions on its economic partners.” requisite to access. The same is true for nations outside the EU that must abide by Europe’s strict environmental and security standards, deemed angrily by the Wall-Street Journal as “regulatory imperialism.” Even more spectacular is the leverage gained through European competition law. For instance in 2001, the EU Commission opposed the merger between two American firms, General Electric and Honeywell, threatening them to close the European market to the new company. As a result, the merger failed. Another more recent example concerns the fines the EU imposed on
economic influence in protecting one’s interests. And in such a world, the comparatively unarmed EU is instead a “civilian power” wielding economics as its weapon. The EU’s power might be less obvious and less coherent than America’s simply because the EU is not a state. With 27 members, the EU cannot easily reach agreements on foreign affairs issues, causing many to label the EU a powerless actor on the international stage. But the EU was not designed to become a classical superpower; it was created to reshape the interstate rela-
American Foreign Policy
All eyes on Europe. While the EU is not a traditional power, its unique political structure and its sizeable economic market give it considerable influence.
tions through the concept of cosmopolitical law. This preference for “norm over force” within the Union also determines the way the EU conceives its relations with the rest of the world. Such normative power, combined with economic clout, is particularly useful in a more interconnected world, one in which the sword may eventually be replaced by the ledger. Afp
Jean may be reached at email@example.com
Answers for the quiz on page 14: 1) d 4) c 2) b 5) e 3) a
BY THE NUMBERS
By the Numbers
The Dollar is on a Downward Slide
Mohit Agrawal ‘11
he decline in the value of the dollar, which has accelerated over the past few months, has upheaved norms of the world economy. The falling dollar, which denominates most commodities bought and sold around the world, has raised inflationary pressures due to rises in the cost of raw materials. Countries which peg their currencies to the dol-
lar are beginning to look at other options; China and Vietnam have both let their currencies appreciate against the dollar slightly. The weakening dollar also means that American exports are increasing and that more foreign tourists are visiting the States. On the other hand, when denominated in euros or yen, American GDP has actually decreased.
who were injured in a stampede to get to vegetable oil which was on sale by 20% at a supermarket in China. The Chinese peg to the dollar has been causing widespread inflation in the country.
3000 FACTORIES closed down in the Pearl River Delta manufacturing zone north of Hong Kong, due to price pressures based on rising input costs and the lower value of the dollar used as payment.
€ 288.7 BILLION cost of energy imports in the Eurozone in 2007, which represents a decrease of 3% in euro terms since 2006. Since 2002, the price of oil has increased 198% in euros but 430% in dollars.
$ 1.48 MILLION amount that the € 899 million fine levied against Microsoft by the EU has increased, on average, per day since it was announced on Feb. 27, 2008. Microsoft now owes $40 million more than one month ago.
€ - 2.47 TRILLION
RS 6 the amount of profit, in Indian rupees, that black market smelters can make by melting a 1 Rs Indian coin and making shaving blades. The price of the metal in the 1 Rs coin now far outstrips its value.
change in nominal US GDP from 2002 to 2007 when accounted for in euros. In dollars, the GDP grew by $ 3.29 trillion over this period. Compared to Europe, the US has been significantly weakened economically.
- 64 %
in sales of gold jewelry in India in Q4 2007. India imports 700 metric tons of gold every year, 1/3 of the world total. The decline of the dollar is fueling the price of gold, hurting jewellers across India.
Western European tourists expected to visit NYC in Q4 2007. American luxury retailers are surviving the economic downturn by selling to foreigners who suddenly have more dollars to spend.
Get more AFP at
www.princeton.edu/~afp Kai Uwe Knoth/AP