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Acta Universitatis Sapientiae The scientific journal of the Sapientia University publishes original papers and deep surveys in several areas of sciences written in English. Information about the appropiate series can be found at the Internet address Editor-in-Chief ´ L´aszl´o DAVID

Main Editorial Board ´ Zolt´ an A. BIRO ´ ˝ Agnes PETHO

´ Zolt´an KASA


Acta Universitatis Sapientiae European and Regional Studies Executive Editor ´ (Sapientia University, Romania) Barna BODO Guest Editor ´ L´aszl´ o MARACZ (University of Amsterdam, Netherland) Editorial Board Gabriel ANDREESCU (National School of Political and Administrative Studies Bucharest, Romania) J´ozsef BAYER (E¨otv¨ os Lor´and University, Budapest, Hungary) Mikl´os BAKK (Babe¸s-Bolyai University, Cluj-Napoca, Romania) ´ Zolt´an BERENYI (University of Debrecen, Hungary) Vasile DOCEA (West University, Timi¸soara, Romania) Andr´ as A.GERGELY (Institute of Political Science, Budapest, Hungary) Radu LUPESCU (Sapientia University, Cluj-Napoca, Romania) Christoph PAN (Volksgruppen Institut, Bozen, Italy) ´ SANDOR ´ Erzs´ebet SZALAYNE (University of P´ecs, Hungary) ´ Istv´an SZILAGYI (University of P´ecs, Hungary) M´ arton TONK (Sapientia University, Cluj-Napoca, Romania)

Sapientia University

Scientia Publishing House

ISSN 2066-639X

Acta Universitatis Sapientiae

European and Regional Studies Volume 3, 2013

Sapientia Hungarian University of Transylvania Scientia Publishing House


Rudi JANSSENS, Virginie MAMADOUH, László MARÁCZ Multilingual Higher Education in European Regions ...................................... 5 Magdalena DEMBINSKA Minorities in the Europeanisation Process: Undermining the Westphalian Order for the Neo-Medieval Scrum? .............................................................. 24 Anita Skelin HORVAT Language Policy in Istria, Croatia – Legislation Regarding Minority Language Use .................................................................................................... 47 Boyka STEFANOVA Crossborder Dynamics at the Southeastern Periphery of the European Union: The Unusual Case of Bulgaria’s Ethnic Turkish Minority .............. 65 Jacques MAURAIS Quebec’s Language Policies in the Neoliberal Age ........................................ 92 Book Review ..................................................................................................... 107 Study Visit to Budapest for the Students .......................................................... 114 Political Science Summer Camp at Torockó/Rimetea ..................................... 116


Acta Universitatis Sapientiae, European and Regional Studies, 3 (2013) 5-23

Multilingual Higher Education in European Regions

Rudi JANSSENS Vrije Universiteit Brussel Brussels Informatie- en Documentatie- en Onderzoekscentrum (BRIO)

Virginie MAMADOUH University of Amsterdam Department of Geography, Planning and International Development Studies

Lテ。szlテウ MARテ,Z University of Amsterdam European Studies Department

Abstract. Although English is often conceived as the dominant language of international and transnational communication in higher education, it is not the only medium of communication in the academic community. National, regional and local languages remain important, in some European countries more than in others. In Janssens, Mamadouh and Marテ。cz (2011) we have argued that too little attention is paid to languages in the realm between the local and the global domain: what we called languages of regional communication, that can be used in multilingual and in border regions. Here we focus on multilingualism in higher education in regions where global and regional languages are in contact or compete with each other for hegemony. Will the languages - in the 20th century quite often national languages - of higher education be replaced by English or will there be developing a more balanced situation where next to English also national, regional and local languages play a role in higher education. We will conclude in this paper that the rise of English in the higher education in the context of national, regional and local languages is impressive but that the non-global languages have a robust position in higher education that is rooted in history and connected to the identity of its speakers. The case studies presents evidence from regions where multilingualism does not necessary mean Englishization. Flanders with the role of French, Dutch and English, Hungary and the Carpathian Basin 5


Rudi Janssens, Virginie Mamadouh, László Marácz

with Hungarian as a national and minority language, and universities on the border between Romance and Germanic languages. Keywords: multilingual higher internationalisation





1. Introduction English is often conceived as the dominant language of international and transnational communication in higher education. It has been increasingly the case in the academic community when it comes to research: both as the language of international conferences and international academic journals. This article considers whether other languages of regional communication are used next to English and national languages at European universities. It will therefore consider occurrences of multilingualism in higher education and the way English impact on to the balance between different languages in multilingual regions. The use of English at universities is linked to the recruitment of international students and temporary exchange programs. Bolsmann and Miller (2008) have identified three types of discourse for the recruitment of international students: academic internationalism or “the republic of letters/science discourse”; the economic competition discourse, and the developmental discourse. This pertains to the ideal of the universities as centers of scholarship (foreign students as intellectual assets), irrespective of state borders, the second to the idea of university as economic motor (foreign students as source of revenue) and the third to the training of foreign students as developmental aid to developing countries (Bolsmann and Miller 2008:18-19). Similar considerations can apply to the use of other languages of wider communication, as they can be used to create a regional transnational academic community, to attract and service students from across the border, or to cater host students from specific developing countries (in French or in Spanish rather than in English for example). In addition political motives play a role in the use of multiple languages at universities: it can be a strategy to alter the balance between languages in the region, to enhance the status of a language and to strengthen historical and cultural ties in a cross-border regions. The article first discusses the relation between Dutch and French in Flanders, then turn to the role of Hungarian in the Carpathian Basin and finally consider universities were multilingualism is more than the addition of English. In all three sections, we will consider how English competes with the other languages in place, and whether English expands at the expense of other languages of wider communication.

Multilingual Higher Education in European Regions


English and the Dutchification of Education in Flanders Language use in education is one of the most sensitive issues in the complex history of Belgian language relations. To understand the current discussion on the use of ‘other’ languages in higher education, it is necessary to take a quick look at the arising of the current language laws and regulations in education. French and Dutch in higher Education In 1830, the French language provided the young Belgian state with a sense of cultural unity after its secession from the United Kingdom of the Netherlands that was created in 1815. Both in the Dutch-speaking north as well as in the Frenchspeaking south of the country, French was the language of instruction in secondary and higher education. In Flanders, primary education was available in the local Dutch vernacular although for the middle and upper class primary education in French was organized as well. The French-speaking political elite rejected the idea of general bilingualism on the level of the nation. Education in Wallonia was solely in French notwithstanding the high number of Dutch-speaking working class people living in the industrial basins, Brussels was officially bilingual but in reality education was in French which triggered the process of Frenchification of the Dutch-speaking majority, and in Flanders a Dutch-speaking majority and a Frenchspeaking elite resulted in a bilingual class-based system where Dutch was used in primary school but where an alternative in French was available for the higher social classes (Witte & Van Velthoven, 2011). After the First World War, the introduction of the universal male singular suffrage increased the influence of the Flemish Movement, a political and cultural movement striving for education in the language of the region. The language laws on primary and secondary education of 1932 abolished the freedom of choice by the head of the family and introduced the language of the region as language of instruction. Nevertheless, some Frenchspeaking sections in official state education survived for another 30 years while the law only slowly penetrated the Catholic education system (Janssenswillen, 2009). For the Flemish Movement, an exclusively Dutch-medium university was the ultimate corner stone in their strive for the formation of an own Flemish cultural and political elite. After the independence of Belgium, Latin was replaced by French as lingua franca at the universities. The State University of Ghent became temporarily Dutchified during the First World War as a result of the German ‘Flamenpolitik’, a policy using the linguistic tensions in Belgium to incorporate a part of the Flemish Movement into the Pan-German ideology. In 1923, after a tough political struggle, a parallel system was introduced so that in the Dutchmedium section of the Ghent University, two third of all courses were taught in Dutch. Finally in 1930 Dutch became the only official language for management


Rudi Janssens, Virginie Mamadouh, Lรกszlรณ Marรกcz

and education of the university. Remarkably one of the arguments against the use of Dutch was the loss of students from abroad and a poorer starting position for the career of the graduates (De Clerck 1980). Meanwhile since 1911 at the Catholic University of Louvain some courses where taught in Dutch and from 1936, a parallel system in which most of the courses could be attended in both French and Dutch was established. In 1968 student protests cumulated in street riots and after the fall of the government on the linguistic problems in Louvain, the Belgian bishops agreed to split the university and to build a new French-medium catholic university town in Wallonia (Louvain-La-Neuve). The Catholic University of Louvain became solely Dutch-speaking. In its slipstream, the Free University of Brussels, where since 1935 a growing number of courses were taught in Dutch as well, became an independent Dutch-medium university in Brussels in 1970. The Dutchification of higher education was the starting point of a continuing process of fundamental state reform (De Clerck 1980).

Current legal and political Framework The political battle on the Dutchification of the universities in Flanders led to the abolition of the National Ministry of Education. From 1988-89, education became the responsibility of the communities resulting in three governing bodies for respectively the French-speaking, German-speaking and Flemish (Dutchspeaking) Community. The principle of territoriality is the rationale behind this language policy. There are four language areas: a Dutch-speaking area corresponding with the Flemish region, a French-speaking area and a small German-speaking area both constituting Wallonia, and the bilingual area of Brussels where Dutch and French have the same status. The official language is the only legally accepted language of instruction at school. The only exceptions are municipalities with language facilities around the linguistic border and around Brussels, where French speakers (in Flanders) Dutch and German speakers (in the French-speaking part of Wallonia) and French speakers (in the German-speaking part of Wallonia) have the right to ask for primary education in their home language. For all other municipalities, the official language is the single language of instruction in education. In the bilingual region of Brussels every inhabitant has a free choice between an educational system with Dutch or with French as the language of instruction. The second language, obligatory from the 5th year of primary education on, is French or English in Flanders and Dutch, German or English in the French- medium system in Wallonia. In Brussels the second language of the Dutch-medium school system is French, for the French- medium one it is Dutch. According to the language laws; the language of instruction can only be the language of the region. Since in Brussels, schooling is organized by both the Flemish and the French Community, bilingual education violates the

Multilingual Higher Education in European Regions


current legal framework. However the French Community used a loophole left by the law. Given that language education is a competence of the communities, bilingual education can be considered as a method of language learning. Since 1998 1 the French Community allows that the curriculum in primary and secondary schools can be taught in two languages, French on the one hand and Dutch, English or German on the other. Nowadays, immersion schools (Lambert & Tucker 1972) are quite common. In the Dutch- medium system, apart from some experiments, the use of other languages of instruction but Dutch is rejected by the Flemish Community. Apart from the historical sensitivity due to the negative experiences of Dutch speakers with bilingual education resulting in social inequality, the fact that in the Dutch- medium schools in Brussels and in some urban areas in Flanders Dutch-speaking pupils are a minority among the school population feeds the idea that bilingual education would mainly favor the non-Dutch speakers and that on the contrary more attention should be paid to the teaching of Dutch itself. The situation in higher education, and especially at the universities, differs substantially from compulsory education because of its triple objective: scientific research, education, and a service to the community. However given the Belgian political context, language use has always been a sensitive theme in these different aspects of university life. The last 50 years, without any doubt, English became the first language in the scientific world. Where the French-medium universities could still rely on an important input of scientific research in their language, the Dutch-medium universities quickly adopted English as the scientific vernacular. With an increasing internationalization, English became more and more prominent. Nowadays research projects and scientific publications, the main output of university research and the base of its competitiveness and ranking, is essentially peer-evaluated and written in English. The increasing impact of the European Union and the importance of its scientific funding by the Research Framework Programs stresses this evolution. In that respect, English has fundamentally replaced Dutch and French as scientific languages. Teaching is a much more contested domain according to the use of languages. English always had a prominent place, textbooks and readers in that language were quite common. Nevertheless teaching and examination in Belgium were by definition in French or Dutch. This was regulated by law. The language regulations in higher education follow logically from those in primary and secondary education: the language of instruction is the language of the region, and in Brussels one has the choice between Dutch or French as language of instruction. The Flemish Ministry of Education allowed the use other languages in following 1

Décret du 13 juillet 1998 portant sur l’organisation de l’enseignement maternel et primaire et modifiant la réglementation de l’enseignement


Rudi Janssens, Virginie Mamadouh, László Marácz

situations: when a foreign language is the subject of the course, when master courses are given by visiting professors who do not master the language, in programs designed for foreign students, in post-academic courses and in additional doctoral and post-doctoral training attended by foreign graduates2. At master level, students are allowed to attend 20% of the courses in another language but Dutch. Nevertheless, they have the right to complete their master degree in Dutch and even if they attend a course in another language, they can ask for an examination in Dutch. In 2010, a further relaxation of the law on the language of instruction in higher education enabled institutions in higher education to organize a master degree in another language (which means in fact in English) but only when the same curriculum is presented elsewhere in Flanders. On bachelor level, 1/6 of all credits can be obtained in English. In the French-medium system, the decree of March 31 2004 permits the use of another language in order to integrate the program into the European Higher Education Area, when they are part of an international program, of a program organized in cooperation with another language community or when the language is the most common language according to the subject.3 The French Community is less rigid with language regulations and can present whole curricula in English. A shift towards an increasing use of English seems inevitably. Over the last decades there is a gradual move from the use of English in post-academic training towards master degrees and bachelor courses, first in the exact sciences, later in the life and social sciences. Given the academic context, the language law was considered as an obstacle in comparison to the neighboring countries and therefore neglected. Also the EU plays a substantial role. Initiatives like the Erasmus program and the Marie Curie grants, improving international mobility, resulted in an increase of the use of English. Where the Erasmus program aimed at the immersion of students in the language and culture of another European country, given the weak status of Dutch as an international language, in the Dutch-medium universities it resulted in the fact that more and more courses where offered in English. But the current international labor market asks for multilingual graduates as well. In different curricula, more attention is paid to language training. Teaching courses in another language is considered as an important asset for the students. A good example here is the cooperation in Brussels between the French-speaking Université Libre de Bruxelles and the Dutch-speaking Vrije Universiteit Brussel where civil engineers have the option to 2 3

Decreet van 12/06/1991 betreffende de universiteiten in de Vlaamse Gemeenschap - Hoofdstuk. III, afdeling 14. - De onderwijs- en bestuurstaal (B.S. 03/10/1991) See for instance: Arrêté du Gouvernement de la Communauté française accordant une dérogation aux institutions universitaires quant à l’usage de la langue d’enseignement et d’évaluation pour le master ingénieur civil en informatique et les masters en sciences informatiques 60 et 120 crédits 27 mai 2009

Multilingual Higher Education in European Regions


be taught in a trilingual environment French/Dutch/English. Apart from the ‘scientific logic’, the importance of language learning and the EU, the number of foreign students became an indication of prestige and an extra source of income for the universities. To meet the reality of everyday university life, the Flemish Ministry of Education puts less emphasis on the strict application of the language law but decided that all lecturers who teaches a course in English should pass a test to prove that they meet the European C1 standard for English. Foreign lecturers, not teaching in Dutch, should however obtain a B2 standard for that language to participate fully in their Dutch-speaking environment. 4

No way back? The (limited) public discussion on the use of English in higher education is mainly confined to the social aspect of the mission of the university towards the community that finances them. The race for A-publications and its impact on the competitiveness and ranking of the universities makes that scientist pay less and less effort to the academically undervalued publications in the local language. The use of English facilitates the international mobility of students and lecturers, but decreases the value of the local language as a scientific language and deteriorates the richness of the local culture, especially in the human sciences (see Deneckere & Mantels 2011). The use of ‘English only’ endangers the transfer of knowledge to the practitioners in the field and deteriorates the public discussion. However, debate is scarce and this evolution is widely considered as inevitable. Nevertheless Flemish nationalist politicians oppose the general use of English and the liberalization of the educational market downgrading the local language comparable to the use of French 50 years ago.

The Rise of English in Hungarian higher Education The introduction of Hungarian as a medium of instruction in higher education took place in the second half of the nineteenth century after the Ausgleich between Austria and Hungary in 1867. The language of instruction at the Hungarian universities and colleges before the Ausgleich in royal Hungary was Latin and German. In 1810, all courses at the Hungarian universities and colleges were offered in Latin. In the middle of the nineteenth century this changed, although Hungarian as a medium of instruction was not introduced across-the-board. This had to wait until the Ausgleich. In 1856/1857 at the University of Pest of the 838 students, 72 percent were registered as Hungarians. However, only 28 percent of the courses were taught in Hungarian. The majority of the courses, i.e. 48 percent 4

Draft decree discussed in the plenary session of the Flemish Parliament, October 17th 2012.


Rudi Janssens, Virginie Mamadouh, László Marácz

were offered in German. Note that these changes were indeed extensive. Within almost fifty years Latin as a medium of instruction fell back from 100 percent in 1810 to 23 percent in 1856-1857. 5 After the Ausgleich, Hungarian liberal ministers of Education like József von Eötvös and Trefort Ágoston established a number of new universities, i.e. in Kolozsvár (today’s Cluj-Napoca), Debrecen and Pozsony (today’s Bratislava) and the Technical University of Budapest in 1870. At the end of the Austro-Hungarian period on the eve of the First World War the language of instruction at Hungarian universities was completely Magyarized. This led to grievances among the nationalities of Hungary, i.e. the Romanians, Slovaks, Serbs, and so on that they were excluded from higher education in their own mother tongue (Marácz 2012). The Magyarization of education in dualist Hungary and the ensuing nationalist tensions were one of the reasons why the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy collapsed at the end of the First World War. After the Treaty of Trianon (1920), smaller Hungary became a national state and large groups of Hungarians became national minorities in the neighbouring countries of Hungary, like Romania, Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia. In the Hungarian state, tertiary education was completely in Hungarian due to the fact that the Hungarian national language had a dominant position as a marker of national identity. The Hungarian minorities in the neighbouring countries were confronted with the pressure of Romanization, Czechoslovakization and Serbocroatization of the education system. Hungarian as a minority language was only marginally allowed in the 20th century as a medium of instruction in universities or colleges where the Hungarian minorities lived. It was only the collapse of communism that radically changed this situation. In the 20th century starting from the break-up of the Austro-Hungarian Empire in 1918-1920 until Hungary’s accession to the European Union the language of tertiary education was dominated by the nation-state paradigm. Although in the Interwar period for Hungarian children it was possible to attend elementary and secondary German-, French- or Italian-medium teaching schools that were supported by the states concerned (Vámos 2011) these schools were rather marginal phenomena. The language of education in Interwar Hungary was at all levels Hungarian. After the Second World War these foreign languages schools were closed and the Hungarian educational system was Sovietized by the post-War authorities. This implied that the marginal teaching of Western languages was replaced by the massive teaching of Russian. During communism however Russian as a language imposed by the communist regime, was never popular or widely used among Hungarians (Dörnyei, Csiszér and Németh 2006). 5

We are indebted to Pieter van der Plank for bringing these data to our attention. See also for further discussion of the languages of education in the Habsburg Empire Van der Plank (2012).

Multilingual Higher Education in European Regions


After the collapse of the communist system in 1989 a quick disappearance of Russian from the Hungarian educational system can be observed. In the academic year 1995/1996 the last courses in Russian were offered in Hungarian elementary schools. Russian was replaced by German or English. This started already in the beginning of the nineties. In 1999, there was still a slight majority of German as a target language of teaching in Hungarian elementary schools. With the start of Hungary’s accession to the Bologna Process, dated in 1999, English as a foreign language in Hungarian education became more prominent than German. In the school year 2009-2010 of the 600.000 pupils in Hungarian elementary schools onethird took German as a foreign language and for two-third English became the main foreign language (Vámos 2011, 196).

Englishization In 2005, the Eurobarometer 243 survey demonstrated that only 42 percent of the Hungarians speak a foreign language. 25 percent speak German and 23 percent English (Marácz 2009, 133). 6 Having these alarming figures in mind and with the help of Bologna Process the successive Hungarian governments tried to boost the interest for foreign language learning in Hungary. Hungarian elementary pupils start now with their first foreign language at the age of 10 or 12. Most of the children choose English that is functioning in more and more bilingual HungarianEnglish schools also as the language of instruction (Szabóné Papp 2009). Hungarian secondary pupils have to do a final, school-leaving exam at the end of the secondary education in grammar and vocational schools. In 2005, a new school-leaving examination was introduced. The aim of the new examination was to harmonize it with the exam system of the European Union. The school-leaving exam is not only the closing act of the secondary studies but it also part of the entrance examination to higher education. There are five compulsory subjects in the Hungarian school-leaving examination. One of these must be a foreign language. The fifth subject can be chosen from any subject in the curriculum. Hence, two languages can be part of the final exam of secondary education. As the compulsory foreign language mostly English is chosen. Hence, the English language can be compulsory, compulsory eligible or optional as an examination subject, depending on the type of school and the candidate’s choice (Csernoch, Korponayné Nagy 2005). A successful language test in the school-leaving exam is relevant. The Hungarian universities have the right to add extra admission points 6

In a recent survey (Eurobarometer 386) it was noted that the 42 percent of 2005 has decreased notably with -7 percent to 35 percent. This drop has probably to do with the large number of youngsters that has left Hungary in the recent years due to the bad economic situation and lack of employment opportunities. In any case, we must conclude on the basis of this decrease that the language policy to strengthen multilingualism has not been very successful.


Rudi Janssens, Virginie Mamadouh, László Marácz

on the basis of the results for the language-test of the school-leaving examination (Szabóné Papp 2009). A language test, most often English is also a prerequisite for finishing any discipline in higher education. At present, a quarter of the higher education students do not get their degrees because they do not possess the necessary language proficiency certificates. The languages of instruction in Hungarian higher education have been regulated by Act LXXX of 1993 on Higher Education. This Act was in force between 1 September, 1993 and 28 February 2006 and was repealed by the Act CXXXIX of 2005 on Higher Education. Section 8 (2) of the Act states that “the language of instruction in higher education shall be Hungarian. […] Instruction in higher education – in part of whole – may be provided in a language other than Hungarian.” The Hungarian Act of Education opens the possibility for education in a global lingua franca as English or a traditional regional lingua franca as German. Characteristic for the past twenty years in education has been the expansion of higher education in Hungary. Higher education institutes have developed into institutes for mass education in line with global trends. With around 400.000 students measured in 2009/2010 the number of the students is three times higher than in 1990/1991 (Balázs et. al. 2011). This means that there is an expansion of the foreign languages – mostly English – as well. According to Coleman (2006), English may be allocated across seven categories: CLIL (content and language integrating learning), internationalization, student exchanges, teaching and research materials, staff mobility, graduate employability and the market in international students. As Hungarian drivers of English-medium teaching CLIL courses are not relevant; this is also the case for teaching and research material. Student exchanges and staff mobility are neither relevant drivers of English-medium teaching in Hungary. Only two percent of the Hungarian students study abroad. This is much lower than the average for the 27 EU member states. Most of these students go to Germany, i.e. 45 percent and to English speaking countries, i.e. 20 percent. Student and staff mobility are low because of hampering proficiency in foreign languages and due to the high costs of living in Western Europe. For Hungary the factors of internationalization, graduate employability and the market in international students are more relevant as drivers of Englishmedium teaching: One of the drivers of the rise of English-medium teaching in Hungary is the growing importance of English on the labor market. In foreign or multinational companies in Hungary the language of internal communication is English. This is the case for example in the energy company E.ON, although it is a German company. Similarly English is the language of widespread outsourcing activities of multi-national companies. These companies shift certain operations to countries where human labor is cheap. In 2005, of the outsourcing target countries Hungary was 19th in the world.

Multilingual Higher Education in European Regions


Hungarian institutes for higher education have been trying to take their share in the marketization of higher education in Europe (Coleman 2006, 1, Grin 2010). To have foreign students enrolled is a means of making additional income for these Hungarian institutes. Their most important arguments to attract foreign students is to refer to public safety and the low costs of living in Hungary. In order to be attractive as a target country for higher education foreign students must be offered programs and courses in the global lingua franca English and languages of wider communication, like German and French. This is especially pressing for Hungarian is taught little elsewhere. This has been strengthening the position of English in Hungarian higher education. Almost 35 percent, i.e. 24 institutes of the 69 institutes for higher education offer English, German or French as a medium of teaching (Balázs et. al. 2011). In the academic year 2010/2011 18.154 foreign students attended programs or courses at Hungarian universities. This number is about 4.9 percent of the total number of students. Most of these students, around three quarters come from Europe and around fifty percent of them are ethnic Hungarian minority students from the neighbouring countries. Most popular among foreign students are the English-medium programs in medicine, dentistry and pharmaceutics. These programs can be attended at the Semmelweis Medical University in Budapest, the Universities of Szeged and Debrecen. Students enrolled in these programs have to learn during their education also medical Hungarian in order to be able to communicate with patients. Further, all sorts of engineering studies at the Budapest University of Technology and Economics; and Management and Business Administration at the Corvinus University have a tradition of English-medium teaching. The Central European University is a special institute of higher education. It offers PhD programs in English that attract students from the Central European region. Eleven institutes for higher education in Hungary present programs or courses in German. Prominent for German-medium teaching is the Gyula Andrássy German language University. Here International and Central European Studies, Law and Economics can be attended in German. Finally five institutes are offering courses in French mediumteaching. At the University of Szeged European Law can be attended in French. In sum, Hungary follows a global pattern of becoming diglossic, with one language for local communication, education, culture and expression of identity, i.e. Hungarian and another – English – for wider and more formal communication, like in higher education with foreign students. Besides this, German will maintain its position in Hungary, although less favored than English.


Rudi Janssens, Virginie Mamadouh, László Marácz

The Language of Higher Education in Hungarian Minority Institutes The Hungarian language is spoken by ethnic Hungarians in the Carpathian macro-region in the seven neighbouring states of Hungary, including Romania. According to the Romanian census of 2002 there are over 1,5 million speakers of Hungarian in the traditionally multi-ethnic, multilingual region of Transylvania. Official and everyday multilingual communication in Transylvania is classified in Brubaker et al. (2006: 240-242) as ‘asymmetrical’ due to political and demographic circumstances. Romania is a unitary nation-state by constitution in which the Romanian language is the only official language. The languages of the national minorities, especially Hungarian and German, are officially recognized but their use in official communication is restricted by laws. Both the Romanian and Hungarian communities strive for their separate educational systems from ’Kindergarten to the university’. This is made possible by law. The Romanian National Educational Law 1/2011 is similar to the one of Hungary of 2005 in that it allows higher education in the state language, recognized minority languages and international languages, like English, German and French. Compare Art 10. (1) “In Romania, education […] develops, under the condition of the law, in the Romanian language, as well as in the languages of the national minorities and in the international languages.” Although Hungarian Transylvanian experts and commentators of higher educational issues are very well aware of the fact the internationalization, globalization, marketization and so on are on the agenda their analyses concentrate on the position of Hungarian-medium teaching in the higher educational institutes and the relation Hungarian has opposed to Romanian (see Salat et. al. 2011 45-54, Tonk 2010). Article 3 of the educational law specifying that a person belonging to an ethnic minority should be able to preserve its cultural and linguistic identity, and article 10 stating that the mother tongue of a national minority may be used in education, gives a more solid legal base to the position of the Hungarian language in Romanian higher education. The new Romanian national educational law 1/2011 provides more possibilities for Hungarian language teaching in Romanian higher education. Twelve institutions for higher education offer 125 educational programs in the Hungarian language, sixty percent of the educational programs belong to the humanities and the social sciences. Of these twelve institutions five are state institutions, three are private institutions and four institutes are branches of an institute for higher education in the kin-state Hungary (see papers in Szikszai (ed) 2011). The law has not provided for the establishment of a separate Hungarian language state university in Romania. Hence, the Hungarian community has taken the initiative to establish separate Hungarian language universities on a private basis itself, like the Sapientia University, also known as the Hungarian University of Transylvania. It offers 22 educational programs distributed over three

Multilingual Higher Education in European Regions


Transylvanian towns (Tonk 2010). The Romanian educational law also allows for the establishment of ‘mother tongue tracks’ in higher educational state institutions where national minorities’ programs already exists (Article 135), the Babes-Bolyai University in Cluj-Napoca (Kolozsvár, Klausenburg), the University of Medicine and Pharmacy of Târgu Mures (Marosvásárhely, Neumarkt am Mieresch), and the Theatre University of Târgu Mures. Ethnic Hungarian students from Transylvania also have the option to enrol in higher education in the kin-state of Hungary as was pointed out above (Szarka and Kötél, 2008). Most of the Hungarian minority students stayed in Hungary after finishing their studies. To enrol in a Hungarian university has become easier due to the fact that the Hungarian state has separate funds available that cover the expenses, such as tuition and accommodation in university-owned student houses, of ethnic Hungarian students from abroad. From 2010 onwards ethnic Hungarians can become Hungarian citizens receiving a Hungarian passport in accord with the Hungarian citizenship law, act no. 45/2010 on the Testimony for National Cohesion. This implies that due to this law ethnic Hungarian students from Hungary’s neighbouring countries have the same rights and duties as other Hungarian students. This will make it even easier for them to enrol in a Hungarian university in Hungary, but might make their return to their country of origin even more unlikely. In sum, the struggle for the local introduction of Hungarian in higher education in Transylvania connects Hungarian and its speakers via these institutions to the Carpathian Hungarian linguistic community. Hence, this enhances the position of Hungarian as a transnational regional language but it does not seem to stimulate exchange of students and teachers across the Hungarian linguistic area. Still, the language of regional communication does not mix as easily as English with the established language in the curriculum and is not as widely used as a public relation language (for example on websites). The different language communities are in competition with each other and stick to their own national languages for teaching purposes. Multilingualism in higher education in these multilingual areas often remains at best juxtaposed monolingualism. The question of the introduction of global or regional lingua franca in higher education is secondary. A source of multilingual higher education, including languages of the Central European region as well as global or regional lingua franca is cross-border cooperation with institutes of (higher) education in neighbouring countries that are not Hungarian minority institutions. Such cross-border cooperation exist between West-Hungarian institutes and institutes for higher education in Vienna and the Burgenland area. In these cases, the medium for teaching is quite often German or English (Forray and Híves 2011, 49).


Rudi Janssens, Virginie Mamadouh, László Marácz

English at multilingual Universities In this last section we turn to the role of English at universities across where other multilingual arrangements are in place. As in Belgium, most universities in countries with two or more national languages function in one main languages: this is true of Switzerland and Finland for example. Nevertheless universities in regions that have recently obtained formal recognition for their language are more often multilingual. The recognition and institutionalisation of a regional language that was once neglected, or even repressed, has led to language policies aiming at language revitalization (Fishman 1991) and “normalization”. The use of that regional language in higher education is part of the strengthening of the position of the language in all arenas of public life. As a result of such policies, universities are often bilingual, both the state and the regional languages. In such a situation the increasing use of English can disrupt a precarious balance between the languages at play, but can also be a convenient alternative to politically loaded language choices in the daily practice of teaching. Cots et al 2012 have compared the multilingual policies and practices of three multilingual universities where two official languages have to be accommodated: the regional language and the state language. The three universities displayed different arrangements. They contrast the use of the regional language (Catalan) as the unmarked language at the University of Lleida, the official bilingualism (Spanish and Basque) of the University of the Basque Country (UPV/EHU) and the use of the state language (English) as the unmarked language at Cardiff University in Wales. Obviously in the latest case English is both the hegemonic state language and the language of international academic communication, weakening further the attractiveness of Welsh and the university does not encourage foreign students to learn Welsh. The contrast between the situation in Catalonia and in the Basque Country is also linked to the relative prevalence of the regional language and the distance between the two languages in place. It is easier, even for foreign and exchange students mastering Spanish, to learn enough Catalan to follow a course in Catalan than to do so with Basque. The 2006 Internationalization Programme of the Catalan university is somewhat “ambiguous about the nature of the multilingualism that is favoured“ (Cotes et al 2012 p.20). to attract foreign students it promotes English as a working language and it promotes teaching in other “widespread languages”/ and linguistic competences, but it remains unclear if it means only competences in the two co-official languages or competences in English and other foreign languages. Their conclusion is that the university heads towards “solid trilingualism Catalan-Spanish-English”. At the University of the Basque Country mobility is promoted and more and more subjects are offered in English (although French and German are mentioned in the Multlingualism Plan of the university).

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Other interesting cases in Europe are the newly established universities of Luxembourg and Bozen/Bolzano (in South Tyrol). The Free University of Bozen/Bolzano was founded in 1997 as a multilingual, internationally oriented institution. It provides a multilingual, practice-oriented education in German, Italian and English and prepare students for a multilingual local and European labour market. Prior to that, local students would have to choose between an Italian university or an Austrian one, for example in Innsbruck where special arrangements for South Tyrolean students (Markusse 1996, 124-125). The University of Luxembourg is even more recent, It was founded in 2003 and it is characterised by multilingualism. Courses are typically held in two languages: French/English, French/German, or English/German. Prior to that, Luxembourgian students would study in France or in Belgium, sometimes in Germany. The motto of the university is “Multlingual, Personalized. Connected”. The website of the university underlines the importance of multilingualism as more than the coexistence of different languages but as a daily engagement with multiple languages, Although it provides an interface in each of the three languages (for example in English ) the content is multilingual with items in the three languages being brought together. Luxembourg is also the coordinator of a project called Université de la grande région/Universität der Grossregion ( the crossborder region la Grande Région featuring Wallonia, the German speaking community of Belgium, Luxembourg, Lorraine, Saarland, and Rhineland-Palatinate. The university of the Grand Région is an initiative to promote the mobility of students between the part-taking universities of Saarland, Liège, Lorraine, Luxembourg, Kaiserslautern and Trier and the development of (often bilingual) joint degrees. It is no coincidence if these two universities have been prominent in the network of Multilingual Universities since the first conference convened in 2003 in Fribourg, Switzerland in 2003. The University of Fribourg (founded 1889) is the only bilingual university of Switzerland, and the canton of Fribourg is one of the few bilingual cantons. A second conference was organized in Helsinki in 2005 (the University of Helsinki is the only bilingual university in Finland, Anckar 2010), a third in Bozen in 2007 and a fourth in Luxembourg in 2010. Both in Helsinki and in Fribourg, students can choose between curricula in one of the two languages and bilingual ones, but English is increasingly used as a language of education, especially in the master programmes. This situation in Luxembourg, Bozen and Fribourg contrasts greatly with the situation at other universities in the borderlands between Romance and Germanic languages. In Belgium (as described above) and in Switzerland (except Fribourg), universities are either French speaking or Dutch speaking. French and German universities in the Rhineland do not make much room for the neighbouring language (Abel et al 2007). Similarly the partnership network between the four


Rudi Janssens, Virginie Mamadouh, László Marácz

Meuse-Rhine Euroregion universities: the University of Aix-la-Chapelle in Germany (RWTH Aachen, the University of Hasselt/Diepenbeek in Flanders, the University of Maastricht in the Netherlands and the University of Liège) EuregioUniversity-Cooperation ALMA functions in English ( c_805674/euregio-alma) Dutch universities near the German border (Maastricht, but also Nijmegen,Twente and Groningen) do welcome significant numbers of German students, but the internationalization of their courses has gone through English. Although French and German are important languages of regional communication, they do not really play a role in these academic circles. The lack of attention for German has signaled regularly at Dutch universities but the expansion of English has been a rather uncontested and rapid process since the end of the 1980s mainly to accommodate exchange students and recruit international students Apart from Maastricht, technical universities (Eindhoven, Twente, Delft) and the agricultural university (Wageningen) offer have mainly courses in English. At the large, general universities (such as Leiden, Amsterdam or Utrecht) a large number of masters programmes are in English. English has not only displaced the national language but even more radically other languages of wider communication such as French and German. Textbooks and literature in these languages are hardly used anymore as required readings, while this was common until the beginning of the 1990s. In the Netherlands the language of higher education remains Dutch, officially, but for pragmatic reasons English is used more and more often For the past 30 years this process has amplified, mainly to respond to the internationalization of higher education and academic research (Ten Thije et al 2012). Pragmatically, examinations can be taken and theses written in Dutch, which remove possible incentives to oppose the use of English. The public debate about English is even more limited than in Flanders, as the regression of Dutch does not echo some political mobilization of the past.

Conclusion In larger member states with strong national languages like French, German Italian and Spanish, English has been slower to gain ground in higher education than in the smaller countries with a clear international orientation, economically and academically. Where linguistic diversity is an issue, the role of English has a different feel, it can be either an additional threat to the lesser used language or a “neutral” language of communication between two communities. The three sets of cases presented demonstrate the diversities of such situation. In Flanders the raise of English at the expend of Dutch occurs in a situation in which the national language has relatively recently be institutionalized. In Hungary, English is a more recent arrival, while Magyarization of higher education was established earlier, but

Multilingual Higher Education in European Regions


other language of wider communication (German, Russian) have played a role until recently. In Romania, the position of Hungarian has been recently enhanced but it is not used as a language of transnational regional communication to promote the exchanges of students. Finally a series of multilingual universities have been reviewed where English is also gaining weight. There are contrasted findings with universities and networks banking on English and others promoting multilingualism. In conclusion, in the studied cases, languages of regional communication seem not to be able to maintain their influence as language of higher education and academic communication to resist to the pressure of English.

References Abel, A., M. Stuflesser, L. Vollmer eds. 2007 Aspects of multilingualism in European border regions: Insights and view from Alsace, Eastern Macedonia and Thrace, Lublin Voivodeship and South Tyrol. Bozen: Europäische Akademie Bozen. Anckar, O. (2000), University Education in a Bilingual Country: The Case of Finland, Higher Education in Europe, 25:4, 499-506. Balázs, É. et. al. (2011), Facts & Figures: Higher Education in Hungary 2011. Budapest: Hungarian Institute for Educational Research and Development. Bolsmann, C., and H. Miller (2008) International student recruitment to universities in England: Discourse, rationales and globalisation. Globalisation, Societies and Education 6:75-88. Coleman, J. A. (2006), English-medium teaching in European Higher Education. Language Teaching, 39(1). 1-14. Cots, J.M., D. Lasagabaster, P. Garrett (2012) Multilingual policies and practices of universities in three bilingual regions in Europe, International Journal of the Sociology of Languages 216: 7-32 Council of Europe (2011). The Common European Framework of Reference for Languages. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Csernoch, M., Korponayné Nagy, I. (2005), The English Language Examination in the Hungarian School-Leaving Examination: A Comparison to Practices in Other European Countries. European Integration Studies vol. 4.2. 13-23. De Clerck, K., (ed.) (1980), Kroniek van de strijd voor de vernederlandsing van de Gentse universiteit. Gent, Brugge: Uitgeverij Orion. Deneckere, G., Mantels, R. (2011), Geen haan die ernaar kraait. August Vermeylen en de verengelsing van het hoger onderwijs. Ons Erfdeel, 2011/1. Dörnyei, Z., Csiszér K, Németh N. (2006), Motivation, Language Attitudes and Globalisation: A Hungarian Perspective. Clevedon: Multilingual Matters. Fishman, J. 1991. Reversing language shift: Theoretical and emperical foundations of assistance to threatened languages. Clevedon: Multilingual Matters. Forray, R. K., Híves T. (eds.) (2011), Oktatás a határok mentén. [Education along the Borders]. Budapest: Oktatáskutató és Fejlesztő Intézet.


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Grin, F. (2010). Managing Languages in Academia: Pointers from Education Economics and Language Economics. Paper presented at the Conference Professionalising Multilingualism in Higher Education. Luxembourg, February 4, 2010. Janssens, R., Mamadouh, V., Marácz, L. (2010), Languages of Regional Communication (Relan) in Europe: Three Case Studies and a Research Agenda. In Jørgensen J.N. (ed.): A Toolkit for Transnational Communication in Europe. Copenhagen Studies in Bilingualism. Copenhagen: University of Copenhagen, 69-102. Janssenswillen, P. (2009). Vernederlandsing voor de eindstreep? De taalsituatie in het middelbaar onderwijs voor jongens in Limburg tijdens het interbellum. Wetenschappelijke tijdingen op het gebied van de geschiedenis van de Vlaamse Beweging, 68:2, p. 119-143 Lambert, W.E., Tucker, G.R. (1972), The bilingual education of children. The St. Lambert experiment. Rowley, MA: Newbury House Lovász, Á. (2005), Első évfolyamos német szakos egyetemi hallgatók nyelvtanulási motivációja [The language learning motivation of first years students in German]. Magyar Pedagógia 195.4. 359-379. Marácz, L. (2010), Will Hungarian Become a Lingua Franca in the Carpathian Basin. In: Tonk, M, Bodó, B. (eds.): Nations and National Minorities in the European Union. Scientia Publishing House: Cluj-Napoca. 117-136. Marácz, L. (2012), Multilingualism in the Transleithanian Part of the Austro-Hungarian Empire (1867-1918): Policy and Practice. Jezikoslovlje 13.2. (2012). 269-298. Markusse, J. (1996), Zuid-Tirol: de pacificatie van een multi-etnische regio. Utrecht/ Amsterdam: Knag/Universiteit van Amsterdam. Pap, Sz. I. (2011), Az új roman oktatási törvény hozadéka a magyar kisebbség számára. Kitekintő Elemzések 6. pp. 14. (accessed November 10, 2012) Plank, P. van der. (2012), Effects of Habsburg educational Policies measured by Census Statistics. Jezikoslovlje 13.2. (2012). 373-393. Salat, L., Papp, A., Csata Z., Péntek J. (2011), Az erdélyi magyar felsőoktatás helyzete és kilátásai. In: Szikszai M. (ed.): Az erdélyi magyar felsőoktatás helyzete és kilátásai. Támpontok egy lehetséges stratégiához. [The Situation and Perspectives of Higher Education in Transylvania. Strongholds for a possible Strategy]. A Kolozsvári Akadémia Kolozsvári Területi Bizottsága: Kolozsvár: Ábel Kiadó, 9-126. Szabóné Papp, J. (2009), English as the main Language in Intercultural Communication. In: Ferenčík, M., Horváth, J. (eds.) Language, Literature and Culture in a Changing Transatlantic World. Acta Facultatis Philosophicae Universitatis Prešoviensis 238-243. Szarka, L., Kötél, E. (2008), Határhelyzetek. Külhoni magyar egyemetisták peregrinus stratégiái a 21. század elején. [Border Crossings. The peregrinate Strategies of the outlandish Hungarian students at the Beginning of the 21th Century]. Budapest: Balassi Intézet Márton Áron Szakkollégium. Thije, J.D. ten, Gorter, D., Jansen W., Mamadouh V., Marácz, L., Swanenberg, J. (2012), Toolkit for Transnational Communication in Academia in Europe. In: Jong, N. de, Juffermans, K., Keijzer, M., Rasier L. (eds.): Papers of the Anéla 2012 Applied Linguistics Conference. Delft: Eburon, 367-388.

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Tonk, M. (2010), Present and Future of Higher Education in the Hungarian Language in Romania. European and Regional Studies vol. 1 no. 2 (2010). 149-160. Vámos, Á. (2011), Migránsok iskolái [The Schools of Migrants]. Educatio 2011. 2. 194207. Witte, E., Van Veldhoven, H. (2011), Languages in Contact and in Conflict. The Belgian case. Kalmthout: Pelckmans.

Files Act LXXX of 1993 on Higher Education. Ministry of Education and Culture of the Republic of Hungary. 070113. pdf. (accessed November 10, 2012). Act CXXXIX of 2005 on Higher Education. Ministry of Education and Culture of the Republic of Hungary. 2005.pdf. (accessed November 10, 2012) Legea educaţiei naţionale. 2011. Monitorul oficial al României. Anul 179 (XXIII)- nr. 18. Luni, 10 ianuarie 2011., (accessed November 10, 2012) National Labour Office, and Euroguidance Hungary. 2012. Higher Education Degree Programmes Offered in Foreign Languages in Hungary. Budapest. (accessed November 10, 2012)

Acta Universitatis Sapientiae, European and Regional Studies, 3 (2013) 24-46

Minorities in the Europeanisation Process: Undermining the Westphalian Order for the Neo-Medieval Scrum? 1 Magdalena DEMBINSKA University of Montreal Department of Political Science

Abstract. European ethnic and national groups are often said to undermine European structures, i.e., States’ sovereignty and territorial integrity. Considering the literature on multilevel governance, it is argued that minorities’ politics and strategies are in line with the overall Europeanisation process. A glimpse at the demands and alliances by four central European minorities indicates that they behave as any other interest group: they use European concepts, norms, and structures to reach their goals. They do not present alternative models for Europe, but rather integrate the already co-existing neo-Westphalian and neo-medieval models. Keywords: National minorities, Europeanisation, Westphalian order, multilevel governance.

With the European integration, inconsistencies between nation-states, stateless nations and minority groups were to reduce. Following Eric Hobsbawm’s thesis, transnational institutions and policies embracing all the national and ethnic groups independently of their state of residence, diminish the importance of the ‘national question’ (1990, p. 191). David Held and proponents of cosmopolitan democracy 1

The previous version of this paper untitled ‘Appropriation de l’Europe par les minorités: une instrumentalisation bénigne’ has been published as a chapter of conference proceedings edited by Crespy and Petithomme (2009). The author would like to thank Mathieu Petithomme for his comments. 24

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believe that interdependence and transnational institutions redesign the architecture of the world and ‘globalise’ culture. Since cultures will converge, cultural policies will eventually be unnecessary (Held 1995; Van den Berghe 2002; Brock 2002). However, ethnic group claims are still at the heart of debates and fuel questions related to the structure and the identity of an integrated Europe. Europe has been established by sovereign nation-states voluntarily delegating some of their authority to supranational institutions. However, while Europe is in the making, member states are under pressure: the increase of ethnic and regional identity claims poses the national question in terms of secession or territorial fragmentation (see McGarry and Keating 2006). Analysts agree on the important challenge national movements bestow on the current layout between nation-states. Minority groups weaken European structures and challenge the democratic governance exercised within the boundaries of states (Linz and Stepan 1996, p. 28). Governments thus often accuse ethnic groups to undermine the European order. Do minorities call into question the current structure of Europe? Do they present an alternative - not to say incompatible - model or do they fit into the existing processes? In what follows, it is argued that they fall in with the Europeanisation process and are part of it. Identity groups align their policies on the European model, which provides external constraints and opportunities for the players within states. In so doing, minorities participate in the construction of Europe. 2 They act as any other interest group that adapts and adjusts its strategies according to the circumstances, following the complex European multilevel governance, already taking place in other policy domains, as observed by analysts and practitioners. A look at the strategies and claims of four groups, the Poles in Lithuania, Russians in Latvia, Rusyns in Poland, Slovakia and Ukraine and Silesians in Poland, selected according to their differences, shows that minorities use Europe to achieve their goal of cultural development and survival. Euroscepticism in East European states comes largely from the perception of the national culture being threatened by Europeanisation. The resultant nationalising policies (Brubaker 1996) collide with the perspectives and interests of minority groups. These in turn adopt a European discourse pressuring the state to mitigate the nationalising line and to comply with the acquis communautaire provisions regarding decentralisation and distribution of power. In doing so, they promote the process of Europeanisation and often trigger adjustments at state policy level. Europeanisation benefits minorities. Our research coincides with Rogers Brubaker’s theory of triadic relations between minorities, their kin-state and the host-state (1996). It also aligns with the 2

This corresponds the fourth definition of Europeanization out of the nine presented by Robert Harmsen and Thomas M. Wilson (2000, pp. 15-16).


Magdalena Dembinska

studies by Antoine Roger (2002) on strategic and pragmatic adjustments of ethnic political parties, for example. Acting in a context of constraints and interactions, minorities use Europe to put pressure on states, to ally themselves with similar groups in other countries and thereby to obtain an increased weight in policymaking. The identity groups under study subscribe to the European model and bring their politics in line with it. If the ‘national question’ undermines the sovereignty of states, it does so in a similar fashion other interest groups do, whose study has given rise to concepts such as post-national sovereignty, neoWestphalian and neo-medieval models or multilevel governance Types I and II. The first section discusses modes of European governance as observed in the literature on policymaking and on its players: groups, states, transnational bodies. Projects of Europe adopted by national/ethnic groups that are subject to controversy will then be presented. The policies and claims of the four minorities mentioned above are reviewed next.

Neo-Westphalian and Neo-Medieval Modes of Governance in Europe There seems to be a consensus as to the fact that we are witnessing the ‘development of a mode of governance now located at several levels and involving interactions between multiple partners, including the state’ (Quermonne 2006, p. 211). The decision-making process in Europe and elsewhere takes place at multiple levels and involves interactions between various territorial units within the states, supranational institutions and societal actors such as interest groups, that often trespass boundaries (see Dowding 1995; Pappi and Henning 1998; Thatcher 1998). To achieve their goals regarding the environment, agriculture, policies related to women and minorities, interest groups now have different channels at their disposal: they can take action in partnership with interest groups within the state or join similar groups outside their borders, or ask for assistance the European level lobbying associations and act through them. A vast literature examines the behaviour and choices made by interest groups that adapt their strategies and discourses to the opportunity structures (Kitschelt 1986). Groups seize opportunity windows such as domestic and external institutional changes. For example, Jenny Fairbrass and Andrew Jordan (2001) suggest that British environmental groups use the opportunities offered at the European Union (EU) level to override resistance coming from their government. Donatella Della Porta and Sidney Tarrow (2005) and Margaret Keck and Kathryn Sikkink (1998), among others, argue that groups without voice on the domestic political arena or who suffer repression seek allies elsewhere to put external pressure on domestic policies, a mechanism called ‘boomerang effect’. Based on his analysis of the interactions between interest groups, states and transnational institutions in the processes of policymaking on issues related to

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economic, social, environmental and foreign affairs, Jan Zielonka (2006) identified two distinct modes of governance in Europe, the neo-Westphalian and the neomedieval ones. These, echo the European governance Types I and II as identified in 2001 (and 2003) by Liesbet Hooghe and Gary Marks. Despite some differences in terms and in the emphasis put on an item or another, the types of intra-European relations respectively identified by the authors combine into two distinct modes of governance (Table 1). Both modes embody multilevel governance, but the structure of the system varies in each of the two models. Table 1: Multi-level Governance in Europe Structure Type I neo-westphalian

Zielonka Europe = a super-State Fixed rigid external borders Pan-European identity Centralised structure of governance Hierarchical centre-periphery relations, well defined competencies Limited sovereignty of periphery

Type II neo-medieval

Fluid borders Multiple cultural identities, low level of universalism Polycentric structure of governance Permeation between diverse political entities and loyalties Non hierarchical centre-periphery relations, more or less defined competencies Sovereignty spread across a variety of functional and territorial lines

Hooghe & Marks Jurisdictions with general competencies Non juxtaposed identity belonging Jurisdictions organised in a limited number of levels Rigid pyramidal structure Functional jurisdictions Multiple juxtaposed identity belonging Unlimited number of jurisdictions Flexible and fluid structures

Based on Jan Zielonka (2006, p. 12) and Liesbet Hooghe & Gary Marks (2001, p. 7).

Europe Type I consists of various territorial units, limited in number, however, for reasons of coordination. These entities have well-defined jurisdictions, with general competences devolved based on subsidiary principle, rather than on functionality. They are defined by borders and organised hierarchically. According to Zielonka (2006), it is a super-state organised on a variant of federalism, with Europe-outside world relations being of Westphalian


Magdalena Dembinska

type. Hooghe and Marks (2001 and 2003) examine intra-Europe relations and also point to a federal design, but here with a multiplication of territorial units created according to the presence of historical, cultural or regional communities. On the contrary, the neo-medieval Type II mode of governance is characterised by its polycentric and fluid structures, where one unit’s jurisdiction juxtaposes with that of another so that they compete. Competencies are allocated according to specific policies and issues, following the functionality principle. On a territory, policies A belong to the entity X, but the policies B belong to Y. At the same time, the entity Y has jurisdiction over B on another territory, and so on. This mode of governance relates in turn to the concept of post-national sovereignty or that of cooperative sovereignty that is a polycentric, organised in a non-hierarchical fashion (Besson 2004, p. 271). For Zielonka (2006), the neo-Westphalian and neo-medieval modes present alternative types of governance, with an irrevocable tendency towards the second. Similarly, studying the political spaces created for the Saami in Lapland, the Roma nation-building policies and the Hungarian Status Law, Stephen Deets (2007) places ethnic politics into the neo-medieval category. Yet, the Status Law is subject to heated debates since it is considered incompatible with the current European structures based on state sovereignty. It is a Hungarian idea of an ‘extended citizenship’ granted to external minorities. In early 1990, Prime Minister Joseph Antall proclaimed himself ‘Prime Minister of fifteen million Hungarians,’ thereby including those living outside the borders of Hungary (Rhodes 1995, p. 362). Feeling responsible for Hungarians left outside the country after the First World War and in view of the (perceived) discriminatory policies of neighbouring countries, the government decided, by means of a law called the Status Law, to create a card that assigns privileges to Hungarians outside Hungary, including economic and social rights (Batt 2002a). The Hungarian initiative has two objectives: to secure well-being for its external minority and to ensure a voice to the Hungarian nation, not solely to the Hungarian state, in the process of European supra-state integration (Ieda 2004, pp. 4 and 15). A senior Hungarian official declared that ‘in the process of the European integration, state borders are gradually losing their significance. The Hungarian policy relative to the nation is at the forefront of a Europe that increasingly rejects the importance of borders putting forward communities and peoples instead. The Status Law is the milestone of this process’ (quoted by Ieda 2004, p. 20). The objective is to form a Hungarian nation without state borders in order to build a ‘Europe of nations.’ An extremely difficult debate unfold, with on the one side, Hungary defending the compatibility of its policy with the European norms and, on the other, neighbouring countries and the EU opposed to it in the name of state sovereignty (Batt 2002a; Deets 2007). The main criticisms of the Hungarian law relate to the interference with the internal affairs of neighbours, hence with their sovereignty. The law explicitly

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stated in its 2002 version that recipients would benefit from its provisions in Hungary as well as in their state of residence (Iordachi 2004, p. 265). The law aims at transfering competencies over the external Hungarians from the host-state to the parent-state, where these competencies become part of internal affairs (Ieda 2004, p. 52). The ‘Europe of nations’ idea may be controversial, but it fits Type II neomedieval style of European governance, a mode already identified while studying environmental and other interest groups. However, contrary to the findings by Jan Zielonka and Stephen Deets, minority groups do not necessarily pursue this type of policies. Another vision is put forward by regional ethnic parties, represented in the European Parliament by the European Free Alliance (EFA). It is the vision of a ‘Europe of regions,’ which also seems to undermine state-centred structures. The EFA and its MPs from Scotland, Wales, the Basque Country and Latvia ‘defend stateless nations, regions and disadvantaged minorities.’ 3 The party’s website presentation reads: [EFA is a] European political party that gathers national, regional and autonomist parties from all over the European Union. Political parties, members of the EFA, subscribe to the right to self-determination of peoples (...). The main objective of the EFA is to provide democratic nationalism and regionalism with a political structure for the development of concrete initiatives at the European level. 4 Of the two principles of international law, territorial integrity of states versus self-determination of peoples, the latter takes precedence in the regional idea. This conflicts with the interests of the states. The concept of a ‘Europe of 100 flags’ proposed by the nineteenth century Breton nationalist, Yann Fouere, is taken up by the EFA. Challenging state structures, Scots, Bretons, Catalans, Moravians and others embrace the idea of a Europe composed of historic regions each detaining most cultural, economic and political competencies, based on the subsidiary principle. This minimises - without eradicating - the role of states. Certainly controversial, this model fits well the modes of governance already in place in Europe: ‘Europe of regions’ corresponds to the Type I neo-Westphalian Europe as identified by Zielonka and by Hooghe and Marks. By challenging the principles of sovereignty and territorial integrity, these conceptions of Europe are suspicious for state actors. They are seen as an alternative shaking the European order. Not only they tend to minimise the role of states, but also to call into question the pan-European identity which was supposed 3 4

The Greens/European Free Alliance, ‘EFA; Members’, EFA-Greens website, available at:, accessed 23 April 2008. European Free Alliance, ‘What is the EFA’, official webpage available at:, accessed 23 April 2008.


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to attenuate national particularisms and ethnic divisions. 5 It is argued instead that minorities use Europe and in so doing, they fall into the European discourse and promote European norms in states of their residence. Europe is a complementary political arena and an additional tool in the hands of minorities. Even if they undermine Europe by challenging the Westphalian paradigm, they fit perfectly well into the process of Europeanisation: multilevel governance, interest groups networks, neo-Westphalian and neo-medieval structures that already exist. In addition, a question arises. As minorities appear to promote two types of Europe of nations and of regions - can we identify the characteristics against which a minority chooses a model over another? Hooghe and Marks (2001) rather sustain that the two modes of governance coexist. A glance at the policies undertaken by minorities, proposed in the remainder of the article, contributes to the debate and allows us to conclude to the coexistence – arguably a conflicting coexistence - of the two structures. The strategies of each group under study fit both modes, which are juxtaposed, the two being inherent to Europeanisation.

Most Different Cases: Four Minorities under Study To answer the questions identified in the previous section, four different cases are compared. This method will also establish whether the differences between minorities play a role in choosing their strategies. The choice of cases (Table 2) represents a sample of the diversity of minorities based on: a) their official status (recognition), b) the relationship with their neighbouring country (kin-state), which could lead to the development of claims for irredentism and/or for ‘Europe of nations’, c) the historical link to a specific territory and d) the level of concentration of the minority on a given territory. Silesians are concentrated in a historic region of which they are indigenous, they are not recognised by Poland as a distinct group and do not have a parent-state, that is there is no country with a majority Silesian nation. Rusyns (or Ruthenians) are more or less concentrated on their indigenous historical territory - now divided between Poland, Slovakia and Ukraine -, they are officially recognised in the first two countries, but not in Ukraine, and they have no kin-state. Poles in Lithuania are recognised as a minority, are concentrated on a historic region of which they are indigenous and they have a kin-state, Poland. Finally, Russians in Latvia are recognised as a national minority, have a parent-state, Russia, but are neither indigenous nor territorially concentrated.


Seventh definition of Europeanization provided by Robert Harmsen and Thomas M. Wilson (2000, p. 17).

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Table 2: Cases under Study Minority

Silesians (PL)

Parent-State Recognised Historical/ indigenous Concentrated

Rusyns (PL SL UK)

Poles (LIT)

Russians (LAT)


N Y (PL SL) N (UK)








N (PL) Y (SL UK)



Note: N = no, Y = yes; PL = Poland, SL = Slovakia, UK = Ukraine, LIT = Lithuania, LAT = Latvia.

Poles in Lithuania Following the First World War, new states (re)-emerge, including Poland and Lithuania. The latter includes Wileńszczyzna (Vilnius and the surrounding region) (Snyder 2003, chap. 3), predominantly populated with Poles. In 1920, after the refusal to conduct a plebiscite followed by a military operation, the area is occupied/recovered by Poland (Snyder 1995, pp. 326-330). When the Red Army occupies eastern territories of Poland (Ribbentrop-Molotov secret pact), Stalin gives Wileńszczyzna back to Lithuania, which is subsequently absorbed to the Soviet Union (Karski and Klimek 2000, pp. 146-147). The Polish minority - which presently constitutes 7% of the total population of Lithuania and lives in an area of 30-50 km around the capital (Łossowski 1992, p. 70) - refuses to submit to the sovereignty of the Lithuanian State, restored in 1991. Cut from Poland for forty years, Poles learn Russian rather than Lithuanian (Tomaszewski 1992, pp. 89-94). Moreover, the Polish minority still considers Lithuanians as intruders in Wileńszczyzna. Therefore, the Lithuanian nation-building is perceived more threatening to the survival of this minority than the Russification policies under the Soviet rule were (Snyder 2003, p. 250). In response to the nationalising policies, between 1990 and 1991, the Polish minority adopts several autonomist resolutions (Burant 1993, p. 401; Łossowski 1992). From the beginning, the Polish government clearly dissociates itself from the autonomist movement of its external minority. Unlike the Hungarian approach, Poland adopts the ‘Europe of States’ model: the daily Rzeczpospolita reported in its edition of 11 September 1991 that Poland demands the formulation of European minority norms in Lithuania while clearly recognising the sovereignty of Lithuania over its Polish minority. In the 1992 Joint Declaration on Good Neighbourhood, the parties agree to follow the European norms on minorities, as stipulated in the documents of the Security


Magdalena Dembinska

Council and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE, later OSCE). This provides the Polish minority in Lithuania with an opportunity structure, a legal tool for subsequent negotiations with the Lithuanian government. Russians in Latvia Latvia’s Russophones account for 33.5% of the total population, of whom only 18% speak Latvian. Conversely, over 60% of Latvians speak Russian (Kelley 2004, p. 73). In the early 1990s, most major cities are predominantly Russianspeaking and Russian is dominant in the capital, Riga. After 50 years of being in the dominant position, Russians find themselves excluded from the polity, in accordance with the citizenship laws introduced in the 1990s. In 2005, 45% of Russian speakers do not have Latvian citizenship.6 Authors tend to describe the country’s regime as an ‘ethnic democracy’ (Evans 1998; Järve 2001). From the late nineteenth century, the policy of the empire was to russify the region by encouraging the migration of the Russians and by ensuring the dominance of Russian in local institutions and in the education system. Latvians managed, however, to take control over their state during the chaos of the Bolshevik revolution and their independence was formalised in 1920. However, Soviet Russia annexed Latvia in 1940. Simultaneously to mass deportations, regional demography was altered by the influx of Soviet Russians (Park 1994, p. 71). The number of Latvians drops from 77% in 1935 to 52% in 1989, while that of Russians increases from 8.8% to 34% over the same period (Melvin 2000, p. 135). Population figures and the Russian, then Soviet, dominance explain the resentment of Latvians against the Russian-speaking population and their fear for the survival of the national political community (Evans 1998, p. 59). Although a large number of Russian speakers supported the independence of the Baltic countries since 1989 and did not identify with the USSR, ethnic exclusive policies are adopted towards the Russian minority (Park 1994, p. 70). A survey conducted in 1990 show that 45% of non-Latvians were keen to the idea of independence and the referendum held on 3 March 1991 revealed that even districts with majority Russian-speaking population voted for independence (Melvin 2000). Similarly, only 52% of nonLatvians identified themselves as Soviet citizens. It is a period of the ‘plasticity of identities’ (Smith and Wilson 1997, p. 845). The eventual easing of Latvian nationalising policies was negotiated with Europe, but judged unsatisfactory by the Russian speakers and by a large number of specialists (Kelley 2004; Poleshchuk 2002; Wilson 2002). With the declaration of the Council of Europe, stating its


2005 data from the Latvian Institute, available at:, accessed 14 September 2006.

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satisfaction with the new provisions – now in line with those prevailing in most European countries - the use of European norms by the minority seems impossible. Rusyns in Poland, Slovakia and Ukraine Rusyns are Eastern Slavs, indigenous of the Carpathian region. They are either Orthodox or Greek-Catholic and their language is similar to the Ukrainian. They never constituted an independent state and over centuries, the region has been subjected to multiple changes of state ownership. Nevertheless, from the midnineteenth century, Rusyns are recognised as distinct peoples by different states to which they belong and by the international community. Following the failure of the Hungarian revolution in 1849, Austria divided Hungary into five districts, including one based in the Subcarpathian area administered by local Rusyns. The district remains in place however only for a few months. After the First World War, the Hungarian government created an autonomous Rusyn region, which survived 40 days. Meanwhile, the government of Czechoslovakia guaranteed Rusyns a territory ruled by local leaders in exchange for their adherence to the newly created state. This Rusyn territory, later called Carpatho-Ukraine, had legal foundation in the Czechoslovak Constitution of 1920, but also in two international treaties: Saint-Germain-en-Laye (1919) and Trianon (1920). When Czechoslovakia disintegrated in 1939, the region proclaimed its independence, but was quickly reannexed by Hungary. Paul R. Magocsi (1992, p. 99) concludes that ‘despite the fact that Rusyns have never had a state, over the twentieth century and for significant periods of time, they have had experience - and thus the historical memory - of their political entity.’ Currently, the Rusyns are divided between three countries. They are recognised as a minority in Poland, where they live in the Lemko region (Łemkowszczyzna) at the east-southern end of the country, and in Slovakia where they live in the Prešov region in the east. Their number is 5 800 in Poland and 24 200 in Slovakia. As for the Rusyns of Transcarpathia in south-western Ukraine, they are not officially recognised as a minority group since their ethno-genesis is considered identical to that of the Ukrainians and since Rusyn is considered a dialect of the Ukrainian language. According to the 2001 census, they are 10 100, but according to data gathered by the Rusyn regional organisations they are 800 000 and represent between 65 and 70% of the population of the region.7 The Rusyn movements in the three countries reappeared after the fall of communism (Michna 1995). The leaders of the Rusyn organisations from Poland and Slovakia formulate their objectives in terms of culture rather than territory. On the other side 7

Letter to President Kuchma from Rusyn organizations, dated 19 April 2004, available at:, accessed 15 January 2008.


Magdalena Dembinska

of the European border, in the referendum on the independence of Ukraine in 1991, a question about autonomy was added in the region of Transcarpathia: 78% of people voted for a self-governing Transcarpathia, but such a status was not granted subsequently (Solchanyk 1994, p. 62). Since then, Rusyns claim recognition and autonomy. Associated with separatism, the Rusyn movement is targeted by the Ukrainian government. In 1996, the Ministry of Interior issued a document where Rusyns are presented as a threat to the sovereignty and to the territorial integrity of the Ukrainian state (State Committee of Ukraine 1996). Steps are put forward to eradicate the movement, including: strengthening the position of Ukrainians in the region of Transcarpathia by cultural and linguistic policies as well as by the selection of staff in the regional administration; preventing the holding of any referendum that would seek to determine self-identification of the people in the region; pursuing a media campaign stressing the Ukrainian character of the region and its population (Belitser n.d). Silesians in Poland The Polish census of 2002 reveals that the Silesians, numbering 173 000, are the largest minority in Poland (Simonides 2003). They represent 12.4% of the population in Upper-Silesia, the south-west territory of the country (Bieda 2006, p. 7). Yet, Silesians are not recognised by Poland as a distinct community given that they are considered being Poles, with some distinct cultural traits, and their language as merely a dialect of Polish. Frequent divisions of the territory of Silesia and its belonging to various states throughout history are the basis for the separate identity of Silesians. The region inhabited by the Western Slavs is incorporated into Poland at the end of the tenth century but in the Middle Ages, Germanic peoples settle there. In the fourteenth century, Silesia passes to the Czech crown, and in the eighteenth, the majority of the territory is annexed by Prussia, while a small part goes to the Austrian Empire. Germanisation policies are put in place. After the First World War, Silesia is divided between Poland and Germany, with a small portion in Czechoslovakia. In the Polish part, in the inter-war period, Silesians are provided with a regional autonomy where they have a parliament and detain control over language and educational policies, and over police and public services. After the German defeat of 1945, almost the entire German part of Silesia is allocated to Poland. Once again, Silesia undergoes assimilation policies, this time to the Polish nation. 8 The fall of the communist regime offers an opportunity for Silesians to organise and assert their existence and their rights (Kamusella 1994, p. 114; Szmeja 2002, p. 45). In 1990, the Ruch Autonomii ĹšlÄ…ska (Movement 8

History account based on Maria Szmeja (1998), Karl Cordell (1995), Tomasz Kamusella (1999), Bernard Linek (2001) and Grzegorz Strauchold (2001).

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for the Autonomy of Silesia, RAŚ) is formed. In 2000, a secret document from the Department of State Security refers to the RAŚ as the only internal threat to the sovereignty and to the territorial integrity of Poland (Tajne dokumenty UOP 2000). Despite differences in legal status, demographic and geographic situation, the four groups have a common goal: to assert their existence and rights. They all aspire to be granted (financial) means for cultural development and survival and to get a voice in policymaking processes. In the next section, we turn to the study of their actions in order to see which mode of governance they prefer, if this is the case.

Minorities and Europeanisation: Strategies and Multilevel Governance What kind of Europe do cultural minorities endorse? In what follows it is shown that they act like any other interest group. They put pressure on European and state policies aligning their strategies with the European structures in place. In so doing, they participate in the construction of Europe. The adopted measures operate at different levels – flexible and fluctuating – but they fit into the neoWestphalian structures that are juxtaposed with the neo-medieval ones. Here, an overview of chosen directions is provided rather than an in depth analysis of the background, the validity and extensive scope of the adopted strategies. Each minority‘s use of Europe, the policies promoted within the country and within Europe, will be presented. In Lithuanian politics until 2000, only the political party of the Akcja Wyborcza Polaków na Litwie (Electoral Action of Poles in Lithuania, AWPL), supported by the Związek Polaków na Litwie (Association of Poles in Lithuania), represents the Polish minority. Since then, a competing party made its appearance, the Polska Partia Ludowa (Polish People's Party, PPL), without significant electoral weight so far. The respective programs reflect the European standards and spirit of decentralisation and of the respect for minority rights as stipulated in the Framework Convention for the Protection of Minorities and in the European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages. They fit entirely in the Type I Europeanisation when referring to regionalisation and in the Type II Europeanisation when it comes to language and educational policies for minorities. The AWPL program states that its goal is to restructure the Lithuanian state into a set of regions with general competencies, clearly defined and distinct from the central authorities.9 The regions should hold all the local competencies in industry, finance, budget, education, culture and social policies. It is affirmed that the delineation of these territorial units should reflect the ‘natural economic ties, 9

AWPL Akcja Wyborcza Polaków na Litwie [Electoral Action of Poles in Lithuania], available at:, accessed 20 March 2008.


Magdalena Dembinska

historical traditions and the ethnic distinctiveness of the regions.’ Similarly, the PPL program proposes building a Europe of ‘free nations based on the subsidiary principle and of solidarity with all other nations of the world, based on state citizenship and on regional identity.’ 10 There is confusion between the concepts of nation and region, but the rest of the document - which accounts for the heterogeneity of the Vilnius region – clearly points into the direction of a Type I Europe of regions. The use of Europe is also clear in the AWPL electoral declaration of 2007, which refers repeatedly to European acts. First, a reference is made to the Charter of the Regions, ratified by Lithuania and whose implementation is the primary goal of the party. Then comes the already ratified Framework Convention followed by the mention of the European Charter, whose ratification is pending. The AWPL’s objective here echoes the Type II Europeanisation, since state jurisdiction over collective rights would be limited. Linguistic and educational policies would go to the region, but its heterogeneity also implies the right of Russian, Belarusian and other residents to deal with these issues on their own behalf. In addition, the party aims at establishing the superiority of the EU over state jurisprudence in matters concerning minority issues. The AWPL also has been pressuring Lithuania to ratify the European Convention on Citizenship in order to legalise the possibility of detaining dual citizenship. The difficulty of conceiving of a neo-Westphalian mode of governance or neo-medieval one is also apparent when observing the different alliances the Polish minority builds. The intra-ethnic divide, which is reflected in the formation of competing parties, together with Poland's position which respects the Westphalian order, 11 impede the claim for a Europe of nations. Moreover, given the electoral strategies and the intersection of functional interests, the AWPL allies itself with the Russian minority. Together, AWPL and the Russian association ‘Strength in Unity’ get 7.41% of votes in European elections of 2004, thus overcoming the 5% threshold, without winning however any of the thirteen mandates given to Lithuania. At the European level, the two Polish parties ally with different entities. While PPL is a member of the EFA and joins the family of European regional parties, the AWPL is part of the Union of Polish Communities in Europe. The first chooses an alliance of regional interests, heterogeneous in identity terms; the second opts for the association based on ethnic identity to represent common interests mainly to the Polish government. At this level, PPL adopts the concept of a Europe of regions (Type I) and AWPL that of Europe of nations (Type II). Similar divisions are detected in the case of Russians in Latvia. Despite Europe being satisfied with the relaxation of nationalising policies in Latvia, 10 11

PPL Polish Popular Party, programme available at:, accessed 21 March 2008. One of the reasons being the potential territorial revisionism on the part of Germany, to the West.

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minorities use Europe - its concepts, discourses and structures - to produce a ‘boomerang effect.’ The Saskaņas Centrs (Harmony Centre, SC), a party supported by Russian-speaking population created in 2005, uses in its programme and its strategies the Framework Convention ratified by the Latvian Parliament in May 2005. 12 The SC wins 14.42% of the vote in 2006 and ranks fourth among the eleven competing parties. It is a moderate party that gathers the votes previously granted to the Par cilvēka tiesībām vienotā Latvijā (For Human Rights in a United Latvia, PTCVL), also a Russian-speaking party but radical, which fell by more than thirteen points as compared to the 2002 elections. In the last elections of October 2010, the SC gains 29 seats while the PTCVL loses all its representation in the Parliament. Of interest is the fact that, just as the Poles in Lithuania, the Russian minority in Latvia do not form a cohesive unit. On the one hand, Russians are part of a larger group of Russian speakers including Belarusians, Jews, Poles and other groups whose interests converge in matters related to linguistic rights. On the other hand, the Russian minority is divided in two competing camps having their own plans as to how to get on the agenda and gain resources for the development of the Russian group. At European level, the PTCVL is represented in the EFA, while the SC is joining in the European Parliament's Party of European Socialists. The ethnic divide is fading in the latter case to make way for a programmatic party whose political vision resembles that of some Latvian parties. That said, Boriss Cilevics, SC member sitting in the European Parliament on the Socialists ticket, represents the interests of his Russian and Russian speaking constituents by participating in all committees on human rights, on minorities and refugees. The SC does not call into question the Westphalian structures and its strategies fit into the Type I European governance. Instead, Tatiana Zdanoka from the PTCVL is one of the Euro-MPs members of the EFA. However, it is formally Ms. Zdanoka and not the party who is member of the EFA: the PTCVL is not a regional party, the Russians in Latvia are dispersed and do not occupy a historic territory. The association with the European regional parties sends mixed signals as to the adopted type of Europe. The EFA represents the interests of minorities for the establishment of collective rights, but there is also the question of autonomy or independence of the regions. The purpose of PTCVL is not clear: which region would it be? Is an extraterritorial nation under consideration? If that were the case, what role would Russia have? The accession to European structures provides additional political spaces: a month after the enlargement, in June 2004, a party defending Russians in Europe - whose number is estimated at 6 million - is created (Bayou 2004; Socor 2004). The inaugural congress of the Russian Party of the European Union takes place in Prague bringing together activists from Cyprus, Denmark, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, 12

SC programme available at:, accessed 10 December 2006.


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Norway, the Czech Republic and Slovakia. It includes Tatiana Zdanoka. The group aims at being represented in the European Parliament and calls for the adoption of Russian as an official EU language. Its electoral success is rather weak and uncertain. However, the point is that Russians in Latvia take advantage of present opportunity windows and are now part of a pan-European interest group that transcends state borders and is reminiscent of the ‘Europe of nations’ concept. Both modes of European governance intertwine also in the case of the Rusyns. When showing a geographical map to Rusyn leaders of Slovakia and Poland, they unanimously agree that the Rusyn territory extends over the entire geographical area of the Carpathians. According to the interviews conducted by Ewa Michna (1995, p. 81), these leaders are keen to the idea of such an independent state, but resign themselves to stay within the borders of Poland and Slovakia for reasons of political pragmatism. From her interviews conducted in 1995 and in 2003 with leaders of the Rusyn movement of the three countries, Michna found a significant correlation between the withdrawal of the national aspirations by the Polish and Slovak Rusyns and the prospect of European integration (Michna 2004). This finding corroborates the thesis by Viva Ona Bartkus (1999): it seems that the calculation of costs and benefits related to secession dictates the formulation of Rusyns’ aspirations in cultural rather than territorial terms (Michna 2004, p. 145). Rusyn leaders of Slovakia and Poland say: “for us, hope is not in a [Rusyn] state, but in united Europe as we will be once again in the same space and we will be able to communicate with each other without hindrance. That may worry the Transcarpathian Rusyns as Ukraine shall not enter [Europe] probably any time soon and as they are submitted to total isolation while being subject to assimilation. They are thus right […] to aspire to autonomy.” (Quoted by Michna 2004, p. 145) These assertions refer us to both types of Europe simultaneously. The ‘myth’ of Europe guaranteeing respect for minorities, financing the development and maintenance of their identity, as well as of the infrastructures in the peripheral regions they inhabit, is a powerful incentive to remain member of the state of residence, namely Poland and Slovakia. Europe of states is advantageous so far. Nevertheless, the Hungarian concept of the Europe of nations clearly emerges, albeit implicitly, in these assertions. Rusyns in Slovakia and Poland will benefit from European political institutions in which their identity can be expressed with one voice. They will be able to develop common Rusyn projects within the European structures. Yet, Rusyns from the Lemko and the Prešov regions do not overlook the situation of their kin who find themselves on the other side of the EU border. They focus on the European future of Ukraine and, in the short term, on

Minorities in the Europeanisation Process


opening borders allowing cultural exchanges and trade. 13 Improved structures and financing of Euro-regions, particularly in the Carpathian region, would also benefit Rusyns on the Ukrainian side. 14 There is thus a place for the states, but also for extraterritorial nations, all being function of strategies to advance identity policies. The 2004 Orange Revolution and the victory of pro-European camp of Victor Yushchenko, elected president, gave hope to this unrecognised minority in Ukraine for a change in state policy, which must now conform to European standards. Ukraine's aspirations to join the EU are used by Rusyn leaders and provide them with a new opportunity structure and with a potential ‘boomerang effect.’ The Vice-Chairman of the Transcarpathian Rusyns, Mr. Fedir Shandor, for instance, says it is very important for Ukraine to register the Rusyn nationality in order to avoid all sorts of complications in the EU and so that the image of Ukraine is not tarnished (Maksymiuk 2006). The claims for the autonomy are changed: instead of focusing on a Rusyn region, autonomy for the multicultural region of Transcarpathia is put forward. This is in line with the EU decentralisation policies and with a Europe of regions with general competencies, meeting thus the Type I Europeanisation. Simultaneously however, cross-border activities portend the idea of a wider historical area that includes the Rusyn nation beyond the state borders. In so doing, Rusyns have a voice, one common voice, in Europe regardless of where they reside, including even the part of the nation living outside Europe. Clearly, the neo-medieval model is juxtaposed to the states. Territorial structures of Type I combine with cross-border communities of Type II. To make it even more entwined, the Stowarzyszenie Łemków (Association of Lemks) in Poland and the Carpatho-Rusyn Society are part of the Federal Union of European Nationalities, a lobby group pressuring Europe and bringing together a range of minority groups across the continent, but the Slovak Rusyns are not there. In Poland, since the formation of RAŚ, various proposals are put on the table: from the unification of Silesia with Germany to the creation of an independent Silesian state. Officially, RAŚ claims the granting of regional autonomy under the terms of the inter-war constitution. Immediately associated with separatism, such requests are perceived threatening to the interests of the Polish state. In the context of the ‘return’ of Poland to Europe, RAŚ alters its strategy using the European discourse, similar to the realignment of the Rusyn discourse in Ukraine. On the one hand, autonomy is now presented as being part of the pan-European decentralisation process; on the other hand, autonomy is no more required for Silesians, but for the multicultural region of Silesia, with general competencies. The RAŚ is member of the Liga regionów (League of Regions), an association 13


There is a vast literature on the consequences of Schengen on those excluded from the EU enlargement and a political debate is taking place in Europe regarding possible modifications to the border policies (Batt, 2001; 2002b; Kisielowska-Lipman, 2002; Lepesant, 1999). See Judy Batt (2002b) on the problems related to the Carpathian Euro-region.


Magdalena Dembinska

bringing together other regional groups in Poland, which advocates that the Polish state be composed of twelve autonomous regions. At the same time, the title of the journal published by RAŚ changes. To the former title Jaskółka Śląska (Silesian Swallow), ‘- Europa 100 flag’ (- Europe of 100 flags) is added, referring to the concept used by regional parties in Europe. Since 2004, RAŚ is represented in the European Parliament since it became member of the EFA. Together with the political parties of Moravians, Britons, Scots, Catalans and others, Silesians advocate a Europe of regions and use Europe as a complementary political arena for the enactment of their policies. The neo-Westphalian Europeanisation is clear. Not being officially recognised and constituting only a tenth of the population of the region, political pragmatism dictates they emphasise cultural heterogeneity, instead of a historic nation, to advance their autonomy claims. The autonomous region advocated by the RAŚ does not exceed the current state borders. However, RAŚ cooperates with organisations of Silesians in the Czech Republic and in Germany. In the first case, there is an agreement of cooperation signed in 1998 with the Hnutí samosprávné Moravy a Slezska (Movement for the Autonomy of Moravia and Silesia, HSMS), which seeks the creation of a Czech federation formed by three constituent regions within current state borders (Świderek 1999). In the second case, in Germany, an immigrant Silesian registered in November 2008 the Initiative der Autonomie Schlesiens (Initiative for the Autonomy of Silesia), an organisation whose purpose is to promote a Europe of regions by supporting the claims made by RAŚ. The Initiative proposes to conduct talks with the three states - Poland, the Czech Republic and Germany – in order to establish an autonomy over the whole historical region of Silesia. Cooperation between these three organisations strengthens the Silesian extra-state community, but it is also very pragmatic. Speaking of the Initiative, Jerzy Gorzelik, leader of RAŚ, said that ‘international cooperation is most of the time required to obtain EU subsidies. And this organisation can represent for us a strong partner’ (Świercz 2008). The group adjusts to and uses European opportunity structures to achieve its goals of cultural development as well as to get funding for regional projects. Paradoxically perhaps, Europe strengthens trans-border national/ethnic communities. The mutual influence is constitutive of the Europeanisation process.

Conclusion The study of the four cases supports the argument put forward by Michael Keating: ‘the European theme was taken up by minorities as a substitute for irredentism [separatism]’ (2004, p. 370). Regardless of their legal status, demographic and geographic situation, minorities use the European discourse and structures to advance their goals of cultural development and to get a voice on the political arena. In doing so, they promote Europeanisation. They appeal to various

Minorities in the Europeanisation Process


levels of European governance; do not necessarily join the European family of regional parties and their controversial goal of autonomy or independence (Lynch 2007). The picture that emerges is that of an Europeanisation of juxtaposed two types. On the one hand, the four minorities play the card of decentralisation and granting general competencies to historical regions on the subsidiary principle; on the other hand, they account for the heterogeneity of these regions and advocate granting functional competencies in cultural matters to the various groups inhabiting the region. At the same time, they build extraterritorial communities that would act in unison within the European structures. To make it even more entwined, it is clear that minorities are hardly united entities. Different factions within the same identity group adopt diverse strategies. Domestically, some choose to ally themselves with organisations of other minority groups or with organisations and political parties of the majority. At the European level, some are seeking to strengthen their position by allying themselves with different minority groups across Europe; others opt for cooperation with their ethnic kin-diasporas to put pressure on the parent-state. It has been suggested that policies adopted by identity groups are similar to those adopted by other interest groups in the European multilevel governance. Finding themselves at the margins of the domestic political arena, minorities - as interest groups - capture and use concepts that circulate and the existent structures to achieve their goal. Their claims for a Europe of regions and nations do not collide with European structures and do not represent an alternative to the present day Europe. Their policies are an inherent part of the process of Europeanisation of both types of the process, the neo-medieval and the neo-Westphalian. As noted by Hooghe and Marks (2001), this dual process coexists, intersects and juxtaposes, suggesting perpetual conflicts and continuous adjustments among the different elements of the European system. The same can be said of the European community in the making. Identity is a social construct, it is ‘situational’ and ‘ever changing’ (Hale 2004, p. 466; Maíz and Requejo 2005, pp. 2-5; May et al. 2004, p. 9; Young 2002). Being ‘situational,’ it is not limited to belonging to a single reference group, but rather is composed of multiple identifications that form a whole and that sometimes conflict. European identification is additional and complementary to the cultural, regional and/or state identifications. Europe moulds in the interactions between groups, the regional, state and supra-state structures and in responding to the resistance towards policies and norms that result in continuous adjustments. The European political landscape that emerges from these interactions and adjustments is a set of flexible institutions and political processes that manage ever-present conflicts over divergent values and interests. It is a dynamic process shaping a European ‘imagined community.’


Magdalena Dembinska

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Magdalena Dembinska

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Acta Universitatis Sapientiae, European and Regional Studies, 3 (2013) 47-64

Language Policy in Istria, Croatia – Legislation Regarding Minority Language Use Anita Skelin HORVAT University of Zagreb Institute for Linguistics, Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences

Abstract. Due to its rich and turbulent history and its geographical position Istria is a rather multicultural and multilingual (also multidialectal) European region the biggest part of which belongs to Croatia. It is a region populated by members of different minority groups and the most prominent one is the Italian minority. Because of its cultural and linguistic diversity it is an interesting area for analysing language policy on both national and regional levels. In this paper the official documents on language issues are analysed in order to show how some of the “European” recommendations are implemented and how different languages, dialects as well as language issues, e.g. official bilingualism and standard languages in education, are treated by official bodies in the region. These issues and questions become even more important at present because of the approaching access of the country to full membership in the European Union. In order to understand what this membership and the preparations for it can bring and how it can influence language issues and policy, the analysis also includes the discussion of some undergoing changes influenced by European policies. Keywords: language policy, minority language, Croatia, Istria

Context Characterized by “young” democracy and independency (gained from former Yugoslavia in early 1990s) Croatia is a rather interesting case for the study of language policy. According to the Constitution of the Republic of Croatia, article 12 47


Anita Skelin HORVAT

“The Croatian language and the Latin script shall be in official use in the Republic of Croatia.” Even though the official language is named and prescribed by the Constitution the language situation is not that simple. At the time of Croatia’s accession to EU some language issues have arisen, like the position of Croatian in the European Union what makes the question of the language policy even more intriguing. Considering article 12 of the Constitution about the official language one could conclude that Croatia is a monolingual state, but in the second part of the same article it is stated that “In individual local units, an other language and Cyrillic or some other script may be introduced in official use together with the Croatian language and Latin script under conditions specified by law.” So, on the local level there is a possibility to use two different official languages, and possible introduction of another official language is not prescribed by national authorities thus granting a rather big freedom to the units of the local authorities1. The law does not prescribe the use of another official language on national level. Hence, on the national level the country is declaratively monolingual even though it obviously is not 2. The Constitution also guarantees equal rights for the members of all national minorities in the country, regulating by law the protection of their rights and freedom to “express their nationality, to use their language and script, and to exercise cultural autonomy.” (Article 15) In the early 90’s Croatia inherited the legal model for protection of the minorities from former Yugoslavia, but altered circumstances called for modification of the legal framework. Besides, under the pressure of the international community some changes in the laws regarding the rights of minorities needed to be done. This required changing the Constitution, which was followed by the promulgation of new acts and ratification of international conventions. The Constitutional Act on the Rights of National Minorities (Constitutional Act) was promulgated in accordance with the principles of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, UN Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities (UN Declaration), the Framework Convention of the Council of Europe for the Protection of National Minorities (Framework Convention), the European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages (the Charter), and so on. Croatia became a member of the UN in 1992 3 and signed different documents, agreements, covenants and treaties on the 1



On the other hand in some governmental reports prepared for the European commission about the implementation of the Charter the use of minorities’ languages is guaranteed on all levels, including the national as well. Minority language could be exceptionally used in the institution on second level only if the parties used the official minority language in the institutions of the first or local level. (Article 20 of the Act about the use of languages and scripts of national minorities).

Language Policy in Istria, Croatia – Legislation Regarding Minority Language Use


rights of the national minorities that were embedded in the laws of the country. Even though Croatia is still not a full-fledged EU member state it signed the Framework Convention in 1996 and the Charter in 1997.

Aim The aim of this paper is to analyse different legal documents on international, national and regional levels dealing with languages and language rights of national or ethnic minorities. In the preamble of the Constitution the rights of the minorities are guaranteed and 22 minority groups are recognized as a constitutional part of the country’s population. The goal of this paper is to critically examine legal documents regarding the rights of minorities to use their languages as well as reports on their implementation. Special attention is paid to the analysis of the situation in the region of Istria, a bilingual region in which Croatian and Italian are officially recognized. We tried here to see how international legal acts, conventions and recommendations have been integrated into national and regional legal instruments and the extent to which they were implemented in the respective part of Croatia by using the top-down approach. Our main corpus consist of relevant legal documents, and we analyze their content and discourses on language, culture and identity.

Legislation on the national level and the main concepts Article 5 of the Constitutional Act defined a national minority as “a group of Croatian nationals whose members traditionally inhabit the territory of the Republic of Croatia, its members having ethnic, linguistic, cultural and/or religious characteristics different from other citizens and want to preserve these characteristics.” 4 According to this act, only minority groups which traditionally inhabit the country are recognized as national minorities; other groups of people and other minorities such as “new” inhabitants are excluded. In 1997 the Aliens Act which regulates the conditions for the entry and stay of foreigners or “aliens5” as labelled in legal terminology, was promulgated. We can expect that in the future, especially after the full accession of Croatia in EU, some changes will be needed in the Aliens Act dealing with foreigners because some changes probably will occur in the domain of the labour market. 6 4 5 6 Alien is “a person who is not a citizen of the country.” ( selected=2382) Some changes probably occur even though analysts do not expect remarkable number of immigrant workers because of the specificity of the Croatian labour market and economic situation. See


Anita Skelin HORVAT

From these definitions of minorities and aliens, it is clear that these terms are connected with the concept of citizenship which is also one of the main differences between the two groups, and accordingly between the rights reserved for each of them. In European context aliens, mostly migrants, are sometimes labelled as “new” minorities, while the national or ethnic groups traditionally residents are labelled as “old” minorities. In the Croatian context the “new” minorities are those national groups which used to be a constitutive part of the former Yugoslavia, and after the breakdown of Yugoslavia they remained in the states where they constitute a minority nowadays (see Tatalović, 2005). There is no one overall accepted definition of the minority; there is no international legal definition so even in the Framework Convention the definition of a minority is not given leaving to the authorities of respective states to define a minority taking social, political, cultural, historical, linguistic and other relevant circumstances into account. Probably one of the mostly used definitions is the one given by Capotorti: “A group numerically inferior to the rest of the population of a State, in a non-dominant position, whose members – being nationals of the State – posses ethnic, religious or linguistic characteristics differing from those of the rest of the population and show, if only implicitly, a sense of solidarity, directed towards preserving their culture, traditions, religion or language.” 7 The criteria for considering and labelling a group as a minority are rather questionable, as they usually take into considerations sheer, numbers of group members, the geographical argument (the minority is connected to a certain region), and history (the time when the minority group entered the country). However, none of these criteria is especially stipulated internationally. In the Constitution the concept of citizenship is chosen, while in the “older” constitutions the concept of autochthony was used. In Croatian legislation the term used is ‘national minority’ while some other countries prefer the term ‘ethnic minority’. For a definition of these terms the concepts of language, culture, origin, territory, history and number of the members are important as well as some ‘subjective’ elements, including the feelings of belonging, the will to belong to a respective group and so on. Analysing the laws on minority’s rights in which free use of the minority language is one of the basic rights displays the importance of the language as an element and marker of these identities. It is rather important to notice that the changed and “renewed”, consolidated 2010 Constitution differs from the previous ones, among other things with regard to the number of listed constitutional minorities. In the preamble of 1990 Constitution Croatia was established as the national state of the Croatian people and the members of other nations and minorities: Serbs, Muslims, Slovenians, Czechs, Slovaks, Italians, Hungarians, Jews, and others. In the 1997 Constitution the recognized 7

Language Policy in Istria, Croatia – Legislation Regarding Minority Language Use


minorities were Serbs, Czechs, Slovaks, Italians, Hungarians, Jews, Germans, Austrians, Ukrainians, Ruthenians and others8. In the consolidated text of the 2010 Constitution the number of recognized minorities grew to 22 as listed in the first part Historical foundations: “the Republic of Croatia is hereby established as the nation state of the Croatian nation and the state of the members of its national minorities: Serbs, Czechs, Slovaks, Italians, Hungarians, Jews, Germans, Austrians, Ukrainians, Rusyns, 9 Bosniaks, Slovenians, Montenegrins, Macedonians, Russians, Bulgarians, Poles, Roma, Romanians, Turks, Vlachs, Albanians and others who are citizens and who are guaranteed equality with the citizens of Croatian nationality and the right to the exercise their national rights in compliance with the democratic norms of the United Nations and the countries of the free world.” According to 2001 Census 10 there are 331.383 members of these groups, making up 7,47 percent of the population. The largest groups include Serbs (201.631), Bosniacs (20. 755), Italians (19.636), Hungarians (16.595), Albanians (15.082), Slovenians (13.173), Czechs (10.510), and Roma (9.463). 11 Comparing to the previous (1991) census the number of minority members is decreased due to the war and political, economical, social and other changes that happened after Croatia´s proclamation of independence. Such strong demographical changes are responsible for the fact that today there are no territorially homogeneous minority groups; on contrary they are rather dispersed. Only few minorities thus fulfil the ‘territoriality condition’. For instance, the biggest numbers of Italians live in Istria, Hungarians and Serbs live in East Slavonia and Czechs can be found in a few counties in the north-western part of Croatia. However, a number of members of these groups live all over the country. In the first version of the Constitution Muslim were recognized as a minority which is rather interesting, as they are normally considered a religious group and not a national one. However, Muslims were recognized as a nationality in former Yugoslavia and this tradition was maintained in the earliest version of the Constitution. While in the second version there was no mentioning of the Muslims at all; in the recent version of the Constitution this group is replaced by the national minority of Bosniacs. Initially Slovenes, Roma and others were not recognized but were placed into the category of “others” thus having been put in an unequal position compared to the groups recognized by the Constitution. It is interesting to note that these minorities were recognized by the Constitutional Act adopted in 2002 and by the Constitution only in 2010. 8 9 10 11

Narodne novine 56/90; 135/97. Ruthenians. The most recent 2011 census data will be available in 2013.


Anita Skelin HORVAT

The recognition of Roma 12 minority included in the 2010 Constitution is probably influenced by the EU officials and bodies monitoring the progress of Croatia in implementing the laws and conventions on the rights of the minorities. The position and problems, rights and recognition of this group are of special interest not only for Croatian government, but in the EU as well, where they are seen as being in a very delicate position. In accordance with these European “trend”, a special chapter is dedicated to the protection of the rights of Roma in the Action Plan for implementation of the Constitutional Act on the Rights of National Minorities (Action Plan). In 2003 the National Programme for the Roma is presented with the aim to develop an overall and a long-term plan for the improvement of the life of Roma and to prevent their marginalisation. Another important project is a Decade for the Inclusion of the Roma (2005-2015) in which government organizes different activities in order to implement agreed measures. According to the reports, some improvements can be observed, but the situation is still rather difficult, and Roma still meet prejudice from the majority. In September 2012 Roma children were not allowed to enter school by locals protesting in front of the institution what caused strong public reactions and comments by interested parties, government and public. In this paper we are primarily interested in the language policy concerning minorities so laws regulating the use of minority languages are of special interest here. Two laws regulating the use of minority language adopted in May 2000 are: the Act about the right on education in a minority language and the Act about the use of language and script of the national minorities which are based on the articles 12 and 15 in the Constitution, and elaborated in the Constitutional Act. The Act about the use of language includes the rights to use the minority language and script in private and public sphere, in the official spheres (e.g. courts, local governmental bodies, and so on), to have access to the information in the language and script of the minority groups, to use personal and family names in the minority language (Law about the personal name), to use bilingual personal documents, and others. Minority languages can be official on the territory of local units where the members of a minority make up the majority in the unit or when they “comprise at least one third of the population” (article 12(1) of the Constitutional Act) or if the local units decide by the statute to use a minority language as the official language. In these local units, cities, communes, and districts minority languages are equal to Croatian in the public and official spheres, like at the meetings of representative, executive, administrative and juridical bodies, on city signs, street and place names, and geographical names. The 12

The same apply to Slovenes, as well, but here we mention the situation of Roma only because of the special projects for the protection of Roma minority.

Language Policy in Istria, Croatia – Legislation Regarding Minority Language Use


minority languages that are in official use in some local units are: Czech, Hungarian, Italian, Ruthenian, Serbian, and Slovak. 13 The Act on education in languages and scripts of national minorities states that the members of the national minorities have the right to be educated in their language and script at all educational levels, from pre-school until university, and the same applies to other forms of education, including seminars, summer schools, courses, and so on. The realisation of this law is encouraged also by positive discrimination, i.e. it is possible to organize classes with fewer students than usually required (Article 7). The curriculum is suited to a specific minority´s language, literature, history, geography and culture and has to be approved by the Ministry of Sciences, Education and Sport. The obligatory study of Croatian in schools and classes held in minorities’ languages is nonetheless obligatory 14. Education in the language and script of national minorities is conducted via three basic models and specialized educational frameworks. These models are: Model A – classes in the language and script of the national minority; Model B – bilingual classes and Model C – nurturing language and culture. Besides these three main models there are some other ways of teaching the minority’s languages and cultures: class framework in which the language of a minority is taught as the language of the social environment, special classes – summer and winter classes and school, and special programmes for the inclusion of Roma students into the educational system. Members of national minorities propose and chose a model and program in line with existing legislation and their ability to complete the programme. 15 Education in the language and script of national minorities, under different models, is provided for the Czech, Hungarian, Italian, Serbian, Albanian, Austrian and German, Macedonian, Slovak, Slovene, Ukrainian and Ruthenian national minorities. For members of the minorities who do not have organized forms of teaching the language is cultivated through the summer and winter schools and courses and some other educational programmes. 16 Beside different legal acts, documents, conventions and declarations on the protection of the rights of national minorities there are other “tools” for the protection of the minorities´ rights. Some of them are bilateral conventions or agreements signed between Croatia and a country from which the minority group originates which is prescribed by the article 6 (1) of the Constitutional Act: “The 13

Minority languages are in equal and official use in 57 towns and municipalities. (Application of the Charter, 4th, p. 6). 14 The obligatory learning of Croatian is not only prescribed by different educational laws but is connected to the laws about the citizenship were knowledge of Croatian is needed for gaining the citizenship. 15 About the educational models see Here you can consult the curriculum plans for Czech, Hungarian, Italian and Serbian. 16 Compare Fourth periodical report, 2010.


Anita Skelin HORVAT

Republic of Croatia may conclude international agreements with other states, thus regulating the issue of rights and freedoms of members of national minorities.” Such bilateral agreements were signed with the Republic of Italy in 1996 and with Hungary in 1995. There are different bodies and organizations (both governmental and nongovernmental) in charge of controlling the protection of minorities’′ rights, including the Committee for the human rights and the rights of national minorities as working body of the Croatian Parliament, the Office for Human Rights and Rights of National Minorities of the Croatian Government and the Counsel for National Minorities as an autonomous body founded on the basis of the Constitutional Act cooperating both with the Parliament and the Government. It is an umbrella organization for the national minorities on the state level that tries to connect institutions and interests of the minorities dealing with integral problems of the minorities. Under the Ministry of Science, Education and Sport in 2008 a National Minorities Directorate was established. An office at the state level which deals with the educational issues of national minorities, and holds an important role for the integration of the issues relevant to the education of national minorities and the overall educational policy. In governmental Reports on implementing the Constitutional Act 17 it is stated that the government is determined to protect the rights of minorities and to actualize their rights from the Constitution. The protection of the rights includes protection of minorities’ cultural specificities through organizing different cultural activities. These activities are important for expressing cultural autonomy of minorities and the cultural diversity as an important element of Croatian identity. From these different reports it appears that there are less problems in implementing the provisions about the use of language of the minorities and other rights connected with the language, cultural, and religious denomination than with the employment for example. The European Commission reports on the situation of Croatia are rather similar. The Croatia 2011 Progress Report in the context of the minorities concluded that progress has been made in order to protect the minorities and their cultural rights; the public expression of the support for minority rights is on a rather high level leading to the reaffirmation of the position of the minorities in Croatian society as well as the public presentations of the minorities and their members in the media. The conclusion of this report is that the position of minorities continues to improve, even though some problems remain, but one of the main conclusions is that Croatia needs to “strengthen the spirit of tolerance toward the minorities.”18 17


Here are analysed the reports of 2007, 2010, and 2011 and the special Report about the implementing of the Action Plan for 2011. From these reports it could be concluded that there are no significant problems with the minorities’ members, but the situation is not that clear, i.e. during the War for the Independence the 1991

Language Policy in Istria, Croatia – Legislation Regarding Minority Language Use


The minority rights are protected also by different non-governmental organizations, some of which are financially supported by the government and some are financed by EU funds. Minority associations and counsels are organized for protecting and implementing the rights of particular minorities. They undertake many activities in the field of culture, publishing and informing, maintaining and improving minorities’ national and cultural identity and language. In this way, contributing to multiculturalism of the Croatian society. National minority councils exist on all levels of governance, and they are organized as an ethnic minority representative and consultative body established on local and regional levels with the aim of realizing the needs and resolving the problems of the minorities.

Legislation on international/European level The most prominent documents for the protection of the rights of national minorities, incorporated in the Croatian laws, are the UN Declaration, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights aiming to promote human rights and fundamental freedoms for all, to protect the minorities’ rights to use their language freely in public and private, to use name and surname in the own language, and to express freely the personal identity. The latter is achieved through the use of personal names as an important component of somebody’s identity. 19 The Framework Convention is a document entirely devoted to the issue of the national minorities. In November 1996 Croatia signed and in October 1997 the country ratified the Framework Convention and its provisions are used for composing the Constitutional Act with the intention to put these principles into concrete measures. 20 The aim of the Framework Convention is “to promote the full and effective equality of national minorities by creating appropriate conditions enabling them to preserve and develop their culture and to retain their identity.” The Convention sets out the principles relating to persons belonging to national minorities in the sphere of public life, such as freedom of peaceful assembly, freedom of association, freedom of expression, freedom of thought, conscience and religion, and access to the media, as well as in the sphere of freedoms relating to language, education, cross-border co-operation and so on.21 In this convention the

19 20 21

Constitutional Act on Human Rights and Freedoms and the Rights of Ethnic or National Communities or Minorities (the precursor for the nowadays Constitutional Act) was abolished in most of its provisions and new laws and acts were adopted which put the minorities in a worse position; see The Position of National Minorities, 2005. More about the application and some possible misinterpretation of the Covenant see in de Varennes, 2001. According to the Second report, 2004.


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language rights of the minorities are rather important because according to Viaut (2004:11) “one of the main identifying features of national minorities is linguistic.” The European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages is the most prominent document aiming to preserve the minority languages as well as their cultures, traditions, and customs. The aim of this treaty is to protect “historical regional or minority languages of Europe, some of which are in danger of eventual extinction” (Preamble). The Charter refers to different language issues because language situations sometimes differ significantly across countries. In order to be relevant in such diverse situations different elements of language use are included (the spheres, status of language, territorially connected groups or the groups whose members are rather disperse, and so on). Besides the protection of the endangered languages, some of the rights guaranteed by the Charter are: to promote and facilitate the use of the minority or regional languages in speech and writing, in public and private life, to ensure the use of these languages in different fields, like education, justice, administrative and public services, media, cultural activities, economic and social activities and cross-border exchanges. 22 Croatia signed and ratified this document rather early (signed it in November 1997 and ratified it in March 1998). Reasons for such “early” (early comparing to other European countries, which are members of EU, while Croatia still is not) implementing of the recommendations could be numerous. According to Tatalović (2005), the minorities’ rights were one of the requirements for the international recognition of Croatia and one of the international obligations required by the monitoring. The legal and normative regulation of the minorities’ rights and the practical implementation of these rights were considered a measure asserting the process of democratization of the Croatian society, and as such were seen as an important requirement for the integration of the country in the EU’s economic and political sphere. No difference between minority and regional languages is made in the Charter, while immigrant languages and different dialects of official languages are excluded from it. In article 1 the regional or minority languages are defined as: “languages traditionally used within a given territory of a State by nationals of that State who form a group numerically smaller than the rest of the State’s population; and different from the official language(s) of that State.” The territory in which the regional or minority languages are used are geographical areas in which these languages are “the mode of expression of a number of people justifying the adoption of the various protective and promotional measures (Article 1 b). Specifying the ‘territoriality principle’ as an important part in the definition of the minority or regional language it is important to define “non-territorial languages” as “languages used by nationals of the State which differ from the language or 22

Language Policy in Istria, Croatia – Legislation Regarding Minority Language Use


languages used by the rest of the State´s population but which, although traditionally used within the territory of the State, cannot be identified with a particular area.” (Article 1, c) Explanatory Report (article 33) stresses that the languages covered by the Charter are first of all territorial languages, while on the “non-territorial” languages only some of the provisions of the Charter are applicable as it is stated in Article 7, part 5 that “the nature and scope of the measures to be taken to give effect to this Charter shall be determined in a flexible manner, bearing in mind the needs and wishes, and respecting the traditions and characteristics, of the groups which use the languages concerned.” The last quote implies that traditional presence of the language in the area is equally important for the definition of “non-territorial” languages as well as regional or minority languages. A regional language is defined as “a language spoken in a limited part of the territory of state” in article 18 of the Explanatory Report, while the minority language is the language “spoken by a group of persons, which, though concentrated on part of the territory of the state, is numerically smaller than the population in this region which speaks the majority language.” The number of speakers is an important element in deciding which language is worth being protected. On the other hand, it is already shown that the number argument is rather problematic. Namely, the Oslo Recommendations regarding the Linguistic Rights of National Minorities in recommendation no. 13 states that “where persons belonging to a national minority are present in significant numbers” minority language should be used. It is problematic what a significant number is. According to the Croatian laws, there should be around one third of the members of a minority in order to proclaim minority language as official in a local unit 23, while a minority-based school class can be organized for smaller number of students than is prescribed by the educational curriculum. According to De Varennes (2001: 33) “what is “sufficient” should be interpreted in a generous and flexible way.” The Charter is not aimed to protect different dialects of one language, but in the Explanatory Report (article 32) this is left to the authorities to decide or to define which dialects are dialects of the same language, and which of them are separate language. 24 In the Fourth periodical report two dialects of Croatian are mentioned in order to implement some of the provisions (insurance of sustainability through education, identification, documentation, scientific research, preservation, promotion, protection, and so on) of the Charter in their protection, because these two dialects have the attribute of a cultural good and are listed in the Register of Cultural Goods of the Republic of Croatia, the variant of Hum na Sutli 23 24

This number of one third is considered to be too high by the Committee of Ministers, see Application of the Charter, 4th, p. 6. For possible consequences of applying the Charter on dialects see Viaut (2004).


Anita Skelin HORVAT

and the variant of Bednja. Both are variants of the Kajkavian dialect and rather territorially present so the provisions applicable to the regional languages could be applied on these two as well. The Istro-Romanian language and its variants are mentioned as a cultural good to be protected as well. This group is a rather specific one whose language is recognized as a minority or regional language spoken in a few places in Istria, but members of this group view themselves as a language minority; not the national minority stating their Croatian national identity but Istro-Romanian as a mother tongue. Istro-Romanian is an Eastern Romance language spoken by 200-250 mostly elderly speakers divided in two dialectal groups, northern (in Žejane) and southern (in Kršan); both varieties are mutually intelligible. By the UNESCO Red Book on Endangered Languages this language is enlisted as ‘seriously endangered’. Due to the speakers of Istro-Romanian considering themselves to belong to the Croatian majority they are not listed in the Constitution as a national minority. The signatory states that a minimum of thirty-five paragraphs or subparagraphs should be chosen among the measures, and it will be specified which of the measures will be implemented. Croatia made some reservation in the instrument of ratification, including the provisions of Article 7, paragraph 5 (concerning the non-territorial languages). These are not applicable. The provisions accepted apply however to Italian, Serbian, Hungarian, Czech, Slovak, Ruthenian and Ukrainian. 25 In order to adjust the provisions of the Charter and legislation the term “territory in which the regional or minority languages is used shall refer to those areas in which the official use of the minority language is introduced by the by-laws passed by the local self-government units.” 26 This decision is rather problematic for the members of the Committee of the Experts who stated that it “may produce consequences contrary to the spirit of the Charter and to the fundamental obligations deriving from the treaty” (Application of the Charter, 4th, p. 5). By non-applying the Charter referring to non-territorial languages, the Roma people are excluded from the rights to use their language and to be educated in their language, but the Roma issue is a rather complex one including some other problems such as the nonexistence of the standardized version of the language in which education can be organized.

25 26

Even though the Charter is not aiming to protect only languages of national minorities in Croatia it is first of all implemented to protect the languages of national minorities. The reservations are listed: NT=148&CM=1&DF=&CL=ENG&VL=1.

Language Policy in Istria, Croatia – Legislation Regarding Minority Language Use


Istria – the implementation of laws on regional level Istria is the region well known for its multiculturalism, multietnicity and multilingualism. Thanks to its turbulent history, and long periods carried out under the rule of “others”, including Italy and the Austro-Hungarian, nowadays Istria is a region populated by different ethnic minorities. Because once all of them used to be members of minority groups in the past they tend to be more tolerant towards others at present (Dukovski, 2000). Istria was inhabited since the Middle Ages and a lot of different groups mixed culturally and socially. According to 2001 census Istria is inhabited by 206.344 persons. The majority of these are Croats (148.328), followed by Italians (14.284), then Serbs (6.613), Bosniacs (3.077), Albanians (2032) and Slovenians (2020), while other groups (Austrians, Bulgarians, Czechs, Germans, Hungarians, Jews, Macedonians, Montenegrins, Poles, Roma, Romanians, Russians, Ruthenians, Slovaks, Turks, Ukrainians and Vlachs have less than 1000 members each). All national minorities recognized by the Constitution are present in Istria, but only half of them are organized and have minority counsels (Albanians, Bosniacs, Czechs, Hungarians, Italians, Macedonians, Montenegrins, Roma, Slovaks, Slovenians and Serbians). In this census a rather large group of 8.865 people who did not state the national but regional belonging was registered. This is in accordance with political, social and economic changes that occurred in Croatia and Istria in the 1990s causing a strong connection with the region that asserted its territorial or regional identity as more “important” than the national identity (compare Cocco, 2010). Languages used in Istria are: standard Italian which is in equal use with Croatian in institutions of local and regional government, schools and education institutions, media, and publishing activities. Besides standard Italian and Croatian, dialectal varieties of both languages are used as well, and akin languages such as Istro-Venetian, a variant of the Venetian language mostly spoken in towns on the northwest coast and Istriot, an autochthonous Romance language, and IstroRomanian. Other minority languages are used as well, but mostly in private spheres because they do not have official status in the region. The official status of Italian is recognized by the Statute of Istrian region and this is the only official bilingual region in Croatia. In other parts of the country the minority languages are in official use only at the local level, not at the regional. The Italian minority has rights promulgated by different acts and laws mentioned previously, including the Constitution, the Constitutional Act, UN Declaration, the Framework Convention, and the Charter. The Italian minority is protected also by the Treaty between the Republic of Croatia and Italian Republic concerning minority rights signed in Zagreb in 1996. With this treaty the autochthonous presence of the Italian minority in Croatia is acknowledged and legally acquired rights are guaranteed.


Anita Skelin HORVAT

At the local and regional level the Italian minority rights are protected by the Statute of Istrian Region. According to the Statute (article 6) Istria is a multiethnic, multicultural and multilingual community where “the Croatian and the Italian languages are in equal official use in the work of the Regional committees in the self-governing domain.” The Statute recognizes the right of the Italian minority to nurture national and cultural identity through different organizations providing for the members of the minority the use of their rights. Some of the guaranteed rights are: cultural autonomy, use of minority language in public and private, media access, participation in representative, administrative and judicial bodies, participation in public life, protection from discrimination, right on elementary, secondary and university education in their own language and the right to use the national emblems (article 27). The Statute (article 25) regulates official bilingualism on different levels and prescribes equal use of Croatian and Italian, like the work of the Assembly and the Government in the region is carried out in both languages, and materials for Regional Assembly and local government sessions are submitted in both languages, as well as conclusions, official notifications and invitations of the representative, executive and administrative bodies. The official use of Italian is not prescribed only in the units where Italians are a majority, or where they make one third of population, but also in the units decided to give official status to Italian on the basis of the statutes of these units. Italian is in equal and official use in 21 units. Education in Italian is organized following the model A and it is implemented within seven elementary schools and three secondary schools in Istria. 27 In order to protect the rights to use the language of the Italian minority the Statute (article 30) encourages learning of Italian as a language of the social environment: “Municipalities and towns with statutory regulation of bilingualism for students of school institutions with education in the Croatian language will provide for and especially encourage the study of the Italian language as a language of social environment.” The right to associate and establish cultural and other associations is put in use through the organization of the Italian communities associated in the umbrella organization Italian Union as a central organization of the Italian minority. These Italian communities organize numeral cultural manifestations, including the children’s festival “Istria Nobilissima”, the traditional manifestation “Ex tempore”, folklore and musical groups, cultural societies, publishing house which publishes a daily newspapers La Voce del Popolo, the magazines Panorama, Arcobaleno, La Battana and books in Italian. The importance of linguistic diversity for cultural and regional identity is recognized by the Statute where the idea of multiculturalism related to regional 27


Language Policy in Istria, Croatia – Legislation Regarding Minority Language Use


identity is expressed stating that “the Istrian Region fosters Istrianism as the traditional expression of regional affiliation of the Istrian multiethnos.” (article 23) The diversity is not seen only in the existence of two different languages but also numerous dialects and varieties as stated in Article 21 “the Istrian Region promotes Istrian national customs, marking national holidays, protection of autochthonous toponyms, and the preservation of local dialects (Chakavian, Cakavian, Cokavian, Cekavian, Kajkavian, Istriotian, Istro-Venetian, Istro-Romanian, and others) through education about the homeland and other activities.” Istria with its official bilingualism and rather well organized minorities is seen as a good example of the implementation of the laws on the minority rights.28 In different reports on the implementation of the laws on minority rights there is harmony in stating that the Italian minority is best organized and that the situation in Istria is the most satisfactory, even though there is place for some improvements.

Concluding remarks Here we analysed the legislation concerning the rights of minorities, especially laws and acts dealing with the language, like the right to use the minority language and education in the minority language. We analysed also which international laws and conventions are incorporated in the national ones and how they are understood and implemented by the governmental bodies. A top-down approach was pursued. We started from the analysis of the legal documents from the national and international level to the regional ones. In analysing the laws concerning the minorities’ rights the importance of language as a characteristic of identity is recognized and emphasised. Language rights belong to the basic ones. Linguistic diversity is seen as an important part of the European identity. On the other hand, cultural diversity is seen as one of the fundamental principles on which the European states are based and the Charter “stresses the value of linguistic and cultural diversity as part of Europe’s common heritage.” (See Grin, 2000: 20) Croatia incorporated different international conventions and acts considering minorities’ rights in its legal frame. The cultural, legal, social and political position of the minorities is very often seen as a measure of democracy and modernity of the society. From different reports it is seen that even though the political and social situation in Croatia was not always favourable for actualization of the minorities’ rights the inclusion of the country in the process of European integration and preparing it for the full-fledged membership in EU positively 28

This idea of Istria being a ‘good’ place for minorities is present in the Croatian public opinion, i.e. comments on the recent problems of the Roma children stated that something like that would not be possible in Istria where the Roma people enjoy an equal position with others.


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influenced the position of the minorities (Tatalović, 2005). Multi-ethnicity as a basis for cultural and linguistic diversity gives Croatia “Europeaness” and feeling of belonging to European cultural circle.

References Application of the Charter in Croatia, 4th monitoring cycle, Report of the Committee of Experts on the Charter and Recommendation of the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe on the application of the Charter by Croatia. 2010, December, Strasbourg. Accessed Sept 24. EvaluationReports/CroatiaECRML4_en.pdf Cocco, E. 2010. “Borderland mimicry: imperial legacies, national stands and regional identity in Croatian Istria after the nineties.” Narodna umjetnost, 47/1: 7-28. Croatia 2011 Progress Report - Commissions Staff Working Paper about the progress of Croatia from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Counsel 20112012, Brussels, 12.10.2011. Accessed Sept 23, 2012. pdf/key_documents/2011/package/hr_rapport_2011_en.pdf Dukovski, D. 2000. “Nacionalne manjine u Istri u 20.stoljeću.” In: Fleck, H-G. and I. Graovac, eds. Dijalog povjesničara-istoričara 2, Zagreb: Friedrich Naumann Stiftung, 411-427. (The National Minorities of Istria in the 20th Century) European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages and Explanatory Report, 1992. Accessed Sept 20. Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities and Explanatory Report, 1995. Accessed Sept 20, 2012. AtGlance/PDF_H(1995)010_FCNM_ExplanReport_en.pdf Fourth Report by the Republic of Croatia on the Application of the European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages, 2009 December, Zagreb. Accessed Sept 10, 2012. Grin, F. (with the assistance of B. Kuzmany) 2000. “Evaluating policy measures for minority languages in Europe: towards effective, cost-effective and democratic implementation.” (ECMI Report # 6), European Centre for Minority Issues. Accessed May 9, 2012. Izvješće o provedbi Akcijskog plana za provedbu Ustavnog zakona o pravima nacionalnih manjina za razdoblje od 2011.-2013. godine, za 2011. godinu, 2012, Zagreb. (Report on Implementing the Action Plan for implementation of the Constitutional Act on the Rights of National Minorities for the period from 2011 till 2013, for 2011). Accessed Sept 21, 2012. Izvješće o provođenju Ustavnog zakona o pravima nacionalnih manjina i utrošku sredstava osiguranih u državnom proračunu Republike Hrvatske za 2007. 2010. i 2011. godinu za potrebe nacionalnih manjina, 2008, 2011, 2012, Zagreb: Ured za prava nacionalnih manjina.

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(Reports on implementing the Constitutional Act on the Rights of National Minorities for 2007; 2010 and 2011, by the Office for the minority rights, published in 2008, 2011 and 2012). Accessed Sept 2012. =3154. National curriculum framework for pre-school education and general compulsory and secondary education, Ministry of Sciences, Education and Sports, Republic of Croatia, Zagreb, July 2010. Accessed Sept 10, 2012. Second report submitted by Croatia pursuant to article 25, paragraph 2 of the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities, 13 April 2004. Accessed Sept 20.,,COESFCPNM,,HRV,,415c15b02,0.html Tatalović, S. 2005. Nacionalne manjine u Hrvatskoj. Split: Stina. (National minorities in Croatia) The Aliens Act, 13 July 2007, (provisional translation). Accessed Sept 20, 2012. The Constitution of the Republic of Croatia, consolidated text, 6 July 2010. Accessed Sept 20, 2012. The Constitutional Act on the Rights of National Minorities, 19 December 2002, (provisional translation). Accessed Sept 20. The Position of National Minorities in the Republic of Croatia – Legislation and Practice, April 2005, Zagreb. Accessed Sept 23, 2012. biblio-docs/102/058_report-national-minorities-in-croatia-hrc-april-2005.pdf Third Periodical Report by the Republic of Croatia on the Application of the European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages presented to the Secretary General of the Council of Europe in accordance with Article 15 of the Charter by Government of Republic of Croatia, August 2006. Accessed Sept 23, 2012. education/minlang/report/PeriodicalReports/CroatiaPR3_en.pdf Ustav Republike Hrvatske, Narodne novine 56/90; 135/97, (The Constitution of the Republic of Croatia). Varennes, De F. 2001. “A Guide to the Rights of Minorities and Language.” COLPI Paper, No. 4. Viaut, A. 2004. “The European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages: Sociolinguistic Particularities and the French Configuration.” Working Paper 15 Ciemen, Mercator. Accessed Sept 20, 2012. Zakon o pravu na obrazovanje nacionalnih manjina, Narodne novine (Official Gazette) 51/00, (Act on education in the languages and scripts of national minorities). Zakon o uporabi jezika i pisma nacionalnih manjina, Narodne novine 51/00, (Act about the use of languages and scripts of national minorities). CL=ENG&VL=1


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Acta Universitatis Sapientiae, European and Regional Studies, 3 (2013) 65-91

Crossborder Dynamics at the Southeastern Periphery of the European Union: * The Unusual Case of Bulgaria’s Ethnic Turkish Minority Boyka STEFANOVA 1 University of Texas at San Antonio Department of Political Science & Geography

Abstract. This paper examines the workings of Euroregionalism on the example of the border region between Bulgaria and Turkey. The region is characterized by diverse economic, political, and cultural factors: historical minority dynamics and significant migration flows, crossborder cooperation as a result of the EU’s structural policies, and minority participation in national-level politics facilitated by dual citizenship rights. The paper finds that, in contrast to the premises of Euroregionalism, crossborder cooperation, market homogenization, and territorial-functional regimes have failed to alter the pattern of regional loyalties or contribute to the emergence of a distinctive regional-civic identity with demands for political voice at the subnational level. The disconnect between the homogenizing influences of crossborder programmes and the formation of a transnational political space is explained by Bulgaria’s national model of minority representation. The established patterns of political participation of the ethnic Turkish minority at the national level have so far marginalized its potential regional loyalties and demands for autonomy or self-governance. Keywords: Euroregionalism, ethnic Turkish minority in Bulgaria, EU structural policies, cross-border cooperation, exit-voice framework.


An earlier version of the paper was presented at the UACES Annual Conference, September 6-8, 2010, Bruges (Belgium). 65


Boyka Stefanova

Introduction The macro-political view on the European Union (EU) posits European integration as a consecutive stage of state building, which affects the relationship between national centers and regions by altering the pattern of allegiances to and dependence on the authority of the state (Bartolini 2004, 2005). Ruggie (1993) contends that regional integration in Europe has relaced nation-state territoriality with a post-territorial political order. Borders in the EU are in the process of transition and diversification (Smith and Wistrich 2007a) as internal borders disappear, external borders reorganize, and an increasing number of territories gravitate towards EU membership. Research findings sugest that, in parallel with shifting borders, the structure and salience of regional demands – at the center, internally, and on the periphery – are likely to be reconfigured as well, in the direction of empowerment of the subnational level (Hooghe 1995). The growing salience of transnational links and the prominence of regions as recipients of resources and management functions under the system of European governance is the essence of EU regionalism (Allen 2005; Anderson 2002; Bache 2008). It takes place both as a top-down and a bottom-up process. The top-down dimension is a product of the adaptation pressures of EU structural policies, whereby the member states create institutional arrangements involving the subnational level and, at the same time, resist the growing differentiation of territorial structures through devolution and decentralization (Keating 2000). This aspect of the process is primarily governance-based and, therefore, apolitical in nature, consistent with the welfare optimization nature of EU regional policy. From a bottom-up perspective, EU regionalism represents a more complex development. It functions as an economic and political resource. The process of regional participation in policy making and resource distribution is more political in nature. The capacity of economic resources associated with the EU’s regional policies to serve the political objectives of subnational actors reshapes the model of EU regionalism from a problem-solving device into a framework for political action which transcends the boundaries and authority of the state. EU-induced regionalism tends to diversity collective identities by reinforcing local ones and by empowering political actors with an ethnoregional agenda (Anderson 1997). At the same time, the political model of regionalism is not necessarily of territorialconstitutional nature. Europe of the regions is not a federalist project, although it maintains a territorial dimension (Smith and Wistrich 2007b, p. 15). The multifaceted processes of regional restructuring as a result of European integration have been studied extensively in Western Europe (Keating 1993, 1998; Loughlin 2007; Pasquier and Perron 2008, among others). The literature observes that the direction of influence is that of enhanced devolution, regionalization of politics, and empowerment of subnational actors (Keating and McGarry 2001,

Crossborder Dynamics at the Southeastern Periphery of the European Union


McGarry and Keating 2006). Such outcomes have remained less pronounced in Eastern Europe. The EU’s eastward enlargement has not simply extended its established model of regionalism to the new member states. State sensibilities and resistance to decentralization in the east has been more pronounced. At the same time, although institutional and governance change at the national level has been less visible in Eastern Europe, ethnopolitical dynamics at the subnational level have acquired increasing salience. The conflicting developments of minimal responsiveness to top-down EU pressures on behalf of the central authorities and active conversion of EU resources into political action on behalf of subnational actors are embedded in the legacy of territorial and historical discontinuities in the prevalent model of state building in Eastern Europe. Bulgaria is cited as a case in which the centralized style of territorial politics has remained largely unaffected by the conditionality and incentive structures of its EU accession (Nikolova 2008; Brusis 2010). The EU’s regional policy, including its rules, institutional resources, and public policy requirements, has failed to induce a meaningful territorial restructuring in the direction of regional empowerment. From a bottom-up perspective, regional and minority demands for self-governance have failed to materialize as well (Spirova and Stefanova 2012). Such findings represent a puzzle to the EU’s enlargement model in Eastern Europe and the general conclusions about the political opportunities associated with its regional policies. Access to EU structural funds has required policy reform whose main components are strengthening of administrative capacity at the regional level, transfer of resources to local and regional actors, and a model of territorial decision-making based on a partnership between the state and the subnational level. As elsewhere in Eastern Europe, the polity effects of this process in Bulgaria have been the creation of institutional structures assisting the process of functional regionalization. However, in contrast to other cases, devolution or less formal arrangements for the regionalization of governance have not followed (Pasquier and Perron 2008, p. 11). Bulgaria’s participation in cross-border programmes similarly has not created bottom-up demands for access to resources and transfer of policy-making competences to the regional level. This paradox is especially pronounced in the southeastern region of the country, which participates in a variety of cross-border initiatives between Bulgaria and Turkey, also a beneficiary of Structural funds in the process of its EU accession. Bulgaria’s southeastern border with Turkey combines attributes of cultural distinctiveness, significant cross-border flows, and visible political agency representing regionally specific minority interests. The region includes several ethnically mixed districts with a concentration of the ethnic Turkish minority above or around the national average (8.8%), adjacent both to the Kurdjali district (SouthCentral region) – a majority-minority district with the highest proportion of ethnic Turks in the district population (66.16%) – and to the border provinces of Edirne


Boyka Stefanova

and Kirklareli in Turkey, with which they share common cultural heritage and territorial distinctiveness.2 The policy effects of the EU Structural funds combined with long-term migration patterns, however, have not significantly affected the formation of transnational networks, regional identities, or cross-border economic convergence. Such outcomes are at odds with the expectations of the regionalist perspective which posits the reinforcement of territorial cleavages through the growing salience of ethnoregional identities and deepening of the center-periphery conflict (Fournis and Pasquier 2008, p. 50). The case of Bulgaria’s ethnic Turkish minority in the context of increased cross-border mobility raises important questions. It challenges regionalist propositions about the empowerment of the regional layer of governance, restructuring of the center-periphery cleavage, and enhanced political mobilization of minority demands for compensation or self-governance (Pasquier and Perron 2008, p. 12). In line with the regionalist perspective of European governance (Pasquier and Perron 2008; Nikolova 2008; Scott 2005; Smith and Wiestrich 2007b), we should expect increased opportunities for transnational mobilization, local alliances, and reconfiguration of minority interests. Based on its cultural distinctivess as an ethnic minority group, ethnocultural solidarity and intercommunal cooperation around regional projects, we should expect the ethnic Turkish minority to develop regional loyalties and participate in a public sphere outside the national state potentially leading to the politicization of majorityminority relations in Bulgaria and demands for more direct regional competences in policy making. As neither such demands have materialized, nor has the Bulgarian state unequivocally embarked upon decentralization as a result of the adaptational pressures of the EU’s structural policies, the unusual case of a lack of articulated regional interests and demands on behalf of the ethnic Turkish minority has yet to be explained. Brusis (2010) has argued that the low level of ethnoregional mobilization and lack of political agendas favouring regional self-governance in Bulgaria is due to the absence of minority actors at the subnational level with a capacity for crossborder coalition building and the established tradition of participation of ethnic Turkish minority representatives in the national government. While such variables of political agency are a valid determinant of the strength of subnational mobilization (Hooghe 1995), they lack a reference to social structures. The political agency perspective does not sufficiently take into account the incidence of societal cleavages, historical legacies, the level of centralization of territorial governance, and factor mobility. Agency is embedded in an institutional setup and 2

According to data from the 2011 Census, the ethnic Turkish minority constitutes 8.8% of the Bulgarian population (9.4% according to the 2001 Census). 2/2/R7.aspx. See also Map 1.

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depends on the relative correspondence between social structure and individual preferences. It is affected also by the differentiation of national political space as a result of the functional expediencies of European integration. This paper examines the counter-intuitive dynamics of Euro-regionalism in the case of Bulgaria’s Southeastern region from a structuralist perspective. It presents an argument that, instead of exploring the coalition-building strategies and access to government of ethnoregional actors, the level of ethnoterritorial mobilization may be explained by the embeddedness of regional interests in social structures, functional regimes, and territorial cleavages which collectively form a stable framework for political action and group conflict. The proposition that the structure of political opportunities is at the origin of individual demands for ‘voice’ (representation) or ‘exit’ from the state is the essence of the macropolitical perspective on territorial relations in the European state system. It posits European integration as a consective stage of state building (Bartolini 2004, 2005). The macropolitical perspective argues that the intensity of minority demands, (ethno)-regional mobilization, and the relationship between centers and peripheries changes as a result of the structural features of substate territories, their resource endowment, and the opportunities for regional actors to convert cultural, economic, and institutional resources into political action (Bartolini 2005). It is therefore analytically appropriate and empirically useful to place minority politics within a regionalist perspective and, conversely, examine the centrality of state authority, claims to self-governance, irredentism, and minority nationalism as a continuum of options and choices for structuring the relationship between substate territories and the state. For example, instead of uncompromising irredentist positions or demands for autonomy at the regional level, we are likely to observe a variety of minority demands for access to resources and representation (not necessarily incompatible with the state), as group identities are likely to diversify as well. The core theoretical expectation is in the direction of pluralism and diversity, not that of stability or intransigent minority demands. The paper argues that the ‘exit-voice’ framework is better positioned to explain the lack of minority demands for self-governance in Bulgaria’s case than political exchange models, electoral politics, or agency alone. It proceeds with an overwiew of the macropolitical model of territorial restructuring (Bartolini 2004) with reference to the regionalist perspective on European governance. Analysis then turns to examine the structural features of Bulgaria’s Southeastern region and cultural, econmic and political resources in the context of cross-border flows between Bulgaria and Turkey, which determine the opportunities for political mobilization of ethno-regionalist interests. The paper finds that, given the political opportunity structure, the incentives of local for ‘exit’ from the state versus demands for ‘voice’ i.e., national-level representation, are limited, which explains


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the absence of ethno-territorial demands on behalf of the ethnic Turkish minority in border regions.

Territorial restructuring and politicizing effects of EU regionalism: A framework of political opportunities for regional interests EU regionalism is not simply a component of multi-level governance (Cole and Palmer 2008). The strengthening of the subnational level as a recipient of resources and access to policy making provided by the EU’s structural policies is conducive to the politicization of regional identities. The link between the territorial and political aspects of regionalism is maintained by ethnoregional parties. The conventional view on Euroregionalism posits such parties as marginal, as the EU’s regional policies have no political content and do not directly endow local actors with political objectives. However, if European integration is regarded as a consecutive stage of state building which reorders center-periphery relations and the functional bases of political conflict, regional dynamics should be relevant to the structuring of national political space. As a result of the otherwise nonpolitical territorial aspects of EU regional policies as a process of multi-level governance, ethnoregionalism may be considered as a nontrivial political force. First, European integration encourages regionalism as a political development (Bort 2005; Scott 2005). Regional policy does not require constitutional territorial restructuring through formal devolution. Its main objective is not the achievement of a constitutionalized ‘Europe of the regions’ but rather pragmatic effects: economic efficiency, convergence, and redistribution. The organizing perspective is that of governance, and not the creation of a new legal-territorial order. Governance, however, is not apolitical (Marcou 2002). It increases the sophistication of economic, political, and social networks at the regional level thus empowering local communities (Scott 2005, p. 90). The process has a transnational dimension. Participation in European governance and the implementation of EU structural policies affects the relationships between actors and institutions (Pasquier and Perron 2008). Such relationships are the essence of regionalism: a process of changing functionality of territorial institutions which promotes a given territory by granting more control to the local government. The EU’s structural policies thus may be conducive to the emergence of transnational contexts for discourses on the role of regions (Bort 2005, p. 69). Ansell (2004, p. 13) has argued that, as a result of the interests and demands of social forces, territorial restructuring takes place in the direction of a retreat of the state. New layers of public claims over authority emerge. EU governance therefore affects the constitutive features of the European state system and the rebundling of territory. The corresponding hypothesis is that the position of regional actors is strengthened.

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Furthermore, the Euroregional context increases the permeability of borders and regional openness. Bort (2005, p. 84) hypothesizes that Euroregional institutional cooperation may be conducive to solving the national problem of minorities by providing regional solutions. The underlying logic is that participation in collective crossborder activities leads to a higher demand for governance in such areas (Scott 2005, p. 91; Young 1997, p. 114). As a mechanism of regional policy, cross-border cooperation (CBC) most directly challenges state centrism by altering the concept of peripherality. The argument is that, through CBC, formerly peripheral regions become part of European regionalism. The general perspective of regionalism in the context of European integration therefore acknowledges the repositioning of various categories of regions – national centers, interface, and peripheries – in the direction of strengthening of the subnational level. Regionalism, however, does not suggest a causal process which would link the macro-level of European governance and the articulation of political choice at the individual level. By contrast, a political opportunity structure approach may be better positioned to explain such relationship by outlining a causal mechanism, that of resource conversion, in order to bind together structural conditions/institutional context and individual preferences/allegiances to the state.

The macropolitical model of European integration: The Bartolini (2004) structural framework Two competing and partly overlapping perspectives examine the societal impact of the territorial reordering of the system of rule through European integration: the structural features/individual choice framework (Bartolini 2004) and the political exchange/relational model (Tarrow 2004). Bartolini’s macropolitical approach on European integration traces patterns of political conflict and territorial restructuring in the EU relative to the established framework of territorial politics in the nation state through the lens of societal cleavages and, primarily, the center-periphery cleavage. This approach blends together centerperiphery territorial structures and political demands for exit (or ‘voice’) of the substate periphery from its subordinate relationship with the state (Hirschman 1981). By contrast, Tarrow’s (2004) model of transnational political conflict moves away from the structural determinants of political claims, relying instead on a coalition-building framework embedded in the opportunities for political exchange. Bartolini’s framework builds upon the work of Stein Rokkan on territorial politics in Europe (Rokkan 1999; Rokkan and Unwin 1982; Rokkan et al. 1987) extended to the politics of territorial restructuring in the EU. While the nation-state presupposes the coincidence of cultural, economic, and administrative boundaries and the centralization of loyalties as a result of the functional bases of political conflict, regional integration, as well as the internationalization of economic life in


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general, progressively challenges the coincidence of cultural, economic, and politico-administrative boundaries. Bartolini has argued that the opportunity for open requests for institutionalized territorial representation depend on the cultural, economic, political, and institutional resources of the substate territory. According to Bartolini (2004, 2005), its cultural resources increase in the presence of an outside or alternative support center based on ethnicity or religion. Cultural solidarities, while less flexible at the center, may span across borders in the ethnically mixed peripheral regions, decreasing the costs of exit options. Access to outside capital markets and economic integration with broader-than-national space of market transactions are economic resources creating opportunities for exit from the national center. As crossborder functional regimes develop and induce the territorial differentiation of regulatory orders, individuals, firms, and communities enter different jurisdictions (Bartolini 2004, p. 23). The options for exit from an integrated national economic, political, and cultural life increase. One of Bartolini’s core analytical claims is that interface peripheral regions acquire more resources than external peripheral regions to generate demands for institutionalized territorial representation (Bartolini 2004, p. 38). As the relative attractiveness of the center is likely to diminish as a result of access to external resources, demands for relative independence or separatism may increase as well. The causal mechanism linking structural conditions and individual choice is that of converting economic, cultural, and (geo)political resources available to the substate level into political demands for revising the latter’s relationship with the center. According to this perspective, European integration represents a consecutive stage of territorial restructuring of the nation-state system by providing structural resources and a cross-border context for economic transactions, cultural affinities, and political demands. The EU’s structural policies are central to this process, as they are specifically focused on the governance of territories, especially peripheries, and regional convergence. Devolution creates incentives for subnational units to acquire control over resources and decision-making, in turn structuring local forms of external representation (Bartolini 2004, p. 24). Such developments create a new opportunity structure for political action. The key question is whether the shift of functions to the transnational level results in the empowerment of certain areas of substate-level territorial organizations (Bartolini 2004, p. 27). According to Bartolini, territorial spaces with higher institutional autonomy and participation in administrative networks for the management of functional areas, such as EU functional regimes or crossborder cooperation, acquire diverse exit options based on external administrative resources (EU programming, twinning initiatives, and functional subsystems of governance). National political competition also contributes to this outcome. Dealignment of traditional cleavages opens up space for the mobilization of local interests,

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single-issue politics, and political entrepreneurship. This argument is important, as it suggests that the process of territorial restructuring in the EU, while causally significant, is not an entirely autonomous source of influence on substate territorial loyalties. The EU level of impact is filtered through the pattern of domestic political conflict.3 As a result of the interaction of structural features, external resources, and political preferences, peripheral regions and other substate territories acquire a variety of exit options for revising their relationship with the state. From low to high, such options vary from: a) increased supranational and interregional cooperation – an option compatible with the governance perspective on Euroregionalism; b) demands for a larger share of state resources or devolution – options compatible with neoregionalism and liberal accounts of the ‘Europe of the regions’ perspective; and c) irredentism and forms of separatism, in which regional identities and loyalties subsume loyalties to the national center. The latter outcome is explained by the constructivist view that territorial configurations, such as the region or the nation-state, are socially constructed categories based on interaction and shared identities. The table below outlines the determinants of exit options of substate territories and minorities based on the structural features and resources of a given territory: Table 1. Mapping out the structure of opportunities of the substate territory Structural features CULTURAL

Resources Strong extraterritorial center serving as a cultural focal point DISTINCTIVENESS (language, religion, Monocephalic dominant-capital state versus ethnicity) polycephalic urban structure with strong peripheral centers ECONOMIC STRUCTURE Comparison across borders of the distributive (sectoral specialization, efficiency of neighboring state or supranational free trade) center Substate dependency on trade across border Party system regionalization Crossborder GEOPOLITICAL functional regimes POSITION (external, enclave, interface, “failed” center-periphery) Territorial differentiation of functional INSTITUTIONAL subsystems: economic district, labor, credit, DISTINCTIVENESS salary differentiation, welfare regulations, education

Exit options SEPARATISM





Source: After Bartolini (2004: 39). 3

See also Marks and Steenbergen (2004).


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Applied to the case study of territorial politics in the border region between Bulgaria and Turkey in the long-term process of its transition from an external into interface EU periphery, Bartolini’s (2004, 2005) ‘exit-voice’ framework permits to gain a more in-depth understanding of the capacity for regional restructuring of ethnoterritorial relations in the context of regional integration. The EU borderlands represent a dynamic transnational space in which EU member states interact with applicant and candidate countries, otherwise not fully-fledged participants in the system of European governance. Cross-border cooperation (CBC) encourages community and identity-building beyond national allegiances and is compatible with EU values and principles. The Southeastern EU border emerged in parallel with Bulgaria’s accession to the EU (1998-2007) and Turkey’s adoption of a EU-candidate status and accession negotiations (since 2002). The border region receives significant EU regional programming and is part of the EU-induced regional reforms in Bulgaria and Turkey, respectively (Brusis 2010; Massicard 2008; Nikolova 2008). Following Bartolini’s hypothesis on territorial restructuring, we should expect the border region between Bulgaria and Turkey to acquire the attributes of an interface peripheral region. Furthermore, we should expect it to benefit significantly from EU regionalism and CBC, relative to other regions, such as centers, external peripheries, or internal regions (Bartolini 2004). How does this political opportunity affect established patterns of center-periphery relations? Have the preferences, allegiances, and demands of ethnoterritorial actors vis-à-vis the central authority of the state changed as a result?

Structural resources of Bulgaria’s ethnic Turkish minority at the Southeastern border The Southeastern EU border between Bulgaria and Turkey is a complex ethnocultural, geopolitical, and economic configuration: a zone of expansion of European governance and territorial order and, at the same time, a region within centralized state structures. In line with the macropolitical perspective, we should expect that the inclusion of the region in European integration would affect the configuration of political space there. The relative position of the ethnic Turkish minority in the process would be determined by the interplay of structural and individual-level factors, combining resources and political agency. Cultural distinctiveness The demographic structure of the population in Bulgaria’s Southeastern border region continues to reflect the long-term migration patterns between Bulgaria and Turkey. There have been several historical waves of Turkish

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emigration from Bulgaria beginning with its 1878 independence from the Ottoman Empire. Around 350,000 Muslims (Turks, Pomaks, and Tartars) emigrated from Bulgaria between 1878 and 1912 as a result of the restrictive and discriminating policies of the Bulgarian state. Approximately 10,000-12,000 emigrated annually between 1913 and 1934 following an international agreement. A mass exodus of around 150,000 ethnic Turks took place in 1950-51 following forced land collectivization. Approximately 130,000 left for Turkey between 1968 and 1978 under the terms of a family reunification agreement. The biggest wave of occurred in 1989, when more than 310,000 Turks (exact numbers are unavailable) left Bulgaria due to the assimilation policies of the communist regime during the so called ‘revival process’ of coercive name changing and expulsion. The demographic structure of the population changed significantly as a result of minority emigration. Ethnic Turks comprised around 20% of the Bulgarian population in 1887. Their share fell to 8.6% in the 1950s (Zhelyazkova 1998, Chapter 1). It was estimated at 9.4% by the 2001 Census and at 8.8% by the 2011 Census. 4 Map 1. The Ethnic Turkish Minority in Bulgaria by District, 2001 Census

Notes: Areas in black represent districts with more than 50% ethnic Turkish population. Grey: between 25 and 50%. Beige: between 10 and 25%. Background color: below 10%. Source: Wikimedia resources.

Political development had a similarly profound negative effect on the status of the ethnic Turkish minority in Bulgaria. Following the oppressive policies of the 4

National Statistical Institute (Bulgaria), historical data (online).


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communist regime, it emerged as the most underprivileged ethnic group at the outset of Bulgaria’s democratic transition. Forced emigration and name changing were discontinued but population movement across the Southeastern border persisted. Politically motivated emigration was replaced with economic migration during the 1990s, reflected in an exodus of 30,000-60,000 ethnic Turks annually. According to post-2000 estimates, while significantly concentrated in Bulgaria’s southeastern and northeastern districts, the ethnic Turkish minority has emerged also as a visible minority in Turkey. Concurrent census data indicate that 746,664 ethnic Turks resided in Bulgaria and between 326,000 and 480,817 in Turkey. 5 The number of Bulgarian citizens of Turkish descent in Turkey in 2005 was estimated at 326,000 when 120,000 of them voted in the Bulgarian parliamentary elections.6 Economic structures and resources The demise of communism exposed the serious socioeconomic and political problems of Bulgaria’s ethnic Turkish minority and especially its worsening economic prospects. Even though the ethnic Turkish population has been given full and equal rights, its economic status deteriorated after the fall of the communist regime in 1989. The adverse conditions persisted as a result of the lack of a national strategy for the economic development of the less advanced rural regions with high demographic concentrations of ethnic minorities (Maeva 2005). The transition to a market economy led to high inflation and unemployment rates in the ethnically mixed regions without a corresponding transfer to resources to offset the loss of economic opportunities. The withdrawal of state subsidies for the small textile companies, persisting problems in the field of tobacco growing and grain production, and less developed infrastructure in the Southeastern region, as well as land privatization and differences in the educational and professional status of the Turkish minority reinforced the structural features of a peripheral region with significant ethnic fractionalization. The critical economic situation and limited employment opportunities in Bulgaria produced new flows of economic emigration among the ethnic Turkish minority. Since 1993, long-term emigration was been replaced with consistent shortterm patterns. It takes place in two directions: the EU and Turkey. Most Turkish villages have established their own communities in Western Europe. Ethnic Turkish out-migration patterns are characterized by the presence of links between Bulgarian Turks permanently residing in Turkey and emigration to the EU. Most of them prefer 5 6

According to the 2001 census in Bulgaria and the 2000 census on foreign-born population in Turkey. See also Bishku (2003) on historical estimates of demographic data.

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to travel back to their native places in Bulgaria and then emigrate to Western Europe. Survey research has found that compact Turkish villages are well organized for the export of workers (Maeva 2005; Zhelyazkova 1998). The economic resources of the region have lagged behind the national average, the center, and internal regions. As Table 2 below shows, the economic structure continued to rely on agriculture and traditional industrial structures. The share of services is lower than the national average by 11%. Conversely, agricultural production in the Southeastern and Southcentral region (6.7% and 9.0% in their respective regional gross value added) exceeds the national average. The border areas receive marginal flows of foreign direct investment, which reinforces the relative disconnect of the region from economic trends at the center and other regions. Table 2. Center-periphery structure of economic activity (2007-2009): The Southeastern periphery relative to the national average and the center. Gross value added (GVA) by economic sector, current prices Region/District National average Southcentral Southeastern Southwestern (capital city region):

GVA agriculture 2007 2009 5.6 4.9 9.4 7.3 6.7 5.8 2.0


GVA industry 2007 2009 32.4 31.3 39.0 38.3 43.2 43.1 25.8


2007 62.0 51.6 50.1

2009 63.8 54.2 51.1

GDP/capita (USD) 2007 2009 5,497 6,408 3,946 4,451 4,476 5,282




GVA services


Source: National Statistical Institute (Bulgaria), Statistical Yearbook 2011, pp. 500-503.

Table 3. Access to external economic resources: Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) by Region/District Region/District

FDI Stock (thousand Euro) 22,114,446.3 1,659,060.5 67,859.4 66,708.9 2,728,916.2 1,622,748.5 468,443.5 64,191.3 14,295,496.3

FDI % of National total 100.00 7.50 0.30 0.29 12.33 7.33 2.11 0.29 64.64

FDI District % of Region --4.09 4.02 -59.46 17.16 2.35 --

National Total Southcentral Kurdjali Haskovo Southeastern Burgas Sliven Yambol Southwestern (Region of capital city) Sofia (capital) 12,466,818.5 56.37 87.20 Sofia (district) 1,319,848.6 5.96 9.23 Source: National Statistical Institute (Bulgaria), Statistical Yearbook 2011, p. 510.


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Territorial politics. Regional distinctiveness of the party system The cultural distinctiveness of the ethnic Turkish minority in Bulgaria was officially recognized in 1990 by the Social Council of Citizens, granting ethnic Turks full political rights, including freedom of religion, choice of names, free practice of cultural traditions, and access to education in the Turkish language. Despite cultural recognition, the institutional setup made no provisions for the creation of territorial structures of minority self-governance. On the contrary, the 1991 Constitution adopted a liberal-democratic model which prioritized individual rights. The Bulgarian Constitution remains restrictive towards group rights as an institutional referent for cultural and ethnic distinctiveness. The Constitution bans ethnic, regional, religious, and other non-functional foundations for political parties, although it adheres to the principle of political pluralism (Rechel 2007, 2009). According to Article 11 (4), ‘there shall be no political parties on ethnic, racial or religious lines, nor parties seeking the violent seizure of state power’. The Constitution frames such expressions of collective identities as factors potentially undermining Bulgaria’s territorial integrity and the unity of the nation (Article 44 (2)). 7 The Constitution bears no mention of the existence of ethnic minorities but at the same time prohibits privileges or restriction of rights on the grounds of race, nationality, ethnic self-identity, gender, origin, and religion (as well as education, opinion, political affiliation, personal or social status, and property status). The rules of electoral competition in Bulgaria similarly have restrictive effects on the presence of small and regional parties likely to address minority concerns. The Law on Political Parties prohibits parties which undermine the integrity of the state – an interpretation applicable to ethnopolitical parties which usually pursue regional and cultural autonomy. 8 Sporadic attempts for separatism expressed by segments of the ethnic Turkish minority elite at the outset of the postcommunist transition were neutralized through the creation of the Movement for Rights and Freedoms (MRF) in 1990. Under the prevalent institutional rules, MRF emerged as a unique political actor. It was registered as a political organization with stated objectives to correct for the legacies of the assimilation of the Muslim and ethnic Turkish minority during communism and to contribute to the unity of the Bulgarian people in accordance with the Bulgarian Constitution, the European Convention for Human Rights, and international norms of equality and non-discrimination. 9 Nationalist political actors have challenged the constitutionality of the MRF at several instances. The most significant demand for declaring a constitutional ban

7 8 9

Constitution of the Republic of Bulgaria (1991). See Law on Political Parties, as amended, State Gazette 28/2005. MRF Charter (online).

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on the party was raised in a petition to the Constitutional Court in October 1991. 10 The Court denied the petition. The deliberations found that the definition of an ethnic party did not apply to MRF as its membership was open to all citizens, and it did not seek usurpation of state power. The presence of a constitutional ban on ethnic parties has not prevented the existence of the MRF as a party relevant to minority issues in Bulgarian politics. MRF has been able to gain a prominent place in electoral competition, parliamentary representation, and governing coalitions since 1990. Its importance as a power broker in the political process (1991-1997) and proximity to government through participation in governing coalitions (2001-2009) has been coterminous two with the moderation of its programmatic outlook and lack of autonomy demands (Warhola and Boteva 2003; Zhelyazkova 2001). Through the transition period, MRF maintained a high level of encapsulation of the ethnic minority vote, whereby historically 80-85% of its national vote share have been derived within the ethnic Turkish community. According to Nikolova (2008, p. 97), the combination of a consistent electoral base comprised of minority voters and moderate centrism which rejects conceptions of territorial autonomy and collective rights is ‘surprising’, given the fact that regional autonomy was the object of political debate in the early 1990s in the border regions with Turkey (as well as the Kurdjali district). Nikolova refers to the lack of mobilization in favor of regionalization as a failure to initiate paradigmatic change in Bulgaria’s territorial relations. This analysis explains the weak EU-induced effects in the direction of regionalization with the limited Europeanization of political parties in Bulgaria. However, from a macropolitical perspective the lack of ethnoregional mobilization may be attributed to the structural features of territorial politics in Bulgaria, the relative endowment of ethnic minorities with resources, and the limited territorial restructuring of national political space through EU governance. Political agency In its early history, MRF’s political agenda was focused on securing full equality and political rights for all Bulgarian citizens, including members of ethnic minorities. The guiding proposition was that the democratic transformation of Bulgarian society could not automatically ensure individual rights and that purposeful political action, including through representation, was necessary to 10

The Court found that there were no grounds to withdraw MRF’s registration of April 1990 with the Sofia District Court. The Constitutional Court did not obtain the majority necessary to accept the claim to unconstitutionality. See Constitutional Court, Decision Number 4 of April 21, 1992 in State Gazette 35, April 28, 1992. On the deliberations of the Constitutional Court, see Ganev (2004), among others.


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support the process. In the late 1990s, the MRF oriented its policy priorities from the political platform of rights and freedoms to programmatic objectives related to economic opportunities, participation, and better living standards for ethnic minorities. Both dimensions were compatible with a liberal ideology and with the EU’s attributes of a liberal economic system based on non-discrimination, political equality, and diversity. The long-term reorientation of party priorities from politics to economics in its domestic policy agenda was linked to developing a proEuropean profile and the standing presence of EU-related issues, such as infrastructure, agriculture, regional policies, and decentralized use of funds. Bulgaria’s EU membership was an opportunity for MRF to pursue a more definitive ideological identification as a liberal-centrist party. By the time of the first Elections for Members of the European Parliament in Bulgaria (2007), MRF had joined the Liberal International and the group of the Liberals in the European Parliament. MRF’s electoral messages established a parallel between European values and principles of diversity, non-discrimination, and minority integration in domestic politics. MRF’s programmatic outlook in national and European elections alike was based on the pursuit of national goals in line with European objectives. MRF applied a European dimension to its policy positions recasting the traditional center-periphery cleavage, the core of ethnocultural mobilization, through the lens of EU regional policy. 11 MRF was the first political actor to reorient its domestic policy agenda towards the programmatic nature of EU policy-making, especially in the domain of agriculture and regional development, with a view of gaining access to funding opportunities created by membership in the EU: the European Regional Development Fund, the Common Agricultural Policy, and pre-accession assistance (Spirova and Stefanova 2012). Historical legacies and migration patterns have reinforced the solidarity and identification of the ethnic Turkish minority with political actors with a claim to represent its distinctive interests. Siaroff (2000) notes that during the 1990s, regional and religious cleavages, both of which are an element of territorial politics, remained the most politically salient cleavage after class, the traditional functional cleavage in Bulgarian party politics.


See MRF’s electoral programme for the 2009 European elections (online),

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The regional dimension of territorial restructuring of minority politics: The case of the Bulgaria-Turkey CBC region The EU dimension of territorial structuring through CBC European integration has been relevant to the constellation of regional interests and demands in Eastern Europe along three dimensions: the EU regime for protection of minority rights, the conditionality and incentive structure of the accession process which induced an institutional reform in the area of territorial structuring and regional financing, and the politicization of territorial interests, European governance tends to concentrate competences and resources at the regional level. Bulgaria has differed from this model of territorial restructuring due to the lack of adequate institutional adaptation. Although the administrative framework of the NUTS II system of territorial classification was introduced to ensure an adequate absorption of the Structural funds, the EU did not require substantive decentralization and effective transfer of political authority towards the regional level. Territorial reform resulted primarily in strengthened institutional capacity on behalf of the central government (Nikolova 2008, p. 92). The EU’s structural policies did not alter the distribution of policy-making competences between the state and the subnational level. State centrism in territorial governance remained high with around 60% of municipal budgets distributed by the central government. Arrangements for the provision of EC pre-accession aid, including CBC, and, since 2007, Structural and Cohesion funding have been filtered through the national level. Subnational political actors have had limited incentives and opportunities to demand autonomy and self-governance, or to benefit from devolved competences (Brusis 2010). This institutional framework set the context for the implementation of CBC in the process of Bulgaria’s EU accession. Bulgaria was eligible for structural aid under the PHARE programme, including PHARE CBC. Since January 2004, the geographical scope of the CBC Programme has been extended to the Bulgarian borders with the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Serbia, Montenegro, and Turkey. EU aid to Turkey was provided under a separate regulation on preaccession financial assistance, adopted by the Council of the European Union in December 2001 (Council 2001). The regional programme with Bulgaria was the first EU crossborder cooperation scheme in which Turkey participated. EU-funded CBC activities between Bulgaria and Turkey supported by European Union financing were launched in 2003. Three Financing Memoranda were signed over the period 2003-2006 between Bulgaria and the European Commission and implemented through CBC programmes. The External Border Initiative Programme (2003) financed people-to-people activities between Bulgaria and Turkey. The PHARE Cross Border Cooperation Programme between Bulgaria


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and Turkey (2004) was available for project contracting until 30 November 2006. The 2005 Phare Cross Border Cooperation Programme was completed by 30 November 2007 (European Commission 2007a). Map 2. The Bulgaria-Turkey crossborder region

Source: Bulgaria-Turkey CBC 2004-2006. Republic of Turkey (2004).

The 2007-2013 CBC Programme was financed jointly by the new European Territorial Cooperation objective (previously INTERREG) under the European Regional Development Fund, matched by an equivalent allocation of funds under the Instrument for Pre-accession Assistance (IPA) for candidate and potential candidate countries, including Turkey (European Commission 2007b). The core concept of IPA CBC is that of ‘cross-border benefit’ (European Commission 2007a, p. 5). The cooperation area is determined in accordance with IPA rules set out in Regulation 1085/2006 whereby NUTS III regions are eligible for crossborder cooperation programmes. 12 The area includes the eligible districts of Burgas, Yambol, and Haskovo on the Bulgarian side and the Edirne and Kirklareli provinces on the Turkish side.


The corresponding NUTS III administrative territorial units in Bulgaria are the districts established by the Law on the Administrative Territorial System. In Turkey the corresponding equivalent of NUTS III administrative territorial units are the provinces established by Decision of Council of Ministers No 2002/4720.

Crossborder Dynamics at the Southeastern Periphery of the European Union


Key characteristics of the CBC region The designated regions coincide with or are neighboring to administrative and electoral districts with higher or about the average national concentration of the ethnic Turkish minority. The geopolitical importance of the crossborder region is defined by its crossroads position connecting transportation and infrastructure links of European significance, all of which receive financing through EU structural aid and sectoral programmes. 13 The transnational element is reinforced by an EU strategy to establish a broader scope for CBC in the Balkan and Black Sea region, including multilateral networks. In contrast to its geopolitical relevance and strong cultural distinctiveness, the economic profile of the CBC region is less coherent. The socioeconomic potential of the cooperation area, determined by demographic structures and economic and institutional resources, is different for the two sides. There is significant negative natural growth and out-migration on the Bulgarian side, as well as disparities between the three border districts in terms of depopulation of the rural areas. As a result, the human potential for economic development, especially in rural areas of the Bulgarian NUTS III districts, is decreasing. There is a relative demographic stability on the Turkish side, although the natural growth rate is below the national level of 12.9‰. The Turkish districts also face demographic challenges with outmigration to urban areas elsewhere. The overall affinities between the Bulgarian and Turkish segments of the CBC region, while significant, are contradictory. There is a strong cultural distinctiveness but different linkages between cultural factors and economic and political realities. Cultural solidarity is based on common legacies, language, and ethnicity in the context of reconfigured political borders after Bulgaria’s independence from the Ottoman Empire (1878) and the end of WWI. While the border remains an important migration crossing, the adjacent border regions of Turkey are not a preferred destination for ethnic Turks from Bulgaria due to long13

For example, EU Corridor 4 - Dresden/Nuremberg to Istanbul - crosses the cooperation area in of Haskovo district and Edirne and Kırklareli provinces; Corridor 8 - Durres-Tirana to Burgas crosses the programme area between Yambol and Burgas districts; Corridor 9 - Helsinki to Alexandropolis - crosses the programme area in the district of Haskovo and passes by the province of Edirne; Corridor 10 - Salzburg/Lubljana to Tessaloniki - crosses the programme area in the district of Haskovo. Other international roads that impact the cooperation area include Road E 87 which starts from Odessa in Ukraine, passes through Romania and Bulgaria, enters Turkey and stretches up to Antalya. In the CBC region it passes through Burgas, Tzarevo, Malko Turnovo, Dereköy, Kırklareli and Babaeski. Road E 80 links Turkey with the rest of Europe through the road infrastructure of Edirne and Kirklareli provinces. Road D 100 connects Istanbul to Edirne and Bulgaria. The CBC region is simultaneously served by two Bulgarian National Transport Corridors: ‘Black Sea’ (border crossing Durankulak–Varna–Burgas–Malko Turnovo) leading towards the province of Kirklareli, and a second corridor (Silistra–Shoumen–Yambol–Elhovo– Lesovo–border crossing) leading towards the province of Edirne.


Boyka Stefanova

established emigration flows. The latter are directed towards Istanbul and Bursa, and sustained by family reunification (Dimitrova 1998). The economic structure of the two segments of the border region is also different. The data below show the relative strength of industrial and employment trends which represent the resource base and incentive for common investment projects, shared business interests, and factor mobility. Industrial infrastructure is concentrated in urban centers in Turkey, and is more widely dispersed within medium and small production units in Bulgaria. The distribution of employment by economic sector is changing. NUTS II-level equivalents experienced a trend of declining shares of agriculture and rising shares of industry and services in 20042006. 14 Youth unemployment in the border regions in Bulgaria for the period 20012005 was 23.4%. It was 45.3% in the border regions of Turkey. Women’s unemployment rates were also higher in Turkey with relatively similar overall unemployment rates (European Commission 2007b, pp. 12-14). Table 4. The Bulgaria-Turkey crossborder region: Basic economic sectors and employment NUTS III Level Equivalent BULGARIA District Burgas District Yambol District Haskovo TURKEY Province Edirne Province Kirklareli

Employment in Industry %

Employment in Construction %

Employment in Services %

Employment in Agriculture %

26.35 31.78 38.84

8.66 4.82 4.71

59.91 55.79 53.18

5.08 7.61 3.27

9.00 17.81

3.01 2.79

38.39 31.21

49.60 48.20

Source: European Commission (2007b, p. 11).

According to the ethnoregionalist thesis, cultural distinctiveness, together with economic and institutional resources, is associated with a particular model of political agency which relies on a regional party structure serving minority interests. However, contrary to expectations, the economic (rather than cultural and ethnic) determinants of post-1989 emigration flows have affected the patterns of political participation in the border region which tends to oscillate between the two systems of national party competition. The cultural distinctiveness of the region remains isolated from the structure of political demands. Bulgaria’s ethnic Turkish community benefits from the dual citizenship regime in Bulgaria and Turkey and has preserved its ethnic and political loyalties. Since 2001, opportunities for voting in Bulgarian elections on the territory of Turkey have expanded. Turkey 14

TR 21 includes Edirne, Kirklareli, and Tekirdag.

Crossborder Dynamics at the Southeastern Periphery of the European Union


continuously improves administrative structures to urge Bulgarian expatriates of Turkish origin to vote in Bulgarian elections. On the eve of the 2009 parliamentary elections, the Turkish authorities announced that they would extend expired documents of Bulgarian citizens residing in Turkey illegally, so that they would be able to return to Bulgaria to cast their vote, or vote in voting sections in Turkey without fearing that they would be arrested, prosecuted, or extradited. 15 While crossborder in nature, the political identification of Bulgarian ethnic Turks residing in Turkey remains embedded in the patterns of domestic political conflict and electoral politics in Bulgaria and has failed to recreate a cross-border regional distinctiveness. The enmeshing of structural features and resources falls short of producing the vibrant transnational political space anticipated by the transnationalist literature as an ‘unusual transnational social space of thousands of dual citizens moving back and forth, transferring goods, services, knowledge, biases, and values across the Bulgarian-Turkish border’ (Özgür-Baklacioglu 2005, p. 324). The crossborder space is transnational only in cultural terms. It is structurally diverse as an economic area. Politically, it remains embedded in national political competition and therefore lacks transnational features. As Table 4 demonstrates, the combination of structural features and economic, cultural, institutional, and political resources has determined only limited exit options for Bulgaria’s ethnic Turkish minority and thus may explain the low-intensity, practically non-existent, demands for autonomy and self-governance. The combination of substate territorial and political structures and resources at the disposal of Bulgaria’s ethnic Turkish minority in the border region point to the conclusion that the opportunities for exit options and demands of the substate territory are limited. The cultural distinctiveness and geopolitical variables presuppose highly revisionist exit options. However, they do not possess a ‘voice’ potential due to economic, institutional, and political constraints. The lack of opportunities for partial exit or minority demands to that effect is due to the disconnect between the homogenizing influences of crossborder programmes and the prerequisites of a transnational political space, explained by Bulgaria’s national model of minority representation which emphasizes individual rights and economic opportunities. Political mobilization at the national level largely exceeds the potential of regional community structures to alter allegiances and demands. The patterns of electoral participation of the ethnic Turkish minority in crossborder voting have so far marginalized any salient transnational regional loyalties and demands for regional autonomy or self-governance.


‘Turkey Moves to Influence Bulgaria’s Parliamentary Elections’, (online), 1 July 2009.


Boyka Stefanova

Table 5. Exit options and political choice for the substate region of the Bulgarian ethnic Turkish minority STRUCTURAL FEATURES OF THE TERRITORY











(language, religion, ethnicity)

Monocephalic dominant-capital state, NO SIGNIFICANT PERIPHERAL




(sectoral specialization, free trade)

Comparison across borders of the distributive efficiency of neighboring state or supranational center: REGIONAL DISPARITIES DEVOLUTION












(external, enclave, interface, “failed” center-periphery) INSTITUTIONAL DISTINCTIVENESS

Crossborder functional regimes: INTERFACE REGION

Territorial differentiation of functional subsystems: economic district, labor, credit, salary differentiation, welfare regulations, education: STRONG NATIONAL CENTER DOMINATION; DUAL CITIZENSHIP RIGHTS


Source: Author’s application of Bartolini (2004, p. 39).

Crossborder Dynamics at the Southeastern Periphery of the European Union


Conclusion The EU regional policy, and especially CBC, fulfills important cohesion and efficiency objectives for the new member states from Eastern Europe. However, the southeastern border demonstrates certain contradictory dynamics, at odds with expectations for the potential conversion of the resources of European governance into political action. According to Turnock (2002), CBC has had greater impact on the Northeastern EU periphery than in the East-Balkans region. Such dynamics do not suggest that the EU’s integrative pressures have been weaker in Southeastern Europe. They indicate that territorial structuring and resources follow a different pattern based on economic, cultural, and political factors. A structuralist political opportunity model is thus well positioned to explain the outcome, without prioritizing either the EU-centered, top-down pressures or sunational, bottom-up political agency. Bartolini’s (2004) political opportunities framework, which binds together structural resources and individual preferences, offers important analytical advantages in explaining territorial restructuring and political mobilization in the context of European integration. It that the EU’s territorial order and governance system alter majority-minority relations by restructuring the center-periphery cleavage and by increasing the options and demands of peripheral territories for exit from dependence on the state. The causal mechanism is that of converting economic, cultural, and (geo)political resources available to peripheral regions based on the structural features of the substate territory into political demands for revising the latter’s relationship with the center. The extent of revisionism, ranging from direct participation, access to resources, self-governance, irredentism, to separatism, depends on the combination of structural factors and individual choice (Bartolini 2004, p. 39). The structural component presents a corrective to political opportunities and agency models (Brusis 2010; Tarrow 2004) which rely on the mobilization and coalition-building capacity of minority political actors to advance (ethno)regional demands, enter into crossborder coalitions and alliances with supranational actors, and use their access to government to achieve autonomy. Similarly, the structure-voice framework corrects for the unidirectional perspective on national adaptation prevalent in the EU enlargement literature which emphasizes the conditionality and incentives structure of the accession process. The case of Bulgaria’s ethnic Turkish minority fits well with the resourcesdemands framework. The combination of structural features and uneven distribution of economic, cultural, institutional, and geopolitical resources provides for a limited opportunity structure and exit options for the territory. As a result, despite its strong cultural distinctiveness and interface periphery status, the territorial profile of the Bulgaria-Turkey border region is likely to persist as a bifurcated substate region, rather than as a coherent transnational space.


Boyka Stefanova

While the original formulation of the ‘exit-voice’ framework does not specify whether the effects of the structural features and resources are additive, rankordered, or interactive, it may be concluded that they are collectively necessary for exit options and demands to materialize. Variation in their relative salience, as established in the case of Bulgaria’s ethnic Turkish minority in the Southeastern crossborder region, points to the need for further research to determine the relative strength and potentially interactive effects of material and ideational structures as sources of political opportunities.

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Özgür-Baklacioglu, N. (2005) ‘Dual Citizenship, Extraterritorial Elections and National Policies: Turkish Dual Citizens in the Bulgarian-Turkish Political Sphere’. Paper (online). Pasquier, R. & Perron, C. (2008) ‘Régionalisation et Régionalismes dans l’Europe Élargie : Les Enjeux d’Une Compraison Est-Ouest’. Revue d’Études Comparatives Est-Ouest 39, 3, 5-18. Petkova, L. (2002) ‘The Ethnic Turks in Bulgaria: Social Integration and Impact on Bulgarian-Turkish Relations, 1947-2000’. The Global Review of Ethnopolitics 1 (4), June, 42-59. Republic of Turkey (2004) Joint Programming Document. abbp/cbc/ORTAK_PROGRAMMELAMA_DOKUMAN.pdf. Rokkan, S. (1999) State Formation, Nation Building, and Mass Politics in Europe: The Theory of Stein Rokkan. Flora, P. with Kuhnle, S. & Unwin, D. (eds.) (Oxford, Oxford University Press). Rokkan, S. & Unwin, D. (eds.) (1982) The Politics of Territorial Identity: Studies in European Regionalism. London: Sage. Rokkan, S., Unwin, D, Aerebrot, F. H., Malaba, P. & Sande, T. (1987) Centre-Periphery Structures in Europe (Frankfurt, Campus Verlag). Ruggie, John G. (1993) Territoriality and Beyond: Problematizing Modernity in International Relations. International Organization 47, 1, 139-174. Scott, J. (2005) Transnational Regionbalism, Strategic Geopolitics, and European Integration: The Case of the Baltic Sea Region. In Nicol, H. & Townsend-Gauly, I. (eds) Holding the Line: Borders in a Global World, 90-116 (Vancouver and Toronto, UBC Press). Siaroff, A. (2000) Comparative European Party Systems: Analysis of Parliamentary Elections since 1945 (New York, Garland Publishers). Smith, D. & Wistrich, E. (eds.) (2007a) Regional Identity and Diversity in Europe: Experience in Wales, Silesia and Flanders (London, The Federal Trust). Smith, D. & Wistrich, E. (eds.) (2007b) Collective Identities in a Changing World. In Smith, D. & Wistrich, E. (eds) Regional Identity and Diversity in Europe: Experience in Wales, Silesia and Flanders, 6-33 (London, The Federal Trust). Spirova, M. & Stefanova, B. (2012) The European Dimension of the Political Representation of Ethnic Minorities: Bulgaria and Romania Compared. East European Politics and Societies 26: 1 (2012), 75-92. Stefanova, B. (2010) Ethnic Minority Parties at the Post-transition Stage: Mainstreaming the Movement for Rights and Freedoms in Bulgarian Party Politics. Paper presented at the ASN World Convention, New York. Tarrow, S. (2004) Center-Periphery Alignments and Political Contention in Late-Modern Europe. In Ansell, C. & Di Palma, G. (eds.) Restructuring Territoriality: Europe and the United States Compared, 45-64 (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press). Turnock, D. (2002) Cross-border cooperation: A major element in regional policy in East Central Europe. Scottish Geographical Journal 118, 1, 19-40. Warhola, J. & Boteva, O. (2003) The Turkish Minority in Contemporary Bulgaria. Nationalities Papers 31, 3, 255-279.

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Acta Universitatis Sapientiae, European and Regional Studies, 3 (2013) 92-106

Quebec’s Language Policies in the Neoliberal Age Jacques MAURAIS Former Research Coordinator Office Québécois de la Langue Française (Quebec City)

Abstract. The purpose of this paper is to analyse recent trends in Quebec’s language policies. The paper focuses on the following topics: the language of commercial signs, including the language of corporate (or firm) names; the language used to attend customers; the choice of the language of instruction; and the “quality of language” (that is, quality of the French language) issue. Keywords: Charter of the French Language, French in Quebec, trade-marked business names, language used in serving customers, choice of the language of instruction, endo-normative standard

Introduction Since 1969, the National Assembly of Quebec has passed a dozen laws in language matters. The most significant is the Charter of the French Language passed in 1977 and still in force though over the years some of its provisions have been overruled by the Supreme Court of Canada while others have been amended by Quebec National Assembly itself (for an historical overview, see Office québécois de la langue française, hereafter OQLF, 2012a). The factors which are at the root of Quebec’s language policies began to emerge more clearly in the 1960’s (see Maurais 1985 and 1989): 92

Quebec’s Language Policies in the Neoliberal Age


− the economic inferiority of French-speaking Canadians, a finding made by the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism set up by the federal government in the 1960’s and by a commission of enquiry set up by the Quebec government in 1969 (the Gendron Commission); but Tocqueville had already noted the differences in status between French and English speakers in Lower Canada when he made his famous trip through North America in 1831-32 (excerpts of his diary published by Bouthillier and Meynaud, 1972: 139-147; − the preponderance of English on the labor market in Quebec, this being evidenced by the fact that English was dominant in the workplace and on commercial signage; especially in downtown Montreal there were shop attendants unable to provide services in French: this perception was so widespread that in 1989 a federalist provincial minister, Pierre MacDonald, still spoke of “the bloody fat English women at Eaton’s who could not speak French” (Radio-Canada, 1989); − the apprehensions of French speakers in Quebec regarding their demographic future: immigrants were more and more being assimilated into the English-speaking minority; this language shift was facilitated by the fact that every citizen could choose between French and English as the language of instruction for their children. Even French-speaking parents increasingly chose to enroll their youngsters in English schools (up to 25,000 French-speaking children in 1973 according to Duchesne, 1973). − “language quality” has been a recurrent topic in Quebec’s language debate since the early 19th century (see Gendron, 2007) and when the first language planning agency, the Office de la langue française (French Language Bureau), was created in 1961 it was assigned the task to correct and enrich the spoken and written language (9-10 Eliz. II, c. 23). Among the aforementioned themes the economic inferiority of native Frenchspeakers is no longer a topical issue. Research has shown that major changes have occurred and that there is no longer a wage gap between native English-speakers and native French-speakers in Quebec. In contradistinction with 1970, in 2000 there was no difference between the mean salary of native English-speaking male workers and native French-speaking male workers (women were excluded from the study on the ground that their presence and behavior on the labour market were not comparable in 1970 and 2000); whereas the mean salary of bilinguals had increased in comparison with 1970 (Béland et al., 2008). Admittedly this change is better explained by the rising education level of French-speakers than by the effects of language laws which are more difficult to ascertain. The results on the disappearing wage gap between native French and English speakers come from a longitudinal survey by Béland et al. conducted using census


Jacques Maurais

microdata provided by Statistics Canada. However it is doubtful whether such a comparable survey could be done in the future owing to substantial changes made by the federal Conservative government to the 2011 census. Canada’s chief statistician, Munir Sheikh, resigned in 2010 over the issue “of whether a voluntary survey can become a substitute for a mandatory census” (Chase and Grant, 2010). This is one example of how neoliberal ideology impacts research. To put this in perspective it could be added that the federal Conservative Minister for science and technology Gary Goodyear, a man at the centre of a controversy over federal funding cuts to researchers, is an avowed creationist. The remaining themes mentioned in this introduction will be treated in the following order: the language of commercial signs, including the language of corporate (or firm) names; the language used to attend customers; the choice of the language of instruction; and the “quality of language” (that is, quality of the French language) issue, i.e. what Kloss (1969) proposed to call corpus planning. As will become evident, these themes are still the focus of the language debate in Quebec.

The Language of Commercial Signs The language of commercial signs, or more exactly the place of French on commercial signs, is an issue that has been rampant since at least the 1960’s. From 1977 when Bill 101 was passed till 1993, French was the only language to be used on commercial signs (there were exceptions for signs advertizing cultural activities, for ethnic shops, for political or religious messages, etc., see Maurais 1989: 146). This French-only policy was deemed necessary because it was to symbolize, in the eyes of all, that linguistic change was under way and that French was regaining ground. These provisions were challenged before the courts and in 1993 Québec’s National Assembly passed a new law allowing for bilingual (or multilingual) commercial signs provided that French was given a marked predominance. This concept of a marked predominance of French was suggested and approved of by the Supreme Court of Canada in its 1988 ruling though it did not define it. Neither did the law passed in 1993, which simply states that “Public signs and posters and commercial advertising must be in French. They may also be both in French and in another language provided that French is markedly predominant [...]” (section 58 of R.S.Q., chapter C-11; 1993, c. 40, s. 18). In practice French is deemed markedly predominant when messages in French are twice as numerous or written in characters twice as large as in any other language (OQLF, 2012: 48). The issue of English increasing its presence on commercial signs in the Montreal area has come periodically to the forefront. French lobbies have been active in filing complaints with the OQLF. In 2009-10, 39.1 % of the complaints filed at the OQLF dealt with the language of commercial signs, up from 26.4 % in 2008-09 (OQLF, 2010: 70) and 10.5% in 2006-2007 (OQLF, 2007: XIII).

Quebec’s Language Policies in the Neoliberal Age


A series of reports on the language of commercial signs in Montreal made public by the OQLF on June 1, 2012 went almost unnoticed, since it was released in the wake of massive student protests and social unrest. It should not come as a surprise that these reports were published at a time when they would pass almost unnoticed. For indeed their findings tend to confirm the apprehensions of those complaining that English is coming back in force in the Montreal area (see testimonies posted on French language advocacy sites such as and According to this 2012 report, in 1997 and 2010 French was present on respectively 96% and 94% of business names and signs; this means a slight decrease of the presence of French on commercial signs in the whole Montreal area from 1997 to 2010 and it is statistically significant (OQLF, 2012b: 39). In 2010 some 82% of signs posted on shops and businesses were in French only, some 3% were bilingual but with a marked predominance given to French. The OQLF report acknowledges that French is indeed predominant in the linguistic landscape of Montreal; and in some areas it is even the only language used on commercial signs (OQLF, 2012b: 41). However in the West Island area 11% of commercial signs have no French wording (OQLF, 2012b: 44). The OQLF report also concludes that English is “stable� on commercial signs though its presence went down from 43% in 1997 to 41% in 2010 (OQLF, 2012b: 9-10). The statement that the presence of English is stable is dubious and even misleading considering that from 43% in 1997 it went up to 49% in 1999 and then down to 41% in 2010. The figures rather show that English is far from being stable and suggest that it might indeed be retreating. These figures are not concealed but the report prefers to play down this potential decrease of English on commercial signs. Such a behavior is puzzling and one may wonder why the OQLF prefers not to highlight this relative decrease in the presence of English in a context where this agency is frequently reproached to be weak in its defense of French. The explanation for this behavior might be that it is not socially and politically acceptable to suggest that English might be less present on commercial signage. Especially at a time when the linguistic insecurity of French-speaking Montrealers runs high and when other reports published simultaneously attest to a decrease in the use of French (see below the section on the use of French in attending customers in shops and retail stores). Moreover it should be reminded that the report was published in a pre-electoral climate (elections were called a few weeks later on 1 August 2012) and that English speakers and more generally people who do not have French as their native language constitute the hard core of the Quebec Liberal Party electorate (so much so that political opinion poll data are regularly disaggregated between native speakers of French and native speakers of all other languages). It should therefore not come as a surprise that the then Liberal


Jacques Maurais

government (nor the sovereignist Official Opposition) would choose to play down this relative decrease in the use of English. The 2010 survey was updated in 2012 but only for a section of downtown Montreal (St.-Catherine Street between Papineau and Atwater). The scope of this new survey was restricted to business. The OQLF found that 81.7% of businesses complied with the requirements of Bill 101 while 18.3% did not (OQLF, 2012c: 25). But according to a survey made the same year by Radio-Canada in the same section of downtown Montreal and with the same target, more than 25% of business names did not comply with Bill 101 (Faits et Causes, 2012). It is reasonable to assume that the figures given by the OQLF survey are more accurate owing to the agency legal expertise, whereas the Radio-Canada findings would be more consistent with popular feeling. The issue of English-only business names and more specifically of Englishonly trademarks used as business names has been at the forefront of linguistic tensions in Montreal since the 1990’s. In 2000 the Conseil (since 2002 Conseil supÊrieur) de la langue française (hereafter Conseil or CSLF) published a notice on this issue. The Conseil noted that though the law states that business names must be in French, accompanying regulations grant an exemption for trademarked names in languages other than French. The Conseil adressed the frequent practice of businesses using trademarked English names in their storefront signage. It noted that owing to international agreements it is not feasible to require that businesses add a modifier in French to their trademarked English names. Nevertheless, in November 2011 and again in January 2012 the OQLF launched a promotional campaign asking stores with trademarked English names to add generic or descriptive French terms to their signs or add a slogan in French. The OQLF added that it would crack down on businesses using trademarked English names and began mailing warnings to dozens of retailers. Even in government upper circles some thought that the government agency misinterpreted the law (as reported by Lessard, 2012). It should be added that a peak in Neoliberal language policies was reached in 2011 when the OQLF offered up to $50,000 to help the Francization of small businesses that did not comply with the questionable interpretation the agency gives of the regulations on trade-marked business names (OQLF, 2011). The legal basis for the OQLF move is indeed shaky and one can only speculate on its underlying motives. As the Conseil notice explains, trade-marks are protected by international legal agreements. And it would be difficult to call into question a world-wide legal process, which began more than one hundred years ago. However, the Conseil added, if Quebec cannot act unilaterally, it can express its concerns in international forums. Topics such as English trade-marked names and more generally the language of commercial signs should be discussed at

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the international level. Owing to globalization, products trade-marked in English can indeed be found everywhere (CLF, 2000: chapter 3, section 2).

Language Used in Serving Customers in Shops and Retail Stores In the decades leading up to the adoption of a comprehensive language legislation complaints were frequently voiced about shop attendants being unable to provide services in French in Montreal. The 1977 Charter of the French Language (section 5) therefore states that “consumers of goods and services have a right to be informed and served in French”. But complaints continued to be voiced and in 1988 the then Conseil de la langue française (later renamed Conseil supérieur de la langue française) decided to carry on a survey in downtown Montreal. This survey was done by active observers sent in pairs to visit shops, retail stores and shopping malls in selected areas on Montreal Island. The survey covered two subjects: the language in which customers were greeted and the possibility to get services in French. As for greeting, customers were greeted in French in 60% cases in western down-town and 50% in the West island area. In shopping malls and department stores the rate of greeting in French went from 80% in downtown Montreal to 50% in the West island area. As for the impossibility to get services in French, the rate went from 7% in western downtown to 13% in the West island area; in shopping malls and department stores, it was 4% (Monnier 1989). This survey was replicated in 1995. According to the observation areas the new survey found that the use of French had variously increased, was stable or had decreased. Overall, the impossibility to get services in French was estimated at 5% to 10% according to the areas whereas in shopping malls and department stores it went from 0 to 3%. The report concludes that the overall evolution from the 1960’s is favourable to French but that short term trends (from 1988 to 1995) are ambiguous (Monnier, 1996). The survey was again replicated in 2010. The results show a major increase in the use of French in greeting customers in two areas, downtown St.-Laurent Boulevard (from 72% in 1988 up to 86% in 1995 and 96% in 2010) and western downtown (from 59% up to 71% in shops and retail stores, from 76% to 87% in shopping malls). However the results also show an important decrease in the use of French in the Côte-des-Neiges and Snowdon neighborhoods (from 60% down to 44%). As for the possibility to get services in French, it increased in downtown St.Laurent Boulevard (from 91% in 1988 up to 99% in 2010), was stable in western downtown (ca.95-97%) but went down from 97% in 1988 to 91% in 2010 in Côtedes-Neiges and Snowdon shopping malls (OQLF, 2012d: esp. 64-66). A smaller-scale survey was done in 2012. Its scope was restricted to downtown St.-Catherine Street (between Papineau and Atwater). Results show a significant decrease over a two-year period in the use of French as the only


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language to greet customers in shops and retail stores, from 89% in 2010 down to 73% in 2012. Curiously enough, this finding is not mentioned in the summary published by the OQLF (OQLF, 2012e: 5 where the figure given is 74% for 2012 and the 2010 figure is omitted). There is a corresponding increase in the use of bilingual greetings from 1% in 2010 up to 14% 2012. However there was no difference in the impossibility to get services in French over this two-year period (OQLF, 2012f: 16 and 22). These findings lend weight to the popular perception that the overall use of French in Montreal is indeed decreasing.

Language of Instruction The Charter of the French Language restricts access to English-language public schools to children “whose father or mother is a Canadian citizen and received elementary instruction in English in Canada, provided that that instruction constitutes the major part of the elementary instruction he or she received in Canada� (section 73.1) This means that native French-speakers do not have the freedom to choose the language in which their children will receive their instruction. And immigrants (even English mother tongue immigrants) must enroll their children in French schools. At higher education levels the language of instruction is not regulated and freedom of choice prevails. The system of higher education in Quebec differs from what exists in the other Canadian provinces and territories. Pupils in Quebec leave secondary school after grade 11 and do not enter university directly but go to general and vocational colleges called CEGEPs (junior colleges). There are French junior colleges and English junior colleges; in remote areas, some French junior colleges have an English section. In principle English junior colleges accommodate the local English population. The vast majority of native French speakers having studied in French secondary schools enroll in French junior colleges (some 96% in 2010). The same holds even more so for the English-speaking pupils: in 2010, 98% of pupils graduating from English high schools were enrolled in English junior colleges. 32% of Allophones (students having neither French nor English as their mother tongue) having studied in French high schools switched to an English junior college whereas 99.6% of Allophones having studied in English high schools remained in the English sector. In other words, 47% of all Allophones leaving high school went to an English junior college (MELS 2012). These figures show that the attraction of English is still powerful. Proposals have been made in recent years to regulate the access to English junior colleges and in particular to make sure that the rule governing the access to English primary and secondary education also applies to junior colleges.

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Proponents of this strengthening of Bill 101 argue that students graduating from English junior colleges are much less prone to use French on the labor market. In particular Allophones students graduating from English junior colleges have less friends among French speakers than Allophones graduating from French junior colleges; and students at English junior colleges, whatever their mother tongue, watch French television much less than English television (IRFA, 2010). English junior colleges have therefore a strong anglicizing power (see the discussion of the IRFA data by Lisée, 2010 and Castonguay, 2011). Freedom in the choice of the language of instruction at the junior college level has been endorsed by the Conseil Supérieur de la Langue Française (CSLF), a government advisory body (CSLF, 2011). The CSLF report gave support to the liberal government’s position not to amend Bill 101 in this regard while the Parti Québécois official opposition has in its program to extend to junior colleges the rule governing access to primary and secondary education in English. However statistics on which the Conseil recommendation was made have since been called into question. In 2012, the Conseil had to admit in a communiqué that its recommendation was based on dubious statistics provided by the Department of Education; in particular the proportion of Allophones attending French junior colleges was not 64.2% but 51.5%, a substantial over-estimation (CSLF, 2012). Freedom in the choice of the language of instruction is a topic illustrative of Neoliberal trends at work, especially merchandizing education. Typical of Neoliberal educational politicies is the statement made by the Université de Montréal’s rector that “the brains of students must meet corporative needs” (quoted by Gagnon, 2012). Freedom of choice needs to be discussed in the context of a 75% increase in tuition fees over 5 years proposed in 2012 by Quebec’s Liberal Party government (later changed to a 82% increase over a 7-year period, cf. Fillion, 2012). This proposal led to a major social crisis in 2012 (called ‘le printemps érable’, maple spring, a pun on ‘printemps arabe’, Arab spring). It should be added that all major political parties favor to various degrees an increase in tuition fees (only fringe political parties support free higher education). It is doubtful that freedom of choice can be ignored if tuition fees at junior colleges rise from $2,168 to $3,947 over a seven-year period (Fillion, 2012). This is because Quebec has become a society where the state provides services to customers rather than to citizens, where patients are considered as customers of health services, where citizens are seen more and more as userpayers, where students are asked to pay their “fair share” of tuition fees, where it has become almost commonplace to speak of the electorate as ‘clientèle électorale’, as voter-customers. The law of the market dictates that customers are always right. In a context of client-centered government policies, one wonders why the student-customers should not be able to choose the language in which they


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receive the educational services provided by and bought from the state. This was the argument put forward by the lawyer defending two students who had been prevented from attending their classes during the 2012 student protest movement. This lawyer pleaded that his clients “have a contract with their educational institution and they have the right to receive the services provided for in the contract” (quoted by Herdhuin, 2012). The merchandization of education can be illustrated by another example. Thanks to a legal loophole it had become possible in the late 1990’s to buy access to the English schools system through “bridging schools”: after only one year of study in a non state-subsidized English bridging school a pupil could acquire the right to enroll in the public English schools system. The pupil’s brothers and sisters simultaneously acquired this right. A law was passed in 2002 to fill in this breach but it was over-ruled in 2007 by the Appeal Court of Quebec and in 2009 by the Supreme Court of Canada. In 2010, Quebec’s National Assembly passed a new law: after three years of study in a non state-subsidized English bridging school a pupil could acquire the right to enroll in the public English schools system.

The “Quality of Language” Issue (Corpus Planning) The Charter of the French Language stipulates that French is the official language of Quebec (section 1). But it says nothing about which variety of French should form the basis of its norm. It has been commonly assumed that it was the variety described in the most commonly used dictionaries and grammars (JeanClaude Corbeil, personal communication). At the time the Official Language Law (1972) and the Charter of the French Language (1977) were passed, this meant essentially dictionaries and grammars made by Europeans and published in Europe (Commission des états généraux, 2001: 81). In litigious cases where there was no consensus on which term was to be used in French or when there was no agreement on what the proper translation was for an English term or phrase, Quebec’s language agency, the Régie de la langue française (the name of the language agency from 1972 to 1977), explained in 1976 (Régie, 1976: 9) that it was empowered by the law to officialize a French equivalent and make its use compulsory in certain circumstances (in state documents, in public advertizing, in textbooks, etc.). Nevertheless allowing French to become Quebec’s official, common, and working language has meant an increased preoccupation with social and regional variation. A debate developed on which kind of French should be the official one: was it to be the international standard historically based on Parisian French but increasingly tolerant of local peculiarities (as evidenced by the introduction of many ‘Belgicisms’, ‘Quebecisms’, ‘Africanisms’, etc., in the major dictionaries published in Paris)? Or was Quebec to establish its own standard variety placed at

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the pinnacle of a series of hierarchized colloquial registers (as proposed by the Conseil de la langue française, 1990: 30 and 50 and in various papers by CajoletLaganière and Martel, e.g. 1996)? For those adhering to the second proposal, Quebec French is considered as an autonomous language variety possessing its own standard, a standard that is said to reflect the linguistic uses of the new French-speaking middle class, which arose after World War II (Gendron, 1986). As linguist Jean-Denis Gendron (1986: 95) adds, this new predominant linguistic standard appears in public and official discourses, both spoken and written. In 1990, the Conseil de la langue française proposed to launch a comprehensive description of Quebec French uses (at times abbreviated as... FUQ ‘français en usage au Québec’), including standard uses. This led to the creation of the Franqus project based at the Université de Sherbrooke; the project has received substantial funding from the state (more than $3 M as of 2005, cf. Meney, 2005). Others propose to view the linguistic situation of Quebec as diglossical (e.g. Lamonde, 1998: 96-103; Barbaud, 1998; Meney, 2010). Typically, diglossia means a situation where two language varieties are in contact, each of them having certain spheres of social interaction assigned to it. The relationship between the two language varieties is hierarchical: one has high, the other has low prestige. According to this view, the high variety in Quebec would be ‘international French’, used for example in official, commercial, and scientific communications, while the low variety would be Quebec colloquial French used mainly but not exclusively in non formal circumstances (see the discussion by Meney, 2010: 102-122, esp. p. 106). There is therefore a two-fold division on the topic of which linguistic norm should be favored: on the one hand, those who hold that international standard French should be the variety taught in schools; on the other hand, ‘endogenists’ who propose that Quebec should officialize its own linguistic norm. ‘Endogenists’ have maintained for years that there is a consensus among Quebec linguists and the general public on an endo-normative standard (e.g. Commission des états généraux, 2001: 84 and Conseil de la langue française, 1990). A proposal was sent to the 2008 sovereignist Parti québécois convention asking that ‘the teaching of French should be reoriented toward the acquisition of spoken and written standard Quebec French’ (quoted by Paquot, 2009). Linguist Annette Paquot intervened in the media before the proposal was discussed at the convention (Paquot, 2008). She pointed out that the proposed new standard differs only marginally from the established international norm (mainly easily understandable lexical items) and that even supporters of this new standard write their books and publish their papers in international standard French (Paquot, 2008 and 2009). The Parti Québécois convention finally made no move since promoting a new language standard in schools was clearly not supported by public opinion (this is of course reminiscent of the ‘Oakland Ebonics controversy’ in the USA).


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The rejection of the proposal on standard Quebec French by the 2008 Parti Québécois convention shows that there is obviously no consensus on the adoption of an endo-normative standard in the public at large. Moreover many prominent linguists (e.g. Barbaud, Meney, Nemni, Paquot) disagree on the existence of the consensus peremptorily proclaimed in some official reports. Admittedly the opponents just mentioned are foreign-born but many native Quebecers also discourage the establishment of a local norm (for instance opinion leaders Lysiane Gagnon at the daily La Presse and Denise Bombardier at Le Devoir). Also, this raises the issue of the discrimination that a new standard could bring to immigrant citizens, a great number of whom are selected by the Department of Immigration on the criterion that they already have a working knowledge of French – a knowledge usually acquired abroad at school where the only variety of French taught is ‘international French’. This argument was developped by Maurais (2008b) who advised choosing the standard that would create the least discrimination. The absence of a consensus on a new local linguistic norm is also evidenced by the results of opinion polls: in surveys done in 1998 and 2004 about half the respondents felt that they spoke Québécois while the other half felt that they spoke French (Maurais, 2008a: 19). On the basis of the opinion poll results published by Maurais (2008a), it has been argued by Paquot (2009) and by Meney (2010) that if there is at all a consensus on the linguistic variety to be taught in Quebec’s schools, it does not tend to support the claim made by the proponents of an autonomous norm. Quite the reverse: 76.8% of respondents (all native French-speakers born in Quebec) think that international French should be the standard variety taught in schools while 88.3% think that it is advisable that reference books used in schools (such as grammars and dictionaries) should be the same in all French-speaking countries. Despite the above, the OQLF’s Grand Dictionnaire Terminologique (Grand Terminological Dictionary, hereafter GDT) has maintained its new orientation adopted in the early 2000's, which favors the acceptance of colloquial words (including loan-words and loan-translations). The GDT merely tags them with the label “langue courante”, but this is not done systematically. This approach, in its core more lexicographical than terminological, was denounced in a manifesto by 19 former OQLF’s terminologists. These terminologists were supported by more than a hundred other terminologists, translators and copy-editors (Manifesto, 2011; for a critical assessment of the GDT, see Meney, 2011: 405-443). All in all, the debate over which variety of French should prevail still goes on but supporters of ‘international French’ have made headway and the former chairperson of the Conseil supérieur de la langue française Conrad Ouellon declared his preference for international French (CSLF, 2010: 2).

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Conclusion This paper has reviewed recent data on the situation of French in Quebec from the turn of the century. Worrisome reports have recently documented the fragile situation of French in Montreal, lending weight to the popular perception that the overall use of French has been indeed decreasing over the last decade. The language of commercial signs has been a sensitive issue for many decades. Recent surveys show that there has been a slight decrease of the presence of French on commercial signs in the whole Montreal area from 1997 to 2010. The issue of English-only business names and more specifically of English-only trademarks used as business names remains at the forefront of linguistic tensions in Montreal. Surveys have also been done on the langue used in greeting and serving customers in Montreal. Compared with previous surveys, recent data show quite opposite trends according to the area: in some neighborhoods the use of French in greeting and serving customers has increased while in others it has significantly decreased. On average, it should be noted that French-speakers can be served in their language in nine out of ten cases. As for the language of instruction, the most sensitive issue is currently whether access to English junior colleges should be available only to those pupils who have English primary and secondary schools. 47% of all Allophone pupils prefer to enroll in English junior colleges: this is interpreted as a proof of the poor attraction power of French. As for the quality of language issue, the last topic treated in this paper, it has become clear that supporters of an endo-normative standard are losing ground and it seems to be generally admitted that officializing a local standard would discriminate against the growing number of French-speaking immigrants. The current status quo in favor of ‘international French’ (the exo-normative standard) is likely to be maintained in the foreseeable future despite the imminent (but regularly postponed since 2007) publication of a standard Quebec French dictionary. The facts presented in this paper should be assessed in their larger context. In their early years Quebec’s language policies clearly favored state intervention in accordance with the then dominant social democratic credo. As clearly expressed in the language laws of 1974 and 1977, the state set forth rules on the use of French not only in the public sector but also in private businesses, on commercial signs, etc. (for a more detailed presentation, see Maurais, 1989). Later on, the insistence on legal obligations or prohibitions became less prominent and it became a habit to repeat in various official documents that the state was to set the example (this trend was initiated in a 1996 report, cf. Rapport, 1996: 229). State interventionism left place to a growing number of incentives: year in and year out, the OQLF gives more than a dozen, at times almost a score of recognition awards, the CSLF hands


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out seven medals and four prizes, and the Government of Quebec gives a $30,000 award to an individual who has made an outstanding contribution to the quality and diffusion of the French language in Quebec. At the turn of the century, the application of language policies was further diluted under the growing influence of Neoliberalism in Quebec politics. At the 4 September 2012 general election the sovereignist Parti Québécois regained power by a narrow margin and could form a minority government. Its electoral platform included propositions to strengthen French in Montreal, eliminate bridging schools, restrict access to English junior colleges and adopt a new tougher Charter of the French Language. Minority government situation permitting, this would mean a change of direction towards greater state interventionism. In other words, it could mean the end, or the postponement, of Neoliberal language policies. * I am grateful to Dr. Grant McConnell (Laval University) for his comments on an earlier version of this text. Needless to say I remain sole responsible for the opinions expressed therein and remaining errors.

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Conseil supérieur de la langue française (CSLF) (2010), Rapport annuel de gestion 20092010. Quebec City: Conseil. Conseil supérieur de la langue française (CSLF) (2011), La langue d’enseignement au cégep. Quebec City: Conseil. Conseil supérieur de la langue française (CSLF) (2012), Données sur la langue d’enseignement au cégep: le Conseil supérieur de la langue française apporte des précisions. Quebec City: Conseil. Duchesne, Louis (1973), La situation des langues dans les écoles du Québec et de ses régions administratives (1969-70 à 1972-73). Quebec City: Ministère de l’Éducation. Faits et Causes, une perspective juridique sur l’actualité (2012), Recrudescence des plaintes à l’Office québécois de la langue française. Fillion, Gérald (2012), Hausse de 82 % sur 7 ans: le calcul. Gagnon, Gabriel (2012), Les défis de Pierre Dufresne, Le Devoir, 25 September 2012, p. A7. Gendron, Jean-Denis (1986), Aperçu historique sur le développement de la conscience linguistique des Québécois, Québec français 61, 82-89. Gendron, Jean-Denis (2007), D'où vient l'accent des Québécois? Et celui des Parisiens? Essai sur l'origine des accents. Contribution à l'histoire de la prononciation du français moderne. Quebec City: Presses de l’Université Laval. Herdhuin, Claude Jacqueline (2012), Cours payé, cours dû, Le Devoir, Montreal, 5 September 2012, p. A8. IRFA (Institut de Recherche sur le Français en Amérique) (2010), Le choix anglicisant. Une analyse des comportements linguistiques des étudiants du collégial sur l’Île de Montréal. Montreal: IRFA. Kloss, Heinz (1969), Research Possibilities on Group Bilingualism: A Report. Quebec City: Centre international de recherche sur le bilinguisme. Lamonde, Diane (1998), Le maquignon et son joual, l’aménagement du français québécois. Montreal: Liber. Lessard, Denis (2012), Tensions linguistiques en haut lieu, La Presse, 15 March 2012. Lisée, Jean-François (2010), Cégeps anglophones: enfin des chiffres!, L’Actualité, 7 September 2010. Manifesto (2011), Au-delà des mots, les termes, Le Devoir, 12 February 2011 and Le Soleil’s online edition, 14 February 2011. Maurais, Jacques (1985), L’expérience québécoise d’aménagement linguistique. In Jacques Maurais (ed.), Politique et aménagement linguistiques. Quebec City and Paris: Le Robert, 359-416. Maurais, Jacques (1989), Language Status Planning in Quebec. In Christer Laurén and Marianne Nordman (eds.), Special Language: From Humans Thinking to Thinking Machines. Clevedon UK and Philadelphia USA: Multilingual Matters Ltd., 138-149. Maurais, Jacques (2008a), Les Québécois et la norme, l’évaluation par les Québécois de leurs usages linguistiques. Montreal: Office québécois de la langue française. Maurais, Jacques (2008b), Le français correct plutôt que le français québécois, Le Soleil, Quebec City, 1 November 2008.


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MELS (Ministère de l’Enseignement, du Loisir et du Sport) (2012), Indicateurs linguistiques dans le secteur de l’éducation 2011, Quebec City: Ministère de l’Enseignement, du Loisir et du Sport. Meney, Lionel (2005), Un autre dictionnaire québécois, pourquoi? Le Devoir, 7 January 2005. Meney, Lionel (2010), Main basse sur la langue, Montreal: Liber. Monnier, Daniel (1989), Langue d’accueil et langue de service dans les commerces à Montréal. Quebec City: Conseil de la langue française. Monnier, Daniel (1996), Langue d’accueil et de service dans le domaine commercial. Quebec City: Conseil de la langue française. Office québécois de la langue française (OQLF) (2007), Rapport annuel de gestion 20062007. Montreal: Office. Office québécois de la langue française (OQLF) (2010), Rapport annuel de gestion 20092010. Montreal: Office. Office québécois de la langue française (OQLF) (2011), Respect de la loi dans l’affichage d’un nom d’entreprise utilisant une marque de commerce. Office québécois de la langue française (OQLF) (2012a), Repères et jalons historiques. Office québécois de la langue française (OQLF) (2012b), La langue de l’affichage commercial sur l’île de Montréal en 2010. Montreal: Office. Office québécois de la langue française (OQLF) (2012c), La langue d’accueil, de service et d'affichage dans les commerces de la région métropolitaine de Montréal en 2012 selon les déclarations. Montreal: Office. Office québécois de la langue française (OQLF) (2012d), La langue d’accueil et de service dans des établissements commerciaux en 2010. Montreal: Office. Office québécois de la langue française (OQLF) (2012e), Bilan de l’évolution de la situation linguistique au Québec, Langue du commerce et des affaires, Faits saillants. Montreal: Office. Office québécois de la langue française (OQLF) (2012f), La langue d’accueil, de service et d’affichage des noms d’entreprise des commerces de détail du centre-ville de Montréal en 2012 selon les observations. Montreal: Office. Paquot, Annette (2008), Non à la ‘langue québécoise standard’, Le Devoir, Montreal, 12 March 2008. Paquot, Annette (2009), Pourquoi notre langue doit rester le français international, Argument 11/1. Radio-Canada (1989), Les grosses maudites anglaises, archives, 17 January 1989. Rapport (1996), Le français langue commune, Enjeu de la société québécoise, Rapport du comité interministériel sur la situation de la langue française. Quebec City: Ministère de la Culture et des Communications. Régie de la langue française (1976), La normalisation terminologique. Montreal: Official Printer of Quebec.

Acta Universitatis Sapientiae, European and Regional Studies, 3 (2013) 107-113

Integrating European Language Research A Review of the Volume Rindler Schjerve, Rosita and Vetter, Eva: European Multilingualism. Current Perspectives and Challenges. Multilingual Matters: Bristol 2012 Jan KRUSE Universität Duisburg-Essen

The present volume covers the results of a large-scale research project cofunded by the 6th Framework Programme of the European Commission (EC). This project bears the name Languages in a Network of European Excellence (LINEE). The authors Rosita Rindler Schjerve, full professor of Romance Linguistics, and Eva Vetter, professor for research into Language Teaching and Learning, deal with the central issues of the above mentioned research project. The book presents the common concepts of the 12 Working Packages (WP1-WP12) of the project within the thematic areas ‘Language, Identity and Culture’, ‘Language Policy and Planning’, ‘Multilingualism and Education’ and ‘Language and Economy’. It supplies a ‘sociolinguistics perspective in the attempt to combine the major strands on which […] European Multilingualism (EM) appears to be actually founded’ (7). The authors deal with a special Working Package focused on the theoretical integration of the mentioned thematically orientated packages. This so-called Working Package 0 (WP0) offered a platform for theories and methods of multilingualism within the project and supports the integration and defragmentation of the scientific work done within the WP. The book discusses ‘first the theoretical and methodological issues relevant to the thematic areas, second the identification and assessment of parallel and cross-cutting issues and third the proposal of new strategic lines of research’ (63). The book presents the common variables of fairly different approaches of the research teams involved. These variables are ‘culture’, ‘discourse’, ‘identity’, ‘ideology’, ‘knowledge’, 107


Book Review

‘Language Policy and Planning’, ‘multi-competence’ and ‘power and conflict’. They are also referred to as features, concepts or components. The volume contains four chapters, each divided into several subchapters, as well as an introduction, a conclusion, references and an appendix. The appendix contains the LINEE research structure. The first chapter is dedicated to the multilingualism policy framework of the EU and provides an overview of the major issues of the EU language policy. The subchapters describe the language education policy, the linguistic minority policy and the EU institutional language regime, which taken together reflect the principal elements of the EU language policy. The second chapter offers an overview of the research on multilingualism in Europe. Moreover, it focuses on the multidisciplinary potentials of this field of research. Chapter three is the main chapter of the book and comprises the key varaibles and the methodological issues of LINEE mentioned above. Chapter four aims to present questions regarding European multilingualism beyond LINEE. The respective subchapters discuss possible re-conceptualisations of the mentioned term and the problems and contradictions visible today. Finally, in the conclusion a more sustainable framework for EU multilingualism than presently identified is being discussed. To better understand the context of the presented research areas, the authors start with a general introduction into the EU language policy and give the summary of the political background of the research into European multilingualism. They present the publicly accessible policy documents, e.g. the High Level Group Report 2007, the Report of the Group of Intellectuals 2008, the Declaration of European Identity 1973, the Report by the Committee on a People´s Europe 1985, the European Charter of Fundamental Rights 2000, the Action Plan Multilingualism 2003 and Job Mobility 2007, the ELAN study 2008, the Commission´s communication Multilingualism: An Asset for Europe and a Shared Commitment 2008. In addition, they address other highly relevant publications, including EU treaties, white papers, resolutions and conclusions. Moreover, the chapter presents the documents of the European Council, e.g. the Millennium Declaration 1999 and the Common European Framework of Reference 2001 and therefore provides an in-depth overview of the most important developments within the European language policy. One can see this contribution as an added value of this research since such comprehensive presentations of this issue are rare. The main part of the book opens rightly with the statement that the mentioned policy has become an ideologically driven concept. This concept that includes such topics as migration, social cohesion, intercultural dialogue and lifelong learning has been changing over the past years. Nevertheless, the authors mention that the scope of the migrant and minority languages and the question of language hierarchies have not been cleared yet. Furthermore, they point out the economic value of languages in the common European market.

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In a brief historical outline given in chapter two, the authors give weight to the close interconnection of nation building in Europe and languages and display the different key aspects of the multilingualism policy in a timeline. They conclude that a European identity should be complementary to the national identities since, following the motto “Unity in Diversity”, cultural diversity is one of the most important issues in the EU. The authors refer to the key publication by Peter Kraus A Union of Diversity and accentuate that a common European public sphere is required to establish such policy. Therefore, the arising question of the relationship between linguistic and cultural diversity is tackled. The authors point out that the idea of a single common language is being strongly rejected. The current development with English as the only Lingua franca is clearly not compatible with the eulogy of the blessings of multilingualism in the EU. According to the authors, the so-called European Multilingualism was a matter of education policy in the first place. The principal objective of this policy was the foreign language learning and the protection of minority languages. This means that primarily it was all about plurilingualism. The authors do not mention at this point, but later in the chapter, that already in the fifties of the last century the so-called Declaration No. 1 formed the basis for a multilingual EU without any reference to educational matters. However, the authors conclude rightly that the question remains open whether linguistic diversity can be implemented into an effective communication within the EU. The chapter discusses the problematic integration of the migrant languages in this context. The beginning of the “mother tongue + 2” policy of the EU is dated back to 1984 - this fact is often overlooked and thus is particularly important to mention. Moreover, the authors interpret the 1995 White Paper on Education and Training: Teaching and Learning. Towards the Learning Society as being the first document to address language learning not only for pupils but for all Europeans. However, this turn in EU plurilingualism policy, in my opinion, took place later - in 2002 with the Barcelona decision of the European Council. The mentioned White Paper, however, addresses for the first time the EU commission’s acknowledgement of the “mother tongue + 2” aim and emphasizes that foreign language learning should not be limited to two languages. Disregarding these minor issues, the chapter clearly points out the diversity of foreign language knowledge as pursued by the EU and the existing contradiction with the real politics, e.g. when the European Indicator of Language Competence is being applied to only five most widespread languages in the EU. The authors tackle the issue of the linguistic minority policy, whose roots date back to the early 1980s, and the emerging ethno-linguistic regionalism in Western Europe. This “regionalist crisis” (31) has finally lead to the Community Charter of Regional Languages and Cultures, which was finally taken up in the Lisbon Treaty. The authors point out critically that the charter rejects migrant languages


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explicitly. In this respect they emphasize that “migrants are actually excluded from the equality principle” (46). They nevertheless conclude that “the EU is more than ever committed to including the migrant languages into its multilingualism framework” (36).The subsequent chapter aims to present the EU institutional regime. Here, the authors mention that this institutional regime is not clearly regulated and causes problems when using ‘less widely used’ language. The authors conclude that this regime has a rather “symbolic weight since the everyday practice reflects the leading political role of the powerful states in the EU”. However, as other research indicates, all languages except English are under pressure due to the lack of clear regulations. The concluding subchapter “Positions and challenges” discusses the position of migrants and their languages under the EU language policy and comprises some open questions, which encourage further research. Although the authors seem to be uncritical about the quoted documentations, in this chapter they draw a picture of the most important developments within the EU language policy. Noteworthy, a more critical review of such policy can be found in the concluding chapter of the book. The second main chapter presents multilingualism as a field of research. The authors position this research between being the ground for political planning and being placed in a frame set up by policy making. This dialectic relationship of politics and research is estimated as problematic. As far as the research field itself is concerned, the chapter is dedicated to its high multidisciplinarity: minority languages, diglossia, language maintenance and shift, languages acquisition and learning, code switching, borrowing and mixing, pidgins and creoles, language politics and planning, languages attitudes and ideology or intercultural communication. The chapter thus reflects the difficulty of defining what multilingualism research is. According to the authors, there are several factors which explain this difficulty: it is a relatively young research topic; it is a strongly bi-lingual orientated topic; it has been a marginalized topic in the field of general linguistics; in Europe, it has been strongly driven by EU and EEC policies and it was methodologically dominated by a North-American paradigm of languages in contact; language learning has been lately integrated as an integrative and not only as a sub-part of multilingualism research. The chapter describes this scientific fragmentation as a result of different funding interests and different theoretical perspectives. The latter brings us to the main part of the book: the theoretical and methodological integration of the LINEE project. Chapter three, called ‘The LINEE Project’, presents the structure of LINEE and describes the “analytical backbone” (60) of the project. The four thematic areas are covered here: ‘Language, Identity and Culture’, Language Policy and Planning’, Multilingualism and Education’ and ‘Language and Economy’. As mentioned above, 12 Working Packages covered these areas. These WPs in turn consist of several thematic areas. The task of WP0, and of this book, though, is to

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“integrate the work conducted within the WPs” (62). The chapter thus aims to defragment the scientific space. Therefore it presents a research platform tackling three major issues: it discusses the relevant theoretical and methodological issues; it identifies and assesses transversal issues, and it proposes new strategic lines of research. The subsequent subchapters focus on the above mentioned recurrent variables. All these chapters are divided into four paragraphs: 1) a theoretical dimension providing general explanation of the specific variables or terms; 2) the terms used within LINEE; 3) the terms used in the thematic areas; 4) a conclusion. Here we can see that these terms are commonly used in a great variety of meanings. The authors tend to understand ‘culture’ in a constructionist way associated with primordialist views. The term ‘discourse’ is connected with the interactional ‘language in use’ perspective within the project. ‘Identity’ is seen as a diverse and changing phenomenon in the field. The concept identity interacts strongly with all other features. The project reveals many diverse or competing ‘ideologies’, which are mainly articulated through ‘discourse’. ‘Knowledge’ is seen as a contribution to the shape of European multilingualism. ‘Language policy and planning’ is observed as a comprehensive category which points out the pragmatic dimension of multilingualism. ‘Multi-competence’ appears to be in conflict with the economic restriction of selected languages. The term ‘power and conflict’ plays a role in all thematic areas and is closely interconnected with all others, although it is not explicitly conceptualized. The authors argue that the broad scope of LINEE did not allow to go beyond the general itemization of the common concepts. In addition to the theoretical dimensions, the next chapter addresses the methodological issues arising within LINEE and discusses the methods used within the different thematic areas characterized as transdisciplinary. The authors acknowledge that “methods must contribute to answering the research questions and deal with validity threats to these answers” (147). By explaining different methodological approaches, they situate the overall project in a qualitative framework “the ‘here’ and ‘now’ present day phenomena” (149). Another major focus of WP0 was to combine various methods of data collection used in different research areas. The authors observe that different methods – the paradigm model, mixed methods and triangulation - have been used side by side, and they reject the hypothesis that such research methods might be incompatible. In the following, the authors present some general outcomes of LINEE. They conclude that European multilingualism remains a vague concept, which is conceptualized within the scope of human rights and the language equality principle and is to be seen as an economic capital. They point out the lack of the coherency in the perception of this concept. The authors remark critically: “Since the equality of languages is a guiding principle of the EU politics of diversity, it may at times be instrumentalised as substantial part of political correctness. In this


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function, however, it would be further reduced to an empty wording merely promoting politically correct talk about the diverse languages” (156). Further critical remarks comprise the lack of regulations for ‘legitimate’ plurilingual competences and the weak implementing power of EU language policy. Another issue they mention is the increasing national commitment for minority languages, whereas the language knowledge by migrants is mostly considered to be insufficient. The authors conclude that the monolingual ideologies in the nation state schools undermine the EU endeavors towards multicompetences. As far as the fear that English would become the only dominant ‘Lingua franca’ is concerned, the authors emphasize that this fear has no grounds since English is recognized as a tool for multilingual communication “without comprising speakers’ motivation for learning or using other languages” (159). Unfortunately, the chapter does not provide references for these very interesting results. The last chapter covers the topic of multilingualism beyond LINEE. It asks whether one of the symbols of the EU “Unity in Diversity” can be reached by adopting the present language policy of distinct and compartmentalized national languages. The authors argue that identity and culture are part of historically unstable processes. The use of a certain language does not imply a certain national identity. The subsequent chapter tackles the language equality principle, which should enable the establishment of an equal representation of all official EU languages. However, at present this is not the case. The above-mentioned Regulation No. 1 allows institutions to develop their own working language rules neglecting this overall principle. Another important point is that minority and migrant languages, according to the authors, “largely remain excluded from this principle” (165). The authors claim a basic rethinking of this principle. In the following the authors focus on the different intersections of the eight concepts. The chapter aims to provide a better assessment of these concepts. ‘Knowledge’ and ‘discourse’ are identified as the main terms, and the multi-layered dynamics of these terms is shown. Furthermore, the close interaction of ‘identity’, ‘culture’, and ‘ideology’ emerges. Here, the contradiction of the dynamic equality principle of the EU and the restriction through national policies is revealed. The national policies still promote the homogeneous nature of identity and culture. In the Conclusion the authors one more time point out the fact that the key areas of EU language policy are Linguistic Minorities, Regional- and Immigrant Languages and the Linguistic Regime of the EU Institutions. The authors acknowledge that research in this area is fragmented in themes, theories and methodologies, and they rightly stress that, with this book, a contribution to the defragmentation of the research field is done. One can conclude from this work that the concept of European multilingualism is more than just the sum of all languages. The authors bring up some key questions for further research concerning the ideological basis of the European multilingualism. The first question refers to the

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market-based capitalization of languages, which would interfere with the principle of the equal status for all languages. Further, the authors of the book raise a question what the ‘legitimate’ plurilingual repertoire should look like. To be able to provide an answer to this question, they suggest searching for dynamic and flexible repertoires instead of predefined inventory. And finally, they again point out the role of minorities’ and migrant languages and ask how these languages can be integrated in the EU framework of diversity. In sum, this book is a substantial contribution to further understanding of the correlation of core research issues of multilingualism policies in Europe. It allows an illuminative insight into the theoretical and methodological issues and challenges in such a large multifaceted research project as LINEE. The book should be recognized as a valuable body of experience and as an important guideline for future projects of that kind.

Acta Universitatis Sapientiae, European and Regional Studies, 3 (2013) 114-115

Study Visit to Budapest for the Students of International Relations and European Studies Specialisation, Faculty of Sciences and Arts, Cluj-Napoca, Sapientia Hungarian University of Transylvania

The policy of the Department of Juridical Sciences and European Studies of our university is not only to teach about different public institutions at European, national, regional and local level but also to show these to students in real life as well. This is the motivation for organising study visits to different locations every year. This semester the Department organised a study visit to Budapest, between 19th-23rd November, for the interested International Relations and European Studies Specialisation 1st, 2nd and 3rd year BA students. In the programme we included the visit of several public institutions: political and legal as well as academic institutions and universities. In the Hungarian Parliament our students had a guided tour of the building and were given a presentation on how the Parliament works. We also had the opportunity to visit the Budapest Bar Association and learn about its functioning. The director of the Research Institute for Hungarian Communities Abroad presented to the students the institution and its work. We also had guided visits of several universities – such as the Eötvös Loránd University, the Pázmány Péter Catholic University, the Corvinus University of Budapest and the Central European University – and their libraries. Our goal with these visits is to help students get interested in entering different mobility programmes and apply for scholarships abroad, either during their BA or during their MA studies. Seeing for themselves these different universities they can choose the perfect fit for their studies abroad in the near future. It is also important that they can apply for several mobility programmes, and starting from September 2013, they will have the possibility to take part in the most well known European mobility program, the ERASMUS, as the Sapientia 114


Hungarian University of Transylvania, following its accreditation, signed the ERASMUS Extended University Charter several months ago. Further targets of our study visit were several institutions of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences, Centre for Social Sciences: the Institute for Minority Studies, the Institute for Political Science and the Institute for Sociology. Thirty students and three members of the teaching staff participated in this trip. According to students’ feedback, Budapest was a good choice for a study visit, very informative and helpful from many perspectives.

Tünde Székely, Department of Juridical sciences and European studies

Acta Universitatis Sapientiae, European and Regional Studies, 3 (2013) 116-117

Political Science Summer Camp at Torockó/Rimetea

Between the 5th and 8th of July 2012, the 11th Students’ Summer Camp at Torockó/Rimetea took place. The event was organised by the Hungarian Political Science Association in Romania - POLITEIA, the Eötvös Loránd University Institute of Political Sciences and the KoMPOT, the Association of Hungarian Students of Political Sciences of Kolozsvár/Cluj. The participants were students of political sciences from the Eötvös Loránd and Babeş-Bolyai Universities, as well as the students of International Relations from the Sapientia Hungarian University of Transylvania. A number of very informative scientific presentations were held and several members of the Transylvanian and Hungarian political life visited the camp. Associate professors Miklós Bakk and Barna Bodó discussed the situation of Transylvania in their presentation. András A. Gergely’s and Krisztina Arató’s papers raised further questions mainly concerning the roles assumed by the civil society in Transylvania. The presentation by Alpár Zoltán Szász on democracy and the Romanian parties and party system created the grounds for the understanding of the following papers detailing the very specific problems of the current political situation in Romania. The political scientist István Gergő Székely analysed the local elections in Romania, while Gergő Illyés, also political scientist, presented Romania’s new election law and its consequences. Associate professors Sándor Pesti and Emőd Veress detailed the specificities of the Hungarian and Romanian constitution. The seriousness of the scientific proceedings was slightly broken by the humorous but still very important and informative dialogue of the two Kolozsvár/Cluj mayoral election candidates’ discussion. A specific element was the students’ section, where talented young researchers had the opportunity to present the results of their work. 116


A wide variety of leisure time activities made the programme more colourful. The brave participants of the camp had the chance to climb the 1,129 meter high SzÊkelykő in the summer heat, and then to get acquainted with the taste of the wines of Nagyenyed/Aiud. The camp proved a good opportunity not only for professional discussions but also for the formation of new friendships across the border.

NoĂŠmi Hegyi 3 year student, International Relations and European Studies rd

Information for authors Acta Universitatis Sapientiae, European and Regional Studies publishes original papers and surveys concerning the historical development, the economic, societal, political and philosophical dimensions of the European integration project. The European and Regional Studies provides an independent forum for informed debate and discussion of European affairs. All papers are peer-reviewed. Papers published in current and previous volumes can be found in Portable Document Format (pdf) form at the address: The submitted papers should not be considered for publication by other journals. The corresponding author is responsible for obtaining the permission of coauthors and of the authorities of institutes, if needed, for publication, the Editorial Board disclaims any responsibility. The paper should be submitted both in Word.doc and pdf format. The submitted pdf document will be used as reference. The camera ready journal will be prepared in pdf format by the editors. An accurate formatting is required in order to reduce subsequent changes of aspect to a minimum. The paper should be prepared on A4 paper (210 x 297 mm) and it must contain an abstract not exceeding 100 words. Only papers written in English will be published in the journal (please use English spell-check). Use the template file at for details. Submission must be made by e-mail ( only. One issue is offered each author free of charge. No reprints will be available.

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European and Regional Studies Vol. 3, 2013