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COSTA RICA: A STRUCTURAL APPROACH
7KH SUR ODERU SUR UHIRUP &DOGHUyQ DGPLQLVWUDWLRQ WKXV RSHQHG WKH Ă RRGgates on all of the political pressures that had been building up over the past two GHFDGHV :KLOH D XQLĂ€HG HOLWH KDG PDQDJHG WR PDLQWDLQ WKH VWDWXV TXR WKURXJKRXW the interwar years even in the face of increased labor struggle, “the elite divided as WKH SRSXODU FODVVHV VWDUWHG WR RUJDQL]H PRUH YLJRURXVO\Âľ LQ WKH Ă€UVW \HDUV RI &DOGHrĂłn’s presidency.82 In many ways, CalderĂłn’s reforms merely served as the catalyst for political change. The alignment of interests between elites and the working class upon which Costa Rican democratic stability had been based throughout the Liberal Regime had shattered during the twenties and thirties. With CalderĂłn’s reforms, this HYHU ZLGHQLQJ VSOLW HYROYHG LQWR LQWHQVH FODVV DQG SROLWLFDO FRQĂ LFW WKDW HYHQWXDOO\ OHG to the 1948 civil war. The CalderĂłn era was marked not only by a division between elites and the working class, but also by a series of disagreements within the oligarchy itself. This “precipitated a scramble for political allies that ultimately pitted areform movement spearheaded by President CalderĂłn, the communists, and the archbishop of San JosĂŠ against an opposition alliance composed of the conservative faction of the oligarchy and middle- and upper-middle-class members of the Social Democratic Party.â€?83 There are a number of parallels between the CalderĂłn era and the 1917 military coup, not the least of which is “the striking multiclass coalitions that ‌ formed on the EDVLV RI FRPPRQO\ LGHQWLĂ€HG HQHPLHV UDWKHU WKDQ SURJUDPPDWLF VRFLRSROLWLFDO DQG economic objectives,â€? which allowed them to “temporarily overlook their internal FRQĂ LFWLQJ SROLWLFDO SURMHFWV Âľ84 Consuelo Cruz points out that this period was characterized by a competition among competing factions to frame their ideologies within the political rhetoric of la tica. Republican standard bearer Ricardo JimĂŠnez wrote in 1945: “Our people instinctively repudiate [the communists’] violent lexicon. In other environments this [lexicon] might be appropriate, but [in Costa Rica] it merely inspires fear and caution.â€?85 &RPPXQLVW OHDGHU 0DQXHO 0RUD LQ DQ DGGUHVV WR WKH &RPPXQLVW UDQN DQG Ă€OH VDLG that the Communist Party needed to pursue its goals “realistically, taking into account the level of education of our masses, their political and philosophical traditions. This is what it means to do revolution in Costa Rica. All the rest is low-grade utopianism. . . . Costa Ricans need a Costa Rican brand of communism.â€?86 Both groups attempted to frame themselves as inherently democratic, keeping in line with the unique tica brand of democracy and civility while simultaneously attempting to cast the other group as anathema to the tica way. According to Cruz’s theory, however, this rhetorical IUDPLQJ VKRXOG KDYH PRGHUDWHG WKH SROLWLFDO FRQĂ LFW LQ D ZD\ WKDW ZRXOG KDYH DOORZHG the country to avoid civil war and maintain democratic stability. Revolution, as even Mora would admit, is not the tica way. There is certainly some legitimacy to Cruz’s argument. The debate was framed in a way that emphasized the civility and democratic character of the Costa Rican people, but in order to understand why that civility and democratic character broke down, we must look beyond cultural attitudes toward the structural changes in the Costa Rican political economy. The years leading up to the 1948 civil war were characterized by a number