activities, by partnering with leading international oil companies through PSAs. Table 1.6 presents the shareholders and operators by producing block. With time, Sonangol began expanding its activities beyond Angola. The first subsidiary was established in London in 1983; Sonangol Limited was responsible for direct trading of nearly 40 percent of the production (Oliveira 2007). In 1991 the company undertook a restructuring of its growing business. A holding was created, and the principal line of business became subsidiaries. Overall, Sonangol has emerged from a postcolonial era and a 27-year-long civil war to drive the country’s oil sector economy into 29 joint ventures and multiple subsidiaries (Lwanda 2011), with more than 8,000 employees across the globe in 2008 (CRES 2008). The company has ventured into drilling, fabrication, transportation, industrial supplies and infrastructure, distribution, storage services; banking, food retail, and catering; and civil engineering and real estate development. Table 1.6 Angola: Company Share and Operator (in Gray), by Producing Blocks (%)
Sonangol
Block 3
Block 0
Block 2
3/05
Sonangol P&P
41.00
25.00
25.00
Total
10.00
3/85 and 3/91 6.25 50.00
Canuku
Block 14
100.00
20.00 20.00
BP IOCs
Block 15
39.20
ENI
9.80
20.00
16.67
12.00
15.00
20.00
20.00 40.00
20.00
Sonangol Sinopec
50.00
China Sonangol
25.00
STATOIL PETROBRAS
13.33
23.33
27.50
AJOCO Independents
50.00
31.00
Esso
NOCs
Block 18
40.00 26.67
Chevron
Block 17
20.00
SOMOIL
9.30
POLIEDRO, S.A.
9.10
KOTOIL, S.A.
9.10
12.50
10.00
NATGAS
4.00
5.00
INA-NAFTA
4.00
5.00
GALP
9.00
SVENSKA
6.25
Source:Based on data from Sonangol 2012. Note: IOCs = international oil companies; NOCs = national oil companies. 1.2.6 Management of Petroleum Wealth
Angola’s oil wealth has not been efficiently managed to the benefit of the economy and the population at large. The country has so far not instituted an oil fund, nor has it publicly designated a methodology for the management of oil revenues. In fact, the management of oil revenues has been characterized as illusive, lacking transparency, often fraudulent, and endowed with a certain degree of political motivation. High poverty levels in addition to the country’s overall poor infrastructure are visible proof of the poor management of oil revenues. Over the years, several issues have been brought to the limelight by international economic and monitoring bodies such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and Human Rights Watch (HRW), which claim the unlawful appropriation of oil revenues. Issues include Sonangol’s unaccounted-for sums between 1996 and 2001, which totaled $10 billion, and unlawful donations by oil companies to the Fundacao Eduardo dos Santos (Foundation of Eduardo Santos) to maintain a good relationship with the authorities (Andre 2010).
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