perspective of many: “Business brought in by a sector stays in the sector… There isn’t even a point in the system when the possibility of cross-sectoral or cross-regional teamwork can be considered.”
Conclusions on Efficiency and Effectiveness of Quality Assurance Systems In this section, the evaluation draws conclusions regarding achievement of the intermediate outcome. The efficiency and effectiveness of the matrix system in achieving this outcome has been suboptimal, and the matrix objectives of improved quality, collaboration, and teamwork have not been achieved. Systems for accountability and quality control are more developed for lending operations than for knowledge products and are weak for NLTA, the fastest growing segment among nonlending services. Despite the intent to move away from a lending bank, the widespread recognition of lending approvals as the primary indicator of success by managers and staff alike is incontestable. This is reinforced both through informal incentives and in recognition and career advancement rewards. Feedback from staff and managers alike indicates that the Bank’s quality control systems focus more on fiduciary and safeguard risks with relatively less attention to other aspects of quality. The selection of peer reviewers is not well managed and end-of-year pressures undermine the potential value of peer review feedback, as there is hardly enough time to address substantial comments.. Quality enhancement reviews are a more effective mechanism to address quality, but they are optional and are often not timely. The checks and balances created by a mechanism, independent of line management, to take periodic stock of the robustness of the Bank’s quality assurance system, disappeared with the dissolution of QAG in 2010. An alternate mechanism has not yet been put in place. Quality assurance systems are better for lending than ESW and weakest for NLTA. NLTA therefore has widely varying quality. QAG reviews of AAA are the main source of evidence on AAA quality used in the Knowledge Report. With QAG disbanded, the Bank has lost its sole mechanism for autonomous review of portfolio quality. Staff lack incentives to focus on quality since outcomes of operations and knowledge work are de-linked from the Bank’s current performance management system. Financing and budgetary incentives also militate against high-quality client services and results. The regional sector units, responsible for operational delivery, are receiving a decreasing share of regional budgets. The squeeze on SMU budgets adversely effects quality, especially in the context of escalating lending targets and the growth of more demanding, middle-income countries in recent years. It creates a perverse incentive to mobilize trust funds but creates inefficiencies through an unwanted burden on sector technical staff both for fund-raising and for multiple, sometimes duplicative reporting for
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The Matrix System at Work