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Module 3: Policy Options for Competitiveness and Case Studies
Box 3.7. (continued)
Cameroon: Customs Integrity Initiative Within the Cameroonian context, customs is perceived as one of the institutions with the most important problems of transparency. A new program financed by the World Bank and introduced in 2006 was designed to strengthen the chain of command by holding each link accountable—with the assistance of activity, performance, control, and risk indicators—to improve understanding of activities on the ground, to provide an effective decision-making tool, and to reduce corruption in customs. Cameroon Customs had already carried out steps to strengthen accountability. They included the regular publication of revenue collection data, increased contacts with the business community, automation through the use of ASYCUDA software, and reduced information asymmetry through the use of individual performance indicators. The head of Customs still wanted to initiate a second wave of reforms to change the behaviors of frontline officials and to reduce corruption and increase performance. Accordingly, she commissioned the development of an integrity action plan with a specific focus on human resources policies through a monitoring and incentive framework. A pilot was set up and performance contracts for the two largest customs stations were designed. In early February 2010—following a dialogue among frontline officers and senior management—individual and team performance contracts with measurable indicators were signed. Each inspector’s performance was to be assessed through eight indicators: four related to trade facilitation and four related to the customs clearance process and fines. For each indicator, a maximum or minimum value was set based on median monthly values in the three preceding years. An inspector achieved his or her contract if he or she improved performance by 15 percent on all indicators after the six-month pilot period. For inspectors below 100 percent contract performance, a system was established that began with warnings and interviews and failure to meet performance goals can lead to the inspector’s transfer to another customs station. For the best performing inspectors, a limited financial bonus was granted, along with nonfinancial recognition. Frontline officers, as well as middle management, supported the initiative because they wanted their performance to be assessed on the basis of objective criteria. Early results show that performance contracts have led to decreased clearance times and reduced poor practices, with revenues maintained at the same level as before. Moreover, the contracts have contributed to increased information flow from inspectors to the Head of Customs. Source: World Bank 2011a.
Trans-Kalahari Corridor: Document Standardization and Simplification The Trans-Kalahari Corridor (TKC), the road route between Gauteng province (South Africa) and Walvis Bay (Namibia) via Botswana was opened in 1998, replacing the traditional longer route through western South Africa. Despite major road rehabilitation in 1999, traffic reached only 15 percent of the expected capacity. The major obstacles occurred at the border crossings. This led the TKC Corridor Management Group to seek a partnership with the customs administrations of Botswana, Namibia, and South Africa. This partnership resulted in agreements (October 2000) to extend the operating hours of customs at the Namibia–Botswana border from 22 to 24 hours to enable loading and unloading in Windhoek and crossing the border in the same day. In August 2003, the TKC started a pilot phase to replace all existing transport documents with a single administrative document (SAD). To complement this effort, South African Customs developed a website with details on the SAD process. Border processing times were cut by more than half, from an average time of 45 minutes to 10–20 minutes. According to the US Agency for International Development (USAID) estimates, reduced border delays created savings of $2.6 million per year along the corridor. As a result, the route became economical, and traffic flows increased. Operators were moving about 620,000 tons annually along the TKC, about 65 percent of expected capacity, until the Botswanan government increased road user charges in February 2004. In some cases, road charges were multiplied by a factor of 10. The customs problem had been settled; but following this unilateral decision affecting the transport sector, traffic decreased significantly. Source: World Bank 2004.
Module 3
Northern Corridor Stakeholders Consultation Forum: Trade Facilitation Committees Since 1999, officials dealing with transport, transit, and private operators along the Northern Corridor (including Ministry of Transport, Ministry of Trade, customs agencies, exporters, and importers associations, and so on) have been regularly meeting twice a year to discuss transit issues. This private-public sector alliance has produced the following positive developments: • Elimination of charges on imports routed through the port of Mombasa (by Kenya Bureau of Standards and the Kenya Plant Health Inspectorate Service) • Development of a one-stop processing center • Reduction of the number of required stamps to go through Mombasa port (from 21 to 11) As a result of this forum, national transit and trade facilitation committees are being established in the region. Private sector participation has been extended to include insurance clearing agents, bank associations, the shippers’ council, and the like. Publicprivate partnerships to tackle trade and transport facilitation are also being established in West Africa. Source: World Bank 2004.