Trade Remedy Provisions
189
Table 9.5. Cross-Tabulation of Contingent Protection Rules, by Hub (percent) Full sample (74 PTAs)
EU (21 PTAs)
EFTA (12 PTAs)
Mexico (9 PTAs)
United States (9 PTAs)
Singapore (6 PTAs)
Chile (5 PTAs)
Australia (5 PTAs)
Canada (4 PTAs)
Antidumping Disallowed No rules Rules
12.2 24.3 63.5
9.5 9.5 81.0
33.3 0.0 66.7
0.0 22.2 77.8
0.0 88.9 11.1
16.7 50.0 33.3
20.0 40.0 40.0
20.0 20.0 60.0
25.0 25.0 50.0
Countervailing duties Disallowed No rules Rules
6.8 40.5 52.7
9.5 52.4 38.1
16.7 0.0 83.3
0.0 22.2 77.8
0.0 66.7 33.3
0.0 66.7 33.3
0.0 40.0 60.0
0.0 40.0 60.0
0.0 50.0 50.0
Global safeguards Disallowed No rules Rules
0.0 60.8 39.2
0.0 76.2 23.8
0.0 83.3 16.7
0.0 11.1 88.9
0.0 11.1 88.9
0.0 66.7 33.3
0.0 0.0 100.0
0.0 60.0 40.0
0.0 0.0 100.0
Bilateral safeguards Disallowed No rules Rules
6.8 5.4 87.8
4.8 4.8 90.5
0.0 0.0 100.0
0.0 0.0 100.0
0.0 0.0 100.0
33.3 0.0 66.7
0.0 0.0 100.0
20.0 0.0 80.0
25.0 0.0 75.0
United States
Singapore
Chile
Australia
Canada
X
X X
X
Provision
Source: Author’s compilation. Notes: EFTA, European Free Trade Association; EU, European Union; PTA, preferential trade agreement.
Table 9.6. Antidumping Template for Selected PTA Hubs Provision A. Antidumping actions disallowed B. Antidumping actions allowed, but with no specific provisions C. Antidumping actions allowed, with specific provisions 1. Mutually acceptable solution 2. Different de minimis dumping margin 3. Different de minimis dumping volume 4. Lesser-duty rule 5. Different duration of antidumping duty 6. Regional body or committee a. Conducts investigations and decides on antidumping duties b. Reviews or remands final determinations c. Other
EU
EFTA
X X
X X
X
X
Mexico
X
Source: Author’s elaboration. Note: EFTA, European Free Trade Association; EU, European Union; PTA, preferential trade agreement. Regional hubs are checked if at least 50 percent of their PTAs include the specific provision.
Mexico, there is little support for prohibiting countervailing duties or even including CVD provisions in regional agreements. Of the five hubs that tend to have countervailing duty rules—EFTA, Mexico, Chile, Australia, and Canada—four have also negotiated restrictions on agricultural subsidies (table 9.7). As discussed earlier, developments on
countervailing duties may depend on progress on subsidization, and it is likely that substantial progress on subsidization will only come via a multilateral format. Interestingly, only two hubs (EFTA and Mexico) include the same provision in most of their agreements. By chance, the one provision again involves rather weak language about a “mutually acceptable solution.” This