292
Index
investment climate in African SEZs (continued) performance evaluation (see performance factors in SEZs) sectors invested in, 135 sources of investments, 135 study methodology, 134 survey findings, 148 tariffs and preferences, 142–44 tax levels, 146–47 transport and trade facilitation, 139–41, 142f utilities, 136–39 investment promotion authority (IPA), 202 investments in African SEZs comparative advantage and investment in free zones, 78 data collection, 70 enclave versus single factory zone models, 72–73 FDI statistics, 70–71 number of active SEZ licensed firms, 71–72 principal industries of operation, 77 reasons for low FDI, 76–77 sources of, 73, 74f, 75–76, 77f IPC (Instituto Politécnico Centroamericano), 231–32 Ireland, 34 Island of Delos, 31–32 Israel, 36
J Jamaica, 35 Jebel Ali Free Zone Authority (JAFZA), 39, 160 Jordan, 36, 39, 203
K Kaohsiung Export Processing Zone, Taiwan-China, 196 Kenya business regulatory environment in zones, 142–44 customs and trade issues impacting zones, 139–42 dynamic outcomes in zones, 87–95 employment statistics in the zones, 84–86 export levels related to zones, 78–84 labor rights in zones, 234
lack of a flexible policy framework, 155 monitoring the performance of zones, 234–35 overall performance, 103–09 private sector participation, 189–93 promotion of linkages with the local economy, 229 SEZ investment outcomes, 70–78 socioeconomic outcomes in zones, 96–103 success of SEZs, 18 tariffs and preferences, 144–46 tax levels, 146–47 timing of promotional efforts, 204 utilities considerations in zones, 137, 138 Korea, Republic of, 75
L land and development practices in zones acquisition, resettlement, and compensation problems, 214 overcoming land access constraints, 208–09 problems caused by setting aside large tracts of land, 212–14 success tied to location, 209–12, 213 La Romana Free Zone, 35, 37 Latin America. See also Dominican Republic; Honduras development of private sector zones, 37 launch of export processing zones, 35 scope of SEZs, 42–44 legal and regulatory framework in zones avoidance of institutional conflict, 168, 169 collective action advantages versus fiscal incentives, 179, 182 consequences of fiscal incentives, 174–75, 176 de facto situation’s influence, 172 delineation of roles and responsibilities of key actors, 168, 170, 171t, 172 flexibility requirement, 166–67 phasing out of fiscal incentives, 178–79 physical master plan importance, 165–66 relevance of fiscal incentives, 173, 174t