released for exit. This additional layer of control— and possible corruption—has no use other than to relieve existing state agencies (which may have limited resources) of general policing duties. In Israel border station security is handled by the agency in charge of airport security. While technically viable, this solution has led to the fragmentation of border station work and to the duplication of work by security and customs. International access roads
International access roads pose a problem at juxtaposed border stations distant from the borderline. Vehicles cleared out of such stations by destination country officials must still drive on roads located in the territory of the departure country. During that period the vehicles technically remain in the country out of which they have been cleared. Difficulties may arise in accidents, highway code violations, and cases of customs fraud: which country has judicial responsibility for these cases? Three solutions are possible: • The road can be extraterritorialized. The access road is considered part of the destination country, whose law exclusively applies from the exit of the border station to the borderline. The road should be fenced off to prevent unlawful re-entry into the territory of the departure country. • The road can be internationalized. The access road, though fenced off or otherwise controlled, is under the jurisdiction of the country on which it is located. If the departure country decides to intercept a person or vehicle that has already cleared exit and destination formalities, there could be an international issue: all earlier measures regarding exit and entry procedures would need to be annulled, including penalties already addressed. The traveler could argue that, even though the laws of the departure country were violated, there was no violation of the destination country’s laws—and, further, that destination country authorities knew of the violation yet allowed the traveler to proceed. • The road can be functionally extraterritorial. To simplify control, the access road is fenced off and destination country border authorities will undertake no control action along it—but all other national laws apply right up to the borderline, and purely national authorities are competent to
Borders, their design, and their operation
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enforce them. A traveler or vehicle leaving the access road for the country on which the road is located is considered as having crossed the border illegally. Ethics
Corruption is regularly associated with border operations. Examples of petty corruption include payments to a policeman to move up in a long queue, or to a control officer to avoid physical examination or speed a process—not to mention routine goodwill payments to border officials. Other forms of corruption involve more serious criminal activities. Customs is the border agency most vulnerable to corruption allegations. That is not because other agencies are blameless, but because payments to customs appear higher on average than payments to any other agency. The purpose of this section is not to discuss corruption generally, but simply to envision how it can be dealt with in border infrastructure design. What control mechanisms should be put in place? Border station design can discourage petty corruption. Shorter queues mean fewer reasons for bribing officials. Green lanes and fast tracks should allow some, ideally most, drivers to pass through without even speaking to an official. Isolated control areas—where there are no witnesses to corruption—should be avoided in planning border stations. Strict monitoring of access roads prevents trucks from waiting for a change of shift before entering stations. Juxtaposed stations allow countries to ensure that similar data are reported on both sides. And hotlines, if well managed, enable drivers who are harassed by control officials to alert customs or another agency immediately. Corruption cases should not be investigated by the local border police. The border police agency’s mandate should not include fighting corruption in customs. Why? Because border police officers may be corrupt. Internal control and investigation, followed eventually by judicial investigation, usually is a more effective approach—and it avoids stigmatizing customs by subjecting it to the agency next door. Administration of the facility
New border stations are expensive to build, equip, and maintain. In modern, coordinated border