Holding Government Accountable through Informal Institutions 317
goods and services than they would otherwise get without this kind of informal system—but perhaps not as much as they would get if there was a system of formal accountability to make sure that higher levels of government also contributed resources and took responsibility for providing local public goods. By relieving pressure on the state in the short term, this kind of informal system may help to forestall reforms to the formal institutional system that would be more beneficial to both citizens and the state in the long term.
Notes 1. This chapter has been adapted from Tsai (2007b). 2. Although the central government officially refers to village governments as “self-governing organizations,” village governments are widely considered part of the state apparatus by higher-level officials, village officials, and citizens themselves. Village governments collect state taxes, enforce state directives such as the birth control policy, and provide village public goods and services. 3. Tsai (2007a) describes these villages in greater depth in a controlled case study comparison. 4. For a more detailed account of measurement and analysis, see Tsai (2007b). 5. Others have also discussed the differences between democracy and accountability (see, for example, Przeworski, Stokes, and Manin 1999).
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