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Africa’s ICT Infrastructure
competing operators build networks in different parts of the country and then agree to swap capacity on their networks; and (2) route swapping, in which operators with competing networks along the same routes swap capacity or fibers on those routes. In other countries, examples are seen of joint network construction projects in which competing operators plan and execute fiber-optic network rollout projects together. In South Africa and Tanzania, for example, competing operators are collaborating on joint national fiber-optic backbone projects, and in Zambia, MTN and Zain are collaborating on a joint fiber-optic network in the capital, Lusaka. These cooperative arrangements can increase the geographical coverage of networks, lower costs, and improve service quality by providing operators alternate routes for traffic in the event of technical problems on their own networks. Unlike mobile networks in the region that cover large segments of the population, competition among fiber-optic network operators is concentrated on the most profitable routes—those that connect major population centers and those that connect to the landing points of submarine fiber-optic cables in countries that have them. In Sudan, for example, the landing point for fiber-optic cables is Port Sudan, which is not the main population center, but competition is seen between backbone networks on the Khartoum–Port Sudan route (figure 3.6). The high up-front investment costs involved in fiber-optic backbone networks make them commercially viable only in areas where traffic levels are high or are likely to increase (Milad and Ramarao 2006). Fiberoptic networks connecting small towns and villages therefore seem unlikely without some form of government intervention (Williams 2010). African governments are experimenting with different types of such interventions. In Kenya, the government is supporting network investment in areas off the main trunk routes connecting Mombasa to Nairobi and from Nairobi to the borders of Tanzania and Uganda, while in Rwanda, the government’s construction of a national backbone network, which included additional ducting to facilitate private operators in building their networks, should boost competition. In Ghana, the government invested in extending the fiber-optic network controlled by the stateowned electricity transmission utility (the Volta River Authority [VRA]) and then included the communications assets in the privatization of the incumbent telecommunications operator, Ghana Telecom. The challenge facing all these schemes is how to use public resources to boost overall investment in backbone networks without displacing private investment or adversely affecting competition.