Abyei referendum international observers final report nov 2013 by Wau Diocese

Final Report of the International Observers to the Abyei Area Community Referendum

November 2013

Contents Foreword ...................................................................................................3 Executive Summary .................................................................................4 Overview of Observation Mission ......................................................5 Background ..........................................................................................7 Referendum Management ......................................................................10 Voter Registration ...............................................................................12 Preparations for Polling ......................................................................16 The Voter Registry Distribution of Sensitive Materials Polling .................................................................................................19 Counting .................................................................................................25 Conclusions and Recommendations ....................................................29

Foreword The Abyei Area Community Referendum has been judged as “unilateral”, even “illegal” 1 by many who were not present during the process and have little idea of what actually took place in Abyei Area. Too many condemnations have been hasty. It would have been better, in our opinion, if those who condemned the referendum had first enquired as to the conditions and procedures under which and by it was carried out. The African Union (AU) should make a judgement as to what extent the Ngok Dinka successfully implemented its own proposal on the basis of evidence, rather than issuing an a priori statement. We hope that this report can provide the much-needed evidence that is required in reaching decisions as to how to react to the Abyei Area Community Referendum, and that those actors who have made hasty judgements will revise their opinion in the light of it. We note the current uncertainty regarding the way forward and hope that if any referendum is held in Abyei Area in the future, lessons will be learnt from the Abyei Area Community Referendum and from this report, that will strengthen any future process. We, like the African Union Peace and Security Council (AUPSC), hope to see peace, security and stability promoted in the region,2 but believe that ignoring, misrepresenting or failing to properly acknowledge the Abyei Area Community Referendum will aggravate the situation on the ground and create a barrier to the resolution of the final status of Abyei. We appeal to all to judge the Abyei Area Community Referendum on the evidence and revise current positions in the light of that evidence. Humility and the willingness to revise opinions is the first requirement of an evidencebased approach.

Hannah Cross and Tim Flatman November 2013

1 2

African Union, “Press Release: The African Union Strongly Condemns the Holding of a Unilateral ‘Referendum’ in Abyei,” October 28, 2013. African Union Peace and Security Council, “405th Meeting Press Statement,” November 6, 2013.

Executive Summary The declaration made by the Ngok Dinka general conference which established the Abyei Area Community Referendum Commission (AACRC) invited international observers to witness the referendum.3 Although foreign journalists also enjoyed a high level of access and civil society organisations and opposition political parties in South Sudan acted as external observers, we were the only international observers who responded to the invitation. There was a high level of transparency in the Abyei Area Community Referendum. The referendum was peaceful and credible. Structures functioned well and incorporated local knowledge and expertise. All voters eligible under the African Union High Implementation Panel (AUHIP) proposal4 commended by the AUPSC and other international institutions and governments had opportunity to register and vote, and no eligible voter was prevented from doing so. We would like to commend the AACRC for a comprehensive and thorough process well-executed. We are satisfied that the results of the Abyei Area Community Referendum accurately represent the genuine expression of the will of the electorate. While there were minor irregularities deriving from the short timetable and lack of time available for voter education and staff training, the integrity and credibility of the process was not compromised. This was an extraordinary achievement given the logistical challenges the Commission faced. We had some concerns about assisted voting and lack of attention to secrecy by both voters and staff in a small number of centres, but this was the exception and not the norm. Where it did take place, we are satisfied voters were given a genuine choice and manipulation was not the intent. Assistance was generally given in response to requests by voters and attempting to mitigate the problems faced by illiterate and disabled voters. In many respects the Abyei referendum exceeded the standards met by the South Sudanese referendum held in January 2011. We find that there are no good technical reasons to fail to recognise the Abyei referendum. Countries and institutions who recognised the results of the South Sudanese referendum of 2011 as a genuine expression of the will of the electorate, but who fail to do so in this case, will do so for political rather than technical reasons.

3 4

Abyei Area Ngok Dinka People’s General Conference, “Declaration of the Ngok Dinka Community of Abyei Area to Hold Abyei Area Community Referendum,” October 18, 2013. African Union High Implementation Panel, “Proposal on the Final Status of Abyei,” September 21, 2012.

Overview of Observation Mission

The international observers were Tim Flatman, a regular visitor to Abyei working voluntarily and directly with local churches to support the displaced Ngok Dinka and returnees north of the river Kiir, and Hannah Cross, his fiancee, who was visiting Abyei for the first time. Tim has been an election agent on numerous occasions in the UK and is familiar with all aspects of electoral procedures. His experience and contacts in Abyei helped in identifying which locations would be most useful to visit, and enabled the verification of important information (for example, checking the numbers of registered voters in rural population centres against the expectations of those involved in assisting returns to those areas or providing humanitarian support). Hannah provided a useful counter-perspective as one new to Abyei Area.

Although the AACRC accredited local observers and external (i.e., external to the Ngok Dinka community) observers from opposition political parties and civil society organisations based in South Sudan, we were the only international observers of the Abyei Area Community Referendum. This was due to a lack of interest from organisations that traditionally observe referenda and elections. A clear invitation was issued to international observers5 and the AACRC were ready to accredit other international observers who presented themselves. UNISFA (United Nations Interim Security Force for Abyei) appeared to have their own observation mission, but did not seek accreditation from the AACRC. On repeated occasions we witnessed them making short visits lasting a few minutes to Referendum Centres in Abyei town, both during registration and polling. (Our visits usually lasted 2 hours.)

We would like to thank the AACRC for their co-operation and assistance, which far exceeded reasonable We observed all stages of expectations. Despite the referendum process: the time pressures registration, preparations and resource for polling day (including constraints they production of the voter faced, members of registry and distribution of the Commission sensitive materials), operated an open polling and counting. We door policy and we arrived in Agok on 20 were able to ask and November 2013 and were receive answers to accredited by the AACRC our questions at all the following day. We times. Observers and visited 11 of 29 local (South Sudanese and referendum centres: 8 foreign) journalists during registration and 8 International Observer speaking to staff at were hosted in the during polling, and Referendum Centre AACRC compound, witnessed two counts from located in the former start to finish. We note that the Carter Centre visited a similar percentage of Ministry of Finance building in Abyei Town, centres during the 2011 referendum on the self- near the hospital site. We were therefore immediately aware of new developments and determination of Southern Sudan.6 able to monitor vehicles leaving and returning with sensitive materials. 5 Abyei Area Ngok Dinka Peopleâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s General

Conference, â&#x20AC;&#x153;Declaration of the Ngok Dinka Community of Abyei Area to Hold Abyei Area Community Referendum.â&#x20AC;? The Carter Centre, Observing the 2011 Referendum on the Self-determination of Southern Sudan: Final Report (The Carter Centre, 2011), 7.

We enjoyed continuous walk-in access to the data centre at the AACRC compound and were able to observe and ask questions of staff at all levels and at all times. This is particularly 5

important to note, given the obstruction international observers faced when trying to access the data centre in Juba during the 2011 referendum on the self-determination of Southern Sudan.7 We were even provided with soft copies of the sections of the voter list we requested, in spreadsheet format, so that we could run our own checks on it.

The commission and its staff recognised the importance of transparency to ensure the referendum complied with international standards as far as was possible. However, a stronger motivation was the desire for the world to see the Ngok make their decision as to the final status of Abyei Area. Commission members, staff at referendum centres and voters we spoke to viewed the process as the implementation of the African Union High Implementation Panel proposal for a referendum in October 2013. They welcomed us and journalists alike as those who would testify as to the conduct of the referendum and present conclusions to the international community. This in itself displayed a high level of confidence in the integrity of their process. Staff were willing to take the risk that observers would witness some practices inconsistent with international norms, on the assumption that we would also see that the results were a genuine reflection of the will of the eligible electorate (i.e., eligible under the AUHIP proposal). This assumption was, in the end, borne out in reality.

Despite the lack of vehicles available to the AACRC and the logistical difficulties this presented, the AACRC altered their own plans to facilitate transport to centres we wished to visit, rather than the centres they hope we would visit, during both registration and polling. AACRC also facilitated the transport of journalists. As far as we are aware, the only complaint made by any journalist throughout the entire process related to having to wait a morning for transport to northernmost polling centres. We do not find this complaint reasonable. The AACRC had no duty to facilitate transport for journalists. The delay was caused by a lack of available vehicles and the need to use some vehicles to transport ballot boxes from a secure overnight location to referendum centres so that voting could begin on time. Four centres were within walking distance from the compound, and could be visited without the need for assistance from the AACRC.

Voter registration at Wunruok

We find that both the AACRC and staff at local referendum centres exhibited a high level of transparency. Journalists had freedom to film the inner workings of the AACRC and referendum centres. On occasion they overstepped boundaries by attempting to film ordinary voters marking their ballot, so that the voter and his or her choice could be identified from the photos or film footage. Sometimes referendum staff warned them against these practices, but on other occasions they appeared to be intimidated by foreign journalists and said nothing. While transparency is crucial, it has limits and should not compromise the secrecy of the ballot. We are satisfied that this happened on a small number of occasions only. However, journalists should be aware that regulations apply to them as much as to staff at referendum centres. 7

Ibid., 14, 20.

for the referendum was the Ngok Dinka, but other permanent residents of Abyei Area would also be able to vote. The boundaries of Abyei Area were defined by the ABC in 2005, but the Government of Sudan rejected its conclusions. Abyei Area was attacked and many Ngok Dinka temporarily displaced in May 2008.

Background Abyei has a long, and contested, history. The Abyei Boundaries Commission (ABC) gave some details of this history in its report presented in 2005.8 Accounts of recent history are available elsewhere. An attempt will not be made to present a full history of Abyei here, but merely to situate the Abyei Area Community Referendum in its context.

The Governments of Sudan and Southern Sudan agreed to submit to the verdict of the Permanent Court of Arbitration at the Hague, which further delimited the boundaries of Abyei Area and defined the area clearly as the territory of the 9 Ngok Dinka chiefdoms.9 The Government of Sudan first accepted, then rejected, these conclusions. A referendum did not take place as promised in January 2011. Before the separation of South Sudan on 9 July 2011, the Sudanese Armed Forces -including Misseriya militias incorporated into it- destroyed much of Abyei town and displaced the Ngok Dinka population in May 2011. A series of agreements followed. When the Governments of Sudan and South Sudan proved unable to reach agreement on a process to resolve the final status of Abyei, a proposal was presented by Thabo Mbeki.10 The proposal was accepted by the Government of the Republic of South Sudan but rejected by the Government of Sudan. The proposal has been recognised by the African Union Peace and Security Council (AUPSC) as the only “fair, equitable and workable”11 solution for Abyei Area, but has not yet been implemented by it.

Destruction of classrooms at Abyei Catholic Church following 2011 attacks Abyei was transferred to Southern Kordofan by the colonial authorities in 1905 for administrative reasons. In the early 1950s, a clear majority of chiefdoms urged the Paramount Chief of the day, Deng Majok, to persuade the authorities to reverse the decision. However, action was not taken until it was too late, and on the independence of Sudan, in 1956, Abyei remained in Northern Sudan.

Thabo Mbeki's proposal promised a referendum in October 2013 and offered further clarification as to voter eligibility. Again, the Ngok Dinka were identified as the target community. The Misseriya, as seasonal nomads, were not eligible to vote. However, the proposal offered a series of protections so that those sections of Misseriya who traditionally migrate into and through Abyei Area, would be able to continue to do so,

Relations between neighbouring Ngok Dinka and Misseriya communities deteriorated during and after the 1955-72 civil war. In the Addis Ababa Agreement of 1972 a referendum on the self-determination of Abyei Area was promised. This promise was never implemented. The Abyei Protocol, part of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement signed in 2005, again promised a referendum. The target community 8

Permanent Court of Arbitration, “Press Release: Abyei Arbitration: Final Award Rendered,” July 22, 2009. 10 African Union High Implementation Panel, “Proposal on the Final Status of Abyei.” 11 African Union Peace and Security Council, “339th Meeting Communique,” October 24, 2012.

Abyei Boundaries Commission, Abyei Boundaries Commission Report, July 14, 2005.

whatever the result of the referendum.

the grounds that they had been promised a referendum and it would show more clearly the will of the whole community.

The proposal received widespread support from the AUPSC, AU Heads of State, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) and various national governments, including the US, UK and Norway. The Government of South Sudan encouraged the Ngok Dinka to return to Abyei Area in preparation for a vote, even giving Ngok Dinka in government posts paid leave to return for the referendum.12 The Vice-President, James Wani Igga, attended a protest in New York at which the Ngok Dinka threatened to implement the AUHIP proposal themselves if the AUPSC did not, and promised that the Government of the Republic of South Sudan (RSS) would never let the Ngok Dinka down. However, as the end of October drew near, the Government of South Sudan was silent on the issue of a unilateral referendum. The Information Minister hinted that RSS would not support a referendum organised by the Ngok Dinka, but the President and Vice-President have not commented, and the response of RSS remains unclear to date.13 It is still possible that RSS may recognise the results of the referendum if the AUPSC does not act to implement a referendum.

At the Ngok Dinka General Conference held on 18 October 2013, two options were discussed: a declaration by the 9 chiefdoms or a people's referendum. Strong grassroots backing for the second option strengthened the hand of the minority of leaders who preferred a unilateral referendum and this became the declared option. The conference also set up the Abyei Area Community Referendum Commission, a technical body tasked with overseeing and implementing the referendum, and adopted rules and regulations governing the conduct of the referendum. Although the Ngok Dinka saw the referendum as implementation of the AUHIP proposal in the light of the AUPSC's failure to do the same, their decision was widely condemned. RSS withdrew its backing, though its current position is, as above, ambiguous. Misseriya leaders close to the Government of Sudan and living in Khartoum threatened violence. Youth groups threatened to carry out their own referendum. Neither threat has materialised at the time of writing. A Misseriya referendum is unlikely, since it could not realistically be held in Abyei Area, would need to be held with different eligibility criteria to the AUHIP proposal, and would be unlikely to meet the same high standards as the Ngok Dinka referendum. In any case, the Misseriya community is divided and Misseriya youth have since withdrawn this threat.14 The Chairperson of the AU commission, Nkosazana Diamini Zuma, declared the referendum illegal,15 without substantiating her allegations.

The Ngok Dinka were not prepared to let October 2013 pass without a referendum. One of the observers, Tim Flatman, was present in Agok and Abyei town in the build-up to the Ngok Dinka General Conference held on 18 October 2013, including the time before former Sudan and South Sudan cabinet ministers Dr Luka Biong Deng and Deng Alor arrived in Abyei. During this period, most senior leaders in Abyei preferred to respond to the African Union's failure to implement their proposal by making a declaration, signed by the 9 traditional chiefs of the Ngok Dinka, resolving the status of Abyei themselves. However, the majority of intellectuals and peasants who had returned to Abyei preferred a referendum, on

While the purpose of this report is not to make political judgements, and every effort has been made to present a factual account above, it is important to lay out the basis on which we, as observers, participated in the referendum. We believe that, according to international law, every community has the right to self-

12 Sudan Tribune, “Juba Grants Abyei Citizens Leave for Referendum Voter Registration,” September 5, 2013, www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article47925. 13 Sudan Tribune, “S. Sudan Silent over Abyei Vote Outcome,” October 31, 2013, www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article48642.

14 Sudan Tribune, “Misseriya Youth Back down on Counter-referendum in Abyei,” November 3, 2013, www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article48679. 15 African Union, “Press Release.”

determination and that this right exists independently of any other agreements which have been reached between Sudan and South Sudan on Abyei. The African Union have every right to refuse to recognise the Abyei Area Community Referendum as implementation of their own proposal. However, this does not in itself make the process illegal. The process has not, to our knowledge, broken any national or international laws and cannot therefore be illegal. Furthermore, agreements signed between two parties – Sudan and South Sudan – do not negate the rights of a third party – the Ngok Dinka – to self-expression or even selfdetermination. In our view, the results of this referendum, if carried out to high technical standards (as we judge it has been), can legitimately be recognised as binding by any national government or international institution. However, the referendum does not in itself prevent the African Union from carrying out a further referendum. Since the AUHIP proposal recognises the same eligible electorate as the Abyei Area Community Referendum did, and if any AU referendum meets the same high standards as this referendum did, the results are likely to be identical. If an AU referendum is carried out then it will be especially important to learn lessons (both positive and negative) from the conduct of this referendum, since most aspects of the process will be the same.

Woman awaiting WFP food distribution at Mulmul

Ngok Dinka leaders, while considering the results of the Abyei Area Community Referendum binding and lobbying for recognition of the results, appear to be open to the possibility of the AU carrying out its own process, and view the two processes as complementary. It is at least theoretically possible that some governments and institutions will recognise the results of the Abyei Area Community Referendum, whereas others will urge the AUPSC to implement a referendum before recognising its results.

Referendum Management On our arrival in Abyei town we were introduced to the Chairperson and another member of the AACRC and immediately accredited as international observers. In this first meeting with members of the AACRC we were given a copy of the rules and regulations governing the conduct of the referendum, guidelines given to each Referendum Centre, and a list of Referendum Centres.

the workings of the AACRC and visits to Referendum Centres made by the Commission and the High Committee occurred at different times using different vehicles.

The rules and regulations mandated AACRC to set up Referendum Committees at County level, appointing a Head and members of the Committees. Committees would appoint the Head and members of Referendum Centres and be responsible for the conduct of the referendum process within their County. had a high We were highly impressed Committees degree of autonomy. They We were highly impressed with the rules and were able to set up subwith the rules and some centres to ensure a sufficient regulations, a regulations...In number of Referendum comprehensive 36-page respects, these rules were Centres were located in all document covering all more stringent than UK population centres. In Mijak, aspects of the referendum a sub-centre was set up process. In some respects, electoral law. because of local concerns that these rules were more the population was dispersed stringent than UK electoral over a large area. In Agok, several sub-centres law. (We are not able to speak with authority were set up since a substantial population was about electoral law in other nations.) concentrated in a small area, and there were We note that the rules and regulations were concerns that a single centre would not be able adopted on 18th October 2013, in advance of the to cope with large numbers registering. Where start of the campaign period. This compares subcentres were set up, both the new centre and favourably to the 2011 referendum allowing for the main centre were adequately staffed. We did the self-determination of South Sudanese, when not find any examples where recommendations rules and regulations were adopted well into the by the Referendum Committees were not campaign period. As far as we could tell, the accepted by the AACRC. Structures allowed rules and regulations, and the guidelines, were local knowledge and expertise to be drawn on, distributed to all Referendum Committees and and ensured the eligible electorate had a high Heads of Referendum Centres. At many of the level of access to Referendum Centres during Referendum Centres we visited, we saw staff both registration and polling. refer to the rules and regulations. The rules and regulations clearly specified that the AACRC should be financially, administratively and technically independent of the Abyei Area High Committee (AAHC). We found that, although not all external journalists understood this distinction, the AACRC made great efforts to preserve it. Meetings of the AACRC and the AAHC were entirely distinct. The AACRC operated as a purely technical body and did not take part in political decisions or preparations for the celebrations organised by the AAHC. The AAHC did not interfere in

We found that Referendum Committees were functioning well in all the counties we visited. Members of the Committees circulated between the Centres during the day while registration and polling took place, checking that procedures were being followed by local staff. Staff at the Centres clearly understood the structures set up under the rules and regulations when we questioned them, and deferred to the Referendum Committees as appropriate. The Committees proved an important structure for logistical reasons. They collected registration lists from the centres and brought them to central locations where AACRC members and 10

staff could collect them, and received sensitive materials, making distribution and collection of resources possible in a large area with access problems. (Some roads were still waterlogged, as the referendum took place soon after an extended rainy season.) Chiefs and elders also appeared to understand their role well. They acted as identifiers, ready to establish the identity of any voter whose eligibility was in doubt. Some were also members of Referendum Committees. They deferred to Heads of Referendum Committees as appropriate even though many had a higher level of authority within wider society. AACRC members and staff also circulated between the centres. We witnessed them resolve problems in some centres and were able to report problems to them at other centres, which were immediately resolved. We are satisfied that the structures envisaged under the rules and regulations were implemented and functioned well. In general, the rules and regulations were followed strictly. Where they were not, this was usually a consequence of a condensed timetable. For example, the three-day period for appeals and objections could not be accommodated within the timetable. However, this was not an issue as no appeals or objections were made.

Elders, Referendum Committee, and Centre members at a sub-centre in Mijak 11

Voter Registration th

Voter registration started on 20 October 2013. However, the short time-frame between the decision to hold a referendum, made on 18th October 2013, and the start of the process, resulted in delays. Most Referendum Centres were not opened until 21st October. As far as we are aware, Agok, the centre with the highest number of potential voters, was the only centre to open on 20th October. Leu centre opened on 22nd October, but was the only example we found of registrations starting so late. In addition, some centres did not open on time every day. For example, Wunruok did not open until 11am on the 21st and 9.45am on the 22nd. A lack of cars to transport staff to the Centre was cited when staff were questioned as to why Centres had opened late. Voters seemed happy to wait for staff to arrive and we do not think anyone failed to register because opening hours were not strictly adhered to.

Registration in Wunruok Agok was the only location where a low proportion of the eligible electorate registered. On the last two days of registration very few people were registered and when questioned, registrars, Heads of Referendum Centres and Referendum Committees, told us they believed almost everyone from the cluster of villages covered by the Referendum Centres in question had already registered. Although it would have been ideal for all Referendum Centres to have opened on the 20th, we find that the delay in opening Referendum Centres did not affect the ability of the eligible electorate to register or the total numbers registered.

Discussions with members of Abyei Administration and members of the Church who have been assisting returnees in rural areas suggest that the numbers registered in all locations represent a high proportion of over-18s who have returned, except in Agok. A variety of reasons were given by Commission and Committee members for the low proportion of voters registered in Agok. One member of the Committee covering Abyei town suggested that people in Agok may not have been as aware of the referendum as people in Abyei town or the villages where returnees had settled. It is true that there was little time for voter education or mobilisation ahead of the registration period, and that traditional networks, a vital source of information, are not as strong in Agok where people from all 9 Ngok Chiefdoms are temporarily resident. However, mobilisation campaigns were conducted during the registration period, and the sub-centres in Aniet market were clearly visible to all. A series of demonstrations were held in Agok in the buildup to the vote and word of mouth spreads fast. A Commission member suggested that the interest in Agok was not as high as in Abyei town. She noted while the numbers registered in Agok were proportionately low, the Commission could not force residents to register and vote. It is likely that those motivated to return to Abyei town had a higher level of interest in the vote than those resident in Agok. Nonetheless, no reason offered satisfactorily explains the low numbers of voters registered in Agok. We are, however, satisfied that Ngok and other permanent residents of Agok had opportunity to register and to vote. There were more subcentres in Agok than in any other area, and these centres were open for a longer period. Late on the 24th October the AACRC made a decision to extend the period for registrations for a further day. For most Centres, this was entirely unnecessary. Officials, elders and others present at the Referendum Centres we visited told us they believed everyone who would register had already done so. In only one Centre we visited was concern expressed that there may be 12

residents who had not yet registered. This Centre was Akechnhial, where the Head of the Referendum Centre stated he believed that some elderly voters who had difficulty coming to the Centre by foot had not yet arrived. He had requested extra time to register voters and was waiting for advice from the AACRC as to whether he could register voters on the 25th. We were impressed by the level of knowledge this showed about the local population and recommend that if a further referendum is held by any institution, structures are set up which can accommodate local knowledge in the same way as the Abyei Area Community Referendum did. In our view, the low volume of registrations in Agok was the main reason for extending registrations for a further day. The official reason given was a large number of eligible returnees arrived in Agok on the 24th and the AACRC did not want them to be disenfranchised after they had made the journey to Abyei Area to vote in the referendum. The Chairperson of the AACRC told us that all Centres would remain open on the 25th in case some of these returnees travelled on immediately to their villages, even though he felt the only Centre where there would be a large number of voters registered on the 25th would be Agok. We are not sure whether every Centre did open. At Centre number 4, Mulmul, staff seemed reluctant and unprepared to open for a further day. This Centre did not open until 1.50pm on the 25th, and only a handful of voters registered that day. Registration was also complicated at this Centre by a WFP food distribution taking place on the same day. Many people assumed that the registrars were representing WFP, not the AACRC. Despite the short time-frame between the decision to hold a referendum and the opening of registration centres, we found that all the Referendum Centres we visited had adequate staff and all the materials they required for registration. Most Committees decided to hold registrations, with less need for privacy than polling, outside the buildings used as Centres, to improve visibility. (This was in accordance with Article 34 (1) of the rules and regulations.)

Registrars were competent and literate. Most had completed secondary education, and a few had been involved in the South Sudanese referendum in 2011. Chiefs or elders were present at all Centres, although not always continuously, to resolve any disputes about eligibility. On one occasion, at Wunruok, we witnessed an elder correct registrars who had recorded the birthplace of three voters as their current residence. This cleared up confusion as to why three voters apparently residing in Maker Abior would register in Wunruok. The knowledge of chiefs and elders was instrumental in ensuring the accuracy of the voter registry. While they did not monitor the registration of every name, and some chiefs were more involved in checking the register than others, whenever there was an apparent discrepancy (as above), they were able to clarify matters. If any further referendum is held in Abyei Area, their involvement will be crucial.

Elder points to banner at Referendum Centre number 1 No-one was prevented from registering at any Centre on the grounds that they were ineligible, although a number of new returnees at Awolnhom were advised that it would be better to register at their final destination, since they could only vote at the Centre they registered at, and would have to return to Awolnhom if they intended to vote there. We found that there was no confusion over eligibility criteria at any Centre. All staff had a clear understanding of who was eligible and who was not. No doubt this is partly due to the controversy over eligibility criteria at an international level. Staff 13

were aware of the eligibility criteria set out in the AUHIP proposal, and believed themselves to be implementing that proposal. No-one was prevented from registering. However, it appears that all voters were Ngok and there were no voters who were eligible by virtue of having permanent abode in Abyei but who were not Ngok.

the voter register, which would include polling numbers, available a day before polling began, so that voters could check their name was included, appeal to a special Referendum Court if it was not, and take note of their polling number so as to make finding their name easier on the day. The cards were never intended as a proof of identity, and like polling cards in the UK, it was never envisaged that the cards would be required when voting. While it may have been preferable to give voters some kind of token when registering, we find that the inability to produce cards did not damage the referendum process.

We found queues of up to 15 at Referendum Centres on the 22nd and the 23rd. Queues hardly existed at all on the 23rd, 24th and 25th. Staff made efforts to make sure queues were orderly. ID was rarely checked, except to verify names, at Centres where residents were settled and known. More questions were asked of those Chairperson of the AACRC, Monyluak Alor Kuol, registering arriving from Juba and registering at Referendum Centre Information taken from and recorded about number 1 (Abyei Town Centre), the busiest voters at the registration stage included their centre. In most areas, all those registered were name, age, sex, chiefdom, occupation, level of from one chiefdom, or two chiefdoms if the education, payam and residence. While this boundaries of chiefdoms split across the cluster seemed at first an excessive level of of villages attributed to a particular polling information, it became clear that this station (e.g. Wunruok, which included areas information was indeed necessary on pertaining to Bongo and Abior chiefdoms). production of the voter registry. Many voters However, in Abyei Town Centre, Mulmul, Agok, have the same names in Abyei. In cases where and Awolnhom, all areas where returnees the father is the same but the mother is congregated, those registered included Ngok different, more than a few Ngok have the same from all 9 chiefdoms. age and the same names. Taking other information enabled staff at the data centre to Decisions to open sub-centres, in Mijak and check that identical names were not duplicate Agok, were made during the registration stage. records and that voters had not attempted to This meant that voters voted at the same centres register twice in different Referendum Centres. they registered at. This led to less confusion than during the 2011 South Sudanese referendum, The AACRC had intended to give those where the use of mobile centres in rural areas registering cards with their polling number on. meant that some voters arrived at the location Unfortunately they were unable to secure the they had registered to find there was no polling technology to produce the cards within the station there. short timeframe. The Commission Chairperson told us that the Commission intended to make We witnessed few irregularities during the 14

registration period. In our opinion, there was one minor breach of Article 7 of the rules and regulations. This was at Marial Aleu, where a Youth For Referendum banner had been erected next to the area where voters where being registered. The slogan on the banner read: â&#x20AC;&#x153;The people of Dinka Ngok want to return to South Sudan. October 2013â&#x20AC;?. We explained our view that the banner displayed a clear preference as to the options offered by the referendum and should not be located in a vicinity where it would be associated with officials who should be neutral and impartial. The next time we visited this Referendum Centre, the banner had been moved a considerable distance from the Referendum Centre and we had no further concerns about its location. The issue of campaigning near polling stations is one that often crops up during UK elections, in the experience of one of the observers. Judgements as to what is permissible is largely subjective. However, extra vigilance should be maintained where there is already a widespread assumption that there will be a large majority for one option in a referendum. When we visited Referendum Centres during the registration period, we asked local officials whether they had any concerns relating to the polling period. The only concern was raised at Mijak, where the Head of the Referendum Centre said he was worried about security, and whether the ballot box could be prevented from those who had taken too much wine. He said he had asked the AACRC to provide further security. This was particularly a concern at early stages when AACRC's plan was to have someone sleeping over at each Referendum Centre protecting the ballot box. Due to concerns about security, the ballot boxes were taken by the AACRC each night and stored at a secure location, revealed only to a select few, and returned in the morning. While this prevented logistical difficulties, and occasionally ballot boxes were returned after polling should have started, it alleviated the only concern that was raised with us by local officials relating to the polling period.

We found that staff were highly motivated and dedicated to ensuring as many eligible voters as possible registered. On the 24th, which was to be the last day of registration, registrars at Malual Aleu expressed willingness to stay open for a few extra hours if necessary, to ensure that no-one was disenfranchised. Overall there were few problems during registration. We are satisfied that all those eligible under the AUHIP proposal who wished to register had the opportunity to do so, and that officials fulfilled their obligations under the rules and regulations diligently.

Preparations for Polling

registration for a further day.

The Voter Registry

In the circumstances, it was a brave decision by the AACRC to allow observers walk-in access to the data centre to observe production of the list, and ask questions of staff. We were able to ascertain when lists for various Centres were completed. Most lists were not completed and verified until the evening of the 26th October. Data for one Referendum Centre was misplaced and had to be retyped later that evening. For a minority of localities, lists were not typed at all. Registration lists were numbered by page, and polling numbers were a combination of the page number of the list and voter number (1-15) on that page. This created additional problems for these Centres during polling as names were not in alphabetical order and were therefore harder to find. However, the vast majority of Referendum Centres had typed and original lists available for the start of polling on the 27th October.

Early on the AACRC recognised that production of the voter registry would be one of the greatest challenges they faced, a challenge exacerbated by the condensed timetable. The AACRC prepared for this by collecting registration lists from Referendum Centres near to the AACRC compound, during their own supervisory visits, or when facilitating visits to our choice of Centres, before the close of registrations. Work began on the voter registry from the evening of the 22nd onwards. The AACRC hoped to transfer all names from registration lists onto spreadsheets and reorder names in alphabetical order. Once one spreadsheet had been created per Referendum Centre, and checked against the original list, the spreadsheets would be combined and checked for duplicate names as a way of checking voters had not attempted to register in different centres. In reality this abuse was only a risk where, as in Abyei town, there were a number of Referendum Centres within walking distance of each other. Mulmul and Abyeithony are 20 minutes' walk away from Referendum Centre number 1 in opposite directions; Wunruok is approximately 90 minutes' walk. Polling numbers would then be added. Heads of Referendum Centres would be provided with a copy of a typed list of voters registered at their Centre, and a copy of the original list as a backup. This practice proved important, as at one Referendum Centre a voter's name could not be found on the typed list, but was eventually found on the original list. Evidently the name had been missed in the process of transferring names onto the voter registry. Even though the AACRC took measures to start production of the voter registry before registration closed, and brought in extra laptops and staff to work on the registry, the process of producing the registry and doing the necessary checks took longer than they had anticipated. This was not helped by the decision to extend

We were concerned that effectively the voter registry was not published until polling started. It was not made available to the public as the rules and regulations demanded. Voters should have been able to object if their own name was missing or other names included who they did not believe should have been included. The care and attention given by AACRC staff to production of the voter registry resulted in no instances of voters complaining that their name was missing, save the one example already given that was resolved. Pressure to declare the results before the end of October meant that it was not viewed as an option to delay voting by another day to allow a day for voters to raise objections. There was a suggestion by the AACRC that chiefs would go through the registry as an additional check before it was published. However, we did not see any evidence of this and do not believe it took place. We did see AACRC staff making a series of checks to ensure spellings were correct, names had not been missed off or included twice, and any duplicate names were different people. We requested a soft copy of the lists for the four Abyei town Referendum Centres, where we 16

believed the risk of multiple registration was highest. This was provided to us on the same day we asked for it, and before the eventual publication of the list. We ran our own checks for duplicate names. We found a number of duplicate names. Many had the same ages. However, other details (level of education, occupation, chiefdom etc.) were different. We accept the explanation offered as to why voters may have the same names and ages (the similarity of Ngok names and the possibility that some duplicate names were the names of the same father and a different mother).

available to the public, we believe that the integrity of the voter registry was high, and commend the AACRC on maintaining

It is not impossible that some voters registered at more than one Referendum Centre and gave slightly different information as to level of education, occupation, etc. at each Centre. However, the risks of attempting to do so were high. Voters did not know in advance what kinds of checks the AACRC would run. Voters attempting to give the wrong chiefdom may have been found out by chiefs and elders present at the Referendum Centres during registration, who would know their lineage. On the day, voters' fingers were inked after voting. No staff reported and no observer witnessed a voter whose finger had already been inked attempting to vote. Many centres had 100% or nearly 100% turnout. This in itself suggests that multiple registrations did not take place. In any case, Ngok voters knew that the final result was likely to be a landslide for South Sudan, and that any practice which undermined the vote would undermine the credibility of those results. We therefore find both that multiple registrations were rare or non-existent, and that the referendum process included various checks during registration, compilation of the voter registry, and polling, that mitigated strongly against multiple voting.

exemplary standards of transparency despite the problems they faced. The AACRC did the best job possible given the limited technology available for a self-organised community referendum. If another referendum is carried out in the future, we would like to see more time built in to the timetable between the end of registration and the start of polling, and more effort made to ensure that the voter registry is displayed in a public place in advance of the start of voting.

While there were problems with the production of the voter registry, and we remain critical of the failure to make the voter registry A sealed ballot box

...we believe that the integrity of the voter registry was high, and commend the AACRC on maintaining exemplary standards of transparency despite the problems they faced.

Distribution of Sensitive Materials No sensitive materials were distributed to Referendum Centres before the morning of 27 th October, the first day of polling. Heads of Referendum Committees collected ballot boxes, knives, ballots, indelible ink, stamps, canvas posters and string from the AACRC compound together with the typed and original voter lists on the evening of 26th October. They were taken to secure locations in each county overnight, and to Referendum Centres on the morning of 27th October. This process provided adequate security and guarantees against manipulation, but lack of vehicles meant that polling started late in a minority of Referendum Centres on the 27th. Ballot boxes were sealed using improvised measures by Commission members 17

before Heads of Referendum Committees were permitted to take them. The boxes â&#x20AC;&#x201C; plastic storage boxes â&#x20AC;&#x201C; were taped so that they could not be opened and AACRC stamps were placed over the tape and the boxes themselves. Our view was that this did not guarantee that the boxes could not be tampered with, as tape could be removed and replaced, but the boxes were taped in such a way that large amounts of tape would have to be removed, and the risk of leaving evidence of tampering would be high. We found this a good improvised measure and note that we saw no evidence that boxes had been tampered with during polling or immediately prior to counting. Unfortunately, the canvas posters designed to be displayed outside polling stations had been wrongly printed, and displayed a confusing ballot design that was not identical to the actual printed ballots. This may have caused confusion to a small minority of voters, although this was mitigated by explanations given by staff during the polling process. This was an unfortunate but relatively minor mistake.

Sealing and stamping ballot boxes

We would like to commend the AACRC for consistently adhering to best practice in distributing sensitive materials, despite the logistical challenges faced. The attention paid to this aspect, especially at the same time as trying to compile the voter registry, reflects extremely well on the integrity of the referendum process and compares favourably to practices reported during the 2011 South Sudanese referendum. It was also an indication of its thoroughness and organisation.

Polling Polling hours varied at different Referendum Centres. We were told by staff in various centres that they opened at 8, 8.30 and 9am. Logistical difficulties in delivering ballot boxes each day meant that some Referendum Centres did not open until mid-morning. For example, Dungop opened at 10.30am on 27th October. UNISFA, who continued to pay short visits to the four centres in Abyei town, told us that Wunruok had opened at 10am on the same day. Voters waited patiently until Referendum Centres opened. As many Referendum Centres had a turnout of or approaching 100%, we do not think slight variations in opening hours prevented registered voters from voting. Some centres were reported to have closed early as 100% of registered voters had already voted. The practice of keeping ballot boxes in a secure location overnight and delivering them to Referendum Centres each morning was in our view preferable to the initial plan whereby one person would sleep with the ballot box at each Referendum Centre. We had been concerned that the initial plan placed too much trust in a single person at each Centre, and that a single person would not be able to protect the ballot box if there was a security incident. Examining the voter registry

Basic procedures were similar at all of the Referendum Centres we visited. Names were checked against and marked off on the voter registry. Voters were then given a ballot paper, which was stamped. Voters were then directed to an area where they could mark their ballot paper and were encouraged to fold it and place

it in the ballot box. At most Centres, these procedures were split into three separate areas inside the Referendum Centre. At some Centres, the first and second stages were combined. At all Centres we visited, with the exception of Dungop, voting took place inside the Centre (usually a primary school). At Dungop, returnees were sleeping in every room of the Centre and so this was not appropriate. At Akechnhial, a centre we were particularly impressed by, the first stage took place outside, and staff were on the door to ensure voters could only enter the building once their name had been marked off. This meant there was more space inside the Centre and it was easier to maintain order and guarantee voter privacy. The index finger of voters was inked to show they had voted. This was usually done at the end of the process, but was sometimes done at the second stage. On a few occasions we saw voters attempt to leave without having their finger inked, or progress directly to the second stage on entering the Referendum Centre, but this was always spotted and rectified by Referendum Centre members. We preferred it when the index finger was inked at the end of the process. Some voters had difficult carrying and marking their paper with the thumb of their right hand covered in ink to vote, and the index finger of their other hand already inked. This increased the likelihood of ballots being spoilt by accidentally getting ink in both boxes. At Malual Aleu, staff realised that this was a problem and amended their practice, explaining to us what they were doing and why. In most Centres, officials had access to both typed and original voter lists. They were able to identify and mark off voters quickly and efficiently. Where Centres only had original lists, there were often long queues as staff had to read through the entire list to find each name. Because of this, only 10 voters had voted at Malual Aleu by the time we arrived at 1.50pm on the first day of voting. Malual Aleu and Awonohlm allowed large queues to build up, then called out names from the list who would come up to vote if they were present. This was a good improvised solution which enabled all 19

registered voters to vote by close of polls. (However, Awonohlm actually had the typed list, so we remain unsure why staff used this method at this Centre.) The AACRC had prioritised producing typed lists for the Referendum Centres where larger numbers of voters had registered, so that those Centres that needed quicker throughput were able to process voters more speedily.

name, Awonohlm wrote down the names of voters who had voted on a separate list, and Malual Aleu wrote out receipts which voters then took to the second stage and handed in. These procedures did no harm, and provided an additional means of verifying who had voted if any disputes later arose. However, they would have been impossible to replicate at Centres with more than 2,000 voters registered.

Chiefs and elders were continuously present at each Centre we visited during polling to identify voters in case of any dispute over identity. No disputes arose that we were aware of.

We witnessed staff turn people away on a small

Voters queued patiently and appeared to be in good spirits even where, as in Malual Aleu and Awonohlm, they were waiting for a few hours. The only time we saw problems in the queue was at Referendum Centre number 1, which had long queues on the first few days as 7,640 people had registered there. The AACRC ensured there were plenty of staff present both inside and outside the Centre and they were able to resolve any disputes that arose quickly and peacefully. Most Centres gave disabled voters and women with young children priority in the queue.

Orderly queuing at Awonohlm Referendum Centre There were minor differences in the way staff interpreted the rules and regulations at different Centres. For example, while all Centres marked off voters on the lists they had been given by putting a tick next to their name, Dungop also asked voters to put their fingerprint next to their

We were particularly impressed by the guidance given at Centre No. 1. Guidance was consistent, impartial and appropriate to the needs of each voter. number of occasions and at different centres. On each and every occasion, this was justified and done in accordance with the rules and regulations. At Mulmul and Abyeithony Referendum Centres, both within 20 minutes walk of Referendum Centre number 1, people tired of queueing at Centre number 1 tried to vote. Staff patiently explained that they must vote at the Centre they registered at. Again at Mulmul, one man arrived to find his name was not on the list. After further discussions, it emerged he had been away from Abyei during the registration period and had asked a friend to register his name on his behalf. This was not permitted and he had therefore not been registered. Although this was unfortunate, staff applied the rules and regulations correctly. At the second stage, a ballot paper was stamped and given to each voter. At the better Centres, detailed guidance was given as to how to vote at this stage. Staff explained which option was South Sudan and which was Sudan, how to vote (by placing a tick or their thumbprint inside the oval which represented their preference), how to fold the paper and where to put it. At the Centres that gave detailed guidance at this stage, voters required less assistance at the final stage and we had fewer concerns about lack of secrecy and assisted voting. We were particularly impressed 20

by the guidance given at Centre No. 1. Guidance was consistent, impartial and appropriate to the needs of each voter. When a deaf and dumb voter arrived, staff explained which option was which by pointing and gesturing northwards and southwards. The voter evidently understood and was able to cast his ballot without assistance at the final stage. While Abyei Town Centre and Mulmul were exemplary in this respect, we are satisfied that both options were explained and voters given a real choice at all Centres.

Authentication of ballots at Centre number 1 At the final stage, voters marked their ballot paper, folded it and placed it in the ballot box. Most Centres had a closed off area where voters could mark their ballot paper in privacy. Several had curtains attached to writing benches or the ceiling. There was an effort made at all Centres we visited, barring Dungop, to ensure that only one voter was present in this area at once, or two voters where there was clearly space for both to cast their votes in privacy. In Centre number 1, there was no curtain on the 27th, but the ballot box was far enough away from the other stages to ensure secrecy. Staff had decided to add a curtain by

the time of our repeat visit on the 29th. Voters often had difficulty in folding their ballot papers. Many tried to post their ballot paper without folding it. Staff tried to encourage voters to fold their ballot paper lengthways so that ink did not transfer from one oval to another, and votes were not spoilt. In most Centres, staff managed to communicate and demonstrate this using hand signals. However, staff in a small number of centres became frustrated and took the ballot paper from voters, folded it, and gave it back to them to post into the ballot box. Some staff told us that voters needed help as they did not understand how to fold the ballot papers. However, many voters also had difficulty placing their ballot papers in the ballot box. Staff managed to demonstrate this without touching the ballot paper and we believe it would also have been possible for staff to demonstrate how to fold the ballot paper without touching it themselves. Again, we note that where detailed guidance was given at the second stage, there was a reduced need for assistance at the final stage. At Dungop, staff were so adamant that ballot papers should be folded lengthways that they took ballot papers from voters and folded the papers themselves whenever they tried to fold them the other way. Bizarrely, this was the case even when voters used a biro to tick their preference and there was no chance of marks being transferred from one oval to another. We suspect that they had been told the proper way of folding ballot papers during their training, and were determined to ensure exact procedures were followed. In future, those training staff need to ensure that they understand the reasons for certain procedures, and the principles that lie behind them. The condensed timetable meant there was little time for staff training. It would have been better if more time had been devoted to staff training, including supervised dry runs in the presence of AACRC members. The balance between appropriate assistance and secrecy was hard to achieve and some Centres were better than others in this regard. We note that most of those who took part in the poll, both voters and staff, had never voted before, since no 21

elections have been held in Abyei since the 1970s. Some voters clearly needed a high level of assistance. We observed one voter try to vote by placing his thumbprint on the sample ballot on the wall, despite having just been handed a ballot paper. When a frustrated member of staff told him this was not how to vote, and demonstrated by putting his own thumb on the bench near the voter's ballot paper, the voter responded by also pressing his inked thumb on to the bench. In this context, a longer campaign period before registration started would have been ideal, so that more extensive voter education could have been conducted. Voters and, in some cases, staff attached little value to secrecy. In many cases we witnessed voters try to show their ballot papers to staff to check that they had voted for their intended option. In most cases staff declined to look and simply explained the options and how to vote again. Again, we would like to commend the staff at Akechnhial who followed both the letter and spirit of the rules and regulations when facing this dilemma. In general, staff understood the importance of secrecy and made efforts to ensure that neither they nor other

In general, staff understood the importance of secrecy and made efforts to ensure that neither they nor other voters could see how individual voters voted.

photographed voters marking their ballot. At Referendum Centre number 1, one journalist was prevented from doing this by staff. At Mulmul, journalists were initially prevented from photographing voters marking their ballot papers, but when they complained, restrictions were relaxed. We believe that staff were worried that journalists would report a lack of transparency to the international community if they restricted them in any way. Journalists rarely ventured outside the town and we judge that this was not an issue at other Centres, or indeed for a significant number of voters. However, clearer guidance should be given to journalists, and staff training should include how to deal with journalists. Journalists also have a responsibility to adhere to professional ethics themselves. Our concerns about lack of secrecy relate almost entirely to two Referendum Centres: Malual Aleu and Dungop. When we arrived at Malual Aleu, we found that voters were casting their ballot in the presence of a staff member at the second stage, who was giving clear direction. However, a Commission member travelling with us immediately identified the problem and ensured that all subsequent votes were cast next to the ballot box, behind a curtain, at the final stage. This improvement was made without any intervention by us. Because of the problems Malual Aleu faced with their voter list on the first day, only 11 votes of a total of 1,081, were cast before the Commission member intervened.

voters could see how individual voters voted. There were notable exceptions to this generality. At Referendum Centre number 1, a number of early voters displayed their marked ballot paper clearly to other voters, staff and journalists, at the start of voting on the 27 th. All these voters were politicians associated with the High Committee, and it was clear that they wanted people to know how they voted. When ordinary voters started to vote, journalists left and voter privacy was established. However, there were occasions where journalists filmed or

Staff at Malual Aleu, clearly able to view voters marking ballots, before AACRC intervened

Unfortunately, there were also two members of staff sat behind the curtain, assisting voters and able to see how most voters were voting. We asked staff to ensure they adhered to the rules and regulations by sitting further away from the area where voters voted, and refraining from handling ballot papers once they had been given to voters. Staff followed our advice to some extent, but were frustrated when voters asked for and expected their assistance, including in marking their ballot papers. At a later stage, Commission members arrived to make one of their regular supervisory visits. We explained the problems to them and they ensured that better guidance was given to voters at an earlier stage, and that staff sat further away from the area where voters marked their ballots. In total, around thirty voters voted at Malual Aleu before the Commission resolved problems there to our satisfaction. We witnessed a further twenty voters voting in satisfactory conditions before we left the Referendum Centre. When we returned, correct procedures were still being followed. We have confidence this continued to be the case, since the count at this Centre recorded 5 spoilt ballot papers. Under the conditions we first witnessed at Malual Aleu, it would have been impossible for any voter to spoil their ballot paper!

satisfied that manipulation was not the intent. Even where assistance was given, voters were offered a genuine choice. Voters themselves appeared to value the assistance they were given. However, we are still concerned that voters had less agency at Dungop than at other Referendum Centres. Dungop was an exception and we did not witness similar procedures elsewhere, except at Malual Aleu where the problems were resolved before 97% of ballots had been cast. Commission members and Referendum Committee members paid regular supervisory visits to Referendum Centres throughout Abyei Area to ensure that the rules and regulations were being followed. We expect that, as at Malual Aleu, these visits resolved problems at

At Dungop, one member of staff was often sat at the table where voters made their mark, and another was clearly observing from a distance. Appropriate assistance offered to disabled voters Voters who were literate and more confident Centres we were not able to visit, at an early they knew what to do voted without assistance, stage. Although the larger Referendum Centres but in most cases a member of staff still in Abyei town were highly impressive, we also observed them from a distance and occasionally found that procedures were followed in rural intervened if he felt they were about to do centres that we visited, where there were larger something wrong, like place their mark on the numbers of illiterate and disabled voters. We symbol for South Sudan rather than in the oval find no evidence for a general discrepancy in next to the symbol. Staff here were more standards between urban and rural Referendum concerned about voters spoiling their ballot Centres. papers than they were about maintaining the secrecy of the ballots. Officials seemed to be We asked staff at Referendum Centres we visited trying to mitigate the problems faced by to give their understanding as to what kind of illiterate and disabled voters and we are assistance could be given and under what 23

circumstances. In most cases, staff had a clear understanding of the rules and regulations. At Abyeithony, officials explained that â&#x20AC;&#x153;We cannot force or even show people where to vote. It has to be the voter's choice. If they can, they do it alone, but if they are blind there is a condition where we can help them.â&#x20AC;? We were particularly impressed with the assistance given to visually impaired voters. At several Centres, we saw staff guide them to the final stage, offer them a clear choice between the two options, wait for them to express a preference, then explain what they were doing as they placed the voter's inked thumb on the oval corresponding to their preferred option.

Centres. We are satisfied that the entire eligible electorate was able to exercise their vote in free and fair conditions.

We are satisfied that adequate numbers of staff were present at all the Referendum Centres we visited and at all times. Staff were helpful but not overbearing. There was a peaceful, sombre and quiet atmosphere at all Centres. A few voters spontaneously burst into song or started chanting after voting, but this was not encouraged by officials. Voters were in high spirits. We enjoyed watching old ladies hobble up to vote, cast their ballot, then gain a new lease of life and dance with joy. Staff maintained order at all the Centres we visited at all times, even during the initial media circus at Referendum Centre number 1 at the start of voting on 27th October. While there were minor irregularities at a small number of Centres, and we had concerns about the balance between assistance and secrecy, we are satisfied that these concerns did not affect the integrity or credibility of the referendum process. Voters were offered a genuine choice. Officials offered impartial advice. They did not direct voters inappropriately. Voters faced no intimidation from officials and did not appear to be affected by Misseriya threats of violence. There was no military or police presence at Referendum

Finding Paramount Chief Bulabek Deng Kuol Arop's name during polling at Referendum Centre number 1

Counting

the stringent procedures adopted and the integrity of officials.

We witnessed two counts from start to finish, at Referendum Centre number 1, and Mulmul. During sorting, ballots were opened, displayed These had the highest and third highest clearly, judged (by consensus) to be for South numbers of ballots cast. We judged there was a Sudan, Sudan, or unclear, and put in piles. Sudan higher likelihood of something going wrong at votes and invalid votes were few and were not counted until each box had been completed. these Centres. Despite South Sudan votes were this, the reliability and collected together, transparency of the We were impressed by the checked again to make counts at Referendum stringent procedures adopted sure they were not Centre number 1 was, invalid, counted into in our view, higher than and the integrity of officials. tens and then into the norm in the UK. hundreds. The hundreds One of the observers were bundled using elastic bands, and then has attended numerous counts in the UK and has never seen so much care and attention counted again to check each bundle contained given, nor so many checks carried out during one hundred votes. Votes were bundled using the process. The count at Mulmul was elastic bands. When the Centre ran out of elastic undertaken in difficult conditions, but was also bands, officials improvised by tying bundles with ribbon pulled from the windows of the reliable and transparent. Centre! Again, we were impressed by the At both Centres, the total number of ballots was diligence of officials and the number of checks verified before sorting. Votes were then sorted, built into the counting procedure. As a consequence, we have a high level of confidence bundled and counted. in the results. At Referendum Centre number 1, ballots were removed one box at a time, counted into piles of ten, checked, checked again, then counted back into the box. Every ten votes, the cumulative total was verbalised, agreed by all staff present, and written down independently by two members of staff. This process was very slow, but incredibly reliable and transparent. Errors were rarely made and were spotted and corrected during the checks. When votes had been sorted, two ballot boxes recorded exactly the same number of votes as had initially been counted. This confirmed the high quality of the verification stage. The other ballot box, the first to be counted, recorded 8 more votes than had initially been counted. Staff were very concerned about this development, although this is very common in the UK. Bundles were recounted to check there were exactly 100 votes in each bundle. When checks twice confirmed that the initial count had been wrong, the total number of votes in that box was amended. We were impressed by

Counting at Referendum Centre number 1 25

During the count, the door was locked to ensure no-one interfered with the count, although observers and journalists could enter and leave freely. Commission members continued to make supervisory visits during the count.

instead of the oval next to the symbol, which included ink smudges elsewhere on the paper, and where both the symbol and the oval had been ticked. While few ballots were affected, and there were at most eight ballots that we felt were wrongly declared as invalid, we take the disenfranchisement of a single voter very seriously. We note that no invalid ballots contained a possible vote for Sudan. All those ballots that contained votes for one option and were declared invalid would, if accepted, have been votes for South Sudan. Other ballots were declared invalid because they contained no mark, because both options had been ticked or because the ballot had not been authenticated (stamped).

Invalid ballot papers The only minor criticism we have of the count at Referendum Centre number 1 is regarding the treatment of spoilt ballot papers. In general, officials erred too much on the side of caution and rejected many votes, which, in our view, expressed a clear preference. When we were asked directly for assistance, we refrained from giving a verdict on individual ballot papers, in accordance with Article 37 (4) of the rules and regulations. We did remind staff of the provision under Article 38 (2) that â&#x20AC;&#x153;A ballot paper shall not be deemed invalid as long as the voterâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s choice can be reasonably ascertained.â&#x20AC;? Any slight divergence from a tick or fingerprint fully within a single oval was treated as suspect. Queries were raised about ballots where voters had signed within the oval, or where a tick extended slightly outside an oval. Early on in the count, sensible decisions were taken and an attempt was made to ascertain the voter's preference. The Referendum Committee made one of their supervisory visits during discussion of one ballot, and were asked for their view. They told the staff at the Centre to treat it as invalid. After this, ballots were treated as invalid on the slightest pretext. We saw cases of invalid votes where, in our view, the voter's preference was clear. These included ballots where the voter had ticked the symbol

Of more concern than the tendency to err on the side of caution and disenfranchise individual voters was the number of ballots that were invalid because they had not been authenticated. In most boxes there were at most a handful of ballots affected in this way. However, one box contained 112 ballots that were not authenticated. Our judgement is that it is likely that a single member of staff during a single shift did not stamp ballot papers as he or she handed them out. This highlights the importance of detailed staff training before the process begins. The disenfranchisement of so many voters is of deep concern. All the affected ballots expressed a clear option for South Sudan. If the votes had been accepted, the decision for South Sudan would have been even more overwhelming. Although we class this as a serious mistake, we do not therefore believe it affected the integrity or credibility of the final results. The count at Mulmul was made under difficult circumstances. It did not begin on time because there was a lack of trained officials to supervise the counting staff at the Centre. AACRC were not confident that the count could proceed with integrity and so waited for staff at other Referendum Centres to finish and travel to Mulmul. This meant that the count did not start until 8pm and proceeded in torchlight until 2.30am. Despite the unusual circumstances, we 26

have confidence in the integrity of the count at total. Mulmul. We appreciate the decision of the AACRC in the circumstances while noting that Votes were then sorted and bundled into 10s and counting in such conditions is far from ideal. If then 100s. No elastic bands or ribbon was no observers had been present to witness the available, so bundles of 100s were wedge under procedures followed, the credibility of this benches after being checked. While this solution count would have been under question. was unusual, we are satisfied that it allowed for A large plastic sheet an accurate count was brought into the of sorted votes The count at Voter Centre number 1 Centre and spread flat and that there was across the room. Chairs wasâ&#x20AC;Ś of a high standard for an no opportunity and benches were advanced democracy. That a count for manipulation placed around the room during a self-organised community of the bundles. and staff equipped with torches sat on them, process met such high standards is Although directing torchlight remarkable. decisions on toward the middle of suspect ballots the room. We are were, in our view, satisfied that there was sufficient light to see more reasonable than at Voter Centre number 1, exactly what was going on. officials still tended to err on the side of caution. No ballot was accepted as valid where the mark The two ballot boxes were emptied into the was entirely outside the oval, even where it was middle of the room and two groups counted clear the voter intended to vote for South Sudan. them back into the boxes. Our observer (Again, no ballots rejected as invalid could have watched one of the groups carefully and was been interpreted as votes for Sudan.) There were satisfied that counting was accurate. One a small number of ballots rejected because they person counted out 50 votes while the others had not been authenticated, but the problem was watched and confirmed. One person wrote not nearly on the same scale as at Referendum tallied 50s. The counter rotated every 50 votes. Centre number 1. We note that the Centres The other group counted in 10s. There were which were not as busy did not have the same fewer staff checking the counting. When the problems with unauthenticated ballots as the initial verification had been completed, the total Centres with the highest numbers of votes cast. was considerably higher than the total number of voters registered at Mulmul. The staff While the count at Mulmul was highly unusual realised there must have been an error and the and made in difficult circumstances, we are box our observer had not watched was emptied satisfied in the integrity of the process and the and recounted by the more proficient team, results. We would like to commend those staff under observation. The total was over 300 votes who had worked at other Centres from the under the number of registered voters. We are morning of the 30th and continued working at satisfied that this second count was more Mulmul until 2.30am; for their dedication, reliable, and resulted in a more credible total. diligence and refusal to take short-cuts in the The eventual total was revised upwards slightly, counting process despite tiredness. The count at when the total number of votes bundled was Voter Centre number 1 was, despite our found to be slightly higher than the second misgivings about the treatment of a small

the count was conducted professionally and in accordance with the highest standards, and testifies to the solid organisation and the integrity of the referendum process.

number of invalid votes, of a high standard for an advanced democracy. That a count during a self-organised community process met such high standards is remarkable. We have no reason to believe that other counts we were not able to observe did not meet similarly high standards. Poor counting procedures could easily have let down the entire referendum process and cast doubt on the results. Conversely, the count was conducted professionally and in accordance with the highest standards, and testifies to the solid organisation and the integrity of the referendum process.

Conclusions and Recommendations The Abyei Area Community Referendum was a highly transparent process, carried out professionally in free and fair conditions despite difficult logistical challenges. A comprehensive set of rules and regulations, published in advance of the start of the campaign period, were adhered to consistently. Structures functioned well and incorporated local knowledge and expertise. All voters eligible under the AUHIP proposal commended by the AUPSC and other international institutions and governments had opportunity to register and vote, and no eligible voter was prevented from doing so. We are satisfied that, although the register was not published publicly as promised, sufficient checks were in place to guarantee the integrity of the voter registry. Appropriate procedures for distribution and care of sensitive materials were put in place and consistently adhered to. Voters were offered a clear choice and were able to exercise that choice freely. Guidance was consistent and impartial. In general, staff understood and made efforts to preserve the secrecy of the ballot. Minor irregularities proceeding from the short timetable and lack of time available for voter education and staff training did not compromise the integrity or credibility of the process. The count was extremely transparent and reliable and met the standards expected of an advanced democracy.

standards met by the 2011 South Sudanese referendum. For example, rules and regulations were published in advance of the start of the process.16 Centres were well-situated in areas where local populations were concentrated and local referendum committees had the flexibility to set up sub-centres, resulting in excellent access.17 Unlike the South Sudanese referendum, in no Referendum Centre did ballots cast exceed the number of registered voters.18 There was no shortage of registration materials and procedures for packing and distributing sensitive materials were consistently adhered to.19 There was no confusion over voter eligibility and no-one who was eligible to vote was prevented from registering.20 There was no armed security presence inside any Referendum Centre.21 There were no reports of direct intimidation. Difficulties with the compilation of voter lists did not result in any voter being turned away. 22 Observers were not obstructed from accessing the data centre at any time.23 There are no technical reasons for refusing to recognise the results of the Abyei Area Community Referendum. The process met higher standards than the 2011 South Sudanese referendum whose results were recognised by the Government of Sudan, the UN, AU and other institutions and governments. However, we are aware that the results may not be accepted for political reasons, and that it is possible that another referendum be held at some point in the future. We note that if a referendum is held in Abyei Area in the future, the eligible electorate will be the same as was the case in the Abyei Area Community Referendum. If lessons are not learned from this referendum, it is possible that any process conducted under the auspices of the AU will not meet the same high standards met by the Abyei Area Community Referendum. We

Referendum results displayed at the AACRC compound In a number of respects, the Abyei Area Community Referendum exceeded the

16 The Carter Centre, Observing the 2011 Referendum on the Self-determination of Southern Sudan, 13. 17 Ibid., 19. 18 Ibid., 3. 19 Ibid., 16, 33. 20 Ibid., 16â&#x20AC;&#x201C;17. 21 Ibid., 30. 22 Ibid., 31â&#x20AC;&#x201C;2. 23 Ibid., 14, 20.

would therefore like to make a number of recommendations for the conduct of any future referendum (or, indeed, elections) in Abyei Area. 1. Any future referendum or elections should include a longer pre-registration period, so that extensive voter education and proper staff training can be conducted. Staff were briefed ahead of registrations, and received appropriate written guidance, on-the-job training and supervision. Mobilisation teams proceeded from Abyei to the furthest parts of Abyei Area to increase awareness of the process during registration. However, we believe that more extensive voter education would have increased registrations in Agok and reduced the need for assistance at the final stage of the process, making it easier to preserve the secrecy of the ballot. Staff training should include dry runs where staff practice polling day procedures in the presence of Commission members. This could have mitigated the problems faced at Dungop, resolved the problems faced at Malual Aleu before the start of polling rather than part-way into the first day, and ensured voters at Referendum Centre number 1 were not disenfranchised by the failure to authenticate ballot papers. Training should also include guidance on what journalists can and cannot film.

Area Community Referendum, we judge that if the Referendum is conducted by an external body, there is a higher likelihood that objections and appeals will be made. This will especially be the case if there is an increased expectation that the referendum results will be recognised externally. 4. Any referendum conducted under the auspices of the African Union should consider adopting the same structures as the Abyei Area Community Referendum, to ensure that local knowledge and expertise is appropriated. Any future referendum should ensure Referendum Committees are composed of Ngok Dinka (the target community for the referendum) from each County of Abyei and have a high level of autonomy, so that decisions about the location and number of polling centres are made by those who understand the concentration and needs of local populations. The Commission should consider hiring the same staff hired by the AACRC, who have already been through the process once and will have valuable insights. AACRC members could be involved in an advisory capacity. Chiefs and elders from the 9 Ngok Chiefdoms must have a role as identifiers and be present at Referendum Centres if the voter registry is to have the same level of integrity as was the case in the Abyei Area Community Referendum.

2. Future exercises should ensure the same level of transparency, with observers and journalists able to enter any Referendum Centre and the data centre at any time. 3. Adequate time should be programmed into the timetable, even delaying polling if necessary, to ensure the voter registry is available to the public, and there is sufficient time for objections and appeals before registration starts. Although the process was of a sufficiently high standard that there were no objections or appeals made during the Abyei

Celebrations as results were announced