The Walsh Exchange 2014 Book of Proceedings

microfinance

hegemony

Vladimir Putin

terrorism

poverty alleviation mental health services

Rwandan genocide

neo足Gandhian activism

middle class

epistemic communities

environmental degradation

book of proceedings Khalid Sheikh Mohammed

asylum seekers

Muammar Gaddafi

anti足aircraft weapon

social justice

defense

arms control

grassroots

Israel

refugees

education

natural gas resources

Myanmar

black market

poverty

civil war

the

geopolitical threats

W

elcome

Co­Chair Co­Chair Editor­in­Chief Treasurer Marketing Director Deputy Marketing Director Academic Coordinator Deputy Academic Coordinator Speaker Coordinator Long Term Development Coordinator Webmaster

Chloe Krawczyk Sarah Pemberton Sidharth Sharma Allison Kim Bethan Saunders Samantha Mladen Andrew Scott Cheryl Lau Matthew Eible Esther Sohn Cherie Chung

Held in the cosmopolitan hub of Washington, D.C., the Walsh Exchange is an annual conference dedicated to promoting innovative undergraduate research in international relations by students around the world. To this end, the conference provides students with an opportunity to formally present their original research, receive constructive feedback, exchange ideas, and broaden the scope of international relations research. We seek to inspire new dialogue, encourage more students to pursue research, and showcase the passion of the next generation of scholars.

The Third Annual Walsh Exchange Conference showcased the research of 17 students from 7 universities in the U.S. and Australia. Papers were divided into seven panels on key global issues: resource development and the environment, security, nuclear proliferation, democracy and human rights, quantitative research methods, conflict and post­conflict reconstruction, and economic development. We hope you enjoy reading these exceptional pieces of undergraduate research. If you would like to contact individual authors for more information about their research or full versions of their papers, please submit a detailed inquiry to walshex@gmail.com. For more information on how to submit your paper to future Walsh Exchange conferences, please visit www.walshex.org.

The Third Annual Walsh Exchange was made possible through generous donations from our sponsors: Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service Dean's Office, The Mortara Center for International Studies, Georgetown University Lecture Fund, The Corp, and Georgetown University Student Association. We would also like to recognize Allyson Goodwin and Jennifer Windsor from the SFS Dean's Office for the countless hours they have put into helping coordinate our event. Finally, we'd like to thank our keynote speakers, professor moderators, and student volunteers for devoting their time to advancing student research and intellectual exploration in international affairs. The Walsh Exchange would not be possible without the time, support, and enthusiasm of many dedicated individuals.

R

emarks

Panelists, Attendees, and Friends of the Walsh Exchange, Welcome to Georgetown University and the third annual Walsh Exchange! We are tremendously grateful for the opportunity to host all of you this weekend of March 28­30, 2014, as we aim to bring together international relations enthusiasts and showcase innovative research for an exciting exchange of ideas at a time of great opportunity and great uncertainty in the global community.

We often talk about the divide between incisive foreign policy analysis produced by academics and the actions taken by policymakers in countries around the world. Indeed, the solutions proposed by our leaders to solve the great challenges of our day sometimes seem so divorced from scholarship that we wonder whether academic work reaches a wide enough audience. In an effort to increase the exchange of ideas between undergraduates, “do­ers” and “thinkers” alike, the Walsh Exchange presents its third annual conference: Ideologies, Policies, and People: Shifting Dynamics in Contemporary International Affairs.

Academia in the shifting dynamics of contemporary international affairs shows, if anything, that no system ­­ national or international, past or present, near or far ­­ is perfect. It also shows that we will not solve the daunting problems that our generation faces through one “right answer” or an individual’s “independent study,” no matter how deep. Yet, our choice to bring our research to the table and to strive for objectivity in an age of political apathy and cynicism is valuable in it of itself; it shows a dedication to engaging with a generation of global citizens and leaders in service of our countries and the world as a whole. We hope that this weekend provides you with an opportunity to share your ideas, hear those of others, and be inspired by our keynote speakers who have delved deeply into their fields of study.

On behalf of our steering committee, we would like to welcome you to the third annual Walsh Exchange for a memorable weekend of lively and constructive conversation.

Respectfully yours,

Sarah Pemberton Co­Chair Third Annual Walsh Exchange sjp36@georgetown.edu

Chloe Krawczyk Co­Chair Third Annual Walsh Exchange cjc236@georgetown.edu

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ontents

Changing the Education System in Burma: Preparing to Repatriate Karen Refugees Keila Franks / The George Washington University / 5

Cold War Foreign Policy Through the Eyes of Clark Clifford: The Voice of Reason Ben Gottesdiener / Washington University in St. Louis / 8

Collateral Gains: How Israel Has Benefited from Iran's Nuclear Program Dougal Robinson / University of Sydney / 10

A Comparative Analysis of Regional Environmental Regimes in the Black Sea and Caspian Sea Colleen Wood / Georgetown University / 12

Competing Creeds: Disaggregating the Role of Religion in the Onset of Civil War Linnea Turco / The George Washington University/ 14

Contextualizing Mental Health and Trauma Healing in Post­Conflict Rwanda Lizzie Lamb / Western Washington University / 15

Distributing Opportunity: Microfinance, Poverty, and Growth in ASEAN James Thomas Fishback / Georgetown University / 17

Do MANPADS Matter?

Laurel Zigerelli / Georgetown University / 19

The Dragon’s Curse?: Considering China’s Economic Ties and Participation in United Nations Peacekeeping Operations in Africa, 2000­2012 Ben Yunmo Wang / Tufts University / 21

Greenland of Opportunity?: Modeling the Prospects for Sustainable Resource Development in Greenland Madeleine Livingston / The George Washington University / 23

How to Survive the Rwandan Genocide: Towards a Framework for Genocide Survival Using Memoir Analysis Basil Bastaki / Georgetown University / 25

The Puzzle of the Proletariat: Are Some Forms of Urban Middle Class Activism in India More Democracy­Enhancing than Others?

Avanti Narayanan / Georgetown University / 27

Protagonizar: Economic and Social Development in a Microfinance Model Sarah Baran / Georgetown University / 29

Russian Counterterrorism: The Evolution of Counterterrorism in Russia and its Impact on the State and Inside the Kremlin Joshua Schoen / Georgetown University / 31

Tearmainn na hÉireann: Direct Provision Housing, Child Asylum Seekers, and Violations of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child Narintohn Luangrath / Boston College / 32

Winning Hearts and Minds and Votes: Effects of U.S. and Western Education of Foreign Leaders on Voting Preference Alignment in the United Nations General Assembly Sun Hoo Kim / Georgetown University / 34

Who Proliferates?: A First­Image Look at Pakistani Proliferation Alexandra van Dine / Georgetown University / 36

Tearmainn na hÉireann: Direct Provision Housing, Child Asylum Seekers, and Violations of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child Narintohn Luangrath / Boston College Class of 2014 / 38 Advisors: Dr. Kenji Hayao (Associate Professor, Department of Political Science) and Dr. Jennie Purnell (Associate Professor, Department of Political Science)

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Keila Franks / The George Washington University Recent democratic developments in Burma (Myanmar) and the 2012 ceasefire agreement between the Burmese government and the Karen National Union (KNU) have ended 63 years of civil war, leading to discussions about the repatriation of Burmese refugees in Thailand. From interviews conducted on the Thai­Burmese border with Karen refugees and organizations in Thailand working with these refugees, this research finds that the majority of Karen refugees are concerned about repatriation, with a major concern being the educational system in Burma. The goal of this research is two­pronged. First, it explores how to reform the educational system in Burma (Myanmar) in order to incorporate the students and teachers from the refugee camps in Thailand when they are repatriated to Burma. Second, the research determines how to best address the concerns about repatriation raised by the young people who came to Thailand from southeast Burma because of the lack of educational and economic opportunities in their hometowns or villages.

In light of the recent democratic and liberalizing reforms in Burma and the 2012 ceasefire between the Karen National Union and the Burmese government, the Thai and Burmese governments and organizations working with Burmese refugees in Thailand have begun discussing the possibility of repatriation. However, refugees belonging to the Karen ethnic group (who make up most of Thailand’s refugee camps) have raised concerns about repatriation, especially in regards to security and political issues. The Karen Refugee Committee and the Karen community­based organizations both issued statements outlining the conditions that must be met before repatriation can occur, including the removal of landmines, the withdrawal of Burmese troops from Karen areas, and a political settlement between Karen ethnic armed groups and the Burmese government.

Although organizations working with refugees have

started discussions on preparing for repatriation, there is not a detailed analysis of the challenges returning refugee students and teachers would face in the educational system in Burma and how to best reform the educational system to incorporate returning refugees. In order to address this issue, I conducted semi­structured, in­depth interviews with organizations which work with Burmese refugees or which provide education in the refugee camps in Thailand and in Burma. I conducted these interviews in Bangkok, Thailand and in Mae Sot, Thailand (a town on the Thai­ Burmese border) from June to July 2013. I interviewed representatives from 21 organizations, including the Senior Coordinator in Thailand for the UNHCR, leaders of the Karen National Union and its education departments for Burma and for the refugee camps, and the Assistant Regional Refugee Coordinator and the U.S. Ambassador to Thailand at the U.S. Embassy in Bangkok.

From these interviews, I found that Karen students in the refugee camps could not reintegrate into the education system in Burma and no organization had a clear plan about how to best incorporate these returning refugees. Many organizations stated that they did not have a set plan because, due to security and political concerns, it was not yet time to make specific preparations for refugees to return to Burma. However, it is important that these specific plans are created as soon as possible. The Burmese government has started the Comprehensive Education Sector Review (CESR), a review of the public school system, to understand how to best reform the educational system. Right now they are in the consultation phase when different groups are able to speak up about desired reforms for the education system, and the goal is to have a plan for educational reform in place by the 2015 election. After 2015, it will be hard to change the trajectory of the educational reforms.

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A comprehensive plan on how to incorporate returning refugee students needs to be completed, and this thesis hopes to start the conversation about how to reform the education system in Burma in order to integrate returning Karen refugees. The Karen National Union is essentially in charge of the education in the refugee camps. As a result, the primary language of instruction in the refugee camps is Karen and the curriculum used in the camps is very different from the Burmese government’s curriculum. I found that the majority of refugee students would find it difficult to integrate into the Burmese educational system due to these differences. Thus, Burma needs to establish a decentralized education system which incorporates ethnic languages, culture, and history while fitting into a unified national education system. I argue that Burma should use the lessons learned from the decentralized education system in India by building cluster resource centers and establishing effective monitoring systems. I also caution against creating an education system like the one in Bosnia and Herzegovina, which segregates different ethnic groups.

As part of the Comprehensive Education Sector Review, ethnic groups have already been advocating for multilingual education in Burma, yet the urgency of this reform is heightened when considering that refugee students returning to Burma will not be able to integrate into the educational system unless instruction is in their ethnic language. In addition, a comprehensive plan should be presented to the educational review committee in Burma which highlights the training that returning refugee teachers would need, the increased educational infrastructure that would need to be built to incorporate returning refugees, and the ways in which the curriculum would need to change in order to best incorporate refugee students.

Additionally, the research focuses on the voice of the young Karen who came to Thailand to pursue their education in the refugee camps. I conducted interviews with 17 Karen between the ages of 18 and 40. Six of these interviewees were conducted with residents of the Mae La refugee camp from July 3­ July 5, 2013. The remaining 11 interviewees had formerly lived in one of the refugee camps in Thailand, but had since moved to the border town, Mae Sot, where the interviews were

conducted in June and July 2013.

Of these 17 young Karen, two were born in the refugee camps in Thailand, and the other 15 were born in southeast Burma. Of the 15 who were born in Burma, 14 cited better educational opportunities as one of the reasons that they came to the refugee camps. Many of them moved to the refugee camps because their villages did not offer more than basic education (often only up until 4 standard), while others came to Thailand because their parents could no longer afford to send them to school. Others said that they came to the refugee camps to pursue education because they did not want to become farmers in rural Burma. I found that young Karen in the camps are unwilling to return to Burma now because of the lack of recognition of educational certificates received in the camps, the lack of job opportunities in Burma, and an unwillingness to pursue higher education in Burma because of its poor quality.

In order to respond to these concerns, I argue that Burma recognize educational certificates received in refugee camps and that educational reform should emphasize allocating more educational resources to ethnic areas. Educational reform should also emphasize improving the quality of the higher educational system overall in Burma by reforming the distance education programs, eliminating corruption within the university system, and placing a greater emphasis on developing analytical skills rather than learning through rote memorization.

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Ben Gottesdiener / Washington University in St. Louis “Even if he ignores the advice, every President should ensure he gets a third opinion from selected and seasoned private citizens he trusts. Though Cabinet members and senior White House aides often resent outside advisers, a President takes too many risks when he relies solely on his own staff and the federal bureaucracy for advice. Each has its own personal or institutional priorities to protect. An outside adviser can serve the role of a Doubting Thomas when the bureaucracies line up behind a single position, or help the President reach a judgment when there is a dispute within the government. They can give the President a different perspective on his own situation; they can be frank with him when White House aides are not.” ­Clark M. Clifford, Counsel to the President: A Memoir

This paper adopts a topical, case study approach to analyse three major events in U.S. foreign policy history

questions: What exactly was in the report and what affect did the report have on the beginnings of the Cold

through the eyes of Presidential Advisor and Secretary of Defense Clark Clifford and examines how Clifford influenced these crucial events in American history. I will ultimately make the argument that certain individual historical actors who are often overlooked do matter in the study of Cold War policy making. The events that I will analyze include the production of the Clifford­Elsley Report, which has only recently been declassified, and its impact on Truman’s outlook regarding early U.S.­Soviet relations; Clifford's role in Truman’s decision to recognize the State of Israel in 1948, a decision that affects Middle East policy to this day; and lastly, the large role Clifford played in the formulation of President Johnson's Vietnam policy.

War and the early Cold War major policy decisions?

Clifford and Elsley proposed a new foreign policy outlook for the United States towards the Soviet Union.

The report concludes:

On July 12, 1946, Truman asked Clifford to compile a report detailing Russia’s consistent failure to honor agreements in preparation for the Paris conference, which Truman would be attending later that year. The President had become increasingly frustrated with the Soviet behavior in the spring and summer of 1946. On September 24, 1946, Clifford handed Truman the final copy of the report, one of only 20 printed, titled “American Relations with the Soviet Union.” Truman took the remaining copies of the report, and they were not seen again for over 20 years. This raises two

". . . as long as the Soviet Government adheres to its present policy, the United States should maintain military forces powerful enough to restrain the Soviet Union and to confine Soviet influence to its present area. All nations not now within the Soviet sphere should be given generous economic assistance and political support in their opposition to Soviet penetration."

As Clifford recounted in his memoirs, this policy may now seem like a self­evident summation of American foreign policy of the nine Cold War presidents.

However, in 1946, this policy was unprecedented. The report was delivered on September 24, 1946. Although Kennan’s long telegram was transmitted prior to the deliverance of the report in February of 1946, the telegram did not mention containment. Kennan’s “X” article in Foreign Affairs where he first used the word “containment,” came ten months after the Report in July of 1947. Clifford’s policy of “restraint” was original.

It is clear that there are striking similarities between the report and the foundations of NATO, the principles articulated in the Truman Doctrine along with the

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Marshall Plan. It is hard to be precise about the true relationship between these documents, but the similarity and chronology is too relevant to be dismissed. According to Clifford’s memoirs, “There is no question that the Report had a significant impact on President Truman…It gave the president a precise picture of what the Administration’s senior officials were thinking in that critical year, when the nation was suspended between the end of World War II and the beginnings of the Cold War.”

This controversy over the recognition of Israel brought Clifford into one of the biggest political showdowns he would be a part of in his long political career. Clifford first became involved when he was asked by Truman to prepare the case for immediate recognition of the new Jewish state. He was to prepare himself, Truman told Clifford, as though presenting a case before the Supreme Court. “You will be addressing all of us present, of course,” Truman said, “But the person I really want you to convince is Marshall.”

General Marshall had been one of the leading voices strongly denouncing the prospect of recognition, and this split between Marshall and Truman was troubling to the President. Clifford’s position was clear on this issue. Clifford articulated his position to the President on May 12, 1948, in a meeting with the President, Secretary of State George Marshall, Robert Lovett, Robert McClintock, Fraser Wilkins, David Niles, and Matthew Connelly.

Ultimately, recognition of Israel was Truman’s decision.

Although a decision of this magnitude is far too complex to attribute credit to advice given by any one adviser, Clifford had measurable influence on Truman’s decision­making. His position stated at the showdown with the President and his senior staff on May 12, 1948.

Clifford, a fairly new member of the White House inner­ circle, went against the opinions of some of the most influential men in the world, and convincingly articulated his case to the President and acted as the President’s lawyer to argue the case for recognition.

Clifford’s role as an individual historical actor was noteworthy and should not be understated in the study of this remarkable decision by President Truman.

Throughout the early years of the Johnson administration, LBJ often brought the two together when he had a difficult decision to make. Clifford would ultimately play a significant role in winning over the president’s mind in shaping American policy in Vietnam.

In March of 1965, General Westmoreland, who was in charge of operations in Vietnam at the time then requested ground troops in order to pursue the enemy to Vietnam Policy complement the bombings. Clifford became increasingly concerned with increasing American involvement in the Vietnam conflict. Clifford was one of the few opponents of escalation and the commitment of ground troops who had any access to president Johnson, and he used this access to voice his opinion to Johnson. On May 17, 1965, Clifford sent a letter to Johnson arguing against troop escalation.

Johnson never replied, and agreed to deploy ground troops to the conflict. Johnson’s decision to deploy the troops was of no surprise to Clifford. In July and November of 1965, Westmoreland and McNamara requested 100,000 and 400,000 additional troops respectively. Clifford was becoming increasingly concerned with the direction of U.S. policy towards Vietnam. Clifford advocated for bringing North Vietnam to the peace negotiation table and then withdrawing from Vietnam honorably, quickly and peacefully.

Clifford articulated this view to the President, and did so once again when Johnson reached his final decision to increase troop commitments.

By January 30, 1968, following the resignation of Secretary of Defense McNamara, President Johnson turned to Clark Clifford as the new Secretary of Defense.

Clifford accepted the post, and on January 30, 1968 the Senate confirmed Clifford (although he did not assume office until February 29, 1968). January 30 was also historically significant aside from Clifford’s confirmation; this marked the beginning of the Tet Offensive. The situation in Vietnam had just become exponentially worse.

On February 28, 1968, a day before Clifford officially took office, Clifford received a memo from the

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President, creating a task force with Clifford as the chairman to give the President a recommendation on a request by Generals Wheeler and Westmoreland for 206,000 additional troops. Johnson also requested that Clifford ultimately produce recommendations that “reconcile the military, diplomatic, economic, congressional, and public opinion problems involved.”

After many days of deliberation, Clifford presented his recommendation to the President on March 4, 1968.

Clifford and his team recommended sending 20,000 troops to Wheeler and Westmoreland, with a massive build­up of reserves to use if necessary.

Johnson internalized the results and made up his mind in line with Clifford’s recommendations and planned to articulate the new direction of U.S. policy in a televised speech on March 31, 1968. The reason these results of the task force were so important is because this was one of the first times that top officials began shifting their view on Vietnam policy towards peace and de­escalation and away from escalation and total victory.

Clark Clifford left office on January 20, 1969. The main premise of this paper is not to prove Clifford was the sole driving force behind any of the Cold War policies aforementioned, but instead, to demonstrate that certain forgotten individual historical actors matter in the study of these history­altering decisions. Clifford’s influence on major foreign political events during the Truman and Johnson administration’s should not be overstated, but also should not be forgotten, as his contributions were measurable and important.

10 Dougal Robinson / University of Sydney Over the last two decades, Israeli Prime Ministers have increasingly warned that Iran is close to acquiring nuclear weapons. The profound impact an Iranian bomb would have on Israel’s national security has provoked vigorous debate about Israel’s best strategy to prevent this potential existential threat. With politicians, journalists and academics focused on the future, there has been little analysis of the significant impact that Iran’s nuclear program has already had on the Middle East.

Contrary to the prevailing Israeli and western narrative that Iran’s nuclear program is an exclusively negative phenomenon for Israel, I argue that Israel benefited considerably from Iran’s nuclear activities between in the four years to August 2013. Benefit is defined as an advantage or profit gained, and in this case the benefit to Israel is an improvement in its national security as a result of developments that are connected to Iran’s nuclear program. As Iran’s nuclear capability expanded, the world’s major powers and Sunni Arab states adopted a range of increasingly harsh economic and tactical measures that sought to alter Tehran’s nuclear calculus. These measures have had both direct and indirect consequences for Israel’s national security.

This paper has two main empirical arguments. First, I assert that actions taken by the international community, primarily in the form of sanctions, isolated the Iranian regime and reduced its revenues, thereby increasing the relative cost to Iran of acquiring a nuclear weapon and funding anti­Israeli organisations such as Hezbollah and Hamas. Second, I maintain that Iran’s nuclear program has led to an unprecedented degree of c­operation between Israel and Sunni Arab states, with associated benefits for Israel’s regional threat environment.

As a result, when Hassan Rouhani succeeded Mahmoud Ahmadinejad as President of the Islamic Republic of Iran in August 2013, Israel was in a better strategic

position than four years earlier: Iran did not ultimately obtain a nuclear weapon, Israel’s conventional and assumed nuclear capabilities dwarfed those of neighbouring and divided Arab nations, and many Sunni Arab states no longer viewed Israel as an enemy.

In fact, the shifting dynamics of the Middle East have been so favourable for Israel that its serving Ambassador to the United States, Michael Oren, was unequivocal in his July 2013 declaration “Geopolitically… our situation is better than it has been at any point in history.”

The theoretical part of the paper proposes an hierarchical framework for evaluating the importance and relative bearing of particular geopolitical threats on Israel’s national security. No single threat, in this case the Iranian nuclear threat, should be seen in isolation in an analysis of Israel’s national security. It is important to note that while Iran does not have a nuclear weapon or a nuclear weapons capability, the threat to Israel is for the time being potential rather than actual.

In the paper, I develop a portrait of Israel’s regional threat environment, from an Israeli perspective, as a basis for empirical analysis. I classify a diverse array of threats into three groups, graded by the Israeli leadership’s current perception of the order of magnitude of each threat: a) the potential existential threat posed by a nuclear Iran, b) day­to­day threats from Iran’s proxies, and c) conventional threats from neighbouring states. In each case, I link the threat to the actors ­­ Iran, Iran’s proxies, and Israel’s neighbours ­­ in respective order.

Using this snapshot of Israel’s national security considerations, it is possible to identify and categorise the nature of actual and potential benefits to Israel. In broad terms, a diminution in Iran’s economic or military resources, collaboration between Israel and Sunni Arab states, and an increase in Israel’s regional legitimacy, are favourable for Israel.

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The aim of this paper is to provide a different way of looking at the dynamic between Iran’s nuclear program and Israel’s national security by drawing attention to a presumed ‘side’ story of Iran’s nuclear program. In general theoretical and academic terms, it seems useful to broaden the scope of this topic. A potential existential threat tends to focus attention on strategies invoked to prevent the threat from materialising. As measures are implemented to avert the threat, significant events occur. However, amidst a preoccupation with the threat, the larger picture can be obscured and these events can be overlooked, even though they often outlast the threat itself.

During the Cold War, many states accrued benefits that were overshadowed by concerns over a potential nuclear war. Some of those benefits have had a lasting impact that is still visible today. In the same way, Iran’s nuclear program has already had important consequences that may have been overlooked. This paper seeks to address this gap by drawing attention to Israel’s collateral gains from Iran’s nuclear program.

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Colleen Wood / Georgetown University Overfishing, massive algae blooms, and countless tons of pollution from oil, fertilizers, and heavy metals have left lasting marks on the ecosystems of both the Black and Caspian Seas. Environmental degradation in both seas resulted from industrialization and poor policy planning. The transboundary nature of pollution in the seas has made it difficult to place blame on any one state. Recognizing that ecosystems do not respect political boundaries, cooperative solutions have been the preferred strategy for addressing environmental challenges amongst both groups of littoral states.

Until 1991, the Soviet Union and Iran were the only states that bound the Caspian. The USSR and Iran had developed a system of bilateral agreements to jointly manage sturgeon populations and pollution levels. The Black Sea region, in contrast, was marked by geopolitical tension throughout the Cold War. Competing political alliances marked the Black Sea littoral states, which were divided amongst the Warsaw Pact countries and Turkey, which was aligned with NATO. It was not until the late 1980s that Gorbachev’s glasnost policies allowed for environmental cooperation. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the creation of new states in both regions required a renegotiation of treaties and agreements, including those related to the environment.

In spite of the Black Sea region’s history of divergent geopolitical interests and the difficult transition from communism to market economies, the Black Sea states managed to create a more robust regime for managing pollution than the Caspian states. In my research, I sought the reason for this paradox among four possible hypotheses: the hegemonic interests of Russia, littoral states’ participation in other institutional arrangements, the strength of regional epistemic communities, and the existence of hydrocarbons. To test the hypotheses, I applied the historical narrative of both environmental regimes, which I created by reading legal documents,

project reports from international funding agencies, reports from local NGOs, and conversations with representatives from environmental organizations in both regions.

A brief comparison of the environmental cooperation process in both region finds that the Black Sea states began to meet and create agreements much sooner than in the Caspian, with Black Sea states ratifying their first agreement and protocols in 1992 whereas the Caspian states did not sign anything until 2003. Moreover, the Black Sea states have continually updated their agreements and obligations, as seen in the signing and ratification of agreements and new action plans in 2002, 2007, and 2009 reflected higher government capacity and concern for the environment, in addition to fostering a better contractual environment for cooperation.

It does not appear that the presence of a hegemonic state has an impact on the effectiveness of an environmental regime in these cases. Russia is the hegemonic power in both the Black Sea and Caspian Sea regions, and its political will and interests regarding environmental cooperation do not vary significantly in either case. Yet cooperation in the Black Sea led to a more robust environmental regime, in spite of Russia’s contrarianism, as seen in its action to block the establishment of the Black Sea Commission’s secretariat headquarters.

An epistemic community is a network of knowledge­ based professionals with a shared set of beliefs and that enjoy an authoritative claim to policy­relevant knowledge.

In theory, the demands and input of an epistemic community affect the achievement of political agreement on action plans. In both regions, technical task forces were assembled to carry out Transboundary

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Diagnostic Analyses and to staff monitoring stations.

Thanks to the Soviet Union’s extensive system of scientific research centers, there was no one state that provided the majority of experts to the teams. Even after the collapse of the USSR, scientists working in former Soviet research centers shared common ideas about data collection and the environment. In contrast to Peter Haas’s research on epistemic communities in the Mediterranean Sea area, the existence of a regional epistemic community cannot solely account for the variation in success between the Caspian and Black Sea regimes.

The Black Sea littoral states are highly integrated with other regional and international institutions, much more than their Caspian counterparts. Iran and Turkmenistan are largely isolated from the international community, whereas the post­communist Black Sea states jumped at the opportunity to become engaged with the international community. The Black Sea states have become embedded with the European Union and projects it organizes, such as the Danube­ Black Sea Task Force (DABLAS), and other regional organizations, such as the Black Sea Economic Cooperation and GUAM Organization for Democracy and Economic Development.

Beneath the seabed of the Caspian lies an enormous repository of oil and natural gas resources, consisting of nearly 50 billion barrels of crude oil and over 250 trillion cubic feet of gas. Before 1991, division of these resources was relatively simple – there was no formal delimitation of codified, although an informal seabed division was respected by both the Soviet Union and Iran. The collapse of the USSR and the creation of new littoral states required a decision about the division of the resources. Since 1991, the Caspian states have failed to agree on a legal definition of the sea, which would affect the division of valuable oil and gas resources.

After several exploratory missions, the Black Sea does not appear to have much if any hydrocarbon wealth.

Legal definitions of delimitation are not as complicated or high­pressure as those in the Caspian.

Legal confusion about the Caspian’s hydrocarbon resources appears to seep into the littoral states’ conceptions of responsibility for the sea’s

environmental condition. In addition, the presence of hydrocarbon resources has shaped the Caspian states’ conceptions of economic development. When oil and gas fund development projects, regulation and obligations to reduce hydrocarbon pollution can appear to put economic growth in supposed conflict with the goals of sustainable development. The Black Sea states have reconciled economic growth with sustainable development, something made easier by the lack of temptation to rely on extracting oil and gas to fund development projects.

In addition, the Black Sea states, despite their economic, political, and historical differences, have had experience in cooperation due to their embeddedness in international institutions. Cooperation in other spheres enhances the contractual atmosphere for collaboration and trust building on environmental issues, which explains the relative success of the Black Sea environmental regime.

None of this is to discount the cooperative efforts in the Caspian Sea or to put the Black Sea agreement on a pedestal, however. The Tehran Convention, signed in 2003, is the first and only legal document that all five Caspian states have agreed upon. This constitutes an incredible accomplishment for cooperation in the region, and marks a step in a positive direction. While the series of agreements signed by Black Sea states is impressive, there is still much room for improvement in monitoring, data collection, and standards enforcement. It’s necessary for both the Caspian and Black Sea states to heed the lessons of other regional seas agreements and continue forward in cooperation.

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Linnea Turco / The George Washington University How can competing logics regarding the causal role of religion in civil war be reconciled in useful way for future research? Many scholars have endeavored to link religion to civil war through broad and specific case analyses, primarily by characterizing religious civil wars as distinct from nonreligious in several important ways.

Although there is certainly great merit to such studies and their findings, I find them to be ultimately unconvincing, due to their failure to analytically distinguish the uses of religion in distinct civil wars.

I argue that most of the prominent literature has failed to distinguish between wars in which religion is peripheral and wars in which religion is central to the goals of actors in their attempts to understand the connection between religion and civil war. The present research reconsiders the independent variable of religion in the context of civil wars. The paper disaggregates the designation ‘religion’ into analytically­ distinct categories with regard to civil war, and uses these categories to re­code Toft’s large­N sample of civil wars, judging whether religion plays a central, peripheral, or negligible role in the violence. I argue that it may be useful to conceive of the link between civil conflict and religion as being substantive (central) versus instrumental (peripheral).

There is an analytical distinction which must be considered when examining the role of religion within civil wars. Wars fought over the implementation and doctrinal substance of a religion must be conceptualized as distinct from those civil conflicts fought for territorial or other political power gains that instrumentalize the language of religion to mobilize support for the cause.

Additionally, I reduce the units of analysis to the dyadic level, in order to better measure the religious dimensions of civil war. I argue that understanding these more micro­level elements of religious civil war can contribute to more internally­valid coding and analyses of the data.

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Lizzie Lamb / Western Washington University Trauma is not an easily solved or understood problem, nor is it one that can be fixed with “more therapy.” Over one million people were killed in the Genocide against the Tutsi in 1994 and the desire to push therapy and Western psychology into Rwanda is understandable, but is perhaps a misplaced evangelization of Western psychology. A study conducted in 2009 by the Rwandan government shows that, “79.41% of the adult population has been exposed to traumatic events as those defined in DSM­IV,” yet not even half a percent of the population sought [Western­based] trauma healing services offered by the government in that same year.

This large schism between the estimated number of people who have experienced trauma compared to the number of people who have sought trauma services provided by the government begs the question, how are people coping?

Between April and November of 2013, I interviewed 25 people of various professions in Kigali, Rwanda, to understand the field of mental health in Rwanda; what did mental health care look like before the introduction of Western psychology? How has it changed with the introduction of Western psychology, Christianity, genocide, and development and why has the government so blindly embraced Western psychology?

Mental health problems were traditionally attributed to one’s ancestors. If the spirits were unhappy with their living relatives, they exhibited their disproval through creating mental disturbances. Community mediators and spiritual leaders helped facilitate transformation and structure solutions.

The advent of colonization and Christendom created prompted a stigmatization of the belief in spirits, and the idea of mental illness as stemming from an external source shifted to placing the blame on the individual.

This shift marked the beginning of the dismantling of

cultural institutions and community networks supporting mental health, which were further disrupted during genocide.

Rwandans have a history of emotional reservation and valuing stoicism long before genocide; an old Rwandan adage dictates, “The tears of a real man go into his belly,” or, men do not express sadness but instead swallow their sorrow. While this proverb generally applies to men, cultural stoicism is one of the barriers to expressing trauma. Expressions of trauma and post­ traumatic stress disorder are typically somatic complaints relating to stomach pains, insomnia, headache, flashbacks, and episodes mimicking epileptic seizures. During the annual commemoration period each year in April, PTSD expressions become more frequent, particularly epileptic­like outbursts of uncontrolled screaming, spastic loss of motor control, and flashbacks. There is a general fear of being diagnosed as “depressed” or having PTSD, and some Rwandans prefer to use the word ihungabana, referring to a state of being that happens when someone experiences something that made them weak or sick which diminishes their chances of coping.

The government’s Mental Health Strategic Plan promotes the use of Western­based therapy practices as healing strategy, partly from a desire to accept modern, or “developed” ways of thinking, and to publicly reject older and traditional methods. It is widely believed that the President at the start of genocide, Juvenal Habyarimana, used “witchcraft,” or traditional rituals, to foment violence. As a response, the government has rejected traditional spiritual beliefs by institutionally promoting secularity and the sanitized comfort of Western psychological practices. Rwandans have responded and now less than one percent adhere to traditional spiritual practices. Some people do benefit from psychoanalytic psychology and pharmaceuticals,

The Third Annual Walsh Exchange but it is erroneous to base an entire governmental strategy on fear of being perceived as “backwards” or

for what purpose?

“undeveloped.”

The narrative of genocide divides Rwandans who were alive in 1994 into distinct categories; public testimony on genocide is given during the commemoration period but is limited to Tutsi survivors and Hutus who express great remorse for being Hutu, yet the majority of Rwandans do not fit neatly in these categories.

Regarding all other experiences, there is little to no open space for expression. My research leaves off at the inquiry, how do people who fall into the margins cope?

Rwandans are subtly and overtly coping in many ways; some turn to religion or form survivor associations, while others abuse substances or turn towards isolation.

In a 1978 census, 66.9% of Rwandans identified as Christian; in 2006, the number measured at 93.6%.

Churches were some of the quickest institutions to rebuild after genocide because of international help from missionaries and the codified blueprints of church structures. Institutionally, churches help tend to physical needs of congregants by helping people obtain food, shelter, work, and pay for school fees. Churches provide a sense of community, kinship, and provide a platform of stability for people with psychological issues. Many clergy in Rwanda believe that the only way to reconcile is through the church as confession, forgiveness, and loving your neighbor were practices predating genocide. This belief reduces the role the Catholic church played in architecting genocide, but many clergy attest that it was Christendom, not Christianity acting in 1994.

Amongst positive coping strategies, mental health practitioners, psychologists, psychiatrists, community leaders, and members of the clergy all agreed that two factors critical for healing included the need for individuals to make a personal commitment to healing, and the need for expression and testimony as a therapeutic device.

The current ruling party, the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), diffused the violence in 1994 and established the current government. As the victor of genocide, the RPF constructs and controls the historical narrative of conflict in the country to promote a sense of peace, transformation, and to secure their own power by glossing over the injustices incurred by the RPF since 1994. Criticisms of the current government are viewed as promoting “genocidal ideology,” and a culture of censorship is being fostered both politically and socially. This begs the question of how does censorship, both by the individual and the government, play a role in mental health? Who is being censored in Rwanda and

Like other dimensions in aid work in developing countries, psychology is complex and deserves a historical analysis. Additionally, this work highlights the role government plays in shaping expressions of mental health.

17

James Thomas Fishback / Georgetown University Most forms of international aid are concerned with medium­term infrastructure projects and hasty employment initiatives, frequently overlooking the individual needs of rural families and urban constituencies. Developing states, unlike their developed counterparts, are not afforded the same rule of law or financial frameworks that are often taken for granted by the West. In effect, a common path for developing states and their societies rests on the adoption of grassroots financial systems and informal economies, in which agriculture banks, development trusts, and rural cooperatives thrive.

For rural and urban constituencies alike, the most important buffers against poverty’s crippling setbacks are financial tools: namely, savings accounts, insurance policies, and familial remittances. Even so, such tools are rarely available as most of ASEAN’s rural, poverty­ stricken constituencies lack access to formal banking services. Globally, 77 percentof the population do not have a savings account; in Southeast Asia, the figure stands at 65 percent. An even greater number of these constituencies lack even the most basic of access to established credit or insurance services. As a result, rural, poverty­stricken constituencies struggle to stitch together a patchwork of informal, precarious arrangements to manage their financial lives. Common as they may be, these arrangements comprise of unpredictable outcomes for ASEAN’s poor, exposing them to perils of underground economies, predatory lenders, and local crime syndicates.

successfully reach borrowers, there is only a limited increase in entrepreneurial activity – and no measurable decrease in poverty rates.

This investigation cross­assesses the five distinct economic and political systems of Cambodia, Lao PDR, Myanmar, the Philippines, and Thailand, each subject to its own set of central­banking measures, exchange rate regimes, and anti­poverty efforts. ASEAN’s success as organization hinges on its inclusivity toward not only its member states but its people; because no organization, including ASEAN, can succeed if its people are left behind.

In the Philippines, non­state microfinance institutions have been primarily funded through commercial deposits, or borrowings from public financial institutions. Microfinance markets of Cambodia, Thailand, Myanmar, and Lao PDR rely instead on the proxies of foreign­direct investment. The most common of these proxies – ad hoc investment – functions as a means to pooling the assets of non­state NGOs, which are regularly denied proportional stock ownership due to the highly regulated nature of cross­national investment within ASEAN.

Despite its success, the microfinance industry, especially in Southeast Asia, has faced major hurdles.

Countries in which fiscal authorities pursue a variant degree of microfinance­led poverty alleviation are more likely across­pursuing a policy of state­led investment, through a number of communal expenditures and public financing. All of the countries being examined by this investigation are pursuing such a policy. As with all ASEAN members, government expenditure derives from each state’s legislature, cabinet, or appropriate

As high overhead costs of loan administration and growing government bureaucracy continue, interest rates and fees associated with microfinance remain steep, often reaching 100 percent annually. Moreover, in many cases, even when lending programs

fiscal authority acquiring debt to finance such efforts.

Since consumers, firms, and governments alike operate in the same economic realm, government borrowing affects consumer borrowing, which in turn affects market borrowing in its entirety. This autocatalytic

The Third Annual Walsh Exchange

Figure 1

relationship between both state­led and consumer borrowing is best embodied through Figure 1.

Here, Thailand’s loanable funds market is in equilibrium, as it was prior to fiscal developments succeeding 2008. Thailand’s nominal interest rate (y), the rate at which microloans are distributed, remains equivalent to the quantity of loans funded (x). At this intersection, both lenders and borrowers of microloans are content with the transactions taking place. Here, neither lender nor borrower could transact at an advantageously higher or lower interest rate, respectively, given a general avoidance of underground economies, informal marketplaces, and predatory lending.

In Figure 2, however, the market adjusts to an increase in Thai government expenditures, eliciting short­term debt acquisition. As d1 shifts rightward (d2) to adjust for increasing demand, the market’s real interest rate inches upward. Government’s increasing demand for funds drives interest rates higher, in turn deterring highly elastic private investment, of which microfinance is comprised. In the example of Thailand, the government’s expansionary fiscal operations have crowded out private investment and microfinance loans. Bangkok’s state­led spending is sapping financial resources that would otherwise be used by private enterprise, mainly, in the form of pre­dissolved micro assets that have yet to fully mature.

Figure 2

Many in Asia have already demonstrated their interest in financial mechanisms that encourage savings. In China, women commonly join groups called rotating savings and credit associations, or ROSCAs, which require them to attend weekly meetings and meet rigid deposit and withdrawal schedules. Yet, poor households, not unlike rich ones, are not well served by loans in isolation; they need a full suite of financial tools that work in concert to mitigate risk, fund investment, grow savings, and move money. Insurance, for example, can significantly affect how borrowers invest in their businesses and view long­term returns on financing.

Microfinance remains of one the few societal readjustment tools capable of leveling the playing field for Southeast Asia’s financial minorities. In the right hands, access to basic financial services can stimulate underserved economies and, at critical times, determine whether a poor household is able to capture an opportunity to move out of poverty. Given the rapid proliferation of cellular data and electronic banking, it is now possible to deliver such services to more people than ever before. Both of these trends have set the stage for yet further innovations by banks, NGOs, cellular providers, microlenders, and entrepreneurs – all of whom have a role to play in delivering life­changing financial services to those who need them most.

19 Laurel Zigerelli / Georgetown University Man­portable aerial defense systems (MANPADS) were created in the 1940s as a mobile, anti­aircraft weapon for military use during conflict. Since then, non­state actors have co­opted the technology and employed MANPADS against both military and civilian aviation.

At a material disadvantage against states from which they hope to exact political change, MANPADS work to level the playing field between non­state actors and their targets.

These weapons are: a) highly concealable, b) easy to assemble, and c) can cause devastating damage. Most MANPADS measure five to six feet in length and weigh 35 to 40 pounds. There are only four components to most types of MANPADS ­ launch tube, grip stock, thermal battery, and warhead – requiring very little training for assembly. In terms of their range, MANPADS can strike aviation flying at up to 20,000 feet. With a price tag as little as $5,000 on the black market, MANPADS are truly desirable weapons for non­governmental organizations.As Matthew Schroeder once wrote, “Shoulder­fired missiles are a terrorist’s dream and a law enforcement nightmare . . . for less than the cost of a used car, a terrorist can cripple a commercial airliner, and with it the airline industry.”

The RAND Corporation quantified this point, estimating that a single attack against a commercial airliner in the U.S. could cost as much as $16 billion in damage, mostly due to a fear­induced loss of revenue after an attack.

Estimates vary regarding the number of MANPADS in circulation; there are anywhere between 5,000 and 150,000 MANPADS in the hands of non­state actors.

Particularly mysterious were the stockpiles of Saddam Hussein and Muammar Gaddafi, which disappeared shortly after the leaders were removed from power. In 2003, then­Secretary of State Colin Powell cautioned the international community about the danger that MANPADS pose saying, “there is no threat more serious to aviation.” Since 1975, there have been around 40

MANPADS attacks against civilian aircraft, killing more than 800 civilians.

With the relative ease of carrying out a MANPADS attack, as well as the staggering potential economic, political, and psychological damage associated with such action, why have non­state actors not used MANPADS more widely, especially against American targets? “Non­state actor” is a fairly nebulous term that will be used interchangeably with “non­government actor”. Though the cases of MANPADS attacks against civilian aviation include rebel groups, insurgencies, and terrorist organizations as all under different circumstances, this study seeks to answer the question, regardless of the actor, why have MANPADS been used against civilian aviation at all?

To answer this question, I will examine use of MANPADS as the dependent variable, with independent variables being: domestic politics in countries where MANPADS were used, geography of said countries, availability of MANPADS to various actors, given countries’ adherence to international arms control agreements – particularly the Wassenaar Agreement, the first and only international arms control agreement that specifically mentions MANPADS ­ domestic reaction to attacks, and material countermeasures, such as anti­missile defense systems on civilian aircraft or jamming and tampering devices on MANPADS to prevent illicit use.

Through a qualitative approach, this work will analyze the relative significance of the various independent variables in an attempt to isolate the factor(s) most important for policymakers to considering when attempting to mitigate the MANPADS threat. The ten representative case studies chosen range from instances where MANPADS caused a significant loss of civilian life (e.g. the 1993 downing of a Tupolev 154B in Georgia killing 108 people) to instances of significant failed attacks (e.g. the 2002 attack against a Boeing 757 operated by Israeli Arkia Airlines as the plane was

The Third Annual Walsh Exchange

taking off from Mombasa, Kenya en route to Tel Aviv).

These cases also represent politically important uses of MANPADS, such as when the Dassault­Mystere­Falcon 50 jet carrying the presidents of Rwanda and Burundi was shot down over Kigali in 1994, what many consider to be the spark that ignited the Rwandan genocide.

Finally, this study will also address situations in which one would expect MANPADS to be used but were not.

Examples include the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC) in Colombia and the Irish Republican Army (IRA) in Ireland. Both of these insurgent situations share many of the same characteristics as the cases where MANPADS were used; this study will explain why structural factors (such as geography) and ideological factors (such as incentive) made using MANPADS much more difficult and much less advantageous for these groups.

After a careful and thorough analysis of ten representative cases, as well as a general overview of all MANPADS attacks against civilian aviation to date, this study will conclude that non­state actors use MANPADS against civilian aviation where the incumbent regime does not maintain effective control over domestic security. Not only is it easier for non­state actors to acquire MANPADS in these situations, there is little or no law enforcement structure to punish individuals for using such technology. In these situations, it is even more crucial that whatever governance structure does exist participate in international arms control agreements and MANPADS removal efforts. These strategies have been remarkably successful; to date, the U.S. Department of State­led removal efforts have destroyed over 32,500 MANPADS in more than 30 countries. These agreements are both more cost­ efficient and ultimately more successful than material countermeasures. This finding is especially important for policymakers in a fiscally strained security environment where the MANPADS threat is nevertheless real.

Assessing these various means of controlling MANPADS proliferation, with the large bureaucratic, economic, institutional, legislative, technological, and coordination challenges associated with reducing the MANPADS threat, will shed light on successes in

current MANPADS counter­proliferation efforts and what progress still needs to be made. Despite the past accomplishments in stemming the MANPADS trade, the international community ought not be complacent; this technology will remain desirable for non­state actors, and policymakers would be foolishly naïve to discount the threat.

21

Ben Yunmo Wang / Tufts University Two major trends occurred in China’s relationship with Africa since the beginning of the 21st century. First,

peacekeeping principles that China subscribes to today, such as the upholding of sovereignty and the non­use of

China strengthened its economic relationship with Africa, overtaking the United States as the continent’s number one trading partner by 2009, and offering more concessional loans to developing African countries than the World Bank. Second, China increased its troop contributions in United Nations Peacekeeping Operations (UNPKO), becoming the 13th largest contributor and the first among the Security Council’s five permanent members. Over 80% of these Chinese peacekeepers are deployed to missions in Africa. As China’s involvement in Africa rises in profile, certain popular media began to portray Beijing as being solely interested in exploiting Africa and its natural resources.

Subsequently, some Western analysts began to suspect that the increase of Chinese peacekeepers in Africa carries similar ambitions. While Deborah Brautigam famously called Chinese aid to Africa the “Dragon’s Gift,” more cynical observers worry that it may in fact be a curse.

force except in self­defense.

This paper examines whether a correlation exists between China’s contributions to African UN peacekeeping missions and its economic interests in Africa. The first section provides a theoretical and historical background of Chinese peacekeeping in Africa. It begins by reviewing current literature that seek to explain China’s reasons for participating in peacekeeping, including the expansion of soft power, demonstration of China’s ‘peaceful rise,’ acquiring operational experience, and diplomatic subversion of Taiwan. Next, it retraces the historical narratives behind China’s growing economic interests in Africa and China’s change­of­heart towards peacekeeping participation. It also discusses some distinctive

The second section of the paper analyses the relationship between Chinese peacekeeping and economic interests in Africa. First, it demonstrates that China’s deployment of peacekeepers in Africa is indeed selective. China dispatched significant contingents to Liberia (UNOMIL/UNMIL), the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUC/MONUSCO), Sudan (UNAMID and UNMIS), South Sudan (UNMISS), and recently Mali (MINUSMA). However, it participated little in other African UNPKOs in the same time period, including Cote d’Ivoire (UNOCI), Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE), Burundi (ONUB), and the Western Sahara (MINURSO).

An empirical analysis of African UNPKOs since 1990 finds that China’s decision to participate has little correlation with the host country’s economic status and trade relationship with China, prior to troop deployment. Second, the study compares Chinese peacekeeping troops sent to seven UNPKOs in Africa with import and export volumes between China and the missions’ host countries, from 2000 to 2012. Although each case has its nuances, the overall trend is that countries receiving large numbers of Chinese peacekeepers eventually also enjoyed improved trade with China. The findings are summarized in Figure 2 below. The red and orange lines are countries that received significant Chinese peacekeeping contingents, and the blue lines are host countries that did not receive many Chinese peacekeepers despite having sizeable UNPKOs. The evidences suggest that the presence of Chinese peacekeepers does have a positive correlation with trade relations, after troop deployment.

The Third Annual Walsh Exchange To offer context for these trends discovered, the paper’s third and final section includes three case studies of countries where China has contributed a significant number of peacekeeping personnel. In Liberia, Chinese participation is strongly tied to its One­China Policy.

Beijing used its UN veto power to co­opt Liberia into severing diplomatic relations with Taiwan. In return, China dispatched nearly 600 peacekeepers and played a significant role in the UN mission. The rekindling of relations as a result of Liberia’s change of allegiance toward Beijing facilitated trade and investment. In the DR Congo, President Joseph Kabila closely aligns himself with Beijing. Chinese leaders expressed sympathy as Kabila struggled against rebel forces, and generally considers the DR Congo government a political ally. While there is speculation that stability in the Kivu region would grant China access to its mineral resources, these claims lack reliable evidence. In Sudan, China faced international criticism for its close ties with the government in Khartoum despite ongoing violence in Darfur. Participation in UNPKOs offered China an opportunity to rescue its reputation ahead of the 2008 Beijing Olympics. China leveraged its ties to President Omar al­Bashir and convinced Sudan to accept peacekeepers.

strategic and operational objectives for China.

Nonetheless, Chinese deployments did often contribute to improving relations with the host government and populations and providing a secure environment for business investments and transactions. These conditions in turn facilitated the signing of export contracts for natural resources and the import of Chinese manufactured goods.

The findings of this paper suggest that improving trade and increased access to markets correlates to Chinese peacekeeping in Africa, but it is a consequence of rather than the cause behind China’s decision to participate.

Contrary to some claims, China does not seem to be deploying peacekeepers to protect investment assets or existent trade interests in the host nation. Rather, Beijing deployed peacekeepers to serve a combination

This project began in Spring 2013, when the author interned with the Future of Peace Operations program at the Stimson Center, an international security think tank. This was followed by summer research in Beijing, which has expanded into the author’s senior honors thesis. The paper includes insights from interviews with professionals and academics in both Washington D.C. and Beijing.

Overall, the impact of China’s participation in UNPKOs has been highly positive, and there does not appear to be a “Dragon’s Curse.” Even though participation in peacekeeping sometimes helps China gain access to new markets, it should not be viewed as a threat. Rather, the involvement of a non­Western developing country adds credibility to UNPKOs. Moreover, Chinese peacekeepers have won acclaim for their professionalism and efficiency. The continued engagement of Beijing in such multilateral organizations will be an important dimension in managing China’s rising economic and military strength. Future researchers may wish to expand the scope of this topic to UNPKOs worldwide, and investigate whether China remains selective in its participation.

of case­specific political reasons as well as overarching

Figure 1

Figure 2

23

Madeline Livingston / The George Washington University Climate change has rarely ever offered consolation on the global economic environment. However, in the case of the Arctic state of Greenland, changes in the world’s overall climate have fundamentally transformed its prospects for economic independence from Denmark.

The Arctic is warming twice as fast as the rest of the earth and evidencing the environmental degradation that temperature shifts can induce. In Greenland, polar ice caps have been receding, a process that has led to the discovery of minerals, oil and gem deposits.

However, Greenland will only be able to achieve economic independence from its former colonial ruler if resource exports stimulate economic growth that removes the need for the annual Danish block grant to Greenland. Literature on resource abundant countries suggests that economic growth is often replaced by the “resource curse,” which refers to the negative effect that resource wealth may have on economic and political systems institutions. Through the original application of the resource curse theory to the unique context of Greenland, this thesis begs the question: can Greenland escape the resource curse? This thesis analyzes the effect that resources have on economic development and democratic consolidation in Greenland.

Additionally, this research unpacks the causal chain between Greenland’s resource discovery and the resource curse by identifying institutions, education and political culture as channels for the negative effects on the economy and democratic governance. This research concludes that Greenland is vulnerable to the political afflictions of the resource curse. This thesis argues that Greenland can avoid the resource curse by utilizing institutional capacity building to control the pace of development.

While the existing literature identifies several variables, this thesis specifically strives to evaluate institutional quality, education and political culture as causal mechanisms. In light of these variables, this analysis makes an original contribution by both applying the resource curse theory to the unique case of Greenland and expanding the literature on Greenlandic institutions and political culture through the use of surveys and interviews. This thesis utilizes an original political participation survey that establishes an understanding of Greenlandic political culture. To complement the surveys, this thesis includes interviews from Greenland experts and Greenlandic citizens. These interviews add contextual evidence to my analysis of Greenland’s vulnerability to the resource curse.

This analysis of Greenland’s vulnerability to the resource curse proposes that Greenland shows economic signs of Dutch Disease and exhibits signs of a political resource curse. In order to provide a complete analysis, this thesis predicts how the resource curse may arise in Greenland given the current state of Greenlandic institutions, education and political culture. Although Greenland does not yet have natural resource revenue as a significant portion of their economy, projections may be made about their vulnerability to the political resource curse given the extensive size of the public sector, lack of democratic legitimacy, and lack of diversification in the economy.

Institutional quality is a dynamic variable in analyzing the presence of the resource curse in countries. In the context of this research, institutions are defined as the “humanly devised constraints that shape human interaction” and “structure incentives in human

The Third Annual Walsh Exchange exchange.” This research is primarily concerned with government, fiscal, and supervisory institutions that play a role in natural resource management and decision­making. This thesis seeks to analyze institutions as a mechanism for transmitting the negative effects of resource wealth to economic development and democratic consolidation outcomes.

In effective democracies, institutions often have the “strong checks and balances” needed to withstand political incentives that will harm democratic quality and long­term economic development. However, in young democracies like Greenland, institutions have less established traditions of preventing corruption, enforcing the rule of law, providing regulatory oversight, and promoting accountability and voice. In the face of resource decisions in Greenland, political institutions have not wholly upheld democratic processes or involved Greenlandic citizens in decision­ making. This trend falls in place with the prediction of resource curse literature that resource shocks undermine institutionalized mechanisms for public scrutiny.

If afflicted by the resource curse, Greenland may experience a decrease in education spending. Resource abundant countries often go through a period of decline in skilled labor, which has the result of increasing income inequality and decreasing educational opportunities. The current state of the Greenlandic education system is weak, as only about half of the population completes education through high school, and the system is often dependent on Denmark for teachers. Further decreases in educational quality would not only democratic consolidation, as civic engagement levels are dependent on the education levels of a state’s constituents. The Greenlandic state must approach education from a capacity­building standpoint, as the extractive industry is a knowledge industry. In order to develop expertise in the extractive industry, Greenland will need to invest in education in order to close the “competency gap” between Greenlandic firms and foreign firms.

In an examination of political culture, qualitative research has been essential in establishing an original viewpoint on political participation in Greenland. This

thesis refutes the findings of existing literature and posits that Greenlandic citizens are politically active and increasingly critical of the government. However, the paucity of institutionalized mechanisms for response in the resource decision­making process, and the lack of transparency in the Bureau of Mineral and Petroleum evidences that recommendations must be targeted at improving democratic processes rather than fostering increased civic engagement. To prevent the negative effects of the resource curse on democratic consolidation, the Greenlandic government must work to provide public scrutiny on extraction decisions.

This analysis concludes that Greenland is highly susceptible to the resource curse given the current state of its institutions, education and political culture. This research also finds that the cause of deficits in education and political culture stem from institutional weaknesses. Therefore, recommendations for mitigating the resource curse in Greenland must begin with institutional capacity building. Following prescriptions for institutional weaknesses and deficits in institutional trust, this thesis recommends that Greenland takes measures to 1) build a comprehensive network of corruption controls, and encourage the development of watchdog civil society organizations, and, 2) control the pace of extraction. These recommendations focus on the end goal of mitigating the resource curse and achieving the means to eventually become independent from Denmark through economic development and democratic consolidation in Greenland.

25

Basil Bastaki / Georgetown University How did people survive the Rwandan genocide? Can we use their lessons to help people survive in the future? I studied two memoirs of the Rwandan genocide – Left to

In order for a Tutsi civilian to have survived the Rwandan genocide, they must have successfully navigated each violent event. In order for a Tutsi

Tell by Immaculée Ilibagiza and My Father, Maker of the Trees by Eric Irivuzumugabe – using a methodology I devised. From the memoirs, I proposed a framework for understanding survival.

civilian to navigate each violent event, they must have matched the correct technologies of survival to the encountered technology of violence. But a correct matching only improved their odds; ultimately, survival came down to luck.

First, an episode of genocide can be disaggregated into thousands of violent events. In order to survive a genocide, a person must navigate all encountered violent events. People do not survive one genocide, but they survive several violent events.

Second, different ontologies of killing constitute an episode of genocide. I focused on the categorical killing of Tutsi civilians, not the coercive killing of moderate Hutus, the elimination of political rivals, or resisting the Rwandan Patriotic Front’s invasion.

Third, I problematized the concept “violent event” and “survival.” I talked instead of “technologies of violence” and “technologies of survival”: these are the different patterns of violence and survival that can be found in a genocidal episode. Importantly, each episode of genocide may be constituted by different technologies.

The Holocaust, unlike 1994 Rwanda, employed death marches, labor camps, and gas chambers.

Previous scholars used memoirs for two purposes: to study current self­perception or to reconstruct history. I needed to use memoir like a qualitative dataset: to extract accounts of violent events and make generalizations. Because I did not come across such a methodology, I had to devise my own.

Memoir, as a primary source, poses unique challenges: the passage of time distorts memory, fitting memories to a narrative distorts facts, and publishers, editors, and co­writers can dilute the memoirist’s account.

Moreover, I needed to correct for Schacter’s (2001) The Seven Sins of Memory: transience, absent­mindedness, blocking, misattribution, suggestibility, bias, and persistence. To correct for these problems, I first analyzed the memoirs in whole – context, purpose, audience, narrative arc, coherence and consistency.

Then, I analyzed the violent events narrated in the memoirs. I developed a confidence rating system dictating the type of information and degree of accuracy

Table 1: Confidence ratings for memoir analysis: I only considered the second and third categories as fit for use as evidence

The Third Annual Walsh Exchange each piece of information could convey.

The first column was irrelevant to my research, and the fourth and fifth columns were too uncertain for meaningful use. Therefore, I only used information from the second and third columns. Sometimes, I would apply additional checks to verify or discount information: self­indictment checks, internal consistency checks, external consistency checks, or post­hoc discourse corrections. However, I did not need to depend on these checks for this project.

The following Survival Matrix identifies the technologies of survival (rows) available to Tutsis and the technologies of violence (columns) employed by their attackers. Beneath each technology I list some of that technology’s attributes. The grid displays the success odds for survival given the matching of survival and violent technologies. Extreme outcomes – guaranteed failure or likely success – are color­coded for easy reference.

The Survival Matrix reveals two findings. First, every technology of survival and violence had its strengths and weaknesses. No technology of survival was perfect; to survive, you had to fit different technologies to different violent events. Second, survival success depended on the interaction of technology attributes (were you stationary or mobile, did you actively pursue targets or receive them, did you hide, deceive, or resist violently). For example, fleeing succeeded against

concentrated massacres where it failed against roadblocks because the roadblocks were positioned to receive mobile civilians whereas concentrated massacres were positioned to attack immobile civilians.

The Survival Matrix obscures the practice of technology blending. To improve their survival odds, civilians would combine two or three technologies at once, and some technologies naturally blended with others. For example, a Tutsi could mitigate the danger of fleeing at a roadblock by masquerading as a militia­member or by accompanying a Hutu patron. Moreover, the Survival Matrix obscures the particulars of each technology. For example, I found that as the duration of the genocide increased, the patience and willingness­to­help of the Hutu patron decreased.

The Survival Matrix, as a framework for understanding survival, can help civilians survive future genocides. A few caveats are in order. First, the specific technologies of violence and survival will be different. You should not assume that each episode – or even each sub­region within massive episodes such as the Holocaust – shares technologies with previous episodes. Second, the Survival Matrix cannot account for survival­ technological innovation, new technological attributes, or technology blending. The Survival Matrix is a heuristic device, not a law­book. Third, the Survival Matrix accounts for categorically­targeted civilians, not in­group members killed to coerce others or political rivals killed to reduce competition.

Table 2: The Survival Matrix: match technologies of survival with technologies of violence to improve your odds

27

Avanti Narayanan / Georgetown University What is the impact of the middle class on the world’s largest democracy?

class activism in India more democracy enhancing than others?

Comprising in 25% of India’s population, the middle class forms a sizeable segment of the subcontinent today. While their participation in formal electoral politics remains relatively low, the political presence of the Indian middle class has surged in recent years through protests, mass movements and civil society activism centered in India’s metropolises. This increase, in turn, presents fascinating questions on the priorities and motives of this echelon of Indian citizens today.

In order to address this query, I map three “strands” of Indian middle class activism as defined by Vinay Sitapati (legal activism, corporate activism and neo­ Gandhian activism) against Larry Diamond’s seven features of democratic civil society: (1) democratic internal processes, (2) pursuit of goals and methods that do not seek to win control of the state, (3) organizational institutionalization and established procedures, (4) ability to achieve vertical depth, (5) adaptability to social context, (6) pluralism, and (7) density of associations. I will trace the movement of these various forms of activism from a scale of “democracy enhancing” to “democracy limiting” over the last two decades, from India’s liberalization in 1991 until today. Finally, I will examine which “democracy enhancing” forms of activism provide the most potential for the Indian case, as well as elements of Diamond’s theory that prove problematic in the Indian context.

The importance of associational life to India’s middle class is a prominent theme in present scholarly analyses. In his survey research conducted in the Indian cities of Delhi, Bangalore and Chennai, John Harriss details the middle class use of residential associations to attain access to cable television and neighborhood beautification services. Similarly, Leela Fernandes highlights the relevance of civic organizations, public narratives and the media as a means for middle class “consumer citizens” to pursue their interests and gain access to state power.

As much as such literature provides valuable insights on India’s middle class, it also highlights pervasive skepticism towards elite cries for “accountability” and “efficiency,” citing self­interested motives and hegemonic aspirations as the impetus for such associational activity. These accounts therefore posit that middle class associational life has worked to limit substantive democracy in India. However, I argue that a narrow focus on India’s middle class as self­interested consumers fails to account for other strands of middle class civil society, whose priorities do not lie in selectively improved service provision alone. Thus, the following thesis seeks to ask: are some forms of middle

My alternate hypothesis postulates that some forms of middle class civil society in India are more “democracy­ enhancing” than others due to their democratic internal processes, goals, methods, and capacity for inclusiveness. Conversely, the null hypothesis of this study remains consistent with existing literature in its prediction that all forms of middle class civil society in India are similarly debilitating to democracy.

Given India’s upcoming general elections in April 2014, the ensuing analysis of the middle class provides important insights on a group that “every [political] party is looking for ways to seduce.” The present study thus seeks to add to the gap in existing literature in two ways. First, given that most studies of the Indian middle class focus either on income­based or traditional

The Third Annual Walsh Exchange identity­based (e.g., caste) stratification, this examination considers ideological and intellectual divisions as a basis of characterizing the middle class.

Second, while parts of India’s “new middle class” are concerned with the accumulation of cultural and material capital, the associations and activism engaged by them cannot be considered an accurate representation of Indian middle class associational life as a whole. Rather, a wider, systematic approach to detailing the remaining strands of elite civil society is necessary in order to fully determine the impact of these groups on Indian governance.

29 Sarah Baran / Georgetown University Microfinance is a development strategy that utilizes personal relationships and group­based models to offer small loans to individuals who otherwise do not have access to credit from formal institutions. This report provides an evaluative analysis of the unique history and structure of Protagonizar, one of the first organizations to bring microfinance to Argentina, as a case study. Protagonizar is a community­based initiative in San Miguelhas and has had an immense economic and social impact on the local community.

A qualitative ethnographic methodology was utilized to conduct this research with the majority of the information collected from 24 formal interviews with the foundation’s founders, employees, and micro­ entrepreneurs, ranging from 30 to 90 minutes each.

Various observations and informal interviews were also conducted during the three weeks in which the foundation was visited. Quantitative budget reviews and statistical data on the foundation’s operations and the microbusinesses were also analyzed and used to complement the qualitative information.

Three principle questions guided the process. The first was looking at the foundation’s operational structure: how does the model work and what are its policies? The second question focused on the success of its implementation and the results: what is the impact?

Finally, both these aspects are combined in examining how the foundation works at the intersection between education and social justice.

This report offers a brief background of the current economic situation in Argentina followed by an explanation of how microfinance works to address deficiencies regarding access to liquidity. Then, it outlines how Protagonizar operates according to its mission, the positive impacts the organization has had on the community, and its current and future challenges. Lastly, it addresses the role of education and

faith in Protagonizar’s work for social justice.

The foundation grew as a local­based project in the impoverished province San Miguel. In this area there were limited public resources, a lack of infrastructure, and little economic activity. Excess water floods the streets and debris piles in the gutters from inadequate waste disposal and an outdated centralized sewage system. Stray dogs wove between buildings. The housing conditions reflected people's wages. Some had brick walls, floors, running water, and electricity.

Others were much less sound, constructed with cardboard, sheet metal, tarp, recycled wood, or fencing.

With the poverty came crime, violence, drug trafficking, and robberies.

Conditions became even worse in 2001 when there was an economic crash in Argentina. Around this time, Father Rod Zarazaga, S.J., the founder of Protagonizar who also grew up in San Miguel, recalls, “unemployment was around 60% and people were starving. We were sure we had to do something. The basic needs here are always twice that of the national level.” As a result, he pursued the idea of offering microloans through his Parish in the Chapel of Nuestra Señora de Lujan in 1999. Driven by the ambition of the residing pastor and six volunteers, the idea quickly developed into a foundation that has since expanded into four different branches. Protagonizar differs from other financial lending firms because all but one of its employees are from and live in the very communities the organization serves, allowing for an important knowledge of the neighborhoods and more personal relationships with the entrepreneurs. Both of these elements are key factors vital to the success of the organization.

Protagonizar works with the mission “to be a self­ sustainable foundation which, with efficiency and ethical and social responsibility, grants financing in a

The Third Annual Walsh Exchange quick and timely way to those who want to leave poverty behind and do not have capital to develop their skills.”

Protagonizar offers low­interest loans ranging from $50 to $3,000 U.S. dollars on a weekly commitment return plan which spans ten weeks on average. The entrepreneurs have commercial, production, or service microbusinesses, including small retail stores, kiosks, clothing stands, tutoring centers, pet stores, carpentry shops, hair­salons, bee­keeping areas, artisan workshops, bakeries, traditional wooden and leather crafts, street food vendors, grocery stores, and hand­ knit goods, among other creative endeavors.

The entrepreneurs are approved for a loan after meeting several requirements and then pay it back weekly with 5% interest. Yet, each entrepreneur must form a solidarity group or join an existing one of three to six people where none of the members are from the same family or dependent on a shared income. In the event that one member cannot pay their weekly quota, the other members must pay on their behalf. Prior to signing for a loan, an economic evaluation is conducted that determines their payment capacity. Protagoinzar’s credit assessors travel by bike to do a home visit to calculate the operational costs of the business including inventory, liabilities, passive and active finances etc, along with the total family costs to check if there are any outstanding debts.

Protagonizar currently offers loans to over 1,300 people with a 97% success return rate. Those in arrear, which is the period past when the final payment was due, is 2.2 percent, which is less than the 5.5 percent of the average market. While it is clear that the access to liquidity produces tangible results, measured through personal, social, and economic development, the organization also systematically enriches the community in ways that are less visible. By creating a system that reinforces values such as financial literacy, solidarity, co­ operation, and trust, Protagonizar actively works to cultivate a seed bed for empowerment. In this way, Protagonizar works at the intersection of education and social justice, as it eases the path for individuals to pursue and accomplish their goals. As the founder Father Zarazaga said, “When we were talking about it, we realized it was exactly that—they have to be the Protagonizars of their own lives.”

31

Joshua Schoen / Georgetown University The Beslan hostage crisis, which took place in School No. 1 in Beslan, North Ossetia, between September 1­3, 2004, has been often been considered Russia’s 9/11.

Russia and the Russian response to it.

Despite the fact the numbers involved were smaller and the casualty count was only a third of 9/11’s, Beslan has nonetheless been ingrained into the Russian collective memory, into the national psyche, not least because most of the victims were children. What has become important are not the details of the events – the attack and the failure of the Russian security services to stop it – but rather the responses and ramifications after the event took place. The events created new dimensions for Chechen issues. Terrorism is a key element in understanding the Putin regime and the current parameters of the Russian state. Therefore, when we examine the Russian response to terror, it is not only about the issue of terrorism, but the story of the para­ political system that has defined the Kremlin and especially its most powerful ministries.

describes the beginning of Vladimir Putin’s counterterrorism strategy, stemming from the 1999 Moscow apartment bombings. My intention is to show that the primary catalyst for the changing nature of North Caucasian separatist terrorism was in fact tied to the evolution and development of Russia’s counterterrorism policies. The paper examines the responses of the Kremlin and structural changes it made in the wake of the key events, most particularly the Moscow apartment bombings, the Dubrovka Theater massacre, and the Beslan hostage crisis.

A large amount of information on the Russian response to terrorism is available, mainly due to the efforts of brave journalists who have made it their mission to draw back the curtain that cloaks the Kremlin. But since not everything can be uncovered when discussing this issue, at some points I have had to make some assumptions. I certainly believe that these assumptions are correct, but they may only be corroborated circumstantially.

What I intend to show is the story of the development of Russian counterterrorism and the consequences of the actions taken by the state. I note for the reader that, despite the growing Islamization of the current conflict, terrorism in Russia differs significantly from the varieties of terrorism that we have experienced in the West. This is because Chechnya and the North Caucasus, and the politics of these regions, remain central to understanding the evolution of terrorism in

The paper is divided into two parts. The first part

The second part deals more directly with the issues surrounding the North Caucasus – for terrorism in contemporary Russia is invariably linked in some way to the North Caucasus question. This part of the paper moves away from counterterrorism developments inside the Kremlin, essentially because the Russian military left the North Caucasus in 2007 and the Kremlin has more or less stopped undertaking counterterrorism operations there since 2009. But terrorism in Russia remains inextricably tied to the political situation of the North Caucasus. Thus, in order to grasp how to stop terrorism or at least limit it, one must examine the political situation and those developments which have in some cases led to an increase in stability, and in others have led to a decrease.

32

Narintohn Luangrath / Boston College While waiting for their asylum applications to be evaluated, the living arrangements for asylum seekers vary considerably: some are detained in prisons, some

promoted by the government as supporting Article 37 of the CRC, which forbids the punishment of children in a cruel or harmful way (in the context of prison

are held in direct provision housing, and some are held in other accommodations with periodic reporting requirements. The paper focuses on direct provision (full­board) accommodation centers and, in particular, its negative impact on asylum seeker children. Given concerns over children’s health and safety, why is the system of direct provision still in place? Which articles of the 1989 United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) does direct provision uphold (or not uphold) and to what extent does it do so effectively?

The paper argues that the passive denial of access to education and other services to asylum seeker children living in direct provision insinuates their inferior status relative to Irish children. Asylum seeker children are dehumanized and designated as “the other,” while the State absolves itself of responsibility for their care by contracting for­profit private businesses to run the day­ to­day operations in direct provision centers. These private contractors do not have the expertise to respond to asylum seeker children’s unique needs and fail to promote practices consistent with Ireland’s responsibilities under the CRC. The Irish government uses direct provision to falsely portray itself as being in compliance with the 1951 UN Refugee Convention and the CRC. Direct provision also allows the government to subvert dialogue on the injustice of the prison detention of asylum seekers, as direct provision is promoted as a more “humane” alternative. The paper concludes with considerations for future asylum policy construction in Ireland.

detention). Direct provision is also promoted by the government as supporting Article 9 the CRC, which discusses a child’s right to live with their parent(s).

Proponents of direct provision argue that the incarceration of children and/or the separation of the child from the incarcerated parent are avoided through this type of accommodation system.

Direct provision housing usually takes the form of hostel­like arrangements clustered in enclosed areas and often dispersed across rural parts of the country or otherwise outside of city centers. Because direct provision housing is not prison detention, it is also

Direct provision is promoted by the government as accommodation on a full­board basis in that meals and utilities are provided. The government also affords allowances at €19.10 per adult and €9.60 per child per week to help pay for child care items and other needs.

Such rates, however, have not been adjusted to account for inflation in over fourteen years. Direct provision was intended to fulfill the basic dietary and accommodation needs of asylum seekers, thereby disobliging the State from providing supplementary welfare benefits, which would be more costly. In addition, the housing centers are managed by private companies contracted by the government, and over €650 million has been paid by the State to these companies over the past decade. Asylum seekers assigned to direct provision centers are not allowed to work or seek alternative housing options while waiting for their claims to be processed and must rely solely on the small weekly allowances provided by the government.

Even after taking these funds into account, the “incomes” allotted for families place them 20 percent below the poverty line.

Children often suffer from extreme material deprivation because these small cash allowances force trade­offs among items like non­prescription medicines, toiletries, diapers, and nutritious food not otherwise provided by housing staff.

In addition to restricted movement outside of the

The Third Annual Walsh Exchange housing centers and poor nutrition, overcrowded living quarters in direct provision housing constitute a violation of Article 16 of the CRC, which articulates children’s rights to privacy. Due to limited space, some asylum seekers and their families are required to share one bedroom or one hostel­like room with non­ relatives. Such close quarters make children vulnerable to verbal, physical, or sexual abuse by others, undermining the “protection” that they supposedly receive under the Reception and Integration Agency’s (RIA) Child Protection Policy.

Since direct provision sites are often located far from city centers, asylum seekers have limited, if any, regular contact with Irish citizens. If an asylum seeker’s application for refugee status is eventually granted, those years in isolation end up making integration into Irish society difficult. The rural locations of and lack of transportation infrastructure near most direct provision sites make it difficult for children to avail of schools and interact with Irish children. Although asylum seeker children are permitted to attend Irish primary schools, schools are often inaccessible without a car or money to afford public transportation; these barriers violate Article 28 of the CRC, which articulates children’s rights to primary education. Additionally, the lack of suitable play areas, childcare facilities, and other resources in direct provision centers, as well as the lack of freedom to associate with children outside of direct provision is arguably in violation of Article 31 of the CRC regarding the right to “leisure, play, and culture” and the right to join in a wide range of “cultural, artistic, and other recreational activities.

Taking into account the political, legal, and logistical difficulties of amending the direct provision system (or abolishing it altogether, as many advocate) is important while making policy recommendations to the Government of Ireland. However, it is also crucial to consider asylum seeker children’s unique needs and backgrounds; some have witnessed or experienced war, violence, separation from their families, and significant material deprivation.

The social and emotional adjustment needed for these children to acclimate to life in Ireland is negatively impacted by their experiences in direct provision accommodation.

Children also experience extreme deprivation due to insufficient

participation in society, and the social exclusion faced by asylum seeker children in direct provision harms their overall health, well­being, education, and happiness.

34

Sun Hoo Kim / Georgetown University Behind the end of the Cold War, an exceptionally peaceful end to a great power rivalry, there were U.S.­

policy preference alignment.

educated elites, such as Yakovlev, who carried out liberal reforms and opened up the Soviet Union to the West. However, a number of individuals who inflicted serious harm to American national interests were also educated in the United States; Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, the mastermind of the September 11 attacks, and Sayyid Qutb, a thinker whose writing was essential to the founding of Al Qaeda, are such examples. These conflicting cases present a puzzle regarding the effect of U.S. education on foreign elites’ behavior toward the United States.

U.S. education affects international students’ attitudes in two ways. First, it alleviates negative prejudice that the students may have toward the United States – this is referred to as identity effect in this paper. Psychologists such as Allport (1958) have argued that people form negative prejudice toward an out­group in order to preserve the positive image of their in­group and that contact with members of an out­group can help alleviate such negative prejudice. Education is a particularly effective form of contact because it happens at a formative stage of students’ lives and their interaction with American students and professors is extensive rather than superficial. However, based on this theory, the contact alleviates all kinds of prejudice rather than necessarily improving people’s attitude toward the out­group. Accordingly, if students come to the United States with positive prejudice, which is often the case due to positive portrayal of the United States in local media in many parts of the world, they may become disillusioned and develop a more negative opinion of the United States.

Understanding this puzzle has become especially important today due to two recent developments. First, the number of international students coming to the United States, especially from China and India, has increased dramatically over the past few decades, and thus so has the need to evaluate the impact of U.S. education on these rising powers. Second, its immensity notwithstanding, America’s hard power has limits, as were demonstrated in Iraq and Afghanistan, and isolationist sentiments are rising among the American public. Thus the United States has to find alternative ways to exert influence when hard power is insufficient or inappropriate. In response to these developments, this study explores how U.S. education of foreign leaders can affect the foreign policies of the countries they represent. U.S. education and, more broadly, Western education align foreign elites’ policy preferences with those of the United States by influencing the values held by the elites; empirical evidence based on United National General Assembly (UNGA) votes confirms that Western education, though not U.S. education separately, significantly enhances

In contrast to the identity effect, the value effect of U.S. education on international students’ foreign policy preferences is unambiguously favorable to the United States. Through classes, student activities, and interaction with American people in general, international students come across various American values such as democracy, freedom, and human rights.

While people do not always come to like the values they frequently encounter, past studies have found that international students from a variety of cultural backgrounds are attracted to Western values related to freedom, often because they perceive the values as just

The Third Annual Walsh Exchange or because they believe those values can benefit their home countries. One thing to note is that any Western education, rather than U.S. education in particular, may be sufficient to influence students’ values. That said, the value effect of non­U.S. Western education may not necessarily be favorable to the United States when American values conflict with those of other Western countries.

Once they become leaders, U.S.­educated elites implement their pro­American policy preferences in three ways. First, they decide the general directions of their foreign policies in ways that reflect their attitudes and values. Second, the leaders fill key government positions with other Western­educated elites who can be relied upon to make lower­level policy decisions in line with the leaders’ policy preferences. Lastly, U.S.­ educated leaders work closely with Western governments and organizations; their familiarity with Western culture and language facilitates the cooperation with Western actors. The resulting reliance on the support of Western actors, in turn, makes the leaders more vulnerable to the demand of these foreign actors, ensuring that the countries’ policies continue to promote Western liberal values. Syngman Rhee of South Korea, Saakashvili of Georgia, and Abdullah II of Jordan are examples of the leaders who widely used some or all of these means to implement policies that directly or indirectly benefited the United States.

I test the theory using voting patterns in the UNGA. Limitations notwithstanding, UNGA voting data provide a useful means to observe foreign policy preference alignment across time and countries, especially when the voting alignment is measured using “ideal point difference” (Voeten & Strezhnev, 2013) rather than simple voting coincidence. I include in some models country and year fixed effects as well as control variables such as U.S. aid commitment.

Empirical analysis demonstrates that the presence of a Western­educated leader is significantly correlated with decrease in ideal point difference with the United States at the 0.1 or 1 percent level; regressions using Newey­ West or Discroll­Kraay standard errors, which are robust to heteroskedasticity as well as autocorrelation, show the same results. In terms of substantive effects, a

country with a Western­educated head of government has, holding all others equal, the same degree of voting preference alignment with the United States as a country without a Western­educated leader that is promised between $57 million and $81 million (in 2011 dollars) more in aid. I address some endogeneity concerns using a lagged dependent variable and by testing models with modified samples; based on these additional tests, I conclude that it is reasonable to infer causal relationship between the Western education of the head of government and increase in the country’s policy preference alignment with the United States.

36 Alexandra van Dine / Georgetown University Papers hitting newsstands in late 2003 and early 2004 were dominated by stories of the illustrious, infamous A.Q. Khan: the father of Pakistan’s nuclear bomb, a Pakistani national hero…and now, what appeared to be the CEO of the world’s first nuclear Wal­Mart.

Journalists gobbled up the story, which read like a spy novel: scientist motivated by love of country works to build a nuclear bomb, goes rogue, and sells the same technology he stole from Europe to, as it turns out, public enemies one, two, and three: North Korea, Iran, and Libya. The question was why would someone do this, and everyone from the media to members of Congress to academics tried, unsuccessfully, to nail down a narrative that was both glamorous enough for a sound bite and accurate enough to actually mean something.

As the West plunged into blame­laying and hand­ wringing over the possibility that nuclear proliferation could now be conducted by and between individuals instead of states, the fifth anniversary of the death of another man crucial to Pakistan’s weapons program was fast approaching. Munir Ahmad Khan, the former head of the Pakistani Atomic Energy Commission (PAEC), had died after heart surgery in Vienna five years before the revelations about A.Q. Khan’s actions became public. He had experienced the same enmity toward India, the same national and historical traumas resulting from wars between the two nations, and had the same knowledge of and access to Pakistan’s nuclear technology. Yet, he had not sold secrets to anyone, let alone these three unstable nations. He had retired from the PAEC in 1998, living quietly until his death in 1999.

Why did one man choose to wreak international havoc, while the other did not?

In this thesis, I examine the question of why individuals proliferate through a process­tracing case study focusing on Pakistan. Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program had two branches: the Pakistani Atomic

Energy Commisison (PAEC), headed by Munir Ahmad Khan, and Kahuta (later Khan) Research Laboratories (KRL), headed by A.Q. Khan. A.Q. Khan went on to sell centrifuge technologies and other nuclear expertise critical to building a nuclear bomb to Libya, Iran, and North Korea. Munir Khan did not. This paper asks why.

Ultimately, I argue that an individual’s proclivity to proliferate is impacted by his or her institutional involvement and tendency towards egomania. The more institutionally involved a scientist, the less likely he or she will be to proliferate, and the more egomaniacal, the more likely. In Munir’s case, his involvement with Atoms for Peace and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) raised the opportunity cost of engaging in illegal nuclear transfers, channeled his talent in a productive manner that challenged him intellectually and professionally, and provided him with the legitimacy necessary to gain political power through traditional means. A.Q. Khan’s lack of involvement, on the other hand, left a power­hungry man feeling that he had to prove his credentials outside of the system in order to obtain the domestic power he craved.

I arrived at this conclusion by testing two hypotheses against a detailed historical case study.

These hypotheses are as follows: Hypothesis 1: Scientists who possess (lack) institutional credentials will be more (less) likely to refrain from engaging in proliferation because the professional cost would be prohibitive (negligible) while personal benefits would be low (high).

Hypothesis 2: Scientists who tend toward (away from) egomania are more (less) likely to turn to proliferation as a way to prove their power, relevance, and worthiness.

A variety of concepts, theories, and arguments spanning multiple disciplines underpin the hypotheses outlined

The Third Annual Walsh Exchange

above. Hypothesis 1 comes from a broad base of literature on existing proliferation theories, the role of epistemic communities and international scientific scholarship in impacting individual and national decision making, and the effect of institutional paths to power on individual choices. Hypothesis 2 synthesizes a variety of psychological fields, including Jacques Hymans’s work on the psychology of nuclear proliferation and existing literature on why individuals engage in dangerous activities like espionage.

This paper is not without its limitations. The small n of cases of rogue nuclear proliferation in history, while encouraging from a real­world counterproliferation standpoint, will necessarily limit the extent to which my findings can be extrapolated into larger policy implications. There are no further cases against which to test my theory. Additionally, this thesis focuses solely on Pakistan, further limiting its generalizability.

However, this paper remains useful and relevant for two reasons. Firstly, Pakistan is an area of serious concern to nonproliferation scholars and policymakers around the world today; even if the conclusions generated from this thesis only apply to Pakistan, they still provide a valuable contribution to the counterproliferation field.

Secondly, this paper starts the discussion of a much­ needed first image explanation of nuclear proliferation for an increasingly first image world.

Today’s world is one of the non­state actor, with individual scientists, smugglers, and terrorists posing an increasingly large proliferation threat. As nuclear scholars reinterpret the strategic role of nuclear weapons in the 21st century, they must also reinterpret the ways in which these weapons can and do spread.

With a strengthened international nonproliferation regime focused on states as primary actors, proliferation to rogue states like Iran and North Korea, schematics for basic nuclear bombs available online and even the most lax security measures around fissile material going unenforced, individual actors play a larger role in nuclear proliferation than ever.

38

Narintohn Luangrath / Boston College Class of 2014 Advisors: Dr. Kenji Hayao (Associate Professor, Department of Political Science) and Dr. Jennie Purnell (Associate Professor, Department of Political Science)

This submission was selected by the Paper Review Committee of the Third Annual Walsh Exchange Conference to receive the 2014 Best Paper Award.

Luangrath's composition was selected for the quality of its writing, the originality of its topic, and the extent of its research. Accordingly, the paper is reproduced in its entirety below.

Whereas prison detention is often used to house asylum seekers considered at risk of absconding during the

poor, as the IRC has repeatedly received complaints from residents concerning the cleanliness and safety of

claim evaluation process, direct provision is intended for parents, children, and others deemed a “low security or flight risk” by immigration authorities.

The Reception and Integration Agency (RIA) oversees direct provision centers, as residents’ housing, meals, heat, and other basic necessities are provided. RIA also developed the Child Protection Policy, outlining procedures for staff to follow in the event of suspected abuse of asylum seeker children in housing centers.

Despite these services, the direct provision system is controversial and faces strong opposition from migrant rights groups. Accommodation centers have proven to be unsafe, as children are frequently injured within the poorly maintained housing sites.

the accommodations. Cases of children being injured by damaged property (including on­site play structures), crumbling ceilings, and faulty plumbing and electrical systems are particularly concerning.

Additionally, while waiting for their claims to be evaluated, asylum seekers are not permitted to work.

The weekly cash allowance provided for residents is meager, and asylum seekers have reported difficulty purchasing appropriate food, medication, toiletries, and other necessities for their children which are not otherwise provided by housing staff.

According to a 2012 report by the Irish Refugee Council (IRC), direct provision accommodations—some of them built as early as 1999—were only designed to house asylum applicants for up to six months. Due to the overwhelming number of applications awaiting processing, however, the average stay today is four to six years. At the end of 2012, 59 percent of 4,800 asylum applicants had been living in direct provision accommodation for at least three years, and about nine percent had been living in the same situation for more than seven years. Upkeep of these facilities is typically

Given various concerns about asylum seeker children’s health and safety, why is the system of direct provision still in place? If direct provision were originally envisioned as a more “humane” system for families, which articles of the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) does direct provision uphold, and to what extent does it do so effectively? Which articles does direct provision fail to uphold? Although the direct provision system is overseen by RIA, the Irish government contracts private companies to perform day­to­day operations within the housing centers, while limiting asylum seekers’ and their children’s freedom of movement outside of them. In doing so, this paper argues that the government symbolically—and to some

extent, literally—relieves itself of its responsibility over the care and integration of asylum seeker children into mainstream Irish society. This paper will assess the government’s rationale for preserving direct provision to answer the above questions and articulate why the system of direct provision is violating the CRC, not upholding it.

The distinction between refugees and asylum seekers is important to consider when tracing the development of the direct provision housing system, as well as the exclusion of asylum seekers and their children from Ireland’s welfare apparatus. A refugee is “any person who, owing to a well­founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion is outside of the country of his nationality and is unable, or owing to such fear, unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country.” An asylum seeker is a person who is seeking to be recognized as a refugee. Migrants forcibly displaced due to non­persecutory reasons (including, but not limited to, generalized violence or conflict, environmental disasters, food insecurity, state fragility or collapse, and so on) do not fall under the traditional definition of “refugee,” as outlined in the 1951 UN Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (hereinafter, Refugee Convention).

Thus, asylum seekers applying for refugee status must fall under the 1951 definition in order to qualify.

In recent years, Ireland has transformed from a country of mass emigration to a country of net immigration, having begun to experience appreciable asylum flows in the past decade. John O’Donoghue, a former Minister for Justice and Equality, expressed surprise at the increased number of asylum seekers arriving in Ireland.

The lack of conflict near Irish borders and the fact that Ireland has never been a colonial power adds to the puzzle of increasing asylum applications. Although direct provision is a relatively recent policy creation by the Irish government, anti­asylum seeker sentiment has historical roots which could be seen well before the introduction of direct provision. News headlines in 1997 proclaimed that Ireland was being “flooded, swamped or invaded by an influx of asylum seekers tap[ped] into visceral fears,” and the arrival of a few thousand asylum seekers was reported as a “national

crisis.” As far back as the early 1900s, Fr. John Creagh stated that “[Jewish asylum seekers] were leeches that sucked the lifeblood of the Irish nation.” There are policy­level consequences for the otherization of asylum seekers, a phenomenon which has a long history in Ireland.

On a local level, the Government of Ireland’s 1996 Refugee Act was considered a progressive piece of legislation. It broadened the legal definition of a refugee to include people persecuted on the grounds of gender and sexual orientation, making Ireland one of the first Western countries to do so.

The Act was drafted at a time when Ireland received very few asylum applications.

However, the government did not establish a right to legal aid or grant asylum seekers the right to work in the country. Moreover, although the Act was passed by the Daíl Éireann, the lower house but dominant chamber of the Oireachtas (Irish parliament), with support from all political parties in Ireland, it was not implemented by the end of the decade when asylum applications grew to almost three times the number received in previous years. The Act was drafted at a time when Ireland received very few asylum applications. Unfortunately, the rapid rise in the number of asylum claims within a short amount of time (e.g., claims tripled from 1,179 in 1996 to 3,883 in 1997) was used by government officials to justify not implementing of much of the Act. A preoccupation with discouraging asylum applications in Ireland persisted within subsequent legislation. The 1999 Illegal Immigrants (Trafficking) Bill made it more difficult to apply for asylum by proposing sanctions against those who aided asylum seekers trying to enter Ireland, without recognizing that many asylum seekers escaping their home countries are often forced to use illegal means to flee persecution.

An “illegal immigrant,” in turn, was defined as a “non­national who enters or who seeks to enter the state unlawfully.”

The bill essentially criminalized asylum seekers lacking “proper papers” as well as those assisting them for humanitarian reasons.

Another distinctive feature of the Irish asylum reception system has been the exclusion of asylees from mainstream welfare provisions. Welfare restrictions, “aimed at making Ireland less attractive as a destination for asylum seekers,” were approved in 1999. Prior to

1999, access to the Irish welfare system was based solely on the demonstrated “need” of an individual; now, however, case workers had to consider a person’s legal status in the country.

Although asylum seekers technically have an authorized presence in Ireland, they have been excluded by the structure of the welfare state: asylum seekers exist as a unique category of immigrant wherein there are no statutory or constitutional rights of social support. In line with these exclusionary practices, the full­board accommodation system of direct provision in Ireland was being promoted as a “fair and effective” means of meeting the basic needs of asylum seekers and their children. Despite being forced to endure squalling conditions in direct provision centers while waiting years for their claims to be evaluated, O’Donoghue asserted that “genuine” asylum seekers and their children would “appreciate that one of the purposes behind direct provision was the prevention of fraud.” Thus, O’Donoghue’s remarks implied that the traditional welfare apparatus in Ireland was being taken advantage of by asylum seekers whose claims were not bona fide. Thornton argues, however, that state­centric concerns surrounding immigration control and abuse of the asylum system have allowed justifications for the poor treatment of asylum seekers in direct provision housing accommodations across Ireland today.

Universality and inclusion may have been at the core of Ireland’s immigrant and refugee policies, but those policies have effectively excluded asylum seekers in the process. Ireland has always differentiated between refugees and asylum seekers, and historically has allowed refugees but not asylum seekers to work.

Between 1992 and 1998, Ireland’s first state­funded refugee program was established, and it accepted Bosnians fleeing armed conflict in the Balkans and entitled them the right to work. While Kosovar arrivals were not granted the status of “program refugee,” they were also allowed to work and receive welfare entitlements.

With regards to asylum seeker protection at the European Union­level, the EU member states adopted the Reception Standards Directive, seeking to ensure that asylum seekers within the EU have a “dignified standard of living for the duration of their asylum claim.” Apart from preventing secondary asylum flows within the EU (due to the perception of more generous

reception conditions in other EU member states), the directive also establishes limited and qualified rights of which the asylum applicant is guaranteed. These rights include the right of minors to receive an education, the right of asylum seekers to work after one year if his or her application has not been decided upon, the right to maintain family unity while living in state reception (e.g. state accommodation centers like direct provision), and the right to basic healthcare and reception conditions that can “sustain an individual adequately,” among other rights. Ireland, however, did not opt into this directive. An EU­wide report found that Ireland is one of just five member states which do not provide tailored accommodation for vulnerable asylum applicants, including asylum seeker children.

Moreover, all EU countries except Ireland and Lithuania allow asylum applicants to work, often after a certain period of time spent in the reception system.

Although Ireland’s record of asylum seeker protection is as limited as it is poor, Ireland is a party to UN conventions impacting the rights of asylum seekers and in particular, asylum seeker children. First, Ireland acceded to the Refugee Convention in 1956. The UN Office of the High Commissioner for Refugees (hereinafter, UNHCR or the UN Refugee Agency) argues that asylum seekers must be treated on the assumption that they are refugees. Reflected in the EU Reception Standards Directive, UNHCR has also argued that asylees should have access to their “basic support needs,” which includes “the maintenance of human dignity and self­sufficiency” as well as guarantees to ensure family unity in the case of asylum seekers travelling with children.

Second, Ireland acceded to the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) in 1992. The CRC requires state parties to “respect and ensure the rights set forth in the present Convention to each child within their jurisdiction without discrimination of any kind” (my emphasis). Direct provision has been criticized by researchers, non­governmental organizations, immigrant rights activists, and international reporting bodies for violating Article 3 of the CRC, which requires that the best interests of the child (i.e., asylum seeker children) be a “primary consideration.”

Direct provision has also been deemed a form of institutional discrimination, given the physical and social exclusion faced by children in housing accommodation centers,

which will be discussed later in the paper.

The system of direct provision is promoted by the Government of Ireland as a more “humane” housing alternative for asylum seekers, especially ones with families, when compared to prison detention. Direct provision housing usually takes the form of hostel­like arrangements clustered in enclosed areas, dispersed across rural parts of the country or other areas outside of city centers. Because direct provision housing is not prison detention, it is also promoted by the government as supporting Article 37 of the CRC, which forbids the punishment of children in a cruel or harmful way (in the context of prison detention). Direct provision is also promoted by the government as supporting Article 9 the CRC, which discusses a child’s right to live with their parent(s). Proponents of direct provision argue that the incarceration of children and/or the separation of the child from the incarcerated parent are avoided through this type of accommodation system.

The government argues that asylum seeker children in direct provision housing are also better protected from harm due to the aforementioned Child Protection Policy implemented through RIA, protection measures which would almost certainly be unavailable in prison. RIA oversight is intended to protect children from the sexual exploitation they could potentially face in an environment without the presence of specially trained staff, where children risk rape and other forms of sexual abuse.

These child protection initiatives can be considered to be in­line with Article 22 of the CRC, which states that children have the right to special protection and help if they are refugees—broadly defined by UNHCR to include asylum seekers—as well as all of the other rights listed in the CRC. The abuses that asylum seekers in general, not just children, face in mainstream Irish prisons have led migrant rights groups and other human rights groups to push the government for non­prison alternatives.

Additionally, direct provision is promoted by the government as accommodation on a full­board basis in that meals and utilities are provided. The government also affords allowances at €19.10 per adult and €9.60 per child per week to help pay for child care items and other needs.

Additionally, two exceptional needs

payments of €100 are given each year to asylum seekers in direct provision. Such rates, however, have not been adjusted to account for inflation in over fourteen years.

Direct provision was intended to fulfill the basic dietary and accommodation needs of asylum seekers, thereby disobliging the State from providing supplementary welfare benefits, which would be more costly. In addition, the housing centers are managed by private companies contracted by the government, and over €650 million has been paid by the State to these companies over the past decade. Despite criticisms of conditions in direct provision centers, Alan Shatter, Ireland’s Minister for Justice and Equality, argued that there was no cheaper alternative to the program. In response to criticism, however, the government made a number of exceptions to the general policy of direction provision: heavily pregnant women, nursing mothers, and certain qualified families could be catered for within the traditional Irish welfare apparatus. On a number of occasions, however, even persons in the above categories were still kept in direct provision housing “due to lack of appropriate alternative accommodation.”

Historically, the Irish government has coordinated the reception of asylum seekers with “interested parties in the voluntary sector.”

Prior to state­sponsored accommodation such as direct provision, the coordination of asylum seeker reception (and later, resettlement of refugees) from the 1930s until the 1990s was largely left to charities and other volunteer organizations. The system of direct provision ended up achieving the government’s goal of dispersing asylum seekers and their children outside of Dublin and into rural accommodation sites. Because they are prohibited from working, asylum seekers are effectively rendered dependent upon the State and upon their assigned accommodation centers. Thus, the building of these centers emerged prior to the development of any viable strategy for dealing with increased asylum flows and improving the welfare state apparatus.

Fanning argues that the Irish model copied, to some extent, the dispersal policies in the United Kingdom.

Historically in the UK, however, responsibility for resettlement and healthcare services was given to the federal immigration authorities and corresponding agencies.

By contrast, in Ireland, much of that responsibility was either contracted out to private

businesses overseeing service allocation in the housing sites or voluntary organizations like charities and immigrant rights organizations.

Thus, examining Ireland’s history of asylum seeker reception prior to the introduction of direct provision allows us to better understand three factors: first, the government’s rationale for contracting for­profit private businesses to run day­to­day operations within housing centers; second, why the facilitation of appropriate healthcare, food, and other services is poor and ill­fitted to suit diverse asylum seeker populations and their children; and third, why such practices have simultaneously contributed to inconsistencies in response to asylum seekers over the past several decades.

Asylum seekers assigned to direct provision centers are not allowed to work or seek alternative housing options while waiting for their claims to be processed and must rely solely on the small weekly allowances provided by the government. Even after taking these funds into account, the “incomes” allotted for families place them 20 percent below the poverty line. Children often suffer from extreme material deprivation because these small cash allowances force trade­offs among items like non­ prescription medicines, toiletries, diapers, and nutritious food. For example, 92% of asylum seekers living in direct provision housing believed it was necessary to buy extra food to supplement the meals provided by the housing staff because those meals did not meet the dietary needs of their children. Joan Giller, a doctor who visited a direct provision center in Cork, elaborates on the interrelated problems facing asylum seeker families: Not being able to work is devastating to people whose worth [...] is based on their ability to provide; being forced to live as a family in one room is anathema to most families, for whom privacy is essential; not being able to cook for the family and having to exist on food that is often barely edible is torturous; living in poverty is degrading and demoralizing […] waiting, often for many years, for a decision on your asylum application in a system that appears to dispense arbitrary justice is demoralizing.

Moreover, there are approximately 8,083 asylum seekers comprising 96 different nationalities living in

59 accommodation centers in 22 counties in Ireland, and about 30% of those living in direct provision housing are 17 years of age or younger. Thus, given these diverse national origins, ages, and corresponding accommodation preferences, direct provision’s “one size fits all” policy neglects the unique needs of different asylum seekers, particularly those of children.

The welfare discrimination and severe poverty experienced by asylum seeker children in direct provision run contrary to Ireland’s obligations as a party to the CRC. Although external agencies and organizations often subsidize childcare services and other services for asylum seeker families, these arrangements are usually on a short­term basis, thus creating further instability in the children’s lives.

Moreover, reductions in fees for services can only be offered on a short­term basis, and not all childcare services are in a position to offer reduced costs to asylum seeker families. Ultimately, these families’ dependence on meager weekly allowances, their inconsistent experiences with charitable arrangements, and the instability of funding from external agencies compound difficulties that already exist with the high cost of childcare.

Article 24 of the CRC states that parties to the Convention must ensure that children have “access to education and are supported in the use of basic knowledge of child health and nutrition [...] hygiene and environmental sanitation and the prevention of accidents.” Unfortunately, lack of appropriate food and resulting instances of malnutrition among children and expectant mothers is a daily problem in direct provision. According to Regulation 1.7 of the RIA’s House Rules governing accommodation centers, these centers must provide a “varied and nutritious breakfast, lunch, and dinner” as well as “varied and nutritious packed­lunch for school­going children.”

Several studies published on various direct provision centers in Ireland, however, noted that the food served to children (and adults) tended to contain high levels of calories and fat, while fruit and vegetables were limited. The residents of Eyre Powell accommodation center, for example, reported having only “a steady stream of chicken nuggets, white rice, ketchup, vegetables and chips [...] and a distinct lack of toddler appropriate foods.” Others at that particular accommodation center noted that most of the food served was considered “fast

food,” and not appropriate for their diets. Children living in direct provision were also found to have high rates of “asthma, stomach problems, constipation, and eye problems” among other health problems.

In addition to restricted movement outside of the housing centers and poor nutrition, overcrowded living quarters in direct provision housing constitute a violation of Article 16 of the CRC, which articulates children’s rights to privacy. Due to limited space, some asylum seekers and their families are required to share one bedroom or one hostel­like room with non­ relatives.

There are concerns about mixed­sex accommodation among non­family members, as well as the safety of unaccompanied children living in direct provision housing. Such close quarters make children vulnerable to verbal, physical, or sexual abuse by others, undermining the “protection” that they supposedly receive under the RIA’s Child Protection Policy.

Tensions within housing centers are a detriment to family life; children reported becoming upset as a result of conflict or being shouted at by non­parental adults.

Some parents described their children as becoming psychologically withdrawn due to tensions within housing centers In 2012, a concerned asylum seeker reported that his children were living in close proximity to men (who were not known to them) and adult asylum seekers with “severe mental health conditions.

Single mothers of small children typically share just one bedroom with other mothers (usually non­relatives) and their small children. Asylum seeker children often receive much­needed support and strength by being kept with their parent(s), however, the challenges of maintaining a healthy family life “within the confines of a small space shared with non­relatives” must also be acknowledged. Geoffrey Shannon, Special Rapporteur on Child Protection, highlighted the risk of child abuse in direct provision accommodation where single parent families are required to share one room. Shannon cites the example of a 14­year­old asylum seeker girl in a housing center in Mayo who became pregnant by an adult male resident in September 2011.

More generally, parents living in direct provision noted that they cannot “parent their children in a normal way” and that their right to be a “guardian to their children was constantly undermined” by the housing arrangements in accommodation centers. Even normal

child rearing activities like toilet training was made difficult by overcrowding and lack of adequate private space in most centers. As early as 2000 and 2001, when direct provision was a new development in the Irish asylum system, it became apparent that this system of accommodation restricted parents’ ability to protect their children from potential harm.

Since direct provision sites are often located far from city centers, asylum seekers have limited, if any, regular contact with Irish citizens. If an asylum seeker’s application for refugee status is eventually granted, those years in isolation end up making integration into Irish society difficult. Thornton notes that the Irish asylum reception regime insists that asylum seekers reside “away and apart from the host community,” and that the “asylum seeker is viewed as neither a citizen nor a warranted class of individual deserving of social rights on par with others in need.” The rural locations of and lack of transportation infrastructure near most direct provision sites make it difficult for children to avail of schools and interact with Irish children.

Although asylum seeker children are permitted to attend Irish primary schools, their isolation and restricted movement outside housing sites amount to a passive denial of their right to an education. Schools are often inaccessible without a car or money to afford public transportation, and these barriers violate Article 28 of the CRC, which articulates children’s rights to primary education. Additionally, the lack of suitable play areas, childcare facilities, and other resources in direct provision centers, as well as the lack of freedom to associate with children outside of direct provision, arguably violate Article 31 of the CRC regarding the right to “leisure, play, and culture” and the right to join in a wide range of “cultural, artistic, and other recreational activities.

There are also policy consequences for the otherization of asylum seekers through their isolation in poorly maintained housing sites. The direct provision system effectively segregates asylum seeker children from the general Irish population, and this segregation has negative impacts on upholding children’s rights under the CRC. In December 2007, approximately 30% of asylum seekers living in direct provision centers in Ireland were under 12 years of age. Thus, around 1,964

young children had limited, if any, access to schools, health care, and social interactions outside of their housing sites. Psychological impacts were also evident, as adolescent and teenage children in Fanning and Veale’s 2004 study discussed perceptions of having a “lesser status than other children in Irish society.”

Asylum seeker children are dehumanized and the State absolves itself of its responsibility for their care by hiring for­profit private businesses to run the day­to­ day operations of direct provision housing centers. It is costly and logistically difficult for the government to employ medical specialists and caregivers for these children, especially since direction provision sites are often located in rural areas, but these private contractors do not have the expertise to respond to asylum seeker children’s unique needs. The ability of asylum seeker children to exercise personal autonomy in the forms of play, social interaction, and education is subsequently undermined due to direct provision.

Fanning notes that within Ireland, asylum seekers have always lived on “the limits of rights regimes.” As discussed earlier, Ireland has historically been a reluctant host to asylum seekers; Thornton argues that “racism within Irish society continues to be mobilized for administrative purposes.” The almost “natural exclusion of asylum seekers from traditional welfare state structures,” as well as what Geddes calls the “bogus myth of welfare scrounging,” have driven these exclusionary practices and allowed for a new “welfare apartheid” to develop in the country.

If the right to adequate housing were simply viewed as having a roof over one’s head, then direct provision housing could meet the basic needs of Ireland’s asylum seeker children. However, international standards in the CRC require a more holistic approach to “appropriate” housing, illustrating that Ireland’s current approach to meeting asylum seeker children’s rights to adequate housing, food, education, and healthcare is severely lacking.

Although direct provision is potentially safer than prison detention, the inhumane conditions that asylum seekers and their children are kept in warrant a reassessment of the government’s policy. Direct provision is arguably a modified prison system, and the social and educational development of children in particular is hindered by

their lack of access to primary education and language classes.

The Irish government uses direct provision to falsely portray itself as being in compliance with the Refugee Convention and the CRC. Certainly, keeping asylum seeker children with their parents (per Article 9) and not in prison detention (per Article 37) is a positive step towards finding alternatives to the inhumane practice of detaining asylum seekers in prison. More generally, migration can often result in the fragmentation of families and households, as different members move at different times for different reasons. Direct provision can, in some ways, keep familial networks together; for child asylum seekers, familial fragmentation is often the result of traumatic experiences related to fleeing their home countries. Given the diversity of the asylum seeker population in direct provision, it is possible that children’s family networks and friendships are reproduced through contact and relations with other asylum seeker families from various countries. In some cases, direct provision housing may also provide a greater sense of safety and security, especially if asylum seekers and their children are not being housed in mainstream Irish prisons with convicted criminals.

Unfortunately, the overcrowded housing and lack of privacy which often come with direct provision accommodation present numerous other problems and undermine any potential advantages of direct provision.

Alastair Christie writes: Conditions in [direct provision housing present] a range of day­to­day tensions and pressures that affect the psychological well­being of parents and children. The lack of privacy [makes] family life extremely difficult and the chronic overcrowding posed health and safety risks to parents and children. For example, dangerous items such as kettles and utensils could not be left out of the reach of children due to the lack of space and facilities.

Lack of privacy would undoubtedly strain children’s relationship with their own parents, while making them vulnerable to physical or sexual abuse from relatives, non­relatives, or other asylum seeker adults living in the same housing accommodation, a violation of Article 34.

Further, the government’s subversion of dialogue regarding the injustice of asylum seekers in prison detention is managed by pointing to the more “humane” option of direct provision.

The government also benefits from promoting the narrative that all “good,” “non­threatening” asylum seekers are kept out of prisons. Apart from being false (there are cases of asylum seekers and their children being housed in mainstream Irish prisons with convicted criminals), touting direct provision as an alternative to prison detention excuses the poor quality of these housing sites and the damage it does to asylum seeker children’s health.

Regarding social exclusion, concepts like “social participation” and “social exclusion” should not be assessed as a zero­sum equation: the ability of children to achieve some level of enrichment through social interaction with other children at a direct provision housing site may allow for a more nuanced understanding of the intersection between social participation, exclusion, and inclusion. In his case study of a direct provision center in Glengarry, Allen White finds that asylum seeker children often developed strong relationships with other children within the center. White notes that viewing Glengarry and other accommodation centers simply as a space where children live disconnected lives from their local communities neglects ways in which “the spaces, routines, and daily interactions in Glengarry offered the children tangible opportunities for developing and cultivating important and significant peer friendships.”

White further argues that although asylum seeker children in Glengarry’s accommodation center lived lives that were “disconnected and excluded from the local [...] communities,” it was not necessarily the case that these children were unable to “develop a meaningful sense of attachment and belonging to Glengarry.” Using examples of asylum seeker children and their cross­national, cross­ethnic, and cross­ cultural friendships, White argues that the “limits of the social spaces available [in the Glengarry center]” were, at times, able to facilitate close friendships between the children. The significance of “potential friends,” White argues, should not be dismissed, since such friendships often prove important in the development of new peer networks for children. Further, asylum seeker children are often marginalized in academic literature concerning asylum and refugee policy; White and

Bushin argue that children are usually discussed as passive figures, as “adult­centric” theories on migration deny migrant children a certain level of agency.

Despite this more “nuanced” understanding of children’s lives in direct provision centers, their physical segregation and accompanying passive denial of rights to education, adequate food, and recreation illustrate that they are never truly humanized by the State. Consequently, the positive integration of these children is never fully realized. It is important to recognize the limitations imposed on children’s agency by an oppressive system like direct provision accommodation and the Irish asylum system more generally. While the CRC emphasizes the individual rights of children and implicitly acknowledges a certain degree of autonomy in children, it also recognizes the need to critically analyze the systems in which these children develop, particularly in the context of the family. In line with Article 18 of the CRC, Ireland’s 2001 National Children’s Strategy acknowledges the importance of the “family, community, and wider society” and the child’s relationship with all three.

Moreover, the decisions made by the RIA combined with children’s restricted mobility inside and outside of accommodation centers play a central role in undermining the access that children have to the resources needed to articulate their own agency.

Lastly, Justice Minister Shatter’s argument that the “low cost” of direct provision housing makes it the only feasible option for the Irish government is shortsighted.

If asylum seekers held in this housing arrangement are eventually granted refugee status, then the long­term cost of integrating this population will be high. For example, if asylum seeker children are kept segregated from the mainstream Irish population for several years while receiving little to no schooling, it will be much more difficult for them to acquire necessary English language skills, excel in school (if they return at all), and socially and culturally integrate into Irish society. Lack of educational opportunities will also lead to fewer employment opportunities in the future. Thus, the systemic poverty caused by direct provision continues to impact asylum seeker children into their adulthood.

Research for this paper was performed while working

with the Research, Policy, and Promotion division of the Irish Human Rights Commission (IHRC) in Dublin, Ireland. My findings were ultimately articulated in a set of policy recommendations to the Government of Ireland to improve its treatment of asylum seekers, particularly asylum seeker children.

This was a qualitative research study which consisted of desk research, consultations between myself and the IHRC Legal Enquiries department, and consultations between the IHRC and non­government organizations (NGOs) including the IRC, and international organizations including the UN Human Rights Council (HRC) and UNHCR. I worked to shed light on a marginalized group which receives scant attention in mainstream academic work on asylum policy: asylum seeker children. My research relied heavily on statements retrieved from asylum seekers and their children by IRC and pro bono attorneys working with asylum seeker families.

My work in Ireland gave me a greater understanding of the difficulties surrounding policy­making on asylum issues, especially when they affect or target asylum seeker children. Many national governments, not just Ireland’s, struggle to treat asylum seekers and their children humanely and respond appropriately to their unique needs. Unfortunately, fears of asylum fraud and corresponding national security concerns usually govern the creation of asylum policies. I had to balance those concerns with domestic pressure coming from groups like the IRC and their calls to improve housing and care services. Although better treatment of asylum seekers is not necessarily incompatible with addressing Ireland’s national security concerns, I had to ensure that my policy recommendations took into account the Irish government’s frustration with a severely backlogged application processing system and legitimate fears related to application fraud and asylum seeker abscondence.

Balancing the government’s interests while emphasizing the importance of Ireland’s compliance with the Refugee Convention and the CRC gave me greater insight into the difficult relationship between the IHRC and the Government of Ireland.

Unfortunately, state­commissioned independent inquiries on the treatment of asylum seeker children in direct provision are currently unlikely to occur due to lack of political will.

Taking into account the political, legal, and logistical

difficulties of amending the direct provision system (or abolishing it altogether, as many advocate) is important when making policy recommendations to the Government of Ireland. However, it is also crucial to consider asylum seeker children’s unique needs and backgrounds. Some have witnessed or experienced war, violence, separation from their families, and significant material deprivation.

The social and emotional adjustment needed for these children to acclimate to life in Ireland is negatively impacted by their experiences in direct provision accommodation. Although I have highlighted the financial hardships faced by asylum seekers and their children in direct provision, poverty faced by these families cannot strictly be measured in relation to income. Children also experience extreme deprivation due to insufficient participation in society, and the social exclusion faced by asylum seeker children in direct provision harms their overall health, well­ being, education, and happiness, as they are restricted from fully interacting with children outside of accommodation centers. Social exclusion should not be strictly measured in relation to income, but the earnings of asylum seeker families can greatly impact the degree of exclusion their children may face in Ireland.

Considering that “children suffer from exclusion by experiencing atypical living patterns, customs, and activities, for example, where their access to resources is significantly below the national average,” direct provision accommodation centers negatively impact the education levels and physical and social development of children.

Asylum seekers and their children in direct provision often endure severe stress, likely compounding the physical and/or emotional trauma of fleeing persecution in their home countries. Direct provision has, over the past 14 years, repeatedly proven unfit for children. Despite the introduction of the RIA’s Child Protection Policy, asylum seekers are often too afraid to complain about violence, verbal aggression, and other problems in accommodation centers due to a fear of repercussions on their asylum applications.

Previous policy recommendations from the IRC illustrate the government’s failure to fulfill even the basic needs of asylum seekers and their children, and more specifically, its commitment to the CRC. In a 2012 report, the IRC made the following recommendations:

1. Review the system of direct provision in line with Fine Gael and Labour commitments.

2. Ensure accommodation centres are in good condition. Heating, hot water, and cleanliness should be guaranteed.

3. Ensure children have access to private toilet facilities.

4. Ensure children are provided with safe accommodation without exposure to other adults’ aggression and inappropriate behavior, including that of a sexual or violent nature.

5. Ensure families have adequate space and parents have separate rooms for their children.

6. Ensure children have play space and homework space.

7. Enable children to be able to host their non­resident friends in a safe home environment.

8. Ensure families and children are able to choose, prepare, and eat healthy and nutritional foods as a family and at times appropriate to their needs.

9. Allow asylum seekers who have been in Ireland for more than 12 months to work to enable parents to provide for their children.

10. Increase social welfare payments for all families and reinstate child benefits for all children in Ireland.

11. Ensure children are able to fully participate in the Irish education system by ensuring they have the means to buy uniforms, buy school supplies including books, and attend school trips (educational and otherwise).

12. Consider children and families’ religious and cultural needs in consultation with the family before dispersal.

13. If it is not possible to make these changes within the current accommodation centres, then it is necessary to remove all children from direct provision at the earliest opportunity.

I acknowledge the IRC’s need to make very general recommendations, in part because the government has largely failed in meeting even the most basic requirements for asylum seeker children’s health and well­being. However, these recommendations fail to address the legal—and arguably, a priori—need for Ireland to comprehensively and effectively incorporate children’s rights protections in line with the CRC into domestic law. Rather than proposing ad hoc policy or “normative” changes alone, I argue that the IRC and other civil society organizations must pair specific

recommendations to amend Irish asylum laws with policy recommendations that can be rooted in those legal changes.

The Thirty­first Amendment to the Constitution (Children) Bill 2012 was a proposed amendment to Ireland’s Constitution relating to children’s rights and the duty of the state to take protection measures related to children’s safety and health. Although the bill was passed by both Houses of the Oireachtas in October 2012 and approved at a referendum a month later, the bill has not been signed into law by the President of Ireland due to a Supreme Court case challenging the referendum. Signing this bill into law is necessary for the incorporation of the CRC into Ireland’s legal framework. Although it is commendable that Ireland was one of the earliest to ratify the CRC—and one of the few countries that ratified it without any reservations—simply having the “spirit and aims of the Convention” reflected in Irish public policy and law is insufficient.

Apart from constituting a vague government stance, such a determination is unlikely to ensure the true promotion and protection of the rights of children in the way that incorporating the CRC into Ireland’s domestic law will.

Another issue meriting future policy and legal considerations are the separation of asylum seeker children from their parents. My paper focused on in­ tact asylum seeker families, but unaccompanied asylum seeker children and those separated from their parents while fleeing their countries of origin are comparatively more vulnerable. In an amendment to the 1996 Refugee Act, unaccompanied asylum seekers under the age of eighteen are supposed to fall under the care of Ireland’s Health Service Executive (HSE), an agency obligated to “do all that they reasonably can to reunite the child with [his or her] family, if this is in the best interests of the child.” In addition, the unaccompanied child must also be accommodated by HSE; this can include placement with foster parents, placement in residential care, or other housing arrangements the HSE believes is proper with regards to the circumstances of the case. However, it is unclear how effectively HSE assists unaccompanied children in navigating the asylum application process or overcoming language barriers and other problems.

Moreover, there is not legislation in place that guarantees an unaccompanied child will not be refused

entry into Ireland, nor is there legislation that guarantees an unaccompanied child will be provided an interpreter during his or her asylum interview.

Additionally, Ireland’s current asylum policies do not clarify whether unaccompanied children will be transferred to direct provision if they are eventually reunited with their asylum seeker parents.

With all of the damaging effects of direct provision in mind, it is difficult to maintain that Ireland is upholding Article 22 of the CRC regarding special protection for asylum seeker children, among the other Articles highlighted in this paper. The lack of social workers and health care providers assigned to work with asylum seeker children perpetuates Ireland’s failure in commitment to these children as per the Refugee Convention and the CRC. Although touted as a humane alternative to prison detention, direct provision has consistently contributed to the poor physical and mental health of many asylum seeker children.

Unfortunately, it is politically and logistically difficult to end the long­standing system of direct provision.

Asylum seeker children are dehumanized and the State absolves itself of responsibility for their care by having for­profit private businesses run the day­to­day operations in direct provision centers. These private contractors do not have the expertise to respond to asylum seeker children’s unique needs and fail to promote practices consistent with Ireland’s responsibilities under the CRC. Meanwhile, direct provision has also been used politically to subvert public criticism over Ireland’s practice of detaining asylum seekers in prisons, while creating a host of new problems for children held in this type of housing accommodation.

Thus, greater inter­sectoral collaboration between government policymakers, service providers, and community­based immigrant assistance organizations is crucial. If the government does not intend to abolish the direct provision system, then the effects of direct provision must be considered vis­à­vis the unique needs of asylum seekers and their children. Dialogue at an inter­sectoral level should lead to more formal planning and on­the­ground inter­ agency collaboration between statutory and non­ statutory agencies as well as within Ireland’s health service.

In order to address the significant delays in processing

asylum claims, Ireland should introduce a “single protection procedure” in its asylum application evaluation system to help reduce the backlog of asylum claims. As noted earlier, the average stay for direct provision housing residents is four to six years, and this long wait is largely due to an asylum system that has been unable to keep up with an increase in applications during the past decade. Using a single procedure system would give officials the legal powers to ask both “refugee­related” questions (questions relating to persecution of the individual) at the same time as “protection­related” questions (questions relating to the general conditions in the applicant’s home country).

Ireland is only EU member state without the single protection procedure. The significant delays faced by asylum seekers and their children compound the trauma many of them have already suffered in the countries from which they fled. Thus, the introduction of a single protection procedure system is important to ensure comprehensive access to all forms of international protection and to bring an end to the serious delays in processing new applications which arise as a result of Ireland’s inefficient system.

Lastly, there are other types of forced migrants that Ireland should consider if it amends its various migrant protection schemes. For example, people currently seek protection in Ireland due to generalized or indiscriminate violence in their home country.

Although this population is not considered refugees under the Refugee Convention definition (i.e., individual persecution is a requirement), they are usually still given what is called “subsidiary protection” in Ireland and other countries. Unfortunately, with Ireland’s current application evaluation system, only the individual persecution aspect is examined during the interview and application process. Thus, people who arrive in Ireland after fleeing indiscriminate or generalized violence in their home countries must first wait until after they have been denied asylum through normal channels and given a deportation notification.

Only then can they have their protection claims, which are on the basis of indiscriminate or generalized violence, examined for subsidiary protection. Apart from causing delays in application processing (and being nonsensical), many asylum seekers and their children arriving from countries like Iraq, Sudan, and Somalia, where generalized violence has regularly led to forced displacement, must wait for years in direct

provision housing in order for the State to re­evaluate their application for subsidiary protection instead of refugee status.

Unless the structural and legal problems with Ireland’s asylum system are resolved, ad hoc (and overly general) policy recommendations will do little to eliminate the inconsistencies in the asylum seeker and refugee protection regime in the country. It is the duty of CRC state parties to ensure “the equal rights of children to social security, health care, and education,” while allowing “no distinction between children who are citizens, and those, such as asylum seekers, who are non­citizens.” While voluntary groups such as the Irish Immigrant Support Centre, the IRC, and others

throughout the country have done a great deal to mitigate the harmful impacts of direct provision accommodation, many asylum seekers and their children continue to remain physically and socially isolated from mainstream Irish society. Given historical examinations of Ireland’s refugee and asylum policies, racist treatment of different immigrant groups in Ireland, a restrictive welfare apparatus, and various laws conflating illegal immigrants with asylum seekers, it should be no surprise that Ireland is failing in its commitment to the Refugee Convention and the CRC. To date, there has been little focus within mainstream asylum policy debates on the plight of asylum seeker children, as direct provision fosters and entrenches poverty within an already marginalized population.

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Fanning, Bryan. “Chapter 12: Asylum­Seeker and Migrant Children in Ireland: Racism, Institutional Neglect and Social Work,” in Social Work, Immigration and Asylum: Debates, Dilemmas and Ethical Issues for Social Work and Social Care Practice (eds. Humphries, Beth and Debra Hayes) (Philadelphia: Jessica Kingsley Publishers, 2004) Fanning, Bryan. “Reluctant Hosts: Refugee Policy in Twentieth­century Ireland.” Administration, Vol. 48, No. 4 (Winter 2000­2001): 83­99 Fanning, Brian and Angela Veale. “Child Poverty as Public Policy: Direct Provision and Asylum Seeker Children in the Republic of Ireland.” Child Care in Practice Vol. 10, No. 3 (2004): 241­251 Giller, Joan. “The shocking suffering of asylum seekers.” Irish Times, March 27, 2013, http://www.irishtimes.com/debate/letters/the­shocking­suffering­of­asylum­seekers­1.1339476 Gilligan, Robie. “Residential Care in Ireland,” in Residential Care of Children: Comparative Perspectives, eds.

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The Third Annual Walsh Exchange Conference Georgetown University Washington, D.C. March 28足30, 2014