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bility high-impact scenario. Threats include hijacking of an LPG carrier for use as a floating bomb, or the detonation of a dirty bomb. Perhaps the biggest fear is the hijacking of a cruise liner. A vessel sunk in the narrow Singapore Strait would have a dire effect on passage flows. These fears are not just academic, for Singapore authorities arrested Jemaah Islamiyah members with a Phillips Channel “strategic kill zone” mapped out. Asian maritime terrorism has so far been limited to ferry bombings or bomb-laden smallboat attacks, such as have occurred in the Philippines.
Port Case Study 1 – Singapore
Singapore is the world’s second busiest port, handling 29,918,200 containerised Twentyfoot Equivalent Units (TEU) in 2008. Around 132,000 vessels visit Singapore annually, with approximately 1,000 ships in port simultaneously. In an interview, an MPA spokesman stated, “As a shipping nation and major hub port, Singapore takes a serious view of all potential threats to shipping, and implements the necessary measures to ensure maritime and port security.” Such steps include creating prohibited areas around sensitive oil installations or naval bases. Another is redesignating shipping routes to minimise large and small craft convergence. Singapore has also formed what it calls Accompanying Sea Security Teams (ASSeT), the marine equivalent of air marshals. ASSeT detachments board selected ships such as cruise liners to safeguard their passage.
A JMSDF P-3C maritime patrol aircraft releases flares. Such surveillance aircraft are extremely valuable in protecting territorial waters © Gordon Arthur
Singapore also legislated beyond the minimum International Ship and Port Facility Security (ISPS) and Automatic Identification System (AIS) codes by introducing the Harbour Craft Transponder System (HARTS). HARTS tracks vessels smaller than 300 tons (for example, ferries and pleasure craft) within port limits. This is logical, since smaller vessels are most likely to be employed by terrorists. All 2,800 Singapore-licensed harbour craft have transponders, the system being operational since January 2007. Underscoring the notion that maritime security is a joint responsibility for a wide variety of agencies, the MPA spokesman revealed, “Interagency coordination is a critical factor for the effective implementation of maritime security. Our security measures are thoroughly discussed at one or more of the interagency committees set up to oversee maritime security at a national level. On the ground, there is also close cooperation among all the agencies concerned, mainly the Police
This kind of Swedish-designed CB 90 HEX fast patrol boat of the Royal Malaysian Navy is suitable for coastal patrol and interdiction © Gordon Arthur
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ASIAN MILITARY REVIEW
Coast Guard, Republic of Singapore Navy, Immigration and Checkpoints Authority, Singapore Customs, and MPA.”
Flashpoint 2 – Spratly Islands and South China Sea
A significant Asian security challenge stems from longstanding territorial disputes over mineral-rich waters in the South China Sea. Brunei, China, Malaysia, the Philippines, Taiwan and Vietnam contest ownership of the Spratly Islands. Based on what it calls a “historical right”, China claims virtually all the South China Sea as its EEZ, although such a claim is unsupportable under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). Introduced in February 1992, the Law of the PRC on the Territorial Waters and Contiguous Areas stipulates China has the right to use force to protect its Spratly Islands claims. China has previously used force in the South China Sea, grabbing the Paracel Islands in 1974 during the dying days of the South Vietnam government, while in 1988 it briefly confronted Vietnam. China is investing heavily in its military, including establishing a major People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) base on Hainan Island for its South Sea Fleet. The PLAN does not have the necessary power projection capability to gain regional hegemony, but it is still considerably stronger than other Southeast Asian navies. Vietnam is modernising its military and recent purchases should deter presumptive Chinese actions. The acquisition of six Kilo-class submarines was announced in April 2009, with the first two to be delivered in 2010. In May 2009 Vietnam announced a contract for twelve Su30MK2V fighters in addition to four already in service. This shows Vietnam is serious about maintaining a presence in the South China Sea in the face of Chinese expansionism.