HAL LALUYA, Appellant, v. CITY OF MANDEUNO, Appellee. Florida YMCA Youth In Government Supreme Court Argued February 14, 2015 Decided February 20, 2015 Chief Justice JACOB GLASSER.
I. Hal Laluya, a 28 year-old man, went missing for over six hours after using explicit language toward his mother. His parents found an empty bottle of aspirin, with 26 missing tablets. Suspecting that Laluya ingested these tablets, his parents called the City of Mandeuno police for support. Police officers used the Stingray, a cellphone tracking device, to locate Laluya at a public park. He was involuntarily committed to a mental hospital under the provisions of the Baker Act, § 394.463, Fla. Stat. (2014). Since he exhibited tinnitus symptoms, his hearing and concentration was inhibited and he refused the voluntary examination after the explanation was given. Laluya sued the City of Mandeuno for violating his privacy by illegally searching for his location using Stingray and violating his right to be free from unreasonable seizure by confining him under the Baker Act. The trial court ruled in favor of the City, finding that Laluya was in need of care or treatment based on the comments to the mother and the aspirin bottle, and lacked sufficient capacity to make a reasonable application for treatment on his own behalf, such that the Baker Act was effectively invoked in compliance with the Fourth Amendment, and that “Stingray” was used to protect the citizens of the City, which was ruled as reasonable due to the community caretaker function doctrine. Laluya appealed, and the District Court affirmed the trial court’s decision.
II. A. The Florida Mental Health Act, § 394.463, Fla. Stat. (2014), also known as the Baker Act, has been used in Florida in order to protect those with “mental illnesses” and mental disorders. This act sets out provisions that include involuntary examination and involuntary placement which include:
1) CRITERIA.—A person may be taken to a receiving facility for involuntary examination if there is reason to believe that the person has a mental illness and because of his or her mental illness: (a) 1. The person has refused voluntary examination after conscientious explanation and disclosure of the purpose of the examination; (b) 1. Without care or treatment, the person is likely to suffer from neglect or refuse to care for himself or herself; such neglect or refusal poses a real and present threat of substantial harm to his or her well-being; and it is not apparent that such harm may be avoided through the help of willing family members or friends or the provision of other services; or 2. There is a substantial likelihood that without care or treatment the person will cause serious bodily harm to himself or herself or others in the near future, as evidenced by recent behavior. Id. In In re Beverly, 342 So. 2d 481, the Florida Supreme Court held that Section 394.467, Florida Statutes (1973), was constitutional. The Florida Supreme Court held that it was not unconstitutionally vague. In Beverly, it was stated that “...even though the other criteria are met, a non-dangerous individual who is capable of surviving safely in freedom by himself or with the help of willing and responsible family members or friends should never be hospitalized involuntarily.” A person may be seized by the police, even if police do not have concrete evidence, if they present themselves as a danger in a way that “a reasonably prudent man would [be] warranted in believing [they were] armed and thus presented a threat to the officer’s safety while he was investigating his suspicious behavior,” as shown in Terry v. Ohio, 392 US 1.
B. The Baker Act was used appropriately in this case, proving to be constitutional. The Baker Act has many detailed and clear provisions. Laluya was seen as a clear threat to himself and those around him due to his suspected ingestion of 26 aspirin tablets. This led to tinnitus symptoms which impaired his hearing and concentration. Although these symptoms are not life-threatening, they can definitely be qualified as a mental illness based on section 394.455, Florida Statutes. The Baker Act statute is constitutional, and we thereby validate the involuntary examination of Laluya for his mental illness. Although Beverly says that mentally ill people cannot be subject to the Baker Act unless they are a threat to themselves or others, Laluya met these standards. By ingesting 26 aspirin tablets that led to tinnitus symptoms, it showed alarming behavior that could result in being Baker Acted. In the case of Laluya, concrete evidence did not have to be present to seize him because he seemed as though he were a danger to himself, as shown in Terry. After ingesting 26 aspirin, which was a danger to himself, Laluya could have also been a danger to others while in a public park. We therefore affirm the decision of the District Court that Laluya’s confinement under the Baker Act did not violate Laluya’s right to be free from unreasonable seizure.
III. A. A warrant may not need to be obtained for a vehicle if there is probable cause that the vehicle “would be beyond the reach of the officer . . . .” Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925). If there is probable cause that a person could get away before getting a warrant of a vehicle, then the police may use their discretion instead of obtaining a warrant. This possibility of danger to others and the crime itself can allow for warrantless searches and seizures. A beeper, or tracking device such as “Stingray,” may be used as “a more effective means of observing what is already public.” United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276 (1983). If the beeper is showing information that could be found in another way or is already public, then it is constitutional. If danger could potentially be present without a search, then searches are legal, as shown in Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385 (1978). Police officers have the right to enter a house without a warrant in order “to protect an occupant from imminent injury,” as shown in Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398. The role of a police officer, as shown in Brigham, is to prevent violence and restore order, not just to clean up after a casualty.
B. Laluya would be considered a threat to himself or others before the officers could reach him, therefore providing reasonable cause for the use of Stingray under the fourth amendment, as shown in Carroll. As shown in Knotts, information obtained by “Stingray” may show what is already public. In this case, Laluya was in a public place when he tracked through “Stingray,” therefore, this information could have been found using other means. This shows that this information could have been found through other means and making it legal. Using “Stingray” in search of Laluya would be legal in this case because Laluya’s actions gave a reasonable suspicion of being an imminent danger to both himself and other members of society, supported by Mincey. The difference between Stuart and the case at hand is that Stuart took place in a house, whereas the incident under consideration here took place in a public park. Therefore, it would be even less invasive to use “Stingray” in order to find Laluya in a public park to protect someone, whether that’s Laluya himself or someone else, from imminent danger or injury. Accordingly, we affirm the decision of the District Court that police use of the “Stingray” tracking device did not violate Laluya’s right to be free from unreasonable searches.
IV.
A. It has been found that at times, under special circumstances, law enforcement officers need to act out of their given protocol to “ensure the safety and welfare of the citizenry at large.” Ortiz v. State, 24 So. 3d 596 (Fla. 5th DCA 2009). As a result, individuals, such as Laluya, may claim that their Fourth Amendment rights and privacy rights under Article 1, Section 23 of the Florida Constitution have been violated. In Riggs v. State, 745 So. 2d 1111 (1999), two police officers, who had found a naked and disoriented child outside, entered an apartment after knocking on the door and identifying themselves multiple times. Fearing a medical emergency, they went inside and found a man was growing marijuana. This Court found that “The Fourth Amendment, which protects against unreasonable searches, requires only that the police reasonably believe that an emergency exists.” Furthermore, the situation all depends on the different options available. “There is a difference between automobile searches and homes/office searches in relation to the Fourth Amendment.” South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 US 364 (1976). Because threats in vehicles can get away before a warrant is obtained, a warrant may not be needed. Additionally, searches performed that are “totally divorced from the detection, investigation, or acquisition of evidence relating to the violation of a criminal statute,” Colorado v. Bertine, 479 US 367 (1987), are also considered constitutional. Thus, actions done to keep the general public safe that end in the finding of evidence against an individual may be valid under the community caretaker function doctrine.
B. Laluya would be considered a threat both to himself and the larger society due to his previous actions. He had ingested 26 aspirin tablets on top of directing explicit language towards his mother. Therefore, it is reasonable that the law enforcement officers of Mandeuno consider him liability and use the community caretaking function doctrine. In relation to Riggs, that only unreasonable searches and seizures are protected under the Fourth Amendment and emergency situations are considered reasonable, the fact that Laluya was a potential liability would prove to be reasonable. His overdose and use of profanity would have left the police to think he was a threat to himself and others. When found, he was exhibiting tinnitus symptoms so the police were within their discretion to skip obtaining a warrant. If they had not done so, it may very well be possible that Laluya currently may have been injured or even deceased. The same degree of risk applies to any citizen. Laluya was also not at home at the time of the alert according to his parents. The police did not know where he was at the time or who he may be harming. South Dakota found that vehicle searches may not need warrants if the threat is on the move. Because of the potential that he was on the move, the Appellee was valid in conducting the search without taking the significant amount of time necessary to get a warrant. Additionally, the police never showed any intention of investigating or convicting Laluya. They were simply dedicated to keeping the public and the Appellant safe from any injuries that
could have originated from Laluya’s actions. Colorado found that situations like this in which there was no intention of the result are constitutional. AFFIRMED. Justices JENNIE VYAS, KAMRYN LEWIS, and JENI SWENSON CONCUR.
Senior Justice JORDAN PILANT and Justice ALYA BARQ concur with respect to Parts I and II, but dissent with respect to Parts III and IV. Justice SIMRAN VYAS concurs with respect to Parts I, II, and IV, but dissents with respect to Part III.
Senior Justice JORDAN PILANT, CONCURRING IN PART AND DISSENTING IN PART.
I. A. DeShaney v. Winnebago County Department of Social Services., 489 US 189, “forbids the State itself to deprive individuals of life, liberty, or property without due process of law,” therefore saying that the Community Caretaker Function Doctrine would be invalid. Not only that, but DeShaney sets the precedent that the government is not required to protect its citizens from one another. Without a warrant, searches go against the fourth amendment because they are unreasonable, as shown in the case of Illinois v. Lafayette, 462 U.S. 640. Every Florida citizen has the right to privacy, as shown in the Florida Constitution Article 1 Section 23, when it states that “Every natural person has the right to be let alone and free from governmental intrusion into the person’s private life.”
B. Deshaney shows that the police had no right to use “Stingray” in order to locate Laluya. Considering that the only evidence that Laluya could have been in danger were missing aspirin, which doesn’t necessarily mean that Laluya took the missing aspirin. He could have simply saved them for later. Not only that, but Deshaney proves that police are not responsible for protecting citizens from each other. Simply taking or stealing multiple aspirin does not prove that someone is a danger to themselves or other people, but even if it did, the government does not have to protect citizens before something bad happens. Without a warrant, the police did not follow the due process of law, and therefore should not have been able to find Laluya and commit him as shown in Lafayette. By neglecting to give the citizens of Florida the due process of law, we are therefore not protecting their right to privacy, which is a right protected in the Florida constitution. By using “Stingray” without a warrant, it would allow the government to completely intrude into any person’s private life.
II. A. In section 934.42, Florida Statutes, about mobile tracking device authorization clearly states a law enforcement officer must have authorization and approval before tracking a mobile device. In order to receive this authorization, the application must include: (a) A statement of the identity of the applicant and the identity of the law enforcement agency conducting the investigation.
(b) A certification by the applicant that the information likely to be obtained is relevant to an ongoing criminal investigation being conducted by the investigating agency. (c) A statement of the offense to which the information likely to be obtained relates. (d) A statement whether it may be necessary to use and monitor the mobile tracking device outside the jurisdiction of the court from which authorization is being sought. The Fourth Amendment to the United States constitution clearly gives citizens “[t]he right . . . to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, [and it] shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.” Section 23 of the Florida Constitution clearly gives “Every natural person [] the right to be let alone and free from governmental intrusion into the person’s private life except as otherwise provided herein. This section shall not be construed to limit the public’s right of access to public records and meetings as provided by law.” In Katz v. United States, 389 US 347 (1967), it was ruled that “[w]herever a man may be, he is entitled to know that he will remain free from unreasonable searches and seizures.” Although Katz was in a phone booth, a public place, he was still given the liberty of privacy, showing that people have a certain expectation of privacy wherever they go. A cell phones as minicomputers filled with massive amounts of private information, which distinguished them from the traditional items that can be seized from an arrestee’s person, such as a wallet. The warrantless search exception following an arrest exists for the purposes of protecting officer safety and preserving evidence, neither of which is at issue in the search of digital data. Digital data cannot be used as a weapon to harm an arresting officer, as shown in Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473 (2014).
B. In the case of Laluya, police officers clearly did not have the proper authorization from a judge in order to track Laluya, therefore making it an unconstitutional search, which invades his right to privacy given in section 933.04, Florida Statutes, and the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution. The police officers never submitted an application including the identity of the police officers conducting the search, the relevancy of the information to be received based on this search, nor was it for a criminal investigation, the statement of the offense, of which there was not one, and why it was necessary, which at the time was arguable and would not have been perceived as relevant or necessary by the reasonable person. According to Katz, Laluya should have been granted privacy from government intrusion, even though he was in a public park. This case showed that there is a reasonable expectation of privacy, which can be assumed even in public places. Although there was no verbatim search on Laluya’s phone by the government, it still conflicted with his constitutional rights because it infringed on his location and invaded the privacy each individual expects on his or her cellphone.
The court ruled that the warrantless search and seizure of digital contents of a cell phone during an arrest is unconstitutional in Riley, so the same thing can be applied to the case of Laluya. Although none of his phone’s contents were searched, he was located on the basis of his cell phone which still counts as information. The court ruled that some warrantless searches of cell phones might be permitted in an emergency; however, Laluya’s situation would not be considered an emergency by any reasonable person. Simply getting in a fight with a parent and having 26 aspirin missing from a bottle does not constitute as an emergency. Just because 26 tablets are missing doesn’t mean that they have been ingested. At the time that “Stingray” was used, there was no evidence or proof that these tablets had been consumed. Therefore, the use of “Stingray” was not warranted. I dissent. Justice ALYA BARQ concurs. Justice SIMRAN VYAS concurs with respect to Part I.