Jason magazine (1992), jaargang 17 nummer 6 by Stichting Jason

Volume 17

December 1992

Number6

Magazine for International Affairs

THE CHANGING

Contents EDITORlAL BOARD Chicf Ed itor: Manijn Hop

The world changes, change the United Nations! by M.G. Hop

Peter Lingg

Herman Kok EmmaMuller Jason Magazine is a bimonthly publieatlon of the. Jason Foundation

De relopll/e 1/ 1.\

From peace-keeping to peace-enforcement by Prof.Dr. A. van Staden

EXECUTI VE BOARD

Chainnan: Manijn Boelen Vice~Chainnan: Mjchiel de Weger

,\t/al/lil' a\\;,lal/ce

Secrelary: Ellen von Koczian Int. Secretary: Joho KooIstra Trcasurer: Ingeborg van Dijck Fundraiser: Richard Louwers PR Coordinalor: Maronn van den Heuvel

The UN and Nato in peace-operations: Partners or competitors? Intcrview with Mr A.P.R. Jacobov its dc Szcged

GENERALBOARD Jhr.Mr. A.G.F.M. Alting von Geusau Drs, F,O. B. van den Broek Mr. F.C.M. Caris. M.B.A. Drs.F.G. Cleton Mr.Drs.A. H. Gierveld Mr.F.A.M. van den Heuvel Drs. J.A. de Koning. M.Phil. Mr.R.H. van der Meer Drs.F.J.J. Princen Ir.I.WJ.M. Runen. M.B.A.

Drs. EJ. Weterings ADVISORY COUNCIL

la\IJ1/ ()I/ TI/(, Spol

UNCRC Simulation '92: Strenthening the world by M. Geus

10 Slruggle.liw lile

The viability ofthe UN as an effective peace- and securitystructure by Prof.D r. J.G. Siccama

Prof.Dr.W. Dekk.er,chainnan

F. de Bakker Prof.DrJ.Th J . van den Berg

Prof.Dr.H . de Haan

[I/Iemal chal/ge.1

Prof.Drs. V. Halberstadt Drs.GJ .J.M. Hayen

Restructuring ofthe United Nations

e.c.van den Heuvel

H.A.M. Hoefnagels Mr.J,G.N. de HoopSchefrer

by Drs. G. Rin gna ida

Drs.R.W. Meines

R.n. Praaning

Drs.W.K .N. Schmelzer Prof.Dr.J.C . Siccama Prof.Or.A. van Staden Drs.L. Wecke

A .1.1 ;I/glI/('1II

NATO's role in peace-keeping by Dr. J. Shca

Jason Foundation Laan van Meerdervoort 96 25J 7 AR The Hague The Netherlands phone: 31-70-3605658 fax : 31-70-3633285

The Jason Foundation cannOl he held account3ble for opinions p UI forward in coOlributions 10 this publicalion

Pholo cover: Mosaic al United NatĂ?<ms Headquarters. N'ew Vork Print : Haagse Drukkerij en

Uilgeversmaatschappij/Sijthoff Pers

ISSN 0165-8336

C O P YRI G HT Reproduction of contributiom. to th is period ica l is onl y pcnni lled with pcmlission of the iluthor alld the edilorial board of Jawn Foundation when accompanied by a sourcc notc along the follow ing lines, between brackets the data of the contibution bei ng rcproduced: "This contribution of [name and title a uthor] was published in Jason Magazine. volumc Ivol ume no.]. number t issue no.]. {month. year]. which had as a Ihe me {t itie l. Jason Magazine is a bimonlhly publication of Ihe Jason Foundation for International Affairs. The Hague,"

Edito ria I

The world changes, changethe United Nations! Nowadays the world is subject 10 many changes. The Unitcd Nation s wil! have 10 prepare for these changes. ft should not react indolentl y 10 these changes and conseq uentl y risk its credibility as a mondi al peace-keeper. To get grip on the quick changes in the world , it is necessary thai the UN changes in the same direction and with the same speed as (he world c hanges. Change the world and change the UN . Before 1985 the UN could not operate effeclively in (he field of peace and the security. DUTing the eold War the contrast between East and West was 50 big thai the executing ofgan of the UN, (he Sec urity Council, was obstructed in perfonning its

task. Over (he years more than 250 vetos about crucial. mondi al top ics have been pronoul1L:t:d. Tht: UN only st!1 up a pt:a(.;~ u~ra tion if the conce rning te rritoty would not have been disputed by East and West. Such te rritories were Cyprus, the Sinaï and Lebanon. The Security Council did not go further than the install ation of a peace force whi ch was placed between the part ies who at that time already had stopped fightin g. The efforts or the Security Council did not go futher than diplomatie deliberation and peacekeeping operations. Once however the Security Counci l took furth er meas ures than se nding troops: that was during a peace operation in Namibia. He re the by member states di sposed troops got placed bctween the struggling parties. Next the peace force got attacked from both sides; in th is way a third

party . ri sed. Thus the UN did not become a ' part of the solution ' but a 'part of the problem'. Berore 1985 the whole world kne w whe re it was standing. Because of the conIrasIs a certain stabi lity ex isted. Bot h sec uri ty organi zations Warsaw- Pact and the NATO militari ly balanced each othe r we il. The Greal Powers had to slay far off each other, beca use ifthey came 10 close. lhey would gel out of balance, as it became clear during the Cuba-crisis. Now. in 1992, after many deve lopments in Ihe last seven years the world has become rathe r instabie. As a consequence of the easing of te nsion betwee n East and West, the collapse or the Warsaw- Pact and the fa ll of the Soviet Union an imbalance o f power d~veloped . The United States prides itself on the ' ncw world order ' and it has the military leadership. A non-quic k-w iued Russia cannot counterbalance th is. On the othe r hand the US,j ustlike the CIS , stands econom icalIy weak in the world. To achieve Ihe ' ncw world order ' the US firstl y has 10 pUl it s economie affairs straight. That will prevent lhe US of being outvied by the EC, Japan or even the CIS. Considering the lasl the Russian bear has lost a part of il s g loss on il s pelt , but it can soon come back. The imbalance of power whic h arises nowadays can he compared with the situ at ion before 19 14 in Europe. How dangerous such a situalion can be appears from the two World Wars. The word two is emphasized

here. As is kn own the so lut ion 10 a war creales lhe conditions and circ umstances for a poss ible nex t war. Fortunatel y after the Second World War several inte rnational organ izalions have been cal led into ex istence to contri bule 10 mondial and regional securi Iy and slabi lity. Of all these organi zations the UN is lhe most important one and it can become the most influential one. BOlh reg ional and mondial problems can he located, dicussed and handled by the UNo The UN was given a clear task to increase the security and the slabilily in lhe world. The UN is offe red Ihe opport unity 10 cope with mondial and reg ional problems. The UN has 10 adapt qu ick ly 10 thi s because there is a chance th ai thi s poss ibili ty will never occur again. The whole world agrees that the re is a clear lask for the UNo Counteracli ons as a conseque nce of the conIraSIs between East and West do not occur anymore. Even Ch ina cooperales wi th the UN and it is convineed thai lhe UN can fu lfil a stimulating and ini ti ating role in the world. If we want to bener the world, we wi ll firs tl y have 10 strengthen , reslructure and improve the UN so that it can throw itself 10 the new opportunilies whic h are offered to keep lhe peace, the security and the stability in the world . •

M .G. Hop Chief editor

Jasml Magazine nr. 6. december 1992

Developments

From peace-keeping to peace-enforcement Strengthening the security role ofthe United Nations In the past decades the United Nations (UN) played a modest role in the prevention and resolution of international conflicts. The ideological confrontation between East and West paralyzed decision-making in the Security Council and prevented the world organization from using its full authority to punish acts of aggression. Given the circumstances the UN had no choice but to seek a role that was far less ambitious than the framers of its Charter had intended. By making a virtue of necessity the instrument of peace-keeping was developed. by Prof.Dr.A. van Staden

Jason Magazjne nr. 6. dece mber 1992

The instrument, which emanated from the Suez crisis of 1956, implies lhe deploymenl of mililary personnel under the auspices of the UN in areas of conflict to monitor truce agreements and 10 disengage hoslile forces. The consent of the contending parties is essenti al; if one of the parties decided to violale a cease-fire UN peace-k.eepers can do nothing coercive. Indeed they have no orders 10 fight an enemy; their function is only semi-militarily as being rellected in the lim ited size and weaponry of their forces. Ailhough UN peace-keeping certainIy has contri buted to stability in certain parts of lhe world (particul arly lhe Midd le Easl), the limited val ue ofthi s instrument shou ld be c1ear. The success of peace-keeping is conditional on lhe goodwi ll (and lhe cynical observer may add lhe ex haustion) of lhe feuding states. Thus, for example, the horrible situation in former Yugos lavia amply shows the need for pun端ive actions against law-breakers. Slim uia led by lhe end of lhe Cold War as we il as by the practical cooperation among Lhe permanent members of lhe UN Security Council in repelling Iraq's invasion of Kuwail an animated debale has started about finding practical possibilities 10 strengthen lhe role of Ihe UN in maintaining and restoring peace and sec urit y in Ihe world. Centerp iece of Ihis debate is the nori on of preventive diplomacy, i.e. action to prevent dispules from arising belween parties or escalating into military conllicts, eX lended to fonns of peace-enforcing rcferring 10 chapter VII of lhe Charter (entitled "Action wiLh respect ro rhreats to Ihe peace, breaches of Lhe peace, and aclS of aggression"). In lrus article two reports putting forward proposals and suggestions 10 move beyond the traditional boundaries of peace-keepi ng, will be briefly discussed. The flrsl report is the publication of the (Netherlands) Advisory Council on Peace and SecurilY, call ed "What is peace worth 10 us? The Un ited Nations after lhe Cold War". The ,econd publication concerns the report issued by the UN Sec retary-General , Boutros Boutros-G hali, one monlh later (June 1992) under the title "An Agenda for Peace". Views of the Advisory CouncH In lhe report of the Advisory Cou ncil (AC) a strong case is made for shifting Ihe emphasis in UN operations from monitoring Ihe oulcome of conflicts that have been fought to preventing (he outbreak of armed conflicts. The Securily Council is advised to take action more often at an early stage of international conflicts in order to bring pressure 10 bear on the dispuling parties to settle their di spute peacefully. The AC believes lhat sueh pressure is likely {Q be more effective if the parties recognize thaI the Securit y Council will nol hesitate 10 consider enforcement measures by invoking Article 39 of the Charter. The article says thai the Counci l "shall determine the ex istence of any threat to the peace, breach ofthe peace, or act ive aggress ion and shall make recommendali ons, or decide what measures shall he taken (... ) 10 maintain or reslore international peace and sec urity". The flrs t conceivable coercive action is Ihe

imposition of economic and olher non-military sanctions (as envi saged in Artic1e 41). While admiuing thaI non-military sanctions may he important means to compel criminal Slales to accept international norms and decisions of the world commu nilY, in many cases those sanctions have proven 10 be ineffective. 1t is suggested, therefore, thaI the Security Council must set a time limit which may actually serve as some sort of ultimatum. Should the target state not bow 10 thi s pressure, the Security Council, in the AC's view, has no alternative but 10 lake - whal is called - appropriate preventive military act ion in a final attempt to avert armed confrontalion. (p. 2 1)

"The Advisory Council argues that the instrument of "trip-wire" forces should be used only ij a UN rapid deploymentforce is readily available, considering that appropriate preventive military action not always require the dispatch of land forces." Whal kind of measures does lhe AC have in mind? First of all, the Security Council might decide 10 send military observers 10 Ihe troubl e spot. Realizing that at least one of the parties is likely to refuse admitting UN observers la its territory, the AC holds that, by so doing, the party concerned would create the impression of having aggressive intentions and invite lougher action on the parI of lhe UNo Secondly, lhe poss ibility of deploying "trip-wire" forces is cons idered. The AC feel s lhat a relatively small UN force quickly sent to the lrouble spot 10 ereCl a barrier between the parties, could prevent the oUlbreak of hostilities. However, this option has its particular drawbacks. Should the conflict erupt in spi Ie of all efforts to foreslall it, the need arises to bail out Ihe trip-wire forces Ihrough immediate back-up actions. Even if the Security Council wou ld move fasl and apply Article 42 (regarding mililary operations), it would normally take a lot of time to commit a group of UN member states to contributing to a large peace-enforcing action for this purpose. In view of thi s Ihe AC argues that the instrument of "trip-wire" forces should be used only if a UN rapid deployment force is readil y available, cons idering thaI appropriale prevenlive military action not always require the dispatch of land forces. {ndeed in certain situalions deploying air and naval forces in the vicin ity of the contl ict area may be sufficient. Not surprisingly, Lhe AC urges lhe Dulch govemmcnl to support the idea of establishing a UN rapid deployment force composed of stand-by units from various countri es. These units shou ld undergo joint training on a regular basis, and their equip-

ment and means of communication should he compatible so as to enable them to take up

preventive action immediately after a crisis broke oul. (p.23) For laking care of Lhe necessary preparalions the fonnation of a military planning cell in Ihe UN Secretariat is recommended. To the AC it is self-evident that Ihe Netherlands, given its reputation of promotor of international law and its important traditional role in UN peace operations, should participate in such a UN force. Proposals by the UN Secretary-General The main thru sl of the Advi sory Council 's report coi ncides wi lh one of the central tenets of Boutros Boutros-Ghali's " Agenda for Peace". The UN Secretary-General, 100, pleads for the creation of peace-enforcement units from member states which would be available on call and which would consislof troops thai have volunteered for UN missions. (p. 27) Whereas Lhe AC's argument for preventive action (if necessary by coercive military aClion) was very much intluenced by lhe diplomatie fai lure to di ssuade Saddam Hussein from launching a military attack on Kuwait, the repeated violations of cease-fi re agreements in fonner Yugoslavia apparently prompled Lhe UN Secrelary-General to make his proposal for a rapid deployment force. He writes: "Cease-fl res have often been agreed to but not complied with, and the United Nati ons has sometimes been called upon to send forces to restore and maintain the ceasefire. This task can on occasion exceed the mi ssion of peace-keeping force contributors. I recommend that the Council consider the utilization of peace-enforcement units in clearly defined cireumslances ... " (p. 27) Besides Yugoslavia-like situations demonstrating an urgent need to uphold truces, one can easil y imagine the use of peaceenforcement units to deal with the warlords in Somali a who actively impede the sending of food and medicine to people on lhe brink of starvation. It may he pointed out that many times the Dutch minister for development cooperation, Jan Pronk, has broken a lance for large-scale humanitari an intervention in th at pitiful country. Ailhough Lhe peace-enforcemenl unit s the UN Secretay-General has contemplated would have to be more heavily armed than traditional peace-keeping forces and would need to unde rgo extensive preparatory training withi n their national forces , he underlines Ihat such units should not be confused with the forces that may eventually be constituted under Article 43 to respond to oulright aggression. The article speaks of lhe obli gat ion of all UN memhers " to make available to the Security Council, on its call and in accordance with a special agreement or agreements, anned farces, assislance, and facilities , including righls of passage, necessary for the purpose of maintaining international peace and securi ty". ft is common knowledge th aI as a consequence of the Cold War thi s provision has remained a dead letter. The UN Secrelary-General believes, however, that with the end of the East-West conflict for the lirst time since the Charter was adopted, the long-standing obstacJes to Jason Magazine nr. 6. december 1992

â&#x20AC;˘

U~I

Dutch UN- trucks ready to go ra Yugoslavia. (Photo H . Keeris) (he conclusion of the special agreements (as mentioned in Article 43) should no longer preva il. (p. 26) He further argues Ihal Ihe ready availability of anned forees on call cDuld serve in itself as a means of deterring breaches of Ihe peace since a would-be aggressor wou ld know that (he Counc il had at its disposal a mean s of response. Yet , il is recogni zed th aI forces under Art icJe 43 may perhaps never be sufficientl y large or we il enough equ ipped 10 cope with a threat from a major ann y equipped wi lh sophi sticated weapons. Nevertheless, according lO (he Secretary-Ge neral. they woul d be userul in

meeting any thrcat posed by a military force of a lesser order. Ir is hard 10 accuse Boutros BoutrosGhali of laek of reali sm. He real izes that farces under Article 43, however desi rabie, are not likely to eome in the near future. For thi s reason he has a imed at the less ambit ious and more limited goal as indicated above, i.e. the creation of a pool ofpeaee-enforcemen l unit s for well-eirc umsc ribed purposes like act ion against truee violation s (and not for dealing with massive acts of aggression). In this context it is important to note that the SecrelaryGeneral considers the use of such peacee nforeement unit s to he warranted as a prov isiona! measure under Article 40 of the Charter. In recent interviews he has clarified and e laborated hi s views. Thus, he pointed out 10 ant ic ipate the conclusion of bil ateral ag reements wi th 40 to 50 cou ntries (each comri buling 2000 troops on average) with an escape clause unde r which a country might OP! ou t of an operat ion if it feel s its domesti c inte rest would be prejudiced. 4

Jason Magazin e nr. 6, december 1992

"Theformation ofa UN rapid deploymentforce by no means would heraid the state of eternal peace to which Kant referred by the end ofthe eighteenth century." Caveals and problems The format ion of a UN rapid deployment force by no means wou ld heraid the state of eterna l pcace to whi ch Kant re ferred by the e nd of the e ighteenth century. It is no panacea, cure-a ll or quick-fix for solv ing our sec urity dilemma. The limits of the principle of collective security in the UN framework should he clear. For one, each of the permanent members ofthe Security Council re tain s Ihe poss iblity of blocking UN aCli on, for any reason whatsoever. even in the eve nt of a flagrant violati on o f the Charter. In view of na less than 279 vetoes having bee n cast since 1945, it is encouraging that there were no such vetoes since 3 1 May 1990. The re is no free politica1lunch. however. At a numher of crucia l Security Council votings severe pressure was required to persuade China not to oppose the other permanent members. There is also the rule of antic ipated reaction: in

drafting resolutions the objections o f reluctant parties have la be laken mlo account in advance. For another, the UN 's capacity to preserve peace is limited by organizational and finan cial constraints. For this reason, priority shou ld he given to solving the fmanc ial cri sis of lhe UN and to putting lhe UN budget for pcace opcrations on a more solid footing. A more fundamental problem, however, ari ses from the commitment of political leaders and ordinary people to the idea of collective security as such. Collective belief in the indivi sisec urity assumes a bility of world peace: No distinction should be made between an attac k on your own te rri tory, that of your allies, and on countri es far away. Unfortunately. hi story does not bear out thai optimist ic assumption. The cruel password here is "body-bags"; "pourquoi mourir pour ... ". UN members cannol he expected to he unconditionall y pre pared la assist a victim of aggression and to use all means at the ir di sposal. On the other hand, at present many nation s are more in volved in the fate of other nation s lhan they were in thc past, and because of the growing interdependence of the world the number of conflicts which do not touch upon the inlerests of a wider group of statcs seems to he shrinking. At any rale, the instrume nt of a UN rapid de ployme nt force may be helpful to relieve Ihe plighl of people in distress now that the emotions in many UN mcmber slates are deeply stirred by tragic conditions abroad and. consequently, strong public support in th ose slates is generaled for quick humanitarian action. Of course, this does not re li eve govemments of the

rum

task of fonnulating c1ear political objectives and of the task to deliberately engage in riskassessments. It is a hopeful sign that in the pari iamemary debate of October 1992 devOled to lhe lalest etherlands Govemment Paper on the United Nations the DUlch minister for foreign affairs, Hans van den Broek, was willing 10 accept in principle Ihe proposal of a UN pool of stand-by forces. Funher discussion wiJl be needed on Ihe con tents of the agreement coveri ng the possibl e Dulch contribution. What cond ilions have 10 be ineluded? I! is obv ious Ih al any deci sion of the Dutch goveflun enl 10 participate in specific UN enforcement ope rations can only be made subjec t 10 parliamentary approva l. Consequenlly, some procedure has 10 be worked out. But other issues mu st be settled as we il : Ihe problem of ri sk-shari ng among the participating cou mries and Ihe duration ofpossible operati ons. More gene rally. much attemion has to bc paid 10 adequate military planning and 10 the interoperabililY of UN military units. These problems are fonnidabic indeed, but they cannOl bc an excuse for failing 10 make serious auempt s 10 strengthen the security role of the United Nations.•

ProfDr. A. val/ Staden is professor of il/ternational relations al Leiden Unirersityalld c!wirma1l of ,he Advisory Cow ll:i/ 0 1/ Peace alld Secur;ty.

NOTES I.Prescntcd to the Dutch ministers for fore ign atTairs and of defensc in May 1992. 2.Full title: All Ag /'ntla lor PI'DCI'. Prl',·,mi,·1' diplomacy. pl'acl'making afld peace-J:.uping. Repon of the SecretaryGe ncr.d prusuant 10 the slatement adoplcd bij lhe Summit Mee ting orlhe Security Council on 3 1 January 1992.

3.m for inslanee Thl'Guardio" October 2, 1992. Nm;l'$ In I't'n \·trllntll'rtrlllt wtrl'ld (The Uniled Nations in a changi ng world ). September 1992.

4.01' Vf'rf'lIIgdl'

Dweil UNIFIL-su/dier in Lebanoll. (Piloto H. Keer;s)

ARMED PERSONNEL DO NOT ..ENTER ~

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Ja son Magazin e nr. 6. dece mber 1992

Atlantic assistance

The andNATO in Peace Operations: Partners or Competitors? Interview with Ambassador Mr A.P.R. Jacobovits de Szeged, Pennanent Representative of the Netherlands on the North Atlantic Council Netherlands Ambassador at NATO Mr lacobovits de Szeged states that, with regard to the role of the UN and NATO in peace-keeping operations, the UN should always be in charge. The UN can make use of the potential NATO has to offer. NATO 's supporting task would greatly enhance effectiveness and would benefit the UN, which has to carry out a large number of peace operations and other duties all over the world. The Agenda for Peace which was presented to the Security Counci/ by (he UN Seere/ary Genera! on / 7th June /992 stated thaI, with the Cold War era bellind us, (he United Na/ians have been offered unique possibilities 10 safeguard international peace and security or, in 6

Jason Magazine nr. 6, december 1992

[he words of the UN Charter: social progress and better standards of life in larger freedom . Whot could be NATO's comribution fo (he UN elfart fO rea/ize (his goal?

Hit is essential [or the UN to remain the controll ing organization for most peace

operations. And I say ' most', because 1 could think of inslanees where CSCE would he in control. The UN shou ld make better use of regional organ izat ions, which have a special capacity to support UN tasks. Of course, NATO has the ca pacity to support the UN in carrying out its duties.

Ambassador Mr A.P.R. Jacobvits de Szeged. (Photo Jason)

NATO is undergo ing a large-scale process o f change. In the past, in the Cold War si tuation, il was impossible 10 imag ine NATO ever ope rating outside its own treaty area in order 10 promole peace or 10 take preventive act ion. NATO was complete ly dedi cated 10 (he defence of its own territory

recause this was under threat. Al present, there is no immediate threat to the te rritory, al any rme not in (he sense of mass ive aggress ion. for which we were prepared. The quesli on (hen anses, whcther we need NATO al all and should wc not abolish (he organi zati on altogether? My answer is that NATO se rves 10 proteet and e nh ance OUT security. Fonnerl y thi s protection was ilS all -encompassing and onl y task. We had prepared for an all -out attac k whic h could mate ri ali ze within 48 hours. NATO can turn more towards e nhancing our sec urity. for the threat lies not in aggress ion, but in instabil ity that is omni prese nt. The ma intenance of security can be achieved in many ways, po litically and mili tarily. NATO could contribute in both ways, also mil itarily wi th its existing apparatus. Thus, NATO would carry out its original task, which is the promotion of o ur own securi ty, by increasi ng stabil ity in the SUfrounding regions. In thi s respect. seve ral regional organi zalions are important. The UN Secretary Genera l stated in a lette r 10 CSCE that Europe is richl y endowed with security organi zati ons, while the UN itse lf is a lready in vol ved in a varie ty of conflicts. He appealed to these organi zations 10 assist the UN, most notably in the fi e ld of peace operations in the former Yugoslavia. NATO answered in the affi rmalÎ ve . S ince Ihe n. muc h has been done.

In essence, NATO supported UN peace operati ons in three areas. NATO star(ed mon itoring shipping in the Adriatic. Recently, AWACS reconnaissance planes were added to en force the fl yi ng restrictions over Bosnia-Hercegovina. These airplanes fl y in Hungari an airspace; reconnaissance fli ghts over the Adriatic alone are not effecli ve. The Yugos lavian mounta in ranges run parall el to the coastline and thi s is why not all ai r traffic can be seen by AWACS fl yi ng over the Adriat ic. From a positi on over Hungary you can sec into Ihe valleys and have a tola l view. Permi ss ion for these fli ghts was obta ined from Hungary (and Austria). This is a good exampl e of (he supporti ve task of NATO. Tbc third deve lopme nt is th at staff members of the Northem Anny Group (NORTHAG) have set up a headquarters in Zagreb for the bene fi t of UN PROFO R 11. NATO has lhe experti se 10 do thi s, but it was done without ' advenizing' il as a NATO acti on largely because of the prese nt constÎ tuti onal problems in Genn any. 1 hope Ihis proble m will be solved before year 's end , but as long as it is not, there is a hesitati on to conduct NATO out-of-area operations. Forma ll y, the Zagreb HQ is is a UN HQ, but it is manned for 3/4 by NATO personne l."

Did tlle UN request such assistanc,'e? " Yes. And il is worth noting that NATO and the UN werc not uscd 10 communicating reg ularl y in the past. Thc Sec retary General of the UN addressed the leue r I me ntioned to CSCE and not to NATO. NATO did get a copy. Thi s is probably due 10 numerous sens iti ve matters. In sum , relations have re laxed and an active correspondence between both Secretaries General has started. In the latest leuer by Mr Wömer he has lold Mr BOUlroS Ghali aboul lhe wi llingness of the Alli ance 10 perfoml more tasks which the UN conside rs useful. These are qu ile important development s." Was (his a/ready on i.~.'iUe when you were Nether/o1lds' UN Ambassador rhree years ago? " It most ce rta inly was not. Peace operations d id gel underway, duc 10 the gradual disappearance of the East-West-conn iet, as became c1ear in the Iraq operation. The idea 10 ask other organi zali ons to join in, however, was Ithink bom out of sheer necessity on the part of the UN. I have the strong impress ion th ai thc UN wou ld rathe r carry out these dUlies itself. However, they are confronted by overburdening in an organizational and fi nanc ial sense. lt has become necessary, lhe refore. th ai regional organizations ass ist the UNo Furthcrrnore I Ihink th at the NonAli gned Countri es wil! not resist thi s development , aJthough they may not be very enthusiasti c about it. They seem 10 think, however: if t.hc Europeans can solve the ir own problems the beuer. The UN could then concentrale on othe r areas. Tbc UN is involved, as you know, in Cambod ia and Somalia. But there is still much to do in the Thi rd World . If the UN can make use of regional organizations 10 promole peace in Europe, il can con-

centrale on acting d irectly e )sewhere. Comparative advantages should be fully ex ploited."

COllid you reil li S something aboUl rhe new Strategie COlleept of NA TO, especially with regard to NATO's response 10 a c/zanging world? "The basis for Ih is conce pt is lhe changing security situation in Europe, characterized by omnipresent instability whi ch can be reduced by peace operati ons. In view of the present situation we have to develop a new force structure. NATO 's task is nol 10 lie low behind a border across Europe from Norway to Turkey. Our arrned forces wil! have 10 become much more mobile. They will have to act whe re aggression erupts and th is wi ll be in othe r pl aces than whcre we expected it in Ihe past, name lyon the flanks of the treaty area. Thu s, a Rapid Reaction Corps will be set up, a mul tinational unit where mobility comes firs t. Moreover, il is in our political interest 10 help alleviate instability in Eastem Europe by hav ing these countries gel used 10 the positi on of the mil itary in a democrati c socie ty. In the past, the defe nce budget of the Sov iet Union was a Slate secre t. Another evoluti on is lhe fact that the min iste r of de fence is a civ ili an instead of a hi gh-ranking military offi cer. And Ihi s is whe re the Nonh Atl anti c Cooperation Counc il (NACC) comes in. Ln this body, lhe Eastcrn European countries and NATO members confe r and cooperate in the polit ical and military sphere."

Could membership of the NACC develop into membership of NA TO for these countries? " We do nOl excl ude this possibility, but at the mome nt is is not relevant. ft is in our interest to build up cooperation and 10 let them get used to our way of thinking on defence matters, on the role of armed forces in a democracy. Al so, they will have to get used 10 de fe nsive instead of offensive strategy. Tbere are two aspecIs 10 an e ventu al entry into NATO, When a country j oins, it will have to accept the so-called acqui s communautaire of Maastricht and thi s co uld mean jo ining the Western European Union (W EU). When a country joins the WEU it is hard 10 imagine it would not also join NATO. WEU member states are obli ged to support each othe r, but in view of lhe fact that some me mbers of the W EU are also a me mber of NATO, they are supported both by NATO and WEU member states. An odd situation with regard to support could arise whe n there is a WEU country that is not also a me mber of NATO. But , of course, it will take some time fo r these countries 10 join the EC and the WEU, we believe some where in Ihe 2 1st century. Some of these counlries think this should go faster, most notabl y Poland , which takes the vie w that entry into the EC would present more proble ms Ihan the eas ier and speedyentry into NATO. Tbe countries in Eastem Europe would like to see that NATO developed crite ria for e ntry as the EC has. Nowadays NATO emphasizes to deepen cooperati on in the NACC." Jason Magazine nr. 6. december 1992

Where does democratie contra/ resl ;n sueh a case? With Ihe relevant parliaments or, inlhe case ol a UN mandate, with the UN ? "One could argue that there is no di stinction. Every govemment is respons ible to its parliament for participalion in any given operation. Next 101hal, Ihere is a responsibility for units operating under the UN. Every govemment will have 10 decide for itself whelher or nOl to participate in a peace operation, apan from whelher NATO or lhe UN sanctions or agrees wilh that operation. German y, because of the above-mentioned problems would in all Iikelihood nOl panicipatc."

Dwch soldier on UNPROFOR-missionfor the UN in Yugoslavia . (PhOfO H. Keeris) During the NACC meeting ill Oslo ill Jwze the formal decisioll was takelI tllaf NATO units eou/d be dep/oyed olllside the freaty area. How will fhis turn out in praetiee, do all members agree and is it really possib/e?

" In Oslo NATO offered its services in lhe field of peace operalions lo CSCE. Should CSCE appeal lo NATO for assi stance, under narrowl y defined circumstances, lhan NATO will carry oullhe lasks assigned to it. This could include out-of-area operations. We are talking about a hypotheti cal case, because no such request from CSCE has materialized yet. Since then. in another development the UN has requested assislance and the 16 member Slales have agreed 10 the operations already mentioned, even though assistance 10 the UN was not mentioned in the Oslo dec1aralion. So, praclice has overtaken the decisions reached in Oslo. France would not Iike to eXlend these deci sions in a general sense, all olhers feel that out-of-area operalions are pennitted. albeit underthe auspices of eilherthe UN or CSCE. NAm will nol perforrn independenl peace operations. for thi s could easil y lead 10 the misconception that NATO is the policeman of Europe." 8

Jason Magazine nr. 6, december 1992

Wou/d ir be possibJe in the long term, if mandated by fhe UN, for NATO units fa operate vel) far away Jrom Ille trealy area, say ;11 Africa or Asia ? " Theorelicall y. anything is JX>ssible. bul I Ihink that the nature of the organizations is a determining factor. As far as the U is concemed, reg ional organizations have an obligation to assist in the field of peace and security according 10 Ihe Charter, but in Iheir respective regions. Therefore, 1 cannOI imagine the UN appealing 10 an organization such as NATO for operations in Africa or Asia. I do nOl lhink NATO would be very pleased 10 receive such a request This seems 10 be a very remOle possibilily." What are NATO's criteria il1 considering a request for ass;stance? "NATO has never exec uted such an operation on Î(s own. I do nOl think the chances are very high. A NATO operation within a UN framework would require changes in thc command structure. Where supporting lasks are perforrned, lhe so-called rules of engagement should be agreed upon. These are the condilions undcr which forces are commilled and answer questions as 10 who is in command and who is in political control."

Where are the limits between peace-keeping, peace-making or peace-enlorcing ? "Formerly, Ihe Iimits were c1early defined. DuTing my lour allhe UN, lhe limil was peace-keeping. There had to be a ceasefiTe and agreement between all warring factions in orderto keep the peace jointly agreed uJX>n. Mr Urquhart was vcry adamant about this. He said things wenl wrong in the Congo, because lhe UN tri ed lo enforce peace and thereby became involved as a party: ' Pan of lhe problem, inslead of pan of lhe solution'. Later on, the UN adopted the view lhal it was beller to stay away from areas wilh heavy fighling, lhan being in lhe middle of warring faclions and nOl being able to do somelhing aboul it. Now this view is being regarded as somewhat limited. Peace-enforcing under lhe UN nag has yello lake place, bUl in certain silualÎons far-reaching decisions were made. For example, with regard to escorting humanitarian aid missions, in the event of obstruction in the perfonnance of lhe mission armcd act ion is now permitted. It is open whether such a situalion will actually occur, but it is more than peace-keeping. The UN is very sensilÎve about real peace-enforcement. For inslance, the observers in the Adriatic can only monitor a ship going in the direct ion of a harbour in Montenegro and not take aClion. The same goes for the fl ying restrictions over Bosn ia, where no sancti on is available. and only reports of flying violation s are made up. The UN is the place 10 decide whelher action will be taken. This is a delicate maller, since a lOl of countries have trouble wÎlh the idea of peace-enforcing. When a problem occurs in their country, action will be taken against it. Pennission for such operations by these countries is quite something, in vicw of Ihe principle of national sovereignty. Development within the UN now stands at aClual peace-enforcement, although the concepl of humanitarian operations has been ex tensively developed." Is keeping the peace, as Minister Van den Broek ollce put il. more than peace-keeping? " Keeping the peace comprises peacemaking and potentially peace-enforcement. Peace-making is primarily a political lask, conducled by diploma tic means. This is where the emphasis should lie. This should not exclude the use of military means. The meaning of peace-keeping has broadened. NATO could play an important part and the Netherlands are strongly in favour of Ihis. Recently,

the Netherland s have taken iniliali ves to enhance NATO's effecti veness. UN forces are now drawn from a wide range of countries, which does not prese nt a problem in peace- keepi ng. but which does in strictly mil itary operati ons. In that case, decisionmaki ng is much slower. In the case of Yugoslavia it look six rnonths before any act ion whatsoever was taken. NATO could react more qu iek ly and the member slates are wi lling and ab Ie 10 coope rate successfull y. The Netherl ands is one of several counlries whi ch suggesled dra win g up pl ans fo r peace operati ons, together wilh CSCE coumri es."

Whar could be rhe NerIterlands' cOIuribwiol/ ra UN peaee operarions wirltilJ rite NATO or CSCEframework? " It is c1ear th at the Ne therl ands sees an im portant ro le for amled forces in the future , with regard to peace operations. The structure of its mil itary units wil l renecllhis. It is our intent ion 10 coll ecli vely train and organi ze for peace operati ons bath with in the NATO and Ihe CSCE framework." Bilt ClimolJ hos been elecred President of ,he Unired Stares. Whor will be rhe eOllsequences for ,he relatiolJs be/ween the US alld

Europeon member states ? "The next Pres ident will continue the poli cics of the prese nt one. US interests remain the same. regard Jess of who is president. Greater emphasis on and attent ion fo r US intemal economie affai rs is Iikely. ln what way th is woul d innuence the re lation US-Europe wi lhin NATO is hard 10 say. Clearly it will not change the posit ion of the UN in a major way." Is ;r possible that European member stores would be asked to conrribllfe more equally to NATO. because ir is rheir security thaI is al stakel "All member statcs sec eye-to-eye on this. The Europeans will definitely have to make a larger contributi on to their own security. Another equ il ibrium should be fo und. The WEU sho ul d strenglhen Ihe European pillar of Ihe Alli ance." Whal is [he meanillg of UN or CSCE peacekeeping operaliol/s in //Jis context? "The essence of the issue of peacekeep ing and Ihe role of Ihe UN is Ihal il seems natural to NATO that ils pOlenti al be used. I1 benefi ls Ihe UN, see ing Ihe number of operations all over the world . This is also

crucial with respect to maintain ing the transatlantic sec uri ty link. Europe regards cooperat ion with Canada and the US as the best way to safeguard our security. A common po licy in this fie ld is essenti al and the situati on should not deteriorate into the one present in the econom ie sphere. where a trade war is im minent. NATO's role in the promotion of our own security should be hi ghli ghled. Peace operalions for Ihe UN or CSCE serve 10 illustrate th is. lllis will surely be benefi ciai lo globa l securily." â&#x20AC;˘

This interview was held in Brussels ill november by Marlijn Hop, editor of 1ason Magazine.

NA TO surl'eillance-plane AWACS monitors the Yllgoslavian ainpace. (PhOfO defensie voorlichting)

Jason Magazj" e nr. 6. decembe r 1992

Jason on the spot

CRC Simulation '92: Strengthening the world. From October 1-4, the World Federalist Movement and the Co1umbia Model UN Club organized the first ever UN Charter Review Conference Simulation (UNCRC '92) at Columbia University USA. As Marga Geus already participated in the Moscow Model UN (organized by United Nations Association of the Russian Federation and UNA-USA) earlier this year (January 25-February 2), she was again invited to take part in this Conference in New York. The following contains a report of this Simulation Conference by M. Geus "For when the United Nations is strong, each of its Member States is strong; when the UN is strong, each people is strong; when the UN is strong, small and weak states cao expect protection from the World Organization; when the UN is strong, the sovereignty of the people is enhanced.

Sovereignty and international responsibility thus require support ror the UN and its sister institutions." Javier Perez de Cuellar Dr. Benjamin B. Ferencz gave the hest speech in the Opening Plenary Session. He infonned the audience about hls hi storie loyalty in respect 10 the UN. Nevertheless he feit that the UN路Charter is still aR illusion; "There is no equality, the vetopower in the Security Council destroys a lot; worldwide more than 100 wars have broken out after the UN-Charter came into force and more than 10 million people were ki lied in those wars. Therefore refonns are absolu10

Jason Magazine nr. 6, december 1992

te necessary." An Internali onal Criminal Court has to be constructed, vetopower has to vani sh as positions of states (e.g. Gennany and Japan) have changed. Approxi mately 200 students from over 30 countries (a.o. Ukraine, Croatia and Nepal) attended the UNCRC'92. They were split up in 10 Committees. The I.nternational Court of Justice (lCJ) Committee, from which I forrned part of, consisted of delegales from Venezuela (President), United States (Vice-President), Ireland , Canada, India, Philippines, Estonia and thu s the Nether路 land s. In order to represent the Dutch govemment in the ICl Comm ittee in a decent way, I spoke Mr H.A.C. van der Zwan (UN Political Affairs Department, Head of Political Affairs Bureau of the Minislry of Foreign Affairs), who infonned me about the viewpoinl of lhe Dutch government in respect of the ICJ路role in the UNo The Dutch

Government feeis, like UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros Ghali writes in hi s report uAn Agenda for Peace", that the ICJ is a "u nder-used resource for peaceful adjudication of disputes. " Boutros Ghali calls on all UN memberstates as far as they have not yet done trus, to accept the compulsory jurisdiction (art. 36.2 Statute ICl) without any reservation before the end of the UN decade of intern ational law, 1990-1999. The Dutch Gaver路 nmenl strongly supports this appeal . The importance of the acceptance of compulsory ICJ-jurisdiction was obvious to all participants in the Committee. A lot of preparatory lobbyi ng and compromising work had 10 be done before this Committee cou ld draft its Endresolution. This Resolution was the onl y one which passed unanimously in the Final Plenary Session where all UNCRC Simulation participants were present .

intends

The World Federalist Association 10 hold a ceremony (probably next

year) at the UN in which representatives of the conference wi ll present to the Sec retary Genera! the (jnal resolutions and recommendations of Ihi s UNCRC Simulalion '92. My opinion is. Ihal World Federali sl speakers we re nearly aJways rather cynical about how Ihe world is and idealistic about how she could and should beo A good ex arnple was the Indi an woman who stood up after speeches of the Israeli Ambassador to Ihe UN Ephraim Tari Dr Mohammed Noman Galal who currcntl y serves as the Mini ster Plenipotentiary for the Permanent Mi ss ion of Egypl 10 Ihe UN and Ihe Auslralian Ambassador Richard Butler . She stated: 'The world has cnough for everyone to feed, bUl not for one man 's greed." She feit that the three representati ves didn't te il anythi ng new; they failed at least to give her hope for a beller future. In conclus ion of thi s report of the U CRC Simulalion ' 92. I can only recommend students to participate in international conferences in order to create a better understanding bet ween people from all over the world . â&#x20AC;˘ Marga Geus studies internationallow at the Ulliversity of Leiden

The Commilte of review of the International Court of Justiee:

Reaffirmi/lg !hal the international Court of Justice was established by !he Charter of !he United Nations as !he principaI judical organ of !he UN, Affirmi/lg tbe authority of !he ICJ to render a building decision on the substanee or merits of all cases placed before it,

Affirmi/lg the necessity for all members of international community to accept and uphold the general principles of inlemationallaw as being fundamemai to peaceful co-existence,

Acknowledgi/lg the inability of the ICJ to ensure compliance wi!h the rule of among actors in the international community.

1. Sirollgly recollln/ends that article 36.2 of the Statute of Ihe ICl be amended to read: "That UN recognized international actors before the Court be subject to !he compulsory jurisdiction of the ICJ in .~I legal disputes coneerning a) the interpretation of a treaty; b) any questions of internalional law; c) !he existence of many fact which, if established, would consLĂ&#x17D;tute a breach of an international obligation; d) the nature of extent of the reparation to be made for the breach of an international obligation" ,

2. Fur/her recommends Ihat articJe 34. I ofthe Statute of !he ICl be amended to read: "states and other international actors (including indiv iduals) and corporale enlities may be parties in cases brought before !he Court".

3. Fit/her recommel/ds (hal article 41 of (he Slatute ofthe JCJ be amended to include the third provision as follows: "The ICJ recognizes Ihe aulhority and responsibility of !he Security Council to enforee ICJ decisions in keeping with sections 41, 42 and 43 of !he Charter of !he UN",

4. Fu/her recommends that only the General Assembly be responsible for electing members of the ICJ, in the manner currently set forth in the Statute. 5. Fwher recommellds thst member nations of the UN may not have justice serve on the Coun in conseculive tenns,

6. Fut/her recommends that the ICJ entertain all petitions brought before it by any international actor recognized by!he UN,

7. ealls for international Criminal Court be created inunediately.

jason Magazine nr. 6, december 1992

Struggle for life

The viabilit ofthe as an e ective peace- and securitystructure The eold War has lasted 40 years, from 1949 until the fall of the German Wall in 1989. During this period the UN was nearly paralyzed by bringing out veto's by East and West. Altogether the Soviet Union and the United States faced each other no less than 289 times. by Prof. dr. J.G. Siccama

As a conseq ue nce of thi s the Security Council did not appear lO he able to take rea l action. Of course: it proved ilS usefulness as a panel for deliberation belween the nation s. But during the confrontation of both bl oes, there hasn '( been any actuaJ mainte nance or re-establi shme nt of the international peace and sec urity as it was intended in the framin g of the Charter. As a universal platform the UN wasjusi a rnarginal phenomenom in the bipolar worldsystem . Tt acted as a mouthpiece of the non aligned countries and it perforce applied itself to fun cLional integration with the help of many auxiliary organi sations. To a new world order? Does the end of the Co ld War mean that the

inferior position of the UN in the field of peace and security has come lO an end? Ind路 eed many indications pointed 10 a much stronger role of the Security Couci l. First the United States were left the only power which could bring some order in the world after the di sintegration of !he Sov iet Union. BUl sinee Lhe end of Lhe sixties Lhe western superpower 12

Jason Magazine nr. 6, december 1992

is subject 10 the decline of powe r espec iall y in the economi e field . This forced Ameri ca 10 cooperate with other powers. On world scale partial leadership can best be leg itimated by the UNo This was the substance of the so-called ' ncw world order' which the AmeTiean president Bush evoked aner the Russian co ll apse. Actually the ncw world order comes to nothing more than living up lO the old one. The old (and thu s the ncw) world order is rooted in the Charter. The substance of the UN -Charter - and thu s of the low of nalions - still is a prohibition of vio lence belween narions. By successfully undoing the Iraqi conquest of Kuwait in 199 1 living up to a prohibition of aggression for the first time seemed to be possible. There we come IQ Ihe second actor which suited (he reinforcement of the UN very well: the Russian Federation. It was e1ear (hat the American leadership could not on ly be justified through the UN and it was also e1 ear that the collapse of the Soviet Union could at leasl in some degree be masked through the organization of nalions. The revival of the UN, which was initiated by Gorbatsjev, served

the purpose of ass uring Ru ss ia a prominent pi ace in for in stance the Security Council. A similar reasoning rcfers to the two smaller Weste rn ex-G reat Powers: the United Kingdom and France. These counlries also conside r the proces of deel ine of power as the attributes of power. The deeline of power over several centuries is slOpped by the coutries' possess ion of nuelear weapons an by the right of velo in the Sec urity Counc il. The required cooperation (or at least the absence of opposition) of the enigma China remains. China des ires to rehabilitate itself from the massac re on the Tiananrnen-Place. Thi s desire seerns to conlend for the mastery with the want to wilfully stick to (he political ideology of the communi sm and the desire to make a lOl of money through the export of weapons. For the time being the cooperative attitude gets the beller of the confrontative one, although the export of rockets and nuelear (cchnology could soon bring the people's republic ioto conOiet with the conde mnatjon by the Security Counci l on Januari 31s1 1992 of the proliferation as being a ' threat of the peace '.

lnternal conflicts The biggest problem whieh had manifested quiekly after the break up of the blocstrueture was that the most frequent use of violence didnl't happen between states, butjust within states. For a long time ﾃ四 has been dear for the Third World that a faulty state building was unbreakable related 10 the underdevelopment and violence. Ethnical conflicts, nationalism and escalation to war between states are consequences of the fact that certain groups are living on both sides of the borders of the states. These phenomena are going together with di sintegration. In certain parts of Afriea (S udan , Mozambique, Liberia, Somalia, Ethiopia), but also in the Near East (Lebanon) and the Far East (Cambodia) a vacuum of power was developed. In that vacuum political mafia-groups appropriated the dominance over certain parts of the stateterritory by means of the possession of weapons. In certain 'pockets' of the fonner Second World similar developments revealed. In 1990 a war of separation started in Yugoslavia and the withdrawing of Russ ia and the abo lition of the ce ntral oppressionmachinery in parts of the farmer Soviet Union (Nagomo-Karabakh , the Caueasus) lead to war. In June 1992 the secretary-general Boutros Boutros-Ghali revealed an important part of the 'Agenda for Peace' at the request of the Security Council. This agenda is meant to suppres fonn s of intemal violence. On the basis of a great number of reasonings one can justly argue that for in stance massive violation of human rights can he considered as a 'threat of the peace'. Therefore the Security Counci l can take meas ures to reslore the international peace and securi Iy. This is made possible through articJe 39 in ehapter VII of the Charter. This ehapter deals with enforcements which the UN ean operate. Here the Seeurity Couneil acts eontrary to article 2.7 of the Charter, whieh prohibits intervention in internal affairs of member state s. Therefore the UN searehes for forms of intervention whjeh go less further than the enforcement. Possible fonns of interven tion are represented by the four P's. These are: Preventive diplomacy, which means attempting to reduce confli cts in an early stage by mediation and negotiation. In military tenns one can think of preventive stationing of troups, if necessary against the wiJl of one of the parties involved. Peace-making whereby the international Court of Ju sti ce and assistance can play a certain role. Peace-keeping which means military presence with agreement of conflicting parties whereby firing is only allowed in case of self-defenee. Peace-building, which comes 10 builing a state-order like it gelS shaped by means of demilitarization and organizing elections in Namibia, Cambodia and Angola. The assistance in rescueing peopJe from death of starvation and military action to prevent mass ive slaughters are undoubtl y prominent activities for the new UNo Enforcements take place to assure the respect of peoples rights. This cause s problems in

Road-sigl/ il/ Ihe midd!e oflhe Sil/ai. (PhoIo AVD, KM)

equality in the Ireatment of countries. Who wants to help in Bosnia of Somalia should also help in Sudan, Liberia or Tibet. Therefore intervention should in real severe cases not be a right , but an obligation from which member states can't withdraw.

War between states Ethnical and tribal conflicts are very important, bul they disturb the status quo ante. The prevention and (after agression nevertheless has taken place) restoring of the status quo ante is necessary. This acti vity is, as already has been said, the substance of the UN's functioning as a securitystructure. Concerning thi s the hope which had been raised by the Iiberation of Kuwait was dashed by the victims in Bosnia. Why does Bosnia threaten 10 seal the destruction of the UN analogous to the League of Nations in 1935 by not

sanctioning Ital y for conquerin g Abyssinia. A sanction would have forced Ital y 10 undo the conquest of Abyssinia. In April 1992 Bosna-Herzegowina has been reeognized by the EC, after the Bosnians had given sati sfaetion to the claim of keeping a referendum. The country has also been admitted as a member state of the UNo And there has been some talk of a war bet ween small -Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) and Kroatia. Nevertheless many people still cons ider the war in ex- Yugoslavia an intemal affair. The Security Council has demanded the guilty parties (read: Serbia and Kroatia) many times to c1ear the territory of Bosnia which they had violently occupied. This conclusion has been drawn on the (;onference which had been called for by the parties involved called in London at the end of Jason Magazine nr. 6, december 1992

August. Nevertheless the UN hasn't reall y done anything IQ d iminish lhe aggression agai nsl Bosni a. The on ly enforceme nt wh ich

is launched in virtue of chapter VII is the economical embargo. Th is spccifically strikes Bosnia whic h fails 10 defend itse lf effect ively. Al lhe same time the observanee of the prohibition on military nighls, which is de fac to directed agai nst the Serbi an airforce, still hasn' t been compe lled.

Bosnia. In the summcr of 1992 during the

summit in Helsin ki Ih is confe rence has been appoi nted as a regional secu rity-arrangemenl according 10 the meaning of chaptcr V U of

Ihe Charter, bul it has onl y bee n authorized 10 perfonn peace-keeping operat ions. In case of Bosnia more is needed viz. mil itary enforcements (thu s: fighti ng instead ol peace). The CSCE gradua lly rid icu lizes itsell continually by only send ing observers to the fo rmer Yugoslav ia.

Conclusion

The Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) is the fi rst victim o l (he failure 10 rcstorc Ihe statu s quo ante in

O nl y the uni versal UN which has its seat at New Vork is authori zed to perform mili tary enforce menl s mainl y against Serbia.

DUlcI. UN-helicopler durillg Ihe UNTAC-missioll ill Cambodia (P/IOIOAVO, KM)

Jason Magazine nr. 6, december 1992

If (he Security Council om its to effecli vely take such action thcn it will signi fy its fa ilure as an effeclﾃ思e peace- and sec uri tystructure. In thaI case Ihe organization o f nations degene rates into an organ for allev iating humani ari an needs as it was the case during the Cold War. 窶｢

Prof Dr. J.C . Siccama is ehief of Ihe deparlment Research of Ihe DWeil Instilwe for International Alfairs in r he Hague and professor in military history atlhe Ulliversity of Utrecht.

I nternal changes

Restructuring of the United Nations The political map of the world quickly changes. After Years of indolent growth in the list of members of the United Nations the number of requests for membership has rapidly rised. Several years ago who would have dared to think that the Baltic states, Northem- and Southem Korea would be admitted as members of the UN? Former Sovietrepublics have already applied for membership. by drs. G. RingnaIda The end of the Cold War has magnc ti e conseque nces. T he fac t thaI the Sec urity Counc il suddenly di spl ays (he quic k-w iltcdness as it was provided in the Charte r is more spectecul ar than the increase in the num ber of memebers of the

whic h Ihe Uniled Stat es runs the show. The commolion of Ihe non-aligned coun tri es about the func tioning of lhe weste rn domi nance in the Sec urity Counci l increases. The questions have la be answered cl early by the West.

UN. Combaning and comrol ing conniCIS has become possible since the United States and the Sov ie t Uni on do not stand to each olher li ke fi ghters. After a peri od of seri ous di sap-

pointment in the funclioning of the UN. the convic ti on has grown thaI (he UN can fonn an cffecti ve instrument in seeking for a solu tion for the problcms whi ch can onl y be sol-

ved through internati onal cooperation. Exampl es are: the approach to the ex isting centres of confli ct, like in the Middle East and Cambod ia, the sharpen ing of the internati ona l con trol on the produc tion of nuclear fi ssionable mate ri al, opposing the proliferation of the mass destruction arnlS, re pelling the trade in anns, combatting the trade in drugs, working on the problem of population, protecting human rights, fighti ng agai nst e nvironme ntal pollution, combauing migration for politica l and economica l reasons and contro l of AIDS. At the same time th is e nume ration concers a poJitica lly se nsitive po int. The deveJoping countries j ustfull y state that these are designs in which especiall y the West is inte rested . Further the re is the fear that Western Europe will have 10 assist Eastem European co untries substantiall y in economically and politicaH y rebuilding their country. Won 't thi s be at the cost of the ex isting North -South-relati on? The suspici on gets strengthe ned by the by president Bush introduced slogan of a new world order. The de ve loping countries wonder if th is does n' t mean that a ncw world order wi ll be one in

Proposals for reforming the UN In the peri od 1990 - 199 1 the de legations in New-Vork intensive ly looked la the question in which areas the UN could operate more effective ly and more eff誰cientl y. Outside the UN scveral reporls wcre publi shed with suggestions for slrengthening the po licy and the organizati ona l stru cture. Everywhe re people are convinced that a more qu ic k-w itted and stronger organi zation is needed for the UN to successfully perfoml its tasks. But Ihe re is no need for the UN to change the structure of its organi zation and Ihei r Specia li zed Organi zations. It 's des irab ie th at the separate organ izations are going to function beuer Ih an they do now. It espccia lly is req uired for the most im portant organ of the UN, the Security Counci l. At th is mome nt the Securit y Counei l bears to muc h characle ri stic features of the relati ons of power of 1945. But there are more anachroni sms. The re Jati ons of the UN w ith the Specia Ji zed Organizati ons re nects the view about the fun ctiona lism whic h was in great demand in the years af te r the Second World War. Using a fashi onable te ml ino logy: the modem organi zation of Ihe UN- famil y can be characteri zed as a confederation of independent UNorgani zati ons whil e at present there's more want of strong ond a stiff fede rati ve structure. The prese nt confederati ve design is the most important cause of the laborious course of the coordin ation within the UN- family. This obstructs a quic k-w illed performance. Added to thi s the UNo including

UNCTAD and a num be r of largcr Special ized Organizati ons. has deve loped int o c umbrous bu reauc rac ies since 1945. Tasks which belong to the past are hardl y pushed off: new tasks get eagerl y gathered. In this respect the UN-organi zations do not yie ld to olhe r p~ b lic. sem i-publ ic and private bureaucrac Jes. The politi cal cl imate appears to be favo urable fo r introduc ing proposals for refonn. That's why there are many suggestions for rev ita lization, re fonn , reorganization and/or restruc lu rin g. The disadvantage of these suggesti ons is th at they are restricted to a cert ai n sector o f the UN-organi zation. Conseque ml y Ihe proposa ls are to little tuned to each othe r. The pro posal s for re foml won 't gel reali zed without contest. Some me mber states with a penn anent scat in the Sec urity Counc il have a lready taken a finn stand out of fear to loose the ir pennane nt scat. Many deve loping countri es on the othe r hand face the proposals from lhe Weste rn tu bes with suspi cion. One can ask why most of the proposals come from these tu bes. There is also resistance with in the Secretariat because of the fear lhat the vested interests and pos itions will be damaged. One has to steer clear of the rocks before a e rasonable result can be achieved. One has to endeaver to a good coherent package of proposals, whi ch fo r example gets submitted to thc f誰fthi est Gene ral Asse mbl y. In thi s way the semi -cente nary o fth e UN can be celebrated w ith more than a ceremonial show. Be low a perspecti ve is fonnulated whic h perhaps won' t be achieved immediatc ly, but it must be reali zable in phases. The foll owing points are in il : I. stre nghte ning of the Un both concerning slructu res of consul-

Jason Magazin e nr. 6. december 1992

tation and in the field of admini stration. 2. adjustment ofthe UN to the present political, economical and soc ial realitics. 3. rationali zation of the executive tasks of the UNo

Strengthening and reorganization of the UN-secretariat Tlze secretary-genera/: Dag HammarskjĂśld

(secretary-general from 1953 untill 1961 ) has shown how independent and powerful a secretary-general of the UN can be - thi s at great di spleasure of not onl y the great powers. After hi s death permanent members of the Security Cou ncil have done everything to prevent a new person like Hammarskjold to be appointed. In a recently published stud y Urquhart and Childers propose to institute a comprehensive procedure of nomination. One or two years before a new secretarygeneral will be appointed the commission for nomination gets instiluted and searc hes for capable candidates. This commission submits a list of, for examplc three, persons to the Security Council which has to choose one of these persons. The authors further propose to appoint a secrelary-general for a period of seven years. Not being re-elect ionable will benefit the independence. These proposals deserve support of all members states. It is a piuy that the authors have failed to go one step further. The position of the secretary-general would considerabl y be strengthened if he got the competence to select the chiefs of the UN-departments and to appoint them as his nearest cooperators. These officials, with the secretary-general at the head, could shape a kind of ' Inner-Cabinet'. If moreover the secretary-general got the competence to (re-)appoint and di scharge the chiefs of the Specialized Organizations. his grip on the UN-system would considerably bc strengthened. These officials should also be appointed for a period of seven years. They could act as a 'Outer-Cabinet'. All thi s would result in a stiffly lead organization and Ă&#x17D;t would also benefit lhe coordination within the UN-system. Naturally such a proposal meets with opposition by the chiefs of the Specialized Organizations. But it is less cerlain that member stales (especially the departments involved) will also refuse 10 support such a proposal. The councils of control and the general assemblies of these organizations remain in funcion. Through these organs the ministers and civil servalllS of Ihe relating professional sectors stay in contact with each other. They keep exc hanging infonnal ion an assailing the management of the organizations with their valuable recommendalions about international legislation and policy. Choosing the chief of the organization di sappears. 11 is unlikely thai member slales as a consequence of thi s would loose grip on the management. Even stronger th is grip in the present situation appears to be very loosely: the management uses all the avai lable instru ments, including ass istance. 10 bind the majority of the membcr stales. The Secrewrior: Not long after his appointment secretary-general Boutros Ghali has complied with the request of a group of member stales 10 indlroduce correction s in 16

Jason Magazine nr. 6. december 1992

the top heavy UN-organi zation. The funcli ons of the 14 under- and assistant-secretaries-general were abolished. The number of departments was reduced to seven. During a recently held press conference the sec retarygeneral sideways announced thai he will carry throu gh a second reorganization next year. It wou ld be a good [hing if he changed over to appointing an acting secretary-ge neral who could lead the important Department of Adminisfratioll & Managemeflf. Besides substituting the secretary-general during his absence, the acting sec retary-general could be the first-responsible for the UN-personnel-policy. Too often the personnel-poliey has paid the pi per as a consequence of overburden of the secrelary-general because of his political responsibilities. The Security Council The right of velo: This topic belongs to the most delicate themes. Rece ntl y the Swedi sh Permanent Represe ntative at the UN compared ripping up the right of veto with opening the box of Pandorra - and there is nOlhing in it. Nevertheless the pressure grows to scrutinize the construct ion of permanent members of the Security Council with the ri ght of velo. In 1945 thi s construclion could be approved. The five allied powers (United States, Soviet Union, United Kingdom. France and Chi na) had won the war. They were the 'Great Powers', which could nOl wl eratc the ncw organization to take decisions which would interfere wilh their interesIs. Now, about 47 years later, the re lati ons of power differ. Germany and Japan became the economical great powers. During the war in lraq they made clear thaI they do not want to he the large moneygivers without being involved in the decision-making about thi s war in the Security Council. More than once Brasil , Argentina, Nigeria and India have lel know that they think thay have the right to a permanent membcrship of the Security Council with the right of veto.

"With the same argument as 47 years ago it has to be said now that the present great powers can't be excluded from the ring of permanent members ofthe Security Council without political damage." Are the UN served by a change in the present construct ion of the Security Counci l? Will the organ ization get more effective in achieving its goals if her design changes? Everyone who pUlS one's ear to the ground in the caves of the UN-building will afftrm thi s. The Security Council in its prese nt composition in which one country takes a dominant position is hard on its way 10 loose its legitimacy. The first indications are thai Ihird countri es (which are not a party in a conflict)

refusc to execute the dccisions of the Sccurity Council. The past has proven lhat a UN without an effective Securi ty Councillooses its credibility and falls into decay. Everything has to be done to give the Security Cou ncil its credibility back. With the same argument as 47 years ago it has to be said now that the present great powers cannot be excluded from the ring of pennanent mem bers of the Security Council without political damage. The German irritation about nol being informed about the top of the Security Council on Januari 3 1st 1992 is characteristic of the situatĂ&#x17D;on. There are divergent scenarios thinkabie to restructure the Security Council. The first and most radical one is the fonnation of groups of countries with a similar ethnic-cultural congeniality. Each of these groups appoints to a representative in the Security Council on the ground of a mutuaIly agreed circulation-scheme which the groups themselves had set up. The di stinction between permanent and non-pennanent seats in this scenario disappears just like the ri ght of veto. Instead of thi s a weight voting-procedure is introduced whereby criteria like the size of the population and the amounl of subscription have to play a role. (Before setting up a specific procedure the EC's help could be called in; the EC has obtained a great reputation in thi s area. ) The big advantage of this scenario is that the member states are more or less represellled in the Securily Council. This scenario has by far been prefe red to all othe r scenarios. If the member states decide to restructure the Security Council (whereby revision of the Chaner won't bc avoided) then it has to happen so that Ihe legitimacy will be recovered. ft is beller to mise a new building than patching up a brittie and old one with clefts. Are the member states capable to such a thing? One may fear that loss of legitimacy has gone so far, that il becomes clear for everyone thai the Security Council again doe s not function with all the consequences of the functioning of the organization as such. It is more likely thaI the member states will decide on one of the following scenarios, which at best slow down the process of loosing legitimacy. The second scenario is a small operation which however requires a change in the Charter. The EC could take the place of France and the United Kingdom. The liberated seat could be yielded to Japan. The EC-member states could mutually agree on a circulalion-scheme. The third scenario is the simplest one to accomplish, without a chan ge in the Charter. This is the scenario with the biggesl chance. Gennany, Japan, Argelllina, Brasil, India and Nigeria all get admined to the Seeurity Counci!. They do not get a right of veto. but il can be privately arranged that they will always keep their seat. Such agreements are crucial in organs and commiss ions of the UNo This scenario wil! irrevocably in the long run lead to the end of the Security Council. Further enlargements cannot be prevented: this will paralyze the organ. This course is too often followed with in the UNorgani zalion. It is the easiest way and it evades the problem behind the enlargemenl.

Broadening fhe mafldare of fhe Security Council: ln a lengthy press conference, 79 days after hi s appointmenl as secretaryge neral, Boutros Ghali enumerated all conflicts whi ch were submitted to him. Action of the UN was desired everywhere. Ouring (he press conference he announced that is was decided 10 send a peace-force to Yugoslavia to prevent furth er bloodshed. He also announced that the first contingent UN-militaries had left for Cambod ia. According to the secretary-general th is operation would in the end be the largest one in the UN-history. No one wil l he amazed if (in the near future) Ihe UN will be called on more frequently for peace-keepil1g operations. At present the Security Cou ncil should get more elbow-room in operating its tasks to keep the peace. Therefore the Securil y Cou ncil must fas ter have the disposal of more troops and materia!. The logistical provisions should considerably have to be improved. Meet ings shou ld not endlessly be held about financing. This means that the member states mu st have the di sposal of conlingenl s and malerial at the request of the UN. Above all it is desirabie that the Security Council gets the competence 10 perfonn preventively in an earl y stage to nip a threatening confl ict in the budo Boutros Ghali had announced 10 make proposals about thi s soon. In chapter VI of the Charter, which dea ls with peacefully composing di sp utes, anc wi U vainly seek for the tenn 'peace-keeping operations'. It is a fonn of act ion wh ich is invented spontaneously. Thi s is a consequence of the fact thai Ihe applicalion of

chapter VII (the enforcement when initiatiyes on Ihe basis of chapter VI do not yie ld anything) as a conseq uence of Ihe Cold War did not appear to be practicabie exept for a few offs hoots. Till now twenty UN-peacekeeping operations have been establi shed. Their fonn d iffers depending on the si tuation , but some habits have originated, e.g. peace-keeping operations may only he perfonn ed of both panies in the confl ict agree. The parties have 10 agree with Ihe countri es that suppl y the (roops. while the military personne l may onl y use lhe anns for se lf-defence.

"One ofthe advantages of concluding stand-by-agreements is that it can take away the fear that the United States become police-officer of the world." The ve locity of acting of the Security Counc il in adjusting peace-keeping operati ons cou ld he raised in the way of article 43 of the Charter. This art icle among other things decides that all member states negotiate agreement s with the Security Council in which they bind them selves to suppl y troops at request. Since thi s anicle falls under chapter VII of the Charter (enforcement s) it has

never bee n deve loped because of the Cold War. But the eold War is over and perhaps can the Dutch govemment take inilialive at this point. One of the advantages of concI ud ing sfalld-by-agreements is that it can take away the fear that the Un ited States become police-officer of the world. Of course the disposed troops can be employed bolh for enforcement s and for peace-keeping operations. It could be considered to let the WEU be a party in the agreement. The anicle ex plicitly allows such a collective agreement. For the here proposed strenglhening of the UN a change in the Chaner won 't be necessary. This is however the case when security of man is not on ly threatened by anned viole nce, but also by environmental disasters and starvation. In confonnity with art iel e 65 of the Charter ECOSOC can give the Security Council infonnation about affa irs on basis of whi ch the Security council can dictate measures for member states to take . Moreove r a new kind of problem comes upon the stage. In the recent past the right of se lf-determination has been used in the context of the proces of decolonization. Now Ihe event s in Eastem Europe show how ethnical mi norities can refer to the ri ght of self-govemment or they can even totall y claim independence. Furthennore the ' humanitarian interventi on' which took place agai nst the will of lraq 10 help the Kurds in Northem lraq wi th the tl ag of the UN in the hand. This is a development about which the last word has not been spoken yet.

The Security COll11cil afflte VN in New York. (Photo VN)

Jason Magazine nr.

Ă&#x2013;,

december I ~Y2

The General Assembly Thc General Assc mbly is a unique organ in thi s world: almost all counl ries are repTesen· led and every country, sma ll or large. has one VOle; thi s is a fomlU la for which espec ially the greal powers have li nie c nthusiasm. The Gene ral Asse mby fulfil s several fun ctions. FiTst il is a fo ru m whe re every country ann ua ll y has (he opportunity 10 fu lly di sclose its fore ign policy through the Chie f of the state, the pri me-m inister of (he Mini stcr for Fore ign Affairs. Crit ic ism of behaviour of othe r slales won' , bc avoided at that. Because almos l cverybody participates in lhi s debate il is a perfecl, annu all y retuming standard for te nsion and relicf in the world . After thi s de bate (w hic h can last fo ur lill fi ve wee ks) othe r funetions get a chance: approval of the report of the Commi ssion for the C rede nti als; di scuss ion o f Ihe topics which are of such a great pol itical interesl that Ihey are put direetly plenary on the order-paper (e.g. the Paleslin ian problem); electi on of some high UN-officials and members in council s ans commi ssions; judgement and rati fication of the recommendati ons of the commissions of the Ge neral Assembly. In looking over these tasks the concl usion is justified that little can be improved on Ihi s organ, exept fo r cases like introduci ng fi xed times of speaking and starting the meetings in time. At th is mome nt there is a call for reorgan izati on of Ihe age nda, on which there are 130 to 140 top ics whi eh have to be fini shcd in three monlhs. In practise the num ber of cancell ed topics is nOl eXlremely high, beeause people look at the age nda earefull y

JOSOIf

Magazin e nr. 6, december 1992

and they cont ro llhei r own po litica l prefere nces. the proposa1 to di scuss an agenda-topic every two or th ree years (i nslead of every year) offe rs more poss ibi lit ies. Othe rs propose the General Assembl y not 10 meet onl y onee a year, but twice short times. Thi s is a proposal whi ch deserves some consideration. The Trusteeship Counci l One of the succes slOries of lhe UN is the realizali on of Ihe proces of decoloni zation. Afte r the Second World War a number of states achieved to sha ke off the coloni al statu s, but the rea l break Ihrough 10 inde pendence gOI going in the second half of the sixties. In Ihi s who Ic proces Ihe Tru sleeship Council pl ayed a modest role. Chapter X I of the Charter (Decl aration of conce ming not-selfgoveming areas) and the in 1960 by the General Assembly accepted Dedararioll 011 rlle Grantillg of Illdepelldence 10 C% l/ial Coulllries and Peoples have bee n the most im portant politica l instruments for peopJes which fo ught for their independe nce. The Tru stees hip Counc il on the other hand has been adjusted to attend Ihe process to independence of areas of mandate whi ch were adj usted by the League of Nations. Colonial areas whi ch were under the admini slration of It aly and Japan before the Seeond World War were added to thi s. The Charter ex pli eitl y kept the poss ibilit y open for other colonial powers to also pl ace Ihe ir co lonies under thi s syste m. Th i, ea ll is hardly heard. To eaeh of these trustee-areas a mandatary has been appointed. who was obliged to periodi eall y report 10 the Counci l how far Ihe area had made progress on it s way to independe nce.

In 1949 the re were eleve n trusteeship-areas; sixteen years late r te n areas had ac hieved indepe ndence. At this moment the Trusteeship Couneil ae tu ally has no task. Chapter XII and XIII are oul of date as a consequence of the developments since the Second World War. In thi s area a rev ision of the Charter would not be uncoming. But thi s gets also rctarde by the pennane nl representatives of the Security Counci l. I1 's poss ible to charge Ihe Trusteeship Council of even belle r the Commission IV of the Gene ral Assembl y 10 occupy the mse lves with the minorit y- proble ms related to the ri ght of se lf-dctcnnination. The Internatioll al La w Commissioll co uld be consulted and one eould hiteh on to the reeently published declarati on of the UN-Commission for the Righls of lhe People about the protection of e thni cal minorities. In a speech held in The Hague on Nove mber 29th 199 1 professor Marc Cogen (uni versity of Gent) pointed to the faet that more ofte n the ri ght of se lfde te rmination is more and more declared appli cable to certain minority-groups, when 1. the ce nt ra l a uthority doesn' t appear to be able (Q govem th at area in accordance 10 the inte mationall y accepted stand ards. 2. the ri ght of se lf-de te rminali on can be achieved th rough polit ical and/or diplomati cal initialÎYes. Economie and Social Couneil (ECOSOC) The Charte r g ivcs cl ear indi calions (article 55 and furth e r) what the tas k of the Economic and Soc ial Council are. In the first place it has 10 be a forum in whi ch there ean be deliberaled upon mone tary. economie and

social situations in the world and upon respect of the human right s. Further the Council has to coordinate the activities ofthe Speciali zed Organ izations. Finally it has to stimu late the assistance IQ the developing countries. All developing strategies are set up under the umbrella of the ECOSOC. The ECOSOC was only indirectly concemed with actua l multilateral UN-assistance to the developing countries. Important tasks were destined for the Council. In spi te of that this chief organ of the UN has functioned laborious ly, exept for the first few years. The opinions about the causes are strongly divided. The ECOSOC is a brain child of the Americans. The League of Nations was not aquai nted wi th such an organ. The Europeans did not sympathize with the idea because of the monetary and economie relations with their colonies. Moreover they knew that the United States had a critica I attitude towards thi s colonial relalion. Neverthe less they murmurous approved of setting il up. According as more developing countries appeared on the UN-stage, the Americans started IQ be more critical in tlte ECOSOC, because of the increasing press ure to give more assistance to developing countries. It was c1ear: the Western countries prefered not to go in business withi n the ECOSOC. They prefered the GATT, the World Bank .nd the IMF as organs of negotialion where they esteemed the more business-Iike policy beller guaranteed through preponderance of votes. This western attitude was a di sappoi ntment for the developing countries. The developing countries also lost interest in ECOSOC. They took the initiative in setting up a UN-organization for trade and development (UNCTAD). After 1975 the cohesion of the group of the developing countries got stronger. As a group (G-77) they wanted to enter the negotiations with a common position. This was not possible in the ECOSOC. Many decesions prepared in ECOSOC got at the request of the G-77 passed to the General Assembly. This is another reason for frustration concerning the functioning of ECOSOC. Another problem is that the coordinating role ofthe Council does not work at all. Although the Speciali zed Organizations are involved in ECOSOC through agreements on cooperation, especially the large organizations did not care at all for the directives and recommendations of the Council. Their agreement is that they have their own intergovernmental organ of contro l and that the direclĂ&#x17D;ons of ECOSOC aften contradicted those of their own council of conlrol. Formally they are alligned to the directions of the last one. They are not totally wrong. The member states aften make mi stakes. They do not give similar instruction s to their delegations in the several organs of the UN. Future developments in the ECOSOC For the ECOSOC the future does not look bright. Apart from the fact that the group of the seven riehest industrialized countries, the G-7 , stipulate the rules of the game, until now one could state with convi ct ion that monetary and trade-questions had to bc dealt with in the ECOSOC, the General Assembly and UNCTAD, because these are the only organs in which all countries of the world are

represented. But this argument won't do here anymore because the Eastern European countries and, some of them left, the fonner Soviet-republics became a member of IMF and World Bank and they got a status of observer in the GAlT. Developing countries, which till now were not members of these institutions, show more and more interes t in entry inlO them. The concl usion should be that trade and monetary affairs will disappear of the agenda of the UNCTAD and the ECOSOC. Howeve r thi s does not mean that the ECOSOC will become an empty case like the Trusteeship Council. New tasks lie ready. ft is of vital importance that the secretarygeneral of the UN gelS the competence to appoint and discharge the chiefs fo the Specialized Organizations. Only then it is possibie that the Ower-Cabinet submits economie and socia l policyproposals to the ECOSOC of whieh can be expected that, after approval, they will be performed by the whole UN-system. Then the ECOSOC won 't need a Coordination-Commission anymore, because the coordination of policy becomes the responsibi lity of the Outer-Cabinet. Not all matters will be smoothed over in this way, but coordi nation is out of the interference of the member states. It can be recommended to joint the economical and socia l commi ssions of the ECOSOC to clearly show the coherence between both sectors 10 full advantage. This commis sion should among other things be concerned with the promotion of science and technology, with ref ugee-problems (including economical migration), with the problems of popu lation, human righls, combatting the use of and the trade in drugs. and with the trade in anns. Reorgani7..ation for the superfluous subcommissions For years delegations in the UN are concerned how Ihe agenda of the Council and the like mushrooms sprung up subcommi ss ions can be reorganized. In evaluating the effectiveness of a subcommi ss ion one could start from the following criteria: I. Does the topie, deal I with by the subcommission, have enough priority? The question will be who does judge thi s. The answer mu st be: the majority of the members of ECOSOC. This is astrong limitation to the process of reorgani zation. The bargaining will break ouL .. 2. What is the added value of a subcommi ssion to the decision-making in the last fiv e years? 3. Is there eno ugh scientific and substantial support of the Secretariat for the job of the subcommi ss ion? 4. Is there an agency within the Secretariat whieh can check if the subcommi ssion's recommendation s are actually followed by the member states? If not, why not? In the last General Assembly a lot is done to come to decision-making about the reorganization. The result was linie. The suspicion of developing cou ntries about the proposa ls of the West is very great at thi s moment. Perhaps il is usefull 10 drop thi s point for a wh iIe. It holds good with regard to everyone that more time is needed to view how the deve-

lopments in Eastem Europe crystallize. It will become possib le to approach thi s topi c more fundamenlally when there is more insight in the developments of the relations of power in the world and in the patterns of negotiation within the UNo UNCTAD UNCTAD also cannot escape from a searching reconsideration of its own tasks when the development in GATT, IMF and World Bank as is outlined carries 011. nle suggest ion which has already circulated some time is 10 transfornl this organization in a OECD for developing countries. The UNCTAD preeminently appears 10 be suitable 10 thaL The on ly prob lem will be who is go ing to finance Ihe organization.

"Thefounders ofthe Un did not expect that the concrete assistance would become such an important part ofthe UN-activities, " UN-assista nce Will the character of the UN-assistance change? The only thing that can be said in Ih is stage is that assistance has been an instrument in the Co ld War. Now it has ended it is thinkable thaI a change will take place from bilateral to multilateral assistance. The more so as new problems we face (environment , mi gration , refugees) lend themse lves 10 a multilateral approach. Over against thi s England, France. Belgium and the Netherlands wiJl keep aJlocating a large part oftheir assistance for their ex-co lonies (with exeption of Indones ia). The founders of the UN did not expect thaI the concrete assistance wou ld become such an important part of the UNactivities. An apin ion poll under a large number of developing countries has shown that these countries especially praise the neutrality of the UN-assistance. There has been some criticism on the perfonnance of il (indo lent, bureaucratie) bul everyone agrees thai th is fomlof neutral assistance must remain. The UN-representatives on the spot (the Residen t Coordinator) get highly estimated because of their neutrality. They often aclvice Ihe governments. In thecourse of time a lot offunds for assistance came into ex islance which supply technical assistance on the basis of donation. The United Natiolls Development Programme (UNOP) is an important example, but also UNICEF, the Peoples Fund (UNFPA), the Capital Development Fund (CDF), the fund for UN-volunteers and a series of smaller funds. The World Food Programme (WFP) takes a separate place. This fund serves out food in emergencies, bUI also and especiaJly as pay in kind in UN-projects. Then there is IFAD which finances agricultural projects. A number of these funds have their own controlling councils. Like in the Specialized Organizations thi s leads to laboriou sly functioning ' in the field' because of con trary instruclions. There is a ca l! for brin-

jaso" Magazine nr. 6, december 1992

ging the same line in the whole UN-assistance. Further there is a di scussion on te rule thai lhe UN-funds should exc lusive ly make use ofthe Specialized Organizalions in perfonning their assistance-projects. Finally the donor countries ask for bener Financial accountability of the spending of the multilateral costs fo assistance. Recently a Northern study has been published in which lhere is argued for joining the councils of control in an International Council of Development. This council should provide general directives for the policy of assistance. Bes ide it the fund s should set up Boards of Directors with a limited composition which should be charged with the supervision over the policy. These proposals deserve support on lhe understanding that the Council of Development should become a commission of the ECOSOC. In this way an ECOSOC comes to existance. This ECOSOC is charged with the same supervision and it provides direc tives about problems that are of importance for both developing and developed countries now and in the near future. A hinge-point in the system as is outlined, is the competence of the secretary-general to fonn its own Outer-Cabinet.

macy of the Security Council it will be necessary thai the several ethnic-cultural groups, represented in the UN, recognize themse lves in the composition of the Counei l. The present political realilies have 10 be taken account of. lt won't do IQ give Japan , which accounts for 12.5 percent of the UNbudget, a prominent place in the Council. Gennany contributes more IQ the budget than England and France together. Spread of the mandate of the Security Council wil1 strengthen the political meaning of thi s organ considerably. It will benefit the whole UN-system. The quick-wittedness of the UN wil! considerably be improved by the competences of the secretary-general, a new way of appointing the secretary-general and the possibility that he can appoint hi s near cooperator including the chiefs of the Specialized Organizations. The thesis can he defended that the ECOSOC will not function weil as long as the coordination within the UN-system is not arranged as il should be . •

I. B. Urquhan and E. Childers: A World in Need of Leader· ship: Tomorrows United Na/ions. 1990. 2. Yet before signing the Charter the Outeh Representative, Van Kleffens. has slrongly opposed to the right of velo. If it neve rtheless had 10 be conferred. smalt countries should also have a right of veto. according 10 Van KlefTens. ft did not help. 3. Groups of countrics could be: the Unilcd States. Lalin America, the EC including the Seandinavian eountries, CentnJl Europe, the CIS-tenitory. Northem Afriea and Ihe Middie East. Afriea south of Ihe Sahara, China, Japan incJuding Northem and Soulhem Korea.the ASEAN- and the ex domi nions. Perhaps !he member slales eorne to a bener di vision Ihrough mUlual delibemtion. 4. In his lhesis. luridical aspects ofparticipation with contin· Kents in UN.pellce-keepingforces (,he Netherlands and UNI· FIL; Robert e.D. Siekmann s!ales that in 1972 Ihe Ne therlands sent a memorandum to the then sceretary·gcneraJ of the UNo The last paragnlph goes: ·In order 10 prepare adequately for futore peaee-keeping operations members of Ihe UN eould negotiate agreeme nts in accordance with anicJe 43 of the Chaner. 1be Nctherlands is prepared 10 ncgotiatc such an agreement with respect to ils stand-by forces ... ' (p. 1(4). Why not taken a same initiative again? 5. Here the World Bank (which gives its technica] assistancc on a large seale on basis of loans) is lef! out of considcrntion. This ean be a problem for the poorest eountries.

This artic/e has been copied, wirh the permission 10 the editors, from tlle Septemberedirion of rhe International Spectator; (monthly) magazine for international politics from the Dwch Inslilwe for Inlernalional Alfai,-s, C/ingendael in The Hague.

Final remarks 1995, when the UN has its tïfthi est anniversary, would be a good moment to make up the mind to a renewed UN, which is adapted to the political realities of the near future and which is strong enouhg 10 handle the old and new problems qui ck-wittedl y. Thereby lwo changes are of substantial importance: the revision of the composition of the Securily Council and the spread of competences of the secretary-general. If one wants 10 strengthen the legiti-

Two times drs. G. Ringnalda has been a member of Ihe section of Ihe Permanent Represell1arion of the Netherland\ ar the Uni red Nations in New York. He ended his cm·eer at rhe Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs as Director Illlernational Organizations. In 1989//990 he has been the consultam ofthe UNo His task was bringing out an evaluation-report aboUf tlle efficiency of tlle assistance ofthe complele UN-syslem. Th/o kurd refugees in northern Iraq . (Photo H. KeeI'is)

Jasoll Magazille nr. 6, december 1992

Assignment

NATO's fale in

peacekeeping During the Cold War the Western Allies had a clear objective: to deter and, if necessary, defend against attack. However, the definition of what are our vital interests has today become more complicated. In the case of conflicts taking place beyond our borders and posing no direct threat to our survival , it is more difficult to define clear and realistic political objectives and the most effective means to achieve them. by Dr. Jamie Shea

There cao he

doubt about th ai

the international community has 50 far not been able to fiod a succesful balance betwee n ends and means in their handling of Yugoslav and ather crises. Shou ld we therefore conclude that our objecli ve of a ncw international order is unreali stic? Should we abandon oureffofts 10 build a ncw security architee lure in Europe? Have a ll the international organisation s failed? Has NATO become irre levant? Is there any change for us 10 be able to pre vent and manage crises succesfu 11 y? These are valid question s to which we must respond . There is 0 0 predetennined pattem of hi story whereby certain events or geopolitical situations are destined 10 repeat themselves every so often. Only those who do not leam from history are condemned to repeat it. We know thaI many earlier aggressors could have been halted by a timely di splay of determination by the international comrnunity. The breakdown of comrnunism, the end of the Cold War and East-West confrontation has offered our generation opportunities unique in Europe's hi story. We simply cannot afford to mi ss them. Of course, there are also new ri sks and dangers. But in my opinion the opportunities outweigh the ri sks. Compared with the beg inning of ou r century, today 's conditions are undoubtedly better, our capabi lities to deal with the diffucu lties are much more developed and - above all- we have institution s and in struments in place, which did not ex ist at the beginning of the century. Thi s is espec ially true for the two most succesful and dy nam ic model s of

international coopcration - NATO and EC. ft is also true for a reinvigorated United Nations and a reinforced CSCE. So the building blocks for a new and lasti ng European order of peace and sec urity are the re. ft is our hi storie task to link them togethe r. The concept of inte rlocking institution s, whieh Nato developed, is founded on Ihi s basic idea. I do not see any altemative to it, since no single power - not even the Uni led States - nor any single organi sation, can deal with the challenges alone. However essential th is framework of inte rl ocking institution s seems in theory, critic s have nonetheless questi oned il s ability to function in pract ice, They fear that thi s conce pt focuses too much on prerogative s of individual institutions: produci ng at best duplication as each insitution hankers for its slice of act ion or, at worst, paral ys is as each institution tries to ensure its precedence over the others. A future European securit y system is not, however, something thai wil! just happen - not without a certai n process of trial and e rror as we search for the best formuia. Our concept of interlocking in stitulion s has in this respect only just begun to take shape. It wi Jl lake time for us 10 make it func ti on properly. Setbacks are unaviodable. NATO, the most succesful All iance in hi story, was not created ovemight or without some hard negotiation either. I do not draw the conclu sion that we shou ld abandon our effort s but rather that we have to redouble them. In particular, we mu st re inforce the operational link s and practical interp lay among these

institutions. Thcy must bccome accustomed to working together and more aware of the speci fi c contribution 10 the common endeavou r that each institution can and must make. So NATO will have to play its part in overcoming the obstacles thaI have hampered the smooth interact ion of these institution s. First. the A ll iance will have 10 establish closer link s to the UNo The UN is overburdened and underfunded. lt s responsibli li es in the Third World are increasing even more than in Europe. So it will look increasing ly to regional structures a nd will di scourage the m for giving up too early or too easil y. Mr Boutros G hali in hi s â&#x20AC;˘Agenda for Peace' and letter to the CSCE, has welcomed the ro le of regiona l organ isation s in uphoJding UN decisions. At the same time, the habit of cooperation and look ing 10 each other for gu idence has yet 10 he establ ished at the working level. Second, we mu st conti nue 10 support the CSCE. Over the past three years NATO has laken a number of initiatives to give the CS CE not on ly add itional respons iblities bul also new institutiona l means 10 imple ment the m. We have supponed CSCE designating itse lf as a regional organisat ion under Chapter VIII of the UN Charter. We have assisted its observer mi ssion 10 Nagomo-Karabakh. Most important of all we have now offered our A ll iance's resources and expertise in suppon of CSCE peacekeeping operations. So as the CSCE increases it s authority in Ihe field of conflict prevention and the peaceful sett lement of di sputes, its interaction with NATO is bound to grow.

Jasoll Magazille nr. 6, december 1992

NATO a/sa monilor s in Ihe Adriolic Seo . (PhoIo AVD , KM)

Third, wc are establi shing a ncw rela-

tionship with the Western European Union. There will be situation s in whic h the United States prefers Europe 10 take the lead. The Yugoslav crises has been a case point. 50 the re is a clcar need for an effective WE U,

which acts bolh as a European securily and defence identity and as NATO's European pillar. A strong WEU obviously mean s a

WEU that is cJosely assoeiated with NATO. Ta operale meaningfull y, it would need 10 be

able to use NATO's assets or NATO's assigncd forces in cases where NATO does not choose 10 act. We have offered Dur assets 10 the WEU and such double-assignment or double-hatting does nol pose any problem sa

long as the priority for NATO is cJearl y rnaintained . A grealer French participation in

NATO 's politico-military decision making Slructures cDuld facilitatc such solutions. What, nonelheless. we must avoid, is a situation in which NATO and the WEU are compellcd always 10 aCI together, as if the one fears losing out to the other. Notions of rivalry cannot fail but undermine both organisations and also severely hamper the Western military operations in crises situations. This is espccially true of ground and air operati ons in areas oftension and contlict where a clear command structure is absolutel y essentiaL So the future will belong to a divi 22

Jasoll Magazille nr. 6. december 1992

sion of labour bascd on close consultation. Every inslilulion in Europe is evolving rapidly. We are learnin g that to be succesful we have to work Ihrough all of these instituIions simultaneously. We have 10 bring their combined assets to bear on any given problem and not be tied by narrow and largeIy outmoded perceplions of roles and responsibilities inherited from the time of the Cold War. At the same lime, it is perfect! y obvious that our interesIs and indeed securily responsibilities do not stop at our borders. Thus, the Alliancc's Foreign Ministers have decided that NATO. with ils proven crises manage ment ex perience and fucti oning military slructure, can contribule 10 peacekeeping missions. Jndeed. in Ihe connicl in Bosnia. NATO is supponing. with ils ships in Ihe Adriatic. the UN in the surveillance of the embargo set againsl Serbia and Montenegro. We have affe red our support to the United Nations and CSCE. both for protecting the humanitarian relief effon s and for the monitoring of heavy weapons. Our mililary authori ties have drawn up a comprehensive plan for the monitoring of Bosnian airspace and we would be prepared to place some of our unique command and contro! assets at the disposal of the United Nations. We are also strongly supporting the effort s of the London

Conference 10 find a political solution. Member nations mede il clear that they only want to act under as pecific mandate from the UN or CSCE. So it is now up to the UN and CSCE to make use of our offers. Looking ahead the Alliance will also be prepared on a case-by-case basis and in accordance with its own procedures, la support peacekeeping operalions under Ihe responsiblity of the CSCE. The CSCE Summil in Helsinki in July endorsed th is Alliance iniliative and role. Now wc are developing a concept for carrying it out. The specific requirements of peacekeeping missions will have 10 be a factor in our force planning, crises management procedures, exercises and contingency planning. Indeed it would be foolhardy to leave the Alliance on the sidelines and ils unique assets under-utilized. All the more so when we are considering major military operations requiring the full range of capabilities. such as larger-scale troop deployments, transport, supplies, communications and close air support . The Alliance as a who Ie could undenake a peacekecping operation; we could make available common Allied asselS or we could support the participation of individual AlJies. The UN or the CSCE would retain overall authority. Looking towards the longer-tenn, I personall y believe thai il makes little sense 10

restri ct NATO's role to peacekeeping in Ihe classic meaning of Ihe tenll , i.e. when parties 10 a confict are exhau sted and ready lO make peace of observe ceaselires. Before we reach thi s stage, the international communily may weil have to intervene 10 create the condili ons for peace. NATO 's military structure, tran satlantic dimension and consultati ve mechani sms will, in my opinion, become essential to Ihis type of operation either under a UN or CSCE mandate and overall UN or CSCE aUlhority, or even a combination of the two. So my conclu sion is dear. Whal we have to aim for is a coherent and, above all, pragmatic approach by the system of interlocking institutions Ihal enables us, in any given situ ation, to choose which package of measures and inslitulions is best suited for our needs. Thi s means that in certain circumstances one particular institution will play the leading role while, in others, another will do so; in still others, joint leadership on the part of two or more institutions may be necessary or desirabie. What we mu st do is keep all our options open and reali se that each situation will be different and require a different res ponse.

The American poel Robert Frost once said that ' freedom consists in being bold'. A system of inlerl ock ing institulions, even if it can be perfecled, will not he a panacea thai moves automatica lly to prevenl and manage crises. It wil! only work if there is detennination, political will and leadership from the leadi ng members ofthe international community. Whal we must not do is allow ri sks 10 become an exc use for inaction , as ifthe choice in dealing with reg ional conflicts were bel ween tOl al abstention or tolal in volvement. For thi s is precisely the false dil emma that aggressors wi ll always seek 10 ex ploit once they perceive that the international communil y is nol prepared 10 use force. So we have 10 develop a flex ible and carefully tailored in ventory of limited polit ico-mi lilary options which escapes the 'all-or-nmhin g' dilemma prevailing nowadays. Attempts 10 deter or repel aggression through diplomatic and economie measures, may in certain cases require the uhimate sanction of enforcement

communi sm wou ld collapse withoul convul sions. We realise loday th at we still have 10 secure and proleet the peace even after the Cold War is over. We recogni se 100 that we can on ly do this by preserving a slfong and cohesive Allanlic Alliance and by maintaining the dynamic process of European political inlegralion. Only astrong and vigorou s Iransallantic axis can provide Ihe necessary stability to enable change 10 take place

peacefull y. â&#x20AC;˘ Dr. Jantie Shea works at the Policy Planning Section Political Directorate of NATO in Brussels. In this artic/e he expresses his perSOIW/ opinion on/y.

under ArticJe 42 of Ihe UN Charler if we want them 10 he succesful. Yugos lavia, Nagoro- Karabakh, Georgia and Moldova have heen a soheri ng experi ence for those who had hoped th ai

Trucksfar EC-missioll in Yugoslavia. (P/wto N . K eeI'is)

Ja soll Magazille nr. 6. december 1992

FIJNE MEID

"Tuurlijk, waarom niet, ze ziet er nu toch

goed gezond uit?" Nou, ze zou bijvoorbeeld vervuild water kunnen drinken. En dat kan ernstige gevolgen hebben . Duizenden kinderen hebben het al door de vele bacteriĂŤn in het schaarse water moeten ontgelden. Ze kregen diarree en stierven als gevolg van uitdroging . Geld voor veilige waterbronnen is er niet. En het ontbreekt de plaatselijke bevolking aan de kennis om het vervuilde water te zuiveren .

UNICEF bouwt waterputten en filtreerinstallaties. Daarnaast leggen we rioleringssystemen, wasplaatsen en latrines aan.

Afvalwater en drinkwater blijven zo strikt gescheiden . En we geven voorlichting aan moeders, hoe zij hun kinderen hygiĂŤnisch kunnen verzorgen . Door deze programma's

kunnen duizenden kinderen water drinken zonder gevaar voor eigen leven. Zodat we kunnen spreken van verbeterde levens-

GOEDE KANS DAT ZE GEZOND OPGROEIT

kansen in de honderdachtentwintig gebieden waar UNICEF werkt. En dat willen we graag zo houden . Steun UNICEF. Bel 070 - 3339300.

UNICEF geeft ze toekomst. GIRO 121 DEN HAAG

Publication of this magazine was made possible by the contributions of:

Aegon

Internationale-Nederlanden Group

NATO Information Service

AT&T

Phjlips

Arnev

Delta Lloyd

Royal DutchjShell

AKZO

Jason Magazin e nr. 6, december 1992

What is Jason? The Jason Foundation for International Affairs was founded in 1975 by a group of young people to meel Ihe demand of Dutch youth for unbiased, balanced information on international affairs. Jason is not connected to any political party and has no ideological foundation. Jason strives to achieve its aim in two ways . Firstly, by publi shing thi s bimonthly magazine. Secondly, by organizing activities, ranging from lectures and debates to role games and study tours. Recent topics of the Jason Magazine include "Europe caught by Nationalism" ( 1992/2), "One world , one problem" ( 1992/3), "The shortage of The Netherlands" ( 1992/4) and " Dynamic Easl-Asia". Every year is one Jason Magazine published in English. For more Information , write to the following address or please contact the followin g Jason Informalion Officers:

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Index Jason Magazine 1992 1992/1. Coming in From the Cold ...

1992/4. The Short.ge ofThe Net herlands

Prof Mr. M. e. Brand s (inte rview)

Thc European game

Karst Bouman

Jason O n The Spot

T hc strategie im portance o f the Lathe

Dr. W.l .Sengers (I nterview)

Legali se drugs !

Edi tor o f Jason Magazine

Nato transfomlcd: See Rome and d ie?

Erwin Mull er

T hc Nethe rlands: Thc white crow

S. Mil ia e n A.Nu yt

Di plomatie Negotiations

Gee rt Wi smans

Who's afraid of.. .Germany?

Fisse ha-Tsion Menghi stu

Misinformation about Elhiopia

M.l . Jon ker

United Nati ons:.Chan ging of the guard .

Pe te r Lingg

Worldscenari os Made in Holland

Herman de Lange

Will the deterrence disappear? Pari T wo

Nc therlands

Prof. Doornbos and De Gaay Fon man Ma rtij n Hop

About thc rein ve ntion ofThe

Africa: Thc reb irth of a sovereign . continent "

Austrian ncul ralily and Europeah sec urit y cooperali oll 1992/5. Dynamie East-Asi.

Patricio Si lva

Dcmocrati zation. po litica l stability and securi ty in Latin Amc ri ca

Ingri d d' Hooghe Stcfan Land sbcrger

1992/2. Europe C.ught By Nation.lism Koen Koc h

Rev iving nationa li sl11 in Easte m Europe

Theo va n der Voort

Re li gion and nationali sm in Eastc m Europe

Amout Nuyt

Profil e: Umbcrto Boss i

Leende r! Jan Ba l

Gennan minoriti es in East.e m Eu rope

Jan Jaa p Donse laar

Dil ettanti sJll or threat?

Prof.mr. P.H. Kooijmans

The T imor-case

Fe mando Sousa

Thi nking about T imor

1992/3. One World ,One Problem? Frans Bevort

Deve lopme nl coope rali on Japanesc Sty le

Chud i Ukpabi

De moc racy, e thn itici ty and apart heid in c hangi ng Afr ica

Jan Mic hiel Otto

Profile: Preside nt Anwar Sadat

Anl oni o Pe rez Man zan o

Bridging the ric h North and poor South . The pri vileged Mexico

Mami x Lambert s

Disannament. deve lopme nt -a id and developme nt in The Third World:

A hope f ui repĂŞc hage Arthur va n Buitene n

Powe r and impotence o f NGO' s in the UNCED-process

Peter Lingg

UNCED: A gree n crowbar for economical growth

He rman de Lange

Will the de te rrc nce di sappear?

Chin a on the cve of the revoluti on o r lhe fourteenlh party-congres Ch ina as a meaning rul powe r in the Paci fi c

Ruud Jan ssens

American occ upations in East-Asia

Paul ' t Hart

A le xander George (ed .) A voiding War

S il vio Mili a

Cambod ia, the land with the punishme nl of Sissyphus

Pe te r Lingg

Agenda 21 ? Even with beating offi c ia ls we won', make it