ARUNDHATI GHOSE
is today perceived, even by commentators at home, to be against most multilateral arms controls, particularly in the nuclear field.
T
To understand India’s changing approaches, it is necessary to revisit some of the early declarations by Jawaharlal Nehru, who at that time was not only the Prime Minister but also, possibly, the only authoritative voice of India that was heard abroad. Speaking at the Conference of Scientists on Development of Atomic Energy for Peaceful Purposes in 1954, Nehru recognised that “a dominating factor in the modern world is the prospect of these terrible weapons suddenly coming into use before which our normal weapons are completely useless.” Clearly the implication of this was to either try or push for the elimination of these “terrible weapons” or to develop them to meet any future security challenges. It should also be remembered that while India faced many challenges in those early years, not the least the integrity and economic survival, the country was also in the process of building its capacity in the field of nuclear energy, which was then seen as a possible panacea to India’s economic woes. These circumstances and the in-built moral repugnance to a weapon of mass destruction appears to have tilted the balance towards the first course of action-to demand actions which would lead to the elimination of weapons that India felt might pose a challenge, in the future, to her security. Somewhere along the way, the moral argument overwhelmed the original security imperative, at least in articulation, except in rare cases as will be seen later, and nuclear disarmament became the touchstone of India’s positions on issues of control of the spread of nuclear weapons and related technologies.
GET YOUR COPY TO READ IN COMPLETE
47 SP's MILITARY YEARBOOK | 2009-2010 | 39th Year of Issue
WEAPONS EQUIPMENT VEHICLES CONCEPTS & PERSPECTIVES INDIAN DEFENCE
India’s Changing Approaches
he year 2010 will see a resurgence of the debates on non-proliferation and the elimination of nuclear weapons at the international level. In view of the review conference on the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) being held in New York from May 3 to May 28. At the domestic level, India will be faced with a complex variety of questions, some pertaining to the impact of these activities on her own security interests, and others of a more political nature. It is essential that these issues are examined as objectively as possible and a serious non-ideological debate takes place nationally, particularly on the multilateral nuclear treaties that India has so far tended to view with wariness and suspicion. Contrary to what is commonly believed, India has not always been against multilateral treaties controlling the spread of weapons technology and materials. In fact, it was India, after the first Chinese nuclear weapon test in October 1964, who took the issue of non-proliferation (and ‘nuclear blackmail’) to the United Nations General Assembly in early 1965, with the help of the Soviet Union. A year earlier, soon after the Partial Test Ban Treaty was signed and opened for participation to countries other than the depositories, the US, UK and the Soviet Union, India was amongst the first to sign on to this treaty that banned nuclear explosions in the atmosphere in 1963. In 1972, India signed the Biological and Toxic Weapons Treaty and as late as 1995, signed the Chemical Weapons Convention. Despite these early moves, India
ASIAN WHO’S WHO
Abbreviations & Index toward rear of yearbook
TECHNOLOGY
India has travelled far from the time when she entered the NPT negotiations. The economic and military strengths are vastly different now. India’s approach to and positions on multilateral nuclear treaties should reflect the changed circumstances.
REGIONAL BALANCE
www.wikipedia.org; www.pib.nic.in; SP Guide Publications
India’s Changing Approaches to Nuclear Ties
BUSINESS
11 Nuclear Ties Multilateral
CONTENTS
www. s p s m i l i t a r y y e a r b o o k . c o m