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Eric Cox
groups because the lack of opposition makes policy success for automakers the most likely. III – Environmental group dominance: The third state is the opposite of the previous one. Environmental groups increase inside and outside lobbying strategies to increase fuel mileage standards while automakers do not respond with an opposite pressure. An example of this situation is when President Obama approved new Corporate Average Fuel Economy (CAFE) standards in 2010. Environmental groups worked hard for this change and automakers were generally accepting of this change (US Department of Transportation, 2010). This is the best state for environmental groups because they face few obstacles on the way towards achieving their policy goals. However, it is the worst state for auto corporations because environmental groups would be passing laws potentially restricting auto companies’ profitability and automakers would not be defending themselves. IV – Compliance: The final state is that in which both sides are not actively influencing air pollution policy in government. This is essentially the “holding pattern” that exists when there are no significant air pollution policy matters on the policy agenda. This is the best state for auto companies because when fuel mileage policy changes, it tends to change in favor of being more restrictive. This is better for them than state II because they are not diverting resources from producing cars to lobbying for policy repeal with an uncertain fate. This state is the next-worst for environmental groups because they like to be able to demonstrate progress on the issues the members care about. This state is better than state II because there is less of a risk that policy will change in an unfavorable way to environmental groups. The solution that maximizes the benefit for both sides is state IV in which both sides use a more passive influence strategy, yet the traditional game theory understanding says that this is not the outcome of this particular game. One reason is that the environmental groups have a dominant strategy in their active pursuit of policy goals, where they maximize their benefit regardless of the strategic choice of the other player (Brams 1994, 21). No matter which strategy the auto corporations choose, the active strategy for the environmental groups will always yield a preferable situation. If the auto companies choose the active strategy, environmental groups will follow, and if auto companies choose to be passive, then environmental groups will still be active because this gives them the best chance to achieve their goals due to less opposition. From a practical standpoint, the dominance of the active strategy is derived from the fact that environmental groups have committed members who strive for some policy change through their actions. This tendency to favor the active strategy when the resources exist is important when considering how auto companies will anticipate the moves of environmental groups.