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Syria’s agony is far from finished an Alawite state, Jabal Druze, the Sanjak of Alexandretta and the State of Greater Lebanon. The French encouraged ethnic and religious favouritism to counteract the numerical predominance of Arab Syrians. For example, the Christian Maronite community in what had been Mount Lebanon were one of the few groups to positively welcome French rule and came to oversee a far larger territory in the new Greater Lebanon. However, this larger state now included a substantial non-Christian minority. Decades later, as demographic changes whittled them down into a minority, the Maronites' entrenched privileges became one of the causes of the 1970s Lebanese civil war. Aside from mainstream Sunni and Shia schools of Islam, the French found themselves ruling over communities of some of the more unorthodox offshoots from Shia Islam. The Alawites, Druze and Ismaili schools were regarded as unbelievers by strict Sunnis and as misguided heretics by mainstream Shi'ites. Alawites and Druze minorities were given their own autonomous areas and the French heavily recruited them into the colonial military forces. Despite this attempt to play ethnic groups against each other, there were several revolts against French rule. There was an Alawite uprising from 1919-1921 although the Alawites were less enthusiastic in their support for the largely Sunni-Christian-Druze Great
Syria Revolt of 1925-27 against French rule. This was brutally suppressed by the colonial authorities leaving more than 6,000 dead and creating at least 100,000 homeless refugees. As French rule weakened during the 1930s, the colonial authorities centralised the Syrian territories but the territory of Alexandretta was leased to and eventually incorporated into Turkey despite its substantial Arab and Alawite population. Today it is the Turkish province of Hatay but Syrian maps continue to show the territory as disputed. Syria and Lebanon became separate states in 1943, yet there was no Syrian embassy in Beirut until 2008, signalling a continuing belief, in Damascus at least, that the relationship between the two countries was not that of separate states. This complex colonial background is an essential factor in understanding today's crisis. Ethnic and sectarian tensions are not natural eternal features of the country but have been manipulated and accentuated by foreign rule and occupation. The lessons for today are obvious.
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In his defiant speech in Damascus Syrian president Bashar al-Assad stressed his determination to see off the internal and external attacks on his regime. Assad’s speech was dismissed by Western politicians and media as yet another example of his unwillingness to engage in talks. This was despite offers of a ceasefire, a new constitution and political reform if outside forces stopped arming and funding the rebel groups and opposition forces committed themselves to a peaceful and Syrianbased dialogue. Now that US President Barack Obama has officially recognised the rebranded National Coalition of Syrian Revolutionary and Opposition Forces and Tory PM David Cameron has given the green light for British military preparations the Syrian conflict is likely to escalate further. But this flies in the face of the military failure of the various rebel militias. Even with arms shipments from wealthy Gulf regimes, training support from various foreign states and thousands of foreign jihadi fighters the insurgents have not managed to break the government. Substantially increased foreign firepower will be needed to do that. Despite the sectarian intentions of many of the rebel militias and their documented participation in ethnic atrocities, the Nato-Gulf alliance remains intent on toppling Assad at all costs.
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