The Joint Multinational Training Command Training Journal 2
A publication of the Joint Multinational Training Command, Grafenwoehr, Germany, 2010.
www.hqjmtc.army.mil winter / spring 2010 7TH U.S. ARMY JOINT MULTINATIONAL TRAINING COMMAND T R A I N I N G J O UR N A L A F G H A N I S T A N AFGHANISTAN: THE WAY AHEAD BY GEN. STANLEY A. McCHRYSTAL FOCUSING ON THE FIGHT: UNDERSTANDING THE ARMY'S TRAINING NEEDS BY BRIG. GEN. STEVEN L. SALAZAR DEFEATING IED’S TIO N NA A L TRAI NI N G AN D JOIN MM TM I LT CO U KNOWING YOUR ENEMY H M Y 7T UN ITED STATES AR 7th UNITED STATES ARMY JOINT MULTINATIONAL TRAINING COMMAND TRAINING JOURNAL AFGHANISTAN afghanistan - isaf rc and prt locations Regional Command Capital (RCC) Lead Nation: Italy (rotates: FRA, TUR) Stage 1 Regional Command North Lead Nation: Germany Stage 2 Regional Command West Lead Nation: Italy Stage 3 Regional Command South Lead Nation: Canada (rotates: GBR, NLD) Stage 4 Regional Command East Lead Nation: United States key to the the isaf mission: stability Photo: Pfc. Andrya Hill, 25th ID PAO WINTER / SPRING 2010 Afghanistan fact sheet Geography Location: Southern Asia, north and west of Pakistan, east of Iran Geographic coordinates: 33 00 N, 65 00 E Border countries China, Iran, Pakistan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan Land use Arable land: 12.13%; permanent crops: 0.22%; other: 87.65% Environment - current issues: Limited natural fresh water resources; soil degradation; overgrazing; deforestation; desertification; air and water pollution People of Afghanistan Population: 29,928,987 (July 2009 est.) Age structure: 0-14 years: 44.7% 15-64 years: 52.9% 65 years and over: 2.4% Life expectancy at birth: 42.9 years Nationality: noun: Afghan(s), (not Afghani) Ethnic groups Pashtun 42%, Tajik 27%, Hazara 9%, Uzbek 9%, Aimak 4%, Turkmen 3%, other 6% Religions Sunni Muslim 80%, Shi'a Muslim 19%, other 1% Languages Afghan Persian or Dari (official) 50%, Pashtu (official) 35%, Turkic languages 11%, 30 minor languages with much bilingualism Literacy Age 15 + can read and write of total population: 36% Government Country name: Islamic Republic of Afghanistan Capital: Kabul Administrative divisions: 34 provinces Constitution: new constitution drafted 14 December 2003 - 4 January 2004; signed 16 January 2004 Note: The boundries represented in this map do not necessarily indicate official recognition of the political status of the territories concerned. 1 7th UNITED STATES ARMY JOINT MULTINATIONAL TRAINING COMMAND TRAINING JOURNAL WINTER / SPRING 2010 THE JOINT MULTINATIONAL TRAINING COMMAND TRAINING JOURNAL is an unofﬁcial publication of the 7th United States Army Joint Multinational Training Command. Circulation is 5,000 copies. Editorial views and opinions are not necessarily those of the Department of the Army. Photo: Staff Sgt. Richard Roman Correspondence may be sent to: HQ 7th Army JMTC Attention: Public Affairs Ofﬁce, Building 123, Room 101 APO AE 09114 or via Bundespost: HQ 7th Army JMTC Attention: Public Affairs Office Lager Grafenwoehr, Geb. 123 92655 Grafenwoehr Photo: Staff Sgt. Adam Mancini, HHC JMRC Telephone: DSN 475-7776 or commercial 09641-83-7776 email: firstname.lastname@example.org JMTC COMMAND Commanding General U.S. Army, Europe Gen. Carter F. Ham Commanding General 7th U.S. Army JMTC Brig. Gen. Steven L. Salazar JMTC PUBLI C A F F A I R S Photo: Spc. Tia Sokimson Public Affairs Ofﬁcer 7th U.S. Army JMTC Maj. Jennifer R. Johnson Deputy Public Affairs Officer 7th U.S. Army JMTC Denver Makle JMTC Public Affairs Specialists Christian Marquardt Michael Beaton JMTC Public Affairs Staff Sgt Maj. Rodney Williams Staff Sgt. Lyttleton Yates 2 Cover photo by Photo: Staff Sgt. Adam Mancini, HHC JMRC This page: U.S. Air Force photo by Tech. Sgt. Efren Lopez VISIT JMTC ONLINE AT WWW.HQJMTC.ARMY. MIL joint multinational training command J OUR NA L TABLE OF CONTENTS 4 FOCUSING ON THE FIGHT: UNDERSTANDING THE ARMY'S TRAINING NEEDS Brig. Gen. Steven L. Salazar, JMTC 6 ISTC: SPECIAL TRAINING FOR SPECIAL FORCES Denver Makle, JMTC 7 AFGHANISTAN: ONE BOOK AT A TIME. Col. John M. Spiszer, JMRC 11 - 15 PROTECTING THE PEOPLE IS THE MISSION Gen. Stanley A. McChrystal, ISAF 16 - 17 INTEGRATED TRAINING DEFEATS IMPROVISED EXPLOSIVE DEVICES Capt. Ronald J. Gevry, JMTC 18 - 19 BATTLE STAFF TRAINING PREPARES SOLDIERS FOR AFGHANISTAN Sgt. Major Lance T. Dyckman, CATC 20 - 21 ENSURING A LEGACY: BATTALION-LEVEL REAR-DETACHMENT OPERATIONS Capt. Joshua D. Buchanan, 172nd Infantry Brigade 22 - 23 BUILDING THE AFGHANISTAN MISSION NETWORK, ONE TRAINING EVENT AT A TIME Maj. Wallace N. Smith, 69th Signal Command ONE TEAM, ONE SYSTEM: INTEGRATING CENTRIX FOR SUPPORT TO ISAF Capt. Robert Hoover, 2SCR 24 - 25 AFGHANISTAN METRICS: ASSESSING TRAINING EFFECTIVENESS Denver Makle, JMTC 26 JMSC: FEEDING REALITY INTO SIMULATIONS Brad Joy, JMSC 27 FLEXIBLE STRUCTURE LEVERAGES POWER OF THE 18TH CSSB Maj. Jerome K. Barnard, 18th CSSB 29 PRE-DEPLOYMENT AFGHANISTAN READING LIST 3 7th UNITED STATES ARMY JOINT MULTINATIONAL TRAINING COMMAND JMTC COMMANDER’S TRAINING JOURNAL WINTER / SPRING 2010 COLUMN Focusing on the fight: understanding the Army’s training needs By Brig. Gen. Steven L. Salazar soldiers have to believe in the value of the training, which means the training must be realistic. T his past December at West Point, our Commander in Chief announced the Afghanistan surge of 30,000 additional U.S. troops to support General. Stanley A. McChrystal's, commander of the International Security Assistance Force (COMISAF’s), Counter-Insurgency (COIN) strategy. Previously, U. S. Army Europe (USAREUR) and the Joint Multinational Training Command (JMTC) trained and deployed forces to support the Iraq surge. In the past few months, JMTC has shifted its training focus toward supporting the COMISAF, both for U.S. forces, and our NATO allies and Troop Contributing Nations (TCN). This edition of your Training Journal focuses on preparing for operations in the Afghanistan operational environment. There is no better place to prepare for operations in Afghanistan than here in Europe. We train with 37 of the 45 ISAF TCN. Along with combat troops, our partners provide Operational Mentoring Liaison Teams for the development of the Afghan National Army troops, Provincial Reconstruction Teams, U.S. Special Operations Forces detachments, Close Air Support and more. We train U.S. and multinational forces at Grafenwoehr Training Area; our Joint Multinational Simulations Center (JMSC), the only Joint National Training Capability certified battle command training venue in the U.S. Army, at the Joint Multinational Readiness Center (JMRC) in Hohenfels, Germany, and during the many exercises the JMTC supports for USAREUR and the U.S. European Command. Training, like operations, begins with understanding. Your Afghanistan reading list (see the JMRC Commander’s reading list on page 6), Center for Army Lessons Learned publications, seminars like the Leader Development Education Seminar Program (see page 19), and hopefully this publication, the Training Journal, will help form your understanding of the operational environment. In this edition, you will find reference material, training tips, operational lessons and information on the training resources available to commanders in USAREUR. Addressing staff at the NATO Training Conference by videoteleconference, Gen. McChrystal spent 75 percent of the time available illustrating the importance of “understanding.” He suggested we start by ensuring we understand our COIN doctrine and its historical application. For example, in COIN operations, the Afghan people are “key” to the fight. In the Afghanistan area of operations, tribes and informal power brokers are important, along with the government of Afghanistan and its local representatives, the Pakistani Military, the Afghan National Security Forces, NATO, and the Taliban. He made the point of stating the Taliban last, noting that in most cases they are the least important and the simplest to understand and affect. International Joint Command (IJC) is executing its campaign plan by district, using an evolved “clear, build, hold,” Concept of Operations (CONOP). The IJC CONOP starts with “understand,” includes “shape,” then “clear, build, hold,” and eventually, “transition”. Once you understand the requirements and consideration of each phase, you will understand that preparing to build, and ultimately to transition are more complex activities, requiring more time and resources. So, how do we train, and prepare for operations in such a complex environment? Training is leading. Leading in a complex, challenging environment requires the use of available tools, starting with our Battle Command doctrine: Understand, Visualize, Describe, Direct, our new training and leader development strategy identifies outcomes-based training as an imperative. 4 V V II S S II T T J JM MT TC C O ON NL L II N NE E A AT T W WW WW W..H HQ QJ JM MT TC C..A AR RM MY Y.. M MIIL L JMTC COMMAND SERGEANT MAJOR’S COLUMN Lead and Assess. Understanding includes the culture, history, and people as described above. It also includes the resources available such as lessons-learned along the training path of Army Force Generation, the plan for deploying troops. I encourage you to use our emerging design doctrine to form your training vision: • Frame the problem: how do you get this formation ready? • Visualize the process: how will you get your troops from here to there — trained and ready. • Develop the tools: describe your desired end state • Assess your progress Our new Training and Leader Development Strategy identifies outcomes-based training as an imperative. At the JMRC, we use this technique every day. It’s about capturing the cause and effect. Soldiers have to believe in the value of the training, which means the training must be realistic. Soldiers should “believe” they are in the operational environment, and understand the importance of the training tasks. Observer controllers (OCs) “capture,” and “document” what happens during training, by video or other instrumented systems. After analyzing the actions, reactions, effects and consequences, the OCs can use the documented results of a leaders’ decision-making process, and the Soldiers’ actions during the training and reactions based on feedback to benefit the entire training audience. These detailed lessons-learned contribute to the Army‘s OC Green Book, and creates an exchange that fortifies the knowledge and understanding of the greater Army’s corporate knowledge. We can all benefit from multiple perspectives — the “what” happened.” With a full understanding of the “what happened” most can readily determine for themselves, the “why” and most importantly, “how to improve.” We are fortunate to have the latest Army training devices and simulations available. I encourage you to seek out new and improved training offered by our professional cadre and staff. The training is as realistic as it comes. The Virtual Battlespace 2 is a first-person simulation that allows Soldiers to virtually conduct mounted and dismounted missions on geo-specific or geo-typical terrain. The Combined Arms Training Center in Vilseck, Germany, offers a new Counter-IED Trainer Course, which incorporates training feed-back, current operations and new technologies. The ranges at GTA, and the training devices, simulations and gaming capabilities at the Directorate of Simulations and Training Support, which incorporates Training Support Activity Europe and the JMSC, all support the commanders’ training program that ultimately leads to a Mission Rehearsal Exercise at the JMRC. The JMTC Team is ready to support your training requirements and assist your efforts to become Ready Thru Training! STEVEN L. SALAZAR Army Training Network Brigadier General, U.S. Army Commanding enhancing the overall training experience By Command Sgt. Maj. Darieus A. ZaGara The Joint Multinational Training Command (JMTC) has turned its attention toward supporting the ISAF theater of operation. Our leaders, planners, controllers, and trainers at every level have taken on this challenge with total abandon, tapping every resource available to enhance their technical and tactical knowledge, while also providing some of the most relevant and realistic training opportunities for U.S. and multinational Soldiers and units. The training offered at the JMTC is among the very best available, anywhere in the Army. In U.S. Army Europe, we share a unique relationship with our European partners. This relationship enhances the overall-training experience and its effectiveness. Our junior Soldiers are exposed to cultural differences, and the unique challenges associated with working with our international partners during Warrior Leader Course; our mid-grade Noncommissioned Officers and Officers share the multinational experience equally through more than 60-courses provided at our Combined Arms Training Center, and our units train routinely with coalition forces at our live-boots-in -the-mud maneuvers and live-fire training area at the Joint Multinational Readiness Center in Hohenfels. While supporting NATO in Afghanistan, the JMTC is in a unique position to work jointly with our coalition forces to further enhance all of our training rotations. Our European partners provide us with a myriad of forces from all services, which accounts for a very robust and realistic training experience for every Soldier going into theater. ISAF is our focus; training is our mission, and our Soldiers stand trained and ready to support the needs of our Army, anytime, anywhere. Ready Thru Training! DARIEUS A. ZAGARA Command Sergeant Major, USA JMTC CSM 3 5 7th UNITED STATES ARMY JOINT MULTINATIONAL TRAINING COMMAND TRAINING JOURNAL WINTER / SPRING 2010 JMTC G3 WEB WATCH istc: special training for WWW.ARMY.MIL/CSF special forces Why you should bookmark it: A By Denver Makle, JMTC Public Affairs loose interpretation of the Special Operation Imperative #2 could imply that since U.S. Field Manual 1-108, states a special operations Soldier must, "understand the Operational Environment," and the current environment consists of Joint and Multinational troop engagements, involving more Special Operations Forces (SOF), while serving in coalitions in Afghanistan. There is no better organization to teach advanced Soldier skills than the International Special Training Center (ISTC) located in Pfullendorf, Germany. This comprehensive website is greater than the sum of its parts! Materials found on this site are designed to help the soldier balance physical fitness with mental toughness and includes specialized features that address every aspect of personal well-being. Features include a variety of topics and commentary from professionals in all facets of health care and psychology. Real life studies and examples speak to the issues that concern Soldiers and mil- Across the globe, sustained operations in Iraq, Afghanistan, the Horn of Africa, and the Philippines continue to represent a need for NATO SOF to collectively develop and share their unique skill sets. ISTC teaches SOF Soldiers to operate in the new overseas contingency operations by giving typical examples and lessons learned from the current operating environment. tary families. "Soldiers attending ISTC get experience, and are initiated into an international brothers-in-arms network," said an ISTC Soldier from Germany, who didn't want to be named. "They definitely benefit later - when they deploy, from building those relationships. For example, specific training, such as, the sniper training could probably be taught in their own nation, but it is the combined training environment with other SOF Soldiers from other Nations that is important. Here, we train as we fight." This fully interactive portal is designed specifically for The ISTC offers standard NATO SOF training in Troop Leading Procedures, medical protocols, sniper integration and standardization, Close Quarter Battle tactics, recognition, as well as, operational planning and Command and Control. "The ISTC is unique and draws strength from its international command structure, in addition to the unmatched skill sets and combat experiences of its Special Operations instructors," said the SOF Soldier. "As a result, the member states from nine NATO countries [Belgium, Germany, Greece, United States, Norway, Italy, the Netherlands, Denmark and Turkey] serving as an international working group, provide some of the most experienced and highly renowned instructors to meet national training requirements for SOF and in some cases SOF enablers, while reducing costs and also sharing interoperability advantages and opportunities." To function in this diverse combined environment, ISTC is required to specialize in cross-culturization and crosspollenization of each nation's skill set. However, by working together, the Soldiers of each Nation learns from the others. “We all benefit,” he said. 6 Where to find it: www.army.mil/csf WWW.ATN.ARMY.MIL Why you should bookmark it: training professionals, and is regularly updated with recent news and information by the Army’s senior leaders and trainers. Find the tips you need based on the latest lessons-learned submitted by the units in today’s fight. Site is updated daily. Where to find it: www.atn.army.mil WWW.AEPUBS.ARMY.MIL Why you should bookmark it: If you are looking for official policy and information on such topics as registering your POV in Germany, deployment and reunion information, birth registrations, local national and DOD employment entitlements and your entitlements in general, THIS is the site for you! Where to find it: www.aepubs.army.mil V V II S S II T T J JM MT TC C O ON NL L II N NE E A AT T W WW WW W..H HQ QJ JM MT TC C..A AR RM MY Y.. M MIIL L COMPREHENSIVE SOLDIER FITNESS T he Comprehensive Soldier Fitness (CSF) program represents the Army's investment in the readiness of the force and the quality of life of our Soldiers, Family members, and Army Civilians, to provide Soldiers the critical skills they need to take care of themselves, their families, and their teammates. The CSF program develops the "whole person," by giving the same emphasis to psychological, emotional, and mental strength that is often given to physical strength. This enables Soldiers, Family members and Army Civilians to more easily manage various physical and psychological challenges in their personal and professional lives along the five specific dimensions of strength. The Dimensions of Strength are: Physical - Performing and excelling in physical activities that require aerobic fitness, endurance, strength, healthy body JMRC COMMANDER’S T composition and flexibility derived through exercise, nutrition and training. Emotional - Approaching life's challenges in a positive, optimistic way by demonstrating self-control, stamina and good character with your choices and actions. Social - Developing and maintaining trusted, valued relationships and friendships that are personally fulfilling and foster good communication including a comfortable exchange of ideas, views and experiences. Spiritual - Strengthening a set of beliefs, principles or values that sustain a person beyond family, institutional, and societal sources of strength. Family - Being part of a family unit that is safe, supportive and loving and provides the resources for all members to live in a healthy and secure environment. The end-state of CSF is a fit, resilient, and ready Army comprised of individuals with "Strong Minds and Strong Bodies." READING LIST AFGHANISTAN: ONE BOOK AT A TIME... his reading list was provided to the Observer/Controller/ Trainers (O/C/Ts) of the Joint Multinational Readiness Center (JMRC) by Col. John M. Spiszer, the commander. This listing of books and articles was meant to enhance the O/C/Ts background and knowledge of the history, culture, and current trends in Afghanistan prior to the execution of the most recent training rotation conducted in Hohenfels Training Area for the 2nd Stryker Cavalry Regiment. CURRENT ENVIRONMENT Heroes of the Age By David Edwards The Fragmentation of Afghanistan: State Formation and Collapse in the International System by Barnett Rubin HISTORY Afghanistan: A Short History of its People and Politics By Norman Friedman Afghanistan: A Military History from Alexander the Great to the Fall of the Taliban by Stephen Tanner Col. John M. Spiser, Commander Operations Group, Joint Multinational Readiness Center ISAF COIN References: - COMISAF Tactical Directive, 1 JUL 09 - COMISAF Tactical Directive (unclass.), 6 JUL 09 - COMISAF Counterinsurgency Guidance, 26 AUG 09 - COMISAF Tactical Driving Directive, 15 AUG 09 - HQ ISAF FRAGO 221–08 Civilian Casualty Reporting, 24 JUL 08 - HQ ISAF SOP 353 – Force Escalation Awareness, 2 MAR 09 - CALL: Handbook 10-11 Escalation of Force: Afghanistan, DEC 09 The above references may be accessed at the following link on the JKO-S Portal: www.us.army.smil.mil/suite/page/16656 SOVIET ERA The Soviet-Afghan War: How a superpower fought and lost By Lester Greiss Afghan Guerrilla Warfare: In the Words of the Mujahideen Fighters By Ali Ahmad Jalali The Bear Went Over the Mountain: Soviet Combat Tactics in Afghanistan By Lester Grau CULTURAL (FICTION) Islam and Resistance in Afghanistan By Oliver Roy A Thousand Splendid Suns By Khaled Hossein. Three Cups of Tea By Greg Mortenson and David Oliver Relin 7 7th UNITED STATES ARMY JOINT MULTINATIONAL TRAINING COMMAND TRAINING JOURNAL WINTER / SPRING 2010 NEW AT TSAE EUROPE’S NEWEST TRAINING DEVICE IMMERSES SOLDIERS IN VEHICLE MISSIONS Story and photos by Christian Marquardt, 7th Army JMTC PAO Training Support Activity Europe (TSAE) has fielded the Army's newest virtual training device and it is open for business to U.S. Army Europe Soldiers at the Grafenwoehr Training Area. The Reconfigurable Vehicle Tactical Trainer, or RVTT, officially opened during a ribbon-cutting ceremony at Camp Aachen on February 18, 2010. The RVTT is unlike traditional computer simulators or engagement skills trainers because it surrounds Soldiers in a realistic, 360-degree virtual world, said David W. Darnall, Soldier Program Manager for the 7th Army Joint Multinational Training Command (JMTC). "In any other computer simulations you're constrained by a 14, 18 or 19-inch monitor that you view your world through," said Darnall. “All of the RVTT simulators that we have are 360 degrees," said Darnall. "There's no such thing as moving your mouse to glance right. In here, you glance right and you see the terrain moving. It becomes much more immersive." The RVTT system consists of a series of trailers equipped with four life-size replica HMMWVs surrounded by floorto-ceiling movie screens, said Darnall. These HMMWV simulators contain everything you would find in a real HMMWV, to include secure radios, individual and crew-served weapons, and current command and control systems. Soldiers familiar with their equipment require only moments to be fully operational in the simulator. A third trailer provides command and control and full AAR capabilities. The system can accommodate a whole platoon training simultaneously on the same mission, said Darnall. "The last (simulator) we did was not this advanced," said Spec. Selah Hadi, who went through the RVTT as part of the JMTC's Theater Specific Individual Readiness Training (TSIRT) course. "This was more realistic, fun, I mean. I always enjoy doing stuff like this," said Hadi. The RVTT simulators can save commanders immense time particularly when the unit is conducting complex training missions, said Darnall. The RVTT is equally capable of helping units train basic drills and tasks or enabling well-trained units to conduct more complex and demanding training, some of which would be impossible to replicate in a live training environment. Each RVTT scenario is fullycustomizable by the training unit, said Darnall. 8 Currently, the RVTT has access to eight terrain databases, which include northern California, the National Training Center, and the ranges and training sites of the JMTC's Grafenwoehr and Hohenfels Training Areas. Even though it looks like a giant arcade game, the Army has made all the scenarios and the simulator equipment as realistic as possible, said Darnall. "You're going to have the same rate of acceleration in (RVTT's) HMMWV. You're going to have the same rate of fire on that weapon as you would in real life," said Darnall. “You have to do the things you would normally do to be successful." In addition to RVTT, the JMTC's Virtual Device Training Facility (VDTF) will eventually also incorporate the current armored vehicle simulators (Mobile Close Combat Tactical Trainers) with the future Dismounted Soldier Virtual Trainer, a system that will allow up to 12 Soldiers to physically maneuver through a three-dimensional virtual world with the use of goggles and body sensors, said Darnall. When it's fully operational, the VDTF will be able to simu l t a n e o u s l y t ra i n up to a battalion of soldiers in one location on virtual missions, said Darnall. "Right now we don't have the capability to plug everything together. When we get the other simulators that are coming in, they will arrive being able to be plugged into each other." "Beyond that, the only limit is what the unit commander's imagination is," said Darnall. TSAE identifies, acquires, manages, and sustains training resources to support all echelons of training throughout Europe. TSAE is geographically dispersed throughout Europe at Regional and Training Support Centers in 18 cities and six countries. V V II S S II T T J JM MT TC C O ON NL L II N NE E THE BATTLE FOR INTELLIGENCE: A AT T W WW WW W..H HQ QJ JM MT TC C..A AR RM MY Y.. M MIIL L RSTC SPOTLIGHT LEARNING TO DEPLOYING TRAINING RESOURCES TO CONDUCT TACTICAL DEPLOYED SOLDIERS: TSAE EXPEDITIONARY QUESTIONING AND SUPPORT KEY TO SUCCESS OF JTF-EAST DEBRIEFING IN A VIRTUAL WORLD An evolution in training, just like being there! Following the successful implementation of Virtual Battle Space 2 (VBS2) into realistic virtual training for Company-sized elements and below, the new Human Intelligence (HUMINT) Control Cell (HCC) is the next step in tactical gaming. Your unit is deploying to an austere training location to conduct training with a host nation. How do you obtain the training resources you need? The 7th Army Joint Multinational Training Command’s (JMTC) Training Support Activity Europe’s (TSAE) Regional Training Support Center-Expeditionary (RTSC-E) is ready to support your deployed training resource requirements. RTSC-E provides units deployed in Romania and Bulgaria with Training Aids Devices and Simulators (TADS), including first generation Multiple Integrated Laser Engagement System, medical TADS, Escalation of Force Kits, Improvised Explosive Device TADS, and audio-visual equipment. The Training Support Center (TSC) enhances a unit’s individual and crew collective training capabilities with onsite premiere training simulators such as the Engagement Skills Trainer 2000 and Call for Fire Trainer. It also provides support for six live fire ranges. In Romania, there is one 25M static range located just outside of MK Airbase and five live fire ranges located at Babadag Training Area (BTA) in Bulgaria. The capabilities include a 25M static range for zeroing individual weapons and modified ranges, such as, a two lane multi-purpose machine gun range, a four lane Combat Pistol Qualification Course, an eight lane Modified Firing Range and a one lane Sniper Field Fire Range. All ranges are supported with Deployable Range Package targetry and a range crew. Photo courtesy JMSC The HHC is an automated system that allows Soldiers to interact directly with a virtual entity. Using a life size projected image and voice recognition software, the HCC is an excellent tool for teaching tactical questioning to any unit. A soldier can walk in, sit down, put on a set of head phones and start talking directly to the Avatar. The system stresses simple direct questioning which is key to garnering information quickly and accurately. The training can be conducted in English or Arabic with or without a virtual interpreter. Scenarios include Tactical Questioning and friendly debriefing. Photo courtesy JMSC For more information contact the Joint Multinational Simulation Center at DSN 475-JMSC. Photo courtesy JMRC The RTSC-E can deliver a turnkey range with programmed target scenarios that meet unit live fire objectives if the area around the range can support the required SDZ for the weapon systems being fired. To capture remaining training enablers RTSC-E provides Military Operations on Urban Terrain support in the form of 14 Mobile MOUT containers at BTA that can be configured into different types of single story buildings to support individual squad, platoon, or company/battalion level collective training requirements. Validating training support resources required with the deploying unit 180-270 days out allows for the proper resourcing of the required training simulators. Deployable Instrumentation System, Europe (DISE) is managed from RTSC-E’s parent unit TSAE. A total of three DA civilians, three contractors, and five Soldiers comprised the DISE team which provided the deployed TFs in both Romania and Bulgaria with instrumented simulations exercise support and immediate After Action Review capability. To find out more about DISE please visit your local TSC. Now that you know what RTSC-E can offer, you should know what RTSC-E requires to best support you. The key is “early coordination and early planning between the training supporters and the training unit”, said Mr. John Barnett, RTSC-E Chief. Working with your unit through advanced planning and coordination, RTSC-E is dedicated to providing training support for any mission, anywhere. 9 10 TRAINING TRAININGJOURNAL JOURNAL THE IMPORTANCE of the ISAF MISSION Photo Credit, clockwise from top left: ISAF PAO / Sgt. Russell Gilcrest / Staff Sgt. Justin Holley / Staff Sgt Dallas Edwards / Pfc. Richard W. Jones Jr. / Staff Sgt. Andrew Smith / Staff Sgt. Adam Mancini / Pfc. Cody A. Thompson / Tech. Sgt. Cicilio M. Ricardo Jr. / US Army Collection / Spc. Matthew McKinny / US Army Collection 7th 7thUNITED UNITEDSTATES STATESARMY ARMYJOINT JOINTMULTINATIONAL MULTINATIONALTRAINING TRAININGCOMMAND COMMAND WINTER WINTER//SPRING SPRING2010 2010 V VIIS SIIT T JJM MT TC CO ON NLLIIN NE E A AT T W WW WW W..H HQ QJJM MT TC C..A AR RM MY Y.. M MIILL FEATURE STORY BY GEN. STANLEY A. McCHRYSTAL COMMANDER, INTERNATIONAL SECURITY ASSISTANCE FORCE and U.S. FORCES AFGHANISTAN ISAF Commander’s Counterinsurgency Guidance I Photo: Lance Cpl. James Clark, USMC protecting the people is the mission. SAF’s mission is to help the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIRoA) defeat the insurgency threatening their country. Protecting the Afghan people is the “the conflict will be won by persuading the population, not by destroying the enemy”. The Afghan people are skeptical and unwilling to commit active support to either side until convinced of a winning proposition. We need to understand the people and see things through their eyes. It is their mission. The Afghan people will decide fears, frustrations, and expectations that who wins this fight, and we [GIRoA and we must address. We will not win simply ISAF] are in a struggle for their support. by killing insurgents. We will help the The effort to gain and maintain that Afghan people win by securing them, support must inform every action we take. by protecting them from intimidation, Essentially, we and the insurgents are pre- violence and abuse, and by operating in senting an argument for the future to the a way that respects their culture and people of Afghanistan: they will decide religion. This means that we must change which argument is the most attractive, the way that we think, act, and operate. most convincing, and has the greatest We must get the people involved as chance of success. active participants in the success of The Afghan people are a diverse mix of their communities. Every action we take ethnicities and tribes with strong traditions and a fierce sense of independence. Their country has been scarred by 30 years Photo: Sgt David Alvarado ISAF Commander Gen. Stanley McChrystal speaks with Afganistan Foreign Minister Dr. Rangin Dadfar Spanta. must reflect this change: how we interact with people, how we drive or fly, how we patrol, how we use force, how we fund work of war, and the fabric of Afghan society has been badly programs and projects. This is their country, and we are their damaged. Traditional tribal structures have been undermined guests. We must think carefully about everything we do and deliberately by the insurgents; many communities have understand the impact of our actions on the people we are fractured. State weakness and corruption erode confidence here to partner with and protect. Security may not come in government. Nearly eight years of international presence from overwhelming firepower, and force protection may mean has not brought the anticipated benefits. more personal interaction with the Afghan people, not less. 11 7th 7thUNITED UNITEDSTATES STATESARMY ARMYJOINT JOINTMULTINATIONAL MULTINATIONALTRAINING TRAININGCOMMAND COMMAND TRAINING TRAININGJOURNAL JOURNAL WINTER WINTER//SPRING SPRING2010 2010 JMTC HONORS AND CELEBRATES THE YEAR OF THE NONCOMMISSIONED OFFICER H ow insurgents operate. Our task is complicated temporary at best: insurgent disruption and threatened by a resilient, highly adaptive and multifaceted insurgency. An insurgency is unlike a conventional military threat. The insurgent’s attack is a secondary effort to discredit the government and provoke a counterinsurgent response that alienates the people. Corruption and abuse of power by government officials feeds into the insurgent narrative. Behind the smoke of battle, the insurgents are principally focused on political and social activities, to include information operations, designed to gain control over the population. In so doing, they displace Photo: ISAF PAO the government’s legitimacy. We must understand how the insurgents compete in order to combat their strategy. They adapt to local conditions. They influence the population through both intimidation and attraction. In their propaganda they claim to protect Afghan culture and religion. They include social strife and undermine traditional structures. In places, they control the roads, collect revenues, and mete out swift justice. They co-opt disenfranchised groups and pay young men to fight. They exploit ISAF mistakes and inappropriate actions to reinforce their argument. “conventional military action against insurgents consumes considerable resources with P little real return.” leaves eight remaining: 10-2=8. From the insurgent standpoint, those two killed were likely related to many other who will want vengeance. If civilian casualties occurred, that number will be much higher. Therefore, the death of two creates more willing recruits: 10 minus 2 equals 20 (or more) rather than 8. This is part of the reason why eight years of individually successful kinetic actions have resulted in more violence. The math works against an attrition mind-set. This is not to say that we should avoid a fight, but to win, we need to do much more than simply kill or capture militants. Second, conventional military action against insurgents consumes considerable resources with little real return and is likely to alienate the people we are trying to secure. Large scale operations to kill or capture militants carry a significant risk of causing civilian casualties and collateral damage. If civilians die in a firefight, it does not matter who shot them – we still failed to protect them from harm. laying into their hands. A military force, culturally Destroying a home or property jeopardizes the livelihood of programmed to respond conventionally (and predict- an entire family-and creates more insurgents. We sow the ably) to insurgent attacks, is akin to the bull that seeds of our own demise. repeatedly charges a matador’s cape - only to tire and eventually be defeated by a much weaker opponent. Although disruption operations may be necessary at times, This is predictable – the bull does what comes naturally. we must recognize their effects are temporary at best when While a conventional approach is instinctive, that behavior the population is under insurgent influence or control. is self-defeating. Sporadically moving into an area for a few hours or even a few days solely to search for the enemy and then leave does First, an insurgency cannot be defeated by attrition; its supply little good, and may do much harm. The local insurgents hide of fighters, and even leadership, is effectively endless. Roughly in plain sight and the people remain ambivalent. Once we’ve seventy percent of the Afghan population is under age 25. departed, the militants re-emerge and life under insurgent Vast unemployment, illiteracy, and widespread political and control resumes. These operations are not only ineffectual, social disaffection create fertile ground for insurgent influence they can be counter-productive. In conducting them, we are and recruiting. not building relationships with people, and we are not helping The intricate familial, clan, and tribal connections of Afghan Afghans solve Afghan problems. society turns “attrition math” on its head. From a conventional In short, we don’t have to be stupid or ineffective to fail- standpoint, the killing of two insurgents in a group of ten just misguided in our approach. 12 C O V E R S T O R Y B Y G E N . S T A N L E Y A . M c C H R Y S T A L : I S A FVC IS OIM TM JA MNTD CE R O’N S LCI O NU ENA TE T RW I NW SW U.R HG QE JN MC TY C .G AU RIM DY A.NM CIE L C GEN. STANLEY A. McCHRYSTAL ISAF COMMANDER hanging our mindset. We need to think and act context so people are more attracted to building and protecting very differently to be successful. The will of the their communities than destroying them. Leverage economic people is the Objective. An effective “offensive” initiatives and routine jirgas with community leaders to operation in counterinsurgency, therefore, is one that takes employ young men and develop young men and develop form the insurgent what he cannot afford to lose-control of peaceful means to resolve outstanding issues; create viable the population. We must think of offensive operations not local alternatives to insurgency. simply as those that target militants, but ones that earn the setting the conditions: in word and deed. trust and support of the people while denying influence and access to the insurgent. Holding routine jirgas with community leaders that build trust and solve problems is an offensive operation. So is using projects and work programs to bring communities together and meet their needs. Missions primarily designed to “disrupt” militants are not. Think of counterinsurgency as an argument to earn the support of the people. It is a contest to influence the real and very practical calculations on the part of the people about with side to support. Every action, reaction, failure to act and all that is said and done become part of the debate. The people in the audience watch, listen, and make rational choices based on who can better protect them, provide for their needs respect their dignity and their community, and offer opportunities for the future. Ideology can influence the outcome, but is usually subordinate to the more practical considerations of survival and everyday life. the key: earning the trust of the people Photo: PLance Cpl. Tommy Bellegarde At the same time, it would be naïve to ignore the fact that the enemy often gets a vote on how we focus our time and energy. This is certainly the case in times of high kinetic activity as well as in the areas where “shadow government” influences the population. There is clearly a role for precise operations that keep the insurgents off balance, take the fight to their sanctuaries, and prevent them from affecting the population. These operations are important but, in and of themselves, are not necessarily decisive. “we must understand how the insurgents compete... they exploit isaf mistakes and inappropriate actions.” Photo: US Army Earn the support of the people and the war is won, regardless of how many miltants are killed or captured. We must undermine the insurgent argument while offering a more compelling alternative. Our argument must communicate through word and deed - that we and GIRoA have the capabilitiy and commitment to protect and support the people. Together, we need to provide a convincing and sustainable sense of justice and well-being to a weary and skeptical populace. We must turn perceptions from fear and uncertainty to trust and confidence. To be effective, therefore, we have to help change the local They can be effective when the insurgents have become so isolated for the population that they are no longer welcome, have been kicked out of their communities, and are reduced to hiding in remote areas and raiding from there. Setting these conditions throughout the year will enable kinetic operations to have an enduring rather than fleeting impact. Keeping the right balance over time is critical and there is no mathematical formula for it. Mobilizing the community to participate actively for their own safety, stability and success is the crux of counterinsurgency at local levels – and creates circumstances to end insurgent influence permanently. continued on next page. 13 7th 7thUNITED UNITEDSTATES STATESARMY ARMYJOINT JOINTMULTINATIONAL MULTINATIONALTRAINING TRAININGCOMMAND COMMAND TRAINING TRAININGJOURNAL JOURNAL WINTER WINTER//SPRING SPRING2010 2010 We must know the people, their environment and aspirations, Win the argument. Use localized development and economic and work together with them to meet their needs. Strive to support to bring community leaders and people together for focus 95 percent of our energy on the 95 percent of the pop- their own success. Listen, share, and get buy-in. Build local ulation that deserves and needs our support. Doing so will ownership and capacity. Together with legitimate GIRoA isolate the insurgents. Take action against the 5 percent – leaders, work all local issues with the local shura and com- the insurgents - as necessary or when the right opportunities munity. Foster ownership. As the Afghans say, “If you sweat present themselves. Do not let them distract you from your for it, you will protect it.” E primary tasks: ansf & isaf: plan and operate together mbrace the people. Build connections and be conscious of the need to pass them off to your successor. Afghan culture is founded on personal relationships. Earning the trust of the people is a large part of our mission. Build relationships with tribal, community, and religious leaders. Success requires communication, collaboration, and cooperation. Seek out the underprivileged, the disenfranchised, and the disaffected and bring them on the team. Understand the local grievances and problems that drive instability, and take action to redress them. Work with the children and students. Insist the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) and GIRoA officials support these efforts, the afghan people respect courage P Photo Spc. Derek L. Kuhn artner with ANSF at all echelons. Our job is to hold them accountable for performance in serving the Afghan people and protecting them from harm. Build their capacity to secure their own country. Foster ownership – their success is our success. Live and train together, plan and operate together. Share the same battle-rhythm and information. Integrate your command and control structures. Put them in the lead and support them, even before they think they are ready. Coach them to excellence, and they will amaze you with how quickly they take charge. Photo Sgt Russell Gilchrest and teach them to lead these efforts. Use your relationships with the people, the ANSF, and the GIRoA officials to become an expert on the local situation. Get to know the neighborhood. Learn who is the most successful farmer and why, who feels excluded and why, and which families are the most powerful and who they are united to by marriage. Be a positive force in the community, shield the people from harm, and foster safety and security so people can work and raise their families in peace. “afghan culture is founded on personal relationships. earning the trust of the people is a large part of the mission.” B uild Governance Capacity and Accountability. D e v e l o p i n g g o o d g o v e r n a n c e i s e v e r y o n e ’s responsibility. Build capacity and accountability at all levels, down to local communities. Promote Afghan leadership that serves the people. Empower those who Carefully assess risk and project confidence – excessive force display competence, care and commitment for their people. protection is distancing, not inspiring. Think of how you would But be discerning and make distinctions. Confront self- expect a foreign army to operate in your neighborhood, among serving officials who monopolize wealth and power and your families and your children, and act accordingly. The way abuse the people’s trust. Working alongside our Afghan you drive, your dress and gestures, with whom you eat lunch, counterparts, we must find incentives and mechanisms to the courage with which you fight, the way you respond to an change behavior, and demand Afghan leaders take the Afghan’s grief or joy – this is all part or the argument. appropriate action to hold corrupt officials accountable. 14 COVER STORY BY GEN. STANLEY A. McCHRYSTAL : ISAF VC I SOI T MM JM AN TD C EO RN ’ SLC IN OE U NATT ER W IN WS WU .H RQ GJ EM NT CC Y. A GR UM ID YA .N MC I LE GEN. STANLEY A. McCHRYSTAL ISAF COMMANDER Looking the other way or enabling government officials who fail to meet their obligations makes you part of the problem. ISAF CASE STUDY Protecting the people not only requires protecting them from physical harm, but also from corruption and abuse of power. “strive to focus 95 percent of your energy on the 95 percent of the population that deserves and needs your support.” G et better every day. Take action to improve stability in your area. Learn how to adapt, how to shape the environment, and how to be more effective with the community leaders and the people. Listen to our Afghan colleagues; talk with the Afghans you meet; ask questions about how we can improve and help them achieve their goals. Listen to their stories and what they want to tell you. You are authorized – indeed, it is your responsibility – to adjust your actions within the intent of this guidance to adapt to local conditions. Over-communicate. Quickly share critical information and ideas. Challenge the conventional wisdom if it no longer fits the environment. This is a battle of wits – be vigilant as the environment shifts and the enemy adapts. If you are comfortable, the enemy is probably ahead of you. To win, we must understand their strategy and learn from their successes and their failures – and from our own as well. Adapt faster than they are able to adjust. security: transforming the local environment Photo Spc. Matthew Freire We (GIRoA and ISAF) will succeed by transforming the environment through local security, connecting responsible and credible governance to the community leaders and an ISAF unit was often taking rocket fire from nearby a certain village. rather than raiding the village, the commander decided instead to find out more about them and the reasons for hostility. the ana commander suggested an ana patrol to learn more about the village. the patrol discovered the village was upset about a night raid that occured over two years ago. he also learned education was important to the village but they had no school or supplies. the commander sent another patrol to the village a few days later with a truckload of supplies. the next day, the village elders came to the base to meet with the ana and isaf commanders. they delivered over 100 thank you notes from the children. soon, several local projects were coordinated with the elders for the village the projects they owned. the rocket attacks stopped. people, and facilitating compelling alternatives to the insurgency. The people will decide the contest in GIRoA’s favor. 15 7th 7thUNITED UNITEDSTATES STATESARMY ARMYJOINT JOINTMULTINATIONAL MULTINATIONALTRAINING TRAININGCOMMAND COMMAND TRAINING TRAININGJOURNAL JOURNAL WINTER WINTER//SPRING SPRING2010 2010 FEATURE JMTC Counter-IED training Story by Capt. Ronald J. Gevry, JMTC G3 plans officer, photos by JMRC PAO (except where noted). integrated training defeats improvised explosive devices I t is well known the Improvised Explosive Device (IED) is one of the insurgent's most effective weapons against U.S. and multinational forces in Afghanistan. As such, the threat requires units deploying to the Central Command area of operation to have the most comprehensive package of individual, collective, and leader training available. The JMTC's Counter-IED (C-IED) training can help units meet pre-deployment training requirements and objectives. insurgent, creating the awareness, by identifying the need to assess risks, establish controls, and mitigate the risks for their units." The course is designed to have the students "turn the map around" and identify the challenges of operations in this environment, he said. The training teaches units to Attack the Network (AtN) and Defeat the Device (DtD). Live, virtual, and constructive assets are available to train individual, leader and collective tasks for all units. C-IED training is tailored to specific unit missions, areas of operation requirements and the unit's specific ARFORGEN cycles. "The JMRC applies C-IED training through hands on C-IED classes, vehicle operator training and situational training lanes that supports individual and collective training tasks, said Capt. C-IED training is available at the Joint Joint Multinational Simulation Center (JMSC) at Camp Aachen, Joint Multinational Readiness Center (JMRC) in Hohenfels, and at the Combined Arms Training Center (CATC) at Vilseck, Germany. Incorporating the latest guidance from the Joint IED Defeat Organization, the Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Train-the-Trainer course offered at Fort Leonardwood, Missouri, and tactics, techniques and procedures gathered from lessons-learned during past deployments, the training can be tailored to meet the specific unit's mission, projected area of operation requirements and the unit's specific Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN) cycle. "The course taught by the CATC is designed for small unit leaders, who train their units on operating in the IED environment, said Capt. Raymond Bijolle. "The trainers first learn to think like an 16 Andy Rose of the JMRC C-IED Academy. "JMRC incorporated C-IED training into all aspects of full spectrum operations focusing on the Soldiers tasks, and training staffs and leaders on attacking the network that supports the IEDsâ€?. The training curriculum is consistently reviewed and updated by the JMTC C-IED training synchronization working group based on training feedback, current operations, enemy tactics, techniques and procedures, and new technologies. "The JMSC provides the "crawl" stage of the "crawl, walk, run" training-model, before a Soldier goes out on a C-IED lane to perform the mission live," said Tom Lasch, chief of Models and Simulations Branch of the JMSC. "Units go through a rehearsal using the Virtual Battlespace 2." The VBS2 is a first-person simulation that allows Soldiers to virtually conduct mounted and dismounted missions on geo-specific or geo-typical terrain with a robust after-action review feature. "They become familiar with the terrain and the threats," said Lasch. "It gradually builds up to a capstone event, like an exercise at the JMRC." The ultimate goal is to ensure U.S. and multinational forces deploy to Afghanistan prepared for the C-IED challenges expected in theater. JMRC constructs realistic devices that are being used downrange that operate as IEDs. The JMRC incorporates professional fire-markers to facilitate the IED effects, during training lanes, and uses Soldiers from the 1st Bn., 4th Inf. Regt. as professional Opposing Forces to recreate not only the IED on the ground but the support network behind the IED emplacer. V VIIS SIIT T JJM MT TC CO ON NLLIIN NE E A AT T W WW WW W..H HQ QJJM MT TC C..A AR RM MY Y.. M MIILL K attack the network ey to the C-IED fight is eliminating the network supporting the enemy. Financiers, bomb builders, logisticians and emplacers work together to attack Coalition Forces. Units must train to recognize, and eliminate the members of the network to limit the enemy's ability to conduct operations. Catching unauthorized network members is not easy, but the training JMTC provides can improve a unit's effort. JMTC provides battlestaff training to Brigade and Battalion staffs enabling staffs to integrate all of the assets available to a commander in theater. Unit staffs train on integrating intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance, route clearance, biometrics, and intelligence fusion systems to develop networks and create actionable information for the commander. Photo courtesy of JMTC DOS TS At the individual level, Soldiers are trained on systems operation and maintenance. Available training includes Biometric Automated Tool Set, Hand held Interagency Identity Detection Equipment operator courses, Combined Information Data Network Exchange, Tactical Ground Reporting network, tactical questioning, Human Intelligence, tactical site exploitation, and search. These courses provide trained and ready Soldiers to support the commander and staff with accurate, timely, and valuable information. Attack the Network training is integrated by JMSC to fully exercise the staff to process information, make decisions and monitor battlefield action by subordinate organizations. The JMSC integrates Attack the Network training during exercises to drive the commander's staff to process infor- mation, make decisions and monitor battlefield action by subordinate organizations. S defeat the device oldiers conducting operations face the IED threat every day, and protecting the Soldier is every unit's priority. JMTC facilitates defeat the device training at all levels. Live training facilities available for unit use are robust and adaptable, and are located at both Hohenfels and Grafenwoehr Training Areas. Range 211 at Grafewoehr provides units the ability to conduct C-IED combined arms live fire training in a realistic and complex IED environment. Range 211 supports FullRange Training Ammunition up to 120mm mortar systems and Attack Aviation Training Ammunition allowing units conducting C-IED training to incorporate supporting forces into training scenarios. This allows units to train at all levels from the basic battle drill to full combined arms route clearance or mounted patrol missions. A training lane coordinator is available to assist units in preparing and conducting C-IED lane training on Range 211. The JMRC, through the C-IED Academy provides IED Awareness training, with a full complement of working IED trigger devices, a homemade explosives lab and two search training houses. Route Clearance training is also taught by individual drivers training on route clearance vehicles to platoon level route clearance patrols. The C-IED Academy provides operator and leader training on all Counter Remote Controlled IED Electronic Warfare devices. Surrogate and interrupt devices are available for units to train with during live training to provide a fully integrated IED lane training experience. train the force The CATC provides a one week IED Train the Trainer course. The course provides units with the ability to train leaders to provide homestation IED training. Training dates are available on the ATRRS website for units to reserve seats in the course. JMTC has received funding to develop a C-IED Integration Cell, which units will directly contact to schedule training and Mobile Training Teams for C-IED training. The personnel assigned to the cell assist units in developing a full C-IED training schedule that synchronizes training according to the units ARFORGEN cycle. JMTC's C-IED training assets are available now to increase your unit's combat capability. For assistance and information contact the JMTC G3 Plans offices at DSN: 475-8254/8005. Download our brochure online at: www.hqjmtc.army.mil/ organization/G3/G3-main 17 7th 7thUNITED UNITEDSTATES STATESARMY ARMYJOINT JOINTMULTINATIONAL MULTINATIONALTRAINING TRAININGCOMMAND COMMAND TRAINING TRAININGJOURNAL JOURNAL WINTER WINTER//SPRING SPRING2010 2010 FEATURE Battle Staff training prepares Soldiers for Afghanistan By Sgt. Major Lance T. Dykman, Combined Arms Training Center course exposes ncos to the rigors of working the tactical operations center A commander’s ability to decisively impact mission accomplishment is based largely on the accuracy and thoroughness of the information he has to shape his decision-making. Never in history have commanders had access to more information to help this process. Unfortunately, the sheer volume of information available quickly overwhelms a lone individual’s ability to identify, assimilate and comprehend the available information. That is why commanders have battle staffs. Photo: JMTC PAO The traditional picture of the battle staff is the battle captain at the Tactical/Joint Operations Center (TOC/JOC) on-the-floor controlling the mission or the staff major, who is diligently planning the next operation. This is no longer true. A current Brigade Task Force JOC, usually only one or two officers, is a permanent fixture on any given shift. The majority of actions are being conducted by the Battle Staff Noncommissioned Officer (BSNCO). The pace of planning cycles has increased often requiring each section to have representatives at multiple meetings, simultaneously. For most sections this means the officer goes to one and the BSNCO goes to another. Many NCOs assigned to a battle staff for the first time find themselves feeling like a fish out of water. As junior sergeants or staff sergeants, often their only experience is working directly with Soldiers in their functional MOS’s, as Infantry squad leaders, supply sergeants, combat medics, or fire control sergeants. The JOC pushes these junior leaders out of their comfort zone, and into the often hectic world of the battle staff. Traditionally, the NCO Education System has not included battle staff tasks, instead focusing on the leadership, and MOS skills needed for the NCO grade and specialty in question. Recognizing this as mission critical and a specialized skill, the U.S. Army Sergeants Major Academy at Fort Bliss, Texas, developed the Battle Staff NCO Course (BSNCOC) and implemented the S2 Additional Skill Identifier (ASI) to prepare and designate NCOs for battle staff duty. 18 The BSNCOC prepares sergeants through sergeants major to serve as BSNCO for battalion and higher level staff positions. The course provides selected Noncommissioned officers with the tools necessary to learn specific staff duties and become familiar with the duties of other staff sections. Likewise, the course provides technical and tactical curriculum that is relevant to missions, duties, and responsibilities assigned to staff members in battalion and brigade-level units. The Battle Staff NCO Course is the only course offered by the United States Army to educate NCO Staff members about operating as part of a Battalion or higher staff. This course is an intense, fast paced, performance-oriented program of instruction that focuses on the battle staff duties and responsibilities of the coordinating and special staff sections, regardless of the NCOs functional area of assignment. The Battle Staff NCO Course is a two-phase non-branch related functional course for sergeants through sergeants major selected for staff assignments. Phase I consists of 75 hours of self-study using Interactive Multimedia Instruction produced by the USASMA. Phase II is 177 academic hours, a course taught via video-teleconference (VTT) to distant sites from the US Army Sergeants Major Academy. Students must complete Phase I before they are accepted into Phase II. Seating in this VTT course is always limited. Priority seating goes to those Soldiers who are currently assigned to staff positions where the S2 ASI is warranted. Any Soldiers not currently assigned to a S2 coded position, will need to present a signed memo by an O5, or higher, to justify their seat. The CATC supports both phases by registering students, and providing digital classrooms and instructors during phase II. if you know the enemy and know yourself you need not fear the results of a hundred battles; if ignorant both of your enemy and yourself, you are certain to be in peril; know your enemy and know yourself and you can fight a hundred battles without disaster. sun tzu With the current pace of operational deployments, the Army’s Leadership felt that all NCOs should benefit from a level of Battle Staff NCO instruction. The latest evolution of NCOES courses such as the Advanced Leader Course and the Senior Leader Course incorporate much of the current BSNCOC’s curriculum. V VIIS SIIT T JJM MT TC CO ON NLLIIN NE E A AT T W WW WW W..H HQ QJJM MT TC C..A AR RM MY Y.. M MIILL FEATURE afghanistan: increasing cultural awareness N By Capt. Fernando Pelayo, JMTC G3 Operations Photo courtesy of JMRC Hohenfels PAO The CATC is hosting two more BSNCOC classes via VTT this fiscal year. The dates for those classes are Class Nr. 002 01 JUN-02 JUL and Class Number 003 30 AUG-01 OCT. Our NCO Corps sets the standards for professionalism and competence that many other countries would like to emulate. The ability of U.S. Army junior NCOs to plan, coordinate, and execute missions independently sets them apart from many of their peers. This is a product of service culture, professional education, and dedicated leadership development through a Soldier’s career. Part of the JMTC’s partnership mission is to bring some of this NCO development to our partner nations. Many countries still have regimented roles for officers and NCOs on their staffs with NCOs rarely sharing duties with an officer. A version of our Battle Staff NCO Course is one way CATC is working to develop foreign NCOs and their ability to lead and train. So although the BSNCOC will no longer be offered by the CATC for U.S. Forces after these last two classes, it will morph into the Battle Staff Training Program (BSTP) for our Partner Nations’ Students via Mobile Training Team (MTT). This 10 Day MTT will be available for request from Partner Nations’ Office of Defense Cooperation (ODC) Liaison Officers via USAREUR’s Staff. The intent of the course is the same, but incorporates NATO standard terminology. The hosting country will provide the training facilities, interpreters, and some supplies such as translated lesson plans. With this MTT, partner-nations can provide their Soldiers with valuable and relevant staff training toward any future ISAF deployment or simply to increase their units’ operability. Recently, at the Polish Land Force’s NCO Academy in Pozen, Poland, JMTC completed a The Battle Staff Training Program (BSTP MTT). Approximately, 46 Senior NCOs from units throughout the Polish Land Forces were trained. The combination of a professional hosting organization and the JMTC MTT instructors made short work of this course’s challenging curricula. The key to ensuring the success of the BSTP as with any MTT is coordination, those who do so get the most from their BSTP MTT. We at the CATC look forward to bringing MTT to our Partner Nations and our brothers-in-arms. The continuing pace of operations and the continuing evolution and advancement of information collection guarantees the NCO a valued place on the Battle Staff. As NCOES adapts to meet the changing duties of the NCO, what was once specialized instruction for a select few will become standard knowledge for all. early 100 participants, ranging from coalition staff officers to U.S. battalion commanders, were immersed in the history, politics, and culture of Afghanistan, as part of the Leader Development and Education for Sustained Peace (LDESP) program at the Joint Multinational Readiness Center (JMRC) in Hohenfels, Germany in February. The seminar gave troops an insight into the governance and politics of the country, as well as, the latest trends in the counterinsurgency fight. The LDESP is a graduate-level educational seminar offered by the Naval Postgraduate School. The program was created to provide military and civilian leaders with a comprehensive overview of operational environments throughout the world. "This academic endeavor is about developing a frame of reference that facilitates clear understanding and decision-making in complex environments," said Bob Tomasovic, the LDESP Program Manager, who organized the team of instructors that included a former ambassador, as well as, professors with long ties to the region. Participants learned how to best use a linguist, and how to interact with the media in Afghanistan. They learned Afghanistan was an oral culture, and the consequences associated with the oral practice. "To build a good relationship with a local national you are working with, communicate with him orally," said Tomasavic. Throughout the three days of instruction, participants listened to economic, cultural, and historical vignettes that provided relevance to current coalition operations in Afghanistan. "All leaders should understand the environment in which they plan to operate," said Lt. Col. Michael Lefebvre, chief of the JMTC G3 Plans and Operations Section. "As leaders we should strive to understand our environment to make the most effective decisions." While the seminar, hosted at the JMRC, was specific to Afghanistan, the LDESP program offers other courses, which focus on numerous regions, including Iraq and Kosovo. The first of the program's three phases begins online with a Web site that offers distance learning training modules. The training offers the participant the ability to explore the material at his own pace and convenience. The second phase is the seminar, which is taught by academics, or subject matter experts with practical application of their expertise in the field. The final phase is a bi-weekly news update on the specific area of interest. This phase allows the participant to further his education by exploring news articles, as well as, other region-specific material provided by the program managers. Upon completion of phase I and phase II, free course credits are offered for the successful-completion of certain course requirements. The culmination of the student's efforts is a 7,500-8,000 word research paper. For information on the LDESP, go to www.ldesp.org/public/spd.cfm/spi/training_centers. 19 7th 7thUNITED UNITEDSTATES STATESARMY ARMYJOINT JOINTMULTINATIONAL MULTINATIONALTRAINING TRAININGCOMMAND COMMAND TRAINING TRAININGJOURNAL JOURNAL WINTER WINTER//SPRING SPRING2010 2010 JMTC AND CELEBRATES THE YEAR OF THE NONCOMMISSIONED OFFICER F E A T UHONORS RE A convoy travels through the desert. No matter how many times this platoon of soldiers completes an escort mission, it never becomes routine. A sudden, single explosion strikes the lead vehicle with devastating force. To the occupants of the trail vehicles, the overwhelming damage from the improvised explosive device becomes amazingly clear in seconds. Despite the flames, a darkness settles over the soldiers—the realization that one of their own was lost. The blast is staggering, but its sound does not travel the thousands of miles to the home front. Instead, there are three knocks on a family’s door. Inside, a mother hurriedly gets her children ready for school. She pulls the door open, curious. Two soldiers stand on the doorstep. She notices that one is a chaplain. The other is from her rear-detachment team—a familiar face, but now without a smile. The soldiers have been charged with carrying a message that will devastate her family. T born of necessity he noble goal of ensuring the legacy of the next generation of warriors and their families must include the selection and training of a successful reardetachment team. The challenges brought about by the hardships of a deployment can be daunting, not only for the Soldier on the front lines, but also for his or her family members at home. The complexities of multiple deployments further exacerbate these challenges. Rear-detachment teams, including the family readiness group (FRG), are born of necessity. Their missions are important; their efforts help define the unit’s success. A battalion that fails to train a quality rear-detachment team will fail to leave a positive legacy. SMA Kenneth O. Preston recognized the importance of ensuring the founding of dependable rear-detachment teams when he stated: “We must ensure that each Soldier is equipped and trained to fight and win. We must also provide for our families. We will not be successful if we fail to care for our loved ones. … We must fight for their health care, children, housing and wellbeing with the same vigor we fight with on the battlefield”. Each particular unit imparts a legacy to the Army, and the Army in turn passes a legacy to the nation. Leaders will ensure a positive legacy only by ensuring the selection and training of a successful rear-detachment team. W the mission hat defines success in battalion-level reardetachment operations? Overall, the mission includes at least three fronts: supporting the forward-deployed command, maintaining high levels of family readiness and coordinating with the local garrison command. 20 All three of these fronts must be sustained for the length of the deployment, through each stage of the emotional cycle. The team must ensure effective information flow on each of the fronts, identifying useful information and disseminating it to the formation. Examples include information-operations products, such as, pictures of ceremonies and family activities, and changes to home-station policies and procedures, to include new passport guidelines and changes in opening hours for installation services. Official notifications, such as casualty messages, are also included. A timely and accurate flow of information is extremely important. The primary mission of the rear detachment is to support the forward-deployed command. Properly sponsoring new Soldiers, familiarizing their families with the community, completing mandated predeployment activities and deploying the Soldiers to combat operations are steps in a system established prior to the unit’s initial deployment. Providing world-class care for wounded warriors, fallen Soldiers and their families forms the most important aspect of supporting the forward command. Providing a casualtynotification or assistance officer is the most important task for the team. By being proactive, a team will maintain high levels of family readiness. This task is best achieved by anticipating the needs and requirements of the formation. Family members rightly expect timely and accurate information and an easily accessible, open-minded soldier team. Countless resources have been published and are available to a rear detachment to aid in better understanding how to thrive in the uncertainty that a deployment brings. Each family and servicemember must discover how to best maintain a proactive attitude. Two helpful resources are Surviving Military Separation: A 365-Day Activity Guide for the Families of Deployed Personnel by Marc Maxwell and Courage After Fire: Coping Strategies for Troops Returning from Iraq and Afghanistan and Their Families by licensed clinical social worker Keith Armstrong and his colleagues. Both offer numerous resources, strategies and advice for both family and soldier teams. A proactive rear-detachment will incorporate all resources and ideas to achieve high levels of family readiness. V VIIS SIIT T JJM MT TC CO ON NLLIIN NE E A AT T W WW WW W..H HQ QJJM MT TC C..A AR RM MY Y.. M MIILL By Capt. Joshua D. Buchanan, 172nd Infantry Brigade Photos courtesy of Grafenwoehr Garrison PAO Finally, the local garrison command stands as the gateway to important installation services and organizational resources. The benefits of maintaining open lines of communication and professional working relationships with those individuals and agencies that form the local military community are crucial to a rear detachment’s success. This front cannot be overestimated and is especially applicable to those units stationed overseas. A team that fails to demonstrate its proactive stance will find success elusive. W THE TIMELINE ith the recent reduction in deployment lengths from 15 months to 12, many of the accompanying stressors will be proportionately reduced. For soldiers on the front lines and their families on the home front, however, 12 months remains a long time to be apart. The timeline of a deployment may be divided into five stages: predeployment, during which the rear-detachment team is selected, resourced and trained; deployment; sustainment; redeployment and reintegration; and postdeployment, this includes the dissolution of the reardetachment team. A THE FIRST STEPS battalion commander must begin his or her efforts to achieve successful rear-detachment operations by selecting the right team members and training and equipping them for the important mission ahead. Training accomplished prior to the actual deployment will prove invaluable. A consistent opportunity for a smallerscale “deployment” is the unit’s mission-readiness exercise. In addition to selecting the right people for the job, battalion and company commanders must set the climate in which they operate. A rear-detachment commander and first sergeant who can aggressively tackle any task while providing a caring and resourceful environment for soldiers and families are a prerequisite for success. A family readiness liaison is a company commander’s representative on the home front. He or she must, therefore, select a reliable and professional noncommissioned officer to fill this role. It is important that the primary staff sections also designate a high-caliber representative to serve as the respective subject-matter expert on the reardetachment team. The team is not limited to soldiers, however. Its ranks also include experienced volunteers, usually in the roles of FRG leaders and the chain of concern. The insights and experiences contributed to the team by spouses who have endured one or more deployments are priceless. Their contributions often prevent the loss of institutional knowledge gained from past experiences that is invaluable when new challenges arise. Supporting the forward command, providing for high levels of family readiness and working together with the local garrison compose the mission of a rear-detachment team. The mission is accomplished over the course of all the various stages of the deployment, essentially over a period lasting 18 months. The battalion commander holds the responsibility for the climate in which the soldiers and families of a rear detachment operate. Ultimately, he or she owns the team’s overall success or failure—the responsibility of ensuring a legacy. Years from now, when the current campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan have run their course, what legacy will have been left to the next generation of warriors and their families? Commanders directly affect the hearts and minds of soldiers and families. If leaders within our Army wish to ensure a positive legacy, then they must combine successful forward operations with successful rear-detachment operations. The former, alone, is not enough. A deploying battalion commander must select a dedicated team of professionals and train them to create a proactive environment of individual and collective readiness. Company commanders must follow suit. Soldiers and families must know they are a top priority—they deserve nothing less. This article is easily dowloaded on the web at: www.hqjmtc.army.mil 21 7th 7thUNITED UNITEDSTATES STATESARMY ARMYJOINT JOINTMULTINATIONAL MULTINATIONALTRAINING TRAININGCOMMAND COMMAND TRAINING TRAININGJOURNAL JOURNAL WINTER WINTER//SPRING SPRING2010 2010 FEATURE Building the Afghanistan Mission Network, One training event at a time U ntil now, all Coalition Forces in Afghanistan, to include the United States, relied on their "own" national classified network (SIPRNET) to receive their intelligence and Situational Awareness information. As a result of these "Independent", non-integrated networks, all of the data from the coalition partners supporting operations in Afghanistan were NOT shared. In an effort to correct this deficiency, the commander for the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) directed the creation of the Afghanistan Mission Network (AMN). There is a requirement that all Troop Contributing Nations (TCN) will operate on AMN, while in country. For US forces, this required the By Maj. Wallace N. Smith, 69th Signal Command migration of the US Battle Command Systems from SIPRNET to the AMN. This change in operations required a shift in training for units preparing to deploy into the Afghanistan Area of Operations. To support this training requirement, the 69th Signal Bn., working with 2nd Signal Brigade, 5th Signal Command and the Southwest Asia Theater Network Operations Security Center, extended the operational AMN into Hohenfels, Germany. The configuration of their communications equipment will be validated on the theater operational network, AMN, prior to their arrival in Afghanistan. The extended network allows BCTs to prepare One team, one system: Integrating CENTRIX for support to ISAF I By Capt. Robert Hoover, 2SCR Public Affairs n December 2009, the 2nd Stryker Cavalry Regiment (2SCR) received a Warning Order from the International Security Assistance Force Joint Command that all units in Afghanistan fight on the Combined Enterprise Regional Information Exchange System (Centrix) network by the summer of 2010. In a CENTRIX environment, instead of a Common Operating Picture (COP) and intelligence analysis tool residing on an isolated, US forces only, network; units must begin to embrace the coalition environment, turning its focus to understanding the types of information-sharing needed to function in areas of operation, such as Afghanistan. No one really knows the impact of this new way of communicating, but, a recent 30-day rotation for the 2nd Stryker Cavalry Regiment at the Joint Multinational Readiness Center (JMRC) in Hohenfels, Germany, has initiated the development of a template for use, during an upcoming deployment, using the CENTRIX Domain. The process, for making the transition to CENTRIX, began with negotiations between 2SCR staff and Program Managers (PMs) from all the participating organizations. The PMs provided hardware, software and field service representatives. The Program Executive Office Command Control and Communications Tactical (PEO-C3T) is the overall program office responsible for the program managers that handle the major systems, such as, Warfighter Information 22 Network Tactical (WIN-T) and many of the Army Battle Command Systems (ABCS). It's a template to be replicated for other units facing similar deployments. â€œIt is been a long time coming," said Col. James Blackburn, the 75th Regimental Commander for 2SCR. "We are glad to have a common NATO communications architecture in Afghanistan." One of the challenges associated with the transition to CENTRIX was establishing the relationship between the Exchange servers, the unit [2SCR], and the digital "higher headquarters." Unlike existing, tactical Secret Internet Protocol Routing (SIPR) network servers, where units have substantial control the transition to centrix represents something much more challenging for units preparing to deploy. V VIIS SIIT T JJM MT TC CO ON NLLIIN NE E A AT T W WW WW W..H HQ QJJM MT TC C..A AR RM MY Y.. M MIILL for deployment and train as they will fight. This endeavor permits the units to immediately connect to the network upon arrival in theater, which saves more than six weeks of configuration and validation of their systems. The AMN connection also allows units, like the 2nd Stryker Cavalry Regiment (2SCR) the opportunity to create their data products, data mine it on the AMN, and to remain current with the daily situational update. The 69th Signal Battalion Operations Center in Hohenfels enabled the 2SCR to become the first unit Army wide, to prepare for deployment by training with the same network configurations they would use in Afghanistan. The network Photo courtesy of 5th Signal PAO allows the Joint Multinational Readiness Center (JMRC) to download Afghanistan Situations and to build them into the capability in Hohenfels enables support to coalition partners training scenarios for the 2SCR rotation there. during exercise rotations in both Hohenfels and Grafenwoehr. This effort will enhance the 2SCRs ability to react if faced with a similar situation in theater. During exercises, this over the systems, using CENTRIX, units are at the mercy of For the exercise, the conversion meant imaging massive a technical control facility located far from the Tactical Oper- amounts of hard drives for each ABCS system with a new ations Center and outside of the operational chain-of-command. CENTRIX product and the new Internet Protocol addresses "Ultimately we achieved our goal of migrating our servers associated with those devices. into the CENTRIX one-domain environment," said Warrant "The reconfiguration of an entire data product, and Officer Chad Jones, the Signal Systems Technician at 2SCR. imaging that product onto the hard drives was a very "Most of our problems in this process arose from the lack of time intensive process, as well as, shipping them [the privileges we were given from higher. Working through these products] to Germany in time to install and use them for problems now will result in a smoother transition into our MRE," said Jones. "The hardware tasking was even Afghanistan for 2SCR and other units to come." more difficult for the WIN-T program office because the The one domain setup means that instead of a unit operating its own domain, using its own naming conventions, or standards for naming the servers, and creating domain administrator accounts to operate. They operate as a suborganizational unit underneath the Regional Network Operations Security Center. While in theater they are subject to patches, policies and naming conventions that are pushed out by Joint Network Operations Control Center-Afghanistan. The two major hurdles of moving all of these systems onto CENTRIX are hardware and data filtering. "Data filtering is a necessary step any time you are talking about data transmission and two different enclaves. You can't have classified data being broadcast across an unclassified network for all to see," said Jones. "2SCR, along with the PMs for each system, heavily scrutinized why each system was on SIPR, be it the data that it transmitted, software embedded on the system, or databases that the system came in contact with. We have transitioned most of the system, as fielded, was only able to support two enclaves [Unclassified and U.S. Only: Secret]. " There was a lot of configuration and rearrangement of assets needed to accomplish the goal. The PEO-C3T provided subject matter experts to facilitate these changes, he said. â€?We were taking devices used to operate in the SIPR environment, and moving them to the CENTRIX side, which made a lot of program offices very wary of moving their systems over to a network open to our coalition partners, said Jones. "The intelligence community is particularly sensitive to the situation. "Although CENTRIX is a hot buzz phrase in the signal communications, Joint Operations arena, the transition to CENTRIX represents something much more challenging for units preparing to deploy, it is a fundamental shift in how a unit sees itself, the enemy and the environment. It requires coordination and cooperation. systems, but are still trying to develop solutions for others." The hardware solutions were straight-forward but, involve a lot of logistics and short timelines. This requires the cooperation from the Program Managerâ€™s office managing each individual product. This article is easily dowloaded on the web at: www.hqjmtc.army.mil 23 7th 7thUNITED UNITEDSTATES STATESARMY ARMYJOINT JOINTMULTINATIONAL MULTINATIONALTRAINING TRAININGCOMMAND COMMAND TRAINING TRAININGJOURNAL JOURNAL WINTER WINTER//SPRING SPRING2010 2010 FEATURE JMRC COIN Fundamentals T By Denver Makle, JMTC Public Affairs he Joint Multinational Readiness Center (JMRC) evaluates the proficiency of Soldier's COIN skills, while preparing for operations in Afghanistan, using the 10 Counter Insurgency (COIN) Fundamentals. "The 10 COIN Fundamentals help us provide feedback to rotational training units on what we believe are the essential fundamentals that every Soldier, leader and unit must be able to execute to a high standard to achieve mission success in Afghanistan," said Col. John M. Spiszer, commander of the operations group at the JMRC. The 10 COIN fundamentals expand on a set of criteria first developed at the U.S. Army's National Training Center (NTC) in Fort Irwin, Calif. The NTC established eight fundamentals for high intensity conflict in the '80s and '90s, and then adapted the concept to COIN in the midst of the current fight. "We did not try to create anything from scratch with the 10 COIN Fundamentals; we took a product that was originally developed by the NTC, and modified it for what we felt were the most essential 10 COIN Fundamentals that units needed to be able to perform to be successful in Afghanistan." said Spiszer. "JMRC's 10 COIN Fundamentals are continuously assessed and updated as we identify new training requirements, COIN Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures, and theater commander guidance and needs." Two additional skills were added to reinforce "tried and true," Army principles, basic small unit and Soldier skills - Composite Risk Management (CRM) and Pre-Combat Check and PreCombat Inspection (PCC/PCI). These are especially important in the decentralized operations conducted in COIN operating environments. "One of the two fundamentals we added to our list is CRM, which provides a method for systemically identifying risk factors, and ways to mitigate those risks not only to personnel or equipment, but to the overall ISAF mission," said Lt. Col. Jack L. Rich, operations officer at the JMRC. "The second fundamental we added to our list is the PCC and PCI, to reinforce the importance of this fundamental, JMRC dedicates a full-day for Troop Leading Procedures in between Situational Training Exercise (STX) Lanes to allow units time to conduct PCC and PCIs to standard." The intent is to reinforce Gen. Stanley A. McChrystal's, Commander International Security Assistance Force and U.S. Forces Afghanistan's, intent and tactical directives throughout the rotational unit's training. During the preparatory phase, leaders can influence the success on any mission - anywhere, said Rich. "We felt that PCC and PCI has a direct impact on the unit's ability to successfully perform any of the other fundamentals." The JMRC's observers, controllers, and trainers provide daily feedback to the unit leadership during STX, and force-on-force operations using these metrics. Just like NTC, the 10 COIN fundamentals use a number value of one through five; the number "three" describes proficiency in each task. A number less than "three" is below standard proficiency, while a number above "three" indicates a certain level of mastery. "This is a living-document, we regularly go through external references, and theater directives to assess the validity of the tactics and techniques. We look at these fundamentals and evaluate if these are still needed in theater," said Rich. "This is a set of metrics we use over the course of a 16-day exercise. On E1, the first day, we start observing the unit on that day." Photo : Airman 1st Class Kenny Holston 24 V VIIS SIIT T JJM MT TC CO ON NLLIIN NE E A AT T W WW WW W..H HQ QJJM MT TC C..A AR RM MY Y.. M MIILL ENGAGEMENT SKILLS (KLE) Not conducted or observed. No preparation conducted. Leader engagements conducted to standard. Unit identifies intended outcome, conducts mission analysis,wargames potential variations with talking points and rehearses the principal. CULTURAL UNDERSTANDING Not conducted or observed. Unit has smart cards and is attempting to display sensitivity towards cultural differences. Cultural understanding is conducted to standard. Unit has smart cards and is attempting to display sensitivity towards cultural differences. Cultural understanding is conducted to standard. All Soldiers have thorough understanding of cultural differences. ZOPA is identified and best alternatives to a negotiated agreement are identified for the principle and his counterpart. A recorder is present and prepared to provide objective input throughout to help the principle. Incorporates cultural understanding into patrol rehearsals. LANGUAGE CAPABILITY Not conducted or observed. No knowledge of 5 C's and 5 & 25; no knowledge of current hotspots; No knowledge of CREW implementation and Patrol/Convoy planning related to CIED; No CIED equipment on hand. All Soldiers have thorough understanding of cultural differences. Incorporates cultural understanding into patrol rehearsals. Patrol/convoy leaders, squad leaders, and TC's knowledgeable of Tier 1 hotspots and knowledge of IED indicators in AO. 75% of Soldiers trained on 5 C's and 5 & 25 procedures and using them. Soldiers maintain and use CREW. Equipment distributed properly . All Soldiers knowledgeable of Tier 1 hotspots and knowledge of IED indicators in AO. All Soldiers trained in 5 C's, 5 & 25 procedures as well as using them; All Soldiers trained on, maintaining, and using CREW. All Soldiers know the established observations guidelines. COUNTER-IED Equipment on hand not distributed or used properly; Nonspecific knowledge of IED indicators; Knowledge of 5 C's and 5 & 25 but no knowledge of locations or current status. Counter-IED conducted to standard ESCALATION OF FORCES No understanding or EOF training. Equipment and procedures trained to squad leader level, equipment on hand not distributed or used correctly, Language cards/ electronic interpreters on hand; Smart-Card/SOPs enforced. Effective use of language cars/Electronic interpreters to mitigate EOF incidents, accurate and timely reporting through the COC when an EOF incident occurs. EOF conducted to standard Thorough and complete investigation is conducted by the command within 72 hours of an incident being reported. RULES OF ENGAGEMENT No understanding or EOF training. Equipment and procedures trained to squad leader level, equipment on hand not distributed or used correctly, language cards/ electronic interpreters on hand; EOF conducted to standard. Smart-Card/SOPs enforced. Effective Thorough and complete investigation use of language cars/Electronic interpreters is conducted by the command within 72 to mitigate ROE incidents, accurate and timely hours of an incident being reported. reporting through the COC when a ROE violation occurs. PRE-COMBAT IMPLEMENTATION Not conducted. Did not check all the areas or did not fix identified problems. PCC/PCI's conducted to standard. RISK MANAGEMENT Not Done. Risks identified but not reduced. Risk Management conducted to standard. Progress of checks sent to higher, commander inspects, critical deficiencies corrected. All deficiencies ID'd and corrected. Soldiers anticipate requirement and anticipate requirements. Uses the unit's SOP, IDs and assesses hazards, develops control measures; disseminates. Continues to refine and update the risk assessment; tracks risk levels, IDs different types of risk. EVERY SOLDIER A SENSOR / TACTICAL QUESTIONING No understanding of tactical questioning. Sporadic, ineffective, Smart Cards on-hand, understanding of JUMPs, Understanding of TCP Screening Systematically and routinely conducts: patrol preparation, currency of info and debriefing process as it relates to the 4Bs, ROE/EOF, IO Talking points, Tips. All Soldiers have thorough understanding of the situation. Soldiers study and memorize HVI, BOLO lists, etc. Proficient use of interpreter, Communication aids, or Personal command of target language. EVERY SOLDIER AN AMBASSADOR Not present. No formalized individual or collective training conducted. Soldiers don't have or aren't using language cards/aids. Unit has smart cards and is attempting to display sensitivity towards cultural differences. Use common and accepted hand gestures in normal conversations, carefully treats cultural considerations in all meetings/ contact with indigenous people. Language cards on hand, use of key phrases, language customs understood and interpreters incorporated. Enforced, Effective All Soldiers have thorough understanding of cultural differences. Use of language tools while interacting with locals. Leaders are enforcing key phrase memorization and rehearsals with interpreters. Feedback assessed, incorporated into next patrol/targeting cycle. SALUTE report submitted to S2 or HUMINT Collection Team (HCT) using the Smartcard's "Indicators of CI/HUMINT Interest" & SALUTE format reference. Feedback assessed, incorporated into next patrol/targeting cycle. Incorporates cultural understanding into patrol rehearsals. Unit integrates on hand trained or native linguists, is communicating effectively with locals at all levels. 25 7th 7thUNITED UNITEDSTATES STATESARMY ARMYJOINT JOINTMULTINATIONAL MULTINATIONALTRAINING TRAININGCOMMAND COMMAND TRAINING TRAININGJOURNAL JOURNAL WINTER WINTER//SPRING SPRING2010 2010 FEATURE JMSC: Feeding reality into simulations training units with real-world feeds from Afghanistan A By Maj. Robert E. Young, Joint Multinational Simulations Center ccording to the Army Chief of Staff's Training and Leader Development Guidance for Fiscal year 2010-11, "Corps and Division headquarters and Brigade Combat Teams (BCT) that are required to deploy . . . execute a Combat Training Center-supported mission rehearsal/ readiness exercise (MRE/MRX), prior to deployment. Similarly, functional and support brigades execute an 'MRX-like' culminating training event, supported by the Battle Command Training Program or the Centers of Excellence." The Joint Multinational Training Command maintains the capability to conduct both types of events. While the Joint Multinational Readiness Center (JMRC) provides support to the BCT, the Joint Multinational Simulations Center (JMSC) provides the capability to provide "MRX-like" training events for functional and support units within U.S. Army Europe (USAREUR). During Dec. 2009, the 95th Military Police Battalion (95th MP Bn.) completed a JMSC supported "MRX-like" event, a master-events list, simulations-supported, command post exercise in preparation for a Police Transition Team (PTT) mission in Afghanistan in support of International Security Assistance Force Afghanistan. The JMSC provided the unit with access to a realistic Common Operating Picture (COP). "Being able to provide a realistic COP allows units deploying to different parts of the world to conduct operations supporting the nation's interests and to train in the environment that they will operate out of when they arrive at their destination.â€? said Maj. Jose G. Collado, deputy chief of the models and simulations branch at the JMSC. "They [the units] can plan and rehearse missions and contingencies without real world consequences, and become familiar with the area of operation, and take charge of that area almost seamlessly when they arriveâ€?. During the exercise there were two feeds. The first, the realworld feed, provided current unit position reports for ground and air, as well as access to significant activities for adjacent units. The second, the simulation feed provided control of the battalion's military police units. The combination of both tools provided a realistic and dynamic operating picture that supported current operations training objectives, while also providing access to accurate and relevant information to drive unit assessment and planning of future operations. This exercise design construct also facilitated the integration and use of the MP battalion's battle command systems focusing on Command Post of the Future, Distributed Common Ground System-Army, and Force XXI Battle Command for Brigade and Below. The JMSC provided access to additional web-based and communications assets including Microsoft Internet Relay Chat, Joint Training Counter-Improvised 26 live unit/air simulation air simulation unit Explosive Device Operations Integration Center (JTCOIC), Adobe Connect Services, and FM radio replication through Voice over Internet Protocols. These tools enhanced the realism of the event by providing access to the same tools and data used by units currently in theater. Units scheduling these types of events require higher headquarters, USAREUR, and JMTC resources to create a realistic training event, and should submit a request for training at least 180 days prior to the start of any training event. The request should be sent through their normal command channels to USAREUR and identify the type of JMTC support needed. This process facilitates the training management process, ensures command support, and allows JMTC to leverage all aspects of its training capability to provide units with training that allows forces and leaders to dominate in Full Spectrum Operations in any environment, under all conditions. our new jmsc digital university courses: battle command systems executive seminar (bcses) four-hour overview of key army battle command systems (abcs) and their integration into staff processes and battle drills Target Audience: battle captains, commanders digital master warfighter (dmw) four varients (40 hours each): intelligence, supply, Command and Control and Artillery Target Audience: system operators and cell ncos & officers battle command system of systems (bcsos) 24-hour course emphasizing the integration of ABCS into TOCs target audience: battle ncos and officers V VIIS SIIT T JJM MT TC CO ON NLLIIN NE E A AT T W WW WW W..H HQ QJJM MT TC C..A AR RM MY Y.. M MIILL Flexible structure leverages power of the 18th CSSB By Maj. Jerome K. Barnard, 18th Combat Sustainment Support Battalion understanding the organizational design of a T combat sustainment support battalion he 18th Combat Sustainment Support Battalion (CSSB) leveraged partnership training events and trained deploying units despite common challenges related to a condensed Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN) timeline, and the degradation of habitual support relationships with combat arms units with in its Bavarian footprint. Understanding the challenges means one has to understand the organizational design of a CSSB. The doctrinal organization, a CSSB is not fixed, battalions are tailored to meet specific mission requirements to provide support on an area basis. A CSSB may have anywhere from three to eight subordinate companies supporting units in or passing through an area of operations; this could be a Brigade Support Battalion (BSB) and/or non-brigade aligned units. CSSBs do not necessarily deploy as entire battalions. They deploy individual companies, platoons, or detachments into theaters of operation determined by theater requirements. This deployment methodology has dictated the battalion’s subordinate companies into different stages in the ARFORGEN process at the same time. The Headquarters Company, which is the center of gravity for command and control, is very often out of cycle with its units. This fact contributes to the difficulty in exercising the battalion’s full command capabilities during any single exercise. For the 18th CSSB Headquarters this has meant that their train up and mission readiness exercises have not included all its' subordinate companies or a supported unit. The battalion’s Joint Multinational Readiness Center (JMRC) rotations have relied heavily upon higher and lower headquarters cells to inject events from a Master Scenario Events List (MSEL). a partnership between the Ammunition Center in Europe (ACE) and the 18th CSSB, established several mission support exercises that included the 1st Inland Cargo Transfer Company (ICTC) and the 23rd Ordnance (ORD) Company. The 1st ICTC established central receiving and shipping point (CRSP) yard operations, moving and tracking hundreds of containers of ammunition. The 23rd ORD broke down ammunition pallets, repacked, and prepared ammunition for distribution throughout USAREUR or return to the United States. These exercises provided the two companies with training opporcssb: understanding tunities they don’t normally the challenges have otherwise. The exercises also served as part of 1st ICTC’s road to war training for deploying platoons and provided much needed support to ACE. The battalion’s continued partnership with ACE helps ensure proficiency for six MOS’s and helps with ARFORGEN training challenges. The 18th CSSB has planned a Photo : USAREUR PAO Field Training Exercise (FTX) CSSB executing command and control that allows the battalion to train as a whole, of 2,480 Combat Logistics Patrols, and exercising it’s full command capabilities. covering 2,785,000 miles, during the The battalion conducts the 14-day culpast two deployments. The condensed minating FTX to prepare the battalion ARFORGEN timeline experienced by many to operate as part of a combined, joint units within Bavaria is demanding, with and multinational team across the full most units deploying three times within spectrum of operational environments. the past six years. Constant deployment The Headquarters establishes a Tactical and reset has left many units little time Command Post and Tactical Operations to posture themselves to establish support Center for command and control of the missions and relationships in garrison that exercise. In addition, the staff receives allow the support operations to exercise training from JMRC on systems, such as sustainment management and the oper- the Command Post of the Future, during this training, which ensures command ational control of logistics. The developing partnerships within and control training readiness. The Joint Multinational Training Command in Grafenwoehr, Germany, provided support for the development of realistic scenarios as part of the rotations. The battalion headquarters received the latest technology for training, and instruction to the command and staff. The instruction for the battalion’s last two deployments has included training on the Blue Force Tracker, Air Ground Integration, Battle Command Sustainment Support System, MEDEVAC procedures, and Counter Radio Controlled Improvised Explosive Device Electronic Warfare. This training translated into the 18th USAREUR support agencies and leveraging USAREUR level exercises to provide the additional MOS training to units to mitigate the battalion’s training challenges is one of the keys to success. For example, This article available on the web at: www.hqjmtc.army.mil 27 7th 7thUNITED UNITEDSTATES STATESARMY ARMYJOINT JOINTMULTINATIONAL MULTINATIONALTRAINING TRAININGCOMMAND COMMAND THE LAST WORD Peace cannot be kept by force; it can only be achieved by understanding. Albert Einstein TRAINING TRAININGJOURNAL JOURNAL WINTER WINTER//SPRING SPRING2010 2010 “Power is not revealed by striking hard or often but by striking true.” Honore de Balzac French Writer and Patriot Mathematician and Physicist If you have knowledge, let others light their candles with it. “Perseverance is more prevailing than violence; and many things which cannot be overcome when they are together, yield themselves up when taken bit by bit.” Winston Churchill British WWII Prime Minister Persuasion, perseverance Ancient Greek Biographer and Author and patience are the best advocates on questions depending on the will The most glorious of others. A good cause moments in life are is often injured more not the so-called days by the ill-timed efforts of success, but from of its friends than by the arguments of its enemies. Plutarch “Any fool can criticize, condemn and complain and most fools do.” Benjamin Franklin American Statesman those days when out of dejection and real despair you feel rise in you a challenge to life, and the promise of future accomplishments. “The first thing is to be honest with yourself. You can never have an impact on society if you have not changed yourself... The great peacemakers are all people of integrity, honesty and humility.” “Whatever you do, you need courage. Whatever course you decide upon, there is always someone to tell you that you are wrong. There are always difficulties arising that tempt you to believe your critics are right. To map out a course of action and follow it to an end requires some of the same courage that a soldier needs. Peace has its victories, but it takes brave men and women to win them. Gustave Flaubert Nelson Mandala Ralph Waldo Emerson French Author 28 Thomas Jefferson US President and Author of the Declaration of Independence South African president and Statesman U.S. Author, Essayist and Lecturer. V VIIS SIIT T JJM MT TC CO ON NLLIIN NE E A AT T W WW WW W..H HQ QJJM MT TC C..A AR RM MY Y.. M MIILL PRE–DEPLOYMENT AFGHANISTAN READING LIST instructions: These reading lists are divided into three distinct levels tailored to the rank and mission role deploying members will most likely fulfill. The Tactical Level list is designed for deploying E1-E3 personnel, the Small Unit Leaders list is designed for deploying E4-E6 and O1-O3 personnel and the Operational/ Strategic Planners list is designed for deploying E7-E9 and O4-O6 personnel. tactical level small unit leaders operational / strategic planners Revised COMISAF Tactical Directive (6 July 2009) published by COMISAF Revised COMISAF Tactical Directive (6 July 2009) published by COMISAF Commander’s Initial Guidance (13 June 2009; available AFPAK SIPR Portal) published by COMISAF Commander’s Initial Guidance (13 June 2009; available AFPAK SIPR Portal) published by COMISAF Revised COMISAF Tactical Directive (6 July 2009) published by COMISAF Small Unit Leader’s Guide to Counterinsurgency published by USMC Counter-Insurgency – Commander’s Guidance by LTG Sir Graeme Lamb Commander’s Initial Guidance (13 June 2009; available AFPAK SIPR Portal) published by COMISAF MCIA Afghanistan Cultural Field Guide and MCIA Afghanistan Culture Smart Card published by the Marine Corps Intelligence Activity Twenty–Eight Articles: Fundamentals of Company Level Counterinsurgency by Dr. David Kilcullen Counter-Insurgency – Commander’s Guidance by LTG Sir Graeme Lamb MCIA Afghanistan Cultural Field Guide and MCIA Afghanistan Culture Smart Card published by the Marine Corps Intelligence Activity Afghanistan: A Military History by Stephen Tanner The Fragmentation of Afghanistan: State Formation and Collapse in the International System, by Barnett Rubin Afghanistan 101 by Ehsan M Entezar Descent into Chaos: The U.S. and the Disaster in Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Central Asia by Ahmed Rashid Taliban: Militant Islam, Oil and Fundamentalism in Central Asia by Ahmed Rashid The Soviet Afghan War: How a Superpower Fought and Lost by Russian General Staff Afghanistan 101 by Ehsan M. Entezar Jihad: The Rise of Militant Islam in Central Asia by Ahmed Rashid Taliban: Militant Islam, Oil and Fundamentalism in Central Asia by Ahmed Rashid The Battle for Peace: A Frontline Vision of America’s Power and Purpose by General Anthony Zinni Afghanistan’s Cave Complexes 1979 – 2004 by Mir Bahmanyar Counter-Insurgency – Commander’s Guidance by LTG Sir Graeme Lamb Afghanistan’s Cave Complexes 1979 – 2004 by Mir Bahmanyar Three Cups of Tea: One Man's Mission to Promote Peace...One School at a Time by Greg Mortenson and David Oliver Relin Hezbollah by Hala Jaber Hezbollah by Hala Jaber Three Cups of Tea: One Man's Mission to Promote Peace...One School at a Time by Greg Mortenson and David Oliver Relin MCDP 1, Warfighting published by the USMC Soldiers of God: With Islamic Warriors in Afghanistan and Pakistan by Robert Kaplan 6 Nightmares: The Real Threats to American Security by Anthony Lake Pakistan: Eye of the Storm by Bennett Jones Hezbollah by Hala Jaber Afghanistan’s Endless War: State Failure, Regional Politics, and the Rise of the Taliban by Larry Goodson The Punishment of Virtue by Sarah Chayes The Savage Wars of Peace: Small Wars and the Rise of American Power by Max Boot Three Cups of Tea: One Man's Mission to Promote Peace...One School at a Time by Greg Mortenson and David Oliver Relin The Other Side of the Mountain: Mujahideen Tactics in the Soviet–Afghan War by Ali Ahmad Jalali and Lester Grau Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife: Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam by John Nagl The Bear Went Over the Mountain: Soviet Combat Tactics in Afghanistan by Lester Grau War In The Shadows: The Guerrilla In History by Robert Asprey additional readings: additional readings: Additional Small Unit Leader Readings: War In the Shadows: The Guerrilla In History by Robert Asprey Additional Operational/Strategic Planner Readings: MCDP 1-1, Strategy and MCDP 1-2, Campaigning published by the USMC Afghan Guerilla Warfare: In the Words of the Mujahideen Fighters by Ali Ahmad Jalali & Lester Grau The Great Game: The Struggle for Empire in Central Asia by Peter Hopkirk Through Our Enemies' Eyes: Osama bin Laden, Radical Islam, and the Future of America by Michael Scheuer The Sole Spokesman: Jinnah, the Muslim League and the Demand for Pakistan by Ayesha Jalal additional readings: Tactics of the Crescent Moon: Militant Muslim Combat Methods by H. John Poole and Ray Smith War at the Top of the World: The Struggle for Afghanistan, Kashmir and Tibet by Eric Margolis Small Unit Leader’s Guide to Counterinsurgency published by COMISAFUSMC Soldier Sahibs: The Daring Adventurers Who Tamed India's Northwest Frontier by Charles Alan Culture and Customs of Afghanistan published by Hafizullah Emadi Reaping the Whirlwind: Afghanistan, Al Qa'ida and the Holy War by Michael Griffin Jihad: The Rise of Militant Islam in Central Asia by Ahmed Rashid The Man Who Would Be King: The First American in Afghanistan by Ben Macintyre The Kite Runner (FICTION NOVEL) by Khaled Hosseini Afghanistan: A Short History of Its People and Politics by Martin Ewans A Thousand Splendid Suns (FICTIONAL NOVEL) by Khaled Hosseini MCDP 3, Tactics and MCDP 6, Command and Control published by the USMC Flashman: A Novel (FICTION NOVEL) by George MacDonald Fraser Flashman: A Novel (FICTION NOVEL) by George MacDonald Fraser Afghan Guerilla Warfare: In the Words of the Mujahideen Fighters by Ali Ahmad Jalali and Lester Grau The Osama Bin Laden I Know: An Oral History by Peter Bergen Imperial Hubris by Michael Scheuer Ghost Wars by Steve Coll The Village by Bing West Afghanistan by Louis Dupree Flashman: A Novel (FICTION NOVEL) by George MacDonald Fraser G AR NI N ITED STATES A L TR AI OFFICIAL MILITARY MAIL UN T IO N NA M CO H I LT 7T MM AN D www.hqjmtc.army.mil APO AE 09114 Unit 28130 bldg.123, room 101 public affairs office hq. 7th army jmtc training command joint multinational 7th united states army J O UR N A L T R A I N I N G JMTC Y U TM JO IN RECYCLE postage and fees paid by u.s. department of defense