Journal of Catalan Intellectual History by Institut d'Estudis Catalans

English edition

2014 Issues 7&8

Journal of Catalan Intellectual History Revista d’Història de la Filosofia Catalana

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Print ISSN: 2014-1572 Online ISSN: 2014-1564 Print ISSN: 2014-1572

issues Journal of Catalan 7&8 Intellectual History

2014

Revista d’Història de la Filosofia Catalana

JOCIH The Journal of Catalan Intellectual History (JOCIH) is a biannual electronic and printed publication created with the twofold purpose of fostering and disseminating studies on Catalan Philosophy and Intellectual History at an international level. The Journal’s Internet version is published in Catalan and English at the Open Journal System of the Institute of Catalan Studies (IEC) and its paper version is published in English by Huygens Editorial, Barcelona. The JOCIH is edited by four Catalan public universities – the Autonomous University of Barcelona (UAB), the University of Barcelona (UB), the University of Valencia (UV) and the University of the Balearic Islands (UIB) – and by three academic societies – the Catalan Philosophical Society, the Valencian Philosophical Society and the Mallorcan Philosophical Association. The JOCIH also draws on the support of the Institute of Catalan Studies (IEC), the Institute of Law and Technology at the Autonomous University of Barcelona (IDT-UAB) and the Ramon Llull Institute.

CONTENTS

editorial afers http://revistes.iec.cat/index.php/JOCIH Print ISSN: 2014-1572 // Online ISSN: 2014-1564

As its name suggests, our journal focuses mainly on philosophy. However, we also understand intellectual history, in a broader sense, to be a synonymous with cultural heritage and the JOCIH therefore regards cultural history, the history of ideas and the history of philosophy as different branches of a single tree. And for that reason we not only publish historical analyses of various subjects in philosophy, the humanities, the social sciences, religion, art and other related subjects, but also offer critical reviews of the latest publications in the field, memory documentaries and exhaustive bio-bibliographies of various eighteenth- to twentyfirst-century Catalan, Valencian, Balearic and Northern Catalan authors.

issues 7&8

2014

editorial afers

Journal of Catalan Intellectual History

issues 7&8

2014

Journal of Catalan Intellectual History

2014

editorial afers

Journal of Catalan Intellectual History Issues 7&8, 2014

Editors-in-Chief Pompeu Casanovas (Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona) Joan Cuscó (Societat Catalana de Filosofia) Josep Monserrat (Universitat de Barcelona) Xavier Serra (Societat Catalana de Filosofia) Scientific Board Ramon Alcoberro (Universitat de Girona) Jesús Alcolea (Universitat de València) Misericòrdia Anglès (Universitat de Barcelona) Salvador Cardús (Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona) Enric Casaban (Universitat de València) Jordi Casassas (Universitat de Barcelona) Antoni Estradé (Independent researcher) Montserrat Guibernau (Queen Mary University of London) Salvador Giner (Institut d’Estudis Catalans) Thomas Glick (Boston University) Tobies Grimaltos (Universitat de València) Pere Lluís Font (Institut d’Estudis Catalans) Joan Lluís Llinàs (Universitat Illes Balears) Jaume Magre (Universitat de Barcelona) Isidre Molas (Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona) Antoni Mora (Societat Catalana de Filosofia) Carles Ulisses Moulines (Ludwig Maximilians Universität München) Vicent Olmos (Universitat de València) Joan Lluís Pérez Francesch (Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona) Joan Ramon Resina (Stanford University) Ignasi Roviró (Universitat Ramon Llull) Jordi Sales (Universitat de Barcelona) Josep-Maria Vilajosana (Universitat Pompeu Fabra) Conrad Vilanou (Universitat de Barcelona) Executive Committee Meritxell Fernández Barrera (Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona) Marta Lorente Serichol (Societat Catalana de Filosofia) Marta Poblet (Royal Melbourne Institut of Technology) Marta Roca Escoda (Université de Lausanne) Joan-Josep Vallbé (Universitat de Barcelona) Editing Institutions Institut de Dret i Tecnologia (IDT-UAB) Societat Catalana de Filosofia, filial de l’Institut d’Estudis Catalans Associació Filosòfica de les Illes Balears Societat de Filosofia del País Valencià Institut Ramon Llull

English edition Language Editor D. Sam Abrams Translation Dan Cohen, Joe Graham, Valerie J. Miles, Barnaby Noone Journal Management Enkeleda Xhelo (Institut d’Estudis Catalans) Blanca Betriu (Societat Catalana de Filosofia) Rebeca Varela (IDT-UAB) Jorge González (IDT-UAB) Edition Editorial Afers Apartat de correus 267 46470 Catarroja http://www.editorialafers.cat http://revistes.iec.cat/index.php/JOCIH http://ddd.uab.cat/record/112087 Print ISSN: 2014-1572 Online ISSN: 2014-1564 Dipòsit Legal B-14929-2011

La reproducció total o parcial d’aquesta publicació, incloent-hi el disseny de la coberta, resta prohibida. Així mateix, no pot ésser emmagatzemada o tramesa de cap manera ni per cap mitjà, compresos la reprografia i el tractament informàtic, elèctric, químic, mecànic, òptic, o bé de gravació, sense la prèvia autorització de la marca editorial. La distribució d’exemplars mitjançant lloguer o préstec públics resta rigorosament prohibida sense l’autorització escrita del titular del copyright, i estarà sotmesa a les sancions establertes per la llei.

contents JOURNAL OF CATALAN INTELLECTUAL HISTORY, Issues 7&8, 2014 | Print ISSN 2014-1572 / Online ISSN 2014-1564 http://revistes.iec.cat/index.php/JOCIH

Issues 7&8 Preface..............................................................................................

articles

Three theses on the historiography and ontology of Ferrater Mora. Pompeu Casanovas.................................................................................

On Josep Ferrater Mora’s integrationism: the possibility of oscillating. Jordi Sales....................................................................................

Ferrater Mora: political ideas. Josep-Maria Terricabras..............................

Tradition and renovation: the formation of Balmes and Martí d’Eixalà in their historic context. Rafael Ramis Barceló & Josep M. Vilajosana............

Machiavelli translated into Catalan: textual and editorial choices. Gabriella Gavagnin..........................................................................................................

Ramon Valls (1928-2011): The agonist of «we». Gonçal Mayos..............

memoirs

Three essential (unpublished) letters written by Josep Ferrater Mora to the sociologist Salvador Giner.......................................................

109

life-writting

Josep Ferrater Mora. Josep Maria Terricabras & Damià Bardera. ....................

117

reviews

Josep Ferrater Mora, Les formes de la vida catalana [The Character of Catalan Life]. Joan Cuscó..................................................................

159

Journal of Catalan Intellectual History. Issues 7&8. 2014. P. 7-8

Óscar Horta, La filosofia moral de Josep Ferrater Mora. Begoña Román...

163

José Ferrater Mora, Three Spanish Philosophers. Unamuno, Ortega and Ferrater Mora. Josep Monserrat Molas.......................................................

167

Pau Milà i Fontanals, Apunts d’estètica. Eduard Urgell. ............................

171

Ignasi Roviró Alemany (ed.), Estètica catalana, estètica europea. Estudis d’estètica: entre la tradició i l’actualitat. Mireia Jurado.................................

174

Crowdfunding Culture in Catalonia: The Revival of Civil Society? Marta Poblet..........................................................................................

177

preface JOURNAL OF CATALAN INTELLECTUAL HISTORY, Issues 7&8, 2014 | Print ISSN 2014-1572 / Online ISSN 2014-1564 P. 9-10 http://revistes.iec.cat/index.php/JOCIH

This special issue is dedicated to the memory of the philosopher Josep Maria Ferrater Mora (1912-1991) on the occasion of the centenary of his birth. There are many reasons to produce an issue such as this one. Ferrater Mora was the leading Catalan philosopher of the twentieth century and a distinguished essayist in several languages. Useful and clear, his extensive writings not only reached a wide audience, but are characterised by original speculation. Indeed, much of his work remains valid today, inviting reinterpretation and extension. Also, from the standpoint of intellectual history, the study of his contributions and personal journey are crucial to gaining a clear understanding of the revival of Catalan thought between 1955 and 1975, Franco’s military dictatorship notwithstanding. Beyond that, Ferrater Mora was the only Catalan philosopher of his time who conquered the Catalan and Latin American publishing markets and then set out to make an impact in the diffuse and challenging Anglo-Saxon arena as well. While some of Ferrater’s writing on logic, epistemology and philosophy of language are now of little more than historical interest, his work in the latter two areas was highly influential at the time and it does reveal his strivings and learning process. By contrast, his works in ethics, ontology and intellectual history — take, for example, the organisation, structure and content of his monumental dictionary — continue to have a wide appeal and they may yet provide a source of inspiration for future scholars and philosophers. Centres such as the Ferrater Mora Chair in Girona and the Ferrater Mora Oxford Centre for Animal Ethics are clear examples of his later impact. Researchers such as Carlos Nieto, Òscar Horta, Antoni Mora, Jordi Gracia and Narcís Garolera — to name but five picked from a broad spectrum — have shown renewed interest in his work. The excellent initiative of the Ferrater Mora Chair to digitise and disseminate the man’s extensive collected letters (totalling nearly 7,000) has made it possible to delve more deeply into his life and thought, which had previously elicited memorable texts, such as Josep Pla’s portrait in the series on important figures collected under the title Homenots. Even so, we still do not have a significant number of academic studies that provide a thorough analysis of Ferrater’s oeuvre as a whole and in its particulars, including his essays and his neglected fiction. In this spirit, we have

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gathered in this issue a number of pieces written for the two-day conference dedicated to Ferrater Mora, held on 7 November 2012 in the Josep Viader Auditorium at the Casa de Cultura in Girona and on 8 November at the Institute for Catalan Studies in Barcelona. For our part, we have focused on analysing aspects of Ferrater Moraâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s philosophical thought. We also bring to light three unpublished letters written by the philosopher to Salvador Giner, and offer an up dated bibliography kindly given to us by the Ferrater Mora Chair of Girona.

article JOURNAL OF CATALAN INTELLECTUAL HISTORY, Issues 7&8, 2014 | Print ISSN 2014-1572 / Online ISSN 2014-1564 DOI: 10.2436/20.3001.02.85 | P. 11-30 Reception date: 8/11/2013 / Admission date: 12/12/2013 http://revistes.iec.cat/index.php/JOCIH

hree theses on the historiography and ontology of Ferrater Mora Pompeu Casanovas Institute of Law and Technology Autonomous University of Barcelona pompeu.casanovas@uab.cat

abstract This paper advances three theses on the link between ontology and history in Ferrater Mora’s works: (i) his intellectual history is a second-order semantic history, (ii) his ontology may be defined as a second-order hermeneutics, and (iii) his philosophy (which he called integrationism) consists of a second-order dialogue that, despite its limitations, comes to make sense within the latest generation of the Web. The paper also considers the role of computational ontologies in the management and organisation of philosophical contents.

key words Ferrater Mora, ontology, ontologies, intellectual history, philosophy of history, integrationism.

1. Three theses on Ferrater Let me begin directly by spelling out the three theses that I would like to defend1: 1. Ferrater’s brand of intellectual history — I am referring to the history constructed in his Dictionary2 and related articles — constitutes a second-order semantic history. 1 This paper is a revised version of a text presented at a conference devoted to the philosopher and essayist Josep Ferrater Mora (Barcelona 1912-1991) in commemoration of the centenary of his birth, organised jointly by the IEC and the Ferrater Mora Chair in Barcelona and Girona, respectively, on 7 and 8 November 2012. The reader can find the original and much more extensive essay on these three theses in the Anuari de la Societat Catalana de Filosofia, XXIV (2013) (forthcoming), under the title “Josep Ferrater Mora i la història intel·lectual: mètode, ontologia i ontologies”. A presentation on Ferrater’s intellectual journey was given on 23 August 2012, with videoconferencing available too, at the Catalan Summer School at Prada as part of a course on the philosophies of exile, coordinated by Xavier Serra and Josep Monserrat. I trust that these three theses will not be mistaken for “encyclopaedism”, a view of Ferrater’s work as a “repository of ideas” that has been argued against by Antoni Mora based on a literary and political reading of Ferrater. Cf. “La ironia i l’apocalipsi”, in La filosofia de Ferrater Mora, Documenta Universitaria, Ferrater Mora Chair, Girona, 2007.

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2. Ferrater’s ontology (and epistemology), which is apparently a metaphysics of cognition and language, constitutes in reality a second-order hermeneutics corresponding to the history above and to the philosophy of history that guided him in the making of the Dictionary. 3. The elucidation of ontology — of answering the question “what is there?” as Quine put it — led him to engage in a second-order dialogue, an “integrationist” trans-ontology that seeks to describe problems more than to debate solutions. This approach only comes to make sense with the dramatic change heralded by Internet and the second generation of the Web. The intellectual legacy of this dialogue takes on a dimension that it did not formerly possess, and its impact may be felt in the contemporary philosophical discussion of networks such as the one contained in the Dictionary and the history within it: a vast repository of knowledge produced from guiding principles and ontological suppositions. I will not here address the three existing computational ontologies for classifying and managing philosophical content (PhilO, Philosurfical, InPhO)3. I mention them at the outset because Ferrater, fifty years ago, had to raise the question that we are now asking ourselves: what is the structure and organisation of philosophy? He responded with the tools at hand: conceptual analysis, history and classical ontology. My intention is to show how they link together.

2. The intellectual journey Situating a philosopher is always a complex undertaking. Exile was a drama both leaving and coming back4. In our case, Ferrater was one of the thinkers of the Spanish Second Republic who went into exile and never returned. Indeed, Antoni Mora has observed that, unlike writers, poets and novelists such

2 The Diccionario de Filosofía [Dictionary of Philosophy] ran through six editions, from 1941 to 1979, with revisions and additions made by the author. Starting with the 1994 edition, the Dictionary has been edited by Josep Maria Terricabras. The edition of 1979 contains 3,589 pages in four volumes. The total number of entries is 3,154, broken down as follows: (i) people, 1,756; (ii) concepts, including special terms and locutions, 1,398. The cross-references in alphabetical order total over 2,000 in number. 3 The first, PhilO, appeared thanks to Barry Smith and the tradition of classic Austrian phenomenology. The second, Philosurfical, is strictly computational and appeared thanks to Michele Passin’s work with Enrico Motta at the Knowledge Media Institute (Open University). The third corresponds to Colin Allen’s team at the Indiana Philosophy Ontology Project (InPhO, with ties to the Stanford Philosophy Encyclopedia), a project updated on a monthly basis to this day. 4 See Julià Guillamon, Literatures de l’exili, Diputació de Barcelona, Barcelona, 2005; Jordi Gràcia, “Los avatares de la cordura”, in Variaciones de un filósofo, Biblioteca del Exilio, Ed. do Castro, A Coruña, 2005, pp. 7-67.

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as Agustí Bartra, Xavier Benguerel, Anna Murià and Pere Quart, not a single philosopher did come back5. Perhaps one of the reasons for this lies in the fact that the creativity of the philosopher, especially one with Ferrater’s encyclopaedic and encyclopaedist spirit, depends partly on easy access to ideas and books. Libraries and books are crucial, and this raw material could no longer be found in his country of origin. There was one field, which we might call literary or philosophical Hispanism, that represented a middle way between thought and literature and it could be adopted as a kind of calling card or emergency laissez-passer. Manuel Duran explained this very well in an interview given to the journal Insula in 19646. We are also indebted to him for an intriguing theory on the diverse sources or original sedimentary foundations of thinkers in exile: In us, a geological cross-section would reveal several layers, a deep base of Spanish “crystalline rocks” and a series of sediments — French, Mexican; these are perhaps the most discernible: we have lived in Mexico for twelve, thirteen, fifteen years: for us, it is a second country — and above these, there are several layers of US sediment7.

Doubtless, Ferrater’s “crystalline rock” was his Catalan cultural or educational grounding, which he not only never denied but took care to reaffirm time and again, sometimes quite forcefully8. There are many indications of this, such as in the frequent expressions and turns of phrase that seep through his writing in Spanish and that he left uncorrected, I suspect deliberately so. For example, “hilar delgado” instead of “hilar fino” [to “split hairs” in English] , or in his use of “si más no”, or in the examples in Catalan alongside French, 5 Antoni Mora, “La filosofia catalana a l’exili. Notes per a un estudi”, Enrahonar, 10 (2005), pp. 17-28. 6 José-Ramón Marra López,“Entrevista con Manuel Durán”, Insula, 252 (November 1967), pp. 6-7, interview with Marra-López, cit. in Marta Noguer, Carlos Guzmán, 2005, p. 121. 7 Marta Noguer, Carlos Guzmán,“La obra crítica de Manuel Durán”, Escritos. Revista del Centro de Ciencias del Lenguaje, 32 (July-December 2005), Autonomous University of Puebla, pp. 109-130. 8 E.g. in an interview for El Basilisco, Gustavo Bueno’s journal, Ferrater was asked the following question:“One of the acute problems facing Spain today is the question of autonomous regions, the rising tide of nationalism, regionalism and even cantonalism. Does your being Catalan by birth put you in the middle of this issue, does it somehow commit you to Catalanism, or can you keep a critical distance from that ‘seny’ of the Catalan bourgeoisie?” Ferrater’s written response was unusually direct: “A Catalan cannot stop being a Catalanist, if only in reaction against the hurdles that have been put in the way of Catalan life and culture. If being a Catalanist in this sense is equivalent to being a nationalist, then so be it ...” adding,“I would merely point out that — as far as ‘the rising tide of nationalism’ goes — there is a solution that is very sensible in principle, yet as almost nobody believes in it, it cannot be politically sensible: the federalist solution. Perhaps one day it will be thought of again, but without the bitter aftertaste of the nineteenth century that almost always comes with it” (p. 58). Elena Ronzón, Alberto Hidalgo, Manuel F. Lorenzo,“Entrevista a José Ferrater Mora”, El Basilisco, 12 (January-October 1981), pp. 52-58.

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English and German ones. Or by the inclusion of Catalan philosophers in his Dictionary, such as Father Xiberta, Joaquim Xirau and Serra Hunter (which he could perfectly well have left out), thus implicitly acknowledging the existence of the School of Barcelona9. Or by his attention to the character of Catalan life in perhaps his most popular essay outside the circle of specialists, which he wrote in Chile in 1944 and reprised in his acceptance of an honorary doctorate from the Autonomous University of Barcelona, in 197910. Later, he was to make further remarks on the subject, adding nuance to his interpretation11. It seems to me that this primary sediment did not furnish Ferrater with a philosophy or a set of specific theses, but rather a way of going about it, a “frame of mind” as J. L. L. Aranguren put it, with which he seriously and professionally confronted the contexts and environments in which and with which he had to live, dealing faithfully with lived experience. This includes a host of things that are not merely intellectual: poor health, experiences of death (the dead of the Civil War)12, the gruelling experience of “earning a living” in trade before the war to pay for his studies in Barcelona13. Also present, undeniably, was the analytical and methodical passion of the philosopher, but always grounded in concrete, practical experience, which we shall see served

9 Eduard Nicol, “L’École de Barcelona”, Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale, 69:3 (July-September 1964), pp. 258-275. 10 The tendencies indicated by Ferrater in 1944 are: continuity, common sense, measure and irony. When he received his honorary doctorate from the UAB, he gave an address entitled “Reflections on Philosophy in Catalonia” (1979) in which he distinguished between “tendencies” and “attitudes”, which were loosely constant and could be combined into “elements”: “Of what elements do I speak? I see four that seem important to me: faithfulness to reality; a predisposition to form contracts, i.e., a pactism that does not reject compromise as long as no essential value must be given up; professionalism, and the desire for clarity”. See Les formes de la vida catalana i altres assaigs, Ed. 62/la Caixa, Barcelona (1980) 1991, p. 127. 11 “The colleagues who have reproached me for an excessive idealisation are more than justified.” See the conversation published by Salvador Giner, “Josep Ferrater Mora. Una entrevista”, in Enrahonar. Quaderns de Filosofia, 10, Catalan Philosophers in Exile, pp. 173-178. See also the foreword written by Giner himself, “Meditació sobre Catalunya. A guisa de proemi per a Les formes de la vida catalana”, in the new publication of this text. 12 Biruté Ciplijauskaité, a Hispanist and former student at Bryn Mawr whose doctoral theses had been supervised by Ferrater, recalls some verses of Rilke that Ferrater often quoted: “O Herr, gib jedem seinen eignen Tod” (“Oh Lord, award to each his fitting death”. Cf. “’Sacar de ti tu mejor tú’: un escorzo de José Ferrater Mora”, Hispania, 80:2 (May 1997), pp. 280-282. A fascinating view of this essential aspect of Ferrater’s thought can be gained from a look at the unpublished notes of Manuel Sacristán that Salvador López Arnal has recently brought to light in Cinco historias lógicas y un cuento breve, http://www.rebelion.org/docs/104376.pdf, 2010, pp. 14ff. 13 See Antoni Mora, Ferrater Mora, Gent nostra, 73, Edicions de Nou Art Thor, Barcelona, 1989. Recently, Xavier Serra has re-examined a number of the biographical portraits of Ferrater, such as the one written by Pla in Homenots, in order to separate the wheat from the chaff in light of the available documents. Història social de la filosofia catalana. La lògica (1900-1980), Afers, Barcelona-Catarroja, 2010, pp. 131-170.

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him throughout his philosophical inquiry as a guiding light and a spur. “Ferrater is an action verb” — in the words of Bunge14. As early as Cóctel de Verdad [A True Cocktail] (1935), Ferrater began to deal with Spanish philosophy from Unamuno to Ortega. His growing interest in Spanish philosophy appears to me to continue at the same time as he was drafting his Dictionary, in exile in Cuba (1939-1941) and Chile (1941-1947). The first version appeared in 194115. Later he was to justify the existence of a Spanish philosophy16. It is difficult to distinguish here between strategy, vocation and professionalism. Ferrater made a virtue of necessity. His practice of preparing dictionaries — for example, as Conrad Vilanou reminds us, the dictionary of pedagogy published by Editorial Labor17 — predates his departure into exile. In light of the letters preserved in the archives in Girona, Ferrater had earlier begun to write and request information from Spanish philosophers (such as García Morente and José Gaos), with the purpose of rounding out the Spanish edition of Heinrich Schmidt’s philosophical dictionary Philosophisches Wörterbuch by adding the names of Spanish philosophers, although in the end, the project was thwarted by the war. Ferrater explained the work simply, without dressing it up in intellectual trappings18. The Dictionary was a commissioned work. It was a useful, professional project that might eventually be used as a calling card, too. This is how Joaquim Xirau put it to him when encouraging him to persevere with the project after receiving the first version: 14 Letter written by M. Bunge to J. Ferrater Mora, from McGill University (Canada), 20-IX-1976. 15 Cf. Julio Ortega Villalobos, “José Ferrater Mora en Chile”, El Basilisco, 21 (1996), pp. 86-89. 16 “I have the impression that expressions such as ‘Spanish Philosophy’ or any other ‘national philosophy’ can be explained only from this point of view, that is to say, assuming as true one of the two possible concepts of philosophy. I have the impression also that all confusions which have arisen in this field are due to the fact that philosophy as a propositional system has not been distinguished from philosophy as a mode of human being. In other words, as a propositional system we cannot say that there is a Spanish philosophy. But as a mode of human being, and with the restrictions we have introduced, we can say, not only that the expression ‘Spanish Philosophy’ has a sense, but even that Spanish philosophy is one of the philosophical systems of thought in which the condition of being a function of our existence is fully, and wonderfully, realized”, p. 9, Ferrater Mora, “Is There a Spanish Philosophy?”, Hispanic Review, 19:1 (January 1951), pp. 1-10. Nearly forty years later, a more analytical Ferrater rejected the use of national qualifiers for ways of doing philosophy. Thus, in “Reflexions sobre la filosofia a Catalunya” (UAB, 1979), he wrote: “I say ‘the philosophy in Catalonia’ and not ‘Catalan philosophy’, because my philosophical preferences lean toward the idea that philosophy — like science — has no nationality. Speaking of ‘Catalan philosophy’ is only slightly less absurd than speaking of ‘Catalan chemistry’ or ‘Catalan mathematics’. I think that Catalans, insofar as they do philosophy, must (or should) do so as everyone everywhere does it: without much concern about whether or not it expresses the national spirit” (p. 119), in Les formes de la vida catalana i altres assaigs, Ed. 62, La Caixa, Barcelona, 1980, pp. 119-132. 17 Conrad Vilanou, “Josep Ferrater Mora i la pedagogia: recuperació d’un text oblidat”, Educació i Història: Revista d’Història de l’Educació, 4 (2001), pp. 134-141. 18 Cf. Assumpció Maresme, “Entrevista a Ferrater Mora”, Catalònia, 1990, pp. 32-36.

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It would be worthwhile not to abandon the endeavour half done. There is no classic, authorised dictionary in Spanish. This is a work of many years.You can do it. It would be worthwhile for you to spend a good portion of your life on it. Based on what you have finished and by seeking out the collaboration of everyone of good will, you could produce a classic work. I think you must not give up. It is a thing of many years that you should keep doing with persistence and without impatience as you pursue your activities. If you are willing to do so, do not doubt that you will have a collaborator in me. It is a highly ambitious undertaking. But I think that you have demonstrated the personal qualities needed to pull it off. Be so good as to tell me if the idea strikes you as interesting. I think that the mere fact of my saying this to you is an illustration of the lively interest that your work has aroused in me19.

In effect, the Dictionary gave Ferrater a way to make contacts with the representatives of logic and analytic philosophy in the United States starting with the appearance of the third edition, which unlike the second edition was accepted for critical review by Alonzo Church, the editor of Journal of Symbolic Logic, the publication of W. V. Quine. It was Quine himself who penned the review, which was not exactly glowing: “As may well be expected in a singlehanded work of such scope, the shortcomings on logical topics are numerous”.20 I think, however, that this worked rather as an incentive for Ferrater to write his handbook on logic and select the contents21. The Journal gave him the task of reviewing works written in Spanish, which led to an exchange of letters with Church in the late nineteen-fifties and early nineteen-sixties22. In addition, European logicians, such as Bochenski, helped him to better under-

19 Joaquim Xirau, letter to J. F. M, Mexico (17-VI-1941). 20 W. V. Quine, “Diccionario de Filosofia by José Ferrater Mora”, The Journal of Symbolic Logic, 17:2 (June 1952), pp. 129-130. In that same year, Quine wrote to him, saying: “I am flattered that you plan an article on me, but I assure you that this was by no means amongst the omissions that I had felt to be regrettable. I am glad you will include Hilbert, Frege and Peano”, letter dated 26 September 1952, from the Harvard University Department of Philosophy. 21 The manual was written in Spanish in collaboration with the logician Hugues Leblanc — Lógica matemática, FCE, Mexico, 1955 — and it was certainly important for more than a generation of students in Spain and Latin America, who found their introduction to the discipline in its rigorous material. See, for example, Jesús Mosterín,“José Ferrater Mora”, in P. Casanovas (ed.), Filosofia del segle XX a Catalunya: mirada retrospectiva, IV Cicle Aranguren, Fundació Caixa Sabadell, 2010, pp. 199-210. Salvador López Arnal has demonstrated through correspondence between Ferrater and Manuel Sacristán that the latter preferred Ferrater’s manual for his firstyear students over and above his own introduction to logic. Op. cit., pp. 14ff. 22 Looking again at Ferrater’s reviews in Journal, one realises that what he set out to do was to adopt a “normal” scientific attitude, making judgments based on the state of the art in the subject regardless of the language in which a text was expressed. Cf, e.g., the rigorous critique of Lógica del Juicio Jurídico (1955) by García Máynez in what was his first review, The Journal of Symbolic Logic, 23:1 (March 1958), p. 74. Cf. the initial letter of Alonzo Church sent from Princeton, 24 February 1958. The offer to review works written in Spanish came from Ferrater himself, as can be read in Church’s letter of 10 June that year, acknowledging receipt of Ferrater’s first review.

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stand Slavic philosophy — Russian and Polish, particularly the formal tradition of the latter — and they drew his attention to the importance of Scandinavian philosophy. Xavier Serra has shown Ferrater’s publishing history in some detail, particularly in relation to his impact on and entry into the analytic mainstream beginning with his article on Wittgenstein in 1949, at a time when the work of the Viennese philosopher was not well-known outside the circles of specialists and Wittgenstein himself was still alive24 (he died in 1952). From this point onwards, Ferrater was never to abandon a logical, scientific and rationalist orientation. In my view, though, his contributions do not reflect the ideas of a “strict” analytic philosopher. From extant letters, his relationship with Nicholas Rescher and the American Philosophical Quarterly is rather that of an outside collaborator who was highly knowledgeable about the main currents of thought, but without abandoning other more historical or existential trenches. In the journal’s pages, he published only “On Practice” (1976)25, while other pieces on Ortega, for example, were politely redirected to History of Philosophy Quarterly26 or they were rejected outright27. By contrast, his articles were well received at Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, edited by Marvin Farber until 1980, and afterwards by Roderick Chisholm and Ernesto Sosa28. In the 21st century, the University at Buffalo (SUNY) and the University of Rhode Island have continued to be leading centres for phenomenology and ontology, with a special emphasis on European philosophy. These efforts deserve credit, because Ferrater started out as a complete unknown. Let me offer a curious remark from a review of El hombre 23 For more information on all of these, see the letter written by Josef Bochenski from the Europa-Institut of Freiburg, dated 30 July 1960. 24 See Xavier Serra, op. cit., pp. 131-170. Ferrater’s paper entitled “Wittgenstein o la destrucción” was published in Realidad, V:14 (March-April 1949), pp. 129-140, and appeared in Spain in the journal Theoria in 1954, under the title “Wittgenstein, símbolo de una época angustiada”. Translations appeared in various languages: Polish (1951), German (1952), English (1953) and French (1959). See Serra, op. cit., p. 152. 25 J. Ferrater Mora, “On Practice”, American Philosophical Quarterly, 13:(1) (1976), pp. 49-55. 26 Rescher, as editor, wrote to him on 21 September 1983: “Your paper on Ortega y Gasset is too ad hominem for the American Philosophical Quarterly, but it would do well for the new History of Philosophy Quarterly”. Cf. “On Knowing One’s Way About”, History of Philosophy Quarterly, 1:(2) (1984), pp. 213-221. 27 Letter from N. Rescher dated 1 March 1966, rejecting publication of “On taking things for granted”; it provoked an immediate response from Ferrater on 5 March. In the end, the essay appeared in an anthology compiled and introduced by A. R. Caponegri entitled Spanish Contemporary Philosophy: An Anthology, University of Notre Dame Press, 1967. 28 For correspondence on the articles published by Farber and Chisholm, see the letters in the library of the University of Girona (Ferrater Mora Chair). From 1959 onwards, everything seems to indicate that the Catalan philosopher took advantage of the door opened by Farber, because it better suited the historical and occasionally speculative nature of his contributions.

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en la encrucijada [Man at a Crossroads] (Buenos Aires, 1952) published by the Stanford professor Kurt F. Reinhart: “In this fascinating and provocative work, the South American thinker presents a philosophy of Christian Personalism”29. This might sound absurd and, indeed, it is. The truth is, though, that in Ferrater we do not find only one author: there is also the essayist, the historicist, the writer who takes an external view of the meaning of history and integrates it into the (more abstract) cultural behaviour of the elite in order to make broader generalisations encompassing the masses, as Ortega does. Ferrater searches for the grail of social cohesion in the integration of culture, values and the organisation of the state, like Dilthey, Heller, Smend, Schmitt, Binder and many other Germanic authors rooted in European neo-Hegelian historicism. Integration, Einbindung: the family resemblance among Ortega, Julián Marías, Laín Entralgo and Ferrater is too striking to be ignored. And Hombre en la encrucijada (1952; Man at the Crossroads, 1957) is proof enough. Still a work of the interwar period, it asks how great the mental distance is between the intellectual and society. The initial question was hard for US professors to fathom: “Is it possible to integrate our increasingly broader societies in the higher forms of material and spiritual life? [italics added by author]”. Reinhart’s confusion is revealing. In his original work, Ferrater formulated this question from two perspectives, the first from phenomenology and vitalism and the second based on historiography, which he had just discovered in the US and which drew not only on the scientific outlook, but also on the outcomes of the recent global conflagration30. The early 1950’s appear crucial to me as a turning point in the philosopher’s subsequent development. In December 1951, he organised the 48th APA Conference at Bryn Mawr and was one of the discussants of Maurice Mandelbaum’s paper on the scientific value of history31. The symposium palpably vibrated with the climate of the post-war period, the Holocaust, the crisis of European culture and the onset of the Cold War, but also with the new role of ethics and science. I cannot stop here

29 Reinhardt, Books Abroad, 27:3 (Summer 1953), p. 297. 30 “Can so-called ‘material progress’ be accompanied by spiritual or, as is sometimes said, moral progress? Should materially and spiritually higher ways of living be introduced into societies that are increasingly vast and, ultimately, to society as a whole?” I quote from the second edition of El hombre en la encrucijada, Sudamericana, Buenos Aires, 1965. 31 The symposium “What is Philosophy of History?” took place on 28 December 1951 from 2-4 pm as part of the 48th Annual Meeting of The American Philosophical Association (APA), Eastern Division, held at Bryn Mawr on 27-29 December that year.The speakers were Maurice Mandelbaum, Lewis S. Feuer and Horace L. Friess. Responding were the discussants S. P. Lamprecht and Josep Ferrater Mora. You can find the programme of the conference in The Journal of Philosophy, 48:23 (8-XI-1951), p. 738. The discussion was published in “Comments on the Symposium What is Philosophy of History?”, Sterling P. Lamprecht, José Ferrater-Mora and Maurice Mandelbaum, The Journal of Philosophy, 49:10 (8-V-1952), pp. 350-362.

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to delve into Ferrater’s relationships with US philosophers of history — e.g., Richard McKeon, Lewis S. Feuer, Horace L. Friess and so forth. I mention only the result: the philosophy of history can take issue with history — the explanations of history — in the same way that the philosophy of science can do so with the hypotheses of science. As Ferrater asserted in his remarks, this was about achieving a perspective built on the explicitness of the language used to formulate historical explanations. Here, “language” was still set against “ontology”, but it would not be long before Mandelbaum’s suggestion was taken on board: “One cannot discuss problems in the philosophy of science without dealing with fundamental ontological problems”32. All the elements that appeared in the later thinking of the Catalan philosopher — the notions of conceptual tension, core, dialogue, agreement/ disagreement, emergence of collective properties, rejection of dichotomies, ontology, semantic fluctuations of concepts, etc. — are present in the intellectual backdrop from 1948 to 1955. The linguistic and logic-oriented drift of those years, and the effort of assimilation that this represented for Ferrater, is incomplete if we do not add this aspect of the philosophy of science that covers history and, with it, the social sciences. I must say that his ontological position, his metaphysics, appear marked by his historiographical development (more so than the other way round).

3. Second-order historiography What is Ferrater’s method of doing intellectual history from at least the third edition of the Dictionary onwards? He was familiar with and normally cited the histories of philosophy that appeared in Spanish, English, French, Italian and German, as well as experts in ancient, medieval, modern and contemporary philosophy, and also histories of science. However, his way of writing the Dictionary, which observes the necessary concision, makes use of name-based entries and selected terms in such a way as to turn the work into a vast mosaic, in which each piece individually had to be cut, fit and polished to give shape to the entirety. For this reason, I prefer the term “intellectual history” for his work as a whole. This is also the term used by a colleague from his early years at Bryn Mawr, Juan Marichal, who later moved on to Harvard33.

32 M. Mandelbaum, “Comments on the Symposium What is Philosophy of History?”, 1951, op. cit., p. 360. 33 Marichal taught courses on intellectual history at Harvard, cf. Letter to Ferrater, from Cambridge, Mass., dated 21 September 1958.

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It is not merely a history of thought or even a history of ideas or history of philosophy. In my view, it is a conceptual history done from the inside out, taking care always to distinguish between methodology, ontology, epistemology and practical philosophy (ethics and politics) while focusing on the core meanings of authors. It does not dwell on social history or on contextual or historical connections, but rather delves into the genesis of ideas and their connections within and across different periods of time. Ferrater’s style of writing intellectual history in the Dictionary and related articles is concise. His concern is with precision and, above all, with the veracity of underlying data. Although it may seem straightforward, Ferrater as a good historian double-checked his facts and, it must be noted, read the books of authors that he featured. This enabled him to correct any errors and, even more than that, to reconstruct analytically the basic concepts in order to carry out the task of comparison that enabled him to discern competing and contrasting positions. In the end, I believe he moved from the philosophy of language and logic to a separate tracing of the history of terms, concepts and conceptual schema and discourses, distinguishing between levels of language, conceptual objects or constructs, works and philosophical movements. This is no longer historicism, but another type of philosophy of history. Let me offer an example. The article on the origin of ontology is a classic. It corresponds to research that he undertook to understand the return to metaphysics (vs. theology) and the general structure of philosophy as a method marked by the rationalism of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, from Suárez and Fonseca to Baumgarten, Wolff and Leibniz, to the attack of Kant.34 The term “ontology”, explains Ferrater, is first used in 1613 in the philosophical terminology of Rudolf Göckel [Goclenius] (1547-1628), in the Low Countries, not in the works of the second scholasticism, which did not consider necessary the use of new terms to address being and the types of being.35 The term, though, did not yet carry the sense of a rational organisation of knowledge and the various branches of knowledge — “what there is” — that it acquired after the works of Juan Caramuel de Lobkowitz.

34 Ferrater Mora,“On the Early History of ‘Ontology’”, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 24:1 (September 1963), pp. 36-47. 35 Ibid. op. cit., p. 38. “A number of historians (R. Eucken, E. Gilson, Hans Pichler, Max Wundt, Heinz Heimsoeth) mention Johann Clauberg as the first philosopher who used the new term we are looking for: the term ‘ontology’. This is not the case. The first instance occurs in Rudolf Goclenius (Lexicon philosophicum, quo tanquam clave philosophies fores aperiuntur, Informatum opera studio Rodolphi Goclenii, Francoforti, 1613). (...). The word ‘ontology’ occurs in Goclenius’ Lexicon on page 16 as follows: ‘ontologia, philosophia de ente’. This is all.”

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Ferrater is painstaking as he traces the different meanings of the term and how, over time, it distinguishes itself semantically from the classic terms of “metaphysics” and “first philosophy” at the same time that it competes with other equivalent terms, such as “ontosophy” (Clauberg), “gnostology” (Caramuel) and “noology” (Calovius). The term receives its definitive push from Wolff, whose work is entitled Philosophia prima sive ontologia methodo scientifica pertractata, qua omnes cognitionis humanae principia continentur (1730). In Wolff ’s work, “ontologia seu philosophia prima” is defined as a “scientia entis in genere, quatenus ens est”, which uses the “demonstration method” and investigates the most general predicates of being as such. This is as far as Ferrater went. Renewed interest in ontology has permitted later emendation of his reading of the first twenty years of the seventeenth century at Protestant universities in the German-speaking lands, including his misattribution of the first use of the term to Göckel36. In 1607, Göckel was teaching logic, ethics and mathematics at Marburg, where he coincided with Jakob Lorhard (1561-1609), who received an invitation to teach theology there that very year from Moritz, Landgrave of Hesse. The year before, in 1606, Lorhard had written a book for his students entitled Ogdoas scholastica, which addressed the subjects of Latin, Greek, grammar, logic, rhetoric, astronomy, ethics, physics and metaphysics. The eighth and last volume carried the title Metaphysica seu Ontologia. Thus, “ontology” is a word featuring prominently in the frontispiece of Lorhard’s work. Nor does the story end there. Lorhard had based his volume on the contents of a book by Clemens Timpler (1563-1624), entitled Metaphysicae Systema Methodicum. Published in Seifurt (1604) and Hanau (1606), Timpler’s work offered diagrams drawn from the teachings of Pierre de la Ramée [Ramus] (1515-1572) to present the new “ontology” as a science of the intelligible. The recent attention given to this Calvinist line of thinking by the logician Peter Øhrstrøm and his team has made it possible to establish more

36 “Ferrater Mora cita anche un’altra opera del filosofo di Marburg, la Isagoge in peripateticorum et scholasticorum primam philosophiam (1612), di poco precedente al Lexicon. In quest’opera secondo Ferrater Mora oltre a non utilizzare il termine, Göckel avrebbe posto come sinonimi prima philosophia e metaphysica di fatto escludendo ogni tipo di frattura epistemologica in seno alla scienza dell’ente. Probabilmente Ferrater Mora doveva ignorare che l’edizione della Isagoge del 1612 era una ristampa rispetto alla prima edizione del testo (Frankfurt, 1598). La critica successiva (Rompe, Courtine, Moreau) ha peraltro letto proprio in quel lavoro una delle più significative e radicali distinzioni in senso ontologico della metafisica. Il fatto poi che la scelta di Göckel — letta da Ferrater Mora come puramente accidentale (afterthought) — fosse rimasta priva di conseguenze rilevanti è smentito storicamente. Basti riferirsi alla scelta di Alsted che nella sua opera Cursus Philosophici Encyclopaedia (1620) riporta il nuovo nome di ontologia proprio di rimando all’autorità di Goclenius e all’occorrenza del Lexicon del 1613.” Lamanna, op. cit., p. 565.

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precise relationships between Timpler, Lorhard and Göckel, noting how they differ from Suárez’s Disputationes Metaphysicae (Mainz, 1506) (which is the text against which Timpler’s theses are directly aimed) and establishing the epistemic variations in meaning and method represented by the initial use of the diagrams in the seventeenth century37. To Suárez’s mind, metaphysics refers classically to being. By contrast, in Timpler’s view, “metaphysica est ars contemplatiua, quae tractact de omni intelligibili, uatenus ab homine naturali rationis lumine sine ullo materiae conceptu est intelligibile”38. Lorhard’s diagrams show relationships among the conceptual dichotomies that appear in his work, allowing Ogdoas scholastica to be read as a hypertext in which the transversal relationships and internal references (as well as the iterations, inverted parentheses and other symbolic mechanisms) enable us to pull out its foundational ontology. Peter Øhrstrøm has produced a graph depicting the structure of the basic ontological distinctions in Lorhard’s work. The graph is a reconstruction based on the arrangement of the diagrams appearing in chapter 8, presenting Lorhard’s metaphysics as a drop-down menu of the properties of the intelligible. In addition, Sarah L. Uckelman has transcribed the original diagrams39. It should be noted that the successive explanatory notes and internal references do not correspond to a dichotomous hierarchy or distribution, but rather add explanatory or clarifying content — in hypertext — to the successive branchings in the analysis. It is, therefore, a method of semantic enrichment that allows for navigation within the text. To what extent has Ferrater’s interpretation of Göckel been “historically disproved” in light of the new research on the subject — as, for example, Lamanna has stated? Ferrater’s article was published fifty years ago and he would be delighted that his synthesis had been taken into account by researchers in their later work on the subject. That was the crux of the matter: clearly formulating the state of the question and lending a hand to later advances. This is

37 See, among other publications, Peter Øhrstrøm, Jan Andersen, Henrik Schärfe, “What has Happened to Ontology”, Dau, F., Mugnier, M.-L., Stumme, G. (eds.), ICCS 2005. LNAI, vol. 3.596, pp. 425-438. Springer, Heidelberg (2005); Peter Øhrstrøm, Sara L. Uckelman, and Henrik Schärfe, “Historical and Conceptual Foundation of Diagrammatical Ontology”, U. Priss, S. Polovina, and R. Hill (eds.): ICCS 2007, LNAI 4604, 2007, Springer Verlag, Berlín, Heidelberg, pp. 374-386; Peter Øhrstrøm, Henrik Schärfe, Sara L. Uckelman,“Jacob Lorhard’s Ontology: A 17th Century Hypertext on the Reality and Temporality of the World of Intelligibles”, P. Eklund and O. Haemmerlé (eds.): ICCS 2008, LNAI 5113, pp. 74-87, Springer Verlag, Berlín, Heidelberg, 2008, pp. 74-887. 38 Lorhard, Metaphysicae Systema Methodicum,Vol. 1, ch. 1, cf. Øhrstrøm et al. op. cit. 2008, p. 76. 39 The diagrams contained in Lorhard’s eighth book have been transcribed and translated by Sara L. Uckelman, Diagraph of Metaphysic or Ontology, Institute for Logic, Language, and Computation, UVA, Amsterdam, http://www.illc.uva.nl/Research/Reports/X-2008-04.text.pdf.

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the dynamic of communication, clarification and reworking of historiography that goes on through the centuries. Hence, Ferrater’s dating and interpretation have been revised in light of fresh discoveries and increased knowledge of the internal struggles in the Calvinist ranks. Although Ferrater could not have known, he did nevertheless see the importance of the introduction of the new term against the scholasticism of the Counter-Reformation, and he drew attention to the subject. In logic, proslepsis (πρόσληψις), or prolepsis, which is a figure of speech described by Aristotle, is a type of proposition in which the middle term of a syllogism is implied. It was crucial for dialectics and rhetoric. Using prolepsis, one imagines the objections to or refutations of an argument. Through procatalepsis (πρόκαταληψις), one anticipates how to respond to potential objections aimed at an argument in order to strengthen that argument. The shift is toward social science as a way of “making present” subsequent accomplishments, providing an anticipatory glimpse of potential developments. If this is the case, there is no doubt that Ferrater possessed this art. From this viewpoint, Eric van de Luft’s description of the Catalan philosopher as an “ironic Aristotelian”, bearing in the mind how the Stagirite revered the middle term, seems fitting to me40. He did not believe wholeheartedly in his conclusions: he left open the possibility that later information would change his premises and conclusions. I think we need to read this and every other article in the Dictionary in just such a way, and not as the striking of a single, repetitive note. In intellectual history, the construction of general interpretative frameworks depends on the relationship that one can establish among all the wellfounded facts from which one starts. This basic task is precisely what defines first-order historiography. It is attentive to the reworking of the sources and the indispensable effort of constructing and analysing primary data. Unavoidable in this effort is the archival (or ethnographic) work of organising data and later reorganising and using the data, as well as transcribing and transforming information. By contrast, Ferrater practiced a second-order historiography that operates on the meaning of the interpretative hypotheses and on their semantic elements, particularly the consistency of hypotheses and the consistency between the known facts and the models that account for them. In short, it is the work of a philosopher of history labouring over the theoretical models, more than the work of a historian addressing the underlying elements and materials.

40 Eric v. de Luft, “Ferrater Mora, José María (1912-91)”, in Dictionary of Modern American Philosophers, edited by John R. Shook, New York; Thoemmes Continuum, 2005, pp. 766-768.

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I would not regard this as a limitation or a failure, but rather the contrary. Ferrater was a mediator, stirring up mischief, acting the part of the meddler as he liked to say, whose job it was to pose questions or blow on the spoon to cool down the soup. But he was a proleptic cook who tasted and adjusted the soup as necessary, after putting in all the best ingredients. When, in 1982, Ferrater proposes a weak recursion standard for historiography in contrast to the standards of positivism and hermeneutics, he was simply offering a partial, ex-post description of the perspective he himself had adopted in the preparation of the Dictionary41. It was not a faithful depiction of his working method, but rather an epistemological reflection on the conceptual order by which he had tried to guide himself since the nineteen-fifties. I will try to show how this order eventually produced the ontology contained in Fundamentos de Filosofía (1985) [Fundamentals of Philosophy].

4. Second-order hermeneutics This book was a long time in the making. Originally published as El ser y el sentido (1967) [Being and Meaning] and partly growing out of El ser y la muerte (1962) [Being and Death], it was refined and reworked until it assumed a final form and content in Fundamentos de Filosofía (1985). I think that it was in the nineteen-sixties that Ferrater set out to do a synthesis of the fundamentals. El ser y el sentido was conceived to be the first volume in a three-part series that also included El ser y el hacer [Being and Doing] and El ser y el deber ser [Being and Duty]42. This phenomenological approach, however, was to be replaced by the synthesis of semantic and historiographical perspectives that would appear in Fundamentos. I want to single out three ideas of ontology: (i) “integrationism”: “a method for integrating concepts by means of an analysis of their functions”43 using “boundary concepts”; (ii) “concern”, and (iii) “structural traits”. “Structural trait” is a concept used by Ferrater to refer to the general ability to characterise ontological structures. According to Ferrater, these structures are not inflections of being, modes of being, transcendentals, or ways of speaking, rather, they are semantic characteristics for representing things as objects “of what there is”, of the ontology of what populates knowledge.

41 Ferrater Mora,“The Languages of History”, Phenomenological Research, 43:2 (December 1982), pp. 137-150. 42 Ferrater Mora, El ser y el sentido, Ediciones de la Revista de Occidente, Madrid, 1962, “Foreword”, p. 15. 43 http://www.ferratermora.org/lang_cambio_section.html.

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They are “general characterisations of that which is spoken of ”44, “traits of all the things there are, and at the same time concepts by which their ontological structure is thrown into relief ”, “their object is simply the world, with its various groups and on its various levels”. The relationship between statements and objects of knowledge is called “concern” and it covers designations, references, meanings, denotations, truths. A statement “concerns” its objects in different ways and is used up in the relation. What is characteristic of Ferrater is that he thinks of this as equivalent to representation (which can be structural, global). The world is represented by statements. The representations are grounded in representable or represented objects by virtue of the structural trait that the philosopher calls presence: “Realities are permanent possibilities of representation”. The Fundamentos represents a deployment of the fabric of meanings cast by knowledge’s presence by means of the cultural density of their appearance over time45. As a structural trait, presence is rounded out by confluence and non-significance. Confluence points to “everything that can be situated between two ontological poles”; non-significance indicates that there is nothing outside of what there is, and that the world is not only inexhaustible, but goes on being inexhaustible as it develops and becomes better known. “What I have called ontology, therefore, ultimately becomes an epistemology, or as some prefer to say (...) a hermeneutics in which the object is what there is [italics added by author].”46 Put differently: this is what the Dictionary is, an evolving, latticework structure of philosophical concepts reinterpreted and presented on the basis of the ontological labour of the framework that tethers them, bringing them together, separating them and binding them once again. In short, this is not merely the result of a second-degree historiography, but the result of working out a second-order hermeneutics. “Structural traits” operate on the ontological “arrangements” between being and (“intentional”) meaning.

44 All the references correspond to J. Ferrater Mora, Fundamentos de Filosofía, Alianza Universidad, Madrid, 1985. 45 “Newton’s second law is not an eternal truth, but a piece of knowledge that has begun to be real since it was formulated.This knowledge has been incorporated into a network of cultural products, such as a tradition or heritage to be maintained, collected, discussed, transformed, etc. If there had been no subjective knower able to perform these and other similar operations, the original piece of knowledge would cease to be such and instead become a system of ‘marks’ or ‘signs’, ‘audio tapes’, etc. Knowledge does not consist solely of cognitive activities, but without such activities, there would be no knowledge nor, strictly speaking, truth.” Fundamentos, op. cit. 1985, II, 5, p. 37. 46 Ibid. 1985, X, 3, p. 200.

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I would portray the Dictionary as a dialogue between tradition and contemporaneity, a dynamic representation between “what there is” and “what there has been said to be”, if we allow for an instance of word play. From this viewpoint, the Dictionary is a repository of knowledge, the contents of which form an organon of philosophy that has taken the structure given to it by Ferrater’s second-order ontology — a trans-ontological structure. A further aspect of importance remains. To Ferrater’s understanding, the operation of ontological knowledge is dialectic, open, empirical, continuous and unending, and ontology is “pragmatic and rational”47. Perhaps it is not out of place here to look more closely at what can be seen at first glance when we examine ontology: dialogues are possible, but not second-order dialogues. As soon as dialectics or dialogues enter into an inductive operation such as Ferrater poses between “people” and “objectivisations” in a self-referential spiralling, a space of indeterminacy opens up, one that is quite favourable for the final result in historiography, but leads to uncertain results in logic and science. In a manner of speaking, the rules of the game are broken. Ferrater is no longer offering solutions to problems that can be debated. Coming up with a third way represents begging the question, obviating the issue and changing the rules. This approach, which has been the subject of discussion and debate, appears to me to be the source of Ferrater’s relative silence in the field of logic and analytical research. Critics have argued that his formulations did not get to grips internally with the problems, but rather reformulated them from the outside, from a linguistic phenomenology that was certainly of interest, but failed to redirect them toward a workable, familiar methodology. I think that at least Héctor Neri Castañeda, Alonzo Church and Nicholas Rescher were of the same mind in levelling this criticism at Ferrater. Castañeda, who was not exactly generous in making concessions in dialogue or argumentation48, but formulated a theory of quasi-indexicals and guises in his own work in order to account for the non-directly referential symbolic world, asked Ferrater expressly for clarifications in this regard after he read The Idea of Man49. To him, Ferrater’s formulation seemed incomprehensible. He warned Ferrater that “you are getting involved in building a complicated technical terminology instead of formulating straightforward, important facts in clear ordinary terms”. And on the budding science of computation:

47 Ibid. 1985, II, p. 39. 48 See the critique of Toulmin’s position around the appearance of The Uses of Argument (1959), H. N. Castañeda,“On a Proposed Revolution in Logic”, Philosophy of Science, 27:3 (July 1960), pp. 279-292. Castañeda studied under Wilfried Sellars, who had been a student of Marvin Farber at Buffalo. Therefore, Austrian phenomenology and especially the ontology of Meinong were not only familiar to him, but also a source of inspiration. 49 The Idea of Man: An Outline of Philosophical Anthropology, Lindley Lecture, Lawrence, Dept. of Philosophy, University of Kansas, 1961.

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“Obviously no electro- or servomechanism is human in the sense that it has awareness or the ability to think. But there is no logical or physical impossibility why a robot, in the sense of being a product of human technology, cannot develop awareness and learn to think propositionally. This is something that does not tally well with your formula “man is his body” or with your confessed affinities with Ryle.”50 Castañeda held a rather Platonic position. Later developments in cognitive science appear to support Ferrater as regards the Cartesian problem of mind/body separation. But Castañeda’s insight brings out what I wanted to say in relation to the impossibility of a second-order dialogue. I sense that the Catalan philosopher slides imperceptibly from reference as an objective function belonging to scientific discussion into a “dense” description of the uses of language as a communicative process: “Could you explain to me in detail what you mean when you say that “mind” and “body” name “absolute” realities, which do not exist as such, but whose concepts we are obliged to use in order to understand one another. Are mind and body boundary concepts?”51 In effect, I think that this is a blind spot in Ferrater’s pragmatics, which jumps a level without warning, and if I ask myself why, the reply is that the synthesis and description of the uses of concepts corresponds to a secondorder historiography, a second-order hermeneutics characteristic of the intellectual history contained in the Dictionary and in Ferrater’s scholarly articles. Ferrater describes linguistic frameworks, which define the fields of meaning for concepts. There are not only boundary concepts within the frameworks, however, but also boundary frameworks, because Ferrater applies the same technique to the various opposing options and lines of thinking that delimit the frameworks. Ontology is an explicit conceptual embodiment of this transversal technique. And Ferrater uses “concepts” to refer both to frameworks and to the concepts and categories found within them. The result is that he turns categories into concepts as a good practitioner of intellectual history, but this bars him from further discussion of the categories because, quite simply, he has changed the object of his discourse. What is more, he seems to have been aware of this and wanted to do it. I do not think that my interpretation contradicts the observations formulated by critics in relation to Ferrater’s ontology of boundary concepts. Ulisses Moulines interprets it as “heuristic” to consider conceptual dichotomies as indicative. Carlos Nieto Blanco describes it as an attempt to describe

50 Letter from Héctor N. Castañeda to Ferrater on 14 December 1961. 51 Letter from Héctor N. Castañeda on 15 February 1962.

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the world “from within” (taking “the without” into account). Both point to the different levels. Subsequent to Ferrater’s death, Peter van Inwagen published a seminal paper in Erkenntnis entitled “Meta-Ontology”52, which poses the question: what are we asking when we ask, ‘What is there?’ An entire field has been opened up to address this question, which has, in fact, been traced back to Carnap’s formulation in an article published in 195053. The Indiana taxonomy in the Stanford Encyclopedia directly classifies meta-ontology as a part of metaphysics. Carnap’s position, ex ante against Quine, is that questions from “outside” make no sense, as Inwagen’s paper recalls. But if one takes the trouble to look at the final bibliography of Fundamentos de Filosofía, one finds that Ferrater not only cited Carnap, but that this was the sole work of Carnap’s that he did cite, in its original appearance in the Révue Internationale de Philosophie54. I think that a great deal of the discussion in the volume is, in effect, from the outside. Take, for instance, the section on universals. And this fact and how the discussion is set up reflects Ferrater’s experience as a historian. Questions, and how to pose them, were of keener interest to him than a debate over the answers. Inwagen concludes with a defence of Quine’s existential quantifier, because it captures sufficiently the indistinction between being and existence. Ferrater preferred not to debate the matter. Why? Because, at heart, it was not his problem: the triad of non-significance, presence and confluence belong to meta-ontology, but only in order to point out the multiplicity of answers. All second-order dialogue ends up being a first-order dialogue unless one of the interlocutors prevents it. But the risk is that communication is disrupted. That is, the dialogue ends up being more expressive than epistemic, deliberative or even eristic. There is no dispute, because in reality there is no common problem.

52 Peter van Inwagen, “Meta-Ontology”, Erkenntnis 48 (1998), pp. 233-250. “Quine has called the question ‘What is there?’ ‘the ontological question’. But if we call this question by that name, what name shall we use for the question, ‘What are we asking when we ask “What is there?”‘ Established usage, or misusage, suggests the name ‘the meta-ontological question’, and this is the name I shall use. I shall call the attempt to answer the meta-ontological question ‘meta-ontology’.” 53 Carnap, Rudolf. 1950. “Empiricism, Semantics, and Ontology”. Reprinted as a supplement to Meaning and Necessity: A Study in Semantics and Modal Logic, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1956, pp. 205-221. 54 Carnap, Rudolf. 1950. “Empiricism, Semantics, and Ontology”, Revue Internationale de Philosophie, 4 (1950), pp. 20-40.

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5. Closing observations By way of closing, I would like to offer a few final observations. In the world opening up at the interface between the social sciences and computation, where multi-agent systems (MAS) and virtual institutions are under construction, the conceptual structure is regulatory. That is, it guides the building of programmes. This marks a change from the panorama that we have faced until now: “scientists do science; philosophers do not” — as Merrill so memorably put it55. In ontological construction, the philosopher and the scientist can work side by side to build new tools and more precise ontologies, developing methods to evaluate them and to thrash out their fields of application. From this point of view, Ferrater’s semantic ontology seems to me entirely salvageable: it is close to the scientific function of the philosopher, so to speak. This simply means that the conditions for dialogue have shifted and that the discussion that did not happen at the time is now reopening. As I mentioned earlier, we will see the computational ontologies of philosophy proliferating in the near future. Even so, it must be said that Ferrater did not take much notice of developments in artificial intelligence or in the science of computation. Interestingly, the names of Herbert Simon, Alan Newell, Marvin Minsky, Ed Feigenbaum and John McCarthy did not figure in his dictionary of 1979, perhaps because he did not actually view them as philosophers.Yet this is the line that, following on from the Dartmouth seminar of 1955, laid the foundations for the construction and development of the cognitive revolution, artificial intelligence and, ultimately, the Internet. Nor do the names of Georges Miller, David Rumelhart or James McClelland appear, all strictly contemporaries whose work was too recent. In knowledge engineering, ontologies are used to reduce the complexity of information management, classify information and facilitate both the connection to the user and the interoperability among languages and knowledge objects (Simple Knowledge Organisation Systems, SKOS). A foundational or upper-level ontology explicitly sets out the “ontological commitment” to a given vocabulary and assigns restrictions to the provided categories by means of axioms56. Ferrater’s ontology did not have this purpose. It was neither reducible to rules nor completely automatic. However, it does constitute a series of quite nuanced guideposts or set of philosophical theses to mark out the initial steps toward a working ontolo 55 Gary H. Merrill, “Ontology, Ontologies, and Science”, Topoi, 30 (2011), pp. 71-83 (p. 74). 56 Robert Hoehndorf (2010), “What is an upper level ontology?”, Ontogenesis. http://ontogenesis. knowledgeblog.org/740.

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gy. Hermeneutics enabled him not to discard anything that had been formulated as philosophy; it operated like a rake to collect the most disparate and dissimilar philosophies, focusing on specific points of philosophical discourse. As a result, it was able to function as the preliminary conceptual schematisation needed for a computational ontology. Addressing the last point, though, goes beyond the aim of this paper. My purpose here has been to demonstrate why the experience of Ferrater’s intellectual history still seems valid to me today and can make a contribution to this effort. Victoria University, Melbourne, November 2012 Revised at the UAB, Barcelona, April 2013 Acknowledgments: My gratitude goes to Salvador Giner for the invitation to open this conference, and to Sara Adell and the technical team at the IEC for their efforts in making my participation such a delight. I would also like to thank John Zeleznikow, Pauline Stanton, Elizabeth Wilson-Everett and, especially, Tim Crotty, of VU, for video-recording the original lecture.Victoria University has put an earlier version on their servers at: http://lectopia.vu.edu.au/lectopia/lectopia.lasso?ut=945&id=15838. Ed Lewis lent personal hardware to overcome an impossible time difference. The work on ontology is the result of several projects: SGR CIRIT-2009SGR0688); CAPEREU Project 7FP, SGR CIRIT-2009SGR0688, CAPER-EU Project 7FP, DER201239492-C02-01, INNPACTO IPT-2011-1015-430000, EU COST ACTION C0801 AT, and SINTELNET-FP7-ICT-2009-C-286380. Marco Schorlemmer, of the CSICIIIA, put me on the trail of the work of Peter Øhrstrøm. Other friends at the CSIC, such as Pablo Noriega, Ramon López de Mántaras, Carles Sierra, Enric Plaza and Pilar Dellunde, read an earlier draft of the text and encouraged me to keep going. Albert Meroño, Núria Casellas, Pep Vallbé, Marta Poblet, Xavier Serra and Josep Monserrat made contributions as part of the IEC project PT2012-S05 on Catalan philosophy. This paper would not have seen the light of day if the Ferrater Mora Chair in Contemporary Thought, under the leadership of Josep Maria Terricabras, had not made available to researchers the extensive correspondence of the philosopher in digital form at the library of the University of Girona and had not given me permission to work with the material on reserve. To all of these people, I give my thanks. Translation from Catalan by Joel Graham

article JOURNAL OF CATALAN INTELLECTUAL HISTORY, Issues 7&8, 2014 | Print ISSN 2014-1572 / Online ISSN 2014-1564 DOI: 10.2436/20.3001.02.86 | P. 31-42 Reception date: 8/11/2013 / Admission date: 12-12-2013 http://revistes.iec.cat/index.php/JOCIH

n Josep Ferrater Mora’s integrationism: the possibility of oscillating Jordi Sales i Coderch Faculty of Philosophy University of Barcelona sales@ub.edu

abstract This paper sets Ferrater Mora’s integrationist philosophy against the larger background of the opposition between dogmatism and scepticism in the theory of knowledge. Oscillating between these two positions, which is key in Ferrater Mora’s definition of integrationism, can help us unlock the unresolved tension caused by their dichotomy and also poses its own difficult questions in the process.

key words Josep Ferrater Mora, integrationism, theory of knowledge.

§1. The “ism” game will only shed its phenomenological light if we understand what classifies the isms. Our answer must be particularly precise. Isms are like labels, but what do they label? What, exactly, lies beneath them? For if we insist upon some vague and general notion and ignore the fact that scholars and schools naturally classify isms according to their typical character, we fall short of a satisfactory answer. Further examination is needed and should determine the second level of our philosophical enquiry: by not playing the isms game we will be able to resist vague and self-serving systems of classification. And in an examination of the dogmatist–sceptic divide, the particular isms we have chosen are also positions or theses which will become answers to the question of the possibility of certainty in knowledge. One might suppose that ‘our’ reason for studying philosophical isms — which for each of us effectively becomes ‘my’ reason — is so we may use whatever is at our disposal to define a position regarding philosophical problems that is properly ‘ours’. This will either be predetermined, engraved upon our being at the time of our birth and so reminiscent of the Coleridgian maxim that “every man is born an Aristotelian or a Platonist” (which, incidentally,

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the Argentines mistakenly attributed to Borges); or it might be the confused choice we make when exercising ‘our’ preferences in the context of ‘our’ active social lives. But if we wish to discover our personal position, the study of isms can help us determine that position and polish it to a fine glow, illuminating arguments that justify and defend it. We should also remember that while this exercise is innocent enough in itself, it can also lead us, as it did Narcissus, to being overly self-concerned1. What we must generally do is adopt the paying customer’s coolheaded approach to the philosophies laid out before us, keep an eye on what we are being offered and select what suits our personal taste. One way or another, we need to regularly remind ourselves that “we do not practise scholarship for our own benefit alone”2. One of the ambiguities of all isms is that the positive or negative meaning that colours their names is hidden. Another is the ease with which we can doubt or simply not know whether the name of an ism was brought into being by those who espoused the doctrine or was coined later by others. The Cubists knew they were Cubists, so to speak, but the pre-Socratics clearly never enjoyed this collective knowledge of themselves3 and neither did the practitioners of the Renaissance. The Dadaist, existentialist and Surrealist sceptics did practise this self-reference and the term ‘communist’, which was first printed in large letters across the title of the book the Manifesto of the Communist Party, moved like a spectre across the Europe of 1848. On the other hand, the term ‘Christianity’ is quite absent from both the Gospels and the Nicene Creed while, finally, the ism describing Ferrater Mora’s philosophical method and approach — integrationism — is self-assigned. A number of practical considerations for the study of any ism, therefore, would be the careful examination of the root of the term, the moment in which the term was first used, its most broadly accepted exponents, the clearest antitheses to it, the vicissitudes it has experienced in its passage through history and, finally, not only how convenient its use has become but how far it operates as a manner of label. Indeed, Ferrater Mora himself set out to do just these things and so our first port of call must be the entry on Integrationism in his Diccionario de Filosofía (Dictionary of Philosophy)4.

1 See Appendix II of Jordi Sales, A la flama del vi, Barcelonesa d’Edicions, Barcelona, 1996: Convivencialitat, narcisisme i la possibilitat de l’escriptura filosòfica i la vida acadèmica, pp. 141–145. 2 Malebranche’s insightful writing on the defects of scholars in Recherche de la Vérité deserves to be more widely read. 3 In this respect, note that even after an entire century scholarship still fails to pay heed to the words of John Burnet and insists on using the term ‘pre-Socratic’. See John Burnet, Early Greek Philosophy, London, A. and C. Black, 1892. 4 As well as the references to Ferrater Mora’s works themselves (El ser y la muerte. Bosquejo de una filosofía integracionista, 1962 (ed. rev. in Obras Selectas,V, 2), especially “Introducción”; El ser y el sentido, 1967, XIII, §4, and applied in many of his works), note C. Nieto Blanco, La filos-

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This paper sets Ferrater Mora’s Integrationist philosophy against the larger background of the opposition between dogmatism and scepticism in the theory of knowledge. Oscillating between these two positions, which is key in Ferrater Mora’s definition of Integrationism, can help us unlock the unresolved tension caused by their dichotomy and also poses its own difficult questions in the process. §2. A philosophical position, ism or school of thought is always nourished by a nucleus which resists the inevitable moments of weakness this philosophy experiences in the outside world and which holds the fort against the collective weight of the world’s counterproposals. The strength of these nuclei becomes clearest when the ism enters what might be called a ‘transition’. From the Socratics to the Stoics and Academics, the School of Pyrrho or the Sceptics, in the philosophical moment these positions originally emerged we see transitions as changes of position: for example, the scholar Antiochus of Ascalon (150–68) made the transition from scepticism to dogmatism, as Philo of Larissa (160–77) before him had also done; and Aulus Gellius’ teacher Favorinus of Arelate (80/90–150) crossed from Platonism to Scepticism, at least to avail himself of “a convenient rhetorical strategy”5. Further below, I will examine the historical phenomena and data associated with the highly complex position of Eclecticism, which Antiochus, Philo and Favorinus all clearly adopted and which Ferrater Mora fears his Integrationism also borrows from; but first I wish to address in phenomenological terms the reason and manner in which certain aspects of Ferrater Mora’s philosophical thought become possible: the oscillating movement between opposing points, the adoption of mixed positions and also the nature of the dialogue between the poles. The term eclecticism comes to us from the Greek eklegein meaning ‘select’ or ‘choose’. For Antigonus of Carystus, its doctrine first emerged with Antiochus of Ascalon and the Stoics Panaetius of Rhodes (185–110) and Posidonius of Apamea (135–51), and it culminated in the writings of Cicero (106–43). In modernity, Leibniz has been a repeatedly cited exponent and in the XIXth. century the term was used explicitly by Victor Cousin (1792–

ofía en la encrucijada. Perfiles del pensamiento de J. F. M., 1985,“Segunda parte: método filosófico”, Chapter XIV; J. Pagès, “Integracionisme i continuisme. Mètode i ontologia a la filosofia de J. Ferrater Mora”, Revista de Catalunya, 53 (1991), pp. 24–36; J.-M. Terricabras, “José Ferrater Mora: An Integrationist Philosopher”, Man and World, 26 (1993), pp. 209–218; C. U. Moulines, “La distinción entre hechos y valores: una perspectiva integracionista”, in S. Giner, E. Guisán (eds.), José Ferrater Mora: el hombre y su obra, University of Santiago de Compostela, 1994, pp. 87–05; J. Echeverría, “El integracionismo de J. Ferrater Mora: una filosofía abierta al porvenir”, in ibid., pp. 107–125. 5 S. M. Beall, “Gellian Humanism Revisited”, in The Worlds of Aulus Gellius, ed. L. HolfordStrevens & A.Vardi, Oxford, 2005, pp. 206–222.

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1867)6. The Integrationism that Ferrater Mora posited in the century just gone by is also characterised by an eclectic’s willingness to select details from opposing positions in order to think about these together and examine their meaning beyond their greater or lesser importance as ingredients of controversy.7 Historically, one common feature of these eclectic moments is that they have occurred at the end of lengthy periods of explicit scholarly debate, of which four are notable: the moment during Cicero’s lifetime when the Dogmatists, Stoics and Epicureans opposed Scepticism in the debate on the problem of the criterion; b) the moment coinciding with Leibniz when the Aristotelians opposed mechanism in the debate on movement and physics; c) the moment during the period of Cousin’s eclecticism, in the debate between the Kantian system, common sense realism and Cartesian scepticism; and d) the Integrationism of Ferrater Mora, between logical positivism and scientific philosophies on the one hand, and existential philosophy and various European schools of humanism on the other. For the moment, however, one thing should be made clear: eclectics are selectors who choose details from opposing positions in order to answer questions and resolve debates. And the debate on the possibility of the certainty of knowledge acquires new edge if we cast our opposing factions not simply as Dogmatists and Sceptics but as ‘affirmers’ and ‘researchers’ accusing one another of being Dogmatists and Sceptics, and if the battle itself is fought under the watchful eye of a number of ‘selectors’ who pick and choose details from either side of the enemy lines. What remains to be seen, of course, is how exactly our selectors might cross the line to do this. §3. But first, we need to find the visual gradient or vantage point that reveals where that line is drawn so we can oscillate between the two points and beat the isms at their own game, as it were. A number of important questions must be also be asked about the direction in which our enquiry will move. First, how can it travel from one position to another? Second, how might its diversity be explained? And third, what common ground is shared by the arguments that have been used when the two positions were the subject of debate and were themselves the result of a constructive dialogue between specific thinkers who were either affirmers or researchers? One might argue the experience that informs the Dogmatist’s position is somehow more primary and original than the experience informing the Sceptic’s: that its reality ‘comes before’ the Sceptic’s because we can only

6 Victor Cousin, Cours de philosophie professé à la faculté des Lettres pendant l’année 1818 sur le fondement des idées absolues du vrai, du beau et du bien, publié avec son autorisation et d’après les meilleures rédactions de ce cours par A. Garnier, Hachette, Paris, 1836; cf. Patrice Vermeren, Victor Cousin: le jeu de la philosophie et de l’État, L’Harmattan, Paris, 1995. 7 Josep Ferrater Mora, the entry “Integracionisme” in Diccionario de Filosofía.

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identify errors in what we once affirmed. But while this is certainly a natural order of events, we still need to ask from exactly where this thought emerges and exactly what we mean when we argue that affirmation is ‘more primitive’ than negation (§3) and that the facticity of error ‘comes after’ (§4). And we will always be able to mediate between our affirmers and researchers (§5) if we identify the particular way they join when they collide — which because their formal incompatibility is clear, obliges us to distinguish between what we affirm and the basic circumstances in which we affirm (§6). §4. What do we mean when we say that affirming is more primitive or original? The initially rather awkward-looking answer is that affirmations are original in their quality of being almost but not completely affirmations or else not really being affirmations at all. For example, today is Thursday 8 November 2012. It’s half past eleven in the morning and just a while ago we all gathered in this room at the Institute of Catalan Studies, the Sala Prat de la Riba, to celebrate the centenary of the birth of Josep Ferrater Mora. Each of us got here a different way, either by taking a train or driving or walking, but all those ways worked fine, however sceptical we may be about the value of human knowledge. Whatever we’re doing and wherever we are, then, our basic human situation is always already an affirmer’s cognitive success story, and this provides the basis for our actions. Furthermore, our constant experience of communication generally consists of successful rather than unsuccessful events. So before becoming a philosophical position and a response to the ever-present possibility of sceptical negation, dogmatism already constitutes something very basic in us which phenomenology refers to as “natural attitude” or the “general thesis of natural attitude”: each of us is constantly faced with what we form part of, which is the reality of our time and space; we take it as it comes and we form part of it together with all those others who are accounted for therein and with whom we can therefore constantly communicate. Doubting or denying data from the natural world has to come after this first set of circumstances, whose constancy we — or I or you — modify that doubt or denial. The existence of the world and its unity is familiar to all men as the incontrovertible evidence by which the general thesis of natural attitude is named. (Its author, Edmund Husserl, proposed that “no doubt about or rejection of data belonging to the natural world alters in any respect the general positing which characterizes the natural attitude”.)8 The general thesis does not gain certainty, substance or determination by being an already affirmed reality and its nature is not predicative, and yet the philosopher who reflects on its mere, constant exercise can formulate it as a predicative thesis in the very sim8 Edmund Husserl, Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie und phänomenologische Philosophie, Book I: Allgemeine Einführung in die reine Phänomenologie, §30 [1913].

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ple affirmative statement “the world is”. In the exact way we describe it here, this primary or primitive truth holds that all men are potential interlocutors and immediately allows them to perform this role in a common world. Alfred Schütz refers to Husserl’s natural attitude as the “life-world”9, and what Husserl posits in the general thesis and Schütz describes in the life-world correspond to the first of the three meanings of dogmatism in Ferrater Mora’s Diccionario (6a ed., Vol. I, p. 856) as applied to the theory of knowledge: The typical position of naive realism, which will admit not only the possibility of knowing things as they truly are (or in themselves) but also the effectiveness of this knowledge in its daily, direct association with things. Although in general terms the language of informative dictionary entries should not be made an issue of, in the definition above I confess that the verb ‘admit’ causes me some discomfort. But if we linger with it, the word can also help us distinguish between the different facets in that notion of a ‘primitive affirmation’: ‘admit’ is transitive and is variously used to mean ‘receive’, ‘allow entry’ (into a place), ‘accept’ (as in ‘accept as true or worthy’) ‘permit’ and finally ‘suffer’ (as in ‘allow for’ or ‘tolerate’). The knowledge we normally fall back on to guide us in any given situation does not do its job so well because in some way we have ‘admitted’ its potential to do so, or have previously deliberated that this would be a good moment to clear the deck and let that knowledge take over. To return to my example of us here on this Thursday 8 November, when we saw or were told which room to come to we did not consciously classify this information as either knowledge or truth. Affirmation, then, is more primitive and more original than any mistrust, suspicion or relativist positing about the effectiveness or viability of affirming might be. In its original circumstances, affirmation is experienced as the basis for guiding acts which for the affirmation are possibilities rather than subjects and which affirmation therefore poses as such. We have not ‘admitted’ anything before affirming and, for this very reason, are subsequently able to admit. This phenomenon of the original character of the affirmation, where original means ‘comes before’, is what Husserlian phenomenology described as the Urdoxa or original belief, from the German prefix ur- meaning origin and the Greek doxa meaning ‘primary’ or ‘first’ doctrine. Husserl used it to identify the basic belief or certainty that validates all affirmations that have been determined. It denotes what is modified in affirmative positions that are supported by a clear enough modifier. Epistemological terms like evidentia (clarity, illustration or representation) derive from the handbooks of rhetorical figures that allow orators to say what they wish to say. I will return to this below but here I only observe

9 Alfred Schütz, “Concept and Theory Formation in the Social Sciences”, Journal of Philosophy, 51 (1954): 257–272, now in Collected Papers: I.The Problem of Social Reality, Martinus Nijhoff, the Hague, 1962.

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that the basic cognitive condition available to us is this pre-predicative assurance that “the world is” and that this world provides a common space for exchange or trade between the interlocutors who inhabit and drive it. §5. The facticity of error. However far back our memory goes, acts of affirming mistakenly, misinterpreting or misunderstanding and the experience of being led astray or disappointed have always been part and parcel of the life we lead as we negotiate multiple realities, affirmations and human groups. It has always been so and we have invariably moved between the experience of being right and being wrong. Indeed, Descartes reflected on this at the beginning of Meditationes when he recalled that “Several years have now elapsed since I first became aware that I had accepted, even from my youth, many false opinions for true”10. (Animadverti jam ante aliquot annos quàm multa, ineuente aetate, falsa pro veris admiserim.) The facticity of error is the idea that error is already here with us and that we do not need to posit its existence or conjure it up somehow because we have always had the experience of it. We only realize that we err, however, because the substance of a new affirmation invalidates an older one and causes us to look back and see our mistake. And so it is also true that the moment of our erring always exists in past time when we did not recognise it as such, in the memory of a moment when the alarm bell rang and one affirmation replaced another, and in our constant exercise of a primitive affirmation which guides us. It is quite true, as Maurice Merleau-Ponty observes, that when sensory perception hides from our eyes the presence of one particular thing, it reveals another11. So it is that the horizon offers us a constant stream of given presences: as we draw closer to the tree trunk on the beach, it reveals itself to be a rock and Merleau-Ponty argues that while we may have lost the trunk, we have actually gained the rock. And if we lose the rock we will perceive something else in its place because the world always gives us something to perceive and to affirm. This is also very true of our constant experience of presence and affirmation, where we will always affirm before we refute. But Merleau-Ponty’s observation is inadequate when contrasted with the experience of Cartesian doubt because our repeated experience of erring undermines our cognitive response and reveals its vulnerability. Everything depends on how severe the 10 R. Descartes, Meditationes de prima philosophia, AT,VII 17; IX 13: Animadverti jam ante aliquot annos quàm multa ineunte aetate falsa pro veris admiserim, et quàm dubia sint quaecunque istis postea superextruxi, ac proinde funditus omnia semel in vitâ esse evertenda, atque a primis fundamentis denuo inchoandum, si quid aliquandofirmum et mansurum cupiam in scientiis stabilire; sed ingens opus esse videbatur, eamque aetatem expectabam, quae foret tam matura, ut capessendis disciplinis aptior nulla sequeretur. 11 M. Merleau-Ponty, Phénoménologie de la perception, Gallimard, París, 1945.

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wear and tear is and how far our cognitive structure becomes dislodged. If we were mistaken before but in no way imagined we were mistaken until the warning bell rang, who can be sure we are not always mistaken? To return to Merleau-Ponty’s example of the beach, couldn’t that rock disappear just as the trunk had? And even if something else appeared in its place, would that not also disappear and would this process not continue indefinitely? Error follows affirmation because in erring we experience the refutation of what we previously affirmed. And at the same time this ‘coming after’ that characterizes refutation is a driver of scepticism and makes us wary of generalizing about refuting one affirmation or another: the fact that many affirmations have been refuted does not mean this will be the fate of all affirmations. §6. The possibility of mediating between opposites: the collision of two forces. Between ‘yes’ and ‘no’ there will always be a mediating mechanism to help us reach either response so that the answer could be ‘yes’ under one set of circumstances and ‘no’ under another. But the important thing is to mediate in a way that does not undermine the basic force of the ‘yes’ or ‘no’ answer, meaning the primitive force of dogmatism on the one hand (the cognitive effort we constantly exercise in primitive affirmations that are never entirely invalidated) or the weight of scepticism on the other (bearing down on that effort of ours and sapping its strength in the moment we detect our error and witness the invalidation of our past knowledge). If the debate on the possibility of certainty in knowledge has any meaning in the philosophical tradition it is in the constancy of the collision between these two forces, which revitalizes the primary or original possibility of the philosophical life. The weakness of dogmatism is simply the facticity of error: if we can affirm and be guided by affirming, why is it that we occasionally err? Always and at the same time, it would seem, we experience the pull of two conflicting conditions: on the one hand, a sense of eu-phoria or well-being in the world-that-is and on the other, indignation in the face of shortcomings or inadequacies that repeatedly demonstrate our erring nature. And this particular polarity, we might argue, deserves to be explored in our examination the theory of knowledge rather than be sidelined to the fields of psychology or anthropology.

Often less systematically obedient than the scholarship of philosophy and readier to risk embracing complex notions, the field of literary criticism has found particularly able commentators on the all-encompassing nature of this collision. On the subject of the twentieth-century Italian writer Carlo Emilio Gadda, for example, one critic proposes that Gadda “oscillated” between a condition of euphoria prompted by his radiant vision of infinite “co-motivations” and an aesthetic and restrictive scepticism which warned that “however hard we work we are still condemned”. Throughout his literary career, this critic argues, Gadda swung fairly constantly between “the poles of eu-

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phoria and of melancholy and indignation”. And in a poem of 1930, between ‘summer’s sullen midday’, ‘winter’s long silences’ and a welling up of absence and ‘infinite certainty’, the Italian writer Lalla Romano keenly evokes a similar kind of polarisation which we might describe as ‘absence in plenitude’ or ‘richness in desolation’: SILENZI D’estate, nel silenzio dei meriggi, sopra la terra esausta ed assopita, incombe il peso d’una enorme assenza. Ma dai grandi silenzi dell’inverno, sopra la terra rispogliata e nuda, infinita certezza si disserta. Tutto perdemmo: fu sprecato il tempo sì breve del fiorire, ma ora il cielo, non più velato dalle foglie, immenso, di luce inonda gli orizzonti, e nulla fuorché il cielo è vivente sulla terra, una più vera vita è in questa morte12.

Oscillation describes a kind of variation, perturbation or fluctuation in the time frame of a given medium or system. In the immediate surroundings of the collision between the answers of the affirmers and researchers to the question of the possibility of certainty in knowledge, there is also a kind of joining of elements — a ‘system’ in the archaic sense of the word (something ‘united’, ‘put together’) — that oscillates, to-ing and fro-ing from a central position or condition to opposite extremes. In a passage in the Phaedo, Plato’s protagonist uses a series of images drawn from the basic notions of movement and stability to express such a sense of transit or oscillation, in this case between assent and doubt. The scene is the prison of Athens on the day of Socrates’ death and the passage in question is Phaedo’s words after he has explained to Echecratides the substance of Simmias’ and Cebes’ objections to the logoi Socrates used to defend the immortality of his soul. In this moment Phaedo speaks for all those who are listening to the philosopher and for the two Thebans; and according to Gadamer, the profound dejection of the assembled listeners that it evokes has no lyrical equal in all the poetic canon13.

12 Silence / In summer’s midday sullenness, / upon the ravaged, ragged earth / falls a vast absence. / But in winter’s long silences, / the earth stripped naked / reveals infinite certainty. / We have lost everything: our time wasted / and its brief blossom now sky borne, / no longer veiled by leaves, immense, / the horizons flooded with light and nothing / but the heavens here on earth, / a truer life that lives within this death. (Translation by the author.) 13 H. G. Gadamer, Der Anfang der Philosophie, Philipp Reclam, Stuttgart, 1996 (translation to English by Rod Coltman,The Beginning of Philosophy, Continuum Publishing Company, 1998).

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“Now all of us, as we remarked to one another afterwards, were very uncomfortable when we heard what they said; for we had been thoroughly convinced by the previous argument, and now they seemed to be throwing us again into confusion and distrust, not only in respect to the past discussion but also with regard to any future one. They made us fear that our judgement was worthless or that no certainty could be attained in these matters.”14 Phaedo’s words bring together the language of feeling, the language of discourse, mode and assent, and the language of movement in the sense of toppling or falling. The language of feeling in the assembled company’s pleasure-to-pain transition records their fragile state (“all of us [...] were very uncomfortable”), while the language of discourse observes their oscillation from belief to doubt (of the logoi) and the particularly graphic language of movement describes their situation as a manner of fall (“and now they seemed to be throwing us again into confusion and distrust”). §7. The distinction between theory and attitude. If isms are doctrines, they become easy to refute. But what do we need in our enquiry? Should we refute one doctrine by adhering to another or oscillate between one and another? Or perhaps we should do neither of those things and return instead to the relative virtues of a simple system of classification which distinguishes between the theoretical moment of a doctrine and the attitude that sustains it. If we do this, we will identify four different positions in the collision between Dogmatism and Scepticism: at either end, we find what might be termed ‘theoretical radical dogmatism’ and ‘theoretical radical Scepticism’; but in between these poles there is also an attitude of dogmatism on the one hand (call it an ‘affirmative attitude’) and an attitude of scepticism on the other. And that, summarised in the figure below, may be the clearest description of what we need to examine in the Dogmatist–Sceptic divide when addressing the possibility of certainty in knowledge: theoretical radical Dogmatism........................................denied by the facticity of error an affirmative attitude...............................................................basic confidence a sceptical attitude........................................................................basic doubt theoretical radical Scepticism.................non-verifiable hypothesis and contradictory statement

14 Plato, Phaedo, 88c, translated by Harold North Fowler, Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press; London, William Heinemann Ltd., 1966: πάντες οὖν ἀκούσαντες εἰπόντων αὐτῶν ἀη δῶςδιετέθημεν, ὡς ὕστερον ἐλέγομεν πρὸς ἀλλήλους,ὅτι ὑπὸ τοῦ ἔμπροσθεν λόγου σφόδρ απεπεισμένους ἡμᾶς πάλιν ἐδόκουν ἀναταράξαικαὶ εἰς ἀπιστίαν καταβαλεῖν οὐ μόνον τοῖς προειρημένοις λόγοις, ἀλλὰ καὶ εἰς τὰ ὕστερονμέλλοντα ῥηθήσεσθαι, μὴ οὐδενὸς ἄξιοι εἶμ ενκριταὶ ἢ καὶ τὰ πράγματα αὐτὰ ἄπιστα ᾖ.

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Theoretical radical Scepticism is a doctrine on the possibility of certainty in knowledge which holds that no knowledge is immutable and no affirmation is absolutely assured. As a doctrine, Scepticism always supposes (remember Descartes’ “les […] extravagantes suppositions des Sceptiques”) and as a theory it is necessarily a hypothesis because we cannot decide that all affirmations may be refuted simply because many are. One of scepticism’s two favourite debating strategies is to enumerate examples of common human error (error reflected in optical illusion, colour blindness, the changing value of temperature or variation in the taste of foods, etc.); the other is to insist on the diversity of customs and beliefs between peoples and cultures. Together these strategies form the powerful arsenal of Sceptical argument as this is found in the tropes of Aenesidemus or Agrippa, for example. But theoretical radical scepticism contains the contradiction that, because it is a doctrine, it must actually affirm that it is true; or at least in order to say anything at all, it must say that it is true that there is no truth, and admit that this is a proposition of sorts. So we come up against a semantic wall that like all such walls must be scaled using the distinction between language and metalanguage; but in the case of theoretical radical Scepticism its value is undermined because the distinction itself would have to be recognized as valid, useful, healthy, efficient and in some way truthful. One appreciates, th erefore, exactly why Spinoza referred to Scepticism as “a sect of mutes” and how we might more clearly understand it as an ‘attitude of rejection’ of all theory than as an assertable doctrine. As an attitude, scepticism is the expression of doubt. A popular saying holds that “the scalded cat runs from cold water”. The cat hasn’t proved to itself that all water burns; it has simply decided it has no desire to be scalded again. And like that cat, the Sceptic runs from epokhē, ancient Scepticism’s suspension of judgement, which is an attitude to be conquered, because he has tired of the anxiety and disappointment involved in watching one affirmation topple before the next; and because sceptics no longer want to suffer this, as Sextus Empiricus observes, “without holding opinions we follow ordinary life in order not to be inactive”15. On the other hand, theoretical radical Dogmatism is refuted not so much by the innumerable arguments of scepticism — which, as noted above, will always contain a contradiction — as it is by the facticity of error and the appearance and vulnerability of the primitive affirmative capacity. In his Diccionario entry on Scepticism, Ferrater Mora has in fact observed that this dogmatism is as impossible to formulate as theoretical radical Scepticism, because it would have to affirm that “nothing is illusory” and, in grammatical terms, assign a modifier to a subject which does not exist because it is “nothing”. 15 Sextus Empiricus, Outlines of Pyrrhonism, I, 21-22.

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Another particularly interesting and even more subtle aspect of its self-refuting nature is that Sceptics can employ negative Dogmatism in a similar way to the argument used against them. Once again, as Sextus Empiricus observes: “Even someone who denies that all things are relative eo ipso confirms that all things are relative. For by his means of opposing us he shows that ‘All things are relative’ is relative to us, and not universal”.16 Ergo: just as the Sceptic cannot radically affirm his position, neither can the dogmatist radically negate the thesis against his. This, I argue, effectively confirms that the fundamental principle of Scepticism is its negation and the fundamental principle of Dogmatism is its affirmation: when the two factions attempt to exchange roles, the result is an utter failure. Beyond such subtleties, however, one can argue that more than a doctrine, theoretical radical Dogmatism is the common denominator in all those positions that say criteria can be used to successfully differentiate between true and false propositions. Contrary to the sceptical attitude, the dogmatic or affirmative attitude is driven by confidence, which David Hume calls “belief ”, Husserl refers to as Urdoxa (or Urglaube at a more intense level) and Karl Jaspers understands as “philosophical faith” or “faith reasoning”. Confidence in the movement that primitive affirmation constantly and repeatedly produces operates as a kind of indestructible substrate of all human experience. The American philosopher George Santayana (1863–1952) spoke of an “animal faith” and argued that Scepticism was “the chastity of the intellect”16. But in order for it to be such, first there has to be a libido and also some preventive measure against lascivious excess. Santayana’s phrase aptly recalls the perennial debate between sceptical attitudes and affirmative attitudes (the term ‘affirmative’ being preferable to ‘dogmatic’, which seems better suited in its more frequent or common service in the description of issues of social tolerance amongst the world’s citizens). In this new century and as apprentice scholars whose vocation has called them to the study of philosophy, our path must take us to the heart of the debate or the game between isms, in all its complexity and in the experience of the possibility of oscillating. Translation from Catalan by Barnaby Noone

16 Sextus Empiricus, Outlines of Pyrrhonism, I, 135-140. 17 G. Santayana, Scepticism and Animal Faith: Introduction to a System of Philosophy, Charles Scribner’s Sons, New York, 1923, pp. 69–70: “Scepticism is the chastity of the intellect, and it is shameful to surrender it too soon or to the first comer: there is nobility in preserving it coolly and proudly through long youth, until at last, in the ripeness of instinct and discretion, it can be safely exchanged for fidelity and happiness”. cf.V. Cervera, A. Lastra, Los reinos de Santayana, Biblioteca Javier Coy d’Estudis Nord-Americans / University of Valencia,Valencia, 2002.

article JOURNAL OF CATALAN INTELLECTUAL HISTORY, Issues 7&8, 2014 | Print ISSN 2014-1572 / Online ISSN 2014-1564 DOI: 10.2436/20.3001.02.87 | P. 43-49 Reception date: 7/11/2013 / Admission date: 12/12/2013 http://revistes.iec.cat/index.php/JOCIH

errater Mora: political ideas Josep-Maria Terricabras Faculty of Letters, University of Girona Institute of Catalan Studies josepm.terricabras@udg.edu

abstract This paper proposes that although Ferrater Mora was never militantly political, his writing reveals an enduring interest in the relationship between Europe, Spain and Catalonia and a belief that their relations should adopt a federal design. The paper also examines Ferrater Mora’s opinions and feelings about the Catalan language beyond the use of it his circumstances obliged him to make.

key words Josep Ferrater Mora, politics.

Josep Ferrater Mora was born in his home in carrer de la Princesa in Barcelona on 30 October 1912. In his early youth he boarded at the school El Collell, near Girona, and after returning to Barcelona to complete his secondary education he eventually read philosophy at university. He was only twenty-three when in 1935 he published his first slim book of essays, Cóctel de verdad (‘A True Cocktail’ — or alternatively, ‘A Cocktail of Truths’), which by his own account was very much “the book of an adolescent” that he soon regretted writing. But although the style is rough, Cóctel contains a revealing passage on what Ferrater Mora calls “my non-transferable definition of me”. There, he describes (not particularly concisely) his distinguishing features, which include his physical appearance, abilities, tastes and feelings. And although he argues that self-portraits should not disclose one’s political views, somewhere between the adolescent flourishes and cryptic observations he drops this short paragraph into the text: Politics. Who said I was a political sceptic? Who can say politics doesn’t make me buzz inside? How can I be an enemy of politics if I am a friend of science?1 1 Política. ¿Quién ha dicho que soy escéptico en política? ¿Quién ha dicho que la política no me hace vibrar intensamente? Yo no puedo ser enemigo de la política, porque soy amigo de la ciencia.

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We know nothing more about Ferrater Mora’s political interests during this early period, even though his departure for France at the end of the Civil War suggests the ideological position he had adopted and would maintain for the rest of his life. But it was in the United States that he began to publish his thoughts on Catalonia, Spain and Europe, and this is the period I will now address, examining his work chronologically so as to follow his particular intellectual progress. Ferrater Mora’s first book on politics was the very short España y Europa (‘Spain and Europe’), published in 1942. A comparative study, it describes each territory and then argues that while Europe can be defined by its interest in history and its acceptance of reason as a driving principle of life, Spain has rejected history and taken refuge in the driest, most rigid and most backward-looking form of traditionalism. Spain is not modern, he proposes, precisely because it will not live according to reason and instead insists on being led by passion alone, reducing history to an always intense act of living that centres on itself and feeds on what is around it. While Europe is moved by ideas, Spain is controlled by ideals which constantly drive it to disproportionate levels of action. This, he argues, is why Spain has been dominated by violence: because it is not so much a nation or state as an attitude. And from this first brief monograph, written over seventy years ago, one passage is particularly forward-looking: The violence with which Spaniards have attempted to impose upon Spain a particular way of life is not actually the logical result of an allegiance to a culture or belief system; rather, it is the result of an attitude that is prepared to bend every other race, language or creed to its will and is capable of doing whatever it must to convince the rest of the world that the Spanish race, language and creed are unique.2

Twenty years later and as I shall discuss below, Ferrater Mora would admit that the tone of this book was rather lofty and he would be right, even though he continued to have the same basic opinions. And two years later, in 1944, these opinions led him to write his first detailed political analysis of Catalonia in Les formes de la vida catalana (‘The Character of Catalan Life’), which together with his Diccionario de Filosofía (‘Dictionary of Philosophy’) became the writer’s most widely read work (note that the Diccionario, which was first published in 1941 in just one volume, had by 1979 been extended to fill four volumes and was published in its sixth edition).

2 La violencia con que cualquier español ha querido imponer a España una forma de vida no es, consiguientemente, el resultado de una adscripción a una determinada cultura o a una determinada creencia en cuanto tales; es el resultado de esa actitud que está dispuesta a españolizar cualquier raza, cualquier lengua o cualquier creencia y que está dispuesta, además, a hacer creer que esta raza, esta lengua o esta creencia son las únicas posibles en el mundo. (España y Europa, p. 35.)

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In Les formes Ferrater Mora outlined the four essential features of Catalan character: continuity, common sense, measure and irony (the influence on him of the writer and philosopher Eugeni d’Ors was particularly notable). As he maintained even up to the time of the series of lectures titled Un sistema obert (‘An Open System’) that he gave at the Universitat de Girona in 1989 (as the first guest speaker of the newly-created Ferrater Mora Chair), these were not the only features of Catalan character. They might also define Catalans as much in their absence as by their presence. Features or virtues, even, they were essentially four ‘rules of thumb’ that could describe the Catalan way of being. It wasn’t that the Catalans themselves could lay claim to them or possess them in any specific way; rather, and to use Bergson’s expression, they were a description of tendency. (Thirty years later in 1979, in the speech he gave on receiving an honorary degree from the Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona, Ferrater Mora also referred to four “tendencies”, “attitudes” or “traits” in Catalan philosophy that had a “feeling of family” about them — a passing nod to Wittgenstein — and that were, namely, loyalty to reality, contractual predisposition, professionalism, and the desire for clarity. He also conceded that these could be seen as analogous with the four features he had described decades earlier.) In the year of 1944 Les formes was published, in Ferrater Mora’s own words, “together with a humble Spanish translation”. Since then the Catalan text has gone through several revisions (1955, 1960, 1972, and 1980) and the Spanish translation has been revised twice (1963 and 1967), although the text has generally reappeared not on its own but in Ferrater Mora anthologies alongside other essays on similar subjects (note that Ferrater constantly revised much of his work, both in his writing on philosophy and his discursive essays). The second Spanish edition of Les formes was published in 1963 in the book Tres mundos: Cataluña, España, Europa (‘Three Worlds: Catalonia, Spain, Europe’). Tres mundos contains six chapters, of which five are relevant to the present paper. The chapter of Les formes is the longest and contains a new introduction in which Ferrater Mora refers directly to two seminal works that had appeared between the first Catalan edition of Les formes of 1944 and this second Spanish edition: Notícia de Catalunya (‘News from Catalonia) by Jaume Vicens Vives, published in 1954, and Nosaltres, els valencians (‘We, the Valencians’) by Joan Fuster, published in 1962. In the second book, Joan Fuster had in some way recovered the title Vicens Vives had originally planned to give his book, which was Nosaltres, els catalans (‘We, the Catalans’). Ferrater Mora also makes two things clear in his introduction to the chapter. First, he warns us that his analysis of Catalan character is in no way intended to be comprehensive and that his conclusions may not be the only ones or even the best ones (his vision, he says, is simply “one amongst other possible visions”, not because it is “merely subjective” but because it is “selective”). Second, he considers that

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his view “complements” the analyses made by Vicens Vives and Fuster. Indeed, it was Vicens Vives who noted that this expressed “a consciousness of being within a generation”. Finally, it should also be noted that the introduction reveals no significant changes in Ferrater Mora’s attitude towards the essay itself or the concepts he uses in it. From the beginning of his exile and fully aware of the disastrous consequences of the Spanish Civil War and its aftermath, Ferrater Mora had already found it necessary to reflect upon the complex relationship between Catalonia, Spain and Europe. He did not choose this subject because he had in some way become fixed by the paralysing potential of these events, but because he believed that an analysis of the past could help us understand the present and negotiate the future. (Note that much later in his life Ferrater Mora refused to write his memoirs, even though he was asked to do this many times.) He had no desire to contemplate the past for its own sake but saw it as an instrument by which to gain understanding about life. Some of these historical and political essays can be found in several different volumes and in a number of versions, again reflecting the writer’s habit of very rarely declaring a work complete. As suggested above, although Ferrater Mora revised many of his essays, their basic premise did not vary. This is particularly true of another of the chapters in Tres mundos, “España y Europa veinte años despúes” (‘Spain and Europe Twenty Years After’) There, he starts by condemning the style of his writing in 1942 as “frankly unbearable”, “rickety” and “rhetorically verbose” (“just reading my marred production made me more and more irritated”) but concludes that, so many years later, he still agrees with the general lines he set out in that essay and he intends to reflect on the three separate worlds of Catalonia, Spain and Europe and build bridges between them. And beyond the philosopher’s own critique of his heavy-handed discursive style, we should bear in mind the especially keen vision he had of the world around him and the manner in which he always preserved this: that years later, for example, he would continue to warn readers of the dangers of provincialism and self-isolation (the shunning of others’ company), which he saw as much as a threat to the Catalans as to the Spanish. This, he argued, made it all the more important to build bridges across the divide to Europe; this, very clearly, was behind his conviction that the only future for Catalonia and Spain was a future in Europe and in Europe as a federation.

Ferrater Mora did not support the cause for independence and neither was he a nationalist: his family and intellectual tradition as well as the terrible political and social experience that had just taken place in an extraordinarily hostile and belligerent world did not prompt him towards either of these political positions. (It is not easy to understand that his first book, published

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in 1935 in the midst of an atmosphere of severe regulation, was written in Spanish and carried the cryptic dedication “To the memory of Eugenio d’Ors, champion of culture who fell in the line of duty”3). Although time has proved him wrong, Ferrater believed that separatism and nationalism were about to become obsolete, moribund ideologies and remnants of a century that was already dead and buried. His deep-seated aversion to political self-declaration (his earliest text) and his intellectual openness encouraged him to share with many other, mostly leftwing Catalan intellectuals of his generation a vision of politics and territory that was based on federalism. It had nothing to do with the “third Spain” which Josep Pla proposes, the position he defended in the literary portrait he wrote of Ferrater Mora (in the second series of his Homenots, in which he addressed different intellectual figures); and this is especially true if we attempt to base such a case, as Pla did, on Ferrater Mora’s proposal in Les formes that one of the four features of Catalan identity was seny or ‘common sense’. Ferrater did not believe in adjusting or patching up the cloth of his country in one way or another for more or less well-intended reasons; for him, Europe had to be cut fairly and squarely across federal lines, and Spain within Europe had to do the same, divesting itself of its centralist, authoritarian and enforced Castilian character. For this reason, the project of an integrating federalism did not strike Ferrater as being in any way the escape route from some more difficult political path. His pro-Catalan feeling clearly defended Catalonia as a nation and he frequently used the term the Països Catalans. And if there was still any doubt, he dispelled this in his essay “Unidad y pluralidad” (‘Unity and Plurality’), which in 1965 was included in the book Esa gente de España... (These People of Spain...’) alongside essays by such prestigious thinkers as Raúl Morodo, Sergio Vilar or Américo Castro. (Note that In his own article, by contrast, Américo Castro spoke about the “Spanish people” of the XVIIIth. century!) It was also clear that the federalism Ferrater supported would have to respect the Catalan nation, as reflected in his observations on language. And here we need to distinguish clearly between his specific personal experience — forced by the circumstances of a painful linguistic exile — and his intellectual position towards the subject in general terms. Ferrater Mora’s militancy regarding language matters can be clearly exemplified in three specific moments in his writing, which I shall now consider to conclude this paper. These moments are curious because, at least initially, they seem to conflict with the writer’s interest in defending the Catalan language. The first comes in a letter written on 22 May 1951 to Joan Oliver (Joc de cartes, [‘Card Game’] p. 59), where Ferrater Mora had this to say: 3 A la memoria de Eugenio d’Ors, exhausto en las lides de la Cultura.

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The truth be told, you’ll be tempted to wonder at the number of mistakes I make in Catalan but what you should actually be impressed by is the resilience of the language: remember, after all, that I sometimes spend months without speaking or reading it.4

The second moment comes in 1960 in the preface to his book Una mica de tot (‘A Little Bit of Everything’), where Ferrater acknowledged that he was an author who had to assume a number of different linguistic identities: There exists in this day and age a certain type of writer or thinker who can be basically defined as ‘disinherited’ and I am one of these. I must also add that I do not find this deplorable: no longer having a language of one’s own is not necessarily the same as no longer having any language at all; it might also be that you have a number of languages and in a world like ours, which is becoming more universal every day, this may not actually be a bad thing.5

Finally, the third moment is in 1966, when the writer Joan Fuster published in Destino a critique of Ferrater’s book La filosofia en el món d’avui (‘Philosophy in Today’s World’) titled “Ferrater Mora y sus filósofos” (‘Ferrater Mora and his Philosophers’). There, Fuster remembers that Ferrater has pursued his scholarly career in philosophy and language outside Catalonia and, after citing the passage from Una mica de tot recorded just above (“There exists [...] a bad thing.”), he goes on to formulate in somewhat complicated and ambiguous terms the idea that Ferrater “must lament this resolve to ‘not form part’” of the common work. In fact, Fuster used “the case of Ferrater” as an excuse to address an issue that went and still goes beyond any single individual and that is becoming a worrying feature of our culture. For this reason Fuster — who positively reviews Ferrater’s rigor, acuity and clarity of thought — recognises that perhaps the philosopher here should have been as plurilingual as the philosopher there. But although he poses the question he does not pursue matters any further and will neither condemn nor forgive his subject because, as he argues, the issue is a much too complex one. Here, then, are three moments which might not only appear to be apologies for Ferrater’s ‘disinherited’ circumstances but might also be used to demonstrate Ferrater’s disinterest in language and his disregard for Catalan. But nothing could be further from the truth, I would argue. Indeed, beyond his personal circumstances Ferrater defended the importance of the Catalan language as if it were the fifth feature of Catalan life. In a passage in the es-

4 La veritat és que, en lloc de sorprendre’t —com estaràs temptat de fer-ho— de l’abundor de les meves faltes en català, hauries d’admirar la persistència de la llengua. Pensa que passo mesos sencers sense parlar-lo o llegir-lo. (Joc de cartes, p. 59.) 5 Hi ha avui una certa mena d’escriptors i de pensadors que poden ser qualificats d’essencialment «desterrats»; jo en sóc un exemple. He d’afegir que no ho deploro. No tenir ja una llengua «pròpia» no vol dir necessàriament no tenir cap llengua; pot voler dir tenir-ne vàries. En un món cada dia més universal com el nostre no és pas mala solució. (Una mica de tot, 1960, prefaci, p. 9.)

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say “Conreu de la llengua” (‘A Harvest of Language’) from the book Catalanització de Catalunya (‘The Catalanisation of Catalonia’) he demonstrated this briefly, clearly and unmistakably: My thesis is as follows: Catalan personality can only manifest itself in its most complete form through its language. When the language takes a step back, the character wilts and becomes spoilt; it becomes flawed, and is an impediment to the essential way of being that is Catalan. What is Catalan ceases to be so. And to those who would ask what tragedy there is in this I would reply: there would none if in ceasing to be Catalan or in being less so, Catalan did not also simply cease to be.6

It is true that Ferrater never offered a declaration of his political principles in systematic or theoretical terms but he did not do this in other areas of his thought, either (in his preoccupation with aesthetics, for example). And it cannot be denied that, intellectually speaking, he clearly shared the progressive views of his pro-Catalan contemporaries and a commitment to the cause of Europe which, unfortunately, has still not borne its fruit. Indeed, we should remember that later in life, his condition for accepting an invitation to enter the Spanish university community was that the teaching staff who had been expelled by the Franco regime in 1965 should be readmitted. Ferrater Mora never returned to Catalonia but, in a certain sense, he never left the country, either. Even today, his writing still provides a beacon for those who attempt to walk down paths of democracy and progress, just as it shines back on other paths we might once have taken but that in the course of history became closed. Translation from Catalan by Barnaby Noone

6 La meva tesi és: la personalitat catalana pot manifestar-se amb plenitud només per mitjà de la seva llengua. Quan aquesta recula, l’altra es marceix, es malmet, es vicia, retrocedeix la manera de ser pròpia de Catalunya. El català deixa de ser català. ¿Direm que, després de tot, això no és tan deplorable? No ho seria si, en deixar de ser català, o en ser-ne menys, el català no deixés també simplement de ser. (Catalanització de Catalunya, “Conreu de la llengua”, 1960.)

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article JOURNAL OF CATALAN INTELLECTUAL HISTORY, Issues 7&8, 2014 | Print ISSN 2014-1572 / Online ISSN 2014-1564 DOI: 10.2436/20.3001.02.88 | P. 51-63 Reception date: 1/6/2013 / Admission date: 12/12/2013 http://revistes.iec.cat/index.php/JOCIH

radition and renovation: the formation of Balmes and Martí d’Eixalà in their historic context Rafael Ramis Barceló Universitat de les Illes Balears r.ramis@uib.es

Josep M.Vilasojana Universitat Pompeu Fabra josep.vilasojana@upf.edu

abstract Jaume Balmes and Ramon Martí are certainly the most profound of the Catalan thinkers in the first half of the 19th century. This work shows some of the keys to contextualize their contributions, using the influences they received as a starting point. The basic objective of the comparison is to show that, although they come from similar sources, their positions in regard to combining tradition and modernity are different. The analysis ends with a paradox: Balmes, a more noted philosopher, did not enjoy the same level of direct influence as Martí d’Eixalà.

keywords Ramon Martí d’Eixalà, Jaume Balmes, XIXth education.

In this article we present the figures of Jaume Balmes and Ramon Martí d’Eixalà in their historic and cultural context, to try to highlight their similarities and differences in the framework of Catalan thinking in the first half of the XIXth. century. The two most relevant intellectuals of the epoch had very different impacts on the development of Catalan philosophy. Martí d’Eixalà was a sort of Albertus Magnus, a teacher of important thinkers and author of a work which tried to give a new orientation to the ideas of the epoch, with the novelty of the time, which in the XIIIth. century was Aristotelian empiricism. Like Albertus, Martí d’Eixalà did not advance much in his own proposals, but he prepared the way for a Catalan school which came shortly after. Balmes was a brilliant and original thinker, synthetic with

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tradition and open to renovation. In the history of philosophy he might be comparable to Vico, as both represented an isolated flowering, without much impact; an amalgam of the tradition yet able to offer serious criticism of the contemporary philosophy and go ahead in some concepts which would become important later. Undoubtedly Catalan philosophy in the 40’s of the XIXth. century debated between tradition and renovation1. The two most eminent figures, Jaume Balmes2 and Ramon Martí d’Eixalà3, were strictly contemporaries of each other and received comparable philosophical and university educations. Martí d’Eixalà’s brief life (1808-1857) did not allow him to see his theories recognized by slightly later minds, less eclectic and more cautious, which developed what the philosopher and lawyer from Cardona had supported so fervently. Something similar occurred in the even briefer life of Balmes (1810-1848), who almost reached phenomenological conclusions and thought about the “social question” in an almost prophetic way, although few followed his path. Martí d’Eixalà was an essential figure in the development of Catalan philosophy: he was the capo scuola of all Catalan thinking of the 19th century. Balmes could have been the great philosopher of the Catholic world of the 19th century, able to open the way for Leo XIII4 Their respective paths, traced from a Catalan sentiment, were not incompatible with a Spanish feeling. Their strong “Catalanness” was not the basis of a nationalism, but the starting point of a philosophical tradition for the thought of their era, and both had a political attitude which went beyond borders and languages. Balmes and Martí d’Eixalà, although they lived in Barcelona or Madrid, did not set their view simply in Catalonia or Spain, but looked toward Europe, from which they awaited progress and convergence with the ideas of the future. The firm Catholicism that both professed was not an obstacle to their seeking and finding great ideas in modern thought. Catalonia, in the decade of the forties in the XIXth. century, had two of the epoch’s most relevant thinkers in all of Spain. We will try to show how they were shaped by their parallel experiences and the use they made of their contemporary intellectual resources. A study of the Catalan philosophical atmosphere reveals that both authors received a basically Scholastic education, but their intellectual evolu-

1 The bibliography is extense. We only mention Abellán 1984 and Bilbeny 1985. 2 For Balmes, one must see, Casanovas 1932b; Batllori 1947; Florí 1947. Also Sáinz de Robles 1964 i Roca Blanco 1997. For a view more of his political than philosophical thinking, see Fradera 1996. 3 For Martí d’Eixalà, see Roura 1980 and Vilajosana 2011 4 A view on parallels between the two is found in Vilajosana and Ramis Barceló 2012.

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tion, influenced by European thought and political and social circumstances, was very different. We have the paradox that while Martí d’Eixalà was very critical of the period’s traditional teaching, his thought didn’t reach the critical dimension of Balmes’s. Despite this, the wide network of Martí d’Eixala’s disciples made him (at times, unsupported by his own writings) the precursor of a wide scope of intellectual and political trends5.

1. Intellectual formation in Catalonia during the first third of the XIXth. century One can consider that, in general terms, the teaching of arts and philosophy in the first third of the XIXth. century was the continuation of the decadence of the university in the XVIIIth. century. Teaching, despite attempts by reformers from 1812 until Mendizabal’s Disentailment, was in the Church’s hands; there was no lay education and those who wished higher studies had to go through grammar schools, normally run by ecclesiastics6. The situation in Catalonia was not very different, although there was a controversy about the role of philosophy after the expulsion of the Jesuits, which we will discuss later. Teaching in the Principality of Catalonia consisted in three phases. The first was dedicated to grammar and rhetoric and was studied at the university, in convents, schools and seminaries. This instruction was almost always under clerical control. The second phase, the study of philosophy, was only in the university and the convents. The third phase, higher studies, was only taught at the university, which at that time was in Cervera. Since the Decree of the Nova Planta, trilingual education was necessary in Catalonia: students had to learn to translate from the vernacular (Catalan) lexicon learned at home to Spanish for school, and then to Latin. As a result, the study of Latin grammar was slightly different in Catalan speaking areas than in the rest of Spain7. Balmes came from Vic and Martí d’Eixalà from Cardona, towns in central Catalonia which made this trilingual process suitable and let them gain a special linguistic sensitivity8 and brought them 5 Some of his principal disciples were: Manuel Duran i Bas, Estanislau Reynals i Rabassa and Francesc Permanyer (among the lawyers), Francesc Xavier Llorens i Barba and Pere Codina (among the philosophers), Joaquim Rubió i Ors, Josep Coll i Vehí and Joan Mañé i Flaquer (among the literati), Laureà Figuerola (lawyer, economist and politician), i Manuel Milà i Fontanals (philologist). 6 A panorama of the education of the time: Monés i Pujol-Busquets 2009. 7 See Roviró Alemany 2011. 8 The importance of these linguistic studies made both authors extraordinarily sensitive to the philosophy of language and their thinking took into account the latest ideas from France on grammar. See Lázaro Carreter 1948, i Morán Ocerinjáuregui 2000.

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together in their intellectual instruction. Catalan was a starting point to learn Spanish and Latin, and from these it was relatively easy to go to other European languages. Obviously the two thinkers had a solid grammatical and linguistic background. Les Escoles Pies, which formed the man from Cardona, were an exception to the Scholastic educational climate: natural science was appreciated9 and an innovative methodology was used which was sensitive to psychological empiricism, which would later nurture Martí’s philosophy. On the other hand, Blames received a very solid education in grammar and rhetoric in Vic10. Both were extremely well prepared at the end of this phase. There was a great contrast between the possibilities of the Catalan students, capable of great language acquisition and the methodology used at schools and universities. It is not strange that, in philosophy teaching, the two thinkers were greatly disappointed. With few exceptions philosophy instruction in Catalonia was a late product of the most obtuse Scholasticism. Philosophical studies, since the end of the Middle Ages, said that the first year was for logic and mathematics, physics in the second year and ethics and metaphysics in the third. This scheme was an adaptation of the classical view of Aristotelian philosophy, passed through the sieve of Medieval Scholasticism and reworked through the Scholastic tradition since then. The philosophical education taught in the University of Cervera, at least after the expulsion of the Jesuits, was not stimulating for a student who liked new ideas. In fact, during the period from the Constitution of Cadiz until its move to Barcelona, the university in Cervera maintained reactionary and absolutist positions11. As Jaume Castells12 has noted, Cervera was a place with little cultural tradition and its living conditions were in no way comparable to that of the large cities. The Ominous Decade (Dècada Ominosa), when both were tied to Cervera, contributed to darkening their expectations in the University. Fortunately neither of the two authors was too steeped in Cerverine philosophy. Both benefited from the radical changes in educational policy from the “Trienni Liberal” to the reestablishment of the absolutism: the “Reglament General d’Instrucció Pública de 1821” (General Law of Public Instruction), inspired by liberalism, was replaced by the “Pla Calomarde” (1824) which had an absolutist character. The consequences of these plans affected Martí d’Eixalà directly, and Balmes more indirectly. Despite this, the contrast between the

9 10 11 12

See Roura 1980. Roviró Alemany 2011 provides a good synthesis. See Prats 2002. See astells i Bertran 1998.

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two manners of understanding philosophy must have left a profound mark on minds like theirs. By chance both thinkers studied philosophy during the “Trienni Liberal”; this parenthesis in history brought about a questioning of the more conservative philosophy taught in convents and the university. The Cerverine philosophy in the XIXth. century received the influence of two major doctrines which shared an interest in “common sense”13. One was the Aristotelian line, stoic and humanistic which, without opposing Scholasticism, defended a certain serene realism as an objective in morality. This is associated in the common mind as the “seny” (sense or judgment) characteristic of Catalonia and other Mediterranean peoples, who share a realistic understanding of philosophy. The other line was preneoscholastic philosophy14 defended by the Jesuits who, until their expulsion, dominated Cerverine thinking, and which permitted some links to modern philosophy, and specifically with the Cartesian self-evidence of conscionsness. Faced with the first line and its predominantly ethical character, this had a more psychological (and therefore theoretical) imprint. The Jesuit historiography says that the decadence of Cervera began when the Company of Jesus was expelled15, while the other historiographical stream opines that the predominance of the eclectic “seny” line was a major influence since 1767 and formed the humus from which Balmes and Martí d’Eixalà could form their ideas16. There is more general agreement that the time when Dou was chancellor was the darkest and most decadent in the university’s history17. Martí d’Eixalà was enrolled in logic classes in the convent of the Discalced Augustinians in Barcelona in 1820-2118, although he was possibly enrolled in Mataró, taking classes in the Escolapis de Santa Anna. In 1821 the “Reglament General d’Instrucció Pública” came into effect, prohibiting the teaching of philosophy in convents19. As a result he had to go to Cervera in 1821-22 13 We follow Colomer i Carles 1998. 14 Anglès Cervelló 1992, p. 167, proposed the phrase “eclectic ecclesiastic authors”. The eclecticism comes from allowing influences beyond the Aristotelian-Thomist synthesis into his thinking. The “preneoscholastic” concept indicates that the philosophy is prior to the Thomist neoscholasticism which was introduced into Spain from Italy by P. Baltasar Masdeu, and by Fra Felipe Puigserver, author of Philosophia Sancti Thomae Aquinatis auribus huius temporis accommodata, Madrid, 1824, 3 vols. 15 See the classic study by Casanovas 1932a, pp. 5-6. 16 Bosch, Juvells i Valmitjana 1998, pp. 115-116. 17 Fontana 1988, pp. 101-102. 18 Sáenz-Rico Urbina 1973, p. 259, notes that the Discalced Augustinian school was run by masters Fr. José Coll and Fr. Agustín Talleda. As it is not known if Martí d’Eixalà studied logic in this center, we cannot confirm that it was a direct influence on his thinking. 19 For a broad view, see Palomeque Torres 1970.

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to study mathematics20. His teacher was Joaquim Llaró, a liberal clergyman who asked to be transferred to Barcelona21. In fact, in February of 1822 the University of Barcelona was inaugurated and in November of 1822 the University of Cervera was closed. That is why the thinker from Cardona had to return to Barcelona, where he studied ethics during 1822-2322. But in April 1823 the Hundred Thousand Sons of Saint Louis crossed the border and reestablished absolutism and began the political repression of liberals. The purging of faculty suspected of liberal tendencies lasted several years. The end of the year was truly problematic, and Martí d’Eixalà had difficulties in receiving recognition for his studies. November 15, 1823 the edict of the restoration of the University of Cervera was published23 Martí d’Eixalà didn’t enroll immediately in the center; apparently he completed his education in 1824 in Barcelona under Pere Vieta, doctor and professor of Experimental Physics in the “Reial Junta de Comerç de Catalunya” (Catalonia Royal Board of Commerce)24. It is likely that the contact with Vieta gave him a greater sensitivity to empiricism. Balmes studied philosophy in the Vic seminary from 1820 – 23. In this center the political avatars were heard more indirectly, with a flavor of the intellectual controversies typical of the XVIIIth. century. Balmes witnessed the combat between the two Scholastic forms of understanding philosophy25. On one hand, Aristotelian Felix Amat’s Institutiones Philosophiae26, was used as a text in the Barcelona, and later in the Vic seminary. On the other, Jesuit Andrés de Guevara’s Institutionum elementarium philosophiae27 the paradigm of the Company’s philosophic thought during the XVIIIth. century. At this time there appeared the already cited handbook by the Mallorcan Dominican Felip Puigserver, said by Urdánoz to be “the world’s first work on Scholastic and neoThomist renovation in the XIXth. century”28. Balmes, like Martí d’Eixalà29, knew Puigserver’s work, although he had studied Amat’s and Guevara’s more avidly. In particular, starting in 1824, the University of 20 21 22 23

24 25 26 27 28 29

See Roura 1980, p. 34 Palomeque Torres 1970, p. 36. See Roura 1980, p. 36. Monés i Pujol-Busquets 2009, p. 59; also, an interesting comparative chronology between the Spanish legislative model and its reception in Catalonia p. 54-61. See Roura 1980, p. 38. A good summary of the question is in Roviró Alemany 2011, pp. 73-76. Amat de Palau i Pont 1832. Guevara 1796-1798. Urdánoz 1975, p. 612. See Roura 1980, pp. 162 i 203.

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Cervera declared that it would only recognize studies from seminaries that had studied the works of Guevara30. Because of his condition as a cleric, Balmes could not openly show his distance from the Scholasticism tied to Aquinas which he had studied, and toward which the Church wanted to return. Martí d’Eixalà, on the other hand, openly moved awan. As an example, one can see the treatment received by this line of thought in the appendix that Martí added to his translation of Amice’s text of the history of philosophy, “throughout the 17th century the state of philosophy in Spain was lamentable: Scholastics ended up dominating everything, thanks in part to the religious intolerance which shielded and defended them with spiritual and temporal arms”31. Both authors studied their specialties in the University of Cervera during the Ominous Decade, and there they received their degrees, theology the former and law the latter. At the start of that decade there was a sharp conservative turn in education (and even more so, in philosophy)32. Despite that both thinkers, educated during the Trienni Liberal, could sight some renovating ideas which would be essential in their later thinking.

2. The structure of Balmes’s and Martí d’Eixalà’s thinking Jaume Balmes had a totally Scholastic background, although it was shared among various authors. Indirectly he assimilated (through Guevara) the ideas from the Ceverine Jesuit tradition and Amat’s XVIIth. century Aristotelianism. He sowed, among many other disciplines and in a private way, mathematics and linguistics, and brilliantly overcame the weaknesses of his philosophical education. We could say that Balmes managed to avoid the difficulties of his era by introspection and daily observation. Miquel Batllori33, following Ignasi Casanovas’s ideas, presented Balmes as a Scholastic. This interpretation, which has its followers to this day34, is only part of the story. Balmes certainly had Scholastic training but he wasn’t, strictu sensu, a Scholastic. Batllori correctly notes that his basic theses are not opposed to Scholasticism, but it must be added that they don’t subscribe to it. In fact, Balmes’s work has an aggiornamento of Scholaticism, a decided attempt to fit together Christian thinking and modern philosophy, in agree30 31 32 33 34

Corts Blay 1992, p. 70. Martí d’Eixalà 1842, p. 179 (our translation). A general panorama: Palomeque Torres 1974. Batllori 1947. See Forment 1998, cap. II.

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ment with the defense of the role of the Church and using arguments appropriate to the era35. During his time in the Cerverine wilderness, Balmes must have read different authors who did not follow the official academic philosophical line. One must note the influence of Victor Cousin’s spiritualism; he was a widely read eclectic popularizer in Spain in those days. Through him many intellectuals knew the first Scottish Common Sense School, with Thomas Reid and Dugald Stewart at the head, and modern French and German philosophy. Madrid romanticism would lean more and more toward German philosophy while Catalonia preferred the French and Scottish. Both influences were clear in Balmes, but they are also notable in Martí d’Eixalà. In the Barcelona air they breathed, first the Cardona thinker and later the Vic priest, there was a notable empathy for French thinking and Reid’s Scottish Common Sense which, with slight modifications, could be made to fit with the Mediterranean “seny”36. Martí d’Eixalà was an eclectic, although very selective, author. His tendency toward naturalism and empiricism kept him from developing a very metaphysical philosophy. His epistemology sought criteria that were verifiable, objective, natural, and up to a point empirical. In this sense he joined his criticism of authors “abstract” systems (terminology he borrowed from Condillac), who, he said, never used testable hypotheses: The whole structure of these systems consists of building and linking hypotheses so that they don’t contradict each other and work toward a common goal; but just as the skillful combination of scenes in a drama doesn’t prove the reality of the play’s thesis, neither does the clever coordination of the parts of a theory let one conclude that it conforms to the nature of reality37. It is evident that in the work of the philosopher and lawyer from Cardona there was a rejection of the Jesuit scholasticism and the Aristotelian-Thomist synthesis and at the same time a selective appropriation of Aristotelian naturalism and French, English and Scottish empiricist philosophy. Balmes, on the other hand, was an author who was able to integrate, both historically and systemically, just as Hegel had done in his own way, all prior philosophy. Far from putting Scholasticism to the side, he made it the base of modern philosophy: it was a vision, partly a precursor of Maréchal’s transcendental Thomism, trimmed with a Cartesian based phenomenology, and capable of integrating Reid’s discussions with those of the empiricists. Certainly the halls of Madrid and Paris opened their doors to this renovat-

35 See Fradera 1996, p. 103. 36 In fact, the drift from common sense to “seny” is not in Martí d’Eixalà’s work, but is in that of his disciple Llorens i Barba. Related to this question, see Vilajosana 2011, pp. 111-112. 37 Martí d’Eixalà 1841, p. 293 (our translation).

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ing philosophy where everyone of the elements, without disclaiming the past, converged with the thinking of the future. Martí d’Eixalà’s background was more harmonic and not as audacious. In his work there is a counterpoint of classical philosophy (Aristotelian-Thomist) and modernist philosophy: the thinker from Cardona lined up on the side of the latter. Llorens i Barba, as well as Duran i Bas in legal terms, saw their teacher Martí d’Eixalà as the vanguard of advanced thought, although on occasions this extreme is not corroborated as much in his writings as his attitude38. Certainly Balmes was able to historically integrate a series of dissimilar authors and tendencies. On a firm Aristotelian-Thomist base he saltled Cartesian phenomenology, capable of stemming from innate self-evident truths. The Jesuit philosophy, which walked the fine line between rationalism and voluntarism, was no obstacle; on the contrary it permitted him to join his Aristotelian naturalistic rationalism with Reid’s common sense epistemology. From the Scottish philosopher to Kant, speaking phenomenologically, was a small historic step which Balmes covered easily. So we can say that the philosopher from Vic integrated almost all earlier works, overcoming seemingly insurmountable hurdles and setting aside authors he considered to be minor. It was Scholasticism opened to the modernity which was so important in Europe and brought such little good to Spain, and especially to Catalonia. On the other hand, Martí d’Eixalà represented Modernity (and Grecolatin and humanist philosophy) against Scholastic philosophy. His work meant a combination of timid steps in favor of later philosophy, such as when he introduced the concept of conscience as faculty above all others, similar to the idea later developed with more impact by William Hamilton. Both built their philosophies on a substrate that was in part, much the same. When they reached thirty they had, philosophically speaking, mastery of similar themes: Martí d’Eixalà knew Cerverine Scholasticism and the classic authors well; Balmes was up to date with science and European philosophy. The difference between them was the way they integrated the philosophical past and present. While Martí d’Eixalà was more “analytical” in the sense that he wanted to discern, qualify and filter the ideas of the philosophic tradition, Balmes was more “synthetic”, trying to integrate contemporary problems into the tradition. These differences are not surprising, given that they are true reflections 38 For the role of Martí d’Eixalà in the birth of the Catalan school of philosophy and the Catalan school of law in the 19th century, see Vilajosana 2012. Here he argues that some ideas supposed to be key ideas of Martí are really from Llorens i Barba (in philosophy) and Duran i Bas (in law).

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of the different philosophical methods the used. Each explicitly proposes a different approach to philosophical problems Martí’s view in favor of analysis is notable in his both philosophic and his judicial writings. In his “Course of Elementary Philosophy” we can read: When we are faced with a complex object or phenomenon, it is best to analyze it. Sometimes a simple phenomenon can be considered in different ways or times; in such a case the attention is fixed on each aspect, resulting in a sort of analysis39.

In his treatise on civil law: Our procedure is always analysis; generalizations can only come after. Always, with respect to the principles, the law is broken into the pieces that make it up, and its rule is presented to our understanding as a precept, and at the same time as a set of circumstances which cause its application to take place; juridic intuition always appears as an organism which only is understood by knowing the parts which make it up40.

Balmes limited analysis to the role of simply clarifying discourse, but it was not in any way the thinker’s objective. The objective goal had to be synthetic, which meant understanding that the product was always different than the sum total of its parts: It cannot be denied that analysis, that is the decomposition of ideas, serves admirably to add clarity and precision in some cases; we must not forget, however, that the majority of beings are sets, and the best way to perceive them is to see at a glance their parts and the relationships which make them up41.

And using words which could have easily come form Martí, Blames states: Analysis leads us to decompose, but we cannot take the decomposition so far that we forget the construction of the machine the pieces come from. Some philosophers, by analyzing the sensations, have ended up with no more than the sensations; in ideological and psychological science, that is equivalent to mistaking the doorway for the building42.

Conclusions The previous pages show the parallels between the lives of Balmes and Martí d’Eixalà. Both lived through the changes of the Trienni Liberal and took advantage of the cracks of intellectual freedom to spy out new horizons.

39 40 41 42

Martí d’Eixalà 1841, p. 276 (our tranlation). Martí d’Eixalà 1838, p. 24 (our translation). Balmes 2010, p . 123 (our translation). Ibíd, p. 128 (our translation).

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They shared an enormous enthusiasm for knowledge and philosophy, although they had different views relative to tradition. While Martí tried to set the base of an innovative philosophy by selection, Balmes tried to agglutinate the different tendencies in an almost Hegelian manner. An example would be his view of “common sense”. For the modern reader, they were linked to completely different intellectual circles. Martí d’Eixalà prepared an intellectual path so his students could reach different ports in which he would never set anchor. On the other hand Balmes made the whole trip; from the starting point of Scholasticism and the church mentality he managed to raise the flag of innovative philosophy. Both shared a common university background, forged in Cervera during the darkest years of the Ominous Decade. Martí’s formation was directed from the start toward empiricist tendencies while Balmes’s had a traditional scholastic base. Despite this, both were able to overcome the official teaching and make Catalonia a privileged spot where contemporary European ideas could arrive. Their openness to Europe did not impede a similar one toward Spain. Both were firm Catholics. Balmes was, to a point, a Catholic philosopher and Martí a philosophical Catholic. They shared a critical position with respect to the official Church philosophy. Each distanced himself, in his own way, from the official Catholic ideology and established his own system of thought. A deeper analysis of their epistemological, psychological and ethical thought would reveal many similarities which have only been hinted at in this article. To close, a parallel study of the formation of Balmes and Martí d’Eixalà helps us to understand why in Catalonia at that time two such intellectual giants appeared and how that place and environment conditioned the scope of their philosophical discourse.

Bibliography Abellán, J. L. (1984), Historia crítica del pensamiento español, IV, Espasa Calpe, Madrid. Amat de Palau i Pont, F. (1832), Institutiones philosophiae: ad usum seminarii episcopalis Barcinonensis, s.n., Barcelona. Anglès Cervelló, M. (1992), Els criteris de veritat en Jaume Balmes, Balmes, Barcelona. Balmes, J. (2010 [1845]), El criterio, Balmes, Barcelona. Batllori, M. (1947), «Filosofía balmesiana y filosofía cervariense», Pensamiento, 3, pp. 281-294.

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Bilbeny, N. (1985), Filosofia contemporània a Catalunya, Edhasa, Barcelona. Bosch, S., Juvells, I. i Valmitjana, S. (1998), «L’ensenyament de les ciències a la Universitat de Cervera», Palestra Universitària, 10, pp. 115-127. Casanovas, I. (1932a), Josep Finestres. Estudis biogràfics, Balmes, Barcelona. —(1932b), Balmes. La seva vida. El seu temps. Les seves obres, Biblioteca Balmes, Barcelona. Castells i Bertran, J. (1998), «La Cervera universitària: pinzellades d’un entorn (1719-1805)», Palestra Universitària, 10, pp. 159-181. Colomer i Carles, O. (1998), «La ‘filosofia escocesa del sentit comú’ i el seu desenvolupament després de la Universitat de Cervera», Palestra Universitària, 10, pp. 47-66. Corts Blay, R. (1992), L’arquebisbe Fèlix Amat (1750-1824) i l’última Il·lustració espanyola, Facultat de Teologia, Barcelona. Florí, M. (1947), «Bio-Bibliografía balmesiana», Pensamiento, 3, pp. 315-332. Fontana, J. (1988), «La fi de l’antic règim i de la industrialització», a P. Vilar (dir.), Història de Catalunya, Edicions 62, Barcelona. Forment, E. (1998), Historia de la filosofía tomista en la España contemporánea, Encuentro, Madrid. Fradera, J. M. (1996), Jaume Balmes. Els fonaments racionals d’una política catòlica, Eumo, Vic. Guevara, A. de (1796-1798), Institutionum Elementarium Philosophiae ad usum studiosae juventutis, 4 vols., Roma. Lázaro Carreter, F. (1948), «Los problemas lingüísticos en el pensamiento de Balmes», Revista de Filosofía, 27, pp. 886-908. Martí d’Eixalà, R. (1838), Tratado elementar del derecho civil romano y español, Imprenta de Joaquín Verdaguer, Barcelona. — (1841), Curso de Filosofía Elementar, Imprenta de D. José María de Grau, Barcelona. — (1842), Manual de la Historia de la Filosofía. Traducido del manual de Filosofía experimental de Mr. Amice, con notas y aumentado con un apéndice de la Filosofía de España y con la parte bibliográfica, Imprenta del Constitucional, Barcelona. Monés i Pujol-Busquets, J. (2009), El pensament escolar a Catalunya, Societat Catalana de Pedagogia, Barcelona. 62

Morán Ocerinjáuregui, J. (2000), «La formació dels sons del llenguatge segons R. Martí i d’Eixalà i J. Balmes», Llengua & Literatura, 11, pp. 109-137.

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Palomeque Torres, A. (1970), El trienio constitucional en Barcelona y la instauración de la Universidad de 2a. y 3a. enseñanza, Cátedra de Historia Universal, Departamento de Historia Contemporánea, Barcelona. — (1974), Los estudios universitarios en Cataluña bajo la reacción absolutista y el triunfo liberal hasta la reforma de Pidal: 1824-1845, Cátedra de Historia Universal, Departamento de Historia Contemporánea, Barcelona. Prats, J. (2002), «La Universitat de Cervera: las reformas borbónicas de los estudios superiores en Cataluña», a J. J. Busqueta i J. Pemán, Les Universitats de la Corona d’Aragó, ahir i avui. Estudis històrics, Pòrtic, Lleida, pp. 351-380. Puigserver, F. (1824), Philosophia Sancti Thomae Aquinatis auribus huius temporis accommodata, 3 vols., Madrid. Roca Blanco, D. (1997), Balmes (1810–1848), Ediciones del Orto, Madrid. Roura, J. (1980), Ramon Martí d’Eixalà i la filosofia catalana del segle XIX, Publicacions de l’Abadia de Montserrat, Barcelona. Roviró Alemany, I. (2011), «Els textos preuniversitaris a principis del segle XIX: la gramàtica, la retòrica i la filosofia», Revista d’Història de la Filosofia catalana, 1, pp. 61-76. Sáenz-Rico Urbina, A. (1973), La educación general en Cataluña durante el trienio constitucional (1820-1823), Publicaciones de la Cátedra de Historia Universal, Barcelona. Sáinz de Robles, F. C. (1964), Balmes, Compañía Bibliográfica Española, Madrid. Urdánoz, T. (1975), Historia de la Filosofía, BAC, Madrid, tom V. Vilajosana, J. M. (2011), Vida i pensament de Ramon Martí d’Eixalà, Pagès, Lleida. — (2012), «Ramon Martí d’Eixalà and the philosophical and legal Catalan Schools of the 19th century», Journal of Catalan Intellectual History, 4, pp. 111-129. — i Ramis Barceló, R. (2012), «La formació intel·lectual i la projecció filosòfica de Balmes i Martí d’Eixalà», Carthaginensia, 53, pp. 85-103. Translation from Catalan by Dan Cohen

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article JOURNAL OF CATALAN INTELLECTUAL HISTORY, Issues 7&8, 2014 | Print ISSN 2014-1572 / Online ISSN 2014-1564 DOI: 10.2436/20.3001.02.89 | P. 65-84 Reception date: 3/7/2013 / Admission date: 12/12/2013 http://revistes.iec.cat/index.php/JOCIH

achiavelli translated into Catalan: textual and editorial choices Gabriella Gavagnin Facultat de Filologia Universitat de Barcelona gavagnincapoggiani@ub.edu

summary This article provides an appraisal of all published and unpublished, complete and excerpted translations into Catalan of Machiavelli’s works, and reconstructs the cultural circumstances around their completion as a means to determine from which editions the various translators worked. It also explains how the translators confronted and resolved issues of language and syntax in The Prince.

key words Maquiavel, tractadística, traduccions.

1. Machiavelli in Catalan: a recent history All translations of Machiavelli’s work into Catalan belong to contemporary culture since they weren’t carried out until the first decades of the XXth. century. It would be completely pointless and impracticable to argue possible ideological reasons for the absence of earlier translations. The Catalan linguistic system’s delay in being included into the international chronology can’t be evaluated in terms of the author, since the reason for it can be found in the cultural regionalization that began with the modern age, which led to the rapid decline of Catalan as a vehicular language for translation. Indeed, the same phenomenon is true of many other treatise writers and thinkers, such as Montaigne, Erasmus, More, Descartes, Pascal and Voltaire, all of whom, like Machiavelli, weren’t translated into Catalan until the twentieth century. Looking at the subject comparatively, Machiavelli was neither the last to be translated nor the one to receive the least attention in recent history. Given the presence of a variety of books, different translations of the same text or the same translation collected in diverse anthologies, shows that his presence in Catalan publishing compares favorably when taking into account the work of

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other foreign philosophers and thinkers. The objective of this study is to offer a comprehensive review of Machiavelli’s translations into Catalan, including the circumstances of their publication and promotion, along with an analysis of relevant issues in the translators’ work.

2. Translations and their circulation 2.1. Translations in collections

Far from being scattered around or anthologized, the first translations in fact belong to an ambitious project devised and implemented by Josep Pin i Soler during the first two decades of the XXth. century, whose aim was to circulate the work of key humanist thinkers of the time in Catalan. Pin i Soler was a versatile person with an independent nature, a writer and playwright, scholar and bibliophile, controversial columnist and opinion maker, who culminated his intellectual career by translating works by Erasmus, Thomas More, Juan Luís Vives, Machiavelli, Richard de Bury and Antonio Agustín. Though the project had been conceived and developed outside the sphere of official culture at the time, it was nevertheless highly significant for Catalonia and marked a milestone in the history of modern translation. A total of ten volumes were published in different houses between 1910 and 1921, though the translator intended to have them integrated into a single collection of classics, The Humanist Library. The collection was to distinguish itself not only by the novelty of the titles selected, but also because of its ambition to classify knowledge and widen the breadth of learning (four of the volumes are dedicated to Erasmus and two to Machiavelli) through solid documentation (with detailed historical and bibliographical references) and critical information that accompanied the translations in the form of notes and introductions1. This method is most obvious in the volumes dedicated to Machiavelli. In the first place, the ambition is clear in the choice of texts and how they are presented. Two volumes were dedicated to his work, the first of which contains his famous political treatise, The Prince (Machiavelli 1920), and the second a selection of texts from different genres, some more directly related to political issues such as the biography The Life of Castruccio Castracani and the satirical poem The Golden Ass, while others are more literary, such as the novella Belfagor: A Tale and the comedies The Mandrake and Clizia, all of which have complete translations (Machiavelli 1921)2. This was the first time the Florentine secretary was being translated into Catalan, making Pin i Soler’s project even more valuable, and it also compiled other 66

1 I first made an overall assessment of the translations from Pin i Soler to Gavagnin in 2010. 2 A print run of 300 copies was made for each volume.

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texts that were largely unknown or that couldn’t be found even in Spanish translations, as was the case with The Golden Ass and Clizia3. Secondly, both volumes had introductory essays, the first being a very useful approach to the principal issues of Machiavelli’s political thought, and the other a compilation of literary texts. Indeed, the first essay offers a detailed, critical reconstruction of the figure of Machiavelli, giving his bibliography and the political context in which The Prince was written. Pin i Soler structures his discourse according to the most recent critical bibliography of the day, especially the positivist essay by Pasquale Villari, Niccolò Machiavelli e i suoi tempi (1882), which he consulted in the expanded edition of 1912, along with good translations of a nice stack of epistolary documents (family letters and correspondence with Vettori and Francesco Guicciardini) all brought together with his own thoughts. A few of these are worth mentioning, though perhaps not necessarily appealing, particularly when they draw interesting connections between certain ideas expressed by Machiavelli and theories that can be deduced from assertions made in Thomas More’s Utopia. It’s also worth of mention the recovery and positive evaluation of the essay written by Eiximeno Antonio, the Valencian Jesuit who was exiled to Italy in the XVIIIth. century, titled El espíritu de Maquiavelo. What’s also remarkable in his introduction to the Translations, is that he gives differential treatment to the work that deals more with the political and ideological implications such as The Life of Castruccio Castracani and The Golden Ass, which receive passionate and broad observations, while the literary work, like Belfagor and the comedies, are presented more briskly and succinctly. Despite the fact that Pin i Soler’s contribution to translation was well known in intellectual circles, it was never reprinted. During Franco’s regime there were obvious difficulties in publishing in Catalan, but it didn’t help that Pin i Soler held a controversial and reserved stance regarding the period’s currents of Noucentisme and Postnoucentisme. When Espriu included The Prince as part of a very reduced list of essential reading4, it became clear that a new translation of this key treaty of modern political theory should be made available to readers. There were a few personal initiatives in the 60’s, and Espriu suggested as much to friend and publisher Josep M. Boix i Selva. Yet the project stalled before it was completed. It wasn’t until the return of democracy and resumption of normal cultural life that a Catalan translation of Machiavelli could once again be found in bookstores. In this respect, the consolidation of left wing culture and its increasingly systematic approaches were crucial since 3 The only version of The Golden Ass was carried out in 1839 by Manuel de Cabanyes, Clizia had not yet been translated. 4 Cf.: «I think that reading Cohelet or the Preacher, the Moral Letters to Lucilius, the Divine Comedy, The Prince, Discourse on Method, Don Quijote, The Complete Gentleman, and a few cops and robbers novels, gives us quite enough for this sad life, without existentialist howls and any other impolite outbursts.» (Espriu 1957).

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it led to the reestablishment of publishing platforms, which filled they gaps and led to the articulation of Catalan intellectual discourse. What’s more, Jordi Solé Tura, a central figure in these ideological horizons, drew attention to Machiavelli’s political theories from the point of view of a Gramscian interpretation. Finally, the creation of the “Philosophical Texts” collection in the publishing house Laia, in 1981, edited by the philosophers Josep M. Casalmiglia, Pere Lluís Font and Josep Ramoneda allowed Machiavelli’s treaty to become a part of the standardized intellectual and commercial circuit. Published as the collection’s eleventh title, the new translation of The Prince (Machiavelli 1982) is the work of leftist intellectual and political activist, Jordi Moners i Sinyol. Following the collection guidelines, the book is equipped with a comprehensive initial study, which in this case was done by the translator himself, an analytical bibliography and name and subject indexes. The historical and political reconstruction of Machiavelli’s times and analysis of his work constitute a valuable part of the canonical studies of the author from the 60’s and 70’s and stress the historical significance of Machiavelli’s thought from a Marxist perspective. We should also underline this as the first effort at appraising the reception of Maquiavelli’s work 5 in the greater Catalonian territories. Jordi Moner’s translation of Machiavelli’s text became the reference in Catalan for the final decades of the XXth. century. Its predominance is clear in the variety of collections and publications in which it was collected: after two reprints in the same collection (in 1988 and then under the imprint Editions 62, 1993), it was published in Edicions 62’s collection “El Cangur Clàssic” in 1996 without any alterations except the addition of a chronological table, and was reprinted again in the year 2000; in 2002 it was published for the first time in Butxaca’s collection called “Cangur Assaig” (Group 62), with a reprint in 2007. Not long after The Prince found a place in Laia’s catalogue, another publishing platform included a text of Machiavelli’s work as a playwright in the emblematic collection “MOLU” (world literary masterpieces), which was spurred by a similar mission to absorb the most enduring foreign literature of all time into the culture. Montserrat Puig’s new translation of The Mandrake (Machiavelli 1985), one of the works that Pin i Soler had selected for his own anthology, heads the volume Renaissance Theater, which follows the course set by Italian critical studies during the 60’s and 70’s in its selection of texts that are examples of the literary and social phenomenon that marked court life in the Italian Renaissance. Giuseppe Grilli wrote the foreword, which introduces

5 In this overview there is no reference made to the Catalan translation (annotated) by Josep Pla, which he took from a chapter that Francesco de Sanctis dedicated to Machiavelli in his History of Italian Literature. The translation was used as the first chapter of his book Itàlia i el mediterrani (Pla 1980).

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the thematic, structural and linguistic elements that characterize the four selected comedies. A new translation of another play by the Florentine secretary was published on the threshold of the new century, which demonstrates the level of interest given to his theater. The initiative was carried out under the auspices of the Barcelona Theatre Institute in 1998, and Jordi Ferrer Gràcia was awarded the Josep M. de Sagarra prize for unpublished translations of theatrical pieces for his work on Clizia. The text was published in the Institute’s “Collection of Popular Classic World Theatre” (Machiavelli 2000) with a foreword by Jordi Galceran suggesting deep links between the methods of comedy and the observation of man’s disenchantment that are present in the pages of The Prince. In contrast to Pin i Soler’s organic opera omnia approach, Machiavelli’s body of work was split into different volumes, which is characteristic of the editorial choices that were made at the end of the XXth. century, the aim being to assimilate and assess each one of the texts that oscillate between politics and literature, from a specific formal and genre based perspective. However, a new translation of Machiavelli (2006), published in a collection that was co-edited by the Pompeu Fabra University and Edicions Destino, titled “Pompeu Fabra Library”, directed by Lluís M. Todó, seems to move contrary to this trend. They commissioned Carmen Arenas to translate the two selected texts, The Prince and The Mandrake, in keeping with the collection’s appreciation that the translations of classic texts tend to age and need to be redone from time to time. The collection’s books also include an introduction by “eminent specialists, writers and essayists” and in this case the foreword is the one that British mathematician and philosopher Bertrand Russell wrote on Machiavelli for his book The History of Western Philosophy, which Jordi Solé Tura translated in 1967 and titled Història social de la filosofía. These choices can’t help but raise a few questions. First of all, it goes without saying that the type of analysis applicable to the linguistic aging process of the translations of Dickens or Stendhal done in the 30’s, doesn’t necessarily pertain to the translations of Machiavelli by Jordi Moners and Montserrat Puig, not because of the number of years that have transpired since they were accomplished, but simply because they employ a style of Catalan that can still be enjoyed within today’s linguistic conventions. Certainly, some of Jordi Moners’s use of grammatical forms such as “their” (“llur”) or the simple perfect in second person may seem somewhat distant and out of use in today’s usage. In this respect, a new translation that tightens the linguistic relationship with today’s conventions is not only legitimate, but should always be welcome. However, enhancement of a conceptually important text should not cater only to stylistic aspects, but perhaps more importantly, it should advance terminology through improved semantic precision and faithfulness. I’ll come back to the accomplishments of each translator later. Now, however, I’m interested in calling attention to the fact that since several

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examples of Machiavelli’s work hadn’t yet been translated into Catalan, such as the noteworthy A Discourse or Dialogue Concerning our Language and the bulk of his political writings, such as Discourses on the First Ten Books of Titus Livy and The Art of War, the decision to retranslate the same two texts that already have relatively recent modern translations, appears surprising. If the main objective was to modernize, wouldn’t the commission of an original and streamlined introductory study have been more valuable for both translated texts, instead of fishing for a text from the 1940s that has no critical approach to The Mandrake, and that had already been made available to the Catalan reader? This edition’s publishing history was very short-lived: the ambitious “Pompeu Fabra Library” folded a year later, after three years of effort and seventeen volumes, and the book quickly fell off the commercial circuit. However, Carmen Arenas received the 2004 European Farnesina Library Prize, and Edicions 62 reissued her translation of The Prince first in a textbook collection, “62 Education”(2009) and then in an inexpensive edition, “Labutxaca”(2012). The “62 Education” edition was not only published in a new format, but came with a new set of tools for the new context: an introductory study by Oriol Ponsatí-Murlà that was designed to bring young people closer to the theories of a classic work that bears a relevant relationship with the experience of the modern world, along with a set of teaching materials prepared by Joan Vergés Gifra. In short, this evaluation highlights some of the idiosyncrasies that differentiate the diverse periods in which Machiavelli’s work has been translated, and the first major efforts to incorporate him into Catalan, which demonstrate a desire to follow a total approach to his body of work, forged over the course of his lifetime, and the broad range of genres in which his thoughts take form, from the treaty to biography, from comedy to fiction. A long period of time separates this first ambitious series of translations from the modern translations, almost all of which are still available to readers, having been published in collections that are widely distributed, and characterized by prioritizing each unique text within its specific genre. During this second phase, decisions have basically converged on selecting three works: The Prince (translated by Jordi Moners i Sinyol and Carme Arenas) The Mandrake (translated by Montserrat Puig and Carme Arenas ) and Clizia (translated by Jordi Ferrer Gràcia).

2.2. Uncollected and unpublished translations

The previous review raises a question that doesn’t have an easy answer: why didn’t the political culture of Noucentisme bother to promote translations of Machiavelli? Pin i Soler was both outside and against these associations and it could be that they weren’t familiar with his work. Proponents of these cur-

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rents of thought must have been interested in the Florentine treatise writer’s thinking. For instance, despite the fact that there is as yet no detailed study on the echoes of Machiavelli’s theories in a book like La nacionalitat catalana (Prat de la Riba read his political work in the Italian imprint Sonzogno’s edition of Il Principe; Dell’arte della ed altri Scritti politici in the “Biblioteca classica economica” of 1875, with a foreword by Francesco Costero)6, a simple reading of the text shows some points of contact with important ideas concerning the political and military organization of states. From a similar ideological stance, one gets an idea of the amount of interest in his work from the library of an intellectual like J. V. Foix, who in addition to monographs on Machiavelli, Giudice delle rivoluzioni dei nostri tempi by the XIXth. federalist Giuseppe Ferrari (Vallecchi, Florence, 1921) and Machiavel by Vignal Gautier (Paris, 1929), since he owned various editions of Machiavelli’s works: a XIXth. Spanish translation of the The Prince, a 1920s reprint of the same volume Prat de la Riba used, a 1902 Sonzogno edition of the Commedie and an anthology of his thinking in a French translation dated 1921.7 Indeed the latter’s La Pensée de Nicolas Machiavel, extraits les plus caractéristiques de son oeuvre, choisis, groupés et traduits par François Franzoni (Payot, Paris, 1921) is the source of a selection of texts taken from different works8 that appeared in Catalan translations in the magazine L’Amic de les Arts in 1927 ( Machiavelli 1927), to commemorate the centenary of the writer’s death. The translations weren’t signed, but we are inclined to assume that Foix, the editor of the magazine and owner of the Franzoni anthology, did them himself. Despite an apparent interest in Machiavelli by this generation of writers and intellectuals, evidenced by the fact that new translations had been added at the time, these translations were done in a disperse fashion. Even taking into account the translation of the chapter on the figure of The Magnificent in the Florentine Histories, which was also done anonymously and dispersed, published in Josep M. López-Picó’s La Revista (Machiavelli 1927b) for the same commemoration, it isn’t enough to indicate a real presence of Machiavelli’s work in Noucentista culture.

6 The tome, which belonged to Prat de la Riba’s private library, is held in the Biblioteca de Catalunya (index. Prat-6-II-17). 7 The tomes, all of which carry J. V. Foix’s ex-libris, are currently held in the Biblioteca de Catalunya’s collection, respectively, under the index reference Foi-8-2165, Foi-8-3433, Foi8-2810, Foi-8-2544. As proof of the complete rejection of Pin i Soler’s works by Noucentista culture, it should be kept in mind that Foix didn’t have a single copy of either one of the two Machiavelli manuscripts from the Tarragonan translator in his library.The ones that are in the Foix Collection were donated to the Biblioteca de Catalunya later on, proceeding from other personal libraries. 8 According to what’s specified at the end of each excerpt of Clizia, The Letters, Discourses on the First Ten Books of Titus Livy, Florentine Histories, The Mandrake, The Art of War.

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Before closing this assessment, we should mention two unpublished translations whose manuscripts have been preserved, that are also from the early XXth. century: the The Golden Ass done by Lluís Via and the opening chapters of The Prince translated by Pere Corominas. In the first case, it was actually a commission that Pin i Soler gave his poet friend, to adapt his own translation of the poem to the original Italian meter, since he had done it without respecting the measurement of the lines, supposing it would only take some slight modifications to complete it. But it turned out to be more complicated and after trying to patch and mend Pin i Soler’s text, his friend encouraged him to do a new version, as can be read in a letter dated 7 January 1918: You insisted on me finding a way to put into verse what you’d translated and I tried to do it by cutting or lengthening the sentences, and changing the accents, until I was finally convinced that I couldn’t possibly carry this forward by correcting your text without beginning on clean sheets of paper. You weren’t as persuaded as I was that there was no other way to transform the verses, even though you told me to continue.9

The testimony is interesting because it highlights the objective difficulties of translating when trying to reconcile literary form with all the semantic nuances of the text. Indeed, although Lluís Via’s version is in verse, it doesn’t rhyme and converts the tercets to unrhymed feminine decasyllables. However, it tends to rework expressions more freely and even add words frequently, especially determiners, which peel the images away from the original. For example, Machiavelli’s verses: Così tra quelle bestie sconosciuto, mi ritrovai in un ampio cortile, tutto smarrito, senza esser veduto. E la mia donna bella, alta e gentile, per ispazio d’un’ora, o più, attese le bestie a rassettar nel loro ovile. (Maquiavel 2003b, III, pp. 37-42)

that Pin i Soler had translated, according to the manuscript10 we read, in the following manner: Així entre aquell bestiar, confós, me trobí en un’ample cleda tot pertorbat, sense ser vist. Hont ma duquessa gentil y bella per espay d’un’hora, o més, estigué aposentant los remats en llurs estables.

9 Letter from Lluís Via to Pin i Soler dated January 7,1918 held in the Biblioteca de Catalunya. 10 Ms. 4487 of the Biblioteca de Catalunya.

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in Lluís Via’s lyrical version there are several supplementary adjectives, obviously included to achieve the syllabic count that makes a decasyllable: Així confós en mitg de besties tantes, sens que ningú’m vegés, me trobí dintre d’una espayosa interminable cleda. Y la meva arrogant, gentil pastora, ab ses besties un tant atrafegada, esmerçà més d’un’hora aconduhintles.

The fact is that Pin i Soler didn’t consider his friend’s alternative good enough and once he ruled out the metric version, preferred to publish his initial prose translation since as he emphasized in the preface, “we have always made it a point that our translations be extremely faithful”11. Moreover, once Lluís Via expressed his perplexity to his friend over the how long it took before he changed his mind, he reminds him that a translation should be organic and coherent in order to function, “I told him from the start that the service my work would do if he used it in a fragmentary way would be counterproductive. (...) The work is withdrawn anyway, if you only use fragments and quote my name...” 12 Independent of this episode, the epistolary documents allow us to refine the dating of Pin i Soler’s translations, since the letter was written on January 2, 1918, and accompanied the reworked version of the The Golden Ass that Lluís Via had sent him. This means the translation of the poem, and presumably the rest, had already been completed by the end of 1917. Finally, we should mention the conserved portions of an unfinished and unpublished version of The Prince done by the Republican writer and politician Pere Corominas. The manuscript is 22 pages long plus the translation of the inscription, and comprises the first two chapters and a part of the third, in multiple texts arranged one after the other. It’s not dated and is kept in the National Library of Catalonia. Since the manuscript has already been edited (Gavagnin 2004), we find that both the orthographic features of the text (although not entirely in keeping with Fabrian standards) and the fact that the stationary used carries the header “Deputy to the Parliament for Barcelona” it’s likely that the date when they were written can be limited to some time between May 1910 and 1916, i.e., the years when Corominas was a member of Parliament representing the Nationalist Republican Federal Union. The hypothesis is furthered by the fact that the style of handwriting and the ink used in this manuscript are similar to letters he wrote between 1914 and 1916. 11 Maquiavel 1921, p. XXI. Nevertheless, Pin i Soler’s text is not always the one that is closest to Machiavelli’s, because in certain cases, Lluís Via’s version is clearer and more effective. 12 Letter from Lluís Via to Pin i Soler dated January 7, 1918. The version signed by Lluís Via has been conserved, unpublished, in the Pin i Soler manuscript collection, together with all working manuscripts of his Machiavelli translations (ms. 4487 at the Biblioteca de Catalunya).

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If we accept this as the proper date, it’s possible to draw a relation between when Pere Corominas abandoned the translation since it coincides with the news, in 1916, of the forthcoming translation by Pin and Soler13. Whatever the case may be, what remains are more akin to translation experiments that prove the interest he must have had in the book, the difficulties he had in understanding it, and in translating it.

3. Three. The texts: originals and translations 3.1. The originals used

The amount of time that transpired between the translations under review show that some of the differences between them are not only the result of personal strategies on the part of each translator, but also in the access to the different original editions. And just as the styles of translation fall within a range of possible variations that are conditioned by each period’s prevailing trends in translatology, such is the case also with the selection of original texts. For example, we have seen how Foix translated some of Machiavelli’s thinking from a French translation, and he never hid this information, but instead out of a sense of philological scruples, made sure to draw attention to it and to the fact that he respected the order established by the anthology’s French curator. Today, translating a text from another language that’s as close as Italian wouldn’t be well considered, even if only for a magazine. Currently, best practices suggest a single original edition, which critics consider the most philologically reliable, so that any mention is made expressly of this edition (although this doesn’t prevent each translator from taking advantage of other editions, especially in what concerns notes and commentaries, or using translations into other languages to answer questions and expand the range of possible choices). That’s what Jordi Moners i Sinyol did for example, when he followed the text of Einaudi’s edition from 1968, curated by historian Luigi Firpo, an edition that borrowed heavily from the critical text established in 1899 by the positivist trained Giuseppe Lisi, for the first critical edition of The Prince that followed Lachmannian criteria. What’s more, in the case of the textual tradition of Machiavelli’s treatise, there was another critical proposal that circulated in the 60’s and acted as an alternative to Lisi’s text, and which obviously hadn’t been completely withdrawn. It was Mario Casella’s text in 1929, an edition of the complete works of Machiavelli that was widely celebrated at the time,

13 Reviewing the last ordinary meeting of the Reial Acadèmia de Bones Lletres, La Vanguardia reported «The numbered academic, Mr. Pin i Soler, finished reading the introductory text he wrote for his Catalan language translation of Machiavelli’s The Prince.» (La Vanguardia, 12-XII-1916).

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both for the philological work of Casella and Guido Mazzoni, and also for the rhetorical and theoretical justifications that accompanied the volume, towards the recovery of Maquiavelli’s persona14 from a nationalist and fascist perspective. Einaudi’s reprinting of Giovanni Lisi’s text may not have been done for strictly philological reasons. In any case, the selection made by Jordi Moners must have been guided by ideological affinities with the prestigious publishing house based in Turin. Along the same lines, in fact, Montserrat Puig chose to follow Einaudi’s volume, edited by Guido Davico Bonino Teatro (1981) and based on Mario Martelli’s edition of the collected works, for her translation of The Mandrake. It’s not always possible, however, to determine the editions of reference used by translators, either because sometimes they aren’t mentioned explicitly (as is the case, for example, in Jordi Ferrer Gracia’s translation of Clizia and also in Carmen Arenas’s translations15, which is surprising when one considers the aim of scientific rigor declared in the collection’s presentation) or because the translator’s indications aren’t entirely clear. This is the case with Pin i Soler’s The Prince. In fact, the first thing to keep in mind is that Pin i Soler was a bibliophile and had an extensive library of works and essays by and on Machiavelli. As you can read in the inventory of his library (Pin i Soler 2004), he had three Italian editions of the treaty (the Venice edition of 1768, with preface and notes by the Houssaie Amelot; one that was a part of the first Florentine edition of the collected works of 1782, in six volumes; and in XIXth. century publisher Alcide Parenti’s single volume Opere complete of 1843), the Latin translation of the Protestant Silvestro Tegli in the Dutch edition of 1648, and two French translations (the Periés edition annotated by Louandre of 1851, and the Giraudet annotated by Derome, of 1884) and three English translations (Morley’ XIXth. century edition, Ricci’s from 1903, and Thomson’s of 1913). In the bibliographical note that opens Pin i Soler’s 14 Among the critical materials published that could be found there, was Mussolini’s interpretation to the prelude of The Prince. This edition of the collected works of 1929 was widely read and distributed since it became the basis for most Italian editions throughout the 20th century. Salvador Espriu mentions it in a letter to Boix i Selva in 1965 regarding its prestige: «As agreed, if you want to translate The Prince, it’s important that you give me a good critical edition of it. I’m familiar with the one that was published in Florence and edited by Mario Casella and Guido Mazzoni. It’s really the critical edition of Machiavelli’s collected works. I remember it was from the ‘Barbera’ publishing house in 1929. But you know that I’m not one of the great secretary’s specialists, and thirty six years have gone by since that edition so I’m sure there are newer editions, though the one mentioned is excellent.» Letter dated April 5, 1965 cited from Delor 1989, I, pp. 43-44. 15 In the translator’s note there is no bibliographic reference, nor does it state the origin of Russell’s pages that are used as an introduction to the edition. By the same token, the contradictory usage of capitals also demonstrates some carelessness (the title page shows both El príncep and Mandràgora), while in the translators note, both of them appear cited as parts of a title, in lower case.

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The Prince, the translator mentions all Italian editions and the Latin translation without specifying which one he’s using, though he charts the following order: first he details the contents of Alcide Parenti’s edition in the titles and pages, remarking “it’s not the most perfect edition, I quote from it because it helps give a precise idea of the quantitative importance of Machiavelli’s books and pamphlet” (Machiavelli 1920, p.V); then he cites the Latin translation, and claims to have reproduced the Latin chapter titles, and finally he cites the other XVIIIth. century Italian editions, in chronological order, and confirms that the portrait used for the publication comes from one of these editions. In short, after three pages of notes we are left without knowing which full texts he followed for each project. I observed in my first analysis of the translation of The Prince (Gavagnin 2010), that he had used the Latin translation beyond merely reproducing the titles because I found phrases and expressions that were clearly based on this edition16. However, I have to add that he probably didn’t use only the Latin text, but must have worked in a more eclectic way, with several books on the table. Specifically, the head of chapter XVIII that was expunged in Tegli’s translation and that according to the Parenti editions goes as follows: Ed hassi ad intendere questo, che un principe, e massime un principe nuovo, non può osservare tutte quelle cose, per le quali gli uomini sono tenuti buoni, essendo spesso necessitato, per mantenere lo stato, operare contro alla fede, contro alla carità, contro alla umanità, contro alla religione. (Maquiavel 1843, p. 435)

Pin i Soler translated it as: Poso com principi que un Príncep, sobre tot si és novell, no pot exercir impunement totes les virtuts, perque l’interés de la seva conservació l’obligarà sovint a violar les lleys de l’humanitat, de la caritat o de la religió. (Maquiavel 1920, p. 130)

Note should be taken that in the final enumeration, faith disappears (“contro alla fede”). The omission, however, cannot be the result of a personal re-elaboration, comparable to the one that during the same period, he changed from «non può osservare tutte quelle cose, per le quali gli uomini sono tenuti buoni» to «no pot exercir impunement totes les virtuts». Indeed, the final fragment literally follows the reading, purged, from the post-tridentina edition of Tutte le opere, that appeared in 1550, known as Testina, which was the point of reference for the majority of editions up to the XIXth. century. That’s where the enumeration had been reduced to just three elements, arranged in the order

16 It’s important to keep in mind that Tegli’s translation, the treaty’s oldest translation into Latin, was widely distributed throughout Europe with fourteen reprints and re-editions over sixty years (Mordeglia 2010).

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found in Pin i Soler: «operare contro alla humanità, contro alla charità, contro alla Religione» (Maquiavel 1550, p. 41)17. There’s a reference to the Catholic King Ferdinand at the end of the same chapter, which the Testina edition had also eliminated and is indicated below in italics and between brackets: Alcuno Principe di questi tempi, che non è bene nominare, non predica mai altro che Pace e Fede, [e dell’una e dell’altra è inimicissimo:] e l’una e l’altra, quando l’havesse osservata, gli arebbe più volte tolto lo Stato e la riputatione. (Maquiavel 1550, p. 41)

Pin i Soler doesn’t include the deleted phrase in this case, either: Un Príncep, avuy regnant, mes qual nom no’m convé escriure, may parla sino de pau y bona fe, y si hagués sigut sincer, més d’un cop hauría perdut la seva reputació y’ls seus dominis. (Maquiavel 1920, p. 131)

We’ve been able to confirm that one of Pin i Soler’s XVIIIth. century editions, the Florentine one that dates from 1782-1783, effectively follows the Testina edition, although the footnotes reproduce the variations that were extracted from an older manuscript where the censored texts could be found. The textual tradition of a work as shocking and controversial as The Prince has long depended upon the fortunes of the censored editions that circulated in the modern age; so it’s not surprising that Pin i Soler, given his procedural eclecticism, would end up basing his translation on editions that conveyed expurgated versions of the text, notwithstanding the remarkable documentation at his disposal. This does not mean, it should be said, that since he preferred to translate fragments instead of full texts, the task of circulating the works of Machiavelli in the cultural arena of his time was not very important and commendable, since he strove to keep faithfully close to the meaning of the text at a time when translation was practiced more free-handedly, and when all is said and done, the wealth of bibliographic tools he used gave him a profound understanding of the texts, as I pointed out earlier, when comparing fragments of the translation done by Pere Corominas and Pin i Soler’s version (Gavagnin 2010)18.

3.2. Style and syntax of The Prince: notes on versions

This is not the place to provide an internal systematic analysis of the different Catalan translations of Machiavelli’s work. However, to conclude this review, I would like to add a brief reflection on a few of the difficulties the translators 17 Regarding this censorship and its repercussion in some older translations, cf. De Pol 2013. 18 Cavallé i Mallafré (1994) gave Pin i Soler’s version of The Mandrake a positive evaluation after doing a linguistic study.

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encountered working on a text like The Prince, and how they dealt with them. The novelty of thought and theorized concepts are expressed in very original political language, not because Machiavelli resorted to neologisms, but because his approach was from the standpoint of terminology, he technifies19 words that already exist in the language, charging them with new meanings and nuances that are not always easy to interpret unequivocally and with absolute precision and neither is it always advisable to do so. The lexicon’s polysemous nature is not, however, the only difficulty the translator encounters. Machiavelli wrote his treatise in a very personal style, which draws on spoken language and aspires to being vigorous, immediate and effective in presenting and arguing ideas. As Chiappelli (1952) pointed out, there are some very peculiar syntactical characteristics in the prose used in The Prince. Among these, the juxtaposition of two opposing movements: on the one hand, following the traditional textual approach to treatise writing, whose organization is built on subordination, meaning the arrangement of the subordinates one inside the other; and on the other hand, the syntax-based dilemmatic coordination («o per fortuna o per virtù» «perchè è necessario o fare questo o tenervi assai gente d’arme e fanti») or sequences of causal and consecutive items («perché e’ populi amavano la quiete, e per questo e’ principi modesti erano loro grati»). This determination to avoid subordination (Chiappelli called the procedure «principalizzazione») endows the discourse with greater expressive and emotional effects, and often serves to emphasize certain statements and raise them to the status of generalizations. There are times when the two come into conflict with each other and the period develops into an anacoluthon. This means, then, that in translating the treatise, one must strive to respect these balances, which are at times precarious and bordering on ungrammatical, and not easy to undertake from the language of a translation, which is especially true of Catalan since it’s not a friendly language for gerundive subordinates. Pin i Soler wanted to use plain, understandable language, and so he regularly rewrites the entire period, which causes the layout of syntax and plot to be reorded, without reversing the relationship between cause and effect, or hypotheses and conclusions. This method turns the act of translating into an explanation, and from the point of view of today’s translation studies, is no longer acceptable. Both Jordi Moners and Carmen Arenas, however, attempt to reproduce the stylistic features of Machiavelli’s text,20 taking advantage of the resources available. Nevertheless,

19 The word, a real find, was used by Chiappelli (1952) to define this procedure. 20 According to Moner in the introduction he wrote to his translation: «I don’t presume to have found a way to reproduce Machiavelli’s style, but I haven’t done anything to bring him farther away, either, by using easy distillations or circumlocutions that could have resolved the difficulty of comprehension but that would not only have betrayed the style, but also the communicative intentions sought by the author. (...) my effort was geared especially towards preserving the structure, rhythm, and vocabulary of the original as long as the Catalan allowed

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as was already mentioned, Carme Arenas favored an everyday sort of Catalan in arrangements and structures to avoid making it sound too stiff or literary, in keeping with the spirit of the collection and the most up to date evolution in Catalan usage. However, if we compare the choices of the two translators, you can see it has a certain consequence in the conjunctions (the second avoids forms like «nogensmenys» (nevertheless) or «car» (because), which were employed often in the second) in verbal approaches (the latter, for example, avoids causal and temporal gerunds more) and the order of phrases within the sentence. These traits are in evidence in the translation of this passage: Uno principe adunque, non potendo usare questa virtù del liberale, sanza suo danno, in modo che la sia conosciuta, debbe, s’egli è prudente, non si curare del nome del misero; perché col tempo sarà tenuto sempre più liberale veggendo che, con la sua parsimonia, le sua entrate gli bastano, può difendersi da chi gli fa guerra, può fare imprese sanza gravare e’ populi. Talmente che viene a usare liberalità a tutti quelli a chi e’ non toglie, che sono infiniti, e miseria a tutti coloro a chi e’ non dà, che sono pochi (Maquiavel 2003a, ch. XVI). Un príncep, doncs, no podent practicar, de manera que sigui coneguda, aquesta virtut de liberal sense sortir-ne perjudicat, si és prudent no l’ha de preocupar que pugui agafar fama de gasiu: perquè a mida que passi el temps cada vegada el tindrà per més liberal, veient que amb la seva parsimònia en té prou amb les pròpies rendes, pot defensar-se de qui li fa la guerra, pot fer grans empreses sense gravar el poble, és a dir, que acaba practicant la liberalitat amb tots aquells a qui no pren res, que són infinits, i la gasiveria amb tots aquells a qui no dóna, que són pocs (Maquiavel 1982, p. 101). Un príncep, doncs, en no poder practicar aquesta virtut de liberal, de manera que aquesta virtut sigui coneguda sense que li comporti cap perjudici, si és prudent no s’ha de preocupar que no el tinguin per mesquí: perquè amb el temps cada vegada serà tingut més per liberal, en veure els seus súbdits que amb la seva parsimònia les rendes de què disposa li basten, es pot defensar dels qui li declaren la guerra, i pot dur a terme empreses sense gravar el poble; de manera que és liberal amb tots aquells de qui no treu res, que són infinits, i miserable amb tots aquells a qui no dóna res, que són pocs (Maquiavel 2006, p. 118).

Here, the outcome of linguistic renovation, very well resolved by Carme Arenas, is greater fluidity and clarity, although it doesn’t always line up with improvements in other aspects of the translation. For example, in this passage:

me to do so.» (Maquiavel 1982, p. 41). Carme Arenas’s intentions move in a similar direction: «Our desire was to save the spirit of the text without betraying all the characteristic elements of the language, rhythm, and Machiavelli’s syntactical structure, softening the anacoluthons, modifying the Latin syntax and adapting it to the Catalan, in order to save the final meaning and at the same time be true to the different linguistic registers we find in the original.» (Maquiavel 2006, p. 26).

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Ma vegnamo ad Alessandro, il quale fu di tanta bontà che, in tra le altre laude che gli sono attribuite, è questa: che in quattordici anni che tenne lo ‘mperio non fu mai morto da lui alcuno iniudicato; nondimanco, essendo tenuto effeminato e uomo che si lasciassi governare alla madre, e per questo venuto in disprezzo, conspirò in lui l’esercito e ammazzollo. (Machiavelli 2003a, ch. XIX).

In the second part of the period between the adversative conjunction «nondimanco» (= nonetheless, nogensmenys) and the main clause (= l’exèrcit hi va conspirar en contra i el va matar, the army conspired against him and killed him), there’s a syntactic suspension consisting of two subordinates coordinated between them, which refers to Alexander’s passing from the state of being kind to being killed. The relationship between cause and effect that exists in the content of the two subordinates («com que el consideraven efeminat va ser menyspreat / regarded as effeminate, he was despised») is expressed using only one of the two previously mentioned stylistic affinities typical of Machiavelli’s writing («e per questo»), while the relationship between the criminal act and the circumstance it generates (el fet de ser menyspreat/ the fact of being despised) is expressed more implicitly in the subordination, since what Machiavelli wants to emphasize here is the apparent paradox (underlined by the initial conjunction «nondimanco») wherein a governor who didn’t effect an unjust murder, ended up being killed by a conspiracy. All this congeals into a very dense and fast period heading towards the conclusion, a knot of actions that sustain precise relationships of cause and effect, on one hand, and contrast on the other. Following the practice referred to earlier, Pin i Soler unravels the textual organization and rewrites it completely, therefore freely dispensing diverse pieces of information: Parlem ara d’Alexandre Sever qual clemencia ha sigut lloada, si bé fou blasmat per massa moll y per no tenir més voluntat que la de sa mare. L’exèrcit conspirà contra aquest Príncep tan humà, que en un regnat de XIV anys no deixà executar cap sentencia de mort sino per decisió dels tribunals, y no obstant, fou víctima de mans homicides. (Maquiavelli 1920, pg. 141) This new formulation features a clearer contrast between his behavior as a good ruler and the fact that he was assassinated, but misses the explicit causal relationship between his being the subject of contempt and the fact it was the army that killed him (a relationship that is vital to the reflections made throughout the entire chapter titled precisely The Need to Avoid Contempt and Hatred) and establishes, in contrast, an explicit relationship (limited) between the praise and blame Alexander received that Machiavelli never developed or suggested. In turn, Jordi Moners endeavors to respect the original’s syntactical arrangement, although by doing so, reduces some more expressive properties (the demonstrative deictic function «è questa» and the coordinated structure

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between the two subordinates «e per questo»), hence in part, he offers version that is more faithful to the source than Pin i Soler ‘s text: Però veiem Alexandre Sever, que era tan bondadós, que, entre d’altres elogis que se li poden fer, es diu que en catorze anys que conservà l’imperi mai no va ser mort ningú sense haver estat jutjat; i tanmateix, essent considerat efeminat i home que es deixava governar per sa mare, fou menyspreat per aquest motiu i l’exèrcit conspirà contra d’ell i l’assassinà. (Maquiavel 1982, pgs. 113-114)

Read carefully, however, it becomes clear that the effort to coordinate the structure of the two subordinate gerundives has not been correctly resolved. Indeed, «fou menyspreat» (now corresponding with the sentence’s main verb) contradicts the information given as the premise «i tanmateix (...) fou menyspreat (...) i l’exèrcit conspirà» so it creates an explicit interpretation of what is not made explicit in Machiavelli’s discourse, in which there is no contrary relationship between «fou menyspreat» and Alexander’s behavior. Lastly, Carme Arenas translates in a slightly different way, trying to avoid gerunds and at the same time she follows clause sequence, but ends up making a mistake similar to Jordi Moners, though semantically it’s even less acceptable since through the use of the adversative locution «i això no obstant», it brings the fact that Alexander was kind into a contradictory relationship with the fact that he had a reputation for being effeminate21, two things that Machiavelli never put in opposition to each other: Però passem a Alexandre, que fou tan bondadós que entre les moltes alabances que li han estat atribuïdes, hi ha aquesta: que en catorze anys que va tenir l’imperi ningú no fou executat sense judici previ; i això no obstant, era tingut per efeminat i per un home que es deixava governar per la seva mare, la qual cosa li comportà el menyspreu de tothom, l’exèrcit va conspirar en contra d’ell i el va matar. (Maquiavel 2006, pg. 139)

One of the things that translating The Prince forces upon us, is finding how to respect syntax that is very often not linear, without adding ambiguousness to the text, and of course without compromising the causal relationships that are established. As a French translator remarked (Fournel, 2001, pg. 75), it’s important to approach the task through the threefold perspective of the linguist, the philosopher and the historian, in order to grasp the flow of Machiavelli’s thought and interpret his open and elastic language, which necessitates leaving its areas of opacity or vagueness as they are. None of this is easy, or at least is not without its snares. As a result, translations should not be fixed in time. Often, translations reveal specific problems, which can sometimes be attributed to hastiness, but that don’t necessarily cancel the whole work, these are the problems that can and should be corrected when it comes time to 21 Bonada noted the discrepancy (2006), and though he also mentioned Moners’s translation, he doesn’t comment on the deviation this version demonstrates.

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reedit the same version again. To promote, produce and publish the translation of a classic text requires working within an editorial space that can often curb new initiatives applied to a same text. For economic reasons, publishers often prefer to recycle completed translations rather than commission new ones22. This is especially in small markets, like the one for Catalan. Translators have a big responsibility in these cases, but so do publishers. A revised translation by the same translator is a much more useful and honest way to take advantage of work that’s already been done.

References Bonada, Lluís (2006), «Fan il·lògic Maquiavel», El Temps (17-X), p. 83. Cavallé, Joan i Mallafré, Joaquim (1994), Pin i Soler, editor i traductor dels humanistes, by F. Roig and J. M. Domingo (ed.), Pin i Soler Symposium Proceedings. Tarragona, November 26-28, 1992, Institut d’Estudis Tarraconenses Ramon Berenguer IV, Tarragona, pp. 167-191. Chiappelli, Fredi (1952), Studi sul linguaggio del Machiavelli, Le Monnier, Florence. De Pol (2013), «‘Fede’ nel ‘Principe’ di Machiavelli e in alcune sue traduzioni tedesche della Prima Età moderna», Lingua e Diritto. La Lingua della Legge, la Legge nella Lingua, Publifarum, 18 (13-III), consulted on 11-VII-2013, url: http://publifarum.farum.it/ezine_articles.php?id=241. Delor, Rosa M. (1989), «Per a una hermenèutica de l’obra de Salvador Espriu (1929-1948)», doctoral thesis, Universitat de Barcelona. Espriu, Salvador (1952), Evocació de Rosselló-Pòrcel i altres notes, Joaquim Horta, Barcelona, p. 117. Fournel, Jean-Louis (2001), Frontiere e ambiguità nella lingua del Principe: condensamenti e diffusione del significato, a A. Pontremoli (ed.), La lingua e le lingue di Machiavelli. Proceedings of the International Studies Convention. Turin, 2-4 December 1999, Olschki, Torí, pp. 71-85. Gavagnin, Gabriella (2004), «Un fragment d’El Príncep de Maquiavel per Pere Coromines», Els marges, 72, pp. 105-113. — (2010), «Les traduccions al català de Maquiavel a principis del segle XX», Quaderns d’Italià, 15, pp. 77-87. Machiavelli (1550): Il Principe di Nicolo Machiavelli al Magnifico Lorenzo di Piero de

22 Regarding the phenomenon of reprinted versions of the translation, Ortin’s (2011) theoretical and historical reflection with regard to the Catalan experience is very useful.

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Medici, a Tutte le Opere di Nicolo Machiavelli cittadino et secretario fiorentino, divise in V. parti, et di nuovo con somma accuratezza ristampate al Santissimo et Beatissimo Padre Signore Nostro Clemente VII. Pont. Mass. M.D.L., I cite from the digital volume in Google Books. — (1843): Opere complete di Niccolò Machiavelli. Con molte correzioni e giunte rinvenute sui manoscritti originali, Alcide Parenti, Florence, 1843. — (1920): Lo Príncep, traducció catalana, ara per primera volta publicada, precedida d’un Breu Comentari sobre Nicolau Machiavelli y’l seu temps per J. Pin y Soler de la Reyal Academia de Bones Lletres de Barcelona y de l’Academia de la Llengua Catalana, «Biblioteca d’Humanistes, IX», Llibrería Antiga y Moderna de S. Babra, Barcelona. — (1921): Traduccions (promeses ja en nostre Philobiblon del 1916), ara per primera volta publicades en catalá, precedides d’un Breu Comentari sobre Nicolau Machiavelli, novelista, autor dramátich, poeta per J. Pin y Soler..., «Biblioteca d’Humanistes, X», Llibrería Antiga y Moderna de S. Babra, Barcelona. — (1927a): «El centenari de Maquiavel», L’Amic de les Arts, 15 (30-VI), pp. 45-46. — (1927b): «De les ‘Històries Florentines’. Llorenç el Magnífic (1448-1492)», La Revista, XIII (July-December), pp. 133-134. — (1982): El Príncep, translation and edition by Jordi Moners i Sinyols, «Textos filosòfics, 11», Laia, Barcelona. — (1985): La mandràgora, translated by Montserrat Puig, Machiavelli, Aretino, Ruzante, Bruno, Teatre del Renaixement, presented by Giuseppe Grilli, «MOLU, 45», Edicions 62/«la Caixa», Barcelona, pp. 15-86. — (2000): Clícia, translation by Jordi Ferrer Gràcia and presented by Jordi Galceran, «Col·lecció Popular del Teatre Clàssic Universal», Institut del Teatre de la Diputació de Barcelona, Barcelona. — (2003a): Il Principe, Biblioteca Italiana, Rome, electronic edition of Giorgio Inglese’s 1995 edition, available at www.bibliotecaitaliana.it. —(2003b): L’Asino, Biblioteca Italiana, Rome, electronic edition of Mario Martelli’s 1971 edition, available at www.bibliotecaitaliana.it. — (2006): El Príncep. La Mandràgora, translated by Carme Arenas, introduction by Bertrand Russell, «Biblioteca Pompeu Fabra, 16», Destino, Barcelona. Mordeglia, Caterina (2010), The first Latin translation, R. De Pol (ed.), The First Translations of Machiavelli’s Prince, Rodopi, Amsterdam-New York, pp. 59-82. Ortín, Marcel (2011), Aspectes institucionals i culturals de la reedició de traduccions. El cas de la Biblioteca Literària de l’Editorial Catalana, G. Gavagnin and V. Martínez-Gil (ed.), Entre literatures. Hegemonies i perifèries en els processos de mediació literària, Punctum, Lleida, pp. 101-120.

Journal of Catalan Intellectual History. Issues 7&8. 2014. P. 65-84 GABRIELLA GAVAGNIN

Pin i Soler, Josep (2004), Comentari sobre llibres i autors, edited by Sandra SarlĂŠ, introduction by Josep M. Domingo, Arola, Tarragona. Pla, Josep (1980), ItĂ lia i el Mediterrani, Destino, Barcelona. Translation from Catalan by Valerie J. Miles

article JOURNAL OF CATALAN INTELLECTUAL HISTORY, Issues 7&8, 2014 | Print ISSN 2014-1572 / Online ISSN 2014-1564 DOI: 10.2436/20.3001.02.90 | P. 85-107 Reception date: 8/9/2012 / Admission date: 7/6/2013 http://revistes.iec.cat/index.php/JOCIH

amon Valls (1928-2011): The agonist of «we» Gonçal Mayos1 Philosophy Department University of Barcelona gmayos@uoc.edu

summary Like the rest of his generation, Valls was marked by the Spanish Civil War and the Francoist repression. Therefore he viewed humanity from realpolitik, pessimistic and agonistic; he searched to give a philosophical base to an “we” which would end the struggle of one against another. We analyze his attacks on “we” built on class, culture or nationality, civil society o the “I” individual, emotivism or moralism, which are impotent and feed the natural human “agonism”. Instead, Valls first thought he’d found the “we” in the church, but then changed radically and only trusted the Hegelian version of the state. In this article we take a balance of the work and teaching of the recently departed professor.

key words War, State, Hegel, Church, Class, Nation, I, Moralism

The Man, the ideal, the fear Ramon Valls Plana is, without a doubt, a fascinating philosopher because of the difficulty and need to create a “we”. It is not merely because in his highly influential 1971 book he interpreted Hegel’s Phenomenology of the Spirit as a process of “From I to we”. This is not simply a good metaphor (although it is an excellent one), nor merely a very good interpretive line, or even a line of academic research (which it also is). “From I to we”makes explicit the main personal and philosophical concern of Ramon Valls: how can a “we” be possible?What sort of “we” can pacify the “I”s and avoid a war of all against all? 1 Professor of the University of Barcelona, consultant to the UOC and director of the International Research Group “Culture, History, State” (GIRCHE). Web: www.ub.es/histofilosofia/ gmayos, i blog: http://goncalmayossolsona.blogspot.com.br/.

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Valls is not interested in just any kind of “we”, but a very specific one, political, real, effective, and most of all, one which reins in violence, and he forcefully rejects other attempts to construct a “we” based on church, class, culture or nation, a civil society of “I”s, as a moralist option and, ultimately, as an emotion. All of Ramon Valls’s work, personality and intellectual activity has been deeply marked by the thinking of the need for a “we-state”, a legal and co-active institution seen as the only effective alternative to the barbarianism always found among humans. As a realist in politics, Valls does not deceive himself, and knows that the conflicts of interest exist within the institutions of the state itself. But as a Hegelian idealist he believes that the state makes the conflict objective and in the end can pacify it (even if it is through the “peace of the cemeteries”) and carry it over to the “judgment of history” (Weltgericht). This question was omnipresent in his classes and debates, and can be seen between the lines of many of his public speeches. The need, yearning or “saudade”2 that Valls considered the true “we” is a vital clue to his personality and biography. A Catalan without a country, marked from his early years by a brutal civil war and postwar period, he entered the Jesuits (traditionally accused of being “a state within a state”, from whom he would later separate, among other things because, like Hobbes, he accepted the state as “God on earth”, that is, as the only real and effective human absolute. Like many of his generation, Valls suffered for a long time from the absence and the anguishing impossibility of a “we” worthy of the name, able to peacefully shelter the “I”s which were pitted against each other.

The impact of history The generation that came about during the Civil War of 1936-1939 and the post war period was fascinated by the need to create a “we”, which would avoid social fragmentation, was profoundly marked by the barbarity and executions without trial on both sides, soon replaced by the barbarity and executions with a mockeny afair of justice by the victors. To the “Cainism”between the “two Spains” or the protogenocide against republicans, “reds”, anarchists, liberals and historical nationalisms like the Catalan, the Basque or Valencian, one must add hunger, fascism, systematic discrimination and corruption, contraband... and World War Two. As if that were not enough, the Catholic church, together with the traditional oligarchy, controlled the political, economic and cultural current.

2 A more appropriate Portuguese term, with positive and negative connotations, which no doubt perfectly describes Ramon Valls’s relationship with the “we”, since one can’t notice the lack of what one has never enjoyed.

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As the Francoist regime lengthened the impact of these conflicts and shortages until well into the transition to democracy, the metaphor of “we” or “from I to we” fascinated generations of students. The choice of this metaphor permitted Valls to connect with and explain Hegel in simple everyday language, with common sense and, as we will see, a provocatively brutal manner, in conscious contrast to the abstruse Hegelian panlogicism. Evidently,Valls is not the only one who needs a “we” which avoids social fragmentation and a war of all against all. This need presides over a period of more than 50 years. It profoundly marked the generations that lived the “era of catastrophes”, as in Eric Hobshawm’s excellent metaphor. They were whole generations marked by a very strong fear of war, but also a need for a true “we”. The two things were correlative and so strong that they tended to turn authoritarian drifts into a lesser of two evils, as the pacifying and disciplinary effect of “we” was seen as more important than its effect on liberation or recognition.

Brutal style Without a doubt, one of the features we most admired in Ramon Valls’s classes was the contrast between the very speculative and convoluted Hegelian philosophy (the core of his teaching and research) and the forceful, direct, colloquial style with which he explained it. A “lectio microphilosopica3”, worthy of the finest universities and a perfect interpretation which didn’t miss a concept, comma or dot over an i, and was contrasted with a lively style of everyday examples, up to date and macrophilosophical, which avoided academicism. This was a strategy he chose to make himself understood, not to become prisoner of the cryptic, wrought Hegelian language and to demonstrate that he could be understood clearly. At the same time, his argumentative style was very personal. Valls was not a Hegelian in his manner of expression; both in his teaching and the major part of his written work, he shows a style closer to common sense than to Hegel. We could offer many examples, but few are as clear (and so often repeated orally and in written form) as the sarcastic, pedagogical comment of the dialectic between the serf and the noble after they found two “monkeys riding”4. Throughout this article there will be opportunities to show this style. Now we move on to our main theme.

3 To see the contrast between microphilosophy and macrophilosophy, see G. Mayos, Macrofilosofía de la Modernidad, dLibro, Rota, 2012. 4 In addition to using it in many classes, it also appears in some writings, such as Valls 2003, p. 77.

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Panlogicism and panagonism in Hegel and Valls “Attributing Auschwitz or the Gulag to illustrated reason is, more than an exaggeration, a provocative falsehood (...). Barbarities should never be blamed on reason, but on the lack thereof ”5.

Both in Hegelian thought and in its expression two great arguments and approaches to reality are superposed; the panlogical and the panagonistic6. Panlogicism is the essential supposition that reality is rational, and therefore logos is the presiding entity. Reality can be explained speculatively by showing the logical links that unite all and form the philosophical system. On the other hand panagonism has the underlying supposition that reality moves dialectically and that, as a result, it is shown through negativity, conflict, agon, struggle, war and the Heraclitian polemos7. The difficulty in understanding Hegel lies in two viewpoints and discourses that need each other and progress as a result of a dialogue between them. We tried to show this in our thesis (counterposing the logic and empiricism of the story) which Ramon Valls supervised. He had masterfully shown how the awareness that comes from experience in Phenomenology of the Spirit lives in a “panagonic” way (to use our terminology) which is totally diverse from the “we” who coldly narrates the “scientific” result of the experience of that awareness, showing the underlying rationality and “panlogicism”. So our main thesis is that Ramon Valls has a similar structure in his thinking. He can only conceive reality as an “agon” and human nature as inevitably panagonist8. Undoubtedly linked with the traumatic experiences indicated before, this profound panagonism, with its corresponding anguish and despair, made an alternative necessary to minimize the “terribleness”. We believe that this is the role of “we” in Valls’ thinking and, because of the shared social traumas, in that of his generation.

5 Valls 2003, p. 142. If there is no note to the contrary, all translations from the Spanish are by G.Mayos. 6 To speak of Hegel’s “panlogicism” is a well known stereotype; on the other hand it is not so to contrast it to “panagonism”. In fact, this terminology is one we developed from the evolution of G. Mayos’s “empiria” in, Entre lògica i empíria, PPU, Barcelona, 1989, and from «pantragicism» to G. Mayos, Hegel. Vida, obra y pensamiento, Planeta DeAgostini, Barcelona, 2007 especially the sections “From Pantragic to Panlogical, «De pantrágico a panlógico», «Reducción de la Fenomenologia en la construcción del sistema panlógico» and «El sistema panlógico», 2007, pp. 34, 54 i 58). 7 Valls (1983, p. 422) considers one of Schelling and Hegel’s major contributions to be “putting negativity into the absolute”. 8 In Del jo al nosaltres (Valls 1971, p. 52) he reminds us that even absolute knowledge, the “field of reconciliation of consciences” (...) is the result of a long road of pain and struggle, with oneself and with others, to overcome the isolation of individual consciences. It is a process of freedom from the partiality of perspectives.”

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It is possible that something similar occurred to Hegel himself, but it is clear that the panlogicist option, with the construction of a totalizing system absolutely framed by the logical dialectic, would seem incredible even to a convinced Hegelian like Valls. Possibly he would end up closer to a Heraclitian dialectic or agonism, which is more open than the Hegelian and doesn’t presuppose a synthesis or panlogcial reconciliation; or even a Fichtian one, which assumes the uncontrollability of the personal agonism9. Therefore, one cannot say that the effective, political institutional “we” with a monopoly on violence, which Valls aspired to, was Hegelian “panlogicism”. It seems that both the Hegelian “panlogicism” and the “we” of Valls are responses to a similar shared “panagonism”, as are Hobbes’s Leviathan or the long road to Kant’s “cosmopolitan society” Ramon Valls’s thinking is characterized by a profound panagonist vision of humanity10, pacified by a forceful (but also desperate) rationalist discourse. Undoubtedly, this is not Hegelian panlogicism, and we believe that the “brutal” style also shows a profound discomfort with both this panagonism (we’re merely monkeys on horseback”, he said) and the real possibility of a better solution in a “we” worthy of the name.

Philosophy of Human History and Panagonism Staring from this panagonistic view of human nature, Ramon Valls made a scheme of the philosophy of history that makes a pacifying and completely humanized “we” conceivable.11 Valls thinks of human history from a dialectic perspective in three stages: first a political, imposed and educational “we”; second “‘I’s” which are individual, subjective, conflictive, with a dangerous tendency toward the most naive moralism and which resists the political “we” (which continues, however, for otherwise we will relapse into the war of all against all); and third, a new a true political “we” which differs from the earlier ones because it is formed by free recognition, reconciliation and mutual pardon among people12. This dialectic, the last key in the story, only makes sense if one presupposes that human nature is radically agonist, that is, based on and driven by struggle, egotism, conflict and war13. So Valls sets himself within the realism 9 Valls 1981a, p. 19;Valls 1981a, p. 149. 10 Clearly emphasized in the title of the article «Som conflictius...» (We are conflictive...) (2011). 11 We use this word although Valls, unfortunately, never developed it in detail. 12 See Mayos 1989, pp. 188ss, chapter 7.7. 13 AsValls says (2003, p. 217):“Therefore politics is constantly fighting against passions and interests and must keep the flock peaceful. A flock which often becomes lively and turns into a pack. Then they killthe suspected lambs and feed on each other ... as is natural”. (Our italics)

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which from Plautus to Hegel, passing through Hobbes, considers that “homo homini lupus est”. We recall that the first contact between humans in “The Phenomenology of Spirit” leads to a struggle to the death or the complete submission or dominance of one and another. The dialectic of the noble and the serf, master and slave, is significantly the prime collective figure seen as such as a diverse response to agonism. Even more, just as he begins his commentary on the prime figure of “Phenomenology”, the awareness of the senses,Valls (1971, p. 54) exclaims, “We have here the starting point of all diversities and all struggles. The irreducible diversity.” Overcoming his earlier attempt of thinking of absolutes as loves, “Phenomenology” is guided by agonism and the harsh lessons which come from each of the figures of awareness. Each feels itself die just as it surpasses itself. We are, then, faced with the collision between the concept on one hand, of human nature as struggle and egotism without “natural” limits and on the other hope (or despair) for an absolute, objective, final “we” of human existence which can control and overcome the agonism. Valls shows this (2003, p 219, cf 120s) referring over and over to what he calls “the Kantian golden line” (Metaphysics of Morals, “Conclusion of the Doctrine of Right”) “war is not necessary: neither war between you and me in our natural state nor war between us as States (...); because this is not how one procures his rights”.

Controlling Human Agonism and more Powerful Agonism So it is very difficult to control an antagonism so deeply engrained in human nature; it is never completely eliminated and always returns. But Valls thinks that this is the primordial political task and the sense of history, and can only be done by laws and the State. As human nature is terrible, the monopoly on violence which every hegemonic regime has (be it despotic, totalitarian, democratic...) is legitimized because it tends to “end the terrible war”. Therefore, and significantly, Valls (2003, p 147) defines “ the political and juridical as insurance of stability”. As Hobbes showed, human agonism is so irreducible that it can only be pacified and controlled by counterposing a stronger agonism, the Leviathan. It is cruel, but the only possible route to pacification of society is the basic political mechanism defined by Hobbes14. To illustrate the case Valls (1981a, p 95) evolved in a way similar to that theorized by Hegel: a first stage of distrust of the State, then finally realizing that the State “is where we can accomplish

14 Valls was always clear that “justice, when it opposes the egotistical aims of the individual, acts as an equilibrium between law and power”.(1983, p. 397).

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the reconciliation which civil life can not achieve. (...) Meanwhile, it is better to have the State. By virtue of law our liberty is guaranteed here and now, it serves as arbiter between personal interests and egotism and guarantees an education for its citizens.” Valls presupposes that the defining characteristic of the State is its monopoly on violence, which automatically creates an identifiable norm known as justice. He considers this a great characteristic/mechanism, and therefore does not distinguish between the State and what scholars would consider simple, non-institutionlized spontaneous leadership. We analyze the metaphor of the first humanized monkeys; from fear they said “We both want the banana, but since we don’t want to die for it, you tell us what to do and we’ll obey”. The State has been invented. Monkey C has been called to impose law and order” (Valls 2003, p 77). Here Valls ignores that spontaneous leadership tends to be temporal, based on consensus, accepted without much resistance and more linked to the person than to the social role occupied, and therefore tends to disappear with the specific person; the simplest State, however, presupposes a strong institutionalization of power with a permanent division of social functions: power depends more on the structure and place occupied than on the person occupying. In fact, the whole dynamic complex (which fascinated Machiavelli) leads a few spontaneous leaderships to institutionalize themselves in a self-sustained power structure which, in the end, is indisputably a state. Valls himself recognizes this when he continues “monkey C knows he is not equal to monkey A or B. (...) and as he is not ready to tolerate daily challenges to his position, he is obliged to maintain a fine balance the always precarious consensus of the representatives and a certain despotism (...). Such things may seem unpleasant, but they are true” (Valls 2003, p 78). Surely the simplified caricature of “the monkeys”, where one sees his “brutal” and provocative style, has the function of reducing the essence of the State to the control of the agonism of its subjects thanks to its monopoly on violence (in which it is of secondary importance how it got and how it uses the power). Therefore he follows in the same style, “the State’s movement, as legislator and in sanctions, is necessary whatever its territory, if we don’t want to claw ourselves to death”.

Legitimacy of the violence of the “we” Within this framework,Valls coherently argued the legitimacy of coercion and violence by the law or its “armed part”, specifically because it was necessary to control the “natural” violence of those who violated the law. Following

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Machiavelli, Valls accepts the fundamental truth that “without a strong power there is no good legal order. This is so because of the constant danger of the collapse of the political organization. Its equilibrium is unstable because, in function of its congenital weakness, the violence which comes with the state of nature is always about to reappear” (Valls 2003, p 70). In short, the always uncontrollable human agonism can only be pacified by a stronger agonism with the right to use violence. As he says on repeated occasions15 (Valls 2003, p 220): “in the republic of men, where lack of respect for the rights of others is inevitable, the law must always be coactive. We state clearly that politics cannot renounce violence against one who uses natural violence.” This means that for Valls politics has nothing to do with the image of the moralists and the naive because “in synthesis, the common good and soft dialogue are moralizing and, in politics, barren. Political dialogue, if it is realistic, is always hard” (Valls 2003, p 186). Human agonism and the perpetual tendency toward violence generate and legitimize the use of force by the State in the sense that “Law is coactive, but one cannot say that it uses violence. It is coactive because it can force one to comply with it, it is not violent, however, because this force is the inevitable consequence exercised by those who do not comply with the law” (Valls 2003, p 189, 219s, author’s italics). For Valls civil peace must be “undoubtedly armed, for without the sword the law is no more than words” (Valls 2003, p. 189; també 219s).

The dialectic of history The agonism inscribed in man’s animal nature makes necessary, defensible and legitimate a “we” which imposes peace, albeit violently. As we have noted, it is basically a ternary dialectic, with the first stage corresponding to a political “we” which is imposed but educative. More or less, this corresponds to the Hegelian vision of the Oriental world (where only one is free: the despot) but, surprising as it seems, it also fits the beautiful Greek “we” and the harsher, more disciplined Roman Empire. Opposed to the simple application of the metaphor “from I to we”, the historic starting point does not correspond to individuals and “‘I’s”, for individualization and subjectivization are modern developments for Hegel and Valls, with little presence in antiquity.

15 Without exhausting the subject, we refer you to three passages where this idea stands out:Valls 2003, pp. 117, 189 i 219s.

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Both the prehistory of the hordes and tribes and the ancient empires and the Greek cities are stages where the “we” and not the I dominate. An educative, political “we” imposes itself, but it is still spontaneous. Thus it is in the fortunate and beautiful Greek era when, according to Hegel and Valls, a marvelous but unstable equilibrium is achieved, which will have a short lifespan and will not survive the polis16. The second great stage in history corresponds to the long process of individuation and subjectification which make possible the constitution of an “I” which is autonomous and capable of recognizing another. It is a typical second stage of the dialectic (alienation, negation, excision...) where the “I” will finally enter the struggle against the disciplinary and educative “we”. This historic dialectic stage simultaneously develops and disciplines the individual “‘I’s”, directing them toward free recognition and mutual respect. Due to its dialectic nature, during the second stage the “natural”, imposed “we” collides with the increasingly individuated “‘I’s” which, on the one hand demand the essential value of autonomy and personal liberty but on the other, according to Valls, fall into the worst errors of anarchy and moralism. We will show later that Valls is tremendously critical of naive, ineffective, failed, utopian “beautifully souled” moralism and, like Hobbes, he considers inevitable the persistent and despotic “we” and its violence to avoid the war of all against all. Valls is very sure that only in the end, in a third stage, can a superior, true “we” appear. It will be produced by reconciliation and, at the same time, surpass both political discipline and the full development of autonomy, liberty and recognition of the “‘I’s”. In fact, this third stage is an ideal; if not inaccessible, at least it is never completely achieved, for it is very difficult to have a complete match of free, universal recognition, reconciliation and pardon among people (that is among completely autonomous individuals capable of spontaneous mutual respect). As is normal in Hegelian dialectic, the maximum complexity lies in the second stage, marked by the agonism between the “‘I’s” as well as the increasing individuation, subjectification and autonomy. There are three largely opposed determinations here. First, it is a reaction against the insufficiency of the initial authoritarian “we”17. Second, it is an agonist movement of excision, war and negativity18 which will finally be overcome by determination already implicit and developed from that exact initial movement (Valls 2003, p218s). 16 To grasp the fortunate but unstable nature of the Greek world for Hegel andValls, see G. Mayos (1990, pp. 323ss). 17 Valls says (2003, p. 218): “From this moment on, anyone who accepts this ideal legislates above the legislators”. 18 “In our interactions with others and the pleasant and useful relations we have with them, it’s not all a bed of roses. (…) We also hurt and hit. And this is a constasnt threat to the relation of recognition and can destroy it. It’s personal conflict. It’s war.” Valls 2003, p. 219.

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Influenced by present bioethics with Kantian roots, Valls, in his last book, shows himself to be strongly in favor of the idea that “ethics is the obligation and that the supreme human dignity lies in the ability to take the law upon oneself (autonomia) and thus auto-obligate oneself ”. But he immediately clarifies the role of the autonomous individual to avoid any appearance of individualism: “The establishment of moral law, in fact, cannot lie on the isolated individual, but must be based on mutual and respectful interaction of several” (Valls 2003 p 100) . At no time does Valls have the slightest doubt of the superiority of the ethics of the State (Sittlichkeit) over Kantian Moralität19. For our purposes, the third stage of reconciliation in a political “we” requires one to assume the experience of the previous moral autonomy and “raise it to the law” (Valls 2003 p 219). In agreement with Rousseau, Valls argues that individual autonomy, will and liberty need not collide with general political will, but must recognize and submit to it. Thus, politics could be recovered as an authentic “we”, where the various autonomous “‘I’s” freely recognize each other and overcome, now adequately, the dangerous agonist tendencies: “if we oblige ourselves to universal respect, we understand that the will to end war is associated with the birth of the moral, the birth of the humanity of humans. So we make a transition to the political with the moral demand to end war” (Valls 2003, p 219).

Overcoming “we” as the Church “what is my view of Christianity versus the official Catholic version I run into constantly: (...) for me the quintessence of Christianity is simply to respect the sacredness of one who suffers unjustly. The rest is of little or no interest to me. I save the incense around Theodore and Justinian’s speeches and the candles for the ending and the strange dress for the Gothic paintings” (Valls 2003, p 222).

It is not surprising that the young Ramon Valls first searched for the “we” he needed so badly in the Company of Jesus, and later left them with a criticism which was strong and systematic. Significantly, the Jesuits prompted Valls’s studies of Hegel, directing him to study the “intersubjectivity” where “the religious also converges, because religion was always the harbinger of the spirit” (Valls 1976, p 376). The Company was aware that it was necessary to seek a “we” like the Hegelian, which favors the spirit but demands of the institutions effective accomplishment of “real objectives”. Somehow the Church and the Company tended to consider themselves as the Hegelian spirit which “moves itself and engenders itself, not alone, but through common action” (Valls 1971, p 210).

19 Although it is known that in earlier versions of the Hegelian system Morality appears at a later and higher stage.

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In this line, his doctoral thesis “From I to We. A Reading of Hegel’s Phenomenology” investigates “intersubjectivity” as it “pertains to the community of the spirit” which includes the epistemological experience20, as well as the “social” (Valls 1971 p 27), which refers to a “collective subject, a community and its world” (Valls 1979, p 31). In many senses, with “From I to We” Valls was the best in presenting this necessity which inspired his generation and the Jesuits. Thus Valls says, for example, “Despite its absoluteness and its identification with divine understanding, human understanding does not create the world, but understands it in God to the extent that it is true”. Finally, going deeper into Phenomenology of the Spirit ended up distancing Valls from the ideal of the “we” as the Church, and brings him closer to a Hobbesian thesis. For a long time, unlike other secularized Jesuits, Valls avoided open polemics with his old order and the Catholic Church. He maintained a respectful but effective distance, despite approaches of the Theology Department of the Ramon Llull University and the influence on Jesuit scholars studying Hegel, such as the philosophy professors Gabriel Amengual to a greater extent and Eugeni Colomer to a lesser. He also coincided with faithful Marxists such as José Maria Valverde21 (with whom he spoke of these things), who considered religious faith and lay revolutionary faith as inseparable. As time went on, however, the distance between Valls and the Church became clearer and sharper. This could be seen in the prologue that he wrote in 1989 to my book Between Logic and Empiricism (Valls 1989, p 9s), where, however, he still “holds his tongue” (as happened with so many). Despite the advance of the “democratic transition”, intellectual fear and self-censorship was patent. Valls, however, was ever more unbelieving and critical with the Church’s historic role. In the 1989 prologue he interpreted Western history as a collision between politics and religion, between the superior models of Pericles’s Athens and Christianity. He even interpreted the Spanish transition years as a struggle between the nostalgia of Hegelian synthesis and those who wanted to refute it (I include myself in this group, adding amiably “but not as quickly as others”22). More specifically, Valls lamented his failure to create a synthesis between the pagan politics of classical Greece (Valls 1983, p 441) and Christianity, as the heirs of the best effort to date, by Hegel, miss the full experience

20 Because the epistemological project shares the objective of “giving consistency to the philosophy of liberty”, says Valls (1983, p. 455). 21 Valverde accepts the idea of revolution in a Marxist vein and the theory of liberation theology. He was very close to the social victims and more disposed to defend their demands to the end without worrying about the chaos that could result from their ire. 22 Valls (1989, p. 10) was certainly aiming at the potent Marxism of the times with these words.

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of either pagan Greece or of Christianity23. In other words, the political and religious “we”s are incompatible because, as Tacitus said, it seems impossible that Christianity, “that strange spiritualism, could adapt itself to the realism of Greek politics”(Valls 2003, p 50). Obviously, in Valls thinking the political “we” prevails over the religious, and even more so over the Church. Therefore, states Valls (1989 p 11), Nietzsche, the philosopher he most taught after Hegel, must decontaminate Hegel and the philosophical tradition of its “theological blood” and Platonic dualism. Later Christianity will accentuate the dualism and the sacrifice of the terrestrial, political world for the fictitious angelical and antipolitical world.Valls (2003, p 51) lamented that “the homeland of Roman Catholics was heaven”. Now, if in his 1989 prologue Valls interpreted history as still marked by debate, conflict, excisions and dialectic between Greek pagan politics and Christian religiosity24, later he explicitly took on “the typically modern task of undermining the independence of ecclesiastic power” (Valls 2003, p 72). Therefore he forcefully denounces that the “absolutist stream was trying to reestablish the alliance between the altar and the throne, which in Spain meant the continuation of the Catholic moral ethic, in a hardline form, as the rule of social life, and that the civil power would have to assure compliance through laws, up to and including penal laws” (Valls 2003, p 127). As this presupposes that “the conviction that the civil legislator must establish a fised moral code, decided in an authoritarian manner by the ecclesiastic hierarchy, in the juridic ordinances” (Valls 2003, p 210), Valls sees a “theological fallacy” in this viewpoint, which has been systematically used by those “from the Pope to the faithful of Opus Dei long for the alliance between altar and throne” (Valls 2003, p 56). Very critical with the Catholic hierarchy (2003, p 47),Valls demands a new “we”, a new (modern) Ethic which, without being a simple copy of the old one, returns to its social and political base.. This base was no longer the classical polis, of course, but the State in the modern and contemporary sense of the word” (2003, p 63).

23 Valls (1989, p. 11) asked himself if both theology and the “Hegelian reconciliation” are no more than “a paralogism, as the middle ground is always a mistake, for they pertain to two different discourses”. 24 Valls (1989, p. 12) thus ended his prologue, “I invite you to read Hegel in this way. (...) This can be understood at the stage of analyzing the logical core of the development of the philosophy of the history of the two stages (Greek and Christian) which center the discourse and problems. Then the rest of the stages are subordinate and in a secondary position.” 25 Valls (2003, p. 162) denounced that “one doesn’t seek the source of morality in nature (as do the naturalists) but in God. (...) [and sets] obligations considering religious faith to be their source. And for the nonbelievers who want to pass them off as natural law, these obligations are superfluous.”

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Against “we” as a class As we have seen, in his intellectual evolution Valls completely abandoned the idea of the Church as “we” and, although he qualifies it, we believe he also abandons the “religious we”. He never identified his political “we”, always more speculative than of daily praxis, with the sociopolitical class as did Marxism, which he had to coexist with for a long time in the university26. One must remember that Valls considered any social class, even the broadest worker or proletarian class, to be merely a part of the whole confronting the other part (the “capitalists” o Bourgeois”) and therefore cannot be a true, universal “we”. Undoubtedly for Valls and many of his generation the “class struggle” seemed too much like a “civil war” and therefore inhibited the effective existence of a pacifying “we”. On the other hand, the class struggle and the revolution fomented the dangerous agonist impulse which Valls so feared in humanity. In addition, because of his political realism, he considered revolution to be more the violent, lawless chaos of the “during” than the perfect, utopian order of those who only look at the “after”. Therefore for him class struggle and revolution represented the most dangerous triumph of war and the dissolving of all “we”s. Similar to his distance from the Church “we”,Valls (2003, p 131) becomes more and more ironic with “historical materialism”, which he called “philosophy of history or whatever one wants”. Although he can (Valls 2003, p 134) understand the “ethical protest” present in Marxism, he clearly leans toward Hegel instead of Marx (Valls 2003, p 134) who he accuses of being utopian27, moralistic28, lacking in rigor, a creator of misunderstandings29 and now left behind by history30. 26 His pragmatic realism,although not really Marxist,his abandoning the Jesuits,his growing anticlerical drift,without a doubt his having specialized in Marx’s“teacher”permittedValls to be considered an ally by many Marxists. Some kept their distance,such as Manuel Sacristan’s and Paco Fernández Buey’s group. Among those who are closer philosophically, we must mention José MaríaValverde, secondary school professors Maria Rosa Borras and the professor of the UNED José María Ripalda. Not as close were Gustavo Bueno and his group from Oviedo. Valls confronted the Marxists, like Universitat de Barcelona professor José María Bermudo and Manuel Cruz, and secondary school teacher Lluís Alegret. He was even more opposed to those who rapidly evolved from the extreme left to right wing positions which, for Valls, are frivolous and postmodern (like Eugenio Trias). 27 One shouldn’t confuse this with Bloch’s “that which isn’t yet” which Valls praises (1981a, p. 134). Here the accusation is far harsher, says Valls (2003, p. 135): “the prophecy for the future (...) the so-called scientific socialism won’t be able to avoid utopianism”. 28 Valls (2003, p. 134, our italics) criticizes the Marxist concept of alienation to the extent it is “completely pejorative in this sense and has, in our view, moral resonances”. 29 “As far as the originality of this doctrine and its attempt to be scientific, I think it has produced uncountable misunderstandings, because science is a blessing but scientism is a plague (...) The work is full of philosophemes” (Valls 2003, pp. 135s). 30 “Nowadays, when residual groups sing the Internationale with their fists raised, the idea that this struggle is the final struggle is a bit pathetic” (Valls 2003, pp. 135s).

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Valls’s harsh political realism or pessimism cannot conceive the satisfaction and pacification of human agonism nor effective justice, equality and solidarity. He says, “No State has a stupendous solution for everyone. The cleverest, best implanted equilibrium will be temporal and unstable because it must always deal with the hungry waiting to come to the table. The art of politics, by definition, is to administer the discontent, for the only way to stave off conflict is alternating those who applaud and those who protest” (Valls 2003, p 78).

Mistrusful of civil society and the dynamic of “‘I’s” Undoubtedly it was very difficult to be a liberal in a Catalonia marked by the civil war and Francoism, and even more so in a Spain which had never been through a liberal revolution or industrialization. So it is not surprising that the majority of his generation considered the attempts to build the sought after “we” on a base of civil society and the dialectic (immanent and without higher supervision) which the “‘I’s” set themselves to be dangerous. For Valls, both civil society and the dialectic of the “‘I’s” are frankly weak as well as intrinsically dangerous. Valls, although he feels that agonism is a natural impulse in the human species31, is not a liberal. As a result he cannot accept that the so-called civil society can generate a peaceful, industrious “we” by its own simple dialect. He dedicates a chapter to civil society but, ironically, he calls it “uncivil society” (Valls 2003, p 176s), highlighting that it is based on competition and a sort of civil war (or at least the threat thereof). He cannot accept the claim of “civil society” opposed to the State and its “objectively” superior institutions, be it because he underestimated their effectiveness and power or because of the negative, totalitarian drift of the former. In addition, thought Valls, the State is far stronger and more effective, which makes the liberal pretension of civil society as a counter to the State seem ridiculous. Theses like Mandeville’s “industrious hive”, Adam Smith’s “invisible hand” or Locke’s definition of the civil state seem to Valls to be erroneous, false and inefficient. Maintaining himself loyal to Hegel, he accepts the relevance of civil society, but always subordinate to the State, the true “we”, as the interests of the civil society and the I’s “must be disciplined” (Valls 2003,

31 Despite this, the panagonistic realism made him evolve toward liberalism.Valls (2003, p. 164) came to defend the “moral value of the network of economic interests.These interests are not only legitimate in principle, they are essential for giving real content to the value of dignity.”

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p 179) and the State is the only “effective representative of the general interest” (Valls 1983, p 455). Definitively, Valls cannot accept the final basig of the liberal view, which is a profound mistrust of the State as such. Citing the liberal pluralist Isaiah Berlin, he recalls, “nothing assures us that the conflicting interest can be reconciled. In fact, we know that within their plane they are irreconcilable” (Valls 2003, p 186). Like Hegel, Valls thinks that only by climbing to a higher level of objectively effective institutions (among other reasons, because of their monopoly on violence) can the agonistically conflicting human interests be reconciled. Valls (2003, p 84s) highlights that the liberal separation of powers does not rupture “the unity of the State” and that “although there is a mellowing from the separation of powers and the limited democracy of the lower house, it is still an absolute State. To inflict capital punishment, the true absolute master according to Hegel, is still an absolute power (...). I repeat, the king is no longer absolute, but the State still is”. Certainly the true “we” is not something given, simple, natural... but must be built with difficulty, tragedy and discipline by the “‘I’s” of the citizens and individuals. Valls knows that if they abdicate their vigilance as democrats and citizens the State can drift to authoritarianism and the “we” ceases to be a “we”. But, as we have said, one always presupposes that the human panagonism never rests and therefore one is always vigilant, controlling, keeping things from getting out of hand. For Valls this danger is so terrible it makes him distrust the agonist power (praised by the liberals) of the citizens when they watch themselves, because inevitably they depend on something doubtful like an impulse, and on top of that, an agonist one! Therefore Valls not only distrusted the choices of the classical liberals (like Mandeville, Adam Smith and Locke), but also from much more tempered Kant (an author he praises in other aspects). Valls does not accept the human “unsocial sociability” as the “driving force of history”, because that presupposes that the panagonism (unsociability) can be offset by human need to live with others (sociability)32. Also, we think he disliked it because it is too limited to the second stage of the dialectic, to the individualized and conflicting “‘I’s” (although here Kant sets a distance with “moralism”33) and therefore to the free competition of “agonistically” opposing interests of liberalism. 32 Kant’s 1784 work, Ideas for a Universal History in a Cosmopolitan Key. For information on this,G. Mayos, Ilustración y Romanticismo. Introducción a la polémica entre Kant y Herder, Herder, Barcelona, 2004, pp. 172ss, 338ss i 398ss. 33 Valls and Requero, in the end of their 2011 article, highlight the similarity of Kant and Hegel in valuing the role of the State to dominate human agonism, but they also highlight the Hegelian phobia to any argument related to moralism.

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Distancing himself from any option which thinks that, autonomously and by its own dynamic, the “‘I’s” can lead to a true “we”, Valls opts for considering the first stage of the dialectic to be a “we”. Therefore the inevitable condition of the whole dialectic, the original, undifferentiated unity, would be a “we” which is political, disciplining and educating, but also effective, affective and protective. It is a natural “we”, not chosen or imposed; that is, an authoritarian and coactive “we” that pacifies and exercises a monopoly on force. Without this natural, imposed, coactive, effective, pacifying authority with a monopoly on force the individualized “‘I’s” wouldn’t even have a model or the slightest experience of moral law, free recognition or an authentic “we” (Valls 2003, p 219). Certainly, the fear that everyone has when faced with the aggression of another, and the rational calculation that sooner or later he will be defeated are key in individuals freely accepting the cession of their power and freedom to the Leviathan. But for Valls that is not enough for two important reasons: the first is that the assumed “contract” which provides access to the Leviathan is not real, as Hobbes himself recognized. On one hand, in the “natural” situation of the war of all against all, there is not the slightest chance of rational deliberation. On the other hand the “sovereign”, by being sovereign, neither makes nor is bound by the contract. The second reason is that the individual “‘I’s”, facing each other and with no experience of “we”, cannot build a true “we” (with free mutual recognition) simply forced by mere authoritarian restrictions. Some experience of “we” and of free recognition, albeit natural and insufficient, is necessary. This experience of free recognition (albeit limited and not universal) can only be produced, in the first stage of the dialectic to be developed, within the “tribe”: the first law of moral autonomy can only be dictated within the heart of one who has already adopted, as a maxim of his personal behavior, respect for the other (...) We think that if the law must first be a maxim of conduct, this means that respect for all humans, and with it, true and formal morality, can only be achieved after education tin the practice of mutual recognition within the limited circles of the tribe” (Valls 2003, 218). As we see,Valls rejected the liberal presupposition that the simply negative confrontation between “‘I’s” could provide spontaneous recognition and respect for the other, obviating the need for any other principle. Quite to the contrary Valls (2004 pp 172s, 338s, 398s) accepted another principle, in the form of a natural “we” is necessary so that the historical dialectic can finally culminate in a “we” which comes from free recognition.

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Against culture and nation as “we” The romantic German Herder, and Hegel himself, shared with Valls the thought that the “we” cannot come simply from the Hobbesian fear of constant competition nor from the mutual agonism among individual “‘I’s”, but must emerge from a natural “we” which is present on family and community life. In fact, this is the key in the German concept of nation which Valls always viewed with reluctance. Certainly Valls recognized that within the human condition there is the principle of sociability and its contrast: unsocial agonism. But he does not see this dualism as more or less equal (as did Kant and, more optimistically, Herder), but as a disequilibrium with a near complete domination by agonism. For Valls this is a far more powerful principle than unsociability, so that sociability is nearly irrelevant when confronted with the dangerous human agonism. As a result the human condition is dual, as Kant said, and needs sociability and community impulses, as Herder noted, but the predominance of egotistical agonism is so great, according to Valls, that the duality or sociability are marginal. Therefore, in none of his analyses does Valls start from the impulse of sociability to legitimize the “we”; but always thinks of it as a protector (with a monopoly on violence) against the war of all against all, which is inevitable without the resistance of the “Leviathan-we”. For Valls it is a mistake to think of the “we” as a nation, cultural or linguistic community, etc. This radically separated him from many of the Catalan and Spanish nationalists of his generation. He always refused to consider that the true “we” could be limited (which is different from incorporating some of the secondary characteristics) to such a feeble base which is linked to the dangerous animal human nature such as community, cultural, linguistic, historical ... links. Even more, Valls couldn’t accept this “German” concept of nation, but he couldn’t accept the “French” version either (where the privileges are limited to institutional and political elements), although this is closer to his thinking. The key problem is that he associated any nationalism to the dangerous, primary animal impulses and the catastrophes of the civil war and the Franco era. As the realist that he was, Valls could understand that culture or nation habitually form a powerful and necessary base for institutional politics, but he considered them weak and dangerous without armed institutional vigilance. Only the State can effectively pacify the agonist impulses which are omnipresent in the human condition. As a student of modern history, Valls understood (and could defend) the coinciding of nation and State, but a bit naively and despite knowing the setting of the struggle for power, he considered that the State was necessarily the rational element of control and pacifi-

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cation while the nation was inevitably an irrational element of agonist chaos. We must note that this idea was widespread among his generation for reasons previously mentioned. As a result, although he was never in the Spanish nationalist movement, which at that time was inseparable from Francoism, Ramon Valls did not fully coincide with the growing Catalan nationalism, which was unequivocally democratic. He accepted leading the Catalan Philosophy Society (part of the Institut d’Estudis Catalans) from 1982 to 1985, where he collaborated with pro-Catalans of varying ideologies such as professors Jordi Sales i Coderch, Xavier Rubert de Ventós, Pere Lluís Font, Francesc Gomà, Francesc Fortuny, Joan Leita34, Salvi Turró and me. Then he was an active collaborator in the first publications of Col·loquis de Vic, where he was an important presence with various lectures (Valls 1997c, 1998, 1999) and as a member of the science council of the The Catalan Philosophy Society Yearbook. Despite his resistance to any sort of homages, he accepted the presidency of honor of the first Catalan Philosophy Congress, organized by Catalan, Valencian and Balearic Philosophy Societies and celebrated in Barcelona on March 21, 22 i 23 of 200735 . Despite the indisputable democratic pacifism of Catalan nationalism which embodied a potent modernizing project,Valls never really felt close to it. No doubt he remembered the traumatic shocks he’d had with Basque nationalism in the new Basque Country University he’d helped to found. And his unease grew with the consolidation of political autonomy and the emergence of Catalan nationalism from the marginal position where Francoism had put it. In addition, to understand the proud solitude and relative silence of his last years, there are two decisive academic events. The first is that Ramon Valls had to give up his hope to be rector of the University of Barcelona. For some years he had been vice-rector of the professors and was considered, in pectore, the successor of rector Josep Maria Bricall. Poor health, however, forced him to resign, thus cutting off an aspiration inspired in Hegel, and in which he’d placed his dreams. The second was the serious confrontation with the major part of the department of the History of Philosophy36 of the University of Barcelona and his old mentor (professor of the UNED and soon member of the Academy of Spanish Language) Emilio Lledó, the result of a famous and polemical opposition.

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34 With whom he maintained a strong difference of criteria during the joint edition of Fenomenologia de l’esperit (Phenomenology of the Spirit). 35 Josep Monserrat (ed.), Actes del primer congrés català de filosofia, Societat Catalana de Filosofia, Institut d’Estudis Catalans, Barcelona, 2011. 36 He even left the classes in the Philosophy Department and taught in the Law Department, specifically in the philosophy of law. For years he hardly used his office in the Philosophy Department.

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All this embittered his last university years and impelled him to shut himself in. He began to lose friendships and academic/intellectual alliances with professors like Raul Gabás, Victòria Camps, Felipe Martínez Marzoa, Félix Duque, and even ones who were closer to him like José Luis Villacañas, Francisco Jarauta and Víctor Gómez Pin. We believe, and it would be interesting to see an in-depth biography confirm it, that his increasing isolation was the result of the sum of his own character, his failure in his hope to become rector, his academic conflicts and his profound disappointment and distance with respect to the three most powerful social and intellectual groups of the time. As we have noted, Valls never completely connected with the liberal sector, he distanced himself moodily from both the religious sector where he had been formed and from the Marxist sector which had been so influential in his university years and from the modernizing Catalan nationalists, who were regaining their traditional cultural and social central position. In short, for various reasons Valls forced himself to proudly and increasingly retire into himself, his solitary study and translation of Hegel. This had the lamentable consequence of minimizing his direct intellectual impact on the new generations of students and philosophers.

Against moralism “It can be clearly perceived that Politics without Ethics comes to be cruel and frighteningly unjust. However it is equally so that Ethics without Politics is reduced to celestial music. It degrades the moralizing to immoral because its sermon is ineffective in causing the good in this world” (Valls 2003, p. 151s.). The conscious, willful distancing from the model of “we” in the church, classes, civil society, the agglomeration of “‘I’s” or the culture-nation (and its supporters) was key in the later evolution of Ramon Valls. We have also seen that these four rejections were firmly rooted in his agonist vision of human nature and the fears and dangers associated with it. For a realistic pragmatist, convinced of human agonsim, as was Valls, moralism (not morality or ethics) is a total error. Valls thinks that moralism is necessarily naive and inefficient because it proposes a world and humanity which denies its agonist condition, or at least as if this condition could be overcome by limits, penance or will, The human evil and tendency to conflict do not disappear simply because one realizes that it is bad, counterproductive and violent (and it is!). So he states forcefully, “Moralism deals as well with senseless topics. For example it says that if the whole world were good there

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would be no need for laws. Or if we all loved each other the world would be goodness and light. (...) We won’t say trivialities and we repeat that ethics without politics is a children’s story. (...) In short, moralism is immoral. It is an ideal refuge which is condemned to never come down to reality. (Valls 2003, p. 176, our italics). Valls’s denouncing of abstract moralism goes back to an idea very close to Kantian doctrine, of Christian origin , of the “radical bad”: man is made of such twisted wood that there is no way to straighten him out, much less maintain himself straight. Valls is very clear that no moralizing will can effectively and enduringly transform the agonistic human nature. As we have seen, he considers the harsh discipline exercised by a real, institutional “we” (even a despotic one) to be far more effective over the course of history: “We know that Ethics doesn’t fall from the heavens. Its origins are far more modest. It is born from politics as an organizational technique which is always imperfect” (2003, p. 151, our italics). Coinciding with Hegel, Valls constantly accuses the moralists of being utopians, dreamers, abstract... Or “idealists”, in the worst sense of the word37. His basic criticism is that they are not only ineffective and simply boastful, but they often hide their perverse desire to avoid the authentic problem and difficult task at hand. Heavily influenced by Nietzsche, Valls sees there the most common socioethical error of our times and one of the worst inheritances of religion. That is why he says that “moralism impregnates the mixture of beliefs which form the ethical pasta of the world, to use that phrasing. Its origin is clear. (...) The clergy especially seems to enjoy putting others in positions that they can’t reach” (Valls 2003, p. 175s). In the decisive opening of the “Conclusion” of his last book Valls recalls significantly the “Parable of the Grand Inquisitor” that Dostoyevsky included in The Brothers Karamazov. As Valls says in his direct, unmistakable style, “In short, the grand inquisitor says to Jesus, “you act like the good guy, and everyone’s happy with you. I, on the other hand, act like the bad guy and am on everyone’s bad side. Despite that, you don’t do anything and I have to do the work.” and it’s the dirty work, of course. To say it abstractly: morality is clean and politics is dirty. But morality is clean because it only preaches, without ever getting involved while politics is dirty because the human world is dirty.” Ramon Valls’s volleys against moralism were a constant in his classes and his writings. He even included a new type of fallacy which he called the “angelical” fallacy to denounce the “moralist cliche, which as moralist is in-

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37 See the chapter “What is Hegel’s Idealism?” «¿Cuál es el idealismo de Hegel?» a G. Mayos, Hegel.Vida, obra y pensamiento, Planeta DeAgostini, Barcelona, 2007, pp. 80s.

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effective” which “demands that politics convert itself in the arm of morality despite its own interests (Valls 2003, p. 165). Until all humanity is educated and has controlled its agonist tendency, Valls thought necessary (2003, p. 219s) a strong coactive force which imposes peace and the empire of law. So he formulates an imperative, which in many classes and debates created misunderstanding, “It is a moral obligation to take the step from morality to politics to demand the right to do so” (Valls 2003, p. 188).

Against the emotional we Precisely because he linked the dangerous agonist human nature with more animal, irrational and emotional impulses, Valls is strongly opposed to arguments based on feelings or that include emotional aspects. With rational Hegelian coherence he identifies “sentimental” romanticism as another example of moralism, as it limits itself to proclamations of sentimental content without paying attention to concrete mechanisms which could effectively make that content work. Undoubtedly this is what Valls saw implicit in even the most valid versions of religion, nationalism, romantic Marxism like “salt of the earth” or an anarchical liberalism of “people without a State will do it better”. He saw well-intentioned naiveté, “beautiful spirits” putting themselves in a dangerous dead end street, or “angelical” mentalities that try to change the world without knowing it. Coherent with his conception of the agonist human condition, Valls saw emotions and feelings as more of a danger than a solution. He saw more the Sadducean trap which ends up enveloping everything than the intended good impulse which will finally save the world. Therefore he considers the emotional and sentimental attempts to reinforce the “political we” we have described to be dangerous and counterproductive. He believes that they normally strengthen human aggressiveness more than they limit it (which is the prime task of the juridic-state “we”). As we could see in his classes and some conversations, Valls tended to reduce all Romanticism to a sort of sentimentalism, thereby minimizing the romantic bases of German idealism38. He accepted that Romanticism seeks an absolute and it includes a potent ethical “we”, but, he counterattacked, al38 For this reason, as well, Valls reduced postmodernism to a sort of romanticism for spoiled children: “The postmodernist writings give off, in fact, a sort of conceited fatuity, typical of spoiled children (...). Youth who apparently are revolutionaries, but deep down they are yuppies who, possessed by a yearning to break things, take the revelations of their uncentered subjectivity to be brilliant thoughts”.

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ways thought of as natural and too often leaning to solipsisms and individual “genius” and the elevation of grand passions. For Valls, Romanticism doesn’t realize that it wants to construct an absolute or a “we” with the most dangerous part there is in humanity. This leads to its inevitable failure, even more dangerous to the extent that, whether it wants to or not, its efforts attack and destroy rational, juridic, “objective” barriers, which are the only effective ones. They are, in short, the only truly effective “we”.

Basic bibliography of Ramon Valls Plana (1958) Necesidad y contingencia en Avicena y Santo Tomás, tesi de llicenciatura dirigida per Joaquim Carreras Artau, 59 pp. (1964) «La tensión hacia la verdad como justificación intrínseca del ecumenismo», Unitas, 3, revista de la Facultat de Teologia, Sant Cugat del Vallès, pp. 136-147. (1971) Del Yo al Nosotros. Lectura de la fenomenología del espíritu de Hegel, pròleg d’Emilio Lledó, Estela Barcelona (1a ed., 426 pp.), Laia, Barcelona (2a ed. 1979, 426 pp.) i PPU, Barcelona (3a ed. 1994, 446 pp.). (1981a) La dialéctica. Un debate histórico, Montesinos, Barcelona, 156 pp. (1981b) El trabajo como deseo reprimido en Hegel, Universitat de Barcelona, Barcelona, 39 pp. (1982) «El sistema hegelià, ‘ciència’ o tomba de la llibertat?», Enrahonar, 3, pp. 5-11. (1983) «Schelling, libertad y positividad», «Hegel, la necesidad de la libertad» i «Nietzsche, la libertad sin pauta», a J. M. Bermudo (ed.), Los filósofos y sus filosofías, 3 vols., Vicens-Vives, Barcelona, respectivament: vol. 2: pp. 391-433 i 437-463, i vol. 3: pp. 77-106. (1984) conjuntament amb J. M. Bermudo i F. Savater, Progrés i poder, Fundació Caixa de Pensions, Barcelona, 133 pp. (1985) edició de G. W. F. Hegel, Fenomenologia de l’esperit, trad. de Joan Leita, 2 vols., Laia, Barcelona, 407+345 pp. (1989) pròleg a G. Mayos (1989), Entre lògica i empíria, PPU, Barcelona, pp. 9-12. (1993a) Societat civil i Estat a la filosofia del dret de Hegel, Institut Ciències Polítiques i Socials, Barcelona (1a ed., 54 pp.), PPU, Barcelona (2a ed. 1993b, 74 pp.). 106

(1994) «El principi de no-contradicció a Hegel», Anuari de la Societat Catalana de Filosofia, VI, pp. 169-188.

Journal of Catalan Intellectual History. Issues 7&8. 2014. P. 85-107 Ramon Valls (1928-2011). The agonist of «we»

(1995a) «Una vegada més: Què és filosofia?», Anuari de la Societat Catalana de Filosofia, VII, pp. 7-21, lliçó inaugural de la Societat Catalana de Filosofia, curs 1995-1996. (1995b) Conceptes per a una filosofia de l’educació pluralista i pacifista, Universitat de Lleida (Institut de Ciències de l’Educació), Lleida, 54 pp. (1997a) edició, introducció i notes de G. W. F. Hegel, Enciclopedia de las ciencias filosóficas en compendio, para uso de sus clases, Alianza, Madrid, 630 pp. (5a reimpressió, Alianza, Madrid, 2010, 630 pp.). (1997b) «Sociedad civil y Estado en la filosofía del derecho de Hegel», Tópicos. Revista de Filosofía de Santa Fe, V:5, pp. 4-27, i 6, pp. 116-140. (1997c) «La ciutat i la llei», a J. Monserrat & I. Roviró, Col·loquis de Vic (I): La ciutat, Barcelonesa d’Edicions, Barcelona, pp. 141-161. (1998) «Llei i legalitat», a J. Monserrat & I. Roviró, Col·loquis de Vic (II): La llei, Barcelonesa d’Edicions, Barcelona, pp. 9-25. (1999) «Llei i cultura», a J. Monserrat & I. Roviró, Col·loquis de Vic (III): La cultura, Universitat de Barcelona, Barcelona, pp. 9-23. (1999-2000) «El concepto es lo libre (Enciclopedia § 160)», Seminarios de Filosofía, Instituto de Filosofía, Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile, 12-13, pp. 129-145. (2003) Ética para la bioética y a ratos para la política, Gedisa, Barcelona, 224 pp. (2a ed., Gedisa, Barcelona, 2010, 224 pp.). (2005) «El concepto de dignidad humana», Revista de bioética y derecho, 5. (2006) Jaume Balmes predicador de la conciliació, Ajuntament de Vic, Vic, 24 pp. (2011) conjuntament amb Ferran Requejo, La legitimidad en las democracias del siglo XXI. Un giro hegeliano: pluralismo, reconocimiento y acomodación constitucional, Editorial Académica Española, Madrid, 88 pp. Translation from Catalan by Dan Cohen

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memoirs JOURNAL OF CATALAN INTELLECTUAL HISTORY, Issues 7&8, 2014 | Print ISSN 2014-1572 / Online ISSN 2014-1564 P. 109-115 Reception date: 8/11/2013 / Admission date: 12/12/2013 http://revistes.iec.cat/index.php/JOCIH

hree essential (unpublished) letters written by Josep Ferrater Mora to the sociologist Salvador Giner

These three letters, which were written by Josep Ferrater Mora to Salvador Giner and are appearing here in print for the first time, provide crucial information on two points affecting the reach and impact of Ferrater’s writings. The first demonstrates the difficulties he faced in penetrating the Anglo-Saxon book market, even though he had already published a number of volumes in English. The second and third, written shortly before his death, reveal his concern over the widening estrangement, in recent decades, between himself and the publishing house responsible for bringing out the lion’s share of his books. At seventy-eight years of age, Ferrater’s overriding preoccupation was to secure a publisher for his complete works. His correspondent was Salvador Giner, the son of childhood friend Ricard Giner Roque. Together, at the end of the Spanish Civil War, Josep Ferrater and Ricard Giner had crossed the Pyrenees and entered into France. Ferrater’s friendship with the father and later with the son, who became a renowned sociologist, was always extremely cordial. So it is not unusual that Ferrater, in these letters, should roll out an entire arsenal of ironic and witty remarks to which he was so given in the letters that he wrote to his closest friends. Ferrater arrived in the United States toward the end of 1947. By the time of the first letter below, English-language publishers had already printed a number of his books in English: Ortega y Gasset: An Outline of his Philosophy (1957), Man at the Crossroads (1957), Philosophy Today (1960), Unamuno: A Philosophy of Tragedy (1962) and, finally, Being and Death (1965). With the exception of this last volume, all of these books achieved a second edition or reprint. Perhaps the book that found the warmest reception was his overview Philosophy Today, which appeared in English with the subtitle Conflicting Tendencies in Contemporary Thought. The first edition of his Abbreviated Dictionary of Philosophy, compiled by Eduardo García and Ezequiel de Olaso, came out in 1970. If his high-level

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introduction to contemporary philosophy was a success in the Anglo-Saxon book market, why not come out with a new compilation of his hefty Dictionary of Philosophy? The last two letters — in reality, faxes — show a Ferrater Mora who is disenchanted and anxious about the uncertain publishing outlook that affected his literary output in Spanish nine years later. In 1989 and 1990, the edition of his new books in Spanish ran into delays that put their appearance in jeopardy. Ferrater always had a commercial view of literature. He thought that books needed to be sellable and that authors should have a constant presence in bookshops. Accustomed to making the presses roll each year — often several times a year — he was alarmed by the sudden disinterest of his publishers. And his alarm, which was motivated by this specific problem at first, led to a growing unease over the cloudy prospects of his literary posterity. Xavier Serra Letter 1 12 February 1981 Dear Salvador: I hope you can come one weekend in March (either the 14th or more likely the 21st); it would be a shame if you returned to England before we had the chance to get together at least once more1. Enough said. Don’t be too concerned about Martin’s decision, at Blackwell’s2; like you, I imagine that the analytical philosophers who provided the information are ingrates, that is to say, people who don’t even take into account the author’s sympathy for their chosen way of doing philosophy. As far as the dictionary being mutilated from head to toe, though, things are never as radical as that3. Priscilla and I are hugely grateful for what you have done to push the work, condensed though it is, through the cracks in the wall of Anglo-Saxon philosophy4.

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1 Salvador Giner took a year’s sabbatical at Yale and had to return to the University of Lancaster (UK) at the start of the new academic year. Josep Ferrater Mora encourages him to visit his family before setting off. Since 1949, Ferrater had been living in Bryn Mawr, Pennsylvania (US). 2 David Martin, Managing Director of Blackwell UK, the Oxford-based publishers. 3 That is, mutilated in translation. Blackwell’s dismissed the idea of publishing a shortened version of Ferrater’s dictionary of philosophy in English. 4 The initiative to publish this condensed version of the dictionary — compiled by Priscilla Cohn — and the contacts with the British publishing house had been in the hands of Salvador Giner.

Journal of Catalan Intellectual History. Issues 7&8. 2014. P. 109-115 Three essential (unpublished) letters written by Josep Ferrater Mora to the sociologist Salvador Giner

As I told you, I very much liked your paper on the social aspects of freedom5. I regard your ideas as a good way to fill in the many gaps left by my ideas in De la matèria a la raó [From Matter to Reason] — a work that, being my most recent, I don’t yet find wholly deserving of contempt6. With fond memories and a warm embrace, [Signature] Letter 2 J. Ferrater Mora 1518 Willowbrook Lane, Villanova, PA, 19085 2 June 1990 Sr. Salvador Giner Fax 011-3-4-1-521.8103 Dear Salvador, I should like to put on record that this isn’t a question of you scratch my back and I’ll scratch yours, but our recent faxes brought the following to mind. I have a book of essays entitled Mariposas y supercuerdas [Butterflies and Superstrings] that my literary agent, Mercedes Casanovas [C/] Teodora Lamadrid, 29, 08029 Barcelona, telephone 212.4791, fax 417.9037, sent some time ago to Alianza Editorial with the idea that they would publish it, as had been their custom in the past7. Well, these “Alliance people”, which as you know 5 Salvador Giner, “La estructura social de la libertad”, Reis: revista española de investigaciones sociológicas, 11 (1980), pp. 7-28. This was the second version of his essay on the social structure of freedom entitled L’estructura social de la llibertat, Edicions 62, Barcelona, 1971. 6 De la materia a la razón [From Matter to Reason], Alianza, Madrid, 1979. 7 Between 1939 and 1954, Ferrater published all of his books through South American publishers: Losada and Sudamericana (Argentina), Cruz del Sur (Chile), Atlante and Fondo de Cultura Económica (Mexico). In 1955, it once again became possible to publish his books in Spain (lest we forget: he was a Republican exile and the Franco dictatorship still imposed strict censorship). In that year appeared Cuestiones disputadas [Disputed Questions], published by Revista de Occidente, of Madrid, and a second version of Les formes de la vida catalana [The Forms of Catalan Life], published by Selecta, of Barcelona. The growing replacement of established publishers in South America by publishers in Madrid or Barcelona became apparent soon afterwards. The Spanish version of his book on Ortega — Ortega y Gasset: etapas de una filosofía [Ortega y Gasset: An Outline of his Philosophy] — was brought out in 1958 by Seix Barral, of Barcelona. In general, however, Ferrater preferred Madrid publishing houses for his books written in Spanish, namely, Aguilar, Revista de Occidente and Alianza. This trend reached its high point when he shifted his hefty Dictionary of Philosophy from Editorial Sudamericana, of Buenos Aires — which had published the third, fourth and fifth editions — to Alianza in Madrid. Indeed, after Revista de Occidente published two volumes of his Selected Works (1967), Alianza became Ferrater’s sole publisher. Alianza brought out La filosofía actual [Philosophy Today] (1969), Indagaciones sobre el lenguaje [Inquiries

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aren’t the same as before, wanted so much begging and pleading and even then, in the end, I don’t think they’re going to publish it8. It’s the first time this has ever happened to me, but it appears that as I approach eighty, nobody is interested in what I have to say any longer9. Do you think the book could come out as part of the Espasa-Mañana collection that you are overseeing? Send me word by fax; if there’s a chance, let’s talk more about it; otherwise, that’s the end of it. Incidentally, what I said about being almost eighty is truer than you might think. For nearly nine months, this same literary agent (I’ve started to wonder whether she isn’t rather a “patient”) has had a print-out of my novel La señorita Goldie, which is a sequel to El juego de la verdad10. What is happening? I don’t know. Some days ago, I sent her a print-out of a book of “feminist” stories entitled Mujeres al borde de la leyenda, which should have been a phenomenal success, but I may well die without seeing the work in print11. Short of taking action with said agent (for the time being), what do you think I can do? Do you have any publishing suggestions? It would be paradoxical to have to “suggest” anything to said patient/agent, but I’m starting to grow impatient and any information would be helpful. A few days ago, I received a letter from a gentleman in Madrid (I can’t recall his name and I threw the letter in the bin), asking for a recommendation on behalf of Emilio Lledó for the Menéndez Pidal Prize. As you can see,

11 112

into Language] (1970), Cambio de marcha en filosofía [Shifting Gear in Philosophy] (1974), De la materia a la razón [From Matter to Reason] and the sixth edition of the Dictionary of Philosophy in four volumes (1979), a book written jointly with Priscilla Cohn entitled Ética aplicada [Applied Ethics] (1981), the novel Claudia, mi Claudia (1982), the stories in Voltaire en Nova York [Voltaire in New York] (1985) and lastly, Hecho en Corona [Made in Corona] (1986), his second novel. In the end they did not publish it. Mariposas y supercuerdas [Butterflies and Superstrings] was published posthumously in 1994 by Península, of Barcelona. The incident recounted in this letter to Salvador Giner was the decisive moment in Ferrater’s falling out with the firm that had served as his chief publisher up to that time. Ferrater, who had been born on 30 October 1912, was then just over 77 years of age. He had already given up his efforts to gain a secure place in the Anglo-Saxon book market and was visibly growing more apprehensive, as we can see, about his position in the Spanish book market. Disillusioned by Alianza, Ferrater started looking for publishing outlets in Barcelona, for his books in Spanish as well. His novel El juego de la verdad [The Game of Truth] had been a 1987 finalist for the Nadal Prize, awarded by Destino. In the end, La señorita Goldie was published by Seix Barral. Now, though, he had no more time to consolidate anything durable and lasting from a publishing viewpoint. Ferrater died on 31 January 1991 in Barcelona, where he had travelled for the launch of his last novel. The estrangement from Alianza was made even more visible in 1994, when Ariel took charge of the seventh edition of the Dictionary. In effect, the book was published posthumously: Mujeres al borde de la leyenda [Women on the Verge of Legend], Círculo de Lectores, Barcelona, 1991.

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things are afoot. I hope that, in the end, the prize goes to you, unless a recommendation from me proves to be the kiss of death. Anything is possible12. With a warm embrace, [Signature] Letter 3 J. Ferrater Mora 1518 Willowbrook Lane, Villanova, PA, 19085 12 December 1990 Sr. D. Salvador Giner Instituto de Estudios Sociales13 Madrid. Fax 521.8103 Dear Salvador: A neighbour has notified me of a letter in my mailbox (“Mr. Mora, you have a letter in your mailbox; is your fax out of order?”). I was well and truly shamefaced. I haven’t dared give anything to the postman and I send you this fax covertly. I hope you receive it when you pass through Madrid. If I don’t hear from you within five or six days, I will have no choice but to face my neighbour’s wit again. What you said about Orquín and Espasa14 makes me as happy as a little bird (a rough approximation of the phrase Ortega y Gasset used at the constituent parliament when he said to Lluís Companys: “What Señor Companys has said makes me as happy as a birdie). I say a prayer to all the gods spoken of by Dumézil15 (an octogenarian) that these good intentions may be 12 His confidence in Spanish academe was as low as the confidence he began to have in the publishing firms of Madrid. National prizes in research, to which Ferrater is referring, had been set up in 1982 by the Spanish Ministry of Education and Science, through the Santiago Ramón y Cajal National Prize in Research for scientific investigation. Added to this, in the following year, came the biannual Ramón Menéndez Pidal National Prize in Research for investigation in the humanities and social sciences, the Leonardo Torres Quevedo National Prize for technical research, and the King Juan Carlos I National Prize for young researchers. Nonetheless, no call for prizes was made in 1991 or in 1993, with the result that all of this back-and-forth came to nought. 13 Salvador Giner was director of the Institute for Advanced Social Studies (of the Spanish National Research Council) from 1989 to 1997. 14 Felicidad Orquín was a literary director at the publishing house Espasa Calpe of Madrid, where she was in charge of the essay collection “Espasa Mañana”. 15 Dumézil was a French philosopher who wrote controversial studies on Indo-European religions.

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fulfilled. You should really call Mercedes Casanovas16, the wife of your former student Enrique Lynch (office phone: 212-4791) because I went with her to speak with the Editor-in-Chief of the University of Barcelona press17, who also took an interest in publishing my soi-disant complete works (I say soi-disant because they will always be less complete than those of Julián Marías18 — and let us say nothing of Camilo J. Cela, who in his articles calls himself, guess what? “The prizewinner!”) To facilitate matters, I have come up with a new modular scheme: according to this incredibly modern scheme, I don’t put much stock in chronological order, I “organise” my work in three sections (or “modules”): articles and essays; philosophy; narrative20. In any event, it would be good if none of these go unpublished! I look forward to hearing more from you!21 Thank you! In a lengthy phone conversation, Esperanza Guisán communicated to me that she had been fairly under the weather over the past three years (sorry: months). Cataracts and other complications. I have to see her this coming May when I’m off to Santiago de Compostela to do some promotion for integrationist philosophy22, but I hope that the planned Festschrift starts shuffling forward before then23, like the doves of Paul Valéry in the translation by Xavier Benguerel: “These quiet rooftops where the doves are shuffling”24.

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16 Ferrater’s literary agent, already mentioned in the previous letter. 17 Joan Duran Fontanals, who held the post until 2010. 18 This philosopher, like Ferrater, had published nearly all of his books at Alianza since the founding of the firm in 1966. The ten volumes of Julián Marías’s Complete Works began to appear in 1958 through Revista de Occidente. The tenth volume came out in 1982 under the Alianza imprint. 19 Camilo José Cela had won the Nobel Prize in Literature in 1989. 20 In reality, it was impossible to apply a chronological order, because Ferrater was constantly revising his essays. 21 The publishing solution that Ferrater thought he had found after breaking with Alianza, therefore, was to publish his complete works through Espasa Calpe or the University of Barcelona press. In the end, however, nothing was ever published. 22 Esperanza Guisán was professor of ethics at the University of Santiago de Compostela. Ferrater had served as her doctoral thesis advisor. The “promotion for integrationist philosophy” alluded to here is, in reality, a self-deprecating way to put the matter: Ferrater had to travel Santiago de Compostela because the university there had decided to present him with an honorary doctorate. He did not make the journey, however, because his death occurred a few months beforehand. 23 The Festschrift went ahead and was published as the first monographic issue of the journal Τέλος: Salvador Giner & Esperanza Guisán (eds.), José Ferrater Mora: El hombre y su obra [Josep Ferrater Mora, The Man and His Work], 1994. 24 Ferrater met Xavier Benguerel, a writer who translated a number of Valéry’s poems into Catalan, in Chile in 1941, when both were exiles there. Benguerel’s translation of the opening line from ‘Le Cimetiere marin’, to which Ferrater is referring, is: Aquests terrats on els coloms fan via.

Journal of Catalan Intellectual History. Issues 7&8. 2014. P. 109-115 Three essential (unpublished) letters written by Josep Ferrater Mora to the sociologist Salvador Giner

I think I told you that I would return to Barcelona for the week of 26 January to 3 February to talk up and shake up my novel La señorita Goldie (poor thing!)25. I hope that we may see each other; on those days don’t go off to Cambodia or Kuwait. I’m glad to hear that your interview with Isaiah Berlin went swimmingly. We’d like to read it, don’t forget26.

Yes, I had dinner with Victòria, Sir Paco Rico’s partner. I behaved with all the desired humility27.

Thanks again! And give my regards to Monserrat and the children (I received a very kind, beautifully written letter from Ricard Giner i Sariola: he’s quite the gentleman). See you soon! [Signature] Translation from Catalan by Joel Graham

25 See footnote 10. 26 Salvador Giner, “Isaiah Berlin: Conversación con Salvador Giner”, Claves de la razón pràctica, 22 (May 1992), pp. 44-47. 27 Victòria Camps, then Vice-Rector of the Autonomous University of Barcelona, was a professor of Moral and Political Philosophy, and Francisco Rico was a professor of philology at the same university and also became a member of the Real Academia Española de la Lengua in 1987.

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life-writting JOURNAL OF CATALAN INTELLECTUAL HISTORY, Issues 7&8, 2014 | Print ISSN 2014-1572 / Online ISSN 2014-1564 DOI: 10.2436/20.3001.02.91 | P. 117-158 Reception date: 8/10/2013 / Admission date: 12/12/2013 http://revistes.iec.cat/index.php/JOCIH

osep Ferrater Mora (1912-1991) Josep-Maria Terricabras Director Càtedra Ferrater Mora Universitat de Girona josepm.terricabras@udg.edu

Damià Bardera Becari de la Càtedra Ferrater Mora damia.bardera@udg.edu

Josep Ferrater Mora was born in Barcelona on 30th October, 1912. After studying Philosophy at the University of Barcelona, the defeat in the Spanish civil war brought him first to Paris, then to Cuba and Santiago de Chile. From 1949 onwards, he settled for good in the United States where he carried out a long task as a university teacher and researcher at Bryn Mawr College until his retirement, as professor emeritus, in 1981. He was a visiting professor at many American and European universities, and he was appointed Doctor Honoris Causa by several of those institutions. He is author of the famous Diccionario de filosofía, among many other philosophical works, noteworthy El ser y la muerte, Fundamentos de Filosofía, Cambio de marcha en filosofia and De la materia a la razón. He wrote also several novels. Ferrater Mora is considered to be the most internationally acknowledged Catalan philosopher in the XXth Century. In the course of a visit to Barcelona for the presentation of his last novel, Ferrater died of a heart attack on 30th January 1991. Bibliography I. Books (B) II. Articles (P) III. Reviews IV. Newspaper articles V. Translations (T) VI. Bibliography Ferrater Mora Internal references are B (books), P (items) and T (translations) indicating the number.

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Journal of Catalan Intellectual History. Issues 7&8. 2014. P. 117-158 JOSEP-MARIA TERRICABRAS & DAMIÀ BARDERA

Bibliography I. Books (B) 1935 1.

1. 2.

Cóctel de verdad, Literatura, Madrid. See P1, P2, P3, P4, P5, P6, P7, P8, P9. 1941 Diccionario de filosofía, Atlante, Mèxic. Superseded by B4. 1942

España y Europa, Cruz del Sur, Santiago de Chile. See P162. 1944

Diccionario de filosofía, Atlante, Mèxic, 2a ed. Superseded B2, and superseded by B14.

Les formes de la vida catalana, Agrupació Patriòtica Catalana, Santiago de Chile. See B6.

Las formas de la vida catalana, Agrupació Patriòtica Catalana, Santiago de Chile. Spanish version of B5. Superseded by B37.

Unamuno: bosquejo de una filosofía, Losada, Buenos Aires. Superseded P15, and P19, and superseded by B23. 1945

Cuatro visiones de la historia universal, Losada, Buenos Aires. Superseded P24, P25, and P29, and superseded by B16.

Cuestiones españolas, Colegio de México, Mèxic. See P170. Superseded P26, P45.

10. Variaciones sobre el espíritu, Sudamericana, Buenos Aires. See P22A, P27, P28, P30, P32. 1946 11. La ironía, la muerte y la admiración, Cruz del Sur, Santiago de Chile. See P16, P17, P44. 1947 118

12. El sentido de la muerte, Sudamericana, Buenos Aires. See P66. Superseded P46, and superseded by B33.

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1948 13. (A) El Llibre del sentit, Pi de les Tres Branques, Santiago de Chile. See B18, and P31, P48, P49, P68A, P71. 1949 13. (B) Helenismo y cristianismo, Universidad de Chile, Santiago de Chile. See P79. Superseded by B15. 1951 14. Diccionario de filosofía, Sudamericana, Buenos Aires, 3a ed. See P70A, P80, P81, P83, P84, P85, P88. Superseded B4, and superseded by B24. 1952 15. El hombre en la encrucijada, Sudamericana, Buenos Aires. See B21, and P67, P77, P91, P121, P141. Susbstitueix B13B, and superseded by B41. 1955 16. Cuatro visiones de la historia universal, Sudamericana, Buenos Aires, 2a ed. (reprinted 1958). Superseded B8, and superseded by B42. 17. Cuestiones disputadas: ensayos de filosofía, Revista de Occidente, Madrid. See P16, P44, P55, P86, P94, P95, P98, P104, P108, P109, P110. 18. Les formes de la vida catalana, Selecta, Barcelona, 2a ed. Included El Llibre del sentit, 2a ed. See B13A, and P71, P114B, P115A, P115B. Superseded by B28. 19. Lógica matemática, coauthored by Hugues Leblanc, Fondo de Cultura Económica, Mèxic. Superseded by B32. 1956 20. Ortega y Gasset: An outline of his philosophy, Bowes, London, and Yale University, New Haven, 1957. See B25, B26. Superseded by B36. 1957 21. Man at the crossroads, tr. from Spanish by Willard R. Trask, Beacon, Boston, reprinted, Greenwood, Nova York, 1968. Revised English version of B15. 22. Qué es la lógica, Columba, Buenos Aires (reprinted 1960, 1965). 23. Unamuno: bosquejo de una filosofía, Sudamericana, Buenos Aires, 2a ed. See B34. Superseded B7, and P122, P123, and superseded by B42. 119

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1958 24. Diccionario de filosofía, Sudamericana, Buenos Aires, 4a ed. Superseded B14, and superseded by B39. 25. La filosofía de Ortega y Gasset, tr. from English by María Raquel Bengolea, Sur, Buenos Aires. Spanish version of B20. Superseded by B26. 26. Ortega y Gasset: etapas de una filosofía, Seix Barral, Barcelona. Versió espanyola revisada de B20. Superseded B25, and P112, P116, P117, P118, P119, and superseded by B42. 1959 27. La filosofía en el mundo de hoy, Revista de Occidente, Madrid. See B29, B31. Superseded P129, P131, P135, and superseded by B35. 1960 28. Les formes de la vida catalana, Selecta, Barcelona, 3a ed. See P146. Superseded B18, superseded by B61. See P70(B). 29. Philosophy today: Conflicting tendencies in contemporary thought, Columbia University, Nova York (reprinted 1962). English version of B27. See B31. 1961 30. Una mica de tot, Moll, Palma. See P59, P64, P72, P73, P79, P87. 1962 31. Inleiding tot de moderne filosofie, tr. from English by Th. van den Berg, Prisma, Utrecht-Antwerpen. Dutch version ofB29. See B27. 32. Lógica matemática, coauthored by Hughes Leblanc, Fondo de Cultura Económica, Mèxic, 2a ed. (reprinted 1965, 1967, 1970, 1971). Superseded B19. 33. El ser y la muerte: bosquejo de filosofía integracionista, Aguilar, Madrid. See B38, and P199. Superseded B12, and P134, and superseded by B42. 34. Unamuno: A philosophy of tragedy, tr. from Spanish by Philip Silver, University of California, Berkeley. English version of B23. Superseded P153. 1963 35. La filosofía en el mundo de hoy, Revista de Occidente, Madrid, 2a ed. See B40. Superseded B27, and superseded by B42. 120

36. Ortega y Gasset: An outline of his philosophy, Yale University, New Haven, 2 ed. Superseded B20, and P138.

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37. Tres mundos: Cataluña, España, Europa, Edhasa, Barcelona-Buenos Aires; included Las formas de la vida catalana, 2a ed. See P140, P148, P162, P170, P172. Superseded B6, and superseded by B42. 1965 38. Being and death: An outline of integrationist philosophy, University of California, Berkeley. Revised English version of B33. Superseded P150. 39. Diccionario de filosofía, Sudamericana, Buenos Aires, 5a ed., 2 v. (reprinted 1969, 1974, 1975). See B45, B56, and P184. Superseded B24, and superseded by B58. 40. La filosofia en el món d’avui, Ed. 62, Barcelona. Catalan version of B35. Superseded P143. 41. El Hombre en la encrucijada, Sudamericana, Buenos Aires, 2a ed. (reprinted in B42, and B51). Superseded B15. 1967 42. Obras selectas, Revista de Occidente, Madrid, 2 v. Included Unamuno: bosquejo de una filosofía, 3a ed., Ortega y Gasset: etapas de una filosofía, 2a ed., Tres mundos: Cataluña, España, Europa, 2a ed., Cuatro visiones de la historia universal, 3a ed., El Hombre en la encrucijada, 2a ed. reprinted, La filosofía en el mundo de hoy, 3a ed., El ser y la muerte: bosquejo de filosofía integracionista, 2a ed. See B41, B44, B51, B53, B59 and P1, P5, P127, P140, P148, P162, P170, P172, P183, P27, P30, P86, P94, P104, P108, P109, P110, P144, P156, P164, P168, P169, P177, P178, P182, P187. Superseded B23, B26, B37, B16, B35, B33. 43. El ser y el sentido, Revista de Occidente, Madrid. See P228. Superseded P178, P185, P186, P187, P194, P195, P196. 1969 44. La filosofía actual, Alianza, Madrid. Revised version of La filosofía en el mundo de hoy, 3a ed., in B46. Superseded by B46. 1970 45. Diccionario de filosofía abreviado, ed. Eduardo García Belsunce and Ezequiel de Olaso, Sudamericana, Buenos Aires (reprinted, Edhasa-Sudamericana, Barcelona, 1976, 1978). Abridged reprint of B39. See B56. 46. La Filosofía actual, Alianza, Madrid, 2a ed. See P215. Superseded B44, and superseded by B52. 47. Indagaciones sobre el lenguaje, Alianza, Madrid. Superseded P198, P202, and superseded by B62. 48. Els mots and els homes, Ed. 62, Barcelona. See B50, and P179, P208, P209, P212, P213.

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1971 49. El hombre y su medio y otros ensayos, Siglo Veintiuno, Madrid. See NA1-38 (with some variations in order and in individuals titles). 50. Las palabras y los hombres, Ed. 62, Barcelona. Enlerged Spanish version of B48. See P189, P200, P201, P208, P212, P216, P218, P219. 1972 51. Las crisis humanas, Salvat, n.p. revised but abridged version of B41, reprinted a B42. 1973 52. La filosofía actual, Alianza, Madrid, 3a ed. See P222. Superseded B46. 53. Ortega y Gasset: etapas de una filosofía, Seix Barral, Barcelona, 3a ed. Superseded the ed. in B42. 1974 54. Cambio de marcha en filosofía, Alianza, Madrid. See P226. Superseded P217. 55. Cine sin filosofías, Esti-Arte, Madrid. 1977 56. Dicciónario de filosofía, tr. from Spanish by António José Massano and Manuel J. Palmeirim, Dom Quixote, Lisboa. Portuguese version of B45. 1979 57. De la materia a la razón, Alianza, Madrid. 58. Diccionario de filosofía, Alianza, Madrid, 6a ed., 4 v. (reprinted, correcció, 1980). Superseded B39. 59. El ser y la muerte: bosquejo de filosofía integracionista, Planeta, Barcelona, 3a ed. Superseded B33, B42. 60. Siete relatos capitales, Planeta, Barcelona. 1980 61. Les formes de la vida catalana, and inltres assaigs, Ed. 62, Barcelona. Superseded B28. See P231. 62. Indagaciones sobre el lenguaje, Alianza, Madrid, 2a ed. Superseded B47. 122

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1981 63. Ética aplicada. Del aborto a la violencia, coauthored by Priscilla Cohn, Alianza, Madrid. 64. Quattro visioni della storia universale, tr. from Spanish by W. Cariddi, Milella, Bari. Italian version of B8. 65. Cambio de marcha en filosofía, Alianza, Madrid. Superseded B54. 1982 66. Claudia, mi Claudia, Alianza, Madrid. 67. A filosofia analitica: mudança de sentido em filosofia, tr. from Spanish by Fernando Leorne, Res, Porto. Portuguese version of B54. 68. La filosofía actual, Alianza, Madrid. Enlarged version of B52. 69. Cuatro visiones de la historia universal: San Agustín, Vico, Voltaire, Hegel, Alianza, Madrid. Superseded B16 and the edition in B42. Superseded by B74. 1983 70. El mundo del escritor, Crítica, Barcelona. 71. De la materia a la razón, Alianza, Madrid. See B79. Superseded B57 with new preface. 72. Las crisis humanas, Alianza, Madrid. Revised version of B51. 73. Diccionario de filosofía de bolsillo, ed. P. Cohn, Alianza, Madrid, 2v. (reprinted 1983, 1985, 1987, 1989, 1990, 1991, 1992, 1993, 1994, 1995, 1997, 1999). Editied and inbridger version of B58 by Priscilla Cohn. 1984 74. Cuatro visiones de la historia universal: San Agustín,Vico,Voltaire, Hegel, edició revisada, Alianza, Madrid. Superseded B69. Superseded by B104. 1985 75. Unamuno: bosquejo de una filosofía, Alianza, Madrid. Enlarged version of l’edició a B42. See B34. 76. Modos de hacer filosofia, Crítica, Barcelona. 77. Voltaire en Nueva York, Alianza, Madrid. 78. Fundamentos de filosofía, Alianza, Madrid. 79. Dalla materia alla ragione, tr. from Spanish by W. Cariddi, Millella, Bari. Italian version of B71. 80. Las crisis humanas, Salvat, Barcelona. Superseded B72.

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1986 81. Hecho en Corona, Alianza, Madrid. 82. Ventana al mundo, Crítica, Barcelona. 83. Diccionario de grandes filósofos, Alianza, Madrid, 2v. (reprinted 1997). 84. El ser y la muerte: bosquejo de filosofía integracionista, Planeta-De Agostini, Barcelona. Superseded B59. Superseded by B86. 1988 85. El juego de la verdad, Destino, Barcelona, reprinted 1995. 86. El ser y la muerte: bosquejo de filosofía integracionista, new edition, Alianza, Madrid. See B38. Superseded B84. 87. Ética aplicada: del aborto a la violencia, coauthored by Priscilla Cohn, Alianza, Madrid (reprinted 1991, 1992, 1994, 1996). Enlarged version of B63. 88. Joc de cartes 1948-1984 (letters to/from Joan Oliver), ed. Antoni Turull, Ed. 62, Barcelona. 1989 89. Regreso del infierno, Anthropos, Barcelona. 1991 90. La señorita Goldie, Seix Barral, Barcelona. 91. Mujeres al borde de la leyenda, Círculo de Lectores, Barcelona. 92. Las palabras y los hombres, Península, Barcelona. Enlarged version of B50. 1994 93. Mariposas y supercuerdas: diccionario para nuestro tiempo, Península, Barcelona. 94. Diccionario de filosofía, revised by Josep-Maria Terricabras, Ariel, Barcelona, 4v. 1995 95. El seny, Ed. 62, Barcelona. 1998 96. De la materia a la razón, Alianza, Madrid. Superseded B71. See B79. 97. La filosofía actual, Alianza, Madrid. Superseded B68. 124

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1999 98. Diccionario de Filosofía de bolsillo, 1, Alianza, Madrid. Versió reduïda de B94. 99. Diccionario de Filosofía de bolsillo, 2, Alianza, Madrid. Versió reduïda de B94. 2002 100. Diccionario de grandes filósofos, 1, Alianza, Madrid. See B94. 101. Diccionario de grandes filósofos, 2, Alianza, Madrid. See B94. 2003 102. Three Spanish Philosophers: Unamuno, Ortega, and Ferrater Mora, edition and introduction by Josep-Maria Terricabras, State University of New York Press, Albany, pp. 209-262. Fragment of B86. 2005 103. Variaciones de un filósofo: antología / José Ferrater Mora, selection, introduction study and edition of Jordi Gracia, Ediciós do Castro, la Corunya. See P1, P30, P27, P68B, P72, P87, P115A, P86, P123, B94, P140, P155, P205, B2, B4, B14, B24, B39, B45, B56. 2006 104. Cuatro visiones de la historia universal: San Agustín, Vico, Voltaire, Hegel, Alianza, Madrid. Superseded B74. 2007 105. Razón y verdad; y otros ensayos / José Ferrater Mora, edition and prologue Amauri F. Gutiérrez Coto, Espuela de Plata, Sevilla. See P18, P78, P74, P118, P122, P19, P92, P13, P14, P12, P77. 2012 106. Les formes de la vida catalana, and inltres assaigs, Edicions 62, Barcelona. Preface by Salvador Giner. Superseded B61.

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II. Articles (P) 1934 1.

2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9.

«Visita a Hegel», Literatura, 1:5-6 (tardor), pp. 190-196. Collected in B1, pp. 132147, and revised in B42, v. 1, pp. 23-28. 1935 «Aforismos filosóficos en ritmos de 1920», in B1, pp. 101-110. «Breve disquisición sobre mi mismo», in B1, pp. 55-66. «Carta a Laura, la Roja», in B1, pp. 148-161. «Esquemas sobre el cine», Hoja literaria, 2 (november) and 3 (december), Barcelona. Collected in B1, pp. 163-184, and revised in B42, v. 1, pp. 29-34. See P64. «Filósofos de hoy, en España», in B1, pp. 67-83. «Filósofos de hoy, en Europa», inB1, pp. 85-100. «Nuevas glosas antiguas», in B1, pp. 11-54. «Profundidad y superficie de Brigitte Helm», a B1, pp. 113-131.

1936 10. «Filología», Hoja literaria, 4 (february), pp. 2 and 4, and 5 (march), Barcelona. 1939 11. «Nota sobre Sigmund Freud», Escuela activa, v. 2, pp. 5-14. 1940 12. «Alemania o la hostilidad», Nuestra España, 9 (june), pp. 19-37. 13. «Individualismo y colectivismo», Revista bimestre cubana, 46:1 (july-august), pp. 5-23. 14. «Inglaterra o la habilidad», Nuestra España, 12 (september), pp. 37-53. 15. «Miguel de Unamuno: bosquejo de una filosofía», Sur, 69 (june), pp. 29-45. Superseded by B7. 1941 16. «Elogio de la santa admiración», Atenea, 64:192 (june), pp. 288-302. Collected in B11, pp. 91-108, and revised under the title «La admiración», a B17, pp. 103-109. 17. «Muerte e inmortalidad», Sur, 80 (may), pp. 7-29. Collected in B11, pp. 55-90. Superseded by B12. 126

18. «Razón y verdad», Espuela de plata (august), pp. 10-12. Superseded by P33.

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19. «Unamuno: voz y obra literaria», Revista cubana, 15 (january-june), pp. 137-159. Superseded by B7. 1942 20. «Confesión filosófica [de Enrique Molina]», Atenea, 67:199 (january), pp. 87-90. 21. «Nota sobre la caricatura», Atenea, 69:205 (july), pp. 79-89. 1943 22. (A) «Filosofía y poesía en el Canto espiritual de Maragall», Sur, 100 (january), pp. 26-40. Colected, under the title «De la unidad última de la filosofía y la poesía», in B10, pp. 121-152. See P68A. 22. (B) «[Introducción]», and «Advertencia», a T4, pp. 9-11, and 237- 240. 23. «Sobre un libro de filosofia[: Idea de la individualidad de Jorge Millas]», Atenea, 72:215 (may), pp. 202-206. 24. «Vico y la historia renaciente», Cuadernos americanos, 2:5 (september-october, volum 11), pp. 165-180. Superseded by B8. 25. «Voltaire y la razón en la historia», Sur, 104 (may-june), pp. 7-23. Superseded by B8. 1944 26. «Algunas cuestiones españolas», Cuadernos americanos, 3:6 (november-december, volum 18), pp. 62-77. Superseded by B9. 27. «De la contención literaria», Hijo pródigo, 6:21 (december), pp. 161-164. Collected in B10, pp. 103-120, and revised in B42, v. 2, pp. 175-177. 28. «Del intelectual y de su relación con el político», Cuadernos americanos, 3:5 (september-october, volum 17), pp. 84-96. Collected in B10, pp. 13-43. 29. «Hegel o la visión absoluta», Sur, 116 (june), pp. 70-83. Superseded by B8. 30. «Nietzsche y el problema de la expresión filosófica», Sur, 121 (november), pp. 10-22; reprinted Revista de Occidente, 2a època, 42:125-126 (august-september 1973), pp. 358-368. Collected under the title «De la expresión filosófica», in B10, pp. 71-101, and revised in B42, v. 2, pp. 178-184. 1945 31. «El Comte Arnau: sentit d’una llegenda», Germanor, 491 (january), pp. 13-15, 492 (february), pp. 15-16, and 493 (march), pp. 17-20. Collected in B13A, pp. 11-37, in B18, pp. 139-166, and in B28, pp. 131-151. 32. «De la probable condición del espíritu», in B10, pp. 45-70.

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33. «Filosofía y cristianismo», Verano, 1, pp. 49-55. Superseded P18. 34. «Introducció al món futur, I: petita digressió inicial», Germanor, 491 (january), pp. 21-22. 35. «Introducció al món futur, II: El que podia passar; Una nova manera de profecia; Mirada a l’època moderna», Germanor, 494 (april), pp. 21-23. 36. «Introducció al món futur, III: La paradoxa alemanya: El nazisme, monstre bicèfal; Destí d’una nació», Germanor, 495 (may), pp. 14-16. 37. «Introducció al món futur, IV: Realitat and creença; Es demana perdó al lector, El problema de l’època moderna», Germanor, 496 (june), pp. 17-19. 38. «Introducció al món futur, V: Una cita de Comte; Es retarda la profecia», Germanor, 497 (july), pp. 17-19. 39. «Introducció al món futur, VI: La ‘crisi de les personalitats’», Germanor, 498 (august), pp. 13-15. 40. «Introducció al món futur, VII: La ‘crisi de les grans batalles d’idees’», Germanor, 499 (september), pp. 15-17. 41. «Introducció al món futur,VIII: Comença la ‘crisi de la burgesia’», Germanor, 500 (october), pp. 17-19. 42. «Introducció al món futur, IX: Burgesia and ideologia», Germanor, 501 (november), pp. 19-21. 43. «Introducció al món futur, X: Resum final de l’època moderna», Germanor, 502 (december), pp. 24-26. 44. «La Ironía», Sur, 134 (december), pp. 30-57. Collected in B11, pp. 11-53, and revised in B17, pp. 27-42. 45. «Primera introducción al mundo hispánico», Revista de las Indias, 23:74 (february), pp. 181-193. Superseded by B9. 46. «Primeras consideraciones sobre el problema de la muerte», Sur, 127 (may), pp. 27-46. Superseded by B12. 47. «Seminario de filosofía», Vértice, 3, Buenos Aires, pp. 32-34. 1946 48. «El 14 d’april del 1931: Sentit d’una efemèrides», Germanor, 507 (may), pp. 15-22; collected under the title «El 14 d’april: sentit d’una efemèrides», B13A, pp. 91-108. 49. «Eugeni d’Ors o esquema d’una filosofia», Germanor, 503 (january), pp. 24-27, and 504 (february), pp. 24-27; collected under the title«Eugeni d’Ors: sentit d’una filosofia», a B13A, pp. 71-89, in B18, pp. 195-209, and in B28, pp. 175185. See P127. 50. «Filosofía de la filosofía», Conferencia, 4 (november-december), pp. 15-20. 128

51. «Introducció al món futur, XI: Fatalitat and llibertat; Recomença la profecia;Vers una nova aristocràcia», Germanor, 505 (march), pp. 25-27.

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52. «Introducció al món futur, XII: Unificació, tècnica and ruïnes», Germanor, 508509 (june-july), pp. 24-26. 53. «Introducció al món futur, XIII-XIV: digressió sobre les grans potències», Germanor, 510-511 (august-september), pp. 25-27, and 512 (october), pp. 24-26. See P60. 54. «Introducció al món futur, XV: La tècnica, and Digressió final», Germanor, 513 (november), pp. 31-34. 55. «Introducción a Bergson», a Henri Bergson. Las dos fuentes de la moral y de la religión, tr. Miguel González Fernández, Sudamericana, Buenos Aires, pp. 7-60 (printed also as a pamphlet, and reprinted 1962, pp. 7-48). Revised version collected in B17, pp. 113-150. 56. «Joaquim Xirau», Germanor, 507 (may), pp. 36-38. See P57. 57. «Joaquín Xirau», Cursos y conferencias, 29:171 (june), pp. 173-175. Spanish version of P56. 58. «Para la historia de la filosofía contemporánea: el problema del naturalismo», Revista de la Universidad de Buenos Aires, 3a època, 4:1 (january-march), pp. 4147. See P70B, P82. 1947 59. «Anatomia de la novel·la», Germanor, 515 (january-february), pp. 22-24, 516 (march-april), pp. 22-24, and 517 (may-june), pp. 36-39; collected under the title «Digressió sobre la novel·la», in B30, pp. 51-67. See P61. 60. «Digresión sobre las grandes potencias», Realidad, 1:3 (may-june), pp. 358-367. Spanish version of P53. 61. «Divagación sobre la novela», Atenea, 88:269-270 (november-december), pp. 333351. Spanish version of P59. 62. «La Filosofia and els filòsofs», Nostra revista, 2:13 (january), Mèxic, pp. 15-17. 63. «Introducción al tema iberoamericano», a Eduardo Hamuy. Dos ensayos americanos: América íbera, continente en penumbras, Misión de la universidad americana, Santiago de Chile, n.p., pp. 7-18. 64. «Precisa divagació sobre el cinema», Germanor, 518 (july-august), pp. 23-28. Catalan version of P5. Collected under the title «Digressió sobre el cinema», in B30, pp. 37-50. 65. «El problema de la filosofía contemporánea y su forma de exposición», Filosofía y letras, 13:25 (january-march), pp. 55-74. 66. «El sentit de la mort. Introducció», Revista de Catalunya, 20:103 (july-september), pp. 194-208. Catalan version of «Introducción» in B12. 67. «Sobre la sociedad contemporánea: técnica y civilización», Realidad, 2:6 (november-december), pp. 366-376. See P121, P141. Superseded by B15. 129

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1948 68. (A) «El Cant espiritual: sentit d’un poema», in B13A, pp. 51-70 (reprinted a B18, pp. 175-194, and in B28, pp. 159-173). See P22A. 68. (B) «Carta de Nueva York: sobre lo que se lee», Realidad, 3:8 (march-april), pp. 234-240. 69. «Carta de Nueva York: una reunión científica», Realidad, 3:9 (may-june), pp. 377-382. 70. (A) «Esquema para una historia de la lógica», Asomante, 4:4 (october-december), pp. 5-16. 70. (B) «Sant Jordi: sentit d’un patronatge», in B13A, pp. 39-49 (reprinted, sota el títol «Sant Jordi: sentit d’un patrocini», in B18, pp. 164-174, and in B28, pp. 153-158). 71. «Para la historia de la filosofía contemporánea: el problema del evolucionismo naturalista», Revista de las Indias, 32:101 (january-february), pp. 205-231. 1949 72. «Digressió breu sobre la cibernètica», Germanor, 544 (october), pp. 14-16. Collected in B30, pp. 19-26. See P75. 73. «Digressió sobre la semàntica», Germanor, 545-546 (november-december). Collected in B30, pp. 27-36. See P75. 74. «Dilthey y sus temas fundamentales», Revista cubana de filosofía, 1:5 (july-december), pp. 4-12. 75. «Dos digresiones sarcásticas», Realidad, 6:17-18 (september-december), pp. 205214. Spanish version of P72 and P73. 76. «[Enquestes de Germanor, V]», Germanor, 541 (july), pp. 8-9. 77. «Filosofía, angustia y renovación», Lyceum, 5:19 (august), l’Havana, pp. 67-71. See P91. Superseded by B15. 78. «La filosofía y el idioma», Cuadernos de la Universidad del Aire (september), pp. 63-67. 79. «Hel·lenisme and cristianisme», Germanor, 519 (september 1947), pp. 28-30; 520 (october 1947), pp. 28-32; 521 (november 1947), pp. 23-27; 522 (december 1947), pp. 19-22; 523 (january 1948), pp. 22-25; 524 (february 1948), pp. 23-26; 525 (march 1948); 526-527 (april-may 1948), pp. 19-21; 528 (june 1948); 529 (july 1948); 530 (august 1948), pp. 21-23; 531-532 (september-october 1948), pp. 26-30; 537-538 (march-april 1949); and 539-540 (may-june 1949), pp. 28-31. Collected under the title «Digressió sobre hel·lenisme and cristianisme», a B30, pp. 68-141. 80. «El Infinito: esquema para una historia de su idea», Universidad Nacional de Colombia, nº 14 (april), pp. 9-23. Collected in B14. 81. «Nota sobre la prueba ontológica», Atenea, 92:283-284 (january-february), pp. 4-18. Collected in B14. 130

82. «Para la historia de la filosofía contemporanea: la filosofía de Lachelier y el nuevo espiritualismo», Número, 1 (march-april), Montevideo, pp. 12-22.

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83. «El Problema de la verdad. Esquema de su historia y análisis de su significado», Revista nacional de cultura, 76 (september-october), pp. 73-85. Collected in B14. 84. «¿Qué es la logística?», Notas y estudios de filosofía, 1:1 (january-march), pp. 2-10. Collected in B14. 85. «Sobre la noción de existencia: un análisis de sus significaciones», Sur, 174 (april), pp. 7-19, and 175 (may), pp. 48-55. Collected in B14. 86. «Wittgenstein o la destrucción», Realidad, 5:14 (march-april), pp. 129-140; reprinted sota el títol «Wittgenstein, símbolo de una época angustiada», Theoria, 7-8 (1954), Madrid, pp. 33-38. Revised version collected in B17, pp. 129-140, and, again corrected, in B42, v. 2, pp. 225-235. See P96, P100, P106, P145. 1950 87. «Dietari filosòfic», Germanor, 551-552 (may-june), pp. 5-7. Collected under the title «Fragments d’un dietari filosòfic», in B30, pp. 11-18. 88. «Nota sobre el problema de la creación», Revista nacional de cultura, 82-83 (september-december), pp. 141-148. Collected in B14. 89. «El problema de la filosofía americana», Filosofía y letras, 19:38 (april-june), pp. 379-383. 90. «Prólogo», a Xavier Benguerel, El hombre en el espejo, Sudamericana, Buenos Aires, pp. 7-23. See P188A, P193B. 1951 91. «Filozofia, niepokój and odnowienie», tr. from Spanish by Józef Lobodowski, Kultura, 4/42, (primavera), París. pp. 27-37. Polish version of P77. 92. «Francisco Romero: un estilo de filosofía», Revista cubana de filosofía, 2:9 (julydecember), pp. 15-17. 93. «Is there a Spanish philosophy?», Hispanic review, 19:1, (january), pp. 1-10. See P98, P103. 94. «Mea culpa», Sur, 198 (april), pp. 1-8. Revised version collected in B17, pp. 1323, and, again, revised, in B42, v. 2, pp. 197-203. 95. «Suárez y la filosofía moderna», Notas y estudios de filosofía, 2:7-8 (july-december), pp. 269-294. Revised version collected in B17, pp. 151-177. See P104, P174. 96. «Wittgenstein-geniusz niszczycielski», tr. anonymous, Kultura, 7:45-8/46 (julyaugust), París, pp. 44-51. Polish version of P86. See P100, P106, P145. 1952 97. «Comments on the Symposium ‘What is philosophy of history?’, II», Journal of Philosophy, 49:10 (may), pp. 355-359.

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98. «¿Hay una filosofía española?», Revista de filosofía, 2:1 (april-june), Santiago de Chile, pp. 45-64. Spanish version of P93. Revised version under the title «Sobre la filosofía española», collected in B17, pp. 81-92. See P103. 99. «Pedro Salinas: el don del lenguaje», Hispania, 35:2 (may), pp. 145-146. 100. «Wittgenstein oder Die Destruktion», Monat, 4, Jahrgang, Heft 41 (february), pp. 489-495; reprinted a Ingemar Bachman et al., Ludwig Wittgenstein: Schriften. Beiheft, Suhrkamp, Frankfurt, 1960, pp. 21-29. German version of P86. See P96, P106, P145. 1953 101. «Dos obras maestras de historia de la lógica», Notas y estudios de filosofía, 4:14, (april-june), pp. 145-158. See P102. 102. «Dwa znakomite dziela»,tr. anonymous, Kultura, 5/67 (may), París, pp. 18-32. Polish version of P101. 103. «Existirá uma filosofía espanhola», tr. from Spanish by Milton Vargas, Revista brasileira de filosofia, 3:1 (january-march), pp. 21-30. Portuguese version of P98. See P93. 104. «El mundo de Cervantes y nuestro mundo», La Torre, 3 (july-september), pp. 127-133. Revised version collected in B17, pp. 75-80, and, again corrected, in B42, v. 2, pp. 221-224. 105. «Suárez and modern philosophy», Journal of the history of ideas, 14:4 (october) pp. 528-547. English version of P95. See P174. 106. «Wittgenstein, a symbol of troubled times», Philosophy and phenomenological research, 14:1 (september), pp. 89-96; reprinted, corrected, in K. T. Fann, ed., Ludwig Wittgenstein: The man and his philosophy, Dell, Nova York, 1967, pp. 107-115. English version of P86. See P96, P100, P145. 1954 107. «De Boecio a Alberto de Sajonia: un fragmento de historia de la lógica», Imago mundi, 3 (march), pp. 3-22. 108. «Reflexiones sobre la poesía», Buenos Aires literaria, 16 (january), pp. 1-14. Revised version collected in B17, pp. 93-102, and in B42, v. 2, pp. 214-220. See P115A, P137. 1955 109. «Filosofía y arquitectura», La Torre, 9 (january-march), pp. 83-100. Collected in B17, pp. 43-59, and, revised, in B42, v. 2, pp. 274-284. See P114A.

132

110. «El intelectual en el mundo contemporáneo», Cuadernos, 10 (january-february), pp. 7-14. Collected in B17, pp. 60-74, and, corrected, under the title «El intelectual: ética y política», a B42, v. 2, pp. 263-273. See P111, P136.

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111. «L’Intellettuale e il mondo contemporaneo», tr. from Spanish by Luigi Berti, Inventario, 7:4-6 (july-december), pp. 2-13. Italian version of P110. See P136. 112. «Ortega y la idea de la sociedad», Insula, 119 (15 de november), p. 4; reprinted in Humanitas, 7 (1956), Tucumán pp. 13-20. Superseded by B26. 113. «Peirce’s conception of architectonic and related views», Philosophy and phenomenological research, 15:3 (march), pp. 351-359. 114. (A) «Philosophie et architecture», tr. anonymous, Revue de métaphysique et de morale, 60:3 (july-september), pp. 251-263. French version of P109. 114. (B) «Reflexions sobre Catalunya», a B18, pp. 123-136; reprinted a B28, pp. 93104. See P172. 115. (A) «Reflexions sobre la poesia: homenatge a Carles Riba», in B1, pp. 213-228; reprinted a B28, pp. 189-200. Catalan adaptation of P108. See P137. 115. (B) «Sobre El Ben Cofat and l’altre: homenatge a Josep Carner», in B18, pp. 229235; reprinted, sota el títol «Sobre El Ben Cofat and l’altre», in L’obra de Josep Carner, Selecta, Barcelona, 1959, pp. 135-139, and in B28, pp. 201-205. 1956 116. «De la filosofía a la ‘filosofía’», Sur, 241 (july-august), pp. 21-24. Superseded by B26. 117. «Una fase en el pensamiento de Ortega: el objetivismo», Clavileño, 40 (julyaugust), pp. 11-15; reprinted by La Torre, 15-16 (july-december), pp. 119-126. Superseded by B26. 118. «Ortega y el concepto de razón vital», Ciclón, 2:1 (january), pp. 10-16. Superseded by B26. 119. «Ortega y la idea de la vida humana», Cuadernos, 18 (january-february), pp. 3339. Superseded by B26. 120. «Prefacio», in Euryalo Cannabrava, Elementos de metodologia filosófica, n.p., São Paulo, pp. xi-xvi. 121. «Reflessioni sulla società contemporanea», tr. from Spanish by Luigi Berti, Inventario, 8:1-6 (january-december), pp. 1-26. Italian version of P67. See P141. 122. «Unamuno y la idea de la ficción», Ciclón, 2:4 (july), pp. 27-32. Superseded by B23. 123. «Unamuno y la idea de la realidad», Papeles de Son Armadans, 2:6, (september), pp. 269-280; reprinted in Cuadernos, 22 (january-february 1957), pp. 38-42. See P133, P153. Superseded by B23. 124. «Cynics and Stoics: Contempt, resistance and resignation», in Juan Adolfo Vázquez, ed., Estudios de historia de las ideas en homenaje al profesor Rodolfo Mondolfo, Universidad Nacional de Tucumán, Tucumán, vol. 1, pp. 337-365. See P125. Superseded by B20. 125. «Cyniques et Stoïciens», tr. from Spanish of Paul-X. Despilho, Revue de métaphysique et de morale, 62:1 (january-march), pp. 20-36. French version of P124.

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126. «Die Drei Philosophien: Wie gliedert sich das Denken der Gegenwart?», Monat, 9, Jahrgang, Heft 105 (june), pp. 51-62. German version ofP129. See P130, P142, P143. 127. «Eugenio d’Ors: sentido de una filosofía», Indice, 100-101 (may-june), p. 5. Spanish version of P49. Revised version collected in B42, v. 1, pp. 189-197. 128. «On the ‘great analogy’ [according to Milton C. Nahm]», Journal of the history of ideas, 18:2, (april), pp. 280-284. 129. «Las tres filosofías», Cuadernos, 25 (july-august), pp. 21-34. See P126, P130, P142, P143. Superseded by B27. 130. «Les trois philosophies», tr. from Spanish by Catherine Chraïbi, Preuves, 76 (june), pp. 20-31. French version of P129. See P126, P142, P143. 1958 131. «La filosofía y el arte, hoy», Papeles de Son Armadans, 11:31 (october), pp. 11-22. Superseded by B27. 132. «Filozofía wspolczesne spoleczenstwo», tr. from Spanish by W. Czapska-Jorday, Kultura (París), no 10/132 (Październik), pp. 3-16. Polish version of P135. 133. «Miguel de Unamuno et l’ideé de la réalité», tr. from Spanish by Paul-X. Despilho, Revue de métaphysique et de morale, 63:4 (october-december), pp. 468-473. French version of P123. See P153.

1959 134. «Digresión sobre ‘ciencia natural y filosofía’», La Torre, 28 (october-december), pp. 85-96. Superseded by B33. 135. «La filosofía en la sociedad contemporánea», Cuadernos, 34 (january-february), pp. 13-24. See P132. Superseded by B27. 136. «The Intellectual in contemporary society», Ethics, 69:2 (january), pp. 94-101. English version of P110. See P111. 137. «Le Langage de la poésie», a Anna-Teresa Tymieniecka, ed., For Roman Ingarden: Nine essays in phenomenology, Nijhoff, l’Haia, pp. 147-159. French adaptation of P108. See P115A. 138. «Ortega y Gasset, 1883-1955», in International Institute of Philosophy, Philosophy in the mid-century, ed. Raymond Klibansky, Nuova Italia, Florència, v. 4, pp. 215217. Superseded by B36. 139. «Prólogo», in Hugo Rodríguez-Alcalá, Misión y pensamiento de Francisco Romero, Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México, Mèxic, pp. 7-8.

134

140. «Sobre ‘estilos de pensar’ en la España del siglo XIX», Hispanófila, 3:1 (september, tom 7), pp. 1-6. Revised version collected in B37, pp. 177-188, and in B42, 1v. 1, pp. 303-308.

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141. «Técnica e civilização», tr. from Spanish by Rosana Washington-Vita, Revista brasileira de filosofía, 9:34 (april-june), pp. 159-167. Portuguese version of P67. See P121. 142. «Le Tre filosofie», tr. from Spanish by Luigi Berti, Inventario, 15:1-6 (januarydecember), pp. 13-32. Italian version of P129. See P126, P130, P143. 143. «Les Tres filosofies», Pont, 13, pp. 102-122, and 14, pp. 172-184. Catalan version of P129. See P126, P130, P142. Superseded by B40. 144. «Variaciones sobre la tontería», Cuadernos, 39 (november-december), pp. 74-78. Revised version collected in B42, v. 2, pp. 185-191. 145. «Wittgenstein ou la destruction», tr. from Spanish by Paul-X. Despilho, Lettres nouvelles, 7:20 (15 de july), pp. 17-26. French version of P86. See P96, P100, P106. 1960 146. «Catalanització de Catalunya», in B28, pp. 105-127. Catalan version of P148. 147. «Dos obras maestras españolas», Cuadernos, 42 (may-june), pp. 47-54. See P149, P152. 148. «Sobre una cuestión disputada: Cataluña y España», Cuadernos, 45 (novemberdecember), pp. 73-80. Corrected version under tht title «Una cuestión disputada: Cataluña y España», collected in B37, pp. 155-167, and in B42, v. 1, pp. 282-292. See P146.

1961 149. «A Forma radical do saber em Ortega y Gasset», tr. from Spanish by Luís Washington-Vita, Revista brasileira de filosofía, 11:43 (july-september), pp. 313-321; reprinted under the title «Epílogo em 1961: A forma radical de pensar», a P167, pp. 125-137. Portuguese version of P152. See P167. 150. The Idea of man: An outline of philosophical anthropology, University of Kansas, Lawrence. See P176. Superseded by B38. 151. «Introduction to the Torchbook edition», in José Ortega y Gasset, The Modern theme, tr. from Spanish by James Cleugh, Harper, Nova York, pp. 1-8. 152. «On a radical form of thinking», tr. from Spanish by Constance Mazlish, Texas quarterly, 4:1 (primavera), número especial titulat Image of Spain, ed. Ramón Martínez-López, pp. 32-38. Partial English version of P147. See P149. 153. «On Miguel de Unamuno’s Idea of Reality», Philosophy and phenomenological research, 21:4 (june), pp. 514-520. English version of P123. See P133. Superseded by B34. 154. «Por falar nos Estados Unidos: balanço das recentes tendências culturais»,tr. anonymous, Américas (ed. portuguesa), 13:3 (march), pp. 34-37. Portuguese version of P160. See P157, P159.

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155. «Record d’en Jaume Vicens and Vives», Serra d’or, 2a època, 3:6 (june), p. 8. 156. «El Sabor de la vida», La Nación (4 de june), 4a secció, pp. 1-2; reprinted a Papeles de Son Armadans, 22:65 (august), pp. 125-136. Corrected version collected in B42, v. 2, pp. 207-213. 157. «Speaking of the United States: A survey of recent cultural trends (I)», tr. anonymous, Americas (ed. anglesa), 13:2 (february), pp. 34-37. English version of P160. See P154, P158. 158. «Speaking of the United States: A survey of recent cultural trends (II)», tr. anonymous, Americas (ed. anglesa), 13:11 (november), pp. 34-37. English version of P161. See P157, P159. 159. «Tendências culturais nos Estados Unidos», tr. anonymous, Américas (ed. portuguesa), 13:12 (december), pp. 34-37. Portuguese version of P161. See P154, P158. 160. «Tendencias culturales en los Estados Unidos (I)», Américas (ed. espanyola), 13:3 (march), pp. 34-37. See P154, P157, P161. 161. «Tendencias culturales en los Estados Unidos (II)», Américas (ed. espanyola), 13:12 (december), pp. 34-37. See P158, P159, P160. 1962 162. «España y Europa veinte años después», Cuadernos, 67 (december), pp. 22-34. Collected in B37, pp. 13-48, and in B42, v. 1, pp. 207-255. See B3. 163. (A) «[Grant report]», American Philosophical Society year book, pp. 529-531. Superseded by P171. 163. (B) «Llibres als Estats Units», in Joan Oliver, ed., El llibre de tothom, Alcides, Barcelona, pp. 149-154. Catalan version of P161. See P158, P159. 164. «Sobre la fama: la obra de José Ricardo Morales», Cuadernos, 56 (january), pp. 88-90. Revised version under the title «Sobre la fama», collected in B42, v. 2, pp. 192-196. 165. «Sobre la naturaleza de lo orgánico», Philosophia, 26, Mendoza, pp. 1-23. See P180. Superseded by B33. 1963 166. «Diversity of views on the same subject: Objectively justifiable limits», Pacific philosophy forum, 2, special issue (september), pp. 54-59. English version of P219. 167. «Ensaio introdutório as etapas de filosofía de Ortega y Gasset», tr. from Spanish by Luís Washington-Vita, in José Ortega y Gasset, Origem e epílogo da filosofía, Livro Ibero-Americano, Rio de Janeiro, pp. 11-145. Portuguese version of B36. See P149. 168. «La Filosofía, entonces [1923] y ahora», Revista de Occidente, 2a època, 3:8-9 (november-december), pp. 303-312. Collected in B42, v. 2, pp. 247-255. 136

169. «Información y comunicación: enfoque de un nuevo problema», a International Congress of Philosophy, 13th, Mèxic, 1963, Symposium sobre información y commu-

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nicación, Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México, Mèxic, pp. 21-32. Corrected version under the title «Viejos problemas, nuevos enfoques», collected in B42, v. 2, pp. 285-293. See P210. 170. «Nuevas cuestiones españolas», in B37, pp. 49-74. Corrected version collected in B42, v. 1, pp. 226-238. See B9. 171. «On the early history of ontology», Philosophy and phenomenological research, 24:1 (september), pp. 36-47. See P173. Superseded P163A. 172. «Reflexiones sobre Cataluña», in B37, pp. 143-153. Corrected version collected in B42, v. 1, pp. 276-281. Spanish version of P114B. 173. «Sobre os primórdios da historia da ontologia», tr. from English by Raúl de Polillo, Revista brasileira de filosofia, 13:50 (april-june), pp. 163-177. Portuguese version of P171. 174. «Suarez et la philosophie moderne», tr. from Spanish by Paul-X. Despilho, Revue de métaphysique et de morale, 6:1 (january-march), pp. 57-69. French version of P95. See P105. 175. «[Xavier Zubiri,] Sobre la esencia, capítol 8, § 3», Índice, 200-201 (july-august), p. 11. See P181. 1964 176. «A Idéia de homem: Um esboço de antropología filosófica», tr. from English by Pureza Iliana Maria Vauthier de Macedo, Revista brasileira de filosofía, 14:55 (julyseptember), pp. 323-347. Portuguese version of P150. 177. «Unamuno, 1964», Revista de Occidente, 2a època, 7:19 (october), pp. 29-40. Collected in B42, v. 2, pp. 236-246, and, under the title «Unamuno, hoy día», in Antonio Sánchez Barbudo, ed., Miguel de Unamuno, Taurus, Madrid, 1974, pp. 45-58. See P192, P197. 1965 178. «Experiencia, lenguaje y realidad», Revista de Occidente, 2a època, 9:27 (june), pp. 292-315. Revised version collected in B42, v. 2, pp. 502-522. Superseded by B43. 179. «Imatges de l’home», Qüestions de vida cristiana, 30, pp. 35-50. Collected in B48, pp. 7-28. See P191, P201. 180. «Ontologie de la réalité organique», tr. from Spanish by Renée Ferrater-Mora, Revue de métaphysique et de morale, 70:1 (january-march), pp. 74-95. French version of P165. 181. «The Philosophy of Xavier Zubiri», tr. from Spanish by George L. Kline, a George L. Kline, ed., European philosophy today, Quadrangle, Chicago, pp. 15-29. Enlarged Englisch version of P175.

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182. «Sobre un falso dilema», in José Luis López-Aranguren et al., Libertad y organización, Insula, Madrid, pp. 15-18. Corrected version collected in B42, v. 2, pp. 259-262. 183. «Unidad y pluralidad», Panoramas, 17 (september-october), pp. 79-94; reprinted in Américo Castro et al., Esa gente de España..., Centro de Estudios y Documentación Sociales, Mèxic, 1965, pp. 89-102. Corrected version collected in B42, v. 1, pp. 293-302. 1966 184. «Ludwig Wittgenstein», in Ricardo Jordana, ed., Las filosofías de Ludwig Wittgenstein, Oikos-Tau, Barcelona, pp. 13-20. 185. «Ontología y marcos lingüísticos», Convivium, 21 (january-june), Barcelona, pp. 135-146. Superseded by B43. 186. «Sobre el conocimiento», Diálogos, 5 (january-june), Río Piedras, pp. 63-81. Superseded by B43. 187. «Sobre el dar por supuesto», Filosofia, 17:4, suplement (november), Torí, pp. 592605; also printed as a pumphlet, Filosofia, Torí, n.d. Collected in B42, v. 2, pp. 487-501. See P193A. Superseded by B43. 1967 188. (A) «Carta-Pròleg», in Xavier Benguerel, Obres completes, Rosa Vera, Barcelona, vol. 1, pp. 7-14. 188. (B) «Confesión preliminar», in B42, v. 1, pp. 9-20. 189. «Estructura e historia», La Nación (18 de june), 3a secció, pp. 1-2, and (25 de june), 3a secció, p. 2. Collected in B50, pp. 71-83. See P209. 190. «Foreword», a Jaume Vicens-Vives, Approaches to the History of Spain, tr. from Spanish and ed. by Joan Connelly Ullman, University of California, Berkeley, pp. v-viii. 191. «Images de l’homme», tr. anonymous, Revue philosophique de la France et de l’étranger, 157:2 (april-june), pp. 223-237. French version of201. See P179. 192. «Miguel de Unamuno», Aix. Faculté des Lettres. Annales, 41, pp. 157-169. French version of P177. See P197. 193. (A) «On taking things for granted», a Aloysius Robert Caponigri, ed., Contemporary Spanish philosophy: An anthology, University of Notre Dame, Notre Dame-London, pp. 304-323. English version of P187. 193. (B) «Pròleg», in Xavier Benguerel, Obres completes, Rosa Vera, Barcelona, vol. 1, pp. 525-530. Catalan version of P90. See P188A. 194. «Realidades y realidad», Philosophia, 32, Mendoza, pp. 5-20. See P205. Superseded by B43. 138

195. «La reflexión», Razón y fábula, 1 (may), pp. 1-16. Superseded by B43.

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196. «Sobre el llamado compromiso ontológico», Dianoia, 13, pp. 185-220. Superseded by B43. 197. «Unamuno today», a José Rubia-Barcia and M. A. Zeitlin, eds., Unamuno: Creator and creation, University of California, Berkeley, pp. 220-233. English version of P117. See P192. 1968 198. «Del uso», Diálogos, 10 (january-march), Río Piedras, pp. 61-78. Superseded by B47. 199. «L’Expérience de la mort d’autrui: Possibilités d’inférences viventielles», tr. by l’espanyol d’André Gallego and Zdenek Kourím, in Le Temps et la mort dans la philosophie espagnole contemporaine, Privat, Tolosa, pp. 134-148. French version of § 25-27 a B33. 200. «La Experiencia religiosa», La Torre, 59 (january-march), pp. 147-160. Collected under the title «El Lenguaje de la experiencia religiosa», in B50, pp. 37-53. See P211, P213. 201. «Imágenes del hombre», Man and world, 1:1 (february), pp. 96-112. Collected in B50, pp. 13-35. See P179, P191. 202. «Medio y mensaje», Crítica, 2:5 (may), pp. 31-56. Superseded by B47. 203. «[Sobre la validez del concepto de ‘januaryación’]», Symposium, 22:2 (estiu), pp. 176-179. See P223. 1969 204. «Metaphysics», in International Institute of Philosophy, Contemporary philosophy: A survey, ed. Raymond Klibansky, Nuova Italia, Florència, vol. 3, pp. 3-9. 205. «Pròleg», in De Joan Oliver a Pere Quart, Ed. 62, Barcelona, pp. 5-8. 206. «Reality as Meaning», in James M. Edie, ed., New essays in phenomenology, Quadrangle, Chicago, pp. 131-147. English version of P194. 207. «Some thoughts on language», Arroy (april), Bryn Mawr, pp. 21-24. 1970 208. «Cuestiones de palabras», in Homenaje a Xavier Zubiri, Moneda y Crédito, Madrid, vol. 1, pp. 545-567. Revised version collected in B50, pp. 91-121. 209. «Estructura and història», in B48, pp. 63-76. Catalan version of P189. 210. «Hi haurà una batalla naval demà», in B48, pp. 77-90. Catalan version of P169. 211. «The language of religious experience», tr. from Spanish by Priscilla Cohn, International journal for philosophy of religion, 1:1 (primavera), pp. 22-33. English version of P200. See P213.

139

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212. «Los lenguajes de la historia», Dianoia, 16, pp. 124-131. Collected in B50, pp. 55-69. See P214. 213. «El llenguatge de l’experiència religiosa», a B48, pp. 29-45. Catalan version of P200. See P211. 214. «Els llenguatges de la història», a B48, pp. 47-61. Catalan version of P212. 215. «Nota preliminar a la segunda edición: en el umbral de 1970», a B46, pp. 3-10 (reprinted in B52, pp. 16-23). See P222. 1971 216. «El laberinto del conocimiento», in B50, pp. 123-138; reprinted under the title «Fragmentos de teoría del conocimiento», a Homenaje a Aranguren, Revista de Occidente, Madrid, 1972, pp. 129-141. 217. «Lógica y razón», Crítica, 5:15 (september), pp. 29-44. Superseded by B53. 218. «Pinturas y modelos», in B50, pp. 139-152; reprinted in Simposio de Lógica y Filosofía de la Ciencia, València, 1971, Filosofía y ciencia en el pensamiento español contemporáneo (1960-1970), Tecnos, Madrid, 1973, pp. 87-98. 219. «Punto de vista y tolerancia», in B50, pp. 85-90. See P166. 1972 220. «Aesthetics and literary criticism», in Donald W. Bleznick and John F. Winter, eds., Directions of literary criticism in the seventies, University of Cincinnati, Cincinnati, pp. 40-52. 1973 221. «Discurso inaugural», and «Discurso final», in Simposio de Lógica y Filosofía de la Ciencia, València, 1971, Filosofía y ciencia en el pensamiento español contemporáneo (1960-1970), Tecnos, Madrid, 1973, pp. 15-22, and 317-324. 222. «Nota preliminar a la tercera edición», in B52, pp. 9-15. See P215. 223. «On the validity of the concept of ‘januaryation’», tr. from Spanish by Constance Sullivan, in Jaime Ferrán and Daniel P. Testa, eds., Spanish writers of 1936: Crisis and commitment in the poetry of the thirties and fourties. An anthology of literary studies and essays, Tamesis, London, pp. 29-32. English version of P203. 1974 224. «Meta-metafilosofía», Teorema, 4:1, pp. 5-10. 1976 140

225. «La filosofía entre la ciencia y la ideología», Teorema, 6:1, pp. 27-42; reprinted in

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Primer Coloquio Nacional de Filosofía, Morelia, Mich., 1975, La Filosofía y la ciencia en nuestros días, Grijalbo, Mèxic, 1976, pp. 41-56. 226. «On practice», American philosophical quarterly, 13:1 (january), pp. 49-55. Revised English version of pp. 190-210 inB54. 227. «Quatre paraules», in Manuel de Pedrolo, Homes and no, Aymà, Barcelona, pp. 5-7. 1977 228. «Fictions, universals, and inbstract entities», Philosophy and phenomenological research, 37:3 (march), pp. 353-367. English version of § 4-6 in ch. X de B43. 229. «Sobre el ‘hacer’», Dianoia, 23, pp. 197-208. 230. «Elogio (moderado) de la televisión (en januaryal)», Destino, 2a època, 2.059 (1723 may), Barcelona, pp. 20-21. 1979 231. «Reflexions sobre ‘la filosofia a Catalunya’», in Paul Vila Dinares, Josep Ferrater and Mora, Doctors Honoris Causa, Universitat Autonòma de Barcelona, Barcelona, pp. 31-43. Collected in B61, pp. 119-131. 1980 232. «Lo que vale la pena hacer», in Jorge J. E. Gracia, ed., El hombre y su conducta. Ensayos filosóficos en honor de Risieri Frondizi. Man and his conduct: Philosophical essays in honor of Risieri Frondizi, Universidad de Puerto Rico, Río Piedras, pp. 152-158. Superseded by B57. 1981 233. «Estética y crítica. Un problema de demarcación», Revista de Occidente, 4, pp. 43-54. 1982 234. «La muchacha del bolso azul», Los Cuadernos del norte, 3:13, pp. 66-75. See B66. 235. «Diálogos sobre el cine», Los Cuadernos del norte, 3:13, pp. 76-78. 1984 236. «Las variedades de la inteligencia», Revista de Occidente, 35, pp. 49-66. 237. «Ortega, filósofo del futuro», Cuadernos hispanoamericanos, 403-405, pp. 121-131. 238. «The world of Calderón», Hispanic review, 1, pp. 1-17. See B70. 141

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1985 239. «La noción de ciencia», Anthropos: Boletín de información y documentación, 49, pp. 25-27. 240. «Nota sobre los lenguajes de la historia», Theoria, 1:1, pp. 231-234. 241. «Nota sobre ‘Los lenguajes de la historia’», Anthropos: Boletín de información y documentación, 49, pp. 28-31. 242. «Nuevas revelaciones sobre el Observador», Anthropos: Boletín de información y documentación, 49, pp. 29-31. 1989 243. «Razón y pasión en ética», Anthropos: Boletín de información y documentación, 96, p. 75. 1990 244. «La última danza de Salomé», ALDEEU (Asociación de Licenciados y Doctores Españoles en los Estados Unidos), VI:2, pp. 199-220. See B91. 245. «Modos de modelar la mente», in Modelos de la Mente, Cursos de Verano de El Escorial, Universidad Complutense de Madrid, Madrid, 1989, pp. 43-56. 246. «Nota sobre la palabra ‘ideología’», Boletín de la Institución Libre de Enseñanza, 10, pp. 7-10. 1991 247. «Apuntes sobre Lógica y Realidad», Ágora: Papeles de filosofía, 10, pp. 7-12. 248. «La filosofía, entonces y ahora», Revista de Occidente, 118, pp. 107-120. 249. «Vida y doctrina de Claudio Mela», Boletín de la Institución Libre de Enseñanza, 11, pp. 9-12. 250. «Filología: apuntes de los últimos cursos profesados por Claudio Mela», Boletín de la Institución Libre de Enseñanza, 11, pp. 13-22. 1994 251. «Dos elementos del mundo del último Azorín: elementalidad y tenuidad», in Francisco Rico, coord., Historia y crítica de la literatura española, vol. 6, tom 2, pp. 378-382. See B70.

142

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III. Reviews

1935 1. Ernst von Aster, Historia de la filosofía, tr. by Emilio Huidobro and Edith Tech de Huidobro, Hoja literaria, 2 (november), Barcelona, p. 3. 2. Nicolai Hartmann, Ethik, 2a ed., Hoja literaria, 2 (november), Barcelona, p. 3. 3. Aldous Huxley, Un mundo feliz, tr. by Luys Santa Marina, Hoja literaria, 2 (november), Barcelona, p. 3. 1940 4. María Zambrano, Filosofía y poesía, Sur, 75 (december), pp. 161-165. 1942 5. Joaquín Xirau, Amor y mundo, Sur, 90 (march), pp. 53-56. 1943 6. Guillermo de Torre, Menéndez Pelayo y las dos Españas, Sur, 110 (december), pp. 99-103. 1948 7. Ramón Insula, Historia de la filosofía en Hispanoamérica, Journal of philosophy, 4:18 (august), pp. 500-501. 1949 8. José Gaos, Pensamiento de lengua española and Filosofía de la filosofía e historia de la filosofía, Filosofía y letras, 14 (july-september), pp. 161-163. 9. Pedro Salinas, El defensor, Occidental, 4 (april), Nova York, pp. 23-25. 10. Pedro Salinas, La poesía de Rubén Darío, Occidental, 7 (july), Nova York, pp. 26-28. 11. Leopoldo Zea, Ensayos sobre filosofía en la historia occidental, Occidental, 1 (january), Nova York, pp. 23-24. 1950 12. José Ignacio Alcorta, La teoría de los modos en Suárez, Books abroad, 24:4 (tardor), pp. 406-407.

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13. Julián Marías, La filosofía en sus textos, 2 vols., Books abroad, 24:4 (tardor), pp. 374375. 1951 14. Américo Castro, Ensayo de historiología: analogías y diferencias entre hispanos y musulmanes, Hispania, 34:2 (may), pp. 222-223. 15. Congreso Nacional de Filosofía, 1st, Mendoza, 1949, Actas, ed. Luis Juan Guerrero, Philosophy and phenomenological research, 12:2 (december), pp. 311-313. 16. José Gaos, Un método para resolver los problemas de nuestro tiempo: la filosofía del Prof. Northrop, Books abroad, 25:2 (primavera), pp. 161-162. 1952 17. Arturo Ardao, Espiritualismo y positivismo en el Uruguay, Books abroad, 26:1 (hivern), pp. 72. 1953 18. Arturo Barea, Unamuno, tr. by Ilse Barea, Books abroad, 27:2 (primavera), pp. 147-148. 19. Isaac Husik, Philosophical essays, Notas y estudios de filosofía, 4:13 (january-march), pp. 61-62. 20. George L. Kline, ed., Spinoza in Soviet philosophy: a series of essays, tr. by George L. Kline, Notas y estudios de filosofía, 4:13 (january-march), pp. 65-67. 21. Adolfo Levi, Concetto dell’errore nella filosofia di Plotino, Books abroad, 27:3 (estiu), p. 302. 1954 22. Pedro Laín-Entralgo, Palabras menores, Books abroad, 28:1 (hivern), p. 75. 23. Julián Marías, Introducción a la filosofía, Occidental, 6 (june 1949), Nova York, pp. 30-31, and Books abroad, 28:1 (hivern 1954), p. 35. 24. Patrick Romanell, The making of the Mexican mind, Hispanic review, 22:3 (july), pp. 240-242. 25. Francisco Romero, Teoría del hombre, Books abroad, 28, 1, (hivern), pp. 36-37. 26. Joan Triadú, Anthology of Catalan lyric poetry, Hispanic review, 22:4 (october), pp. 323-324. 1955 144

27. V. V. Zenkovsky, A History of Russian philosophy, 2 vols., tr. by George L. Kline, Imago mundi, 9 (september), pp. 84-85.

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28. Gregorio Klimovsky, Problemas relativos a la definición de «verdad lógica» en los sistemas semánticos y sintácticos, Journal of symbolic logic, 22:1 (march), pp. 83-84. 1958 29. Eduardo García Máynez, Lógica del juicio jurídico, Journal of symbolic logic, 23:1 (march), p. 74. 30. Alain Guy, Les Philosophes espagnols d’hier et d’aujourd’hui, Journal of philosophy, 55:18 (28 d’august), p. 791. 1959 31. José Echeverría, Réflexions métaphysiques sur la mort, Cuadernos, 35 (march-april), pp. 112-114. 32. Charles W. Morris, Fundamentos de la teoría de los signos, tr. by Obdulia Alvarez et al., Journal of symbolic logic, 24:1 (march), pp. 92-93. 33. José Ortega y Gasset, Idea del teatro, Cuadernos, 38 (september-october), pp. 108-109. 34. Medardo Vitier, La Filosofía de Kant, Cuadernos, 38 (september-october), pp. 112113. 1960 35. A. J. Ayer, The Revolution in philosophy and La Revolución en filosofía, tr. by Montserrat Macao de Lledó, Journal of symbolic logic, 25:3 (september), pp. 260-262. 36. Risieri Frondizi, ¿Qué son los valores?: introducción a la axiología, Convivium, 8 (julydecember), Barcelona, pp. 85-86, and Philosophy and phenomenological research, 20:4 (june), pp. 574-575. 37. Boleslaw Sobocinski, «La génesis de la escuela polaca de lógica», Journal of symbolic logic, 25:1 (march), pp. 63-64. 1961 38. Américo Castro, Españolidad y europeización del Quijote, Cuadernos, 54 (november), pp. 88-89. 39. Julián Marías, Ortega, I: Circunstancia y vocación, Cuadernos, 45 (november-december), pp. 111-113, and Hispanic review, 29:4 (october), pp. 342-343. 1967 40. Grace A. de Laguna, On existence and the human world, Bryn Mawr alumnae bulletin, 48:2 (1966-7), pp. 14-15. 145

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1971 41. James G. Colbert, Jr.’s, La evolución de la lógica simbólica y sus implicaciones filosóficas, Journal of symbolic logic, 36:2 (june), pp. 324-325. 1987 42. John D. Barrow and Frank J. Tipler, The Anthropic Cosmological Principle, Saber leer, 5, pp. 1-2. 1988 43. Stephen Jay Gould, Time’s Arrow, Time’s Cycle: Myth and Metaphor in the Discovery of Geological Time, Saber leer, 13, p. 3. 1989 44. Freeman Dyson, Infinity in All Directions, Saber leer, 28, pp. 1-2. 1990 45. Martín Bernal, Black Athena: The Afroasiatic Roots of Classical Civilization, Saber leer, 35, pp. 6-7.

IV. Newspaper articles The numerous journalistic articles published by Ferrater Mora can be found in B82 and B93.

V. Translations (T) 1935 1. Wilhelm Flitner, Pedagogía sistemática, Labor, Barcelona (from German). 1941 2. Paul Hüssy, Indicaciones y terapéutica en la práctica de la ginecología y obstetricia, ed. Pedro Domingo, Cultural, l’Havana (from German). 3. René Fülöp-Miller, La lucha contra la enfermedad y la muerte: resumen gráfico de la historia de la medicina, Cultural, l’Havana (from German). 146

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1943 4. François Guizot, De la pena de muerte en materia política. De las conspiraciones y de la justicia política, Cruz del Sur, Santiago de Chile (from french). See P22B. 5. George Santayana, Tres poetas filósofos: Lucrecio, Dante, Goethe, Losada, Buenos Aires (reprinted 1952) (from English). 1944 6. André Lalande, Las teorías de la inducción y la experimentación, Losada, Buenos Aires (from Frech). 7. T. E. Lawrence, Los siete pilares de la sabiduría: un triunfo, Sur, Buenos Aires (no signat) (from English). 8. Charles Renouvier, Los dilemas de la metafísica pura, Losada, Buenos Aires (from Frech). 9. Max Weber, Economía y sociedad: esbozo de sociología comprensiva, Fondo de Cultura Económica, Mèxic (reprinted 1964) (from German). Co-translated with José Medina Echavarría, Juan Roura Parella, Eduardo García Máynez and Eugenio Ímaz. 1945 10. Charles Renouvier, Ucronía: la utopía en la historia. Bosquejo histórico apócrifo del desenvolvimiento de la civilización europea, Losada, Buenos Aires (from Frech). 1947 11. [Lev] Shestov, Kierkegaard y la filosofía existencial, Sudamericana, Buenos Aires (reprinted 1951) (from Frech).

VI. Bibliography Ferrater Mora 1951 1.

Julián Marías, «El Diccionario de Filosofía de José Ferrater Mora», Revista de psicología januaryal y aplicada, 6:20, pp. 707-710. 1958

Javier Muguerza, «Un libro sobre Ortega», Ínsula, 149, p. 3.

Hugo Rodríguez Alcalá, «J. Ferrater Mora en Princeton», Cuadernos americanos (may-june), pp. 132-140. 147

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1959 4.

José Luis L. Aranguren, «En torno a Ferrater Mora y la nueva edición de su Diccionario», Ínsula, 148, p. 3.

Joaquim Carreras Artau, «Bibliografía: un diccionario de filosofía», Arbor, 43:159.

Julián Marías, «Ferrater y su Diccionario», Ínsula, 148, p. 3.

Adolfo Muñoz Alonso, Las grandes corrientes del pensamiento contemporáneo. Panoramas nacionalistas, España, Guadarrama, Madrid, pp. 401-402. 1963

H. Fernández Suárez, «Ser y muerte», Ínsula, 171, p. 25.

Pedro Laín, «Ferrater Mora, José, El ser y la muerte, Bosquejo de filosofía integracionista», Revista de Occidente, I, pp. 364-367. 1964

10. Gonzalo Fernández de la Mora, Pensamiento español, 1963 (De Azorín a Zubiri), Rialp, Madrid, pp. 29-33, 72-76 and 222-226. 11. J. Izquierdo, «La ontología de J. Ferrater Mora», Índice, 183, pp. 20-21. 1965 12. Helio Carpintero, «Los ensayistas contemporáneos», Ínsula, 224-225, pp. 11 and 30. 13. J. Izquierdo, «Pensadores españoles fuera de España», Cuadernos americanos, I (january-february). 1966 14. Alain Guy, Filósofos españoles de ayer y de hoy, Losada, Buenos Aires, pp. 246-253 and 307. 15. José Ramón Marra-López, «Entrevista con Ferrater Mora», Ínsula, 236-237, p. 13. 1967 16. José Luis Abellán, «José Ferrater Mora: una ‘ontología integracionista’ al nivel del sentido común», in Filosofía española en América (1936-1966), Guadarrama, Madrid, pp. 83-89. 17. Helio Carpintero, Cinco aventuras españolas: Ayala, Laín, Aranguren, Ferrater, Marías, Revista de Occidente, Madrid, pp. 150-190. 148

18. Helio Carpintero, «Pensamiento español contemporáneo», in Guillermo Díaz-Plaja, Historia januaryal de las literaturas hispánicas,Vergara, Barcelona, vol.VI, pp. 629-673.

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19. Alain Guy, «La réflexion critique sur la mort chez J. Ferrater Mora», Revue Philosophique, 2, pp. 297-304. 20. Alain Guy, «Les tendences progressistes dans la philosophie espagnole contemporaine», Bulletin Hispanique, LXIX, pp. 454-464. 21. Javier Muguerza, «Ante una nueva edición del Diccionario de filosofía de José Ferrater Mora», Revista de Occidente, 49, pp. 95-107. 22. Baltasar Porcel, «Ferrater Mora o l’anàlisi viva», Serra d’Or (january), pp. 25-33. 1969 23. Joaquín Marco, «Sobre las Obras selectas de Ferrater Mora», in Ejercicios literarios, Táber, Barcelona, pp. 461-466. 1970 24. Alfonso López Quintás, Filosofía española contemporánea, Católica, Madrid, pp. 175-181. 25. Josep Pla, «Josep Ferrater Mora», in Homenots: segona sèrie, Destino, Barcelona, pp. 129-174. 1971 26. José Luis Abellán, La cultura en España, Edicusa, Madrid, pp. 91-95 and 97-110. 1972 27. Teorema, «Entrevista a José Ferrater Mora», Teorema, 7, pp. 97-108. 1973 28. Josep Lluís Blasco Estellés, «Las palabras y los hombres, de José Ferrater Mora», ressenya, Teorema, 3:4, pp. 599-602. 1974 29. José Luis Abellán, «Filosofía española en el exilio. Panorama en 1974», Urogallo, 26, pp. 62-68. 30. Cirilio Flórez, «Filosofía española del lenguaje», Cuadernos Salmantinos de Filosofía, 1:1, pp. 235-241. 1976 31. Mario Bunge, «El ser no tiene sentido y el sentido no tiene ser: notas para una conceptología», Teorema, VI:2, pp. 201-212.

149

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32. Alfonso García Suárez, «Cambio de marcha en filosofía», Teorema, VI/3-4, pp. 533-535. 1977 33. Reine Guy, «La theorie de sens chez José Ferrater Mora», in Equipe de Recherche Associée (ERA), Association de Publications de l’Université de Tolouse-Le Mirail, Tolosa, pp. 115-128. 1979 34. Victòria Camps, «La sinrazón de la razón», El Basilisco, 8, pp. 97-100. 35. Jesús Mosterín, «De la materia a la razón», Teorema, IX/2, pp. 201-210. 36. Javier Muguerza, «De la materia a la razón, pasando por un gran diccionario», El País, supplement «Libros» (11 de november), pp. 1 and 6. 1980 37. Alfredo Deaño, Las concepciones de la lógica, Taurus, Madrid, pp. 220-225. 1981 38. Walter Cariddi, «L’íntegrazionismo de José Ferrater Mora», in José Ferrater Mora, Quattro visioni della storia universale, Edizioni Milella, Bari, pp. 11-31. 39. Priscilla Cohn, ed., Transparencies: philosophical essays in honor of J. Ferrater Mora, Humanities Press, Atlantic Highland. 40. Priscilla Cohn, «Tendiendo puentes: la teoría del sentido y del continuo en Ferrater Mora», Teorema, XI:1, pp. 37-56. 41. Joaquín González Muela, «El arte literario de José Ferrater Mora», La Estafeta Literaria (may), pp. 58-62. 42. Esperanza Guisán, «Ética y logos», Enrahonar. Quaderns de Filosofia, 1, pp. 67-76. 43. A. Jiménez, «Ferrater Mora, José, De la materia a la razón», Revista de Filosofía, 2a sèrie, IV (january-june). 44. A. Jiménez, «Ferrater Mora, José, Diccionario de filosofía», Revista de Filosofía, 2a sèrie, IV (january-june). 45. Elena Ronzón et al., «Entrevista a José Ferrater Mora», El Basilisco, 12, pp. 52-58. 1982

150

46. Cirilio Flórez, «Programas de investigación filosófica en España (tres ejemplos de ontología)», in Actas del II Seminario de Historia de la Filosofía española, Universidad de Salamanca, Salamanca, vol. I, pp. 121-140.

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47. Esperanza Guisán, «Por una libertad solidaria», El País, suplement «Los libros» (february), p. 3. 48. Ulises Moulines, «Blanco, negro, gris: contra el extremismo filosófico», in Exploraciones metacientíficas, Alianza, Madrid, pp. 31-39. 49. Luís Suñén, «Mirar la calle, contemplar el mundo», summary/report of account Claudia, mi Claudia, El País, supplement «Libros» (21 de november), p. 6. 1983 50. Dámaso López García, «El observador observado», summary/report of account Claudia, mi Claudia, Libros, 13, pp. 11-12. 1984 51. Salvador Giner, «Josep Ferrater Mora: una entrevista», Enrahonar. Quaderns de Filosofia, 10, pp. 173-182. 52. Juan Marichal, «El pensamiento español trasterrado (1939-1979)», in Teoría e historia del ensayismo hispánico, Alianza, Madrid, pp. 212-224. 53. Antoni Mora, «La filosofía catalana a l’exili», Enrahonar. Quaderns de Filosofia, 10, pp. 17-30. 54. Carlos Nieto Blanco, «Ferrater Mora y la ontología contemporánea», Enrahonar. Quaderns de Filosofia, 10, pp. 165-172. 1985 55. Norbert Bilbeny, «Josep Ferrater and Móra, cruïlla de llenguatges», in Filosofia contemporània a Catalunya, Edhasa, Barcelona, pp. 261-275. 56. Priscilla Cohn, «El pensamiento ético de Ferrater Mora», Anthropos. Revista de información y documentación, 49, pp. 36-42. 57. Esperanza Guisán, «La aportación de Ferrater Mora a la ética contemporánea», Anthropos. Revista de información y documentación, 49, pp. 42-45. 58. Alain Guy, «El integracionismo de J. Ferrater Mora», cap.V d’Historia de la Filosofía Española, Anthropos, Barcelona. 59. Antoni Mora, «La obra filosófica de J. Ferrater Mora en su trayectoria», Anthropos. Revista de información y documentación, 49, pp. 31-36. 60. Carlos Nieto Blanco, La filosofía en la encrucijada. Perfiles del pensamiento de José Ferrater Mora, Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona, Barcelona. 61. Carlos Nieto Blanco, «Penúltima palabra filosófica» (about De la materia a la razón), Anthropos. Revista de información y documentación, 49, pp. 57-60. 62. Robert Saladrigas, «El amor de un filósofo por las imágenes», La Vanguardia (12 de september), p. 30.

151

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1987 63. Enrique Bonete Perales, «La teoría ética de J. Ferrater Mora», Cuadernos salmantinos de filosofía, XIV, pp. 349-371. 64. Xavier Rubert de Ventós, «Ferrater Mora», entrevista, a Pensadors catalans, Ed. 62, Barcelona, pp. 47-60. 1988 65. Víctor M. Amela, «Isufrible juego», summary/report account of the book El juego de la verdad, La Vanguardia (3 de march), p. 43. 66. Ismael Martínez Liébana, «Ferrater Mora, José: Modos de hacer filosofía», summary/ report account, Diálogo filosófico, 10, pp. 126-128. 1989 67. Norbert Bilbeny, «Josep Ferrater Mora», interview, in Puntes al coixí: converses amb pensadors catalans, Barcelona, Destino, pp. 67-81. 68. Soledad Fernández Gago, «El concepto de racionalidad en la filosofía de José Ferrater Mora», Ágora: Papeles de filosofía, 8, pp. 131-136. 69. Antoni Mora, Gent nostra: Ferrater Mora, Edicions de Nou Art Thor, Barcelona. 70. Javier Muguerza, «J. Ferrater Mora: de la materia a la razón pasando por la ética», Revista Latinoamericana de Filosofía, 15 (2), pp. 219-238. 1990 71. Enrique Bonete Perales, «J. Ferrater Mora: los ‘anti’ de una teoría ética», in Éticas contemporáneas, cap. IV, Tecnos, Madrid. 72. Assumpció Maresma, «Josep Ferrater Mora», Catalònia, 17, pp. 32-36. 73. Javier Muguerza, «De la materia a la razón, pasando, ay, por el hombre», in Desde la perplejidad: ensayos sobre la ética, la razón y el diálogo, Fondo de Cultura Económica, Mèxic, pp. 527-544. 74. Isidoro Reguera Pérez, «Tanatología ferrateriana», Azafea: revista de filosofía, 3, pp. 151-178. 1991 75. Américo Castro, «Ferrater Mora: una superación del localismo», Boletín de la Institución Libre de Enseñanza, II època, 11, pp. 23-24. 152

76. Càtedra Ferrater Mora de Pensament Contemporani, J. Ferrater Mora. In memoriam, Estudi General de Girona (UAB), Girona.

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77. Salvador Giner, «José María Ferrater: el temple irónico», Boletín de la Institución Libre de Enseñanza, II època, 11, pp. 33-36. 78. José Luis López Aranguren, «Ferrater Mora y el estilo de la filosofía española», Boletín de la Institución Libre de Enseñanza, II època, 11, pp. 25-26. 79. Juan Marichal, «Pensador insobornable», Boletín de la Institución Libre de Enseñanza, II època, 11, pp. 27-28. 80. Antoni Mora, «José Ferrater Mora, un diccionario», El Ciervo, 481, pp. 26-29. 81. Javier Muguerza, «La desaparición de un maestro», Boletín de la Institución Libre de Enseñanza, II època, 11, pp. 29-32. 82. Carlos Nieto Blanco, «El legado filosófico de José Ferrater Mora», Diálogo filosófico, 20, pp. 251-254. 83. Julio Ortega Villalobos, «José Ferrater Mora», Isegoría, 4, pp. 227-228. 84. Julio Ortega Villalobos, «El talante filosófico de José Ferrater Mora», Boletín del Ilustre Colegio Oficial de Doctores y Licenciados en Filosofía y Letras y en Ciencias de Madrid, april. 85. Julio Ortega Villalobos, «La desaparición de un filósofo», Boletín del seminario de Filosofía del I. B. «Severo Ochoa» de Alcobendas (february) Madrid. 86. Julio Ortega Villalobos, «Semblanza de un transterrado (Ferrater Mora)», Paideia. Revista de la Sociedad de Profesores de Filosofía de España (october), Madrid. 87. Joan Pagès, «Integracionisme and continuisme: mètode and ontologia en la filosofia de Josep Ferrater Móra», Revista de Catalunya, 53, pp. 24-38. 88. Ignacio Sánchez Cámara, «El integracionismo de Ferrater Mora y su impronta orteguiana», Revista de Occidente, 120, pp. 127-142. 89. Josep-Maria Terricabras, Josep Ferrater and Mora, retrat filosòfic, sonor enregistrament, Ateneu Barcelonès, Barcelona. 1992 90. Antoni Mora, «Inauguración de la Biblioteca de la Cátedra Ferrater Mora, de Girona», Boletín de la Institución Libre de Enseñanza, 15, pp. 85-86. 91. Julio Ortega Villalobos, «Entrevista con José Ferrater Mora sobre su estancia en Chile», Boletín de la Institución Libre de Enseñanza, 15, pp. 87-88. 1993 92. Isaías Hernández León, «Cinco etapas evolutivas en el pensamiento filosófico de José Ferrater Mora. Un estudio de análisis», thesys of the Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México. 93. Denis Huisman, «El ser y la muerte: bosquejo de filosofía integracionista», in Dictionaire des mille oeuvres clés de la philosophie, Éditions Nathan, París.

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94. José Lasaga, «Correspondencia José Ferrater Mora-Antonio Rodríguez Huéscar», Boletín de la Institución Libre de Enseñanza, II època, 16, pp. 7-34. 95. José Lasaga, «Correspondencia José Ferrater Mora-Antonio Rodríguez Huéscar (2ª parte)», Boletín de la Institución Libre de Enseñanza, II època, 17, pp. 7-34. 96. Josep-Maria Terricabras, «José Ferrater Mora. An integrationist philosopher», Man and World. An International Philosophical Review, 26 (2), pp. 209-218. 1994 97. Salvador Giner and Esperanza Guisán, eds., José Ferrater Mora: el hombre y su obra, Universidad de Santiago de Compostela, Santiago de Compostel·la. 98. Jesús Mosterín, «Semblanza de José Ferrater Mora», in Juan José Acero et al., Perspectivas actuales de lógica y filosofía de la ciencia, Siglo XXI, Madrid, pp. 495-508. 99. Julio Ortega Villalobos, «Ferrater Mora: el período chileno de su filosofía», Actas de las I Jornadas de la Asociación de Hispanismo filosófico, Trotta, Madrid. 100. M. Villegas and Josep Virgili Ibarz Serrat, «Aproximación a la psicología en la obra de Ferrater Mora», Revista de historia de la psicología, 15:3-4, pp. 205-214. 1995 101. Juan Marichal, «El universo de Ferrater: sobre José Ferrater Mora: el hombre y su obra, de Salvador Giner y Esperanza Guisán [eds.]», Saber leer, 84, p. 12. 1996 102. Julio Ortega Villalobos, «José Ferrater Mora en Chile: filosofía y exilio», El Basilisco, 21, pp. 86-89. 1997 103. Biruté Ciplijauskaité, «‘Sacar de ti tu mejor tú’: un escorzo de José Ferrater Mora», Hispania, 80:2, pp. 280-282. 104. Denis Huisman, «El ser y la muerte: bosquejo de filosofía integracionista», in Diccionario de las mil obras clave del pensamiento, tr. by Carmen García Trevijano, Tecnos, Madrid, pp. 688-689. 1998

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105. Julio Ortega Villalobos, «El exilio cultural y filosófico español en Chile. Propuestas de investigación para un drama ejemplar», Estudios de literatura y pensamiento hispánico de la Sociedad Menéndez Pelayo de Santander, 9, Estudios sobre historia del pensamiento español (Actas de las III Jornadas de Hispanismo Filosófico), pp. 295-302.

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106. Julio Ortega Villalobos, «José Ferrater Mora en Chile: filosofía y exilio», Boletín de la Institución Libre de Enseñanza, II època, 31, pp. 39-50. 1999 107. Joaquim Romaguera Ramió, «Josep Ferrater and Mora: escriptor cinematogràfic: cineasta», Revista de Catalunya, 145, pp. 53-73. 108. Conrad Vilanou Torrano, «Josep Ferrater Mora and la pedagogia: recuperació d’un text oblidat», Educació and història: Revista d’història de l’educació, 4, pp. 134-141. 2000 109. Antoni Mora, «Ferrater Mora, bajo el imperio de la ley», Hacia un nuevo inventario de la ciencia española. Actas de las IV Jornadas de Hispanismo Filosófico, Asociación de Hispanismo filosófico/Sociedad Menéndez Pelayo, Santander, pp. 391-412. 110. Julio Ortega Villalobos, «La idea de España y Cataluña en Ferrater Mora», in Hacia un nuevo inventario de la ciencia española. Actas de las IV Jornadas de Hispanismo Filosófico, Asociación de Hispanismo filosófico/Sociedad Menéndez Pelayo, Santander, pp. 379-390. 111. Julio Ortega Villalobos, «Filosofía y literatura: los mundos posibles en Ferrater Mora», Instituto Fe y Secularidad, Memoria académica 1999-2000, Madrid. 112. José Ricardo Morales, «El arte de enterarse (el destierro en el pensamiento de José Ferrater Mora)», in Ensayos en suma. Del escritor, el intelectual y sus mundos, Biblioteca Nueva, Madrid, pp. 195-218. 2001 113. Jesús Mosterín, «Josep Ferrater Mora», a Filosofia del segle XX a Catalunya: mirada retrospectiva, IV Cicle Aranguren, col. «Aula de Ciència and Cultura, 11», Fundació Caixa de Sabadell, Sabadell, pp. 199-208. 114. Julio Ortega Villalobos, «El exilio filosófico español en Venezuela, Argentina y Chile», in El exilio cultural de la guerra civil (1936-1939), Universidad de Salamanca, Salamanca, pp. 139-150. 2002 115. Eulàlia Collelldemont Pujadas and Conrad Vilanou Torrano, «Ferrater Mora y la tradición pedagógica republicana», Boletín de la Institución Libre de Enseñanza, 47, pp. 7-22. 116. Antoni Mora, «Las escrituras de José Ferrater Mora», El Ateneo: revista científica, literaria y artística, 11, pp. 43-52. 155

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2003 117. Amauri Francisco Gutiérrez Coto, «La filosofía española contemporánea y el grupo origenista de poetas creyentes: una colaboración de José Ferrater Mora», Vitral, 55. 118. Josep-Maria Terricabras, «Josep Ferrater Mora, filòsof», L’Espill, 13, pp. 139-148. 119. Josep-Maria Terricabras, «El llegat de Ferrater Mora», L’Avenç, 276, pp. 57-58. 2004 120. Llàtzer Bria et al., «Diccionario de filosofía», in Los libros de los filósofos: diccionarioresumen de 850 obras de filosofía y antología de citas, Ariel, Barcelona, pp. 183-184. 2005 121. Carlos Nieto Blanco, «El mundo desde dentro: una aproximación al discurso ontológico de Ferrater Mora», Revista de Hispanismo Filosófico, 10, pp. 59-72. 122. Oriol Ponsatí Murlà, «Les formes de la vida catalana. Una visió des de l’exili», L’Avenç, 305, pp. 24-28. 123. Joaquim Romaguera Ramió, Diccionari del cinema a Catalunya, Enciclopèdia Catalana, Barcelona, pp. 257-258. 2006 124. Eduardo Bello, «Three Spanish Philosophers: Unamuno, Ortega and Ferrater Mora», review, Δαίμωυ. Revista de filosofía, 37, pp. 210-212. 125. Marta Torregrosa, «Peirce en el Diccionario de filosofía de José Ferrater Mora», Revista anthropos: huellas del conocimiento, 212, pp. 183-185. 2007 126. Josep-Maria Terricabras, coord., La filosofia de Ferrater Mora, Documenta Universitària, Girona. 2008 127. Óscar Horta, La filosofía moral de J. Ferrater Mora, Documenta Universitària, Girona. 2009 128. Juan Romay Coca and Jesús A.Valero Matas, «El integracionismo como solución a las guerras de las ciencias», Intersticios. Revista Sociológica de Pensamiento Crítico, 3:2, pp. 279-283. 156

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129. Josep-Maria Terricabras, «Les formes de la vida catalana (1944-1960). Identitats», in Deu testimonis del segle XX, deu lliçons by al segle XXI, Institut d’Estudis Catalans, Barcelona, pp. 149-165, amb una contraponència de Gabriel Amengual, pp. 167-174. 130. Josep-Maria Terricabras, «El exilio español en Estados Unidos», in Manuel Garrido, Nelson R. Orringer, Luis M. Valdés and Margarita M. Valdés, coords., El legado filosófico español e hispanoamericano del siglo XX, Cátedra, Madrid, pp. 617-629. 131. Josep-Maria Terricabras, «El segundo cenit de Ferrater Mora», a Manuel Garrido, Nelson R. Orringer, Luis M. Valdés and Margarita M. Valdés, coords., El legado filosófico español e hispanoamericano del siglo XX, Cátedra, Madrid, pp. 751-760. 2010 132. Priscilla Cohn, «Ferrater Mora: A Philosopher as Novelist», Enrahonar, 44, pp. 11-21. 133. Óscar Horta, «Un reino de este mundo: las aportaciones en ética de Ferrater Mora», Enrahonar, 44, pp. 35-49. 134. Andrew Linzey, «‘Enemies of human beings’: Josep Ferrater Mora on blood fiestas», Enrahonar, 44, pp. 23-34. 135. Carlos Nieto Blanco, «Idioma y filosofía en el pensamiento de José Ferrater Mora», in José Luis Mora García et al., La filosofía y las lenguas de la península ibérica. Actas de las VIII y IX jornadas internacionales de hispanismo filosófico, Fundación Ignacio Larramendi/Asociación de Hispanismo Filosófico/Real Sociedad Menéndez Pelayo/Societat Catalana de Filosofia, Madrid, pp. 295-322. 136. Carlos Nieto Blanco, «Cultura y política en el pensamiento de José Ferrater Mora», in Antolín Sánchez Cuervo and Fernando Hermida de Blas, coords., Pensamiento exiliado español. El legado filosófico del 39 y su dimensión iberoamericana, Biblioteca Nueva/CSIC, Madrid, pp. 126-163. 137. Xavier Serra Labrado, «Dos llibres de Josep Ferrater Mora», in Història social de la filosofia catalana. La lògica (1900-1980), Afers, Catarroja, pp. 131-170. 138. Marta Torregrosa and Jaime Nubiola, «Altre cop, el pragmatisme: Ferrater Mora and Eugeni d’Ors», in Josep-Maria Terricabras, ed., El pensament d’Eugeni d’Ors, Documenta Universitària, Girona. 2012 139. Francisco Abad Nebot, «Semblanza de José Ferrater Mora (1912-1991)», Revista de lenguas y literaturas catalana, gallega y vasca, 17, pp. 255-258. 140. Damià Bardera, «L’obra narrativa de Josep Ferrater Mora: una anàlisi del relat ‘Voltaire en Nueva York’», master work of the Universitat de Girona, 2011-2012. 141. Jordi Gracia, «El compromís d’un pensador o la vocació de Ferrater Mora», Via. Valors, Idees, Actituds: revista del centre d’estudis Jordi Pujol, 19, pp. 52-68.

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142. Frederic Ribas, «Narcís Feliu de la Penya and Josep Ferrater Mora. Una llicó de civilitat and d’eficàcia», Revista de Catalunya, 278, pp. 85-90. 143. «Suplement especial pel centenari del naixement de Josep Ferrater Mora», ARA (23 d’april). 144. A. Josep M. Puigjaner, «Els catalans dibuixats by Ferrater Mora», Butlletí del Centre d’Estudis Jordi Pujol, 317 (22 de november). 145. B. Salvador Giner, «Meditació de Catalunya. A guisa de proemi by a Les formes de la vida catalana, de Josep Maria Ferrater», see B106. 2013 145. Pompeu Casanovas, «Josep Ferrater Mora and la història intel·lectual: mètode, ontologia and ontologies», Anuari de la Societat Catalana de Filosofia, XXIV, pp. 63-111. 146. Damià Bardera, «Els anuncis d’Estrella Damm: les antiformes de la vida catalana», in Damià Bardera and Eudald Espluga, Mediterròniament. La catalanitat emocional, llibre electrònic, Biblioteca del Núvol, 6, pp. 7-35. 147. Josep Borrell, Del silici a la raó, Documenta Universitària, Girona. 148. Roberto Dalla Mora, «José Ferrater Mora (1912-1991). En el centenario del nacimiento», Revista de Hispanismo Filosófico, 18, pp. 358-363. 149. Jordi Gracia, «Ferrater Mora o la gracia de la razón», Claves de razón práctica, 227, pp. 158-165. 150. Clara Alicia Jalif de Bertranou, «Francisco Romero y sus cartas con intelectuales españoles exiliados. José Ferrater Mora», Revista de Hispanismo Filosófico, 18, pp. 89-114. 2014

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151. Roberto Dalla Mora: «La estética de José Ferrater Mora, pensador y artista mediterráneo», in Filosofías del Sur. Actas de las XI Jornadas de Hispanismo Filosófico, electronic book, Asociación de Hispanismo Filosófico y Fundación Larramendi, Madrid, in press. 152. Roberto Dalla Mora: «La breve y sugerente mirada de José Ferrater Mora sobre El Quijote», in La recepción de «El Quijote» en el pensamiento español del siglo XX, Fondo de Cultura Económica, Mèxic, in press 153. Pompeu Casanovas, in this volume. 154. Jordi Sales and Coderch, in this volume. 155. Josep-Maria Terricabras, in this volume. 156. Xavier Serra [memorialística], in this volume. 157. Joan Cuscó, in this volume. 158. Begoña Román, in this volume. 159. Josep Monserrat Molas, in this volume.

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osep Ferrater Mora, Les formes de la vida catalana [The Character of Catalan Life] Edicions 62, Barcelona, 2012

Joan Cuscó i Clarasó jcusco@vinseum.cat

The centenary of the birth of Josep Ferrater Mora, one of the foremost Catalan philosophers of the XXth. century, has been marked by the reissue of one of his most interesting books: Les formes de la vida catalana [The Character of Catalan Life]. The first edition of the book came out in 1944 in Chile, where Ferrater Mora had gone into exile. At the time, he was in the company of a number of other Catalan intellectuals, such as writer Xavier Benguerel and poet Joan Oliver (who published under the pseudonym “Pere Quart”), and it was their encouragement that pushed him to write and publish this book on Catalonia and the Catalan people. From an intellectual perspective, the Catalonia of the first two decades of the XXth. century was a place in ferment.There was the cut and thrust of Modernisme and its authors, the Noucentisme movement was emerging at the hands of Eugeni d’Ors, and it was a new breeding ground for writers of an anarchist, free-thinking or bohemian bent. Fresh ideas, fresh projects and fresh institutions furnished an abundance of new things, especially an enormous enthusiasm. And this cultural revival arrived together with the firm establishment of political Catalan nationalism.Throughout this process, though, there was a problem. Joan Estelrich spotted it in 1925.The problem was a lack of cohesion and continuity and an excess of Messianism and cults of personality. Soon, though, came the Spanish Civil War (1936-1939) and the situation changed radically, Catalan intellectuals went into exile and any hint of political or cultural sovereignty was quashed. Ferrater Mora follows the guidelines advanced by Eugeni d’Ors, but writes his work after the war, from exile (when Catalonia has been left without print media or cultural and political institutions, and its language has been banned; when Spain is a monolithic dictatorship imposing uniformity, and republican and democratic ideals have been scattered to the four winds).This is the

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context that defines the aims of a book written so that the Catalan people are not led by their sorrows into the pridefulness of a blind nationalism or toward the resentment that “crushes the roots of existence and dries up the sap of life”. In the first third of the XXth. century and then again in the second half of the century, Catalonia and the Catalans were a constant focus of consideration, much more so than in other cultures. At times, the topic provided an outlet for anarchic exuberance. At other times, the aim was resistance to an adverse context. Les formes, which straddles the two time periods in question, offers a highly personal vision of the country and its character. Ferrater Mora, as one of the best and brightest Catalan intellectuals of the time, imbibes deeply from the work of Eugeni d’Ors.This is his starting point. (He quotes d’Ors often and takes from him the sardana — a popular Catalan dance — as a symbol of the Catalan character.) Ultimately, he produced a work of thought that might be viewed as philosophical anthropology, but is rather an exercise more closely in keeping with the philosophy of language. It clarifies concepts. And it is a work that was keen to be revisited in the future. In fact, it is one of the few books that Ferrater Mora wrote in Catalan, and a text that, in some sense, opened the way for other books, such as España y Europa [Spain and Europe] (1942) and its companion volume Tres mundos: Cataluña, España, Europa [Three Worlds: Catalonia, Spain, Europe] (1963). In addition, a number of the reflections in Les formes are drafted into service again in later texts, such as “Catalanització de Catalunya” [“Catalanisation of Catalonia”] (1960), which were included in various editions of Ferrater’s work. In Les formes, Ferrater succumbs to an overly pure analysis of the Catalan people’s mode of being, much like the one offered up by Eugeni d’Ors in 1911 in his volume La ben plantada [The Elegant Woman] and its synthesis of the Noucentisme movement. Because of this, Les formes provoked a brilliant and emphatic critique in 1968 from Rodolf Llorens i Jordana, in exile in Caracas.This is the same Rodolf Llorens who had already, back in 1936, turned the work of Eugeni d’Ors completely on its head, directly taking on La ben plantada with his own book, La ben nascuda [The High-Born Woman] (reissued in 2005), which was a subversion of Noucentisme conceived by Llorens in a cell of Barcelona’s Model Prison, where he had been incarcerated for his involvement in the events of 4 October 1934, that is, after he had come to see (and live at first hand) how the philosophy of Eugeni d’Ors was of little use in grasping the political and social reality of Catalonia at the time.

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Llorens’s response to Ferrater’s Les formes is the book Com hem estat i com som els catalans [The Way We Catalans Have Been and the Way We Are], which was originally published by Ariel, in Barcelona, and reissued in 2009. In it, Llorens dismantles what Ferrater Mora had raised up as the four central pillars of the Catalan people: continuity, good sense, measure and irony.And together with JaumeVicensVives’s Notícia de Catalunya [News from Catalonia] and Joan Fuster’s Nosaltres, els valencians [We, the Valencians], it is a crucial work for grasping contemporary Catalan culture.

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When asked about Rodolf Llorens’s objections, Ferrater said that they were spot-on, just as it was spot-on to say that his book, thanks to such a reaction, had opened up a fruitful dialogue; that, as you all know, dialogue is thought in motion, and that is always good. From dialogue comes “seny”, or good sense. This is the just measure that springs from the clash of opposing views.As Ferrater Mora liked to say:“if the just measure consists of stopping in the middle of the road between extremes that are more or less mechanically combined, it deserves the low esteem in which it is held. But if the just measure is the result of hewing to a reality or a situation as closely as possible after an in-depth exploration of the extremes that have failed to represent it, then perspectives shift.”The issue is to reject absorbing “common sense” into “good sense” (as Eugeni d’Ors was keen to observe). To understand the notion better, we can play back Ferrater’s own words:“Colleagues who have called me out for my excessive idealisation are more than justified (…). But does that mean that the ideal-typical method put to use at that time was entirely fruitless? I think not: it has served its function as a starting point for discussion”. Les formes de la vida catalana also offers a highly personal, largely underdocumented take on the character of the Catalan people. The view is very subjective and somewhat elitist in tone. As with many of Ferrater’s essays, it suffers from the author’s over-enthusiasm when setting out his options and ideas but then, just when we get to the final pages, the text seems to retract everything said up to that point and, before anybody can take issue with Ferrater’s arguments, he acknowledges that “Catalan life is, like all human existence, ultimately irreducible. For this reason, an analysis of the sort I have endeavoured to do here aims only to describe it, not to go so far as to truly comprehend it”. That Ferrater’s caution is excessive points as well to a certain haste in the initial preparation of the book, a haste arising more out of the political context than out of the strength of the author’s intention. Today’s reader, therefore, needs to take into account, first, that when Ferrater wrote Les formes, he was among a cohort of determined and quite fervent peers living in exile; second, that he was a person whose sense of irony bordered on the sceptical; and, third, that his thinking was to evolve with the passing of the years as his style, too, gained in refinement. One of his prime concerns was always to match form to content. Why do I say this? To grasp better what we are reading and because in texts written after 1944 (which have gradually been incorporated into later editions of Les formes), Ferrater says fascinating things for his time as well as for the present circumstances in which Catalan culture finds itself, for example, his observation of the difference between the rhythms of Catalonia and those of the rest of Spain.Take two examples: “History is not simply the realisation of a possibility, but rather reality itself ” and “a people cannot spend its life in relentless renewal. If such a neverending rebirth brings out its vitality, it also brings out something essentially incomplete and lacking”.

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For this reason, Les formes is a book of historic value and its reissue makes sense in order to better think about the present day and reflect on the vast number of works written in the twentieth century on the Catalan people and Catalonia as a symptom not only of discontent or of enthusiasm, but also of an inadequacy of successful good sense, vitality and continuity. I think he sums it up perfectly himself, where we read in this book:“that the Catalan is someone for whom Catalonia is like a white-hot iron, but an iron out of which must be forged a handsome escritoire, rather than being left miserably to cool or handled wildly, frantically, to draw forth a few fleeting sparks”. All told, it must be said that by this point Ferrater has departed considerably from his original intention in writing about the “character” of the Catalans.While the initial aim of the text was to reach readers who were not Catalan, the interlocutor gradually changes until Ferrater winds up addressing himself entirely to the Catalans (who had lost the war and the country). And the book bristles and chafes at this switch of interlocutors (or, as Ferrater himself defines it at the beginning of the essay, this “change of destiny”). In any case, and in relation to essays written by earlier authors on the subject, Les formes has the ability to open up a space for reflection in which the aim is not to glorify the Catalans, but rather to invite them to live as fully as possible. And to do so, it is necessary to have clear ideas and to know that the greatest degree of independence also entails the greatest degree of dialogue, that life is a constant movement by which one opens oneself up to reality. From exile, Ferrater does not describe (as he claims to do) a “Catalan attitude” toward life, an attitude far removed from resentment or nostalgia, but rather sets the “rules of the game” needed to achieve such an attitude. In his essay, Ferrater points to four essential features — or, more precisely, two pairs of features — to describe the “character” of Catalan life: continuity and measure, on the one hand, and good sense and irony, on the other. He sees the first pair as formal, the second pair as material. However, they form a tightly-knit fabric, because continuity and good sense relate to the group, and measure and irony concern the individual. In addition, the formal features embrace all of life, while the material features give life content. Together, they endow life with meaning and enhance our awareness. The most important is continuity, whereas the one that seems to us most fully worked out and adopted is irony. Good sense is heir to the sophrosyne and sapientia of the Classical World, and measure is the ability to advance arguments that proceed within the bounds of experience and reason. Ferrater studied these four features of the Catalan character in search of their limits and possibilities, and proposed a model for living based on them. Of these four features in his book, the one that he best embodies as an author is irony. Ultimately, what he brought to the table was his unwavering desire for clarity so that Catalan life should grow in self-awareness and become more cultured, civilised and creative (as he lets us glimpse in a handful of lines in which he paraphrases d’Ors). 162

Translation from Catalan by Joel Graham

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scar Horta, La filosofia moral de Josep Ferrater Mora Documenta Universitària, Girona, 2008

Begoña Román Maestre University of Barcelona broman@ub.edu

A great way to honor Josep Ferrater Mora’s work on the centennial of his birth would be to revisit one of the lesser-known and hence less recognized areas of his thought. That’s precisely what this book does. Horta’s book develops a thorough analysis of Ferrater’s moral philosophy, thereby furthering the knowledge and appreciation of his original contributions to the field of applied ethics. The book, then, also serves to acquaint us with some key issues of current moral philosophy. The book not only explains Ferrater’s approaches and propositions, but also places his work within the wider context of his contemporaries (Foot, Anscombe, Harsanyi, Rawls, Singer), explaining the occasional, often unorthodox peculiarities that distinguish his thinking from that of the rest. Moreover, he goes a step beyond merely explaining Ferrater’s texts, speculating on the positions Ferrater might have adopted in keeping with his philosophical method (when not ending in uncertainty after an exhaustive analysis of possibilities). At times, Horta even takes issue with a few inconsistencies, inaccuracies or shortcomings in Ferrater’s arguments. The book is thorough and lucid: the author always offers a conceptual analysis of terms, such as “realism”, “naturalism”, “subjectivism” or “relativism”, thereby ensuring that the labels attached to Ferrater’s ideas are given the appropriate meaning. Horta places greater value on philosophy committed to the present, as the essay’s three parts each conclude by referring to the fact that Ferrater’s philosophy was “realistic”, not in the sense of “objectivism”, but instead in having its “feet on the ground”, in keeping with the problems of the people alive at the time. Ferrater was one of the first thinkers to devote himself to an area such as applied ethics, which was barely recognized academically on the peninsula at that time. In fact, Horta salutes Ferrater’s pioneering effort,

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acknowledging that it was largely through his dedication to the subject that the discipline earned prestige. The study is based mainly on two of Ferrater’s books on moral philosophy, which the author considers essential: From Matter to Reason and Applied Ethics. Its structure is divided into three sections: the first is the longest, as it provides the systematic framework that endows the rest with meaning, and deals with meta-ethics; the second is devoted to normative ethics, and the third to applied ethics, particularly the moral consideration of nonhuman animals. Ferrater’s meta-ethical argument centers on the idea that moral acts are real, but not in the Platonic sense of belonging to a separate and independent statute away from the world of facts: moral facts, according to Ferrater’s four levels of monistic ontology (physical, organic, social and cultural) are cultural constuctions relative to the context in which they are produced. So he proposes an Emergentist monism with moral implications: there is no fixism, no center, no place of privilege reserved for human beings, who construct cultural products as a means for adapting themselves, for satisfying their needs in the best way possible. Ferrater bases his normative ethics on the Aristotelian theory of action, acknowledging the ends by which things are done. In classifying the ends, he considers three of them to be what he calls “super-sufficient”: life, equality, and freedom. But here all resemblance with Aristotle ends, because Ferrater’s basis is not metaphysical, but instead is coherent with his four levels of monistic ontology in which he considers the ends to be relative to their historical contexts, they are universally “preferable” for the majority of beings who have interest in how life occurs, but revisable from start to finish. In order to avoid confusion, it’s better to refer to them as “interests” instead of “ends” or “preferences”.

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Horta employs such precision in order to make Ferrater more coherent and demonstrates that there are really only two “super-sufficient” ends, since the interest in equality is in fact secondary. He goes so far as to sustain that Ferrater would have been correct in stating explicitly that interest lies in having positive experiences of pleasure, and dodging the negative, painful ones: this explanation is the vehicle for understanding Ferrater’s specific points about life and freedom. These “super-sufficient” interests or ends are minimal and there are a number of different ways to satisfy them. Ferrater’s moral philosophy ends up being tolerant, anti-dogmatic and anti-anthropocentric, and for that reason he defends the idea of revisability, or the ongoing critical analysis of social arrangements to avoid the “crystallization of morality”. Human nature does not exist; everything is historic, in flux. In the same way that equality is not merely inter-human.

Journal of Catalan Intellectual History. Issues 7&8. 2014. P. 163-166 Óscar Horta, La filosofia moral de Josep Ferrater Mora

However, Ferrater’s normative ethics are not relativistic: duties, obligations, and justifications apply, and not everything goes. Certainly, extrinsic moral categorical imperatives do not exist in any moral epoch: everything proceeds by way of agreements reached between social groups. However, they must be justified once they’re established as the most suitable pacts for life. Here, he approaches Rawls’s constructivism: the principles of justice are built by contract. But unlike Rawls, they don’t issue from ignorance, but from the sharpest understanding of the reality of the moment; it’s not a matter of universal justice, but what is validated by a society that has so approved, and furthermore, it always proceeds from the bottom and moves upwards. Since the group and not the individual decide the concepts of right and wrong, Ferrater’s moral philosophy doesn’t focus on the personal, but on social and political ethics. It rejects any extrinsic moral, metaphysical or natural objectivism, and it does so counter to any absolutism; humans are physical, organic, social and cultural, and their moral constructions are therefore also social and cultural. That’s why moral motivation is rooted in sociobiology, because the phylogenetic evolution of humanity explains why certain preferences are chosen over others. In the third and final section, Horta takes up the field of applied ethics, to which Ferrater devoted the last twelve years of his life, focusing on the moral consideration of nonhuman animals. Although Ferrater never wrote a book on the subject, it was a central element in his thinking, tied as it is to the rejection of anthropocentrism. Through Horta’s pondered reading of Ferrater’s two principal books under study, he demonstrates how the philosopher goes too far in linking the question of moral consideration of nonhuman animals, to environmental ethics; both issues clearly divide into separate areas in the Dictionary, where the very specific entries could only have come from Ferrater’s thinking, given his particular philosophical interests, (“speciesism”, “sentient equality”, “animal liberation”, or the broad concept of differential rights). An analysis of these entries allows one to see the accuracy of Ferrater’s critique of anthropocentrism, where he incorporates it into the context of racism and discusses the rights of non-human animals not as universal rights and objectives, but as being protectors of their own interests, such as the right to live free and in health, in their natural environment. These entries give the best demonstration of how Ferrater’s thinking evolved: the paramount interest in living positive experiences of pleasure and avoiding negative ones took the place of a maladroit Leibnizian defense of the pluralistic ontology of biodiversity, or the notion that such biodiversity somehow enriches the human aesthetic. There is no ontological hierarchy between human and nonhuman animals, no moral hierarchy, no substantive difference, beyond merely that of status. No crucial difference exists. Although Horta does challenge and correct

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Ferrater by revealing a weakness in his argument, which leans more heavily upon some of P. Cohn’s approaches than Ferrater himself admits in Applied Ethics, especially when it incurs the logical fallacy of transferring the denial of ontological anthropocentrism to the denial of moral anthropocentrism. Following in Ferrater’s footsteps, Horta advocates making a distinction between responsible moral agents (only humans, and not all of them) and individuals who have interests (and therefore rights, and worthy of moral consideration), which defines all human and nonhuman animals (a more universalizing benchmark that also holds greater moral relevance). Translation from Catalan by Valerie J. Miles

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osé Ferrater Mora, Three Spanish Philosophers. Unamuno, Ortega and Ferrater Mora,

edited and with an Introduction by J. M. Terricabras, Albany, State University of New York Press, (SUNY series in Latin American and Iberian thought and culture), 2003. ISBN 0-7914-5713-3. 268 p.

Josep Monserrat Molas Universitat de Barcelona jmonserrat@ub.edu

Three Spanish Philosophers introduces the English versions realized by Ferrater Mora of his works on Unamuno (Unamuno: A Philosophy of Tragedy, 1962), Ortega y Gasset (Ortega y Gasset: An Outline of His Philosophy, second edition, 1963) and the third chapter of his Being and Death: An Outline of Integrationist Philosophy (1965, entitled «Human Death»). Each text is accompanied by a brief editor’s note, which informs the reader about the different versions of those works, by a biographical note of every philosopher and, finally, by a bibliography of their main works, sources and updated secondary bibliography about the author in question. This added material enriches the work and turns, undoubtedly, an already valuable and engaging book into a useful text for scholars. The merit is acknowledged in that respect to the editor, Josep M. Terricabras, who signs also the introduction (p. 1-9). In the introduction, the texts of the edition are presented in a clear and sufficient manner; more concise for the first two works, more extensive for the commentary on Ferrater Mora since, being an excerpted text from a langer work, and not a complete work as in the case of Unamuno and Ortega, it must be conveniently set in context. The result is a group of brief but clear pages on Ferrater Mora’s thought: «integrationism». As awhole, the volume can be seen as an introduction to the thought of three philosophers of different generations offering, in turn, a penetrating look at human existence. Physiologic anthropology becomes one of the lines, if not the main, which can be followed in a global reading of the work. According to Josep M.Terricabras, Ferrater Mora «provides us with two synthetic and brilliant versions of Unamuno’s and Ortega’s rich and complex thought; that is, he produces two introductory and thought-provoking versions of their thought, without in

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the least reducing their substantial content. From his own work, he offers us a chapter which clearly reveals both his conceptual rigour in dealing with complex matters and his ability to express those matters in an extremely clear form» (p. 7). It may be remembered that, when the two volumes of his Obras Selectas were published by Editorial Revista de Occidente on 1967, Ferrater Mora gathered in a section entitled «Tres maestros», his prior studies dedicated to Unamuno, Ortega and Eugenio d’Ors: Unamuno: bosquejo de una filosofía, Ortega y Gasset: etapas de una filosofía and the chapter about Ors first published in El llibre del sentit (1948). For the edition in Obras Selectas, Ferrater modified the texts, as he used to do, and inform the readers about the different versions and ed rewritings in different languages (Catalan, Spanish and English) due to the authoris publishing o dyssey. In a modification full of sense, the gathering of «masters» realized by Ferrater Mora in 1967 is changed by another gathering, the gathering of philosophers. Three Spanish Philosophers consists of three of Ferrater Mora’s works: the English versions of renowned studies on Unamuno and Ortega y Gasset in addition to a significant fragment of his Being and Death: An Outline of Integrationist Philosophy. We think that the substitution of Ors for Ferrater Mora is due to the editor, Josep M. Terricabras, director of the Ferrater Mora Chair. This substitution upgrades the category undoubtedly: from masters to philosophers. In the introduction to this English edition, it is remarked that «Ors is not represented here» (p. 3). More important than that, for us, is the recognition of Xavier Zubiri, together with Unamuno, Ortega and Ferrater, as «the most important Spanish philosophers of the century». The remains of the previous selection of Ferrater Mora in Obras Selectas emerge have and theve in the new book. «But in view of the philosophical character of Unamuno’s work, and because a substantial part of it developed contemporaneously with the work of Ortega y Gasset and Eugenio d’Ors —who were born almost twenty years after Unamuno— we may even lump these three together in a special group connected with, but in no way dependent upon, the ideals promoted by the great majority of members of the Generation of 1898» (p. 20). «By 1914, Unamuno had become the undisputed mentor of many young Spaniards.This does not mean that he was often violently opposed. But this towering figure made itself felt in the arena of Spanish thought, and there vied for leadership with the other outstanding figures of his time. His chief competitors were Ortega y Gasset [...] and Eugenio d’Ors [...].The writing of these two differed considerably from Unamuno’s both in style and content. Ortega offered a continental manner that was more than a servile imation of Europe, and d’Ors a twentieth-century viewpoint that was infinitely more appealing than an irrational exaltation of our Age» (pp. 28-29).

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Ferrater Mora’s interpretation of Unamuno is well known. In particular we would point out the characterization of Unamuno based on his relation to the «word» (cap. 5). «For Unamuno, the task of the philologist —the “true”

Journal of Catalan Intellectual History. Issues 7&8. 2014. P. 167-170 José Ferrater Mora, Three Spanish Philosophers. Unamuno, Ortega and Ferrater Mora

philologist— was not merely that of chasing words in order to pluck out their meaning, structure, or relationships; it was to enter into them in order to live —or die— with them. If Unamuno combated and despised the professional philologists, the “exhumers” of words or traditions, it was because he wished to be a philologist by vocation, that is a philosopher» (pp. 76-77). And we should recall that for Ferrater Mora himself, «the contradictory» is the pillar or the axis of the book as a note of what is real: «What Unamuno sometimes called “the contradictory”, and what is more properly labelled “the constant conflict of opposites”, is also real. The real exists in a state of combat —at war with an opposite and at war with itself. Here we have one of the pillars —not to say the axis— of this book» (pp. 97). There is no doubt that contrast with Ferrater Mora’s «integrationism» is stressed in these analyses of Unamuno. We highlight the following quotation, which also represents Unamuno, in contrast precisely with Ortega y Gasset and with d’Ors: «Unamuno was not a spectator, like Ortega y Gasset, nor a preceptor, like Eugenio d’Ors, but as Ernst Robert Curtius has written, an “exciter”: excitator and not praeceptor or spectator Hispaniae». From the interpretation on Ortega y Gasset, it is remarkable the way its intellectual itinerary is presented. The key consists in considering that Ortega progressively expresess himself as his philosophy gets its own justification: «At any event, what philosophers can learn from Ortega is that ‘the first principle of a philosophy is the justification of itself.’ Ortega himself never lost sight of this necessity» (p. 189). Ferrater Mora would tend to make of «Ortega’s ontology» the focus of his intellectual development. «Although Ortega developed some of his ideas about reality and being very early in his philosophy career, he did not formulate them rigorously until 1925. He discussed these ideas again and again until they gained a central importance in his thought. We can even conclude that Ortega’s ideas on reality and being — which we shall abbreviate as ‘Ortega’s ontology’— have always been the guiding thread of his philosophical adumbrations. Thus, they can be considered as the most important unifying factor throughout all the phases of his intellectual development. »Blending humility with pride Ortega did not consider his ontology as a particular theory which he had discovered by a lucky stroke. He rather described such an ontology as ‘the present state of philosophy’ or, to use his own words, as ‘philosophy at the present day level.’ [...] Now, integrating the present with the past is not tantamount to accepting all the past philosophical doctrines, and even less to blending them more or less eclectically. The present is integrated with the past only when the latter is assumed by the former. Now, to ‘assume’ the past is not to stand for it, but rather to stand by it» (pp. 180-181). It is not in vain that we quote this passage at length, since we seek to contrast Unamuno and Ortega y Gasset «ontologies» with Ferrater Mora’s «philosophy»: «integrationism».

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The third chapter of Ferrater’s Being and Death introduces an «anthropology» in its first five epigraphs (20-24), an anthropology involving the possibility of confronting a series of paradoxes presented in epigraph 25. Both the anthropology and the paradoxes are contrasted in the last five epigraphs of the chapter with the peculiar human kind of «mortality», a contrast which confirms and endorses the main results of the anthropology (26-30). The ontology can be summarily outlined in this way: «although man is also an inorganic reality (a cluster of inorganic systems) and, to be sure, a biological organism, his existence is not entirely explicable in terms of purely inorganic and organic substances. As a consequence, man’s mode of cessation —his peculiar kind of “mortality”— should not be entirely explicable in terms of the modes of cessations of such substances» (p. 229-230). The application of his integrationist method allows Ferrater Mora to integrate, using the contributions of philosophy and literature, despite their difference —or, better, thanks to their differences—. In a coherent version, tension presented if it is intended to assume reality considering the poles which all explanations lead to, and which cause the paradoxes of considering men either as «mortal or immortal» being, death as that which happens to everyone the same, or that which is more strictly personal and own, or death as that which is present since our coming to life, or as that which marks, from the outside, its limit. We should agree with the editor of the book because this selection furnishes us with a great example for presenting what, his method and his philosophical point of view was for Ferrater Mora. A brief marginal note to conclude. The variation of languages became, for Ferrater Mora, an advantageous possibility for the richness of thought. His translations were re-elaborations –since reeditions of his works were already re-elaborations, more likely were the translations made by the author himself to other languages. As he puts in the preface of the English translation of El ser y la muerte. Bosquejo de una filosofía: «It is not, however, a mere duplicate, in another tongue, of the original version. It differs from the latter in various important respects» (p. 211). Such determination showed one of his deeper philosophical convictions: the richness of the variety of what is real and the thought effort required for respecting it —his «integrationism» stems from here. So it is the variety of his name, too. In Catalan, Josep. In Spanish and English he called himself ‘José Ferrater Mora’, and it seems that he always signed with his second surname because of a promise made to his mother. In the United States, he called himself ‘José María Ferrater’, since this was the only chance of conserving his surname when it was abridged into ‘J. M. Ferrater’. In an ancient Catalan edition, he was renamed in the cover with the name ‘Joan’. On the spine of the book we are reviewing, it simply says ‘Mora’. 170

This anecdote, more than enlighten us with the risks of diversity, must remind us variety involves a bigger metaphysical richness and a plurality we must respect.

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au Milà i Fontanals, Apunts d’estètica [Notes on aesthetics]

A study, selection and translation of texts by Joan Cuscó i Clarasó, Facultat de Filosofia-Universitat Ramon Llull, Barcelona, 2011

Eduard Urgell Caballeria Societat Catalana de Filosofia eduardurcas@hotmail.com

Pau Milà i Fontanals (Vilafranca del Penedès, 1810) is a key figure in Catalan thinking in the field of the theory of aesthetics. His constant struggle against the academicism which dominated the artistic world brought him to abandon his chair at the university and give up teaching, as he felt it limited his freedom of expression and he couldn’t agree with the political treatment of the fine arts. This is when he begins to make patent the difference between academics and genius. Academicism tries to rationalize and rule the aspects of art while the individual genius doesn’t weaken in his proposal to live an aesthetically free existence, unrestrained by norms which limit his creative liberty. In the meticulous preamble of his book, Joan Cuscó refers to Milà i Fontanals as an art theoretician with a notable religious sense, a fact noted in many notes which show that faith, especially Christian faith, act as a pure inspiration for arts such as poetry. Milà also makes active use of art history, highlighting different stages according to the discipline in question. He also shows us that the tendency toward abstraction and the sublime took Milà to separate himself from certain social relations, such as happened with the “Societat Giró”, over disagreements with its members. The author of this collection gives evidence of how Pau Milà i Fontanals has been undervalued simply because he was eclipsed by his brother Manuel and fled tenaciously from mechanicism of the Academy. He also takes advantage of the introductory study to set in relief how Antoni Gaudi has been ignored as an aesthetic thinker.

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As far as the interplay of influences, in the first place we find the indispensable elements of 15th century Italy, such as Michelangelo and Leonardo Da Vinci, together with one their predecessors, Giotto di Bondone, who inspired romanticism and naturalism. Milà was also a member of the group of Nazarenes, led by the romantic German painter Overbeck and his countryman Peter von Cornelius. But if he drank from excellent artistic springs, he also left an excellent legacy. After leaving the academic circles he started to exercise great influence with his oral teaching. The painter from Reus, Marià Fortuny, was his student and we find among his papers some of the notes from a class in aesthetics he took from his teacher. If that were not enough, Gaudí also received knowledge from Milà, knowledge which is clear in all his work; Gaudí’s creations are based on liberty, simplicity and resemblance to nature – the inspirational source which combines geometric and organic order. In addition, Milà shared with Jaume Balmes, a contemporary thinker, a way of understanding aesthetics broken down into different parts: the effort of the artistic task, the figure of the artist who feels pain, religion when understood as an inspirational resource, the distinction between the beautiful and the sublime... Both maintained a constant battle to save society from materialism, skepticism and nihilism. Pau Milà i Fontanal’s influence over his disciples was mostly in theory, fundamentally articulated through history, which makes it possible to live life more fully, implicating itself in the present while it preservers the artistic heritage. The most important part of the book is the publication of all known texts by Pau Milà i Fontanals. Four texts are reproduced which range from 1847 to 1878. The first is an article on Giotto published in Madrid when Milà had returned from his stay in Italy (where he shows the roots of his theoretical orientations). The second and third are handwritten notes (hitherto unpublished) of classes on aesthetics and artistic theory which he gave at the Llotja in 1851-1852. The fourth corresponds to notes Marià Fortuny took in classes by Pau Milà (taken from a notebook dated between 1849 and 1850). the fifth is his pamphlet “Children’s Aesthetics” (Estètica infantil) published by his students in 1878 and republished in 1904 (a series of verses about art).

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The collected writings show the steps on the path that led to Milà’s teaching of aesthetics and the characteristics of his system, followed by detailed distinctims among architecture, sculpture and painting, showing their typologies, techniques and fields. In the piece by taken down byFortuny he denies that art is simply imitation, as that could come to be repugnant. Continuing from this premise, he concludes that art is the spiritual representation of an idea with the aid of palpable media, with the objective of arousing an emotion in the viewer: beauty.

Journal of Catalan Intellectual History. Issues 7&8. 2014. P. 171-173 Pau Milà i Fontanals, Notes on aesthetics

Finally, we find the rhymes of Milà’s Estètica Infantil which, although he despised them, were published by his students. These simple poems try to teach society about contemplation of and opinions on art, stressing that it is not simply decorative elements, but a foundation for a good civilization. At the same time, they attempt to guide the artist, to a greater or lesser extent, in the creative process: “In art, and everything else, better a little and good than a lot and bad” or “As the culture goes, so go the arts of beauty”. Translation from Catalan by Dan Cohen

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gnasi Roviró Alemany (ed.), Estètica catalana, estètica europea. Estudis d’estètica: entre la tradició i l’actualitat [Catalan aesthetic, European aesthetic. Aesthetic studies: Between tradition and today.] Publicacions de la Facultat de Filosofia/ Universitat Ramon Llull, Barcelona, 2011

Mireia Jurado Salvans Universitat de Vic mjuradosal@gmail.com

The third volume in the collection «Philosophy and Culture» (Filosofia i Cultura) gathers a series of works, drawn towards the study of contemporary Catalan aesthetics, to draw attention to the sociocultural influence of these statements in Catalonia and Europe. Professor Giuseppe Di Giocano’s publication is the first to offer a detailed analysis of the relation between image and temporality in three very influential contemporary authors in modern aesthetics: Aby Warburg, Walter Benjamin and Theodor Adorno. Warburg establishes a duality in the images between the Apollonian and the Dionysian, the visible and the invisible, and states the new senses of the artistic images in relation with a complex, omnipresent historic memory. Benjamin and Adorno focus on the relationship image-reality. Benjamin supports a dialectical image, formed by presence and representation, which appears and becomes visible without a historical continuity. Adorno, on the other hand, understands the work of art as a display of its own content linked directly to temporality and historicity and conceives the images as dynamic processes with an indefinite number of meanings. These European statements were hard to accept in Catalonia and weren’t introduced until some years later, after the Spanish Civil War (1936-1939).

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In the second study, professor Luca Marchetti talks about the difficulty of discerning what art is in Arthur C. Danto’s philosophical interpretation. The identity of artistic constructs form the triad of productive intentionality

Journal of Catalan Intellectual History. Issues 7&8. 2014. P. 174-176 Ignasi Roviró Alemany (ed.), Catalan aesthetic, European aesthetic. Aesthetic studies: Between tradition and today

of the author, the historical and artistic context (the art world) and the piece of art itself. For Danto, each work of art is ontologically different and holds within an immutable essence and therefore, only one correct interpretation. When connecting the work of art with the context, its identity becomes totally unstable, with a continuous risk of becoming a mere object. Next, professors Ignasi Roviró, Manuel Jorba, Xavier Serra and Conrad Vilanou, present the state of their investigations about XIXth. century and early XXth. century Catalan aesthetics. In the first place, Ignasi Roviró goes more deeply into one of the paths to liberal thought and the influence of the English aesthetic in Catalonia during the first years of the XIXth. century. He refers to the rhetorician Scott Hugh Blair, who was taken by liberals (Catalans and also Spanish), as an ideological standard. In Catalonia, Blair’s thoughts were introduced by Manuel Casamada i Comella, a friar from Barcelona who defended the moderate government of the liberals which was quite important in the Catalan context. Casamada is not a much studied author, but he stands out for the distinction he makes between beautiful and sublime in the Real Acadèmia de Bones Lletres of Barcelona speech in 1837. In second place, Manuel Jorba, from the Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona, shows us the importance of Manuel Milà i Fontanals in the diffusion of aesthetics outside the academic world. The publication of the first aesthetics text for both students and professors from universities (Manual d’estètica, 1848), has been attributed to him. But, overstepping the limits of the purely academic, this scholar wanted to give readers with different backgrounds in ethical and aesthetic principles guidelines with respect to artistic and literary works and orient their judgement towards works that deserve them. Before the creation of a new doctrine, aesthetic had a target: providing solid and reasoned bases. The third research, done by Xavier Serra, reveals a character from the Renaixença who has been forgotten, the professor Josep Vicenç Fillol, from the time of Manuel Milà i Fontanals. In October of 1862, Fillol opened the university course in València with a speech about intellectual taste «El gust intel·lectual», in which he highlights the importance of developing correct intellectual taste through study and work. The holder of the chair of general and Spanish literature in the Universitat de València, Fillol, «vernacular poet», evolved towards a Catholic integrism, turning (assuming the linguistic inferiority complexes typical in that time) into a firm defender of Spanish. He published several works, among which we can highlight his teaching manual written in verse Ensayos poéticos sobre la estética y la oratoria, from 1853. And last, Conrad Vilanou centers his attention on the aesthetic thoughts of Joan Roura-Parella, a philosopher and educator who exiled himself to the United States. A lover of music, painting and literature, Roura-Parella combined his intellectual interests with teaching, becoming a professor at Wesleyan University. As an educator he taught several subjects related with aesthetics, emphasizing the importance of the work of art, the genius of the artist and

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the aesthetic pleasure. Vilanou focused his research on reviewing the content of his two most successful courses («Art in human experience» and «Art style as a World view») and transcribes the content of the classes. Translation from Catalan by Dan Cohen

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rowdfunding Culture in Catalonia: The Revival of Civil Society? Marta Poblet Royal Melbourne Institute of Technology (Victoria, Austràlia) marta.pobletbalcell@rmit.edu.au

When Antoni Gaudí took over the Sagrada Família project in 1883, the initially planned neo-Gothic church—which had come into existence by a private initiative in 1860—steadily transformed into one of the most sophisticated architectural endeavors of the XXth. century. The project relied entirely on charitable donations, so rapid completion of the temple had never been envisaged. As Gaudí once declared, “the expiatory church of la Sagrada Família is made by the people and is mirrored in them. It is a work that is in the hands of God and the will of the people”.1 For more than a century now, Barcelona’s most iconic temple has been raised with small donations from people, and final completion is just an estimate: sometime between the years 2026 and 2028. Donations, subscriptions, fundraising campaigns, etc. are all based on the idea to collect money from large groups of people to support projects and initiatives. In the last few years, though, the term “crowdfunding”has gained popularity when referring to the effort of channeling a myriad of droplets into the bucket. Crowdfunding also taps the collective resources of the crowd to raise money for innumerous causes: produce a film or an album, organize a concert, publish a book, launch a satellite, test seaweeds as a potentially sustainable food, or build a submarine to explore the ocean depths, to mention just a few of them. Crowdfunding is about engaging people to contribute to projects, usually by donating small amounts of money. What then distinguishes crowdfunding from other traditional fundraising campaigns? A distinctive component of the new generation of crowdfunding models is its symbiotic relation with the Web 2.0, also known as the “social Web”. 1 http://www20.gencat.cat/portal/site/afersexteriors/menuitem.548116b848978a59fea66df bb0c0e1a0/?vgnextoid=4b2796da04550310VgnVCM1000008d0c1e0aRCRD&vgnextcha nnel=4b2796da04550310VgnVCM1000008d0c1e0aRCRD&vgnextfmt=detall&contentid =4e69817f3059e210VgnVCM2000009b0c1e0aRCRD.

Journal of Catalan Intellectual History. Issues 7&8. 2014. P. 177-180 MARTA POBLET

Crowdfunding thrives to the conversational streams of the social web and contributes to generate new ones. Unlike precedent fundraising campaigns, crowdfunding fully embraces seamless connectivity and interaction: donors are certainly expected to contribute, but they are also encouraged to comment, ask, share, and participate. And, by actively engaging people, crowdfunding open calls are able to build new online communities, which in turn contribute to expanding the social graph. In the end, a successfully achieved crowdfunding goal is more than the sum of its donations: it is a shared co-production. While both the goals and the expected outcomes of crowdfunding campaigns are usually anchored his the physical world, none of them would happen without harnessing the vast resources of the Web 2.0. From a technologycal standpoint, the tools of the Web 2.0 have lowered the barriers to online fundraising: in its simplest form, it may take seting a web page and a payment gateway to channel donations (although this will needup to be supported with a sustained effort of planning, sharing, and engaging through social networks). In a few years, though, a number of online platforms especially dedicated to support collective fundraising have fueled the emergence of new crowdfunding models. Kickstarter, the world’s largest and most popular crowdfunding platform, was founded in New York in 2009. At present, there are approximately 450 active platforms worldwide, and by the end of 2013 they will globally raise an annual estimate of 5.1 billion US$ for social causes (30%), business and entrepreneurship (16.9%), films and performing arts (11.9%), music and recording arts (7.5%), energy and environment (5.9%) and other initiatives (28%).2 The dominant players are the North American and European platforms, with 59% and 35% of the market share respectively.3 A most striking fact is that, as of July 2013, 30 of these 450 crowdfunding platforms were currently based in Catalonia. With a population of 7.5 million, this ratio makes Catalonia a special case in point calling for further examination. Why has such a rich crowdfunding ecosystem emerged in Catalonia over the past three years? Although there is little data on the detailed number of crowdfunding campaigns, percentage of successful outcomes, volume of funds raised per platform, etc. one of the pioneering platforms, Verkami, provides some hints on the phenomenon. Verkami was launched in December 2010 in Mataró (Barcelona) by the initiative of “a father and his two sons: Joan, Adrià and Jonàs Sala, a biologist, an art historian and a physicist”.4 None of them had previous experience in

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2 See http://www.crowdsourcing.org/editorial/crowdfunding-industry-trends-and-statisticsinfographic/25662. 3 Idem. 4 http://www.verkami.com/page/about.

Journal of Catalan Intellectual History. Issues 7&8. 2014. P. 177-180 Crowdfunding Culture in Catalonia: The Revival of Civil Society?

crowdfunding, but they realized that their initiative—inspired by the success of Kickstarter and the like in North America—could fill a gap in Catalonia. Two years later, with more than 1,200 projects and 5.49 € million raised from more than 141.000 patrons—as contributors are known in the platform—Verkami has become the largest crowdfunding platform in South Europe.5 According to its founders, “Verkami campaigns represent a 75 percent of the total successful campaigns in Spain (from which 30-40 are Catalan projects, and nearly three out of four projects pledging funds in Verkami end up being funded”).6 No surprise, then, if the expression “let’s make a verkami” has become trendy among the cultural and creative milieux. Verkami was the platform that film producer Isona Passola chose to raise funds for L’endemà [The day after], a documentary on the scenario that an eventual independence of Catalonia would open. After a 40-day campaign, the project collected 348,830 € from 8,101 backers, largely exceeding the initially pledged 150,000 €, and became the largest crowdfunded project in Europe. L’endemà illustrates how crowdfunding campaigns, by tapping profusely into social media, are able to strike a chord in audiences who share the values and goals that projects bear. In some cases, crowdfunding campaigns target inner circles of supporters and/or larger crowds of potential promoters of cultural and artistic initiatives (books, music, cinema, drama, dance, etc.); in some others, they rely on social media word of mouth to create new communities of support. The second largest project crowdfunded via Verkami was Ictineu III, a cutting-edge submersible research project aimed at oceanographic exploration. Scientific research has only timidly started to venture into crowdfunding, so the success of Ictineu III is nonetheless impressive (more than 60,000€raised). Actually, the tiny yellow submarine is presented in the project as the heir of a pride-awakening Catalan saga: “the first manned submersible built in Catalonia since Mr. Monturiol built the first Ictineos in 1859 and 1864”. Who could resist? In Catalonia, crowdfunding platforms have blossomed under a severe economic crisis, so dramatic cuts in public expenditure and R&D funding, together with the draining of credit by the banking sector may certainly have inclined creative, artistic, scientific, and entrepreneurial talent to consider crowdfunding as an alternative source. However, the recent economic downturn cannot be the only explanation of the phenomenon, since other European regions undergoing similar stress have fallen short of breeding such an ecosystem. Other variables should therefore be considered, such as the role played by the 5 http://www.elpuntavui.cat/noticia/article/2-societat/5-societat/661895-catalunya-es-unapotencia-en-micromecenatge.html. 6 Idem.

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particularly dense network of groups, movements, organizations, associations, etc. that have traditionally articulated Catalan civil society. Perhaps paradoxically, the withdrawal of public entities as culture promoters, festival organizers, or event sponsors—especially at the municipal level, where the tendency to phagocytize the cultural sector has been predominant—has given Catalan civil society organizations a second wind. In this new context of forced devolution, crowdfunding platforms have timely lowered the technological barriers for these groups to take the lead,providing them with new tools to coordinate efforts, communicate, and disseminate. Nevertheless, and very much like the Sagrada Família cannot be fully understood without Gaudí’s reference to “the will of the people”, the analysis of the crowdfunding phenomenon in Catalonia requires a wider look to incorporate the socio-political dimension of this new period into the picture.

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English edition

2014 Issues 7&8

Journal of Catalan Intellectual History Revista d’Història de la Filosofia Catalana

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issues Journal of Catalan 7&8 Intellectual History

2014

Revista d’Història de la Filosofia Catalana

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