Cordesman/Wilner, Iran & The Gulf Military Balance Rev 3
AHC 2/29/12
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Iran’s Growing Mix of Asymmetric Warfare Forces ........................................................................... 69 Figure III.14: Key Iranian Capabilities for Asymmetric Warfare ............................................................ 71
The Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) ................................................................................. 72 IRGC Land Forces ............................................................................................................................................................ 72 The IRGC Air Force .......................................................................................................................................................... 75 Figure III.15: Key Elements of the IRGC ................................................................................................ 76 Figure III. 16: Iranian UAVs and UCAVs ................................................................................................. 77 Figure III.17: The Evolving Capabilities of the IRGC .............................................................................. 78 The IRGC Naval Forces .................................................................................................................................................... 79 Figure III.18: The Impact of the IRGC Naval Guards: Force Strength, Roles, and Missions ................... 81 Figure III.19: Iranian Naval Capabilities for Asymmetric Warfare ......................................................... 82 Figure III.20: Iranian Capabilities for Mine Warfare.............................................................................. 83 Figure III.21: Iranian Amphibious Warfare Capabilities ........................................................................ 84 The Basij or Basij-e Mostaz'afin, "Mobilization of the Oppressed" ................................................................................. 85 The Al Qods Force ........................................................................................................................................................... 86 Figure III.22: The Iranian Al Qods Force ................................................................................................ 90
The MISIRI, MOIS, or Vevak ................................................................................................................ 91 Other Asymmetric Forces ................................................................................................................... 94 Figure III.23: Iranian Use of Other States and Non-State Actors........................................................... 97 Figure III.24: Iran and the Hezbollah ..................................................................................................... 98 Figure III.25: Iran and Hamas ................................................................................................................ 99 “CLOSING THE GULF:” IRAN’S REAL WORLD MILITARY OPTIONS FOR ASYMMETRIC WARFARE ...... 100
The Potential Strategic, Energy, and Global Economic Impacts of the Iranian Threat ................... 102 Figure III.26: Estimated US Dependence on Petroleum Imports: 1970-2035 ..................................... 106 Figure III.27: Growing Strategic Importance of Gulf Petroleum production: 2007-2035 .................... 107
Iran’s Growing Military Assets for Such a Mission ........................................................................... 108 Iran’s Submarines and Submersibles ................................................................................................ 108 Submarines ................................................................................................................................................................... 109 Midget Submarines ...................................................................................................................................................... 111 Swimmer Delivery Vehicles (SDVs) ............................................................................................................................... 112
Iran’s Bases and Other Assets for “Closing the Gulf” ....................................................................... 112 Iranian Military Installations in the Gulf........................................................................................................................ 112 Major Surface Warships ................................................................................................................................................ 115 Fast-attack Watercraft, Speedboats, Patrol Craft, and Hovercraft. .............................................................................. 116 Shore and Ship-based ASCMs. ..................................................................................................................................... 119 Naval Mines .................................................................................................................................................................. 122 Maritime Patrol Aircraft ................................................................................................................................................ 124 Helicopters .................................................................................................................................................................... 125 Torpedoes ..................................................................................................................................................................... 125 UCAVs and UAVs ........................................................................................................................................................... 126 US AND ARAB GULF OPTIONS FOR COMPETING WITH IRANIAN .......................................................... 126
US Forces in the Gulf ........................................................................................................................ 127 The US Partnership With Southern Gulf, Other Regional, British, and French forces ...................... 129 Changing the Ground Rules: What If Preventive Strikes – Not Sanctions – Trigger Iranian Efforts to Close the Gulf ................................................................................................................................... 133 IMPLICATIONS FOR US POLICY ............................................................................................................. 134
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