Iran V: Sanctions
March 13, 2012
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The US and its allies should also find ways to warn Iran that any major Iranian effort to “close the Gulf,” or large-scale conventional or asymmetric clash between Iran and either the US or the GCC, could lead to escalating uses of force. Efforts to remove Iran’s nuclear, missiles, and key military facilities would then occur in a radically different context and have far more international support. At the same time, the need to deter and contain Iran while sanctions and negotiations are still an option is very different from giving military options a priority. The real world political and strategic results of replacing sanctions and diplomacy with the use of force are so unpredictable, and the risks are so high, that force must be a last resort relative to both diplomacy and containment. Such risks should only be viewed differently if it becomes clear that Iran’s regime has reached ideological extremes where it cannot be deterred by missile defenses, the forces in the Gulf, and threats like a US commitment to extended deterrence.
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