Cordesman/Wilner, Iran & The Gulf Military Balance
AHC 6/3/12
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COMPETITION OVER NUCLEAR THREATS, MISSILES, AND OTHER WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION ...5 IRAN’S BALLISTIC MISSILE PROGRAM AND ITS ROLE IN US AND IRANIAN MILITARY COMPETITION .............................. 5 Iran’s Missile Programs ........................................................................................................................ 6 What Iran’s Actions and Statements Say About Its View of Competition: Ballistic Missiles ................ 7 Missiles as a Form of Deterrence ......................................................................................................... 8 Missiles as a Form of Warfighting ........................................................................................................ 9 The Warfighting Capabilities of Iran’s Current Missile Force ............................................................. 10 The Escalating Impact of Iranian Missile Capabilities ...................................................................................................... 11 The Impact of Missile Defenses ...................................................................................................................................... 11 The Impact of Retaliatory Threats and Retaliation ......................................................................................................... 12 Figure IV.1: Estimated Range of Iranian Long-range Missile Forces ..................................................... 14 Figure IV.2: Estimated Range of Iranian Long-range Missile Forces -2 ................................................. 15 Figure IV.3: Iran’s Ballistic Missile Arsenal ............................................................................................ 16 Figure IV.4: Iranian Rockets and Missiles .............................................................................................. 17 NUCLEAR COMPETITION: ESTIMATING AND REACTING TO THE IRANIAN NUCLEAR THREAT ...................................... 18
Iran’s Statements about Its Nuclear Program .................................................................................... 18 Analyzing the Details of What Is Known and What Is Uncertain ....................................................... 20 Figure IV.5: ISIS Timeline of Potential Future Capabilities to Make Weapon-Grade Uranium: Modest Growth Projection ................................................................................................................................ 27 Figure IV.6: Probabilities of Iranian Paths to Nuclear Explosive Materials – ISIS (Each probability reflects the likelihood that Iran would pursue each method, based on a judgment of its technical capabilities to do so and a range of factors that deter its pursuit of this method) .............................. 28 Figure IV.7: Cumulative Totals of Natural and Enriched Uranium Feed and 3.5 and 19.75 Percent Product in Iran ...................................................................................................................................... 29 Figure IV.8: Cumulative LEU Production at Natanz ............................................................................... 30 Figure IV.9: Number of Centrifuge Cascades enriching, under vacuum, installed, or with centrifuges disconnected, January 31, 2010 ........................................................................................................... 31 Figure IV.10: Centrifuge Trends at Natanz ............................................................................................ 32 Figure IV.11: ISIS Estimate of Monthly Trends at Natanz ..................................................................... 33 Figure IV.13: IAEA Reporting as of February 24, 2012 – Main Points ................................................... 35 Figure IV.14: IAEA Reporting as of February 24, 2012 – LEU Production and Centrifuge Levels at the Natanz Fuel Enrichment Plant (FEP) ..................................................................................................... 36 Figure IV.15: IAEA Reporting as of February 24, 2012 – Deployment of Advanced Centrifuges at Pilot Fuel Enrichment Plant (PFEP) Delayed; 19.75 Percent Enrichment Continues ..................................... 37 Figure IV.16: IAEA Reporting as of February 24, 2012 – Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant ...................... 38 Figure IV.17: IAEA Reporting as of February 24, 2012 – Taking Stock of Fordow and Natanz .............. 39 Figure IV.31: Amount of Fissile Material Need to Build a Basic Fission ................................................ 53 (Non-Boosted) Weapon ........................................................................................................................ 53 Figure IV.32: February 25, 2011 IAEA Report ....................................................................................... 54 Figure IV.33: Lack of Iranian Cooperation with the IAEA as of February 25, 2011 ............................... 55 Figure IV.34: IAEA on Possible Military Dimensions as of May 24, 2011 .............................................. 57 Figure IV.35: IAEA on Natanz, May 24, 2011 ........................................................................................ 58 Figure IV.36: 20% Enrichment and Weapons Production ..................................................................... 59 Figure IV.37: IAEA on Qom (Fordow) as of May 24, 2011 ..................................................................... 60 Figure IV.38: Enrichment to 20% at Fordow ......................................................................................... 61 Figure IV.39: IAEA on Plutonium/ Heavy Water Facilities as of May 24, 2011...................................... 62 Figure IV.40: IAEA Concerns as of June 2011 ........................................................................................ 62 Figure IV.41: September 2, 2011 IAEA Reporting on Natanz: LEU Production and Centrifuge Levels at the Fuel Enrichment Plant (FEP) ........................................................................................................... 63 Figure IV.42: September 2, 2011 IAEA Reporting on Natanz: Deployment of Advanced Centrifuges at the Pilot Fuel Enrichment Plant (PFEP), 20 Percent Enrichment Continues ......................................... 65 Figure IV.43: September 2, 2011 IAEA Report: Heavy Water Production ............................................. 66
The Data in the IAEA Report of November 8, 2011 ............................................................................ 67 US OFFICIAL VIEWS OF IRAN’S COMPETITION IN NUCLEAR AND MISSILE EFFORTS .................................................. 94 Timing Iran’s Bomb ......................................................................................................................................................... 96
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