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The MISIRI, MOIS, or Vevak Iranian intelligence plays a role in Iran’s asymmetric warfare efforts as well. It is far from clear how the structure of Iranian intelligence operates, how clear the separation is from various elements of the IRGC and Al Qods forces, whether there is a clear separation of intelligence from internal security, how the diplomatic covers of Iran’s intelligence arte run, and whether Iran’s massive networks of over organizations, business fronts and use of bribery and intimidation to import weapons, parts, and military technology hangs together. What is clear is that Iran conducts all of these operations in extensive networks overseas, and that its main intelligence branch plays a key role. This branch is called the Ministry of Intelligence and National Security of the Islamic Republic of Iran (MISIRI). It is Iran’s secret police and primary intelligence agency, which are embedded throughout Iranian embassies in Iraq and all over the world, as well as in Iranian commercial, education, NGO, and religious groups). (The MISIRI is more commonly referred to as the VEVAK (Vezarat-e Ettela'at va Amniyat-e Keshvar), VAJA, or MOIS (Ministry of State Intelligence and Security). It is this organization, rather than elements of the IRGC that seems to play a critical role in threatening and sometime killing opponents of regime overseas as well as supporting Iranian efforts use diplomatic covers and most of Iran’s active civilian fronts to support asymmetric warfare at the political level. It was the IRGC, however, that seems to have run the assassination attempt on the Saudi Ambassador in Washington, and the relative roles of the two organizations are uncertain. There also seem to be separate fronts for importing military and nuclear technology dating back in some cases to fronts established during the Iran-Iraq War that are tied to elements in various ministries and sometimes academic institutions. Similar uncertainties exist as to how the intelligence branches, IRGC, and military manage repression and internal security in Iran. They seem to have overlapping functions and each can sometimes play a role in influencing Iran’s civil, military, and security courts, as well as manage its own detention facilities and prisons and use torture and sometimes attacks on both Iranian citizens in Ira and Iranian’s overseas. Repression and intimidation are used to directly support the regime’s ability to ensure there is no internal threat and enhance its ability to operate overseas. As the US State Department report on human right issued on Aril 8, 2011 notes,62 Several agencies share responsibility for law enforcement and maintaining order, including the MOIS, the Law Enforcement Forces under the Interior Ministry, and the IRGC. The Basij and informal groups known as the Ansar-e Hizballah (Helpers of the Party of God) were aligned with extreme conservative members of the leadership and acted as vigilantes. In October 2009 the government announced the merger of the Basij into the IRGC ground forces. While some Basij units received formal training, many units were disorganized and undisciplined. During government-led crackdowns on demonstrations, the Basij were primarily responsible for the violence against the protesters….Corruption and impunity were problems. 62Bureau
of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, “2010 Human Rights Report: Iran”
2010 Country Reports on Human Rights http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/2010/nea/154461.htm.
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