disciplinary actions not do so on his behalf. In correspondence to Patton, Judge Ligon explained to him that Gibson was responsible for the appeal unless he was relieved by the appellate court. Again in his Order denying Patton's Rule 37 petition, Judge Ligon pointed out that Gibson was still responsible for the appeal. Because of Judge Ligon's statements and because no motion to be relieved was ever presented to the appellate court, Patton believed his appeal was proceeding. After Gibson filed a Motion for Extension of Time lO File the Brief, he was notified that the brief was due August 3, 1994. Gibson failed to file a brief on that date. Honorable Leslie Steen wrote Gibson on January 10, 1995 explaining that he needed lO take some action. Gibson took no action and the appeal was dismissed. The second criminal maHer in which Gibson represented Patton was concluded by conviction on January 5, 1994. Gibson next filed an affidavit for compensation but not a Notice of Appeal. Patton once again filed his own Notice of Appeal. The first action that Patton was aware of having been taken care of by Gibson was on March 9, 1995 when Gibson filed a Motion for Rule on the Clerk. The Supreme Court's Per Curiam on this Motion explained that Gibson impermissably merged Panon's two cases on appeal in his motion. Gibson's next pleading was a Motion for Reconsideration which was denied by Per Curiam with the court again explaining what Gibson needed to do to have his motion granted. At the time of Patlon's execution of formal complaint, Gibson had taken no action. The Executive Director wrote to Gibson about Patton's concerns in an attempt to handle the matter informally but Gibson lOok no action pursuant to that correspondence. In responding, Gibson explained first of all that Patton had not made him aware of all his criminal charges when he hired him. Gibson asserted that Patton was informed of his right to appeal. Gibson averred that he never refused lO file a Notice of Appeal but rather that he explained to Patton that someone else would have to represent him if he chose to appeal. Gibson also acknowledged that Patton filed his own Notice of Appeal from his second criminal maller in which Gibson represented him. Gibson pointed
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out that until the date of his affidavit of response he was operating under the impression that the transcript his secretary filed in March of 1994 was the transcript of the second trial. He was totally unaware that the transcript for the first proceeding had been filed. Gibson also stated that he was totally confused and bafned by the language in the Supreme Court's Per Curiam. Even after contacting the Clerk's office, he was unable to learn that the other transcript had been filed. In concluding his response, he stated that after ransacking old files in his office he was able to determine what had happened. Gibson also stated he was filing the appropriate motions in both appeals. Subsequent to his response, Gibson sent a supplemental response in which he acknowledged the only mistakes in the matter were his.
Q. Byrum Hurst, Jr. Upon the complaint of Ruthie Robinson, Q. Byrum Hurst, Jr. was issued a letter of reprimand for violation of Model Rules 1.3, 1.4 (a) and 1.16 (d). These Rules state, in part, that a lawyer shall act with reasonable diligence and promptness in representing a client; and, a lawyer shall keep a client reasonably informed about the status of a matter and promptly comply with reasonable requests for information; and. upon termination of representation, an attorney shall take steps to the extent reasonable practicable to protect the client's interests, such as giving reasonable notice to the client, allowing time for employment of other counsel, surrendering papers and property to which the client is entitled and refunding any advanced payment of fee that has not been earned. The lawyer may retain papers relating to the client to the extent permitted by other law. In her affidavit, Ms. Robinson stated that she met with Hurst in April 1992 to discuss representation of her husband, James W. Robinson, an inmate at the Arkansas Department of Correction. Mr. Robinson, sentenced to life imprisonment without parole for two counts of murder, was seeking transfer within the Department of Correction or having the sentence reduced or vacated. In a letter following the meeting, Hurst indicated the matter could be completed within six to nine months and quoted a fee of
$3,500. In May 1993, Hurst was retained by Ms. Robinson, acting on behalf of Mr. Robinson, when she paid one half of the retainer. In December 1993, HUTSl mel with Ms. Robinson to discuss the matter. Following receipt of letters from Ms. Robinson, Hurst wrote and apologized for not responding sooner but assured her that he was in the process of drawing up a writ of Habeas Corpus and that it would be filed within the near future. In December 1994, Ms. Robinson wrote to inquire of the status of the matter. In March 1995 Hurst met with Ms. Robinson and advised her that the Petition would be filed immediately. On November 21, 1995, Hurst met with Ms. Robinson to discuss the matter and Ms. Robinson informed him of her decision to terminate his representation. He indicated that he would refund most of the retainer and it would be mailed right away. Hurst also represented that he would deliver the case file to Ms. Robinson by November 30, 1995. In December 1995 Ms. Robinson wrote a letter requesting the file and refund by January I, 1996. It was not returned and neither was the partial refund. Hurst was provided a copy of Ms. Robinson's complaint on February 6, 1996, and submitted a response on March 7, 1996. For his response, Hurst stated that Ms. Robinson's affidavit was substantially t:urrec( in all aspects but that there were extenuating circumstances that should be considered in regard to the matter. Hurst stated that he was reluctant to take the case because Habeas Corpus matters and civil actions under 28 USC 2255, involving the setting aside of convictions or sentences for constitutional infirmities, are very time consuming and very expensive. Hurst stated that it was decided the best, most reasonable relief to obtain with success would be to try to find a way to make Mr. Robinson's life more comfortable. In his affidavit he indicated he then discovered that Mr. Robinson had been convicted twice of capital murder, that the first conviction had been reversed, a new trial ordered, and that he was again convicted at the new trial. Hurst stated he then contacted prison authorities concerning what type of "jobs" Mr. Robinson could have and found that, due to Mr. Robinson's sentence, reassignment might be unlikely.