The Spring 2014 Issue of "The Globe" by Ally Brown

Volume V Issue II Spring 2014

Democratization and Counterterrorism Policy by Tendai Mukau

Public Opinion, Public Pressure by Rio Hart The China Syndrome

by Fatema Ghasletwala

The Terrorism Tactics of Counterinsurgency by Austin Donohue

The Globe aims to engage The George Washington University academic community in responsible global citizenship through the promotion of undergraduate international relations scholarship. The papers in The Globe offer a rich diversity of thought and conviction. All George Washington University undergraduates are actively encouraged to submit their original academic work for consideration. We hope the clarity, honesty, and accountability of these pages encourage dynamic leadership on a community-wide level. - The Editors

ONLINE www.theglobegwu.com @ESIAglobe INQUIRIES & SUBMISSIONS should be directed to Allyson Brown at submit@theglobegwu.com. MAIL correspondence should be directed to the main office: The Globe c/o The International Affairs Society The George Washington University Marvin Center, Room 428 800 21st Street, NW Washington, District of Columbia 20052

From the Desk of the Editor-in-Chief: Past, Present, and Future Dear Readers, I am honored to present the Spring 2014 edition of The Globe, the only undergraduate journal at the George Washington University solely devoted to International Affairs. Our journal strives to promote academic scholarship and inspire responsible global citizenship. The issue provides a forum for undergraduate scholars to present a myriad of pertinent topics. In this issue, Jaclyn Whittaker presents a well-developed thesis on Tunisia’s beer market before and after the revolution. Rio Hart offers interesting analysis on the U.S. public backlash against the Chinese government following the use of force at the Tiananmen Square pro-democracy protests that took place in April-June 1989. In his paper, Tendai offers poignant insight on a vastly important question— can U.S. intervention, specifically democratization, work as counterterrorism strategy? “The China Syndrome,” by Fatema Ghasletwawla explores the strategic partnership between China and North Korea and finds that China is working to avoid international disaster. Max Sanders provides the reader with an interesting thesis on the problems that arise as a result of the International Criminal Court and how the court has precipitated anti-West sentiment in Africa and China. Finally, Austin Donohue’s paper on counterinsurgency in Guatemala is imperative in our understanding of violence and terrorism tactics during the time period. I would like to personally congratulate the talented authors featured in this edition. Additionally I would like to thank the hard-working editorial staff for all of their dedication this year. Without their commitment, this issue would have not been possible. As a senior, this is my last issue of The Globe, and I want to say thank you to everyone who has helped make the journal a success throughout my time at GWU.

Allyson Brown Editor-in-Chief

Allyson Brown is a Politcal Science major with a minor in French and Statistics. She is also the Vice President of Service for Alpha Phi Omega and an Under-Secretary General at WAMUNC XVI.

Spring Issue Spring Semester 2014 Volume 5, Issue 2

FEATURED ESSAYS Brew or Bust 6 Celtia Beer and Tunisia’s Political Transition

Jaclyn Whittaker ’15

Public Opinions, Public Pressures

The U.S. Public’s Response to Tiananmen Square

Rio Hart ’14

Democratization and Counterterrorism Policy

How a More Humanitarian Approach to Foreign Policy Revitalizes the Effectiveness of Counterterrorism

Tendai Mukau ’14

The China Syndrome 24 How China is Affecting North Korean Nuclear Policy

Fatema Ghasletwawla ’14

The Rest Against the West 29 Max Sanders ’14

The Terrorism Tactics of the Counterinsurgency

The Effectiveness of Terrorism Tactics by the Counterinsurgency Agents of the Guatemalan Civil War

Austin Donohue ’14

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THE GLOBE EDITORIAL STAFF:

Allyson Brown ’14 Editor-in-Chief Alexandra Stambaugh ’14 Head Editor Linnea Turco ’14 Head Editor Molly Seltzer ’15 Head Editor Ben Carleton ’16 Web Master Laura Blackerby ’17 Formatting Editor Rohan Bhargava ’16 Assistant Editor Daniel Berstein ’17 Assistant Editor Yumna Rizvi ’16 Assistant Publicity Director Erin Agnew ’17 Assistant Publicity Director

CONGRATULATIONS CLASS OF 2014! On behalf of the Globe Staff, we would like to congratulate Allyson Brown, Alexandra Stambaugh, and Linnea Turco on graduating this semester. They each have been dedicated members of The Globe and we are truly going to miss them, dearly. We wish them the best of luck as they begin their professional careers!

Cover by Laura Blackerby and Allyson Brown Cover photograph: http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/0/0d/KFOR_Kosovo2.jpg German KFOR troops patrol southern Kosovo in the Summer of 1999

Brew or Bust Celtia Beer and Tunisia’s Political Transition Jaclyn Whittaker ’15 I. Introduction

Tunisia came into the spotlight of global news and media after sparking the “Arab Spring” revolutions of 2011. Long before the Jasmine Revolution took place on the 14th of January ,2011, Tunisia struggled to keep its economy afloat: rising levels of unemployment frustrated those in rural areas and the educated Tunisian youth, and inflation was steadily climbing. Three years later, the country remains in a prolonged political transition. Tunisia’s legislative body, the National Constituent Assembly, continues its attempts to address problems in the current political, economic, and security crises. A case study of Tunisia from 2011 to 2013 highlights a unique period in Tunisian history. In 2011, former President Ben Ali fled the country and a democratically elected assembly was formed to create a constitution and host future legislative elections. However, for three years the National Constituent Assembly failed to achieve these goals and the country experienced a prolonged political transition. Four drafts and three years later, the assembly finally ratified a new constitution on January 26, 2014. These three years thus reflect a time of political stagnation and societal frustration with the interim government. This paper documents the effects of this unique period on Tunisian business and society. Thus the case study centers on a popular, locally-made Tunisian good: Celtia beer, produced by the Tunisian company the Société Frigorifique et Brasserie de Tunis. Focusing on Celtia’s growth as a Tunisian product in the years following the “Jasmine Spring” provides interesting insight into Tunisia’s societal changes. This examination will reveal why, during an economic slump, sales of Celtia increased sharply, and continued to remain at high levels. By analyzing the brewery’s sales of Celtia before and after the Jasmine Revolution, this work examine how the revolution affected Celtia’s market influence and demand. Through market analysis, the paper reveals why Celtia production and sales experienced a growth or depression at different stages in the years following the revolution. Analysis will discover the political and social influences of the post-revolution demand for Celtia.

II. A Brief Overview of the Tunisian Economy

Tunisia is a developing country in Northern Africa, where GDP growth before the Jasmine Revolution of 2011 typically ranged between 4-5%. This growth rate was accredited to the country’s investments in public education and the infrastructure reform that took place during the presidency of Habib

Jaclyn Whittaker Ghasletwala is a junior from Acton, MA, and is majoring in International Affairs, with concentrations in Middle Eastern Studies and International Economics. She studied abroad in Sidi Bou Said, Tunisia. She thought of her research question for her paper within this issue of The Globe when she noticed consistent disgruntlement about beer prices by many of her friends. She also was curious as to why many popular bars in the area exclusively sold Celtia instead of other beer brands. Jaclyn currently works in fundraising and marketing with the White Ribbon Alliance, and is the treasurer of the Delta Phi Epsilon Professional Foreign Service Sorority at GW.

Brew or Bust Bourguiba until 1987. In the following years, President Ben Ali hindered these economic advancements through an intensive system of corruption and nepotism.1 The global recession of 2008 and following Eurocrisis hit Tunisia’s export market hard, contributing greatly to the deceleration of economic growth in Tunisia.2 The staggering decrease in GDP growth was ill-timed with the increase in a publicly educated youth, and consequently, the overall and youth unemployment rate rose sharply. Although reinvigorating the post-revolution Tunisian economy is one of the government’s main goals, Tunisia still faces an expected decrease in GDP growth from 3.6% in 2012 to currently only 3.2% for the 2013 fiscal year. There is also still a high unemployment rate of 18% despite attempts to foster job creation.3 This reveals the ineffectiveness of Tunisia’s efforts in expanding the economy to employ more citizens, and emphasizes the lack of economic development with its low GDP growth rate. This data also highlights the frustrations behind anti-government protests and the push for the completion of Tunisia’s new constitution. In an interview with international businessman, Nicolas Battung, he commented on his personal opinion and experiences working with Tunisian contractors in pre- and post-revolutionary Tunisia. He explained the necessity to create a back-up plan for his company’s contracting business, in the unfortunate case that Tunisia’s security crisis extended to his market and the company could no longer secure the protection of their assets.4 In this case, Mr. Battung reveals the key challenge facing the Tunisian economy and hindering its ability to achieve pre-revolution levels of GDP growth: the growing inability of the government to ensure the security of its state and protect its employees, products, and investments.

III. Changes in Celtia’s Market

Celtia is the most famous locally-brewed beer in Tunisia, and is a product of the company the Society of Manufacturing Beverages of Tunisia, or better known by its French acronym, SFBT. The company owns the rights to produce both national brands such as Boga soda, Stella beer, and Celtia, and to produce international brands such as 33 Export and Beck’s beer. It also holds exclusive rights to the bottling and marketing for Coca-Cola. Such horizontal integration, namely SFBT’s production of many diversified brands, gives SFBT a near-monopoly over Tunisia’s beverage market. SFBT controls 90% of the soft drink market and 85% of the beer market in Tunisia.5 However, its influence is limited to domestic demand: of total sales, 97% come from Tunisia and only a small fraction are attributed to the export market, with Europe at 2% and Libya at 1% of sales.6 As Tunisia entered an economic slump, many domestic businesses suffered recessions. Data from SFBT about their production and sales reveal counterintuitive growth and unprecedented success in the years following the Jasmine Revolution. In Tunisia, the official state religion is Islam, which prohibits the drinking of alcohol. However, it is also a nation of liberalism, with a fondness for alcoholic beverages. Demand for beer in Tunisia before the revolution remained steady,7 reflecting a stable market without any outlying points of severe acceleration or deceleration. Examining first quarter (Q1) reports from 2011 lends insight into the immediate impact of the revolution on Celtia’s market. Right after the revolution, in Q1 sales of 2011, the amount of beer sold came close to reaching the entire sum of sales during 2010.8 Sales reports from the 2012 fiscal year indicate a growth rate of 7.5%, highlighting a two-year long increase in the demand for Celtia. In its most recent report for 2013, which represents sales from January through September, Celtia documented sales that continued to increase, but at the lower rate of 4.23%. 1 The World Factbook, “Africa: Tunisia,” Central Intelligence Agency, December 2013, accessed on 5 November 2013, https://www.cia.gov/ library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ts.html 2 “Interim Strategy Note for the Republic of Tunisia for the Period FY13-14,” Document of the World Bank: Report no. 67692-TN, 17 May 2012, p 7. 3 The World Factbook, “Africa: Tunisia,” Central Intelligence Agency, December 2013, accessed on 5 November 2013, https://www.cia.gov/ library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ts.html 4 Nicolas Battung, Phone Interview, 4 November 2013. 5 “SFBT,” IlBoursa: Company, 2013, accessed on 15 November 2013 http://translate.google.tn/translate?hl=en&sl=fr&u=http://www.ilboursa.com/marches/societe.aspx%3Fs%3DSFBT&prev=/ 6 “SFBT: Beverages & Wine/Spirits, Tunisia,” AlphaMENA, 2013, accessed on 20 November 2013 http://www.alphamena.org/Secure/Company/Company.aspx?Id=70869 7 Middle East Partnership Initiative and William and Associates, “Survey of Tunisian Public Opinion,” (Survey, International Republican Institute, 1-12 October 2013). 8 Celtia Brewery Manager, Interview in Bab Saadoun, Tunisia, 27 November 2013.

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Jaclyn Whittaker To meet the new upward shift in demand in 2011 and 2012, SFBT needed to accelerate its production of Celtia. Such measures forced SFBT to invest in raising their production capacity so that their facilities could increase their ability to meet the new quantity of Celtia demanded. In an interview with a facilities manager at SFBT’s Celtia brewery in Bab Saadoun, he recalled that “trucks would be waiting for up to 72 hours before they were able to get their requested quantity.”9 To tackle such problems, SFBT made investments that included job creation throughout the production process in order to increase production capacity. Even with these strides, CEO Bousbiî Hamadi reflected in 2012 that SFBT would not meet the demand for Celtia at the growth rates of that time. The price of Celtia remained stable throughout first few years following the revolution. However, in 2013, prices of Celtia rose by 50-70%,10 depending on the volume and product’s packaging. Beer is considered a foodstuff, and for this sector, inflation can be attributed to forcing overall prices to increase by 3.7% in 2011 and 7.5% in 2012 and 2013.11 Before the revolution, inflation typically only caused foodstuff prices to increase on an average of 3% per year. These figures indicate that, although rising inflation was a contributing factor to the increase in alcohol prices, it was not the key reason.This is evident in the lack of a drastic hike in Celtia prices in 2012, when inflation occurred at levels similar to those of the following year. The rise in Celtia’s price level resulted from an increase in the tax on alcoholic beverages. The Finance Act of 2013, in hopes of raising tax revenue by 10% to combat a growing deficit, focused on increasing the consumer tax on alcohol by 70% and increasing registry tariffs.12 Tunisia instituted this Alcohol Tax of 2013 in February of that year, which subsequently spurred a hefty spike in the prices of Celtia. In raising the tax level, consumers must pay more for the same quantity of a good. On the production side, the businesses that make and sell said product do not gain any more profit. With such an expensive change in the tax level, SFBT and its retailers increased the price of Celtia to its current levels to share the tax burden with consumers. Overall, Celtia buyers must pay more while Celtia sellers receive less profit from the exchange. The leftover money fulfills the consumer tax. However, the price increase also suggests that the Celtia market lost its marginal consumers, or the Celtia drinkers who cannot afford to pay for beer at the new price level. The stabilizing of When questioned about the effects of the Alcohol Tax, the Celtia facilities manager expressed mixed feelings about its consequences. Higher Celtia’s demand, prices for Celtia resulted in less sales. The amount of money consumers instead of a were willing to spend on Celtia would be achieved with a smaller quantity than before the tax. This then prevents SFBT and Celtia vendors from gainconsequential ing their natural profit, as highlighted in the consequential 28% decrease depression, is a in sales of Celtia from bars, restaurants, and hotels in 2013.13 However, the counterintuitive Alcohol Tax introduced an important and unexpected phenomenon: the decelerated growth of Celtia sales did not reach a stage of depression, but result of the 2013 rather a stable level of growth at 4.23%, almost half that of the previous year. Alcohol Tax. This indicates that demand for Celtia did not falter even with the price in14 crease, but stabilized back to normal sales levels. SFBT’s Q3 report for 2013 also reveals that, so far, in this past year, the production of beer only increased by .92%.15 The minimal production growth highlights the ability for SFBT to meet the 2013 levels of demand. The investments in production capacity in 2012 were feared to still not be sufficient to meet 2012 levels of Celtia demand, but instead, are able to supply the stable, market-clearing quantity of Celtia demanded by consumers in 2013. The stabilizing of Celtia’s demand, instead of a consequential depression, is a counterintuitive result of the 2013 Alcohol Tax. As basic economics describe, when the price of a product or service in9 Ibid. 10 Nadya B’Chir, “Despite Soaring Prices, Alcohol Consumption has not Fallen in Tunisia,” Business Insider, 24 April 201, accesed on 15 November 2013, http://translate.googleusercontent.com/translate_cdepth=1&hl=en&prev=/search 11 Chedly Ayari, “Annual Report 2012,” Central Bank of Tunisia, 1 July 2013, accessed on 1 December 2013, p 77. 12 Ibid p 46 13 Letaief Med Anis, “SFBT: Open Letter about the New Tax on Beer,” Business Flood, 7 October 2013, accessed on 17 November 2013 http:// translate.googleusercontent.com/translate_c?depth=1&hl=en&prev=/search%3Fq%3Dla%2Bpresse%2Btunisia%2Bsfbt. 14 Celtia Brewery Manager, Interview in Bab Saadoun, Tunisia, 27 November 2013. 15 “Tunisia- SFBT Increases Sales of Alcoholic Beverages,” Business Insider, 23 July 2013, accessed on 15 November 2013 http://translate. google.tn/translate?hl=en&sl=fr&u=http://www.businessnews.com.tn/tunisie-la-sfbt-augmente-ses-ventes-de-boissons-alcoolisees.

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Brew or Bust creases above its natural market clearing price, the demand for that good will decrease. There are also marginal buyers who cannot afford to buy the good at a price higher than its natural price, forcing them out of the market. The data from 2013 reveals that demand for Celtia did not diminish below its thencurrent growth level after the institution of this tax. This highlights not only that there is a high demand for beer in Tunisia, but also that many of those who demand beer are still willing to buy it instead of dropping out of the market. This increase in the domestic demand for beer also accentuates a new phenomenon in Tunisia: an increase in beer drinkers. Due to the increase in price of alcohol in general after the institution of the 2013 Alcohol Tax, it is clear that alcohol consumption did not originally increase after the revolution because of the availability of cheap products. Instead, it highlights that domestic Tunisians demanded alcohol beyond normal pre-revolution levels, and forced the market to respond. This is evident in the increased production of Celtia and production capacity of SFBT’s breweries. The following sections address the political and societal influences that contributed to the increase in alcohol consumption and demand for Celtia beer. They also explore how the Jasmine Revolution contributed to these changes in mentality and in the market.

IV. Celtia & Politics: Effects of Government Policies

Tunisia offers an interesting and unique case study of the alcohol market. This section examines the influence the political transition and its subsequent challenges, and also the effects of an Islamist government on the sale of a product Islam considers to be Haram, or forbidden. Before the revolution, the Tunisian government instituted import restrictions on a number of products, including alcoholic beverages. Therefore, international brands of beer were not widely sold in local stores and bars, unless originally brewed and produced within Tunisia.16 The post-revolution government did not alter this restriction on alcoholic beverage imports, allowing SFBT to continue maintaining its near-monopoly on the Tunisian beer market. On the other hand, the post-revolution government instituted new economic policies, which do not benefit the Tunisian alcohol market. As mentioned earlier, the raising of the consumer tax on alcohol in the Finance Act of 2013 greatly hindered the alcohol market and decelerated the sharp growth rate of demand for Celtia. The Celtia brewery manager explained that, although the 70% increase in the consumer tax was severe, it was not a spike that SFBT could not withstand; in fact, the tax actually solved Celtia’s production problems.17 He argued that the logic for this tax increase was clear- because alcohol was already a highly taxed product on the market, increasing the tax was bureaucratically easy and would not come as a major shock to consumers, since they were already aware of alcohol taxes. However, recent media reports revealed that the upcoming Finance Act of 2014 for the next year would once again look at increasing the price of beer. Whereas the Finance Act of 2013 increased prices of alcoholic beverages across the Tunisian market through raising the consumer tax, the Finance Act of 2014 outlined a plan to create a fee of 100 millimes per bottle of beer sold. The argument for this fee rests on the fact that companies produce beer using government-subsidized sugar, and thus the additional fee was justified and would support the government’s General Compensation Fund.18 In response to such possible legislation, SFBT published an open letter to Tunisia’s National Constituent Assembly in October 2013, expressing that the company “did not understand the logic of this new tax.”19 The letter outlined the company’s belief that such a fee would be an excessive measure because the amount of sugar utilized in the beer-brewing process per bottle amounts to only 8.2 millimes. The additional fee would thus be disproportionate to the actual value of sugar used in Celtia production. On a more urgent note, the Celtia brewery manager emphasized that the increase in the price of beer would be unsustainable for the company. While Celtia’s demand level is stable currently, an additional fee would exclude consumers from the beer market.20 Falling below this stable level would 16 “Heineken Sets up New Brewery in Tunisia,” Al Bawaba News, 24 December 2006, accessed on 20 November 2013 http://www.albawaba. com/news/heineken-sets-new-brewery-tunisia . 17 Celtia Brewery Manager, Interview in Bab Saadoun, Tunisia, 27 November 2013. 18 “Tunisia- Open Letter from the New Excessive Tax on Beer,” Business News, 6 October 2013, accessed on 15 November 2013 http://translate. google.tn/translate?hl=en&sl=fr&u=http://www.businessnews.com.tn/tunisie-lettre-ouverte-de-la-sfbt. 19 Letaief Med Anis, “SFBT: Open Letter about the New Tax on Beer,” Business Flood, 7 October 2013, accessed on 17 November 2013 http:// translate.googleusercontent.com/translate_c?depth=1&hl=en&prev=/search%3Fq%3Dla%2Bpresse%2Btunisia%2Bsfbt. 20 Celtia Brewery Manager, Interview in Bab Saadoun, Tunisia, 27 November 2013.

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Jaclyn Whittaker have aversive effects on Cetlia’s sales, affecting both SFBT as the producers, and also the liquor stores, bars, restaurants, and hotels that participate in and are dependent on the beer market. The production of Celtia would, therefore, depreciate as well, since consumers would demand less Celtia. Decreasing Celtia production would further hurt the overall Tunisian economy. SFBT would likely be forced to cut working hours of its employees and employees of other production stages, such as transportation. These workers then have less money to spend in the Tunisian market. SFBT’s open letter also questions the fundamental reasoning behind the proposed additional fee. Although raising revenue for the General Compensation Fund is an important goal to support the government’s budget, the Finance Act of 2014 specifically targets sales of beer. SFBT points out that if the National Constituent Assembly desired to reduce the compensation businesses enjoyed from sugar subsidies, there are many more effective solutions to achieve this aim.21 This led the company to deduce the possibility that the objective of this proposed, excessive fee is to lower the consumption of beer, rather than for the sole aim of benefiting the General ComCeltia beer, Tunisia’s most popular domestic beer, was sold pensation Fund. in record numbers during the Tunisian Revolution. Such an accusation is not an unfounded inference considering the majority of seats in the government’s National Constituent Assembly belong to the Islamist Ennahda party. After the publication of SFBT’s open letter, Minister of Finance, Elyes Fakhfakh, was quick to deny that an additional fee on beer would be included as part of the upcoming Finance Act of 2014.22 However, the deep concern generated from this so-called rumor accentuates the current attitude of pessimism in the Tunisian alcohol market towards the government. Mr. Lahyou, an owner of a bar in the prominent suburb Carthage, empathized with SFBT’s sentiments. Due to the Alcohol Tax of 2013, Mr. Lahyou needed to increase the price of Celtia at his establishment by 40%, causing both a drop in his sales and the loss of a significant number of customers.23 Knowing that a majority of the government condemns drinking alcohol, he feels confident that the government is specifically targeting the alcohol market and Celtia’s popularity among Tunisians. Along this train of thought, Mr. Lahyou described another policy during the post-revolution years unrelated to taxes and fees. Authorities in the capital, Tunis, and in most other areas now make bars close by midnight, whereas before the revolution, the usual closing time was 2:00 am.24 Although this is not a direct deterrence to alcohol consumption since beer, wine, and liquor can easily be bought and drunk at home, it is a specific measure that targets alcohol suppliers and consumers. To this point, however, the raising of the consumer tax on alcoholic beverages addresses both those who consume alcohol at outside venues and privately at home. Mr. Lahyou fears that throughout the prolonged political transition, this government will continue to seek methods of deterring alcohol consumption and the culture of beer drinking.

21 Letaief Med Anis, “SFBT: Open Letter about the New Tax on Beer,” Business Flood, 7 October 2013, accessed on 17 November 2013 http:// translate.googleusercontent.com/translate_c?depth=1&hl=en&prev=/search%3Fq%3Dla%2Bpresse%2Btunisia%2Bsfbt. 22 “The Finance Act of 2014 does not Provide for an Increase in the Price of Beer,” Il Boursa: News, 9 October 2013, Accessed on 15 November 2013 http://translate.google.com/translate?depth=1&hl=en&prev=/search%3Fq%3Dsfbt%2Bbab%2Bsaadoun. 23 Mohamed Lahyou, Interview, Carthage, Tunisia.,7 December 2013. 24 Ibid.

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Brew or Bust

V. Celtia & Security: Post-Revolution Loopholes and Paranoia

As previously discussed, one of the main obstacles to growing business in Tunisia is the persistent lack of effective security. The interim government’s policies toward security issues mainly focus on investigating and dismantling illegal weapons sales, and tracking domestic terrorism threats.25 The majority of these terrorist threats are from a group of Islamists called Salafists, who promote a very conservative and militant version of Islam. Analysis of security issues in conjunction with Celtia’s demand and consumption reveals interesting relationships in two key areas, the black market and the perception of safety. As international businessman, Nicolas, commented, the presence of a thriving black market trade provides extreme security issues for a company. It hinders the ability for the business to protect the integrity of their product. For instance, contracting in China is a risky business move because laws in China do not offer strong defenses against the copying or stealing of product designs.26 There is also the possibility of copying if spare or broken parts from a company are sold on the black market, and then copied from that part’s model. Counterintuitively, SFBT actually benefits from black market trade. SFBT only sells Celtia to licensed alcohol retail distributors, who receive licenses from the Ministry of Commerce. Tunisia’s Code of Investment states that “any investment in the field of alcohol” must achieve authorization from the High Commissions Market in order to be approved as a legal distributor of alcohol and alcoholic beverages.27 Typical black market alcohol products are mostly hard liquor and other imports, which are very expensive to buy in a local Tunisian store, and usually exclude other beer brands. Celtia, therefore, does not face any real competition from goods on the black market. Instead, SFBT benefits because the black market allows for a “more fluid market” for the sale of Celtia.28 This is made possible because security forces are focusing less on the black market for alcohol and more on the market for weapons. Consequently, there is a greater opportunity for people to buy Celtia from legal vendors, and then sell it at a slightly higher price in an area that lacks a local liquor store. Thus, although SFBT does not participate in or condone the black market, it benefits from the increased sales of Celtia accounted for by this method of trade. Celtia also benefits by becoming more popular, since black market beer salesmen reach areas in which licensed sellers have not yet invested. While the black market lends Celtia success, the atmosphere of less security and a lack of safety hinders Celtia’s prospects. Since the revolution, Tunisian residents feel generally less safe due to the sudden rise in Salafist threats. A number of these threats have been against liquor stores and bars throughout Tunisia, leading to the closure of many venues and the burning of two liquor stores in 2012.29 Such violence directed at alcohol venues accounted for a slightly negative effect on the specific sale of Celtia in bars, restaurants, and hotels. Although the targeting of liquor stores and other alcoholic venues by Salafists has greatly decreased during 2013, the fear still persists in Tunisian society. The combination of witnessed violence against alcohol endorsers and a mentality of fear create a paranoia now associated with alcohol consumption. The influence of this mentality extends from consumers to producer. Upon approaching the Celtia brewery in Bab Saadoun with my translator, clear markers of the paranoia could be seen. The large brewery is surrounded by a tall outer wall fixed with barbed wire. If this exterior wall was not intimidating enough, it also contains broken glass from the typical green bottles of Celtia along the top to threaten any potential intruders. The manager of the facility spoke to me with ease, but steered away from giving any opinions that might reflect on the religious implications of the government’s actions. The extent to which he discussed the influence of Islam on government policies was limited to public SFBT opinions, such as those discussed in its open letter to the National Constituent Assembly. Given his comfort in discussing other topics and theories, such as Celtia’s benefits from the black market, it is likely that his resistance to discussing religion is not a company policy but rather a consequence of this paranoia. 25 Borzou Daraghi, “Fears Rise of Growing Tunisian Militancy,” Financial Times: Politics & Society, 31 March 2013, accessed on 20 November 2013 http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/5c0b51da-98a9-11e2-a853-00144feabdc0.html#axzz2n4iHpwCX . 26 Nicolas, Phone Interview, 4 November 2013. 27 Nadya B’Chir, “Despite Soaring Prices, Alcohol Consumption has not Fallen in Tunisia,” Business Insider, 24 April 201, accessed on 15 November 2013,http://translate.googleusercontent.com/translate_c?depth=1&hl=en&prev=/search 28 Celtia Brewery Manager, Interview in Bab Saadoun, Tunisia, 27 November 2013. 29 Steve Inskeep, “Once Tolerated, Alcohol Now Creates Rift In Tunisia,” Special Series: National Public Radio, 06 June 2012, Accessed on 17 October 2013 http://www.npr.org/2012/06/06/154349799/once-tolerated-alcohol-now-creates-rift-in-tunisia.

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Jaclyn Whittaker Mr. Lahyou cited one of the key reasons customers After examining the stopped frequenting his bar, before the Alcohol Tax of 2013 came into effect, was this fear of insecurity.30 He argued that if the recdifferent factors that ognition that a bar could be targeted by Islamist militants did not influence Celtia sales, deter a customer, often the fear of leaving the bar at night in this demand, production, insecure atmosphere kept people from leaving their homes. Interestingly, the result of such mentality did not adand buying trends, one versely affect the sale of Celtia overall. While security issues unquestion still remains: consciously prevent more people from buying alcohol at outside venues, the Celtia brewery manager notes that this did not diwhy are people minish the demand for Celtia. Instead of going out for a drink, drinking more after the consumers are increasingly purchasing Celtia in packs of cans at Jasmine Revolution? liquor stores to drink at home.31 As official quarterly reports confirm, sales of Celtia in total did not suffer in 2012. Instead, this phenomenon explains a different trend in Celtia’s sales- the increase in can sales compared to bottles. This outcome is a shift in trends, rather than a decrease in sales, further highlighting the resilience of the Celtia market in Tunisia.

VI. Celtia & Society: The Social Changes

Celtia’s popularity is quite visible in Tunisian society. Besides the abundance of Celtia advertisements in liquor stores and behind bar counters, many popular bars only carry a limited number of other beer brands per night to sell. Bars such as Le Plug in La Marsa, a northern suburb of Tunis, only sell Celtia in the lounge area of their enterprise; customers who desire another brand or type of alcohol must venture to the second floor to purchase from the bar counter in Le Plug’s nightclub section. As Celtia’s brewery manager proudly stated, Celtia is a source of “wataniya,”32 or patriotism and national pride. It seems that even after other international brands, such as Heineken and Becks, attempted to tap into Tunisia’s beer market, Tunisians still prefer their home brand of Celtia. After examining the different factors that influence Celtia sales, demand, production, and buying trends, one question still remains: why are people drinking more after the Jasmine Revolution? The newfound sense of freedom directly following the revolution played a major role in kickstarting the spike in Celtia’s sales. Mr. Lahyou estimated that his clientele consuming Celtia at the bar increased by about a third in the first few months following the revolution.33 The liberty that the Tunisian society felt after toppling its dictator inspired people to seek more freedoms elsewhere in their lives. One aspect of this liberty was the push in 2011 for better salaries and benefits in the work force. The Celtia brewery manager noted this movement as a very important component of Celtia’s demand,34 With better wages, money is injected into the economy and consumers are able to spend more on non-essentials, such as alcohol. The idea of liberty and hope for future prosperity were major reasons for increased drinking in 2011, but a different motive appears to be the main contributor for rising Celtia consumption in 2012. As the political transition entered its second year, the optimism of the Jasmine Revolution began to make way for a bleak reality. Mr. Lahyou noticed this transformation of hope into depression over the course of the year at his bar, describing his customers as drinking out of “stress” rather than hope for the future of their country.35 As sales of Celtia continued to rise in 2012, it seems the country’s depression did as well. The one-year mandate for the National Constituent Assembly came to a close in 2012, with no constitution finished and no date set for new elections.36 The government thus extended its term beyond the allotted time in the mandate 30 31 32 33 34 35 36

Mohamed Lahyou, Interview, Carthage, Tunisia.,7 December 2013. Celtia Brewery Manager, Interview in Bab Saadoun, Tunisia, 27 November 2013. Ibid. Mohamed Lahyou, Interview, Carthage, Tunisia.,7 December 2013. Celtia Brewery Manager, Interview in Bab Saadoun, Tunisia, 27 November 2013. Mohamed Lahyou, Interview, Carthage, Tunisia.,7 December 2013. Kouichi Shirayangi, “Constituent Assembly Members Disagree on Scheduling an End to their Mandate,” Tunisia Live, 25 March 2012, ac-

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Brew or Bust to complete these two goals. However, as the government failed to actualize either aim within the following year, it became clear that this prolonged political transition would be unable to meet the hopes of its citizens. The current “stress” which Tunisian Celtia consumers suffer from is a result of this prolonged interim status. A recent survey of current Tunisian public opinion cited that 79% of Tunisians think that the political transition is going in the wrong direction.37 Tunisians expressed in the survey the three main problems facing Tunisia: the economy and uncontrolled unemployment, the lack of a finished constitution, and rising domestic terrorism at the hands of Salafists. As citizens become more disillusioned with the current situation and lose hope for the future of Tunisia, many consumers are turning to Celtia. Another interesting facet of Celtia’s increased demand after the Jasmine Revolution is evident in analyzing the demographics of Celtia’s consumers. Although SFBT does not have public figures on the demographics of their consumers, the brewery manager did comment on the brand’s marketing campaign. While Celtia is widely consumed across income levels, he revealed that Celtia’s current target audience is Libyan immigrants and nationals living in Tunisia.38 Alcohol is banned in Libya, but a drinking culture still persists through black market trade of illegal alcohol. With the “Arab Spring” revolution turning into a full-out crisis, many Libyans migrated to Tunisia to avoid the violence. Within the first few months after conflict broke out in 2011, close to 350,000 Libyans fled to Tunisia, and reaching up to half a million refugees within Tunisia throughout the crisis.39 This unexpected surge in Libyan immigrants provided a whole new market for Celtia. Libyan immigrants are new buyers in the Tunisian market, which generates more sales than targeting the usual consumers to buy more. The successful introduction of these new consumers into Celtia’s target audience, therefore, also contributes to the increase of Celtia’s sales and demand in 2011 and 2012.

VII. Conclusion

Examining the Tunisian business SFBT’s popular product, Celtia beer, provides great insight to the evolving economy, politics, and society that make up post-revolution Tunisia. Studying Celtia’s sales in the years following the Jasmine Revolution reveals an intriguing conundrum: how could the sales of this Tunisian beer be rising in the midst of an economic recession? Answering this question required research not only into Tunisia’s overall economy and the domestic beer market, but also a strategic analysis of Tunisia’s post-revolution governmental policies and societal changes. At an economic level, it is possible to understand the intertwined relationships between sales, demand, production, and quantity. As sales of Celtia increased in 2011, this indicated more demand for beer. Higher demand signals to a business to produce more, so as to meet the increased demand. Fueling more production of a good subsequently increases the quantity available to be consumed by the buyers.. While this model benefitted the discussion of SFBT’s response to Celtia’s increasing demand, it does not reveal the actual origins of the beginning hike in Celtia sales. The analysis of government policies, security issues, and social perspectives provided insight into this origin. The social aspect highlights how societal mentalities concerning the political transition increases alcohol consumption due to the early optimism and then subsequent depression of public opinion. It also examines how the influx of Libyan immigrants played a major role in adding to Celtia’s consumer market. The first two themes portray some dichotomy in terms of helping and hindering Celtia’s growing success. Government policies that deter imports allow Celtia to maintain a near-monopoly status of the beer market without pressure from many other competitive beer brands. However, recent policies to raise government revenues have negatively affected Celtia’s growing demand by unnaturally increasing the price of alcoholic beverages. Tunisian society’s commitment to the beer market reflects cessed on 20 November 2013 http://www.tunisia-live.net/2012/03/25/constituent-assembly-members-disagree-on-scheduling-an-end-to-their-mandate/. 37 Middle East Partnership Initiative and William and Associates, “Survey of Tunisian Public Opinion,” (Survey, International Republican Institute, 1-12 October 2013). 38 Celtia Brewery Manager, Interview in Bab Saadoun, Tunisia, 27 November 2013. 39 ”Tunisia,” International Organization for Migration, February 2012, accessed on 28 November 2012 http://www.iom.int/cms/en/sites/ iom/home/where-we-work/africa-and-the-middle-east/middle-east-and-north-africa/tunisia.html .

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Jaclyn Whittaker the stabilizing of demand for Celtia, instead of depression. Security issues also illustrate a counterintuitive asset to Celtia sales, as well as a shift in Tunisian trends of beer drinking. Instead of increasing competition, the black market trade of Celtia actually increases the sales of the beer. Along this perspective, the association of alcohol drinking with violent attacks by Salafist militants did not deter Celtia consumption. Instead, overall sales of Celtia continued to grow as more Tunisians started drinking at home rather than at the bars. The future for Celtia in this prolonged political transition does not look completely optimistic. After the debacle with the possible Finance Act of 2014, it is clear that the current majority-Islamist government is not fond of alcohol consumption. The targeting of the beer market reflects a move to attack Tunisia’s drinking culture and Tunisians’ pride in their locally brewed Celtia. If the government remains determined to discourage the drinking of alcoholic beverages, then it is very possible that more conventional-seeming legislation with more hardships for the beer industry could be on its way.

Works Cited

Anis, Letaief Med. “SFBT: Open Letter about the New Tax on Beer.” Business Flood, 7 October 2013. Accessed on 17 November 2013. http://www.businessflood.com/sfbt-lettre ouverte-concernant-la-nouvelle-taxe-sur-la-biere/&usg=ALkJrhgZfDQY4 eos8FPxG5Xp8ZVBLTjSA#sthash.aHJNEjFG.dpuf . Ayari, Chedly.“Annual Report 2012.” Central Bank of Tunisia. 1 July 2013. Accessed on 1 December 2013. Nicolas. Phone Interview. 4 November 2013. B’Chir, Nadya. “Despite Soaring Prices, Alcohol Consumption has not Fallen in Tunisia.” Business Insider, 24 April 2013. Accessed on 15 November 2013 http://www.businessnews.com.tn/ Malgr é-la-flambée-des-prix,-la-consommation-d alcool-na-pas-baissé-en- Tunisie-,519,37698,1. Celtia Brewery Manager. Interview. Bab Saadoun, Tunisia. 27 November 2013. “Celtia.” Société Frigorifique et Brasserie de Tunis. 2009. Accessed on 17 October 2013 http://www.celtia.com.tn/page.php%3Fpage%3Dhistorique&prev=/search%3Fq%3Dceltia %2Bproduction%26client%3Dfirefox-a%26hs%3Dasv%26rls%3Dorg.mozilla:en-US:official %26channel%3Dfflb. “Company New Beverages- SFBT Group.” Turess, November 2009. Accessed on 5 November 2013 http://www.turess.com/fr/lexpert/2558. “The Finance Act of 2014 does not Provide for an Increase in the Price of Beer.” Il Boursa: News. 9 October 2013. Accessed on 15 November 2013 http://www.ilboursa.com/marches/la-loi- de- finances-2014-ne-prevoit-pas-d-augmentation-du-prix-de-la-biere_2695. Daraghi, Borzou. “Fears Rise of Growing Tunisian Militancy.” Financial Times: Politics & Society, 31 March 2013. Accessed on 20 November 2013 http://www.ft.com/intl/ cms/s/0/5c0b51da-98a9-11e2-a853-00144feabdc0.html#axzz2n4iHpwCX. “Heineken Sets up New Brewery in Tunisia.” Al Bawaba News, 24 December 2006. Accessed on 20 November 2013 http://www.albawaba.com/news/heineken-sets-new-brewery-tunisia. Inskeep, Steve. “Once Tolerated, Alcohol Now Creates Rift In Tunisia.” Special Series. National Public Radio. 06 June, 2012. Accessed on 17 October 2013 http://www.npr.org/2012 / 06/06/154349799/once-tolerated-alcohol-now-creates-rift-in-tunisia. “Interim Strategy Note for the Republic of Tunisia for the Period FY13-14.” Document of the World Bank: Report no. 67692-TN. 17 May 2012. Lahyou, Mohamed. Interview. Carthage, Tunisia. 7 December 2013. Middle East Partnership Initiative and William and Associates. “Survey of Tunisian Public Opinion.” Survey, International Republican Institute. 1-12 October 2013. Shirayangi, Kouichi. “Constituent Assembly Members Disagree on Scheduling an End to their Mandate.” Tunisia Live, 25 March 2012. Accessed on 20 November 2013 http://www.tunisia-live.net/2012/03/25/constituent-assembly-members-disagree-on scheduling-an-end-to-their-mandate/. “SFBT.” Il Boursa: Company. 2013. Accessed on 15 November 2013

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Brew or Bust http://www.ilboursa.com/marches/societe.aspx?s=SFBT. ”Tunisia.” International Organization for Migration. February 2012. Accessed on 28 November 2012 http://www.iom.int/cms/en/sites/iom/home/where-we-work/africa-and-the-middleeast/middleeast-and-north-africa/tunisia.html. “Tunisia Inflation Rate.” Trading Economics. 2013. Accessed on 20 November 2013 http://www.tradingeconomics.com/tunisia/inflation-cpi. “Tunisia- Open Letter from the New Excessive Tax on Beer.” Business News, 6 October 2013. Accessed on 15 November 2013 http://www.businessnews.com.tn/tunisie-lettre-ouverte-de-la- sfbt-sur-la- nouvelle-taxe-excessive-sur-la-biere,520,41350,3 . “Tunisia- SFBT Increases Sales of Alcoholic Beverages.” Business Insider, 23 July 2013. A c cessed on 15 November 2013 http://www.businessnews.com.tn/tunisie-la-sfbt-augmente-ses- v entesde-boissons-alcoolisees,520,39542,3. The World Factbook. “Africa: Tunisia.” Central Intelligence Agency. November 2013. Accessed on 5 November 2013 https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world factbook/geos/ts.html.

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Public Opinion, Public Pressures The U.S. Public’s Response to Tiananmen Square Rio Hart ’14 On June 3rd and 4th, 1989, Chinese troops entered Tiananmen Square in Beijing and opened fire on hundreds of pro-democracy protesters. After an internal struggle between hard-liners who supported a crackdown and moderates who advocated a peaceful approach, the Deng administration had decided that while they “anticipated shock and disapproval” of a crackdown, they believed that the “negative reaction would have few prolonged adverse consequences for China.”1 This turned out to be a tragic miscalculation, as the international outrage at China’s brutality towards its own people served as a trigger for a full decade of hostility in its relations with the United States. The U.S. -Chinese relationship, arguably the most important in world politics, deteriorated substantially and remained tense and unproductive for the ensuing decade. The Chinese miscalculation was the result of the leadership’s failure to recognize what Robert Putnam referred to as the “two-level game” of international diplomacy. Putnam refers to the necessity for “central decision-makers [to] strive to reconcile domestic and international imperatives simultaneously” – in other words, effective international partnerships and diplomacy cannot remain isolated at high levels, but must inspire their respective populaces to partake in this engagement.2 The Tiananmen Square crackdown destroyed the U.S. public’s trust and support of the Chinese administration and the U.S.’s policies of engagement. The move also removed the foundation of the two-level game and leaft diplomatic relations restricted within a toxic atmosphere until the leaders could convince their societies that engagement was in their best interests. Chinese and especially American public prejudices against pragmatic deals between the two countries forced leaders’ hands and restricted the options of both administrations, slowing the rate of convergence between these two international giants until the turn of the century. At the time the protests began in Tiananmen Square, the Chinese leadership had an engaged and respectful partner in the White House. President George H.W. Bush had been the liaison to Beijing and he knew the dynamics of China policy “better than any president in the history of the United States.”3 Bush prioritized good relations with China, making sure that the United States did not engage in harmful posturing advocated by critics of China, and working hard to maintain China’s trust.4 However, the Bush administration’s amicable relations with China were shattered when news broke of the Tiananmen massacre. Public outrage forced Bush to publicly end high-level communication with China, yet he sought to protect relations by sending a secret envoy to Beijing to make it clear to Deng 1 Sutter, Robert. U.S.-Chinese Relations: Perilous Past, Pragmatic Present. Rowman and Littlefield, 2013, 95 2 Putnam, Robert. Diplomacy and domestic politics: the logic of two-level games. International Organization Vol. 42, No. 3 (Summer, 1988), 460. 3 Cohen, Warren I. America’s Response to China, Columbia University Press, 2010, 232. 4 Cohen, 236,

Rio Hart is a senior majoring in Political Science from Minneapolis, Minnesota. He currently works at Congressional Digest and is a member of the University Honors Program. On campus he is involved in WRGW Radio and the College Democrats, and he studied abroad in Istanbul, Turkey. His past independent research has ranged from the feasibility of algae-based biofuels to the philosophical implications of love. 16

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Public Opinion, Public Pressures that the United States still valued the relationship. Bush told Deng that “public furor over Tiananmen had forced Nixon and Carter had both [him] to impose sanctions,” but that these would be liftseen their secret diplomacy ed and relations restored as soon as possible.5 Unforturewarded, but in the new postnately, Deng did not recognize the warning signs of this public furor, and he unwisely chose to exploit the situTiananmen and post-Cold War ation by posturing against American “scolding.”6 U.S. environment, the American public approval of China plummeted from 72% to 31% despite Bush’s struggles to emphasize the importance of public and Congress were the U.S.-Chinese relationship.7 Deng did not yet underdisgusted by what they saw as stand the consequences of antagonizing the American Bush’s duplicity and comfort public, but the effects began to show themselves shortly. When news broke that Bush had pursued secret highwith “coddling dictators.” level talks with the Chinese with the intent of maintaining the relationship, he faced a very different reaction than any of his predecessors had. Nixon and Carter had both seen their secret diplomacy rewarded, but in the new post-Tiananmen and post-Cold War environment, the American public and Congress were disgusted by what they saw as Bush’s duplicity and comfort with “coddling dictators”.8 The Chinese saw the consequences of their dismissiveness toward the American public’s outrage when Bush lost his reelection campaign to a candidate who was able to tap into populist rage against what he called the “butchers of Beijing.”9 Bill Clinton entered the White House and immediately sought to deliver his campaign promises by linking China’s Most Favored Nation (MFN) trade status to human rights abuses, promising to hold the PRC economically accountable for its divergence from U.S. values.10 This policy of linkage was popular with the American public and many of their representatives in Congress, and with it China began to understand how high-level relationships suffered without public support . Behind the scenes, President Clinton quickly began to understand the realities of the U.S.-Chinese relationship and the harm that governing by populist vitriol could bring, but he found himself restricted by popular hostility towards China. Though by 1994 Clinton realized the consequences of impeding access to such a vital economy for U.S. businesses and abandoned his policy of MFN linkage,11 the American political environment would not allow a thaw in U.S.-Chinese relations. With the end of the Cold War, the American public’s tolerance for pragmatic engagement with governments that did not share American values had dropped significantly, and China remained a hot topic for interest groups, media figures, and politicians hoping to score political points with harsh rhetoric. Many of these people pushed the government to “promote more vigorously U.S. interests” in Asia and “use U.S. influence to pressure countries that do not conform to U.S.-backed norms,” and China was the primary target.12 This was a pervasive trend and was seen across both political parties and in a litany of interest groups. In 1995, these interests converged to pressure the President to grant a visa to Lee Tenghui, President of Taiwan. Lee hoped for a personal visa for a visit to America despite the U.S.’s historic promises that it would never again recognize the PRC as a legitimate government (a condition vital to China in its agreement to establish relations). Under intense pressure from a Congress eager to engage in a high-profile snub of the PRC13 as well as various strengthening pro-Taiwanese interest groups, Clinton reneged on American promises and granted Lee his visa.14 China was furious and reacted with a 9-month barrage of ballistic missile “tests” in the Taiwan Strait. Loath to exacerbate his confrontation with China, Clinton avoided addressing the issue for months until tension became so great that he felt compelled to send two 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14

Cohen, 241.

Ibid.

Cohen, 241. Cohen, 249. Sutter 95-96.

Sutter, 106.

Lampton, David M. Same Bed, Different Dreams: Managing US-China Relations 1989-2000 University of California Press, 2001, 43. Sutter, 101. Lampton, 50. Sutter, 98.

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Rio Hart

Students led pro-democracy protests in Tiananmen Square in Beijing, China in April, 1989.

U.S. carrier battle groups into the Strait to compel China to cease firing.15 The President had been forced to govern according to urgings of the public and the consequences of their aggressive campaigns, rather than executing a pragmatic and coherent foreign policy. Now fully aware of the harm to American interests that resulted from allowing his foreign policy to be dictated by the public resentment for China, Clinton decided that tensions between China and the United States were too harmful to continue and he began to press for a reemphasis on engagement. Speaking in China towards the end of his second term, Clinton assured the Chinese leaders that America did not support and would not recognize Taiwan – an action necessary to facilitate dètent but one for which Clinton was “roundly criticized in Congress and by the U.S. media.”16 Clinton pushed for Chinese entry into the World Trade Organization (WTO), which would permanently establish its MFN status and save future presidents from annual congressional reviews of Chinese trade policy – an administrative process that had become a target for the American public, media and interest groups. The trade policy review also “provided a highly visible podium from which to question the wisdom of the president’s China policy.”17 Clinton hoped that China’s entry into the WTO would remove the political obstacles and populist interference into nuanced international relations. This strategy showed that Clinton had come to recognize just how toxic a hostile public could be to vital foreign policy, and he realized that for the United States and China to move forward in a productive manner they would need the breathing room that could only come from removing the public and even Congress from high-profile decisions. The Chinese government finally came to recognize the damage U.S.-Chinese relations sustained due to the American public’s disapproval of China. While the Chinese government encouraged mobs to respond to the U.S. bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade by stoning the U.S. embassy in Beijing and burning U.S. diplomatic property in Chengdu,18 it quickly realized that U.S.-Chinese convergence necessitated a respect of the two-level game and a dètent within domestic politics in both nations. An incoming U.S. administration provided China with the opportunity to pursue just that. President George W. Bush entered office after campaigning on populist distrust of China. Dismissing Clinton’s late-presidency emphasis on engagement, Bush expressed the views of the American public when he shifted U.S policy in Asia to focus on Japan and other allies, rather than China.19 Soon, 15 16 17 18 19

Ibid. Sutter, 108. Lampton, 27. Lampton, 60. Sutter, 124.

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Public Opinion, Public Pressures however, this changed. Just as Clinton learned the importance of convergence after the failures of Linkage and the Taiwan Strait crisis, Bush would come to value his relationship with China when dealing with the War on Terror and a nuclear North Korea. Yet the most vital change was in the political environment rather than the Oval Office. hWile Clinton was unable to persuade the American public of the need for improved relations, the attacks of September 11th and the ensuing War on Terror redirected the attention of the American public and media away from U.S.-Chinese relations and allowed diplomats breathing room to bring the two countries together. Early in Bush’s first term, the United States and China “worked to establish a relationship that emphasized positive aspects and played down differences.”20 Soon, recognizing the shifting dynamic after 9/11, China halted its harsh rhetoric and sought to establish itself in American eyes as a partner in the War on Terror.21 When Bush asked for deference in his plan to invade Iraq and for help in managing the erratic behavior of North Korea, two priorities for the American public, China acquiesced. After years of struggling with a hostile public sphere, diplomatic leaders found the American public preoccupied with other issues and unable to conjure effective outcry against engagement policies. China and the United States were finally able to solidify permanent positive relations, no longer undermined by the two-level game. When China’s leaders debated how to respond to the protests in 1989, they failed to take into account the new reality of international relations. The Cold War was coming to a close and the American public believed that “with the end of the cold war China should no longer be treated as indispensable.”22 When China put its divergence from U.S. values on full display, it gained a powerful detractor in the American public – a loss that would dictate U.S.-Chinese policy for years to come. Though Clinton would learn through his experiences with Linkage and the Taiwan Straits crisis that U.S. interests required a positive relationship with China, it would take an international shift in attention towards the War on Terror for the American public to allow its leaders to wholeheartedly pursue engagement. Putnam’s theory of the two-level game explains the importance of the domestic political environment to these relations. The Deng administration’s blindness to the consequences of instilling animosity in the American public set the stage for the next decade of hostility, and one can only hope that future administrations in both countries learn from these mistakes and respect the political power of their respective societies.

Works Cited Cohen, Warren I. America’s Response to China, Columbia University Press, 2010. Lampton, David M. Same Bed, Different Dreams: Managing US-China Relations 1989-2000 University of California Press, 2001. Putnam, Robert. Diplomacy and domestic politics: the logic of two-level games. International Organization, Vol. 42, No. 3 (Summer, 1988), 460. Sutter, Robert. U.S.-Chinese Relations: Perilous Past, Pragmatic Present. Rowman and Littlefield, 2013.

20 21 22

Sutter, 125. Sutter, 126. Cohen, 251.

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Democratization and Counterterrorism Policy How a More Humanitarian Approach to Foreign Policy Revitalizes the Effectiveness of Counterterrorism Tendai Mukau ’14 Defeating extremist terrorist organizations, particularly Al-Qaeda, is perhaps the most urgent security objective of the United States. It is critical to the security of the United States and its allies to undermine Al-Qaeda’s ability to execute terrorist attacks and eventually eliminate the group altogether by applying competent policy that addresses all aspects that contribute to the global Salafist terror organization, Al-Qaeda, and its ability to cause violence. The construction of foreign policy that is cognizant of the mechanism of terrorism and radicalization is vital to a longterm counterterrorist strategy. These long-term considerations are particularly concerning because there are no educational institutions that directly and adequately address the implicit motive that inspires terrorism. The threat of force is a moot deterrent to an enemy that has been indoctrinated to revel in death. As such, violent Islamist extremist groups will not be defeated unless we address the root ideological motives that fuel hatred and hopelessness and compels one to kill themselves for the sake of killing others. Remaining satisfied with the mantra “terrorists hate America and freedom” is not satisfactory in addressing the various nuances of why terrorists become terrorists; dozens of studies challenge the stereotypically attributed causes of terrorism. Additionally, the common assumptions that terrorism results from bleak economic prospects1 and a severe paucity of education2 are simplistic and counterterrorism efforts that focus exclusively on these aspects of nation building are inadequate. The type of nation-building that supports counterterrorism involves not economic, but rather political, human rights and democratic advancement. The political democratization of despotic regimes may play to U.S. foreign policy interests with regards to the curtailment of terrorism and religious radicalism. “Nation-building” is commonly criticized as a policy tool in combating terrorism. However, this conclusion may prove premature because the commonly understood definition of “nation-building” does not address the specific aspects relevant to preventing terrorism. Drawing on Clausewitz’s proclamation that war is merely a continuation of politics, democratic reform may prevent the critical transition to resort to violence because “fringe groups” that would employ violence can alternatively seek means through the political process to present their agenda.3 For a practical application of this principle, 1 2 3

Tim Krieger, Daniel Meirrieks, “What Causes Terrorism,” Public Choice, (2011) p.9-10. “What Causes Terrorism,” p.11. Krieger, Meirrieks, “What Causes Terrorism,” 11-12.

Tendai Mukau is a senior at the Elliott School of International Affairs with a concentration in security policy and a minor in Russian language and literature. He was chair of philanthropy and external affairs for Elliott School’s international affairs honors society, Sigma Iota Rho, and he studied abroad in Ufa, Russia last summer. He is passionate about international human rights issues, and he plans on attending law school in the near future to pursue a career in international human rights. Apart from his academics, Tendai is a violinist, pianist, and an avid composer. He also speaks Russian and Spanish, and a bit of German and Swedish. 20

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Democratization and Counterterrorism Policy one might imagine a scenario in which Saudi Arabia and other similar Persian Gulf states are characterized by genuine democracy with high internal political efficacy. Theoretically, a political movement that views the U.S. military presence in Saudi Arabia as an offensive and intolerable occupation of sacred land could lobby the Gulf state governments to address these grievances. Even if these citizens’ lobby was not successful in removing the U.S. presence there, the government could offer some concessions in a political compromise or create a framework for gradual removal of foreign military presence within their sovereign borders. At the very least, it could engender Smoke rising from a former Bosnian ammunition stockpile after NATO bombing. the belief that the peaceful political process is not a pointless endeavor. While dedicated terrorist organizations like Al Qaeda would likely not disavow their violent means to its ends, if such a scenario were possible, it would decrease the legitimacy of foreign “occupation” as a legitimate pretext for terrorism (and commonly cited motive for the 9/11 attacks) in the Muslim world and frustrate terrorist organization’s recruiting attempts. This assertion is particular relevant given terrorism scholar Robert Pape’s findings that “modern terrorist suicide campaigns”4 are characterized by “nationalist” motivations against U.S. military presence in a terrorist’s “national homeland.”5 Pursuant to this realization, the Dutch government recognizes accessibility to the political system as a tool to combat radicalization:6 authoritarian Gulf States would do well to reach a similar conclusion.

Military intervention; The Bosnia-Kosovo-Chechnya Paradigm and Lessons for Syria

It is also vital to continue to monitor regions where war strife and institutional weakness create an optimal environment for extremism and to use diplomacy to deny violent terrorist groups access to these regions. In the failure of rebel groups to quickly and decisively achieve their irredentist goals, extremism has metastasized to these battlegrounds, evidenced in Bosnia, Kosovo, Chechnya, and now likely in Syria. Apart from the argument that humanitarian intervention bolsters the United States’ moral legitimacy, intervention can also negate factors that render regions susceptible to terrorist and extremist infiltration. Kenneth Comfort, a writer for the United States Army’s Strategic Research Project argues, “A new strategy should combine improved intelligence collection with more aggressive efforts at conflict resolution and post-conflict national building in global crisis zones.”7 The wars in Bosnia, Kosovo and Chechnya contain extraordinary parallels with useful applications to future conflicts. These conflicts were irregular military conflicts characterized by a weak irredentist Islamic faction seeking independence from an Orthodox Christian 4 Albert Bergsen. “Dying to Win: The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism Contemporary Psychology, 35, 5 September 2006; p.460. 5 “Dying to Win…,”35, 5 460-1. 6 Lidewijde Ongering,“Home-Grown Terrorism and Radicalisation in the Netherlands Experiences, Explanations and Approaches,” U.S. Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee, June 27, 2007. www.hsgac.senate.gov/download/062707ongering 7 7 Kenneth Comfort, “Preventing Terrorism thought Nation-Building: A Viable Way?” p.11.

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Tendai Mukau state. All three regions were comprised of Islamic, secular, moderate societies where civil war introduced the entrenchment of extremist forces that posed security risks to the United States. These conflicts also demonstrated opportunities where some sort of humanitarian intervention would produce direct security benefits. The military intervention in Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1995 is a model example of humanitarian military intervention that addressed future security concerns. When the United States intervened early in Bosnia in concert with NATO in Operation Deliberate Force, the Clinton Administration employed its diplomatic position to compel the Bosnian government to eliminate the Al Qaeda and “muj” influence there. It successfully averted the entrenchment of these groups in Bosnia8 and also thwarted Iranian encroachment in Bosnia.9 Without a military intervention in a conflict where extremist agents were Kosovo represents present, the United States would not have been in a position to apply diplomatic leverage to sanitize Bosnia through a middle ground sufficiently provision in the 1995 Dayton Accords.10 Therefore, U.S. foreign outcome in terms of policy must recognize that secular societies with ties to Islam counterterrorist ef- and entrenched in a civil war will, out of desperation, recruit military aid by any means necessary and ally with terrorist orforts: not as success- ganizations, notably Al Qaeda.11 The United States was lucky in ful as that in Bosnia, Bosnia, but not in Chechnya because the same diplomatic opdid not exist. As a result, Al Qaeda retains a strong and but not as disastrous portunity concerning presence in Chechnya.12 It is likely that U.S. intervenas that in Chechnya. tion provided the United States with the leverage it needed to sanitize Bosnia of terrorist organizations. During the Chechen Wars in Chechnya, however, intervention did not provide the same opportunity.13 Instead, it will be critical to utilize diplomacy to encourage Russia to undermine Chechnya’s role as an Al-Qaeda resource.14 Kosovo represents a middle ground outcome in terms of counterterrorist efforts: not as successful as that in Bosnia, but not as disastrous as that in Chechnya. Adrian Lawrence’s theory that moderate political agenda is driven to extremism through political failure explains the entrenchment of extremism in Kosovo and Chechnya15. In Kosovo, however, the radical and terrorist Ushtira Çlirimtare e Kosovës (UÇK)/ Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) swallowed up Ibrahim Rugova’s peaceful Lidhja Demokratike e Kosovoës (LDK) Albanian rights movement.16 The KLA, a group that has committed serious violent human rights violations17 and is responsible for affording Al Qaeda a foothold in Kosovo18 remained prominent after the settlement of the war.19 Although U.S.-NATO intervention and military occupation through KFOR put the United States in a better position to monitor and control security threats in Kosovo and introduce intelligence assets, the United States should have sought to completely disarm and disband radical elements such as the KLA as it had in Bosnia four years prior. In preserving relative Albanian autonomy in the Serbian province through enforcing United Nations Resolution 1244, which stipulated the “meaningful 8 Clarke, Richard. Against All Enemies (RAC Enterprises: New York,) 2004, p.139-40. 9 Clarke, Richard. Against All Enemies (RAC Enterprises: New York,) 2004, p.140. 10 Clarke, Richard. Against All Enemies (RAC Enterprises: New York.) p.139. 2004. 11 Conclusion drawn from the experience in Chechnya. James Hughes, Hughes, s. Chenchnya; From Nationalism to Jihad. (Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2007), 101. For further reading on the infiltration of Al Quaeda and Ismamist extremism in Chechnya, see Tendai Mukau, “The Political and Security Implications of the Civil Wars in the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria,” Sigma Iota Rho Journal of International Affairs, March 15, 2013, http://sirjournal.org/2013/03/13/ the-political-and-security-implications-of-the-civil-wars-in-the-chechen-republic-of-ichkeria/. Online. 12 Edward Walker, “Islam in Chechnya,” Berkley-Stanford Conference Religion and Spirituality in Eastern Europe and the Former Soviet Union. Summery. March 13, 1998. 4. 13 John Fulton, “NATO and the KLA: How the West Encouraged Terrorism,” Global Security Studies, Fall 2010, Volume l, Issue 3 p.132 14 Mike Bowker, “Western Views of the Chechen Conflict” in Chechnya From Past to Future, 233. Vidino, “ Chechnya Became a Breeding Ground for Terror,” Middle East Quarterly.12,3. (Summer 2005): http://www.meforum.org/744/how-chechnya-became-abreeding-ground-for-terror 15 Adrian Lawrence, “Triggering Nationalist Violence: Competition and Conflict in Uprisings against Colonial Rule,” International Security 35, no. 2 (Fall 2010): 99. 16 Keiichi Kubo, “Why Kosovar Albanians Took Up Arms Against the Serbian Regime; The Genesis and Expansion of the UÇK in Kosovo,” Europe-Asia Studies 65,7 (August 2010): 1145, 1149-50. 17 p.132 18 Scott Park, “State Department once called new allies ‘terrorists’: Cohen: For KLA victory, but not for KLA,” Human Events 55, 16 (Apr 30, 1999): p.5. 19 CITATION NEEDED

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Democratization and Counterterrorism Policy self-administration for Kosovo,”20 intervention further helped Kosovo attain its (albeit dubious) independence.21 This reduced local grievances that may engender sympathy towards the KLA. However, had the United States intervened earlier, it may have denied the KLA the opportunity to exist and expropriate foreign terrorism in the Balkans in the first place. It is worth noting that of these three extraordinarily similar conflicts, only Chechnya, where military and humanitarian intervention was absent and the Islamic separatists decisively lost, actually produced significant and non-regional acts of terror.22 There are, perhaps, lessons to draw from these conflicts that support intervention in the Syrian Civil War. Although there are compelling arguments for not intervening in,Syria, U.S. foreign policymakers should consider that by refusing to intervene or supplying secular rebel factions with the means to viably win, the United States has no compelling means of repressing the growth of the Al Nusrah Front. Given that the United States has decided to reject the legitimacy of the incumbent regime in Syria, it should engage the favorable rebel movement and the Syrian public and promote the idea that radical Islamist groups are historically not advocates of their national interests.23 Obviously it is neither practical, nor prudent for the United States to simply intervene everywhere where atrocities are committed. Rather, the point of these three examples is to provide a nuanced argument for humanitarian intervention that reflects U.S. security interests. When scholars simplistically dismiss humanitarian interventions such as in Bosnia as “a diversion from the real work…in destroying the al-Qaeda network,”24 they ignore the counterfactual reality that terrorism had the opportunity to flourish and instead was suppressed. Finally, a significant radicalizing agent is the very legitimate rage generated from atrocities and human rights abuses committed against Muslims in various regions,25 notably in Bosnia, Kosovo, and Chechnya. Although terrible atrocities were committed against Muslims, the United States should increase its effort to demonstrate that the ills perpetrated on Muslims through the world cannot legitimately be blamed on the United States. It is essential to communicate to Muslims worldwide that the United States, for example, was in no way culpable for the Russian military conduct in Chechnya. In bolstering its credibility to this point, the United States should also more forcefully condemn atrocities and better publicize its efforts to help Muslims. For example, its interventions in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo were inarguably instrumental in stopping atrocities committed against Muslims. It should also better publicize its various aid programs in predominately Islamic regions. In conclusion, U.S. foreign policy must consider all forces that promote terrorism, especially in relation to U.S. military and humanitarian intervention, and utilizing in order to develop a more effective, long-term counterterrorism strategy. should consider These are some policy suggestions that may be worth considering in applying counterterrorist objectives to US foreign policy in future conflicts.

20 www.nato.int. “Resolution 1244 (1999)”, June 30, 1999. http://www.nato.int/kosovo/docu/u990610a.htm Online. 00 22 The Chechen “Black Widow” suicide bombers directed much of their terrorism in central Moscow outside the Caucuses. The Tsarnaev brothers, who were responsible for the Boston Marathon bombings in March 2013 were technically from the neighboring province of Dagestan, however this providence was associated with the same conflict in Chechnya. 23 Emma Gilligan, Terror in Chechnya Russia and the Tragedy of Civilians in War (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2010), 131. 24 Kenneth Comfort, “Preventing Terrorism through Nation-Building: A Viable Way?” 8. 25 Sageman Testimony 2 June 27, 2007 US Senate Committee on Radicalizing of Global Islamic Terrorists Homeland security and Governmental Affairs

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The China Syndrome How China is Affecting North Korean Nuclear Policy Fatema Ghasletwala ’14 British Prime Minister Winston Churchill once said, “an appeaser is one who feeds a crocodile, hoping it will eat him last.” Indeed, the situation between China and North Korea can be surmised as such. China is North Korea’s most important ally, largest trading partner, and main source of food, arms, fuel, and other goods. Essentially, China is North Korea’s few ties to the civilized world.While China and North Korea have historically enjoyed close diplomatic relations as a result of the Sino-North Korean Mutual Aid and Cooperation Treaty that was signed in 1961, China’s patience with North Korea is slowly waning.1 Like most alliances in existence, the one between these two nations is entirely self-serving. China appeases North Korea by interacting with it politically and economically and North Korea, in return, does not threaten China with nuclear warfare. However, China’s motivations for aiding in the sustenance of a totalitarian regime go beyond nuclear fears. According to the Council on Foreign Relations, China vehemently opposes harsh international economic sanctions “in the hope of avoiding regime collapse and an uncontrolled influx of refugees across its eight hundred-mile border with North Korea.”2 In international relations, China acts as a self-interested actor working to preserve the integrity of its own nation. In light of these facts, this paper will argue that China’s policy toward North Korea’s nuclear activities is one focused on maintaining both political and economic stability By examining instances of nuclear activity instigated by North Korea and China’s response to those interactions, China’s basic strategic goals and plans can be interpreted. China’s interventions in North Korea in order to facilitate stability date back to the Korean War, when Chinese military personnel were deployed to the Korean Peninsula to fight against the Americans.3 After the split of the Peninsula, China sided with North Korea. The aforementioned Sino-North Korean Mutual Aid and Cooperation Treaty solidified China’s commitment to North Korean interests. Unwavering for so long, China-North Korean rela1 p11097. 2 3

Jayshree Bajoria, “The China-North Korea Relationship,” Council on Foreign Relations, 2013, http://www.cfr.org/china/china-north-korea-relationship/ Ibid. Ibid.

Fatema Ghasletwala is a senior from East Windsor, New Jersey majoring in Political Science with a focus in Public Policy and minoring in Public Health and Law and Society. On campus, she is the Assistant Director of Hall Development with the Residence Hall Association and an University Honors Program Student Peer Advisor. She previously served as a Hall Council Advisor and Hall Council Member. Professionally, she was an Undergraduate Research Assistant to Dr. Theo Christov for his forthcoming book on the appropriation of Jean-Jaques Rousseau into international relations paradigms. Additionally, she was a Congressional Intern in both the district and Capitol Hill offices of Congressman Rush Holt. This summer, she will be completing a fellowship as a Summer Scholar at The American Enterprise Institute in Washington, DC. 24

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The China Syndrome tions have become increasingly strained as a result of North Korea’s nuclear testing. In 2003, China joined the United States, North Korea, South Korea, Japan, and Russia in the Six-Party Talks. The Six-Party Talks were aimed at dismantling North Korea’s nuclear program through negotiations.4 However, the Talks have been largely unsuccessful in fostering stability due to North Korea’s furtive nature and secretive missile testing. A rise in tensions between China and North Korea can be traced back to Pyongyang’s testing of nuclear weapons in October 2006 while still involved in the Six-Party Talks. In a move that broke a long solidarity with North Korea, China agreed to UN Security Council Resolution 1718, North Korea. This universally-adopted resolution “bans the transfer or sale of missiles, combat aircraft, tanks, warships, and nuclear-related products to the government of North Korea.”5 The Council on Foreign Relations argues that China’s acceptance of the UN Security Council’s resolution implies a shift from “diplomacy to punishment” in China’s dealings with North Korea.6 Beijing’s trend of punishment over diplomacy continued when Pyongyang altogether exited the Six- Party Talks and conducted a second round of nuclear talks in 2009. China adopted UN Security Council Resolution 1874, North Korea, which expressed the “gravest concern” toward North Korea’s irresponsible nuclear activities. It also added further sanctions and chastisements to Pyongyang.7 While it would seem that such strong backlash from the international community would neutralize the North Korean threat, Pyongyang continued to test nuclear weapons. In February 2013, North Korea once again tested nuclear weapons, launching a missile. Frustrated, Beijing conducted talks with the North Korean ambassador to no tangible avail. From this short history on Pyongyang’s nuclear activities, it is evident that Beijing has always been in two minds about how to strategically deal with the stress that is North Korea. After the first nuclear test in 2006, China called North Korea’s actions “brazen” and unleashed very harsh criticism. Seven years later, after the third test, Beijing still expressed its displeasure to the North Korean ambassador, but did not take swift action in cutting off North Korea even though the fallout from the February 2013 test fell over the border into China. However, Beijing did agree to extend prior UN Resolutions and promised “significant action” if more activity were to occur.8 Jin Canrong, a foreign policy scholar at Renmin University in Beijing, believes that China’s attitude will definitely change as time goes on and North Korea continues to disobey UN Resolutions. Jin asserts that China attempted to stabilize North Korea by helping the country focus on economic growth rather than extreme militarism. He believes China’s logic was to change the North Korean ethos and shift priorities from strictly militaryideological interests to national interests. By doing so, China hoped North Korea would become more reasonable. Inherent in that is China’s basic strategic goal: to make Pyongyang more receptive to dealmaking and negotiation (herein negotiability).9 China is hesitant to employ brute force and power in order to make North Korea cooperate. Just as an exasperated parent appeases a spoiled child, Beijing tolerates North Korea’s immature actions. This is done with the intention of Chinese self-preservation. For one, sustaining a functioning, albeit totalitarian regime in North Korea assures stability and keeps North Korean refugees and American military forces from entering China on a “stabilization” mission.10 Additionally, Beijing supporting Pyongyang ensures a friendly neighbor as well as a buffer zone of sorts between China and South Korea, which houses approximately 30,000 American military troops.11 As per Shen Dingli, a scholar at the Institute of International Studies at Fudan University in Shanghai, this strategy allows China to reduce its military presence in the northeast and “focus more 4 “UN Security Council Resolution 1874, North Korea,” Council on Foreign Relations, 2013, http://www.cfr.org/proliferation/un-security-council-resolution-1874-north-korea/p19625. 5 “UN Security Council Resolution 1718, North Korea,” Council on Foreign Relations, 2013, http://www.cfr.org/proliferation/un-security-council-resolution-1718-north-korea/p11732. 6 Jayshree Bajoria, “The China-North Korea Relationship,” Council on Foreign Relations, 2013, http://www.cfr.org/china/china-north-korea-relationship/ p11097. 7 “UN Security Council Resolution 1874, North Korea,” Council on Foreign Relations, 2013, http://www.cfr.org/proliferation/un-security-council-resolution-1874-north-korea/p19625. 8 Tania Branigan, “China’s Patience with North Korea Wears Thing After Latest Nuclear Test,” The Guardian. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/ feb/12/china-north-korea-nuclear-test. 9 Ibid. 10 Ibid. 11 Jayshree Bajoria, “The China-North Korea Relationship,” Council on Foreign Relations, 2013, http://www.cfr.org/china/china-north-korea-relationship/ p11097.

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Chinese and North Koreans display their poltical friendship at a cultural event. China and North Korea are neighbors and allies.

directly on the issue of Taiwanese independence.”12 An alliance with North Korea acts not only as a fortification against U.S. military dominance in the Korean Peninsula, but also as a wall against the rise of the Japanese military. An essential part of China’s stability strategy toward North Korea is economic. Along with appeasing the military-political regime, China is also attempting to create a vibrant economy in North Korea. Several Chinese firms have invested in North Korea in many different ways, including the development and mining of mineral resources in the country’s northern area. A 2010 Congressional Research Service report claims that the mining efforts are part of a larger strategy by China to “stabilize the border region it shares with North Korea, lessen the pressure on North Koreans to migrate to China, and raise the general standard of living in North Korea.”13 A report by The United States Institute of Peace adds that the economic development plans also benefit China because its own “chronically poor” northeastern region has mineral and energy resource security just across the border.14 In fact, estimates by the United Nations indicate that Chinese investment grew almost thirty-fold, from $1.5 million to approximately $42 million, between 2002 and 2008.15 Consequently, there are significant implications of the fragile China-North Korea relationship in international security politics. The two nations share a similar past that includes an alliance during the Korean War, a common history of communism, and the battle to develop their post-colonial states. They are also geopolitically important to each other because of the 880-mile shared border.16 Most importantly though, both China and North Korea share a “self-perception as aggrieved, weak countries that can stand up to stronger powers.”17 For this reason, China and North Korea act clandestinely in international matters. They do not wish to divulge their secrets, or lack thereof. For instance, in an April 2013 interview, President Obama stated that he did not believe North Korea has the ability nor the capacity to 12 13 14 tor-0. 15 pdf. 16 17

Ibid. Dick Nanto, “China-North Korea Relations,” Congressional Research Service, 2013, http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R41043.pdf. “The China Factor,” United States Institute of Peace, 2013, http://www.usip.org/resources/the-issues-north-korea-s-leadership-succession-the-china-facBates Gill, “China’s North Korea Policy,” United States Institute of Peace, 2013, http://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/China’s_North_Korea_Policy. Ibid. Ibid.

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The China Syndrome construct a missile-like nuclear warhead.18 To have a nation like the United States doubt nuclear functionality is certain to infuriate Kim Jung-Un and his administration. Coupled with China’s moves to dethrone American economic hegemony, as evidenced by continual devaluation of the Yuan, it can be argued that China and North Korea are united in their wariness toward western influence and the power of the United States.19 It is then a cause of concern for the United States that security interactions between the two countries have increased in recent years. In October 2010, a Chinese CCP Politburo Standing Committee member joined North Korean leader Kim Jon-Il to celebrate a North Korean holiday. The Chinese CCP member was also in charge of China’s internal security at that time. This interaction is notable because it “signals the possibility for the Chinese domestic security apparatus to assume a more important role with regard to North Korean policy.”20 Indeed, several conflicting CIA reports show that private Chinese businesses have been supplying North Korea with materials needed to build ballistic missiles. A 2010 report showed that China, as a nation, was not supplying nuclear or other weapons-related materials to North Korea. Yet, an even more recent report has shown China to be a trans-shipment point for missile materials between Iran and North Korea.21 It is unclear as to whether China is facilitating these movements as a country, or if the trade is going unnoticed by the Chinese government because of obfuscation of facts. The tensions from this special relationship also affect the international community because they blur the lines of authority in the region. It seems that China is affecting North Korean policy. It is not just governmentally related personnel who are affecting this change; private business with economic interests in North Korea are also shaping North Korean policy. It is vital for talks between Washington and Beijing to accurately pinpoint who is controlling what and where. There must be a clear definition of who are the important political and geopolitical actors in North Korea. It is also essential to determine whether or not China is in violation of UN Security Council Resolutions by allowing, either knowingly or unknowingly, the shipment of weapons materials through its borders from Iran to North Korea. In conclusion, stability and negotiability are the stalwart traits of China’s policy toward North Korea’s nuclear activities. By examining instances of nuclear activity by North Korea and China’s response to those interactions, it is evident that China has acted in ways to maintain political and economic stability in North Korea. China’s strategy is to strengthen ties with North Korea in order to better control the actions of the nation. Two major aims of China’s “appeasement” strategy are to ensure stable political transitions as well as steadily sustain North Korea’s developing economy. The benefits of this are two-fold: safe and friendly relations with a geopolitical neighbor and the prevention of an influx of North Korean refugees. Considering that China and the United States also share similar interests, such as the containment of North Korea’s nuclear program and the prevention of the acquisition of nuclear weapons by South Korea and Japan one may see a partnership between the United States and Northeast Asia develop in the future. Regardless of the specific treaties and alliances made, it is crucial that all nations involved in nuclear activities consider the repercussions of nuclear warfare. North Korea is trying to balance power by acquiring some itself, but, realism is a dangerous game to play with the lives of people. Will North Korea ever accept its fate in international relations, or will it ever succeed in proving to the United States it is capable of nuclear warfare? One can only hope that day never comes.

18 David Sanger, “Obama Doubts That North Korea Can Make a Nuclear Warhead,” The New York Times, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/04/17/us/ politics/obama-voices-doubts-on-north-korean-nuclear-warhead.html?_r=0. 19 Dariusz Bialuski, “China’s Devaluation of the Yuan: A Global Economic Imbalance,” Fordham Political Review, http://fordhampoliticalreview.org/ chinas-devaluation-of-the-yuan-a-global-economic-imbalance/. 20 Bates Gill, “China’s North Korea Policy,” United States Institute of Peace, 2013, http://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/China’s_North_Korea_Policy. pdf. 21 Ibid.

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Fatema Ghasletwala

Bibliography

Bajoria, Jayshree. “The China-North Korea Relationship.” Council on Foreign Relations. http://www.cfr.org/china/china-north-korea-relationship/p11097 (accessed December 10, 2013). Bialuski, Dariusz. “China’s Devaluation of the Yuan: A Global Economic Imbalance.” Fordham Political Review. http://fordhampoliticalreview.org/chinas-devaluation-of-the-yuan-a-global-economic-imbalance/ (accessed April 28, 2014). Branigan, Tania. “China’s patience with North Korea wears thin after latest nuclear test.” The Guardian. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/feb/12/china-north-korea-nucleartest (accessed December 15, 2013). Gill, Bates. “China’s North Korea Policy.” United States Institute of Peace. http://www. usip.org/sites/default/files/China’s_North_Korea_Policy.pdf (accessed December 15, 2013). Nanto, Dick . “China-North Korea Relations.” Congressional Research Service. http:// www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R41043.pdf (accessed December 13, 2013). Sanger, David . “Obama Doubts That North Korea Can Make a Nuclear Warhead.” The New York Times. http://www.nytimes.com/2013/04/17/us/politics/obama-voices-doubts-onnorth-korean-nuclear-warhead.html?_r=0 (accessed December 13, 2013). United States Institute of Peace. “The China Factor.” United States Institute of Peace. http:// www.usip.org/resources/the-issues-north-korea-s-leadership-succession-the-china-factor-0 (accessed December 14, 2013). Council on Foreign Relations. “UN Security Council Resolution 1718, North Korea.” Council on Foreign Relations. http://www.cfr.org/proliferation/un-security-council-resolution1718-north-korea/p11732 (accessed December 14, 2013). Council on Foreign Relations. “UN Security Council Resolution 1874, North Korea.” Council on Foreign Relations. http://www.cfr.org/proliferation/un-security-council-resolution1874-north-korea/p19625 (accessed December 15, 2013). Xu, Beina. “The Six Party Talks on North Korea’s Nuclear Program.” Council on Foreign Relations. http://www.cfr.org/proliferation/six-party-talks-north-koreas-nuclear-program/p13593 (accessed December 12, 2013).

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The Rest Against the West How the ICC trial of Kenya’s leadership is bolstering China’s relationship with Africa Max Sanders ’14 The indictment of Uhuru Kenyatta, William Ruto, and Joshua Sang by the ICC in 2011 has sparked a massive debate within the African community over the role and nature of the International Criminal Court (ICC). Not only has the Kenyan National Assembly voted to withdraw from the Rome Statute, the African Union, itself, has threatened and even contemplated rescinding signatures on the Rome Statute. In the midst of this is China—seen as a countervailing power against Western “neo-imperialist” values instilled in many international organizations, such as the ICC. As the Court continues to push for the trial of Uhuru Kenyatta and his associates in government, African nations are increasingly turning to China as both an ally in the UN Security Council (UNSC), a powerful economic partner, and a source of symbolic representation in the international community. China is benefiting from this relationship both politically and economically. The trial of Kenyan leadership in the ICC is factoring into China’s relations with Kenya and is bolstering its presence in Africa as a whole.

Africa and the ICC

The indictment of Uhuru Kenyatta and William Ruto in 2011 was a result of their alleged involvement in the ethThe Kenyatta campaign nic violence which took place following the 2007 Kenyan effectively reframed presidential elections. Although a power sharing agreement the issue as a quasiwas reached in February 2008, the turmoil left approximately 1,300 people dead and over 600,000 displaced. Kenya, in its nationalist struggle past, has been extremely prone to post election violence and, against unfair as some analysts have pointed out, in indicting Kenyatta and Ruto as orchestrators of ethnic conflict, the ICC is attemptstandards and practices ing to stem a culture of violence and tumult which repeatedly embodied by the ICC. grips the country. It is, according to the ICC, intended to end the impunity of Kenyan leaders who incite violence or ethnic tension in pursuit of their own agenda.1 Interestingly, the indictment of both politicians prior to 2013 played a unifying role in the then upcoming presidential elections. As was aptly labeled by the International Crisis Group (ICG), the indictment of Kenyatta and Ruto is a “fortunate misfortune” in that the accusations actually 1 Zak, T. (2013, November 12). “Kenyatta in court: The ICC needs to start winning some public perception battles.” Think Africa Press. Retrieved from http://thinkafricapress.com/kenya/manipulation-and-misinformation-kenyatta-and-icc-question

Max Sanders is a candidate for a Bachelor of Arts degree in international affairs with a regional concentration in Asia, and a minor in Chinese. He studied abroad at Beijing University and spent several months in rural China teaching English at a local middle school. While at GW, Max served as the captain of GW’s nationally ranked Model UN team, he interned in the United States Senate under Senator John Boozman, and he served as the director of public relations for a charitable organization called Learning Enterprises. THE GLOBE - INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS JOURNAL

Max Sanders bound Kenyatta and Ruto together, and bolstered their campaign by allowing them to play the victim card.2 Indeed, much of the narrative surrounding their campaign in early 2013 was not a matter of their guilt, but rather whether or not the ICC was acting responsibly in its mission to try two potential heads of state. This argument resonated with the Kenyan public. The Kenyatta campaign effectively reframed the issue as a quasi-nationalist struggle against unfair standards and practices embodied by the ICC. As written by Tomas Zak of ThinkAfricaPress, “What would have spelled the end of most politicians’ careers, the UhuRuto campaign managed to turn into an electoral asset by painting it as neo-colonialist breach of Kenyan sovereignty.”3 This framing of the ICC indictment as a form modern day imperialism has gained ground both in Kenya and Africa as a whole. The African Union (AU) has long claimed that the ICC unfairly targets African leaders.4 The Ethiopian Foreign Minister has stated, “The International Criminal Court’s way of operating particularly its unfair treatment of Africa and Africans leaves much to be desired.”5 Rwanda’s president, Paul Kagame has agreed, saying that the ICC “has been put in place only for African countries, only for poor countries.” He associated the ICC with “colonialism, slavery and imperialism.”6 Even the AU, itself, has stated, “The abuse and misuse of indictments against African leaders have a destabilising effect that will negatively impact political, social and economic development of member states and their ability to conduct international relations…”7 In general, there is a great deal of distrust of international organizations such as the ICC by African States. The goals of international organizations such as the IMF, World Bank, ICC, etc., are viewed in the context of their dominant sponsors—most notably the United States and European Union. The trial of Ruto and Kenyatta is bringing this underlying disdain to the forefront of African international politics. On October 12th, 2013, the AU agreed unanimously that no sitting African president should be tried in international courts while in office.8 At the meeting in Ethiopia, which was called for in order to reevaluate Africa’s “disappointing”9 relationship with the ICC, many member states even called for a mass withdrawal from the Rome Statute.10 Although it eventually failed, the fact that this action was even considered attests to the growing distaste of the ICC by African leaders, and the falling out of relations sparked by the indictment of Ruto and Kenyatta.

China: The Great Counterbalance

China figures prominently into the growing perception that the ICC is a tool of Western powers and a bigoted arbitrator of African sovereign affairs. China, which itself has not signed or ratified the Rome Statute, has come down unequivocally on the side of the African Union. In doing so it has pitted itself against most Western powers including the United States, Britain, and France—all of which abstained from voting in November on Rwanda’s Security Council proposal to delay the trial. Following the vote, Kenya’s foreign ministry released a statement accusing the powerful members of the UNSC of “reckless abdication of global leadership” which “humiliated the continent and its leadership.” The statement went on to claim that the US and the UK maintained “contempt for the African position” and “[showed] clear cowardice in the face of a critical African matter, and a lack of appreciation of peace and security issues they purport to advocate.” Rwanda, similarly, rejected the strong-arming of its resolution by Western powers on the UNSC. It stated, following the rejection, the “ICC loses face and credibility in the world the more it allows itself to be used by big powers of the world. It can’t continue like this.” China and Azerbaijan, however, were thanked by the Kenyan foreign ministry “for their exemplary leadership.”11 2 Ibid. 3 Ibid. 4 “Un rejects africa bid to halt kenya leaders’ ICC trials.” (2013, November 15). BBC Africa. Retrieved from http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-24961169 5 Karimi, F. “African union accuses ICC of bias, seeks delay of cases against sitting leaders.” CNN. Retrieved from http://www.cnn.com/2013/10/12/ world/africa/ethiopia-au-icc-summit/ 6 “Rwanda’s Kagame says ICC targeting poor, African countries.” (2008, July 31). AFP. Retrieved from http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ ALeqM5ilwB_Zg00Jx3N9hSX-Wu8zEyQGig 7 “ICC, a tool to recolonize Africa.” (2012, March 01). New African. Retrieved from http://www.newafricanmagazine.com/special-reports/sector-reports/ icc-vs-africa/icc-a-tool-to-recolonise-africa 8 Bullock, J. (2013, October 15). “Au and the ICC - how they voted.” Think Africa Press 9 Ibid. 10 Namunane, B. (2013, October 13). Why Africa leaders failed to strike deal on ICC in Ethiopia.” Daily Nation. Retrieved from http://www.nation.co.ke/ news/politics/International-Criminal-Court-AFRICAN-UNION-UHURU-KENYATTA/-/1064/2031050/-/8e29of/-/index.html. 11 Kelley, K. (2013, November 15). “Uhuru kenyatta’s bid to stop ICC trials fails at the UN.” Daily Nation. Retrieved from http://www.nation.co.ke/news/

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The Rest Against the West

ICC protestors rally in Kenya.

In addition to voting yes on the UNSC resolution to delay the trial, China has expressed verbal support for the African Union’s position. Foreign ministry spokesman, Hong Lei, said at a daily news briefing in September, “We hope the international community will respect the Kenyan people’s choice, and the ICC will heed the advice of African nations and the African Union.” This comes in stark contrast to the United States which has not only expressed concerns about Kenyatta’s electoral victory, but also failed to congratulate the new president by name upon entering office. President Obama had chosen to skip Kenya—his ancestral homeland—during his summer 2013 Africa tour due to concerns about Kenyatta and the ICC.12 Perhaps as a result, Kenyatta’s first trip abroad after assuming office was to China, where he spent five days meeting with political leaders and signing trade agreements. As the International Business Times put it, “Kenyatta has been quite clear about the message he wants to send: if Western powers are hesitant to back his presidency or engage with Kenya economically, Eastern countries will be able to pick up the slack.”13 This growing emphasis on Chinese-African camaraderie in the wake of Kenya’s fallout with the West perhaps has its roots in the historical relationship between China and former colonial states. China, in dialogue with African countries, has frequently made use of its colonial heritage to relate with Africa and argue for the virtue of shared anti-imperialist goals. Much of Zhou Enlai’s rhetoric at the 1955 Bandung Conference, for example, was centered on purporting a shared colonial history and a plurality of anti-imperialist ends.14 In 1960 China’s Chairman for the Committee for Afro-Asian solidarity, Liao Cheng-Chih, singled out the United States by arguing that Washington intended to assert its own form of colonialism in Africa and that “US imperialism” represented the most dangerous threat to African independence and sovereignty.15 Much of the present-day rhetoric regarding the ICC and its Western influence sounds strikingly similar. Talks of neo-imperialism, neo-colonialism, and the undue influence of Washington on international organizations have been core issues discussed at the AU in recent months. With the historical context of the China Africa relationship in mind, it seems obvious that as African relations with the West continue to suffer from disagreements over Kenyatta’s trial, China is increasingly looked to as a counterbalance against “neo-imperialist” influence in organizations such as the ICC and the UNSC. The fact that China, itself, is not particularly fond of the ICC UN-rejects-bid--to-stop-Uhuru-and-Ruto-trials/-/1056/2074990/-/twnb8oz/-/index.html 12 White House, (2013). President Obama’s Trip. Retrieved from website: http://www.whitehouse.gov/africa-trip-2013. 13 “Kenya’s president goes east: Why china could become Uhuru Kenyatta’s closest friend.” (2013, August 20). International Business Times. 14 Shinn, D., & Eisenman, J. (2012). China and Africa: A Century of Engagement. (p. 33). Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press. 15 Shinn, D., & Eisenman, J. (2012). China and Africa: A Century of Engagement. (p. 34). Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press.

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Max Sanders has bolstered this perception. China often opposes the ICC due to the fact that ICC jurisdiction is not voluntarily accepted, crimes committed in internal armed conflicts fall under ICC jurisdiction, and the proprio motu of the Prosecutor may fall subject to political influence.16 This congruence of views places China, a permanent member on the UNSC, the world’s second largest economy, and the second most powerful nation,17 directly in the sights of African leaders seeking to boost their presence in the international community and prevent the ICC from “unfairly targeting Africans” such as Ruto and Kenyatta. As William Ruto stated follwing the UNSC’s rejection of Rwanda’s proposal, “What happened yesterday at UNSC is a clear testimony of who the true friends of Kenya were.”18

Implications of this New Dynamic

There is more at stake in the ICC trial of Kenya’s presidents than the fate of those involved. The Chinese-African alliance on this issue has resulted and will continue to result in more than just lip service or rhetorical support between the two polities. In addition to his bypassing of the United States—Kenya’s largest donor of humanitarian assistance—on his first international trip, President Kenyatta, in Beijing, signed nearly $5 billion dollars worth of investment packages including a $2.5 billion railway from the port of Mombasa to Uganda, as well as a nearly $1.8 billion dam.19 Both China and Kenya expressed mutual support for one another’s endeavors—particularly Kenya’s “vision for 2030,” and reaffirmed the notion that China is firmly committed to Kenya as a trading and strategic partner.20 Prior to the trip, there had even been talk between Chinese ambassador to Kenya, Li Guangyuan, and Uhuru Kenyatta about elevating Kenya’s diplomatic relations with China to a “strategic partnership”—a relationship China maintains with only a select few countries throughout the world. China has been feeling the positive impact of this Eastern pivot as well. Many have speculated that the $5 billion investment package between China and Kenya is, in fact, more beneficial for China than it is for Kenya. China is effectively gaining greater access to Kenya’s newly discovered 10 billion barrels worth of oil reserves, as well as mineral and other natural resources in Uganda and other interior regions.21 22 Kenya is strategically important to Chinese economic interests as it contains the most popular East African port, and lies directly between resource deposits in interior Africa and trade routs on the Indian Ocean. Other analysts have been quick to point out that Kenya rests on weaker footing when negotiating trade agreements with China. With Western leaders more critical of and cautious to do business with Kenya’s newly elected government, China has become Kenya’s closest powerful ally and trading partner. Knowing this, China’s $5 billion investment package may have come with less aid and low interest loans than might have otherwise been offered.23 Kenya’s pivot to the east may, in other words, be less discretionary and more out of necessity—with China reaping the benefits.24 China’s “business is business” mentality is paying dividends among other states on the African continent as well. Interestingly, the Gambia decided to break off diplomatic ties with Taiwan on November 15th—the same day that the UNSC turned down Rwanda’s bid to delay Kenyatta’s trial in the ICC. Although the timing is likely coincidental, the same few themes resonant in China’s dialogue with African states might have been germane to Gambian President Yahya Jammeh’s decision to break with Taiwan. In an October 30th issue of New African Magazine, in addition to criticizing the role of international organizations in promoting a Western-led neocolonialist system in Africa, and referring to the ICC trial of a sitting African head of state as a “an insult,” to Africa, President Jammeh stated, “The advent of China in Africa has given the Africans the latitude to 16 Lu, J., & Wang, Z. (2005). “China’s attitude towards the ICC.” Journal of International Criminal Justice, 3(3), 608-620. 17 “2011 National Power Index.” World Press. http://nationranking.wordpress.com/2011/03/06/2011-npi/ 18 Christopher, M. (2013, November 15). “Kenya ICC vote revealed Kenya’s true friends - #Ruto.” Speechlog. Retrieved from http://speechlog.com/kenyaicc-vote-revealed-kenyas-true-friends-ruto/ 19 Raghavan, S. (2013, August 17). “In snub to Washington, Kenyan president visits China, Russia first.” Washington Post. 20 Ndonga, W. (2013, August 20). “Kenya-China pact a thrust for Vision 2030.” All Africa. Retrieved from http://allafrica.com/stories/201308210106.html. 21 Watts, J. (2013, August 20). “China’s $5 billion deal with Kenya is a much bigger win for Beijing than Nairobi.” Quartz. Retrieved from http:// qz.com/116923/chinas-5-billion-deal-with-kenya-is-a-much-bigger-win-for-beijing-than-nairobi/ 22 Ibid. 23 Ward, G. F. (2013, August 29). “Kenyatta’s visit to China - less than meets the eye? IDF - Africa Watch, 1, 24 Watts, J. (2013, August 20). “China’s $5 billion deal with Kenya is a much bigger win for Beijing than Nairobi.” Quartz. Retrieved from http:// qz.com/116923/chinas-5-billion-deal-with-kenya-is-a-much-bigger-win-for-beijing-than-nairobi/

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The Rest Against the West choose who they want to work with.” He goes on to say, “there are people and countries there who have a conscience, who have always stood up for African interests…. let us take control of our countries, our resources, and then from there we will decide who we want to work with.”25 Although President Jammeh never claimed that the ICC was unfairly targeting African leaders, or that China, itself, has acted responsibly in all cases, in his breaking off of ties with Taiwan he has clearly chosen who he wants to “work with.” This decision was made less than a month after Jammeh criticized the ICC’s trying of a sitting African head of state, rejected Western forms of neocolonialism embodied by international organizations, and pointed, specifically, to China as a game changer in African international affairs. Although pointing to this as a confirmation of rationale is speculative, it seems reasonable that China’s growing perception in Africa as a counterweight against neocolonialist norms espoused by the West and the ICC played some role in Jammeh’s decision—especially considering that the decision seems to have come personally from him without regard to any known problems in Gambia’s rapport with Taiwan.26 27 Gambia is not, however, the only country turning to China in the wake of disagreements with the West. Several African leaders, including those from Ethiopia, Sierra Leone, and Zambia have very recently expressed support for a revamped notion of “South-South” cooperation which has prevailed in contrast with tempered relations with the West.28 Sierra Leone’s chief of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation, Dr. Samura Matthew Wilson Kamara, for example, returned from China on November 8th after spending a week discussing cases for greater bilateral cooperation and signing new trade and investment agreements. Some time, however, was dedicated to discussing reform of the UNSC during which China sided with the African cause and urged Sierra Leone to continue supporting the Ezulwini Consensus.29 As was evidenced by Dr. Kamara’s comments following the meetings, the relationship between China and Sierra Leone has grown incredibly close.30

Conclusion

China’s siding with the African cause as it pertains to the ICC trial of Ruto and Kenyatta is factoring into its relations on the African continent. African states are increasingly turning to China as their advocate in international organizations which, they believe, represent Western neocolonialist values. This is not to say that every African state views the ICC is in this manner, or that there is universal agreement that the ICC unfairly targets Africans, but the popularity of this view among African states and the African Union itself pits China in a struggle against Western powers in the UNSC over the trial of Kenya’s leadership. In the course of a year, this emerging factor in ChinaAfrica relations has been paying off. Not only has Kenya turned to China as a key ally in light of fallout with the West, many other states have strengthened their relationships with China and have toned their rhetoric towards building “South-South” solidarity in contrast with Western norms espoused by international organizations. The West, on the other hand, is in a sort-of “damned if you do, damned if you don’t” position in the context of Kenyatta’s trial. It risks either alienating African states such as Rwanda and Kenya, or abandoning its commitment to human rights and the ICC.31 It is difficult to argue that the presence of China in Africa, symbolically and economically, has not increased as a result of Kenyatta’s ICC trial. The net impact of this issue, however, still remains to be seen.

25 “If you always follow others, you can never lead” - President Yahya Jammeh. (2013, October 24). New African. Retrieved from http://newafricanmagazine. com/features/interviews/if-you-always-follow-others-you-can-never-lead-president-yahya-jammeh 26 Hsiu-chuan, S. (2013, November). “Analysts see China behind Gambia loss.” Taipei Times. 27 Jennings, R. (2013, November 15). “Gambia: China looms as Taiwan loses first diplomatic ally in 5 years.” All Africa. Retrieved from http://allafrica.com/ stories/201311150994.html 28 Mwanangombe, L. (2013, November 01). “China’s footprint grows in Zambia.” Associated Press 29 Sesay, J. P. B. (2013, November 11). “Sierra Leone’s foreign minister assesses outcome of China visit.” Sierra Express Media. Retrieved from http://www. sierraexpressmedia.com/archives/62806 30 Ibid. 31 Menya, W. (2013, November 2013). “Western powers face ICC dilemma.” Daily Nation. Retrieved from http://www.nation.co.ke/news/politics/Westernpowers-face-ICC-dilemma-/-/1064/2067306/-/ajgr7fz/-/

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The Terrorism Tactics of the Counterinsurgency An analysis on the effectiveness of terrorism tactics by the counterinsurgency agents of the Guatemalan Civil War Austin Donohue ’14 Introduction

The Guatemalan Civil War, on record, was one of the bloodiest and long-running armed conflicts within Latin America. From 1960 until formal peace negotiations in 1994, hundreds of thousands of people had perished at the hands of the counterinsurgency campaigns launched by the Guatemalan government. The U.N. truth and reconciliation commission, Guatemala: Memory of Silence, estimated that “the number of persons killed or disappeared as a result of the fratricidal confrontation reached a total of over 200,000.”1 This paper seeks to understand the role of terrorism tactics within the Guatemalan Civil War. The main objectives are to outline the Guatemalan conflict by breaking down the character and conduct of the counterinsurgency strategy implemented by the Guatemalan government. By looking at the nature of terrorism within Guatemala, this paper hopes to expand the literature on the role and effectiveness of terrorism in civil war. It further seeks to understand government motivation for implementing terror tactics in their counterinsurgency strategies, and whether or not the use of terror tactics has been effective in ending conflicts. I will argue that the terror tactics imposed by the Guatemalan government were strategic and incorporated both selective and indiscriminate violence. The first wave of the counterinsurgency was unable to effectively subvert the guerrilla insurgent’s long term, but the counterinsurgency of the 1980s essentially disabled guerrilla operations. The use of terrorism tactics in counterinsurgency, therefore, is dependent on the strategic conditions of the environment through which the government is operating. The first section of this paper will give an overarching history on the Guatemalan civil war, but pay particular attention to the two waves of counterinsurgency strikes arguably the most prominent stages of the conflict-the counterinsurgencies launched from 1966-1973, and the counterinsurgency campaigns that lasted from 1977-1983. In the second section of this paper, I will briefly examine basic theories on terrorism in a guerrilla civil war, including effectiveness, government and rebel objectives, as well as conduct. The third section of this paper will address counterarguments and claims about the nature of terrorism in the Guatemalan civil war. The final section of this paper will provide an overview of the evidence from Guatemala supporting the effectiveness of terror tactics as a credible counterinsurgency strategy to suppress rebel opposition, and implications for future research.

1 Guatemalan Commission for Historical Clarification Guatemala: Memory of Silence, Report of the Commission for Historical Clarification Conclusions and Recommendations. American Advancement for the Association of Science, February 1999.

Austin Donohue is a senior from Orlando, Florida in the School of Media and Public Affairs, majoring in political communication with a minor in history. She is a member of the University Honors Program, and worked at SMPA as an administrative assistant for the past two years. She currently works as an intern at the Global Intellectual Property Center at the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, assisting with international and domestic IP rights and enforcement. 34

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The Terrorism Tactics of the Counterinsurgency

Concepts and Definitions

This paper will consider a civil war an “armed combat within the boundaries of a recognized sovereign entity between parties subject to a common authority at the outset of hostilities.”2 Violence will refer to intentional harm, which specifically includes kidnapping, executions, murder, and most notably ‘disappearances.’ The violence considered in this paper is focused on that conducted by the Guatemalan government as part of their counterinsurgency strategy. Insurgency refers to an armed rebellion (in this case guerrilla warfare), and counterinsurgency is the subsequent government and military response in order to subvert insurgents.3 The definitions of terrorism and guerrilla warfare are given in detail in Section 2.

Section 1: The Guatemalan Civil War (1960-1996) In 1954, the United States Central Intelligence Agency successfully launched operation PBSUCCESS, deposing Guatemalan President Arbenz and supporting Castillo Armas in a military coup d’etat.4 Arbenz and the democratic assembly, which had taken over the country in 1944, had spent much of the decade implementing economic and social reforms that had alarmed the United States. Agrarian reforms and broad social programs endangered U.S. economic interests by restricting the power of companies, such as the United Fruit Company. They feared that the wide sweeping agrarian land reform would make Guatemala and other Latin American countries easily susceptible to communism.5 From 1954 to 1960, Castillo Armas established a right wing government that “reversed most of the reforms introduced during the preceding period.”6 Armas’ administration proceeded to arrest suspected supporters of the old regime and implemented an extensive anti-Communist campaign. The civilian population grew frustrated with the restrictions on political parties, government corruption, and U.S. operations within Guatemala, which was being used as a staging area for a potential Cuban invasion.7 The military fractured at the 1954 coup; there were the school officers, “younger, more liberal individuals,” and line officers, “older, more conservative individuals from a lower socioeconomic background.”8 Eventually, in November of 1960, a group of the school officers stationed at the Escuela Politecninca military academy led an armed revolt against the government, known as the MR-13 Rebellion.9 Ydigores Fuentes, who had taken over the government after the assassination of Castillo Armas, quickly crushed the rebellion, using “massive air attack on the rebels, followed by the deployment of ground troops,” with the assistance of CIA weapons and B-26 bombers.10 The remaining members of the MR-13 rebellion retreated and, in collaboration with the Partido Guatemalteco de Trabajadores (PGT), the Communist Party in Guatemala, and Cuba, formed the Fuerzas Armadas Rebeldes (FAR), the Rebel Armed Forces in 1963.11 FAR conducted attacks that included “harassment of communications lines, buses, and railroad tracks...and the assassination of army collaborators.”12 By 1965 the CIA had brought in and set up training operations for the Guatemalan military to establish an effective counterinsurgency.13 In 1966, after the election of President Julio Cesar Mendez Montenegro, the Guatemalan army launched airstrikes into the bases of operations for the insurgency in Izabal and Zacapa. This greatly reduced their capacity and numbers within the countryside.14 FAR concentrated attacks in urban areas and in 1968 were responsible for the kidnap and killing of the U.S. ambassador to Guatemala, John Gordan Mein.15 2 Kalyvas, Stathis. The Logic of Violence in Civil Wars (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 17. 3 Galula, David. Counterinsurgency Warfare; Theory and Practice.(New York: Praeger, 1964.) 17. 4 Streeter, Stephen M. Managing the Counterrevolution: the United States and Guatemala, 1954-1961. (Athens: Ohio University Center for International Studies, 2000.) 5 Ibid. 6 Caumartin, Corinne. “Racism, Violence, and Inequality: An Overview of the Guatemalan Case.” Centre for Research on Inequality, Human Security and Ethnicity. CRISE Working Paper 11 (2005): 23. 7 Caumartin, “Racism, Violence, and Inequality,” 24. 8 Streeter, Managing the Counterrevolution, 222. 9 Streeter, Managing the Counterrevolution, 224-225. 10 Ibid., 225-226. 11 Caumartin, “Racism, Violence, and Inequality,” 25. 12 The Directorate of National Intelligence, “Intelligence Memorandum: The Communist Insurgency Movement in Guatemala.” Case #98-525, Document #22. Washington, D.C.: CIA Directorate of Intelligence, 1968. http://www.dni.gov/ 13 Doyle, Kate, “U.S. Policy in Guatemala: 1966-1996” A National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book (11). Document 1. http://www.gwu. edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB11/docs/ 14 Schirmer, Jennifer G. The Guatemalan Military Project: a Violence called Democracy. (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1998), 16. 15 Guevara, Ernesto. Guerrilla Warfare. Authorised ed. (London: Harper Perennial, 2008). 193.

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Austin Donohue From 1966 through 1973, the extensive counterinsurgency programs of Montenegro, and later Carlos Arana Osorio, effectively crushed resistance movements. From 1973 until about 1976 the insurgency remained relatively inactive.16 Throughout the 1970s the Guatemalan political system was marred with corruption and election fraud, as well as economic inequality. In 1974 President Laugerud made steps toward political and social reforms; but in 1976 a 7.5 magnitude earthquake killed around twenty three thousand Guatemalans and left more than a million homeless.17 The government’s poor response to the earthquake and the desire for reforms made the population of Guatemala discontent with their leadership. From 1976 to 1980, the rebel insurgency reignited. Soon after, FAR was joined by the Guerrilla Army of the Poor (EGP). In 1980 FAR, PGT, and the EGP joined with the Revolutionary Organization of Armed People (ORPA) and established the Guatemalan National Revolutionary Unity (UNRG).18 In 1978, Lucas Garcia was elected president, and simultaneously launched a new counterinsurgency program, while scaling back on the small political reforms that were allowed to flourish under Laugerud.19 The counterinsurgency caused mass casualties, particularly devastating the Mayan indigenous population. In 1982, there was another military coup d’etat where Efrain Rios Montt deposed Garcia. Despite the leadership change, Montt continued the efforts to subvert the insurgents.20 The counterinsurgency efforts of Garcia and Montt effectively ended insurgent capabilities and connections with the civilian population. From 1983 onwards, a series of military coup d’etats and power struggles dominated Guatemalan politics. There were ongoing human rights abuses, most notably the widespread mass disappearances and selective assassinations. Eventually, throughout the mid and late 1980s Guatemalan politics began to transition away from military control. This was in response to international condemnation of the ongoing human rights abuses and the popular discontent among the population regarding the country’s severe economic problems.21 Eventually, peace processes between the government and URNG officially ended the conflict in June 1994 and the UNRG transitioned into a legal political party.22

Section 2: Civil War, Counterinsurgency, and Terrorism

Guerrilla Warfare and Counterinsurgency Unlike a conventional civil war, the fighting in Guatemala is described as guerrilla warfare. FAR, and later UNRG, “rather than fighting pitched battles in the open, avoid[ed] [their] more powerful opponent’s main forces and engage[d] in hit and run operations, attacking when an advantage present[ed] itself.”23 Because the Guatemalan government was fighting an armed guerrilla insurgency, rather than a conventional civil war with evenly matched combat and military conditions, their strategy to end the conflict meant launching a counterinsurgency campaign. Counterinsurgency requires maintaining a monopoly on regional territory and subverting rebel zones of control by threatening their financial and recruiting bases, and isolating them from the population.24 In the case of the Guatemalan counterinsurgency practices, their campaign relied heavily at its inception on the security forces of the United States. A 1966 secret cable from the United States Agency for International Development describes how U.S. Public Safety Advisor John Longan was “[assisting] the Guatemalan government in establishing an urban counter-terrorist task force....and [addressed] the role of U.S. military advisors, the sale of U.S. supplies and equipment to the Guatemalan armed forces.”25 This third party provided Guatemalan government with the means to target rebel guerrilla bases through airstrikes, and later their military training programs paved the way for “clandestine counter-terrorist units to carry out abductions, bombings, torture, and summary executions.”26 The importance of reducing insurgent “zones of control” in guerrilla warfare is a stark contrast from the strategy of ground operations in conventional warfare. Alexander Downes argues that in conventional 16 Caumartin, “Racism, Violence, and Inequality,” 25. 17 Ibid., 27. 18 Ibid. 19 Ibid., 28. 20 Ibid. 21 Recovery of Historical Memory Project. Guatemala, never again! The Official Report of the Human Rights OffIce, Archdiocese of Guatemala. (Maryknoll, N.Y.: Orbis Books,1999) 276-277. 22 Ibid. 23 Downes, Alexander B. (2007) ‘Draining the Sea by Filling the Graves: Investigating the Effectiveness of Indiscriminate Violence as a Counterinsurgency Strategy’, Civil Wars, 9:4, 420-444. 24 Kalyvas, Logic of Violence in Civil War, 88. 25 Doyle, Kate, “U.S. Policy in Guatemala: 1966-1996” Document 1. 26 Doyle, Kate, “U.S. Policy in Guatemala: 1966-1996” Document 4.

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The Terrorism Tactics of the Counterinsurgency warfare, “each side exercises monopoly control over its civilian population,” giving a mutual advantage in terms of arms, regional territory occupation, and civilian support in their battle efforts.27 However, in guerilla warfare, the insurgents can have complete control over some regions, while the government has control over others others. There are also regions where both groups share the power. In Guatemala, the UNRG maintained footholds in countryside areas. By the 1981, the UNRG controlled several population centers, eventually with an estimated 250,000 people living under rebel rule.28 The fact that Guatemala was in guerrilla warfare, with the government strategizing in response to an armed insurgency, effectively shaped the conflict. Given the asymmetrical warfare, with the insurgents outmatched and outgunned throughout the entirety of the conflict, the nature of the counterinsurgency was dependent on how well they connected with the civilian population. The insurgency’s capability of garnering popular support, discussed in later sections, changed over time. The Role of Terrorism in Counterinsurgency Terrorism in counterinsurgency is recognizably different from terrorism, with its own specific definition. Terrorism, in a generalized context, acts to destabilize existing governments by directing attacks toward civilians, with the intention of achieving some form of political concessions.29 Usually, parties undertaking terrorist efforts are non-state actors. However, terrorism, as a counterinsurgency tactic in civil war, is quite different. Terrorism is a tool used as part of a greater counterinsurgency effort by a government, a state actor, against a rebel opposition group(s). The government, by directing and targeting attacks toward their own civilians, uses these strategies with the intentions of forcing rebel groups into surrender. Both definitions have the same basic underlying elements; some political group, whether the government or a non-state actor, uses violence against civilians in their quest for concessions by their opponent. The ultimate goal is, “resorting to violence...in order to achieve compliance.”30 Stanley Kalyvas argues that victims of terrorism in a civil war “may be targeted to eliminate a particular risk and, also, to deter others from engaging in similar behavior.” This makes the victims of the violence distinct.31 Kalyvas further makes the point that the violence of terrorism in civil war also acts to “punish a similar action that has already taken place.”32 The two forms of terrorism Kalyvas argues are used in civil war are selective and indiscriminate. Selective violence occurs when “individuals are targeted based on individual information about their actions,” rather than indiscriminate, “when individuals are targeted solely on their basis of their memberships in a group perceived to be connected with the opposition and irrespective of their individual actions.”33 The distinction between indiscriminate and selective violence is murky, at best. Kalyvas makes the case that selective violence is dependent on an individuals actions and conduct, whilst indiscriminate is characterized by a vague, generalized connection to the insurgents. Victims of selective violence, based on this definition, would be what Downes described, “limited to people who actually provide material support-food, shelter, other supplies, information...” to the adversary.34 Something would be considered indiscriminate violence based on little information other than the fact inclusion into a specific group, which is a limited indicator of when and where violence is used, and for what purpose. It is true that there is a difference between the targeting of specific individuals for their actions and the targeting of large groups based on their supposed connections. However, to suggest that those victims of indiscriminate violence are targeted based on their group status inherently means that the violence they undergo is selective, just on a mass scale. These victims were still targeted for a specific reason, and others were not, despite whether the violence incurred due to regional proximity to insurgents or political party associations. A more persuasive argument about selective and indiscriminate violence has more to do with whether or not they were employed strategically. Strategic violence incorporates both selective and indiscriminate elements. They both serve their purposes for the counterinsurgency, whether that is to force individuals or groups into compliance or rebel deterrence. Both indiscriminate and selective violence can be strategic, de27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34

Downes, “Draining the Sea by Filling the Graves,” 423. Jennifer Schirmer, The Guatemalan Military Project: A Violence Called Democracy, (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1998), 41. Kalyvas, Stathis. “The Paradox of Terrorism in Civil War.” The Journal of Ethics 8 (2004): 97-138. Ibid., 99 Kalyvas, Stathis. “The Paradox of Terrorism in Civil War.” 99. Ibid. Ibid., 101-102. Downes, “Draining the Sea by Filling the Graves,” 421.

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Austin Donohue

A protest during the Guatemelan civil war, opposing the violence, human rights violations, and injustices at the time.

pending on the context, conduct, and manner through which they were used. Counterinsurgency Terrorism in Guatemala: 1960-1973 From 1960 until 1970, most of the terrorism violence conducted by the counterinsurgency would be considered, according to the parameters of this paper, strategic. In 1966 Guatemalan security forces executed the leader of PGT, Victor Manuel Gutierrez, and more than twenty other PGT members who were labeled in secret cables to the CIA as “communists and terrorists.”35 This was the first of several “mass disappearance” in Guatemala’s history.36 These secret mass executions, which were conducted in high volume throughout most of the war, were both selective and strategic. They involved violence against combatants, such as Victor Gutierrez and Francisco Granados, but also non-combatants who were supportive of the rebel insurgency. Especially in the zones controlled by FAR in the early stages of the insurgency, most notably Izabel and Zacapa, the government “intensified persecution of labor leaders, while incidents of intimidation, torture, and ‘disappearances’ of peasants increased.”37 The “disappearances” were intended force compliance and harm information and material support for the rebels. Further intelligence notes from to the U.S. State Department reveal that in 1967 “some of the methods utilized in Guatemala’s ‘successful’ campaign, including the formation of clandestine counter-terrorist units to carry out abductions, bombings, torture, and summary executions.”38 These “right-wing death squads...[were] believed to be responsible for more than 30,000 deaths over the next seven years.”39 During the Mendez presidency, beginning in 1966, the counterinsurgency launched “Operation Guatemala,” which was estimated to have killed over eight thousand people between 19661967, and an estimated fifteen thousand total, in a scorched earth campaign based on the U.S. strategy in Vietnam.40 A second counterinsurgency effort, under the rule of Carlos Arana Osorio, from 1970 to 1973, targeted not only the guerrillas operating in the countryside but those who were infiltrating the urban population. Over the course of the Montenegro and Osorio campaigns, it’s 35 36 37 38 39 40

Doyle, “U.S. Policy in Guatemala: 1966-1996” Document 2. Ibid. Guevara, Ernesto, Guerrilla Warfare, 191. Doyle, “U.S. Policy in Guatemala: 1966-1996” Document 4. Barry, Tom. Inside Guatemala. (Albuquerque, N.M.: Inter-Hemispheric Education Resource Center, 1992.) 52. Barry, Tom. Central America inside out: The essential guide to its societies, politics, and economies. (New York: Grove Weidenfeld, 1991). 216.

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The Terrorism Tactics of the Counterinsurgency estimated that forty two thousand people were killed or “went missing.”41 These counterinsurgency terrorism tactics were largely indiscriminate; the “strategy of institutionalized terror in Guatemala...was employed simultaneously in all parts of the country,” and included “the PGT, trade unions, progressive groups of the petty bourgeoisie and thousands of innocent victims.” However, despite the indiscriminate nature of the violence, the operation itself was strategic, with the intention of dismantling FAR’s small efforts in the 1960s and early 1970s to build cohesive relationships with the civilian population. A majority of these deaths occurred in areas that were guerrilla strongholds; the Izabel and Zacapa provinces that fell under rebel control in the 1960s. The effectiveness of these initial counter insurgency programs will be divulged in greater detail in Section 4. Counterinsurgency Terrorism in Guatemala: 1977-1983 At the end of the 1970s and the early 1980s, the U.S. Human Rights report recorded major abuses by the Guatemalan government. The Guatemalan government subsequently rejected U.S. aid. The Carter administration responded by terminating military assistance in 1978.42 However, the elimination of military aid from the United States did little to divert the Guatemalan government. In any case, once the Reagan administration came into power, they reestablished economic aid to Guatemala in 1982.43 It was during the brief presidency of Lucas Garcia, but most especially during the imposed rule of General Rios Montt, that the terrorism tactics of the counterinsurgency became fueled by indiscriminate violence. In part responding to the formation of the URNG and their increased interactions with the indigenous populations, the “counterinsurgency operations in the early 1980s targeted the indigenous population of the western highlands.”44 In five months of 1982 alone, the World Council of Churches reported, “the government [was] responsible for the death of more than nine thousand people.” In response to EGP attacks on military command bases and transit blocks, the army “concentrated on eliminating all means of support for the guerrillas” in the northern areas of Alta and Baja Verapaz.45 Army offensives in the northern area of Chimaltenango and the southern region of El Quiche left thousands dead. A 1982 secret cable from the US C.I.A about counterinsurgency operations in El Quiche relayed this: “the aim of operation is to destroy all towns and villages suspected of supporting the Guerrilla Army of the Poor. Those who collaborate with the military are allowed shelter and food in refugee camps. If there is resistance from anyone in a town, the entire town is considered hostile and destroyed. According to the cable, the army has yet to encounter any major guerrilla force in the area and its successes are limited to the destruction of entire villages and the killing of Indians suspected of collaborating or sympathizing with the rebels.”46 The total estimated guerrilla strength was thought to be only around twenty-five hundred combatants and four thousand active supporters.47 Despite the fact that the rebels had a relatively strong control, citizens living in the areas were actively disengaged in the conflict and sided with neither the insurgents nor the government. The conduct of the counterinsurgency strategy and its implementation of indiscriminate violence was strategic. The military attacked areas either controlled or disputed territory of the insurgents and they severed guerrilla connections with farmers and union workers. The Recovery of Historical Memory Project states that in 1981 “the army gradually turned up the pressure on populations that potentially supported the guerrilla, in actions ranging from isolated murders to large-scale operations.”48 The violence, while indiscriminate, was not random; “the military zone commanders directed...military campaigns against specific communities chosen for their affinity 41 Fried, Jonathan L., Marvin E. Gettleman, Deborah Estrada, and Nancy Peckenham. Guatemala in Rebellion: Unfinished History. (New York: Grove Press, 1983).121. 42 Evans, Peter B.. Double-edged Diplomacy: International Bargaining and Domestic Politics. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993). 331. 43 Ibid., 331. 44 Oettler, Anika.”Guatemala: the State of Research.” Online Encyclopedia of Mass Violence, (Paris: Sciences Po, 2008). http://www.massviolence.org/Guatemala-The-Stateof-Research?cs=print#citation 1-23 45 Barry, Central American Inside Out, 217. 46 Doyle, “U.S. Policy in Guatemala: 1966-1996” Document 14. 47 The Directorate of National Intelligence, “Intelligence Memorandum,” 2. 48 Recovery of Historical Memory Project. Guatemala, never again! 213.

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Austin Donohue to the guerrillas.”49 The effectiveness of this phase of the counterinsurgency movement will be discussed in Section 4.

Section 3: Competing Theories on Terrorism in Civil War

Selective and Indiscriminate Violence: Effectiveness in Guerrilla Warfare An overarching consensus in international relations theory is that, when it comes to violence against non-combatants, it is “effective when selective.”50 Selective violence eliminates individuals with direct connections to the insurgents, and “clearly signals observers regarding the fate of opponents or traitors...[helping] deter defection and maintain the state’s support among the civilian population.”51 Most scholars would argue that indiscriminate violence is counterproductive, and “gives individuals no incentive to collaborate since they may be killed no matter what they do.”52 Downes argues that there are exceptions in which indiscriminate violence can be effective. In some cases indiscriminate violence might be successful when one party, in this case the government, “wages war to conquer territory, but is not interested in controlling the population,” like in certain cases of ethnic cleansing.53 He ultimately argues that indiscriminate violence is most effective given the size and geographic concentration of civilian populations; “the smaller the population, the more plausible it is to kill or completely isolate it,” and “if people have nowhere to run, then it is easier to hunt them down and kill or intern them.”54 Killing the population effectively cuts off insurgents from supplies and information access, inhibiting their ability to continue fighting. Ultimately, evidence suggests that indiscriminate violence is effective under certain conditions. Kalyvas makes a generalized assumption that indiscriminate violence is counterproductive--he fails to suggest in his argument that individual exceptions, like those mentioned by Downes, are possible. Kalyvas is right in arguing that selective violence is the most effective type of violence against civilians in guerrilla warfare. This is not only because it incentivizes the civilian population into compliance, but also because selective violence is more inconspicuous and less likely to draw the ire from third party countries or groups. Strategic and Non-Strategic Violence: Incorporating the Environment Already in previous sections there has been discussion that the term strategic provides a better understanding of how terrorism in civil war shapes its overall effectiveness. Violence is “by nature instrumental,” and for both insurgents and counterinsurgents, the ultimate goal of violence should be that “it improves their position within a strategic setting.”55 Reed Wood, when discussing violence in a strategic environment, believes that “patterns of violence are therefore contingent on the extant strategic environment and should vary with changes in it.”56 Wood’s argument discusses the strategic quality of the environment in which violence is perpetrated. The adoption of terrorism tactics in a counter-insurgency, therefore, would “counter strategic setbacks.”57 It is in this manner that strategic can be used to evaluate the overall effectiveness of both selective and indiscriminate violence within a civil war. The use of selective and indiscriminate violence depends on the environment and conditions through which it is conducted.

49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57

Ibid. Kalyvas, Logic of Terrorism in Civil War, 145. Downes, “Draining the Sea by Filling the Graves,” 421. Ibid. Ibid., 422. Downes, “Draining the Sea by Filling the Graves,” 438. Wood, Reed . “Rebel capability and strategic violence against civilians.”Journal of Peace Research 47, no. 5 (2010): 601-614. Ibid., 602. Wood, Reed . “Rebel capability and strategic violence against civilians.” 602.

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The Terrorism Tactics of the Counterinsurgency

Section 4: The Effectiveness of Counterinsurgency Terrorism in Guatemala

Effectiveness of Counterinsurgency Terrorism in Guatemala: 1960-1973 The counterinsurgency campaigns that were launched in 1966 and then again in 1970 were effective, through both the use of indiscriminate and selective violence, at suppressing the guerrilla insurgents. The counter-terrorism units that formed in this period conducted successful targeted assassinations and “forced disappearances” of PGT party members, among others, that alienated the civilian population from the rebels. The indiscriminate violence, especially incorporated during “Operation Guatemala” and the counterinsurgency campaign launched during Osorio’s presidency, hit the regions within Guatemala where the insurgent groups had established bases of operations. This violence in areas such as Izabal and Zacapa, outlined in greater detail in Section 2, targeted the population with little regard to their muted connections to the rebels, which actively suppressed FAR recruitment and information access from the local population. Based on the evidence, the use of selective and indiscriminate violence during these waves of the counterinsurgency campaigns was the product of a strategic environment. The guerrilla insurgency, which had begun with the failed rebellion of the MR-13 members, had “limited geographical coverage and support.”58 The political insurrection that left the military in power, in combination with the aid, support, and military sales received from the United States, made the counterinsurgency both well funded and well trained. The selective violence employed at this time ensured that early supporters of the insurgency complied with government demands, and the indiscriminate violence ensured that the guerrillas were unable to effectively convince the civilian population to give them their support. Despite the fact that these conditions were strategic, and the insurgency lost heavy numbers and remained largely inactive for a period of years, the counterinsurgency strategy did not successfully end the conflict. The insurgent rebels retreated and instead “learned...winning support from the rural heartland of Guatemala was essential for a strategy of prolonged popular war.”59 The goal of guerrilla warfare, rather than engaging their opponent in direct defeat, is “[sought] to impose steady costs and prolong the war indefinitely,” with the hope that the higher costs of fighting force surrender.60 Given that information, the fact that the insurgency was quieted, but was able to regroup and resurge in the late 1970s and early 1980s, makes a strong counterpoint to the effectiveness of counterinsurgency’s terrorism tactics. The environment through which the terrorism tactics were conducted was strategic to short term goals for the government (i.e. suppressing the insurgents), but the violence did not ultimately dissuade rebel groups from consolidating the support of the civilian population in the 1970s, and as a result they were able formulate a more cohesive and stable guerrilla operation. Effectiveness of Counterinsurgency in Guatemala: 1977-1983 From the 1970s onward the rebel groups built support structures “in the countryside and specifically from amongst the indigenous population.”61 This is evidenced by the EGP and ORPA activity during this time, which” corresponded to zones of high indigenous influence,” including Chimaltenango, El Quiche, San Marcos, and Alta Verapaz.62 As mentioned in Section 2, the government responded to this resurgence in the guerrilla movements with a massive counterinsurgency campaign in 1981, which largely incorporated indiscriminate violence. The Centre for Research on Inequality, Human Security and Ethnicity argued that the “counterinsurgency activities [were] designed to bring rural areas under the direct control of the armed forces.”63 This violence was indiscriminate, yet strategic. The army concentrated their counterinsurgency attacks on zones with “confirmed massive involvement of the civilization population...it’s actions were proportionate to the population’s relationship with the insurgency.”64 58 59 60 61 62

Caumartin, “Racism, Violence, and Inequality,” 25. Ibid. Downes, “Draining the Sea by Filling the Graves,” 423. Caumartin, “Racism, Violence, and Inequality,” 27. Ibid. The Terrorism Tactics of the Counterinsurgency

63 64

Ibid., 33. Recovery of Historical Memory Project. Guatemala, never again! 219.

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Austin Donohue As such, from a strategic standpoint, the use of terrorism tactics by the counterinsurgency campaign was effective. Although the UNRG maintained a presence and conducted insurgent attacks throughout the 1980s, the counterinsurgency had largely disengaged them from the civilian population.65 UNRG guerrilla groups had neither the capability nor the population support during these continued widespread attacks on members of the civilian population, which “served a much wider function that simply suppressing the guerrillas, namely the suppression of a wide band of political and cultural opposition.”66 The government destabilized the guerrilla resurgent threat by eliminating political actors, including members of the Roman Catholic Church, labor workers, and representatives of the indigenous population. They did this because they were threatened by their control over the country. As such, the use of terrorism tactics in the counterinsurgency campaign of the 1980s were both strategic for the interests of the government, in retaking control of rebel zones of control, and effective in eliminating the growing threat of the UNRG. Effectiveness of Terrorism in Civil War The evidence of the counterinsurgency terrorism tactics employed throughout the Guatemalan Civil War support the theory that short and long-term effectiveness of terrorism tactics depends on the strategic nature of the violence employed, as well as the conditions and general environment of the country. Both selective and indiscriminate violence, when used strategically as terrorism tactics within a counterinsurgency, can successfully suppress insurgent groups. By inhibiting their ability to build relationships with civilian populations, or suppressing those established networks, counterinsurgents are able to cut guerrillas off from their main source of information, supplies, and strength. However, maintaining suppression of guerrilla groups depends on the conditions and environment of the country-instability within the government, as well as economic issues prompted a resurgence of the Guatemalan insurgency groups in the late 1970s and early 1980s. If the point of a guerrilla insurgency is to prolong the conflict, for as long as possible, then the insurgents succeeded in retreating, reorganizing, and garnering support from the population so as to reignite the conflict at the end of the decade. The 1980s counterinsurgency strikes discussed are examples of terrorism tactics used strategically and with long-term effective results. The terrorism tactics, which heavily implemented indiscriminate violence, dismantled prominent networks of rebels’ control over countryside areas and reduced their numbers to an insignificant amount. The end of the civil war simply marked an end to the sporadic, intermittent violence between the crumbling military government, that was self-imploding, and the small network of UNRG that remained. What does this evidence suggest for the argument against the effectiveness of indiscriminate violence? The theory above contradicts Kalyvas, who argues that indiscriminate violence is a disincentive for civilian cooperation and ultimately counterproductive. Rather, the evidence aligns with the point made by Downes, in that indiscriminate violence can be effective in specific situations. For Guatemala, the scorched earth tactics of the 1980s counterinsurgency campaign clearly suggest that the government sought to reclaim or conquer territory, “but [was] not interested in controlling the population-or a particular segment of the population-resident in that territory.”67 The campaign succeeded, in layman’s terms, because the government had little regard for the populations they were attacking as part of their counterinsurgency strategy.

However, maintaining suppression of guerrilla groups depends on the conditions and environment of the country-instability within the government, as well as economic issues prompted a resurgence of the Guatemalan insurgency groups in the late 1970s and early 1980s.

65 Aguilera Peralta, Gabriel , and John Beverly. “Terror and Violence as Weapons of Counterinsurgency in Guatemala.” Latin American Perspectives 92(7) (1980): 91-113. 66 Adebajo, Adekeye. Managing conflicts in the 21st century. (London: Frank Cass, 2001). 6. 67 Downes, “Draining the Sea by Filling the Graves,” 423.

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The Terrorism Tactics of the Counterinsurgency

Conclusion

The terrorism tactics incorporated by the counterinsurgency over the course of the Guatemalan Civil War were strategic and implemented the use of both selective and indiscriminate violence. The first examined counterinsurgency campaign, which occurred in from 1966 to 1973, effectively suppressed the insurgents through the use of these terrorism tactics. However, the tactics were not effective in quelling the long-term operations of the insurgent groups, who restructured and built a significant relationship with a large number of the civilian population. This resurgence of the guerrillas, in combination with government inadequacies, a failing economy, and growing popular discontent, led to the second studied counterinsurgency campaign. This campaign, which began sporadically in 1977 and increased dramatically in 1981, strategically used selective and indiscriminate violence with great effect. This campaign disabled the connections between the guerrillas and the highland indigenous populations through which they were operating, using a scorched earth campaign that left hundreds of thousands dead. The evidence provided suggests that terrorism tactics in counterinsurgency strategies can be effective in suppressing insurgencies, but long-term effectiveness of these campaigns is influenced by the strategic use of violence and the conditional environment in which it is perpetrated.

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