HASC Pentagon Papers Part IV A1 by Carlos Osorio

UNITED STATES 路 VIETNAM RELATIONS

1945 路 1967 IV-.A.l 1fAT()

A1m SEATO:

A COMPARlSOli

IV. A. 1.

HAm AIID SE.bs.TO:

A COl4PARISON

Because the SEATO Treaty has been used by the Eisenhower, Kennedy, and Johnson Administra.tions to justify U.S. policy, aid, and presence in Vietnam, and because many ha.ve questioned this justification, the treaty has become a center of controversy. The issue is whether by intent of the'parties and by treaty terminology the U.S. was obligated to use force to help defend the territorial independence and integrity of Sout!" Vietnam. No one seriously challenges U.S. milita...~ and economic aid prOvisiOns under the SFAT-Q Trea.ty; the thrust of the criticism is the use of U.S. ground combat forces. There are plentiful statements over time by the U. S. Goverment on the importance of SEATO. President Eisell.hOl'ler stated: "vie gave military and economic assista.nce to the Republic of Vietnam. vIe entered into a treaty -- the Southeast Asia Security Trea.ty -- which plainly warned that an armed attack aga.inst this area. \\ould endanger our Olm peace· and safety and that we would act accordingly. tI President Kennedy sta.ted: -II • • • The SE.4.TO Pact ••• approved by the Senate "lith only, I thil".k, tt,~O against it, under Article 4, stated that the United States recognized that aggression by :eans of arDed attack against Vietnam l{ould threaten our Olm peace and security. So since that time the United Sta.tes has been assistins the government of Vietnam to !l"..a.intain its independer.ce ••• The atta.ck on the govermnent by cc.~unist forces, with assistance tro:n the north, beC&1e of greater and greater concern to the Govern!:!ent of Vietna.."!!. and the Government of the United States. n Secretary Rusk, spea.king for the Johnson Administration, n:a.de the strongest sta.tement o~ a.ll: "11e have sent American forces to fight in -:he jungles ••• because South Viet-I-:a.m. has, under the l.a.nguage of the SEATO Trep~ty, been the victim of I aggression by me~..ns of a.rmed attack. I Those \Tho challenge this rationale contend that unlike the NATO Trea.ty which specifically included the tuse of armed force' and unambiguously intended such action, the SFATO Treaty was not m.eant by its U.S. framers a.s an umbrella. for American milita.ry intervention. n This is the kind of issue tha.t can readily be argued either way. It is obvious the le.l".guage of the SEATO Treaty a.llO\,lS the Signatories the choice of military means. And, a respecta.ble argument can be made for the further step of obligation. For example, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee Report on the treaty in 1954 stated: "The committee is not impervious to the risks which this treaty entails. It fully a.ppreciates that acceptance of these a.dditional obligations commits the United Sta.tes toa cause of action over a vast expanse of the Pacific. -Yet these risks 1

are consistent ld.th our 0_71 highest interests. There are greater hazards in not advising a potential ene~ of what he can expect of usJ and in failing to disabuse him. of assumptions which might lead to a miscalculation of our intentions. II. !l'o the contl'ar:rJ a statement before the Foreign Relations Canmittee by Secretary Dulles himself can be cited to demonstrate more . modest" less obligatory designs: ItI might say in this connect.L.on, de:93,rting sane\lhat tr~ order of my presentation" th~~ it is not the policy of the United states to attempt to deter attack in this area by building up a loeal force capable itself of defense against an all-out attack by the Chinese Co:nmunists 11' it should occur .. We do not expect to duplicate in -this area the pattern ot the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and its Significant standing forces. Trat would require a diversion and c~itment of strength llhich ve do not thirtit is either practical or desirable'or necessar,r from the standpoint of the United States. ",,'e believe that our posture in that area should be one of having mobile striking pOl-:er, and the ability to use that against the sources of aggression if it occurs. We believe that is more effective than i f l1e tried to pin. dotm American forces at the many points around the circumference of the Co...:munist lIorId in that area. . nIt may very well be that other countries of the area w1.' 1 vant to dedicate particular forces for the protection of the area under this treaty. But we r:ac.e clear at Manila that it .vas not the intention of the United States to build up a large 10cal force ~uding, for example, United States groUlld troops for that area J but that we rely upo..'"l the deterrent potier of our mobile striking force. It By looking into the words of the treaty in the light of its origins and the interests of the U.S. as perceived in 1954, and by co:nparing these with l~ language, originS, and development, it is possible to ~ake a tentative JudFent on the issue of obligation. Whereas it is c1ear that r~O'was iatended for deterrence against aggression and defense with U.S. forces should deterrence fail, SEATO seems to have' been designed with a 'Viel-10nly toward deterrence. Defense, especially with U.S. ground forces" was not seriously ~ontemplated.

There are t:u-ee pieces of evidence in SUIPOl't of this contentious conclusion; (1) the stringent preconditions which the U.S. delegation to the 14anUa Conference to establish SEATO were instructed to insist upon; (2)' theJ.ack or institutional and force structure deve10pment in SEATO as canpared ~o lfA!rO;. and (3) the fact that SEATO and NATO treaty terminology dif'ter in respect to the use of force and other matters.

Unlike the guidance under which U. S. negotiators helped to frame NATO, U.S. represent~tives to the conference establishing SEATO vere given four uncanpranisable pre-conditions: (a) The U.S. would refuse to comm.it sny U.S. forces Wlilaterally; (b) ,Tere military action to be required, one or more of the EUropean signatories vould have to pa~ticipate; (c) The U.S. intended to contrib~te only sea and air power, expecting that other signatories would ~rovide ground forces; (d)

The U.S. \lould act only agai!!st communist aggression.

These instructions not only clearly exempt the use of U.S. ground forces, but presuppose multil~teral action before the U.S. would act in any capacity. With respect to the co.'iJ.perative develo:p:lent of SEATO and IL.wo, U.S. behavior also indicates great restraint ar;d avoidance of c~itment. liATO wss formed in 1~9, and \/ithin t'.iO ye3!'s it '\-:as ~:ell institutionalized -- con;bined cc.::::and forces in-bein£ and a Standing Grcap for policy guicance. ~~e U.S. consistently re3isted the efforts of its SR~TO partners for cozparable institutions. Secrcter,y ~illesJ in tact, SOUSht to dis~ourab;;: !)1;":::li:! identificatiO!~ of ST'I\TO with !:..r.TO. Only in 1959, did tl':e U.S. accede to the f'om.stion of a I:lodest S£.4TO secretariat. lioreoyer, SEATO had to wait until 19&> before the U.S. would ~r~icipate in the develoF~cnt of a series 0: S~.TO contingency plans. Most i!.:portar!t, no U.S. troops have ever been designated SPecifically for SEATO. Camparine the specific termlllology of the operative sections of the and lUo.TO treaties gives adc.itional credence to the non-obligation argument. The key articles of both treaties are those calling for action against an enemy threat. Article 5 of the !~rth Atlantic Treaty declares that the tlen:ber nat100s "agree that an am.€:d attack against one or more of them in Europe or Borth America shall be considered an attack against ther.l all, II and that in. that event each yTill take nforth'llith ••• such action as it deems necessar.r" including the Use of armed force •••• " The correlative phraseology in the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty Article IV declares tbat "each Party recognizes that aggression by means of armed attack against any of the Parties, or against any state or territory which the Parties by unanimous agreement may hereafter designate, would endanger its ow'll peace and safety, and agrees that it vill in that event act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional process. It The SEATO wordiug is thus intentionalJ.y ambiguous on the point of just what response would be made by the members in the event of an armed attack. Such an attack against one of the SEATO members would be viewed as a "common danger" rather than as an "attack SE.~TO

on all. n "tlhere NATO prescribes action Itforth't"ith~ II SEATO requires on~ that the "common danger" be "met 11 in accordance with IIconDtitutional processes. II SEATO also forecloses action on the treaty of any threatened state without the consent of that state -- a qualification designed to reassure menbâ&#x201A;Źrs that their independence wa, not threatened by neocol.onial.ism or other danination in a SEATO guise.

In some respects, hOlIever, the SEATO Pact is broader than. its NATO counterparts. The nature of the threat is loosely defined in Artic.le IV as "any fact or Dituation that might endanger the peace of the arean and provision is n:ade: to protect threatened member countries of the region. The area of applicability is left flexible. Moreover~ Article n of the SEATO Treaty applies the pact against not Ol'.ly "armed attack" but also "subversive activities directed from. without against ffieri!oeriJ territorial integrity and political stability. It Also, unlike the North Atlantic Treaty~ there is no clause in the SE.4TO Treaty implying a dependence on United Nations intervention to restore peace once the treaty .ere invoked.

TABLE OF COh'TENTS

Paragra.ph

1. Genesis •••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• h~

A-5

.Doctrine, 19117 ••••••••••••••••••••••••• .- ••••••••••

A-5

b. Marshall Plans 1947 •••••••••••••.•••••••••••••••••••••••••

A-6

c. ERP and llA.TO, 1948-1949 •••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• • A-7 d.

The China Aid Program....................................

A-a

e. )mA.P, 1949- ••••••••••••••••••.••••••••••••••••••••••••••••

oA-8

Precursor Pacts inAsh .................................. .

A-9

. g.

IndocbiIlE'. and United Action, 1954 ••••••••••••••••••••••••

A-10

h. Manila Conference, 1954 ••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••

A-13

(1) (2)

The

Force CO!:ll!dtment Anti -CoI!Wlunism

TTe~ties Com~ed ••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••

A-15

a. Introductory Articles Alike ••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••

A-16

The Key Articles •••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••

A-16

~~ent

of Treaty Area.s •••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••

A-19

d. UN and otber Facts •••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••

A-19

e. Treaty Institutions ••••••••••••••••••••• _••• 0- ........ _.. .

A-19

Treaty !.ongen'ty.................................. -• ••••••••

A-20

g. The Appended

~.S.

"Understanding" ••••••••••••••••••••••••

A-20

The Vietnam-Lacs-cambodia. Protoeo1 •••••••••••••••••••••••

A-21

°A-3

..,' .. "-

3. Evolution of tbe Treaty

Orgp~ization ••••••••••••••••••••••••

A- 23

liATO Deve10ps

~pidly •••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••

A-23

SEATO Unstructured by U.S. Freference •••••••••••••••••••

A-23

SEATO Contingency

A-27

(1) . (2) (3) (4)

P~ing •••••••••••••••••••••••• ~ •••••

L9.os Pla.nning Vietnam Planning Tha.iland Planning

The Future

Footnotes •••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••

Appendix A - A

of the Wording of the and SEATO Treaties ••••••••••••••••••••••••••••

A-37

Charts ••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••

A-46

Co~ison

It~TO

Appendix B -

A-32

Organi~tional

A-4

IV. A. 1. 1.

llA.TO a.nd SE.L\.TO:

A Conrparison

Genesis

a..

TrUIn'3.l1

Doctrine, 1947

1946,

'Winston Churchill perceived a postlmr threat in a

wartime ally: tI}Tobody knows \-1hat Soviet Russia. and its communist international organiza.tion intends to do ••• what c.re the limits, if' any, to their expansive and prosel~{tizing tactics ••• Fron Stettin in the Baltic to Trieste in the Adria.tic, an iron curtain has descended across the continent ••• "

And he also depicted a counter: "Neither the sure prevention of war, nor the contiliuous rise of viorld organization will be ga.ined without ••• a. special relationship between the British Commonwealth and Empire and the United States ••• If These insights llere reinforced in early 1947 by influential analyses of George Kenn~~and others of Soviet notives and capabilities, which pointed out th~..t occa.sional and. sporadic efforts to foil Soviet policy were severely disadv-a.nta.gcd. These a.1'lalysts held that the ,-lest should seek to oppose Soviet expansionism "b-.f iibs.t the FOl'eir;n Aff'C'..il's ox" article. of Ja.uU&..7, 1947, called Uthe adroit and vigilant application of counter-force. Such a strategy, it was held, would force the Soviet to reassess and adjust its poliCies, and the U.S. could expect eventually the ubreak-up or the gradual nello't-;ing of Soviet po~;er. tI Out of these, and similar appreciations of Soviet intent e~erged the concept of' a U.S. stra.tegy of involvement. 'j

Theory lo.~ swiftly ab·~tted by event. The British notif'ied the U.S. that it would be unable to ei-tend its economic and military aid to Greece and Turkey beyond J~rch, 1947. The U. S., rather than accept the distinct possibility o~ a Soviet intrusion.foll~~ing BritiSh withdra~~, chose to ta.ke up the burden the British \-lere laying dolm in the eastern Mediterranean. Congress authorized in -May, 1947, some $400 million for direct aid. to those countrie~acting upon therecammendation of President TrW!la.n in the J.ia.rch, 1947, message known since as the "Truman Doctrine": "I believe that it must be the policy of the United States to support free peoples Yho are resisting &.ttempted subjugation by armed minorities c;>r by outside pressures. I believe we must assist free ~oples to work out their own destinies in their ~I own way... II ~ The President went on to underscore the U.S. determination to commit its resources to contain cammmism, clearly subordin::.ting militar,y aid to

A-5

econOLlic and political means.

Final1.y:

"To insure the peaceful. development of nations) free frail coercion, the United States bas ta.lten a. leading Jl8.rt in establishing the Unit ed Nations. The United lations is designed to make possible freedom and independence for all its members. We shall not realize our objectives, however, unless we are willing to help tree peoples to maintain their free institution and their na.tional integrity a.gainst aggressive movements tha.t seek to impose upon them toteJ.itaria.n regimes. II , b.

J.m-shall Plan, 1947

The U.s. Secretary of state on June 5, 1947) proposed the -coope:t'a.tive international economc aid subsequently entitled the European. Recovery Program (ERP), but known widely a.s the l·!a.rshal1 Plan. ERP was a.t first eA~icitly designed to permit and even a.ttract Soviet cooperation: "Our policy is directed not against any country or'doctrine

but a.gainst hunger, poverty, desparation and chaos •. Its purpose should be the revival of' a working economy in the world so as to perm!t the emergence of political. and social eonditions -in which free institutions can exist. It

But the Soviet rebuffed the l·1arsha.1l Plan, turned Bloc propaganda against _it as an adjunct of the TrUI:lan Doctrine) a.nd by so doing, bii'llrcated Europe. l.ioreover J among three top-level U. S. cO!1'!IJ1i ttees exw.ining ~e.ys of bringing U.S. resrJurces to bear on European recovery, the CO'!l'·mjttee on Foreign Aid (Harriman ComIrlttee) found tha.t: 0

"The interest of the United states in Europe ••• CE'..nnot be neasured simply in economic terms. It is also strategie and political. We all know tha.t we are faced in the world today with two conflicting ideologies ••• Our position in the world has been based for a.t lea.st a century on the existence in Europe of a. number of strong sta.tes cOIm:litted by tradition a."!d. inclination to the democra.tic concept ••• " 2f The bipolar world had begun to emerge. In January, 1948, the British Foreign Secretary, following te.l.ks with the U.S. Secretary of State, proposed an alliance among the U.K., France, and the Benelux natiOns, referring to uthe conception of the unitY' of Europe and the preservation 01' Europe as the heart of western civilization. It §} At the end of February, 19l£, western Europe vas shocked bY' the fa.ll 01' the Czechoslovakian government to a. communist eoup 4 l etat. In March, the British-proposed alliance was contracted a.s the Brussels Pact, a fifty-year treaty of collective defense and economic eolla.boration. U.S. approval was iJ:Imediate; the President tol~ Congress that: o

"Its signific:a.nce goes far beyond the a.ctual. terms of the agreement i tselt. It is a. nota.b1e step in the direction of

A-6

unity in Europe ••• This development deserves our tu1l support. I am. confident the United States will, bY' appropria.te ·mea.ns~ extend to the free nations the support which the situation requires ••• "

ERP and li.I\.TO,

1948-1949

Berlin.

On 1 April~ 1948, the Soviets initiated the blockade of In late April, the President called a co:nference of his senior advisers to consider the Soviet threa.t, as well as the possibility of' communist fomented uprisings in France and Italy. John Foster Dtllles, then state De~~tnent consultant, later reported that the conferees agreed tb~t:

a. decisive pronouncement by the United States would check the fear that \o.'8.S inspired by 14:oscow ••• Jj.nd that the U. s. shouJ.§ proceed along the lines of a North Atla.n.tic regional pact ••• tt n ••• Only

Dulles also sta.ted that Senator Vandenberg: " ••• Felt that the Senate liked tbe idea of'regional associations and "lould be disposed to approve in principle a further developing of suCh associations for collective defense." ~ In l·fay, 1948~ Senator Vandenberg introduced a resolution adopted by the Sefl.a.te on June 11, 1948, by a vote of 64 to 4, advising the Executive to undertakt~ the: " ••• Progressive development of regional and other collective arrangements for individua.l and collective self..defer~e in accordance with th:...»urposes, prinCiples, and provisions of the C"n£u'tE:r [Of the w;Y, a.ssocia.tion of the. United States, by constitutional process, with such regione.l and other collective arrangements a.s are ba.sed on continuous and effective sclf'-belp and mutual aid, end as affect its national security." ~ The Department of State later expla.ined to Congress tha.t "the contents of' this resolution ••• became our guide in the discussion and subsequent nego- . tie.tions ,~hich led to the North Atlantic Pact." 1Q/ In June, 1948, Congress a.lso 'Pa.ssed the Economic Cooperation Act, es:ta,blishing the Economic Coopera.tion AdmL.1.Lstra.tion (ECA) to admiulster a. program of foreign a.id. The following month, a.rn:.cd v:ith the Economic Coopera.tion Act and the Vandenberg Resolution, the U.S. opened exploratory talks on an alliance with the Brussels Pact metr.ilers and Cana.da. Subsequently, the taJ.lp3 were broadened to include twelve nations. On April 4, 1949> the North Atlantic Treaty wa.s signed, and in late July ra.tified by' the Sena.te.· It entered into force August 24, 1949_

A-1

The China. Aid Program

In the meantime, U.S. policy suffered. a. setback in ASia. A China Aid Program. had been enacted by Congress in June, 1948, in the S8.!!le omnibus foreign assistance legisll:.tiol1 l'lhich authorized E..~ and ECA; . The China. Aid Program met almost iIll!!!ediate faill...re, for Mao's armies spread .unchecked over the China mainland, and by late 1949, the position of the Nationalists there was untenable. This "failureu of U.S. aid -- it was termed such by Congressional critics -- no lcss than the urgent situation in Europe figured in Congressional action on military assistance legisla.tion pla~ed before it in 1949. 11/ . e.

J.ID..~p)

1949

In Sept~er 1949, the Soviets exploded their first nuclear device. On October 6, 1949, Congress p',-ssed the Mutual Defense Assistance Act, designed a.s a. cC$pI"ehensive la11', providiJ"l.g a J.futua.l Defense Assistance Program (loIDAP) through ,·;hich U.S. e.rms, milital'Y equipment and training assistance ndght be ~ovided for collective defense. In the first appropriations under l·~;P, lUtTO t!ountries received 76'f, ot the total, and Greece and Turkey (not yet n~ membf.'rs), l6~. 12/. But Korea and the Fhilippines received modest a.id, and the legislators clearly intended the law to underwrite subs(.-qusnt aJ.propriations for collective security i.."l Asia. •. T'ae opening paragraph of the law not only supported N..>\TO, but foreshado...ed SEATO: nAn Act to Promote the Foreign Policy and. Provide tor the Defense and Genera.l WelI~'e ot the United States . by Furnishing l·fi.litary Assista.nce to Foreign tle.tior.s, Approved October 6, 1949"Be it efl..acted by the Senate and House ot Representatives

of the United States of America. in Congress a.sseI:!bled, l:.!lat this Act m!:.y be cited as the 'l.lutual Defense Assistance Act of 19119.· uFnmDIGS AND DECIAR.l\.TION OF POLICY liThe Congress of the United. States reaffirms the policy of the United Sta.tes to a.chieve international peace and security through the United Nations so that armed torce shall not be used except in the cOJm:lOn interest. The Congress hereby finds that the efforts of' the United states and other countries to promote peace and security in furtherance of .the purposes of the Charter of the United Nations require additional measures of support based upon the principle of continuous and effective self-help and mutual ai~. These measures include th\! furnishing of military assistance essential to ena.ble the United sta.tes and other nations dedicated to the plrpOses and principles of the United llations Charter to particip.te effectively in arrangements for individual and collective sel.1"-defense in support of those pilI'pOses and principles. In fUrnishing such military assistance, it remains .

A-8

the policy of the United States to continue to exert maximum efforts to obtain agreements to provide the United Nations with armed forces as contemplated in the Cha.rt~· and agreements to a.chieve universal control of v.eapons of mass destruction and universal regulation and reduction of ar.tle.ments, including ar.aed forces ~. under a.dequate. se.t'egu.a.rds to protect complying nations a.gainst violation and evasion. "T.be Congress hereby eA;presses itself as favoring the cre~ ation by the free countries and the :!'ree peoples of the Far East of a joint organization, consistent with the Ch~~ter of the United ~Tations, to esta.blish a. progre.m of seli'-help and mutual cooperation designed to develop their econ~c and social wellbeing, to safegus-...rd bazic rights and liberties end to protect their security and independence. . "T.be Congress recognizes that economic recovery is essential to internaticna.l peace and security 2.:."ld ~ust be given clear priority. The Cong:ress also recogni zes that the increased confidence of free ~~oples in theil' ability to resist direct or indirect aggression and. to .m~inta.in internal security will advance such recovery and support political stability. n 13/ f.

Precursor Pacts in Asia

l'lith the l~f:.ticn!",list evacuation to Forr::osa in November, 1949, a.n urgent situatic!l de'..cloped. in Asia that in '-lays paralleled the conditions that prompted for~a.tio!l of ri.~TO. The rise of l{aol s Peoples Republic of China. (PRC) seem.ed to proj ect the monolithic po:~er of Soviet comElunism to the ea.stern shores of ASia, E!:na.cing the relatively small nations. along Chi'a.'s periphery like the Rassir:.ns thrca.tened l-:~stern Europe. i'he Chi.t:ese parroted the Kre:.llin' s e.ggressive annoul"Lc€:::.cnts, participated in the assault on South Korea., a.nd provided aid to Ho Chi l·anh in Southec.st Asia. u.S. cOU!ltcraction "las forthcomng. By 1951, in an effort to bolster the defensive capabilities of the 8.l.'ea, t..lle U.S. had becoae a partner in five sepa.rc:.te defense treaties in the region. Four bilateral. arrangetlents linke:d the U.S. wit..ll Japan, South Korea, Nationalist China., and the Philippines, forming an arc around the periphery of Comnmnjst China. In addition, the AN2lJS Trea.ty was signed in 1951, end the Five-Power Staff Agency (composed of Australia, New Zea.la.nd, hance, UK, and US) was formed in 1953 "to facilitate coordination on problems in Southea.st Asia." In 1.954, John Foster Dulles recalled that: "When I went out to the Pacific area in 1950 to begin the negotiations which resulted in the Japanese Peace Treaty and a series of security treaties, the original hope had been that we could have a. :fairly broad. collective security arrangement. As it ha.ppened, it was not possible to do at that time, and. we were content perforce with a ·series of' treaties ••• But those treaties themselves indicated that we did not regard them as . an end, but only as a beginning ••• " 14/

A-9

From 1949 through 1953 the Nationa.l Security Council maintained the view tha.t a broader regiona.l defense ~ct or association should be initia.ted by the countries of' the area.. In the following 1950 ex~e with Congressman Fu1ton, Secretary of State Acheson expressed Adl:linistration poliey:

YiI

"MR. FULTON:

Ms.y I read to the Secretary f'rom the seeond

paragraph of the Mutual Defense Assistance Act:

'The Congress hereby expresses itself' as favoring the creation by the free countries and free peoples of the Fe.!' East, ot. a joint orgardzation consistent with the Charter of' the United l.Ta.tions to esta.blish a program of self-help and llllltual cooperation designed to develop their eccno:!lic and social well-being, . to saf'egue.rd the basic rights and l.iberties, and to protect their security and independence.' "Now my I point out that is a bipartisan policy, beca.use it we.s tl\O Republicans and two ])enocrats on this committee who 'Put路the.t e.menduent in. ~1y" question then is to the Secretary and to the State Department, why, ,.,hen.this wa.s pa.ssed cl.ear back in 1949, October 6, has not the State Department ta.ken steps to put into effect the d.eclared bipartisan f'oreign polley of the COl".gress?" .

"SECRETARY ACHESO!f: I路~. Fulton, I think it is iEportant for you. to rea.lly look at your own words. You said that the . Congress expresses itself' as favoring the creation by the f'ree countries and free peoples of the Fa.r East of certain things. Now the President sta.ted he favors that. On all occasions he has stated it and I have stated tha.t that is the attitude of the GoverD!:l.ent of the United States. I should thi..'1k t!:g,t the President and I e.nd the Congress ere all agreed that the ve%'1f 1m;pcrtant words a.re that this orga.nization should be created bJ the free peoples of the Far East and not crea.ted by the United States. ile are not ea.' J ing these na.tions together an1. you never asked us to call these nations together and tell then they should crea.te sO!rletbing. 1 knOW' tba.t your knowledge of the Far East is suf'f'icient to lead you to conclude that if we did the.t it woul.d bave exa.ctly the oppoSite effect of the one which you wish to achieve. The President of' the lhil.ippines has been going f'orward to accomplish this. We have stated to him, and publicly~ tbat we are most SJiapathetic to this activity on his ll&rt, but it 1s most important ~t it should be a spontaneous Asian action." 1拢>/ g.

Indochina and United Action, 1954

. In the spring of 1954, however, the deterioration of' the French situation ~ IDdDchina. caused eo re-evaluation of' U.S. policy on collective security in Asia. and precipitated })l'oposals by the U.S. to the F.rench~路 the British a.nd several other countries to establish SCDe

A-10

kind of Southeast Asian coalition. On 6 April· 1954, the NSC~ asked to consider "appropria.te action regarding Indochina. and the need for U.S. militarJ intervention, tJ replied that the best alternative was a regional grouping with maximua Asian participation. 17/ On 13 May, the NBC looked to "avoid the loss of Indochina. and to resolve the colonial problem by the creation. of a regionaJ. grouping. 11 18/ Crisis transformed the U.S. position on a wide regione.l alliance from tha.t of a potential joiner to that of an anxious organizer. . llhen the U.S. JIOsition changed, the pendulum swung fa.r~ producing not only the general concept of l1united a.ction," but also several. specific plans f'or U. S. -e.llied intervention in Indochina. in a variety of circumsta.nces. Secretary Dulles approached the British and FrenCh direct~ with a ]Uan in which a ten-nation coalition would confront communist ex~ion in Southeast Asia.. On 12-14 April, Dulles visited London to get Eden' s support for this pla...'1, but vas turned dc~m. Eden thought it best to wait and see \-;hat could be accomplished at the Geneva Conf'erenee, then in preparation. Dulles did get what he thought was Eden' s agreement t~ a plan for a.n ad hoc group of the same nations to meet and discuss plans for collective a.ction in case it became necesse.ry, and a public statement in favor of a broad Asian alliance. Congression~.l reaction to the latter was immediate. !he House Foreign Affairs CO;'!l)ittee was at the the holding hearings, and promptly issued a sta.tement endorsing the Dulles and Eden a.ction, and citing the MMP legisla.tion. The :f'clloHing is !'r0!:l the Hearings:

"MR. VORYS. Now, could I read a. paragraph from the text of the recent sta.tenent issued by Messrs. Dulles and Eden••• this pe.ra..&raph v."2.S what ca.ught r:Iy attention this morning. [ReadingJj . •Accordingly we are ready to take V-rt yith the other countries principa.lly concerned in the examl.l\.a.tion of the possibiliqr of establishing a. collective defens~ within the framework of the charter of the United Nations Organization, to assure the peace, security, and freedom of Southeast Asia, in the western Pacific. • 111 have changed our proposed statement slightly.

'The CO!mIl1ttee on Foreign Affa.irs notes with approval the statement issued in London on April 13, 1954J by the Secretary of State and the British Foreign Secretary which is in line with recommendations preViouslJ' expressed by the Committee and Congress in 1949.' . "The second pa.r~aph reads as follows: 'Th~s .paragra.ph was dra.f'ted by the Committee on Foreign ~~~.1peprpore.:ted in the originaJ. Mutual. Defense Assistance ...-. -.. ..

A-ll

Act. A similar :para.graph was incorporated in the Mutual Security Act of 1953 by the Committee on Foreign Affairs and passed by the House of Representatives. This language was left out of the act as finally passed because the committee of. conference regarded the existing pa.ra.graph of the Mu.tual Defense Assistance Act as giving adequate eA~ression of congressional policy. 1ft ~ The U.S. moved immediately to assemble the ad hoc group Dulles had discussed wi~h Eden, inviting representatives of 10 na.tions to meet in ~lashington on 20 April. T\iO days before the I:eeting was to take place, the British announced they would be unable to a.ttend. They bad not realized, they said, that the r.eet1ng \-lould take place so soon; ~d they had not been given the opportunity to pass on the cOl'..ferees. EQI The meeting was held anyway, but be~e a genera.! briefing of the twenty nations compriSing the allied side at the Geneva Conference ..

some

In the lllea.nti:me, other coalition plans l-lere in the ma.1dng. An early concept, the first of mny to be a.dva.nced, provided a. choice. of two courses of action: "The U.S. is prepared to join actively in two regional groupings. The first such grouping will include naotions ready imledia.tely to intervene in Indochina provided certain conditions are met. The second. such grouping should be defined, with wider participation, to guarantee against cOIZlunist a.ggression or subversion of all Southeast Asia. ~ith the exce~tion of Indochina. so long as a.ctive fighting continaes." 2lr The first of these groupings \-las to conta.in the U.S., France, the Associated states of Laos, CaJ:lbodia, e..."ld Vietn8.!l, T'na.ila.nd., and the Philippines. The second was to be composed of "all countries '\.;ho l:ish to join" including the Colombo Plan countries (Burr..:a, Ceylon, India, In:1cnesia., Pakistan), Korea., and "perhaps" the Chinese !~3.tiona.lists. The U.S. l-:ished to a.void a "white man' s party" in the forz:a.tion of any regional group, but the powers able to contribute substantial military sUpIlOrt to the plans were not Asian. lleither coa.lition materialized before Geneva.

The dramatic 1'a.ll. of Dien Bien Phu served notice to the world of French military 1I:potence in Ind.o~hina. When the participants of' the Indochina fighting moved to the conference table in April, 1954, the U.S., fresh 1'rom the bitter experience of Pa.nmunjom, looked on the upcoming discussions a.pprehensive1y, fearing that the French ta.ctical defea.t presaged stra.tegic disaster. At one time or another during the Geneva. Con:f'erence~ the U.S. considered: (1) merely urgir.g the French to a. greater effort, (2) assisting the Fre!!ch with l!l8.terial support in varying degrees, (3) intervening in conjunction with the British, (4) ta.king milita.ry action 'with all tht.?se prepared to do so, and (5) working out a long range Soutbeut Asia alliance. None of these courses of action proved practicabl.e. Nonetheless, the outcome o~ the Geneva Conference did cata.l.y'ze SEA.TO. Within the councils of .the U.S. Government, the concession of ba..lf of Vietnam to the communists was considered another retrea.t before eom:mmist expansion. A-12

Secretary of State Dulles publicly drew two lessons from. Geneva.: (1) that popular support was essential to combat communjst subversion, and (2) collective'defense against aggression could not be devised after the aggression was in progress. 23/ He went on to assert that a collective security ~st~ in Southeast Asia could in the future cheek both outright aggression and subversion. 11le U.S. moved promptly to convene an international conference at loNila in la.te summer, 1954, to devise such a security system. h. Manila Conference, 1954 The outlook at )Ianila., however, tended to be more retrospective than futuristic. Vice Admiral A. C. Davis, Deputy Assistant Secretary • of Defense (18.1\.) and chief DOD representative in the U~S. delegation observed in his report that: ' " ••• the }.1an1.la. Conference convened following communist military a.chievements in Indochina and political and pSJch.ologic:al successes at Geneva. Against this background the effort or the Manila Conference to construct a collective defense arrangsent for Southeast Asia and the Southwest Pacific was directed in large measure to recovering from the psychological bl.ow thus administered to the Free liorld. Much of what \.-a.s said at the Conference bore witness to the preeminence of psychological Objectives in the thinking of the participatil\.g Sta.tes. iii a real sense, the Treaty that emerged at Manila is a response to the Geneva Agreel:lents. n 24/ . The task ta.cing the conferees was foruidable ,COl::pa.red with that Atlantic planners bad faced six years earlier. The Geneva reverse provided a sma'1 basis for COtmlon action. I:A.TO he.d been created in a relatively uncompli- . eated political situ.ation, in an atI!losphere of understanding and ca:n::lOn need, to meet an una.=.biguous threat. I.foreover, the North Atlantic nations could build collective defense on an infrastructure of sba..red culture, political ideals, a.."l.d interdependent economies. Commitments of the member nations could be clarified to stipulate standing forces, command structures, and roles in p).am\.ing. The nations at Manila., on the other hand, confronted a complex of dilem"i'2-s. Anti-communism was no unifJir.g force. !hroughout region, potential comn.;nist aggressors were likely to adopt ee.uses 01' anti-colonialism, anti-traditiona.lism, raCism, religion, or irredentiSm. Moreover, the conferees represented disparate cultures in countries scattered across the world. Of the eight r.a.tions present, only two were .ASi~; several na.tions whose location made them logical candidates for an Asian coalition chose not to attend.

the

The U.S. rePresentatives at the Manila. Conference in September, 1.954, arrived with instructions t:» insist on a number of preconditions 1'or U.S. military action in Southeast Asia. First, with its cOllllitments in Europe, the U.S. woul.d refuse to act unilaterally in Asia; fUrther, any such action woul.d. have to involve not only Asian nations, but also , major European partners. Moreover, the' U. S. would not be prepared to cOmmit ground troops !nto combat in Asia; other nations would do the ground . .

A-13

fighting under a. cover of U.S. sea and air power. In a.ddition; the U.S. defined the cOl!ll!lunist threat as the only rea.! danger in the area.; the U.S. did not want to be moe-un into an alliance directed against 831.:y other sort of enemy, particularly desiring to avoid colonial conflicts. Hence, the U.S. sought to restrict the applicability 0:' e.ft.:y U.S. commitl::lent to a few specified nations especially vulnerable to c~~~~st aggression. Each of these two major U.S. qualifications -- the proscriptions against land forces,. and emphasis on anti-communism -- created its own dilemmas, solutions to which proved to be elusive. â&#x20AC;˘ " (1) Force Commit~ent The resource -- political as ~'lell as military -- the U.S. was prepared to CO!'l!l'lit to SEATO was bound to constitute its principal: strengt.~. But the U.S., with its NATO cOm!lit!!.ents already a sizeable burden, was not prepared to -pay the price of' a stror..g coalition. In no sense 'Was the U.S. prepared to CCI::!lit itself to S';'A.TO as it had to N.U'O. (It, is interesting that Dulles vTas so concerned l\ith avoiding a public identification of' SE.4.TO with I'rATO that he tried to have the new treaty ca.lled. "MANB\C,1t for "l,:a,.."ila Fact." 25/) Rather, the U.S. searched for ways in which other nations would llrovide troops. ~t 1"evi na.tions in 195'J possessed the ca.~bility to field an army of significance 'Within the SE..\TO region. Vice Admira.l. Davis noted that: "The United States 't-:as faced in this issue, I believe, with the dilel!:F..5. cf attetlpting to att':-:,in tv:o v'bjectivc~ that. ilere not cO:'lpletely compatible; on the one !:and there l~S a. desire to ~ce the cc~unists on notice as clearly as possible that fUrther aggression on the area would meet with effective collective counteraction. Such unequivocal notification .~culd tend to eI'.!Jance the psychological effect of the Treaty on t1e Free World and the deterrent effect on the cOm:lunists. Yet on the other ha.nci, in spite of the greater ~syCholcgical effect that a strongly worded Treaty might have, the- attail".::!.ent of this objective was necessarily lil!lited by the exte:'2t to l:hich the United States, in its own interest, could undertake advance military cOlnI:liments under the Treaty in restriction of its freedom 01" action." 26/

, While the U.S. continued to ca.ll the prospective pa.ct nregional, n a. region existed only in the sense that a. certain geographical ',&rea was considered to be threatened by the expansion of communisa. The membership solicited for theSFATO conference wa.s worldwide; potential force contributors were overbalanced on the EUropean side; 8.!ld even within the region itself', several. countries did not de ... ire to become ];l8.rticipants, and others were not invited. Determined not to become enmeshed in Southeast Asia. without help from Europe, the U.S. settled for a SEA.TO based on . unspecified forces from eight nations, five of which were ethni~ European -- a position which apparently dismssed from consideration the disadvantages which would a.ccrue to armies drawn from former metropoIe nations. . A-14

Several of the states at }I~ila ~lere acutely disappointed at the reluctance of the U.S. to place its military forces at the disposal of the pact; they uere e>.."pecting a N.~TO-like commitment and they were surprised when it was not forthcoming. Admiral Davis reported that: "With respect to thc military aspects of the Treaty~ most of the participating States, notab~ the Philippines and Thadl~nd, urged provisions the.t would explicitly commit the Treaty Parties to take military action in event of aggression 1..'1 the Treaty area. The cOI:lJllitment of the United Sta.tes to such action, of course, was the purpose of these urgings. Much was said about the desirability of thc r!.~i'1) as opposed to the allegedly weaker .AN2DS formula. I路fost of the r-articipa.ting States argued' that explicit commitments to take a.ction were necessary if the Trea.t.y was to have the desired deterrent effect on the co~ists." 271 But the U.S. delegates ~inta.ined their opposition, arguing that the U.S. had to retain its freedom of action, and could not accept a. treat,y con~t颅 ment tha.t l1a.S inconsistent \-lith Cor.stitutiona.l requireI:lents, and therefore prejudicial to ra.tification of the treaty by the Senate. (2) Anti-Cot"ol:l'.lnisn At the begiw..ing of' the l-1a.nila Coni'erence~ the U.S. served notice that it looked on the future SR~TO agreement as 8.-'1 anti-communist pact, ani that it would react only against a cOm=lunist threat. The U.S. e.ereed to "consult" with the other !!e<:bers. to decid.e :f\'lture act.iO!1, if faced ,-lith a non-comunist tJ'l..reat. 1'1:is, of course, l"t.a.d the effect of emphasizing once again the qua.lified na.ture of the U. S. com."!litment: the strongest JXTaer in the pact reserved the right to opt out of contingencies. Other nations present at l路!enile. sa1;" l!:!!m'/ other threa.ts to regiona.l pea.ce~ some of l:hie-ll see:.ed to the!: e. good deal more da.r..gerous than cor:!m.ll!li sm ~. Indonesian relations "t:ith J.~laya., and Indian rela.tions "With Pak1sta..'l). There was, as a. result, sene hesita.nce to leok on the pact as e. l:r\ltuaJ. banding together against all da."2gers. Few missed the irony of the U.S. being the chief a.dvocate of t-lle SE..~ro Jl8.ct~ and also its prim.e quaJifier. 28/ 2.

The Treaties CO:lpared

A1though Secreta.ry of state Dulles wished to avoid campa.l-isons of SEATO with RI\TO, such were inevitable. Similarities were in fact intended by many of the Manila. Conferees ~ and emerged in the wording of the treaties. All the delegations at J.!a.ni1a, the U.S. included, took }ains with treaty terminology, ca.lc1.&la.ting" ca.reful.l.y the effect it would have on their own domestic politics ~ as well as on the communist countries. As Admiral Da.vis reported: . "The Trea.ty is a document that speaks to ma.ny audiences; it supports self-determination of peoples, self-government and independence :in deference to Asian nationalism; it provides for economic and technical cooperation as an inducement to present

A-15 "

Asian 'neutralist' countries to associate themselves with the Treaty; it permits the accession of other states, thus avoiding the charge the.t the Trea.ty members form an exclusive club with aggressive designs 'against' other States;~ •• These elements of the Treaty attest to the importance the meIP.ber states place on the effect of the document upon their respE'ctive publics ••• The success tha.t the fieaty may he.ve in enhancing the defense of the area will therefore have to be judged in light of' the fact that . it has psychological and economic as well as military objectives. n 29/ 8..

Introductory Articles Alike

The initial. article of both treaties is the Sa.tlle, word for word.* The member nations promise not to use force in any manner inconsistent with the principles of the United lfations. Article 2 of Nfi.TO conforms to Article In of SEATO: an undertaking to strengthen free institutions and promote economic progress, and is identical except for specific mention in SE.A.TO of technical a.ssistance and promoticn of social well-beill.g, wording which is not in the li-\TO version. T'ne reversal of· the order of presentation of the second and third articles is interesting. In It<\TO, the article col!ltrl.tting the members to strengthen free institutions precedes the article on developing collective capacity to resist attack. T'ne order is che.ne;ed in SE.-\TO, perhaps emphasizing de!"ense over other considerations. Article 3 of r~TO corresponds to Article II of SE:\TO: an expression of resolve to develop a. collective ca.pa.city to resist armed a.ttack. There is, hOrlever, a significant difference in the SE.<\TO article ~dth the addition of e. clause applying the !-reCl.ty specii'ically to subversion. This cla.use, in cOl:ibination with the provision of S:~ATO Article IV th~t the parties shall consult tmmediately on measures ot conmon defense if threatened by other than armed attack, places subversive aggression, in the form of externa.lly fomented or supported insurgency, or coup d I ete.t, wi thin the purview or the treaty. b.

The Key Articles

Central. to analysis of the two trea.ties is comparison of the articles calling for action to meet e.n eneI:lY threat. 1"tlese are Articles 4 and 5 of the ~lATO Treaty, and Article IV of the SEATO Treaty. In general, the SEATO article has come under hea.vy criticism for lack of forcefulness. As presented below, the SEATO article pas been transposed to parallel the two articles of NA!O, but no words have been added or deleted. NATO Art. " &

SFATO Art. IV

The Parties will cons.ult together· whenever, in the opinion of' &n::I of them, the territori.al. integrity,

If', in the opinion of' any of' the parties, the inviolability or the integrity of the territory or

*Appendix A, Compa.riSOD of the Wording of'the NATO and SEATO Trea.ties

A-16

NATO Art. 4

SFATO Art. IV

political independence or security of any of the FaTties is threatened.

the sovereignty or political independence of' any Party in the Trea.ty Area. or of' any other State or territory to shich the provisions of' pa.ra.grapb 1 of this Article from time to time apply is threatened in any way other the.n by armed attack or is aftected or threatened by any fact or situation which might er.danger the peace of' â&#x20AC;˘ the area, the Parties shall consult immediately in order to agree on the mea.sures which should be taken f'or the common defense.

The futies agree that an armed attack

Each Party recog"'aizes tha.t aggression by means of' armed attack

against one or more of them-

against any of the Farties or against any state or territory which the Parties by una.ni.'IlOUS ~eenent

may

here~~er desigr~te

in Europe or llorth -America.

In the Trea.ty

sha!: be considered an attack against them all

would endanger its own peace and safety

and consequently they agree tha.t

and agrees that

-if such an armed attack occurs, each of them

it will in that event

~ea

in exercise of the right of individual or collective selfdefense recognized. by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations act to meet the common danger inaccordance with its constitutional processes

wi1l assist the party or parties so attacked by taking f'orthwith, individDally and in concert with the other parties such action as it deems necessary, including the use of _ armed force. to restore and maintain the security. of'the North Atlantic Area.

A-17

NATO Art.

4& 5

SFA1'O Art. IV

such armed attack and all measures taken as a result thereot sba]] immediatel짜 be reported to the Security Council.

&Dy

measures under this paragra.ph sha'l be immediately reported to the Security COUllcil of the United Nations

. Such me~sures sha.ll be terminated "when tlie Security COW1CU has taken the measures necessary to restore and maintain international peace e.nd security. It is understood that no action on the territory 01' any state designated by unanimous agreement under pa...~rc.ph 1 of this article or on any territory so designated shall be taken except at the invitation or with the consent of the goverr.:ment concerned. As the .Alaerican delegation at lI.aa.nila. noted" the SE.<\TO Article IV was in line with the wording usecl in the U.S." Philippine, Koree.!l, and AN2JJS ~cts. The issue of precommitDent to react to armed a.ttack was side-stepped: n Secretary

Dull.{'s pointed out during the conference that the 'Wording of the North Atlantic Trea.ty, which speaks of an attack on one as an attack 011 e.ll, nevertheless pro\rides that the Parties will act in accordance with their constitutional processes. He persua.ded the Confer(!nce tha.t the fina.1 agreed wording of Article IV would be bettt:r received by the Senate, shou.ld tend to minimize debate, and would facilitate ratification by the United states. n 30/ " The SEATO Trea.ty l.TOrding is thus intentionally ambiguous on the point of

just what response would be made by the members in the event of an armed attack. Such an attack ~"t\inst one of the SPATO members would be vierled as a "cOI:lmon aa.ngerU rather than a.s an "atta.ck on all. 1I where the K.<\TO Trea.ty notes that action t3.ken "forthwith" might include the "use of armed force, If the SPATO Treaty states merely that "common da.r~er" would be Itmet" in accordance with "constitutional processes." SEATO also makes the provision tlle.t no action" shall be taken on the territory of' any threatened state without the consent 01 that state, a qua.lification necessary to reassure sma.llcountry members tpa.t their independence was not threatened by neocolonialism or other domina.tion, and recognition of one of the most significant differences in the" environment or the two trea.ty organizations. In some respects, nevertheless, Article IV of the SEA.TO Treaty 1s broader than its NATO counterparts. The nature of the threat is loosely A-18 ..

defined as "e.ny fact or situation that might endanger the peace or the area. s " and provision 1s made to respond. to threa.tened countries that are non-members of the pa.et. In additions there is no clause implying dependence on the Seeurity Couneil of the UN to step in to "restore and ma.intain internationa.1 peace and. security," as there is in the N.~TO Treaty. Yet, the J:ain point evident is that beth the wording of NATO and that of SEATO provide the basis for a strong def"ensive strategy ors indeed, would admit of a weak - one. There is enough room. for interpretation under the SEATO Treaty for membersto devise all the defensive protection that NATO offers, and more.

c. Extent of the Treaty Areas NATO Artiele 6 is the equivalent -of SEAm Article VIII, dealing with definition of the treaty area. Both are broad, but the ~ article is -the !!lore flexible of the two. In SE.~TO the area is limited on the north at latitude 2l degrees s 30 minutes, thus eliminat1Dg Formosa, Hong Kong, Korea, and Japan. The rest of the area. is de:rined only as "the general area of South-East Asiat1 and "the general area of the South-'West Pacific. It The area, -the trea.ty notes, can be modified at 8.DJ time by . unanimous a.greement. The phrase -that permitted inclusion of lithe entire territories of the Asian parties" "''as noted by the U.S. delegation as having the ad,,~ta.ge of briDging in West Pakistan "under: the protection of the Trea.ty even though it is not in Southeast Asia."

d. UN a.nd other Pacts Except for a. change in t!O c!" threc UIl.i.tlporte.Lt words, NATO 1 and 8 are sllm~ed up and repeated in SEATO YI; these articles deelare that agree!!lents between SEATO members and the mr, or by members with other countries are not, nor will be, in conflict l.'"ith SEATO responsibilit~es.

- e.

Treaty Institutions

•

-9

and SEATO V establish a couneil for military and other In the NATO Treaty this council is authorized to set up "subNATO

pla.mling. sidiary bodies, n t-:hil.e in the SE.\TO Trea.ty such authorization is not given. This was a. disappointment to several of the delegations at the Manna Conference. The Australians came forward with a request for a strong organization, but the U.S. delegation was a.ble to persuade them to accept a m.od2fica.tion of their proposal, substituting a. concept of "consultation": 4

"During the sessions of the iTorking Group it became evident that some countries 'Would propose wording calling for the establishment of military machinery, possibly along NATO lines. Reca 11i ng the position of [the U.S. StatiJ Department that military participation should be consulta.tive a.1ong lines of the ANZUS arrangement ra.ther than permanent and forma.l. as in K-\TO, the Defense Representative •••proposed tha.t consideration be given to the inclusion of the following wording af'terthe first sentence of Article IV: .~ this end the Parties to the Trea.ty will consult with regard

A-19

to military planning as required by the situation in the area.' Shortly thereafter the Australian delegation-proposed the following addition to Article V: 'The CoUncil shall set up such subsidiary machinery as may be necessary to achieve the military and other ob,jectives o'f the Treaty. I Since the Australian proposal involved an open ended cOmmitment, this Department and the Joint Chie-fs of Staff opposed it and accepted the wording suggested by the Defense Representative. The Department of State agreed, and instructed the U.S. Delegation to support incorporation o~ this wording in Article IV." 32/ Secretary Dulles was able to bring about deletion of the references to periodic or regular consultation that had been introduced into the draft treaty. . f.

Treaty Longevity

The finalliATO articles (1l-l4) are administrative, cover.ing ratification of the treaty, the length of time it is to remain in force, provisions for revievi of the articles, and archival responsibi~tties. These are paralleled in SEATO articles DC-XI. The NATO Treaty provides for withdra. . :al of its members after 1969; l!'~embers are to give a year's notice prior to such action. The SEATO Treaty is to remain in force indefinitely, but l:.er.bers also may l'dthdra1v o!! one year's notice. g.

The

A~~ended

U.S. "Understa..'lciinglt

Throughout the discussions at l<ianila the U. S. insisted that the focus of the pact be on the prevention of fu..-rther communist expansion in the treaty area. lfnen the other nations '\\'ould not acquiesce to a -wording of the treaty to make anti-coI!lIl1unism its SPecific objective, the U.S. requested that a..'l "l.:Ilderstanding" be appenc.ed to the treaty. This was a U. S. u!lilateral statement of intent -- a qualifier upon the first paragraph of .Article 'IV., in -which the members agreej that in the event of aggression they -will ttact to n;.eet the common danger in accordance with cOLstitutional processes." The U.S. in the understanding restricts the applicability of its agreement to act, stating that only cOJOu..路list aggression '-Till be recognized as ,,:arranting i:mr1ediate response. In the event of other kinds of aggression, the U.S .. lI'OUld consult with the other member nations. Admiral Davis reported disagreement over this point at the conference: IIAU p~icipating States except the United States supported exclusion of the ,,"'Ord 'Communist I from. the Treaty. The U. S. draft

origina.lly referred to 'Communist aggression I in the preamble and in Article IV. The chief reason advanced by the other Signatories for the deletion vas the desire of most of the Parties that the Treaty cover any kind of aggression in the area. Pakistan, for example, wished that the Treaty would apply to possible aggression by India. The United States position was that the united States' co~ not. properly say that any aggression in Southeast Asia \<j-auld endanger its own peacea:nd safety, and that it could accept the

A-20

obligations of Article IV only in respect to Communist aggression. For this reason, the United States attached ~ 'understanding' to the Treaty in this sense. All other participants accepted the ~ Treaty with the U.S. 'understanding. tit $31 In the "understanding" the U. S. further complicated the matter by changing "aggression by -means of armed attack" of Article IV to "aggression and armed attack"; in the same sentence, the understanding uses "aggression or armed attack" to refer to paragrap.:."l 2 of Article IV, which in fact is worded "threatened in any way other than by armed a.ttack." The admixture' of terms accentuates one of the major difficulties of the alliance: the governments or the SEATO trea.ty area were threatened by ~ complicated variety of destructive movements that might be ca1led a.ggression against a member state. The appellation could be fitted in anywhere between "armed attack" and "fact or situation which night endanger the peace." The U.S. insistence on this point of " understanding" was probably superfluous. The latitude that the U. S. wanted already 'Was built LYl.to the treaty, in Article IV. The emphatic nature of such an appendix to the treaty may have been calculated as a w-a.y to call the attention of the world to a po"leri'ul U.S. stand against further encroachments of com:r:r.mism. Such a call would have been consistent with the U.S. feeling of a necessity to re-eztablish a psychological position in the face of the "defeats" of Geneva. Nevertheless, the co~ma. tion of' U.S. single-mindedness that made a commll..'list threat the only valid call f'or immediate response narrowed S~TO at its inception. h.

The Vietnam.-Iaos-Ce.sbodia. Protocol

The final item of the, SEATO Treaty is a "protocol.," wlicb . states unanimous agreement among the members to include Ca.I:lbodia, Laos, and "the free territory under the jurisdiction of the State 017 Vietna.t1" under the protection of Articles III and IV of'the Trea.ty. In other words, these countries, without actually becoming members of' the pact, would be entitled to "economic measures including technical assistance" and also to .defense against any a.ttack, overt or not, fron vithout or within. The U.S. had wanted to include these countries in SEATO~ but membership might have seemed legally a. contravention of' the Geneva. Agreements. At Geneva., Laos had not signed any agreement prejudicial to such a pact, but the Laotian Government, on the final day of' that conf'erence, had made the following declaration: ' "The Royal Government of' Laos will never join in any agreement with other states if this agreement includes the obligation for the Royal Government of Laos to partiCipate in a military alliance 'not in conformity with the principles of' the United Nations or w.;.th the- prinCiples of' the [GeneviJ Agreement on the Cessati?n of Hostilities ••• It J!Jj South Vietnam, on the other hand, was coextensive with one of the "zones" described in Article 19 of the armistice, which specifies: ,A-2l.

nThe two Parties shalJ. ensure that the zones assigned 'to, them do not adhere to any military alliance and are not used for the resumption of hostilities or to fUrther an aggressive policy."

'J2/

France -- one of the "Parties" to the armistice -- was thus not in a position to admit the GVN to SEATO. However, nothing in the Geneva. Accords a.ppeared to exclude a.l.l. three countries from being extended protection ' under such a pact without member status.:BJ This was pointed out by the French delegation: nAt FrenCh suggestion specific reference to Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam l\~S remoYed from the text of the Treaty, but these States are covered by the provisions of the Treaty in a separate protocol ••• The French ~elt that this method of extending 'the ' application of the Treaty to the Associated States was less . likely to be construed as a. violaticn of the spirit of the Geneva Agreements ~ Il 'J1I At the conclusion of" the l.fa.nila Conference, Admiral Davis " wrote: "I believe the l·~ila. Conference accomplished the objective expected of it frOlll. the United States point of view. In m:I judgment our Defep..se representation in the U.S. Delega.tion succeeded in its efforts to insure that the Trea.ty is consistent in its mili~.ry it:lplications with the positions ta.ken by the -Joint Chiefs or Staff and by this Depart~e!lt. It 38/ The u.s. had, in effect, made a public s~~tement of its intent to counter further comnunist moves in SPA, but left vague the specifics of its response. The pact, e.s intended, wa.s :f'undamentally Uconsultative." There was to be no unified cOE:<:I.nd, no bases, and no contribution of forces to a. standing group; the U.S. accepted these lacks, and stressed the psychological gains of merely bringing a. treaty into existence, pointi.'lg out that SE.I\.TO opened the way to a stronger and nore all-encorn.:pa.ssi.'1g defense of Southea.st Asia than had theretofore been possible. "

A-22

3. Evolution a.

the Treaty Organization

NATO Develops Rapidly

. . NATO rapidly acquired institutions.* The treaty entered into force in ;August, 1949. By September, a Military Committee, a Standing Group, and the Regional P1afl.ning Groups bad been created. By Noverr.ber a Financial and Econo.'l!ic Bo-3r-i. and a I-lilitary Production and Supply Board bad been set up. By Dec6:lber agreement bad been reached on a strategic concept for the integrated defense of the NA~ area. A year later a centralized can:nand. and. control structure was fonnulated, becoming operational as SFAPE on 2 April 1951, witb headquarters in the old Hotel Astoria, in Paris. Spurre.i on by the eve..'lts occurring in Korea, NATO was furtber simp1it'ied snd streamlined in the Ottawa meeting of September 1951, where a Temporary Council Committee chaired by W. Averell Harri.1'!lan vas set up. This became a pemanent council, in 14arch, 1952, a month after the accession of Greece and Turkey to the pact. 39/ In the wake of a major setback when the French Assembly refusedlto rati~ tp~ European Defense Community (EDe) proposal in August, 1954, the Paris Agreetlents were pushed tr..rou&1t in October, providing for the accession of West Germany to riATO, and the establishment or a co:r.bined field corn::and.** Early in 1956 the I-t~TO Council appointed a Committee of Three ~路:injsters (!~artino ot' Italy, Lange of I~onray, and Pearson of Canada) to stuiy ways that further cooperation could be achieved within :r::ATO. The report ot' this Co:znittee was approved. by the Council on 14 December, 1956. Consultation within It4~ was to becO!:le Han integral part of the making of national policy. n JlO/ i'he meeting of 16-19 December 1951 of the n~TO Council included-the heads of government, with Eisenhower sr.d !路~acrnillen participet!ng. This meet~g sy:!!bolized the signiricance ,,;hich all the lZATO countries attached to the pact -- and it was this ser.se of meaningfulness, co::.:-.onality, and necessity, more than the terms o~ the r:~rth Atlantic Treaty, that accounted for the rapid organizational growth. b.

SEATO Unstructured by U.S. Preference

The ~~nila Cont'erence eventuated in a pact termed the "Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty and Protocol Thereto, September 8, 1954"; the treaty was rEtified -by the U.S. Senate by a vote of 82 to 1, and entered into force on February 19, 1955. 41/ The history of the development of SEATO thereafter is quite dif'ferent from NATOts, since the initial policy of the U.S. _vas to discourage, rather than to aSSist, the evolution o~ a permanent structure. SEATO military staff

Appendix B, Organizational Charts

In tbe same month -- October, 1954 -- the Warsaw Pact came into being.

A-23

eonsultatior.s were held.frequently, but "Were actendell by relatively U.S. o~ficers, cerefully instructed on limits of their planning flexibjlity. At the SRt.TO cont"erel'!~t" jn B:!l,:;'kok in February 1955, the U.f:. pvsltion n~ m:!lita~r arrC!nef'm.ell~.s under the pact was to avoid discussjon of permanent formal organization. A Defense Department memorandum on the U.S. stence again recommended that the ANZUS pact be used as a raode1: ~ow-ranking

"The U.S. desires to I!iE~~ no comnitments of U.S. forces .for.use under the !,~an:ile recto (This vie..r has not been con. veyed to the other po~{ers. ) 'rWi"th regard. to nil. ta1"y r:.ac!Jinery for the coordination of measure~ to c~bet ove~t egeression, the U.S. is opposed to the establish:::ent of forr.:~l r.;.ilitery r.:<;chinery or of a pern€nent SEATO steff. ~n8te:.d) the U.S. SU~pOl~S the establishr.1ent of rdlitf.ry adv:Lsors, who liculd ~eet period.ica)~y, i'on-:mJ.ate their ~rl ruleS of procedu.re ar.J. arry neces~ary organizatJonal errcnBe~~nts, cesignate planning assistants to work on &:pecii'iea. p:=-ojects, and iflsure tl1~t nilitary planning activ;i..tiE ~~. S! e co-ordi....9t":l \-lith those desi;3:"H.;d to counter subversive activjties. ';\.h.Lle not exrl:J.citl~· so :c-t::lt -ti" tl ~ U.S. position is one

of cc..ufining its e~ti..,:'t~~s e!~d co=-z:it!:!'2~tS to the scope of those IIiade U!lder the AEZUS Thct. 8-.lch a:p:p~r2r:.t con::essions to the otber pot.;ers as hsve been made in t?!e \']orking GroOlp papers do not ~lt~::- ~~o? :... ::~+ t!1:>t th~' U.S. i:: '.1n'~i11ing to corr!l!lit ar;:yr;rces-,t-otS~-'~'i':_ ~·.;sco:t;-SoUtT:Z['s E'Tiia-;-opposes any :r!lilitary o.rgs~izsti0ml.l ~r!'R!1ge:-;~·=nt -:":;lich 'tlo'.lld require the integration of U.S. a~"2d alli~d w<::r p1a:15, end prefers to deal vith its allies bilaterally rather than multilaterally." 42/ !Jmphasis aa.ded7 The U.S., althoug~ it refused to beco!:le deeply cor.!mitteo in aJ.\rance to a rilitary organi~~ation styled along Nl.TO lines" was well a-ware of the necessity to be prepared to fight in the SE.~TO area. U.S. unilateral plans and preparations had been set in motion when, in January, 1955, the Secretar3 of Defense requested the JCS to provide "a concept of the possible application of' U.S. milita:r-3 pOlver in the implementatio!l of Article IV of thE'! 1·lanila Pact II under two di:fferent assumptions: (1) prohibition of nuclear weapons; (2) permission to emllloy nuclear w~apons.·. Requirements ,Tere estsblished for: . "1.. Broad outline plDns for U.S .. action ••• to deter or counter overt aggression by Communist China or, where allplicable, by Viet l-iinh, against each of the Southeast Asian nations which are parties to~ Manila Pact or against the free areas of Indochina which might be covered by the Pact. LF1rphasis addpd7

A-24

~2 •••• a

statement as to the readiness cRpability o~ U.S •. armed f'orces" in the next t:ev years, to conduct opernt.i.olls in implementation of Article Dl" 1" of' the Manila Pact. II J{3/ The U.S. forces would constitute a "mobile reserve" read,y fn~: ~'·l""~it··· ment to the· treaty area, but the U.S. would enter no fixed agreement as to what those f'orces might be" or under what circumstance~ they would be used. Despite this ur.ilateral planning, however, instn1C~~c!'J~ for the delegates to the Bangkok conf~rence indicated that p~anning for or crea~ion uf' cODbined COl!'~ands v:ere not to be conoidered vttMn th~ scope of the SEATO Pact. Suppression of guerrillas was to r.~ hani! l~:d by Jtindigenous f'orces onlyu unless these proved incapable of' copil1& with the problem. . At the 1955 Bangkok Conference the Au~t~linns anrt N~w Zealanders repeated their willingness to make troop coo;mitment.s to a SEATO t:orce, but the U.S. representatives, following instructions, evaded disc'15sion of the subject. 41:/ The pressures on th~ H.S. h=nn weT; strong, and the me!:lbers ca~e avay with the convicticn th3t. tn.•' major factor "to contend vith".in future tleetings tlae bound t.o be " ••• the obvious desire or the Asian nations to est.~b}j sl't a IW:l'O- L;}'1)e SEAi'O organizatIon with everything that j t ir.'pU C!i in the nature of f'orce cOtl!:litnents."

':21

later in 1955, u.S. planners once r,Qre were DprrOcH"'rp.l} by counterparts of several other countries with the proposel th;.}t., e- {\ step toward some kind of SEATO standing group, a snall secretar"iflt bp set up to study methods of' creating a "possible future organizations 1 stl'ucture. tt The report of the U.S. represente.tives stctcd, "The establishment of' such an ad. hoc s::-rangeIl!ent should not prejudice the eventual creation or evolution-of' a standing group ••• shoulii The l'ir)"Q become necessary because of inadequacies revealed by experience. It 46/ 'l'h~. JCS cOlLmented: t'The Joint Chief'S of' Staff have no objection to the establishment of a small permanent secretarillt" \!hich WC""Jl.il be an instrument of the Military Advisers and subordinate planning committees. However, the Joint Chiet:s of' staff would not agree to the possible evolution of' such a secret~riat into an organi~tion of' a standing nature •••• It 41/ 'This vas the same point of view expressed by CINCPAC, who not!'!d vith apparent relief that: . ''The recognition of' the requirement f'or a small l">n~'0n': Ii t. secretariat has definitely f'orestalled for the f'oreseeable . future anyaeter.mined insistence for either a permanent staff' planners organization, a standing' group, or a canbined stat::f'. tt

. A-25

!!§/

路 PAGES A26 - 31 DELETED

A COJ.fPARlSON OF THE WOlIDING OF THE NATO AND SEATO TREATIES

NOTES: ~.

In this layout) sections of'路 the SEATO Treaty are transposed for comparison with like ~ections of the NATO Treaty. No words have been omitted.

Significant passages pointing out differences are underlined.

3. Comments are in brackets. NORTH ATLAnTIC TREATY

Washington, D.C., 4 April ~949* The Parties to this Trea.ty reaffirm their faith in the p~ses and princi:ples of the Charter of the United Nations t:nd their desire to. ~ive in peace with all peoples and all GoVernments.

The Parties to this Treaty, Recognizing the sovereign equality 01' all the Parties, Reiterating then :faith in the purposes and principles set forth in "!. ~~ Charter of the United liations and their desire to live in peace with all peoples and all governme.l1ts,

They are determined to safeguard the freedQ!l, cor::.mon heritage and. civilizatioL. of their peoples, founded on the' principles of democracy, individual liberty and the rule 01' laW. They seek to promote stability and well-being in the r~ol'th Atlantic area. They are resolved to unite their efforts for collective defense and for , the preservation of peace and security. They therefore. agree to this North At~antic Treaty:

Reaffirming that, i~ accorda."lce '-lith the Charter of the United Nations, they uphold the principle of equal rights and self-determinatio...~ of peoples, and declaring that they will earnestly strive by every peacef'ul means to pl'Ol!lote self-goverm:lent and. to secure the independence o:f all countries whose peoples desire it and . are ahle to undertake its responsibilities, Desiring to strengthen the 'fabric of peace and freedom and to uphold the princip~es o:f democracy ~ individual liberty. and the rule of' law ~ and to promote the economic well-being and development of ail. peoples in the . !rreaty . .A:rea~

'* Effective 24 August 1949 A-37路

Intending to declare publicly and torma.l.ly their sense of unity 2 so that any potential aggressor will appreciate that the Parties. shrJ: together in the area, and, Desiring further to co-ordinate th~lr efforts for collective defense for the preservation of peace ana security, Therefore agree as follows: A.~ICIE

The Parties undertake, as set :forth in the Charter of the United N~tions, to settle eny international dispute in v:hich thEY may be involved by peaceful means in such a manner that internetiqn~ peace and security and justice are not endangered, and to refrain in their international rela. tions from the threat or use of force in any manr.er inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations.

ARTICLE I The Parties undertake, as set l"orth in the Charter of the United ~:r~t:i.;)!lS, to settle a:rry international disp'l.1t.e in which they may be involved. t".,J peaceful means in such a mar~er that internatioDrtl pea=e nn~ ~.... c~~'"'~ hr justice are not enda.l')g€:red, and tu refrain in their interl1ationi:'l ~,(::;" tions from the threat. or use or fort:>.: in any manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations.

ARTICLE 2

ARTICLE I I I

The Parties will contribute toward the further develo:pment of peaceful. and . friendly international relations by strengthening their free institutions, by bringing ?-bout a better understanding of the principles upon which these institutions are foUtlded, and bypramoting conditions of stability and well-being. They will seek to eliminate conflict in· their. international economic policies and will encourage economic collaboration. between any or all of them.

The Parties undertake to strenet.l:'·/i their free institutions and to cooperate l-:ith one anothE'r jn t!,.: further development of economic measures, inclu~ing technical assistance, designed both to promote economic progress and social we])being and to further the indivirlll:.~ and collective efforts of goVel.T.nL'~~~; toward these ends.

•

fjhe BEMO Treaty places more stress on 'technical assistarl.ce and social well-being; reversal of" the order of the second and third articles places emphasis on collective defensed .

A-38

ARTIClE 3

ARTICLE

In order .more effectively to .achieve . . the objectives of this ~~eaty, the ·Parties., separately and jOintly, by means of continuous 'and effective self-help and mu~ual aid, will maintain and develop their individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack.

In order mOre effectively to acbieve the objectives of this fieat" the Parties, separately and· jointly, by means of' continuous and ef'f'ective self-help and mutual aid will maintain and devel.op their individual. and collective capacity and to resist amed attack and to'Drevent :.nd counter sUbversive activities directed from l-n.thout against their territorial integrity and political. stability.

jjhe SEATO Treaty adds subversion as a cont1ngencYd . ARTICLE 4

.ARTICLE IV 2. If, in the opinion of any of the Parties, the inviolability or the integrity of the territory or the sovereignty orpol.itical independence of any Party in the Treaty Area or of any other state orterrito:ry to which the provisions o~ paragra~ 1 of this Article fr~ time to time apply is threatened in any way othel." than by ar.med attack or is atrected or threatened by any fact or situation which might e.l1danger the peace of the area, the Parties shall. consult iJnmediatel3' in order to agree on the measures lihieh· should be taken for the cammon defense.

The Parties "dll' consult together . whenever, in ·the opinion of any of theI!l., the territorial. integrity, political independence or security ot 81r9 of the Parties is threatened.

•

fjhe SEATO Treaty ~ands upon the

word ttthreaten~d.5

ARTICLE

The Parties agree that an armed· attack against one ·or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attaCk against them all) and consequently they agree that, if 'such an armed' attack· Occurs, each

A-39

1.. Each Party recognizes that qgression by means of armed attack in the ~eaty Area against any of the Parties or against any state or territory which the Partiesby' unanimoUs agreement mq hereafter designate, would

at thE:I!l, in exercise ot the right of

endanger its own peace and safety, and agrees that it "-'ill in that event act to meet the COlnr-on danger in accordance with its constitutional urocesses. }'1easures taken under this paragraph shall be immediately reported to the Security Council of the United Nations.

indj.vidual or collective' selt-detense recognized by Article 51 ot the Charter of the United Iiations, will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking fortln路lith, irdividua.J.4r and in concert with the .other Parties! such action as it deems necessary! includ. ing the use of' arned torce, to restore and ~aintain the securit,r of the North Atlantic area.

jjhe SEATo Treaty specifically covers non-members -- "any state" -- this is not specific in the NATO heaty';;

/:A:re.ed torce" is not specifically l!1entioned in the SEATOTreat,y~ such路ar.med attack and all measures taken as a result thereof shall immediately be reported to the Security Council. S~ch neasures shall be terminated ,路;hen the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to restore and aaintain international . peace and security e' Any

[ihis requirement is not in the SEATO Treaty';;

3. It is understood that no action on the territory of 8..."'y state designated by unanimous agreement under paragraph 1 of this Article or on any territory so designated shall be taken exce'Dt at the invitation or with the C=Onsent of the goverr~ent concerned. jjhis understanding is not specific in the NATO Treaty;] ARTICLE 6*

ARTICLE VIn

For. the purpose of Article 5; an armed' attack on one or more 'ot the Parties .is deemed to include an armed attack:

As used. in this Treaty, the "Treaty Area" is the general area of Soutb- . East Asia, including also the entire

* As

amended by Article 2 of the Protocol to the North Atlantic Treaty on.. the accession ot Greece and Turkey. A....O

on the territory of any of the Parties in Europe or North .America~ on the Algerian Departments of France**' on the territoZ7 of Turkey or on the "islands under the jurisdiction of any of the Parties in thp. North Atlantic ar~a north of the Tropic ot Cancer; on the forc':!s, vessels, or aircraft ot any of the Parties, when in or over these territories or any other area in Europe in which occupation forces of ali',{ .of the Parties \-lere stationed on the date ,~hen the Treaty entered into force or the Mediterranean Sea or the North Atlantic area north of the Tropic of Cancer â&#x20AC;˘

territories of the Asian Parties~ and the general area of the SouthWest Pacific not including the Pacific area north of 21 degrees 30 minutes north latitude. the Parties may, by unanimous a.greem.ent~ amend this Article to include within the Treaty Area the' territory of any State acceding to this Treaty in accordance .,."1.th Article VII or otherwise to change the Treaty Area. !ihis emphasis Âˇon flexibility. of application is not in the NMO Treaty,;]

. ARTICLE 7

ARTICLE VI

This Treaty does not affect~ and shall not be inte:rpreted as .affecting, in e...r;y 'f;1~:Y the rights and obligations under the Charter of the Parties . which are members of the United l~etions ~ or .the primary responsibility of the Security Council for the maintenance of international peace and security.

This Treaty does not affect and. sha11 not be interpreted as affecting in any way the rights and obligations 01' eny of the Parties under the Charter of the United l;ations or the respO!lsibility of the United Nations for the maintenance of international peace and security. Each Party declares that none of the international engagements nm-l 1.'1 force bet11een it and any other of the Parties or aDJ third party is in conflict ~~th the provisions of this Treaty, and undertakes Dot to enter into any international engagement in conflict with this Treaty.

ARTICLE 8 Each Party decl81'es that none of the international engagements nOlV' in force

** On 16th January,

1963, the French Representative made a statement to the North Atlantic Council on the effects ot the independence of Algeria on certain aspects ot the North Atlantic Treaty. The Council not~d that insofar as the former Algerian Departments ot France were concerned the relevant clauses of this Treaty had become ~appli.cable as from 3rd July, 1962.

between it and 8Iiy other of the Parties or any third state is in conf1ict with the provisions of this Treaty, 8-'ld undertakes not to enter into any international engageI:l.ent in conflict with this Treaty.

ARTICLE 9

ARTICLE V

The Perties hereby establish a council, on 'Which each of them shal1 be represented to consider matters concerning the ~plenentation of this Treaty. . The Council shall be so organized as to be able to meet proItptly at any time. The Council shall set up such subsidiary bodies as may be necessaT.f; in particu1ar it shall establish icmediately a defense car.mittee ,路,hich shall recommend rueasures for the implementation of Articles 3 e.."ld 5.

The Parties hereby establish a Council, on which each of them shall be represented, to consider matters con- , cerning the implementation of this Treaty. The Council shall provide for consultation with regard to ndlitary and any other planning as the situation obtaining in the Treaty Area may frol:l time to time require. The Council shall be so organized as to be able to meet at any tme.

ARTICLE 10

The Parties nay, by unanimous agreement , invite any other European State in a position to ~~ther the principles of this Treaty and to contribute to the security of the North Atlantic area to accede to this Treaty. }.ny State so invited may become a party to the Treaty by depositing its instrument of accession \dtb the Government of the United States of America. The , Governmellt of the United States of America will inform each of the Parties of the deposit of each such instrument of accession. ARTICLE 11

This Treaty shall be ratified and its provisions carried out by the Parties in accordance with their respective constitutional processes. The instruments of ratification. shall be deposited

[See

also NATO

1f12.J

ARTICLE VII

Any other State路 in a position to further the objectives of the Treaty and to contribute to the security of the area may, by unc:...YllmOUS agreec.ent of. the Parties, be invited to accede to this Treaty. Itny State so invited may become a Party to the Treaty by depositing its instrument of accession with the Government of the Republic of the Philippines. The Govcrrunent of the Republic of the Philippines shall inform each of the Parties of the deposit of each such instrument of accession. ARTICLE IX

2. The Treaty shall be ratified and its provisions carried out by the Parties in accordance with their respective constitutional processes. . The instruments of ratification shall

A-42

as soon as possib~e witb the Government of the United stat.es of America, wbicb will notify all the other signatories of each deposit.. 'rhe ~reaty sh~ enter into force between the states which have ratified it as soon as the rat.ifications of the majority of the signatories, inclllding the ratifications of Belgium, Canada, Fra"'.ce, Luxembourg, the Nether~ands, the United Kingdom and the United States, have been deposited and shall come into ef'fect 'd.th respect to other states on the date of' the deposit of their ratifications.

be deposited as soon as possible with the Government of t.he Republic of the Philippines, which shall notify all of the other signatories of such deposit.

3. The Treaty shall enter into force between the states which have ratified it as soon as the inst~ts of ratification of a majority of the Signatories shall have been deposited, and shal~ come. into effect with respect to each other state on the date of the deposit of its instrument of ratii"ication.

ARTICLE 12

After the ~reaty has been in f'orce for ten years, or at any time thereai'ter) the Parties shall, if any of th~ so requests) cons'ult together forOthe purpose of' revie,dng the Treaty, having regat'd for the factors then affecting peace and securit.y in the North Atlantic area, includ.ing the development of universal as '-lell as regional arran.gements under the Charter of' the United Rations for the Eaint.enance of international peace and . security â&#x20AC;˘

fjouched on in Article V of SEATO.J

.ARTICLE 13

ARTICLE X

Arter the ~reaty has been in force for tlrenty years, any Party may cease to be a party one year a:fter its notice' of denunciation has been to the Government of the United states of America, which ,"~ll inform the Governments of the other Parties of the deposit of each notice of denunciation.

This Treaty shall remain in force indefinitely, but a:ny Part:#, m8ÂĽ cease to be a Party one year after its notice of denunciation has been given to the Gover.DDeJlt of the Republic of the Philippines, which sha.ll. inform the Governments of the other Parties of the deposit of' each I10tice of denunciation.

given 0

.A-43

"ARTICLE

fhis Treaty, of which the English and French texts are equally authentic , shall be deposited in the archives of the Government of the United states of America. Duly certified copies will be transmitted by that Government to the Governments o~Âˇ the other signatories.

ARTICLE XI

fhe English text of this Treaty is binding on the Parties, but when the Parties have agreed to the French text the~eof and have so notified the Government of the Republic of the Philippines) the French text shall be equa.l.ly authentic and binding on the Parties. FROM ARTICLE IX

1. This Trea.ty shall be deposited . in the archives of the Government of the Republic of the Philippines. Duly certified copies thereof shall be transmitted by that Government to the other signatories. UNDERSTAl'IDmG OF

mE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA The United States of America in executing the present Treaty does so with the understanding ttat its recognition of the effect of aggression and armed attack and its a.greement with reference thereto in Article IV, paragraph 1, apply only to Communist aggression but affirms that in the event of other aggression or armed attack it will consult under the prcrl'isions of Article IV) paragraph 2â&#x20AC;˘ . In witness whereof the undersigned Plenipotentiaries have signed this Treaty.

Done at Manila, this eighth day of September, 1954.

PROTOCOL

[On 23 October 1954 a NATO Protocol permitted accession of the Federal Republic of Germany;!

Designation of States and territory as to which provisions of Article IV and Article III are to be applicable: ~he

Parties to the South-East Asia Collective Defense Treaty unanimously designate for the purposes of Article IV of the Treaty the States of Ca"llbodia B-'ld Laos and the free territory under the jurisdiction of the State 0"ÂŁ Vietnam. ~he

Parties further agree that the above mentioned States and territory shall be eligible in respect of the economic measures contemplated by Article III. This Protocol shall enter into force simultaneously with the coming into force of the Treaty. In witness "hereof, the undersigned Plenipotentiaries have signed this Protocol to the south-East Asia Collective Defense Treaty. Done a.t Manila, this eighth day of September, 1954.

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A-50

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A-51

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